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yo hi hetuḥ sugatasarvajñatāsādhanāyopādīyate sugatasutaiḥ | The reasoning which is employed by the followers of the Buddha for proving Buddha's omniscience... |
yathā sākṣād viditasakalārthatattvaḥ sugataḥ, aśrutānanumitāviparītārthopadeṣṭṛtvāt, yathā pratyakṣāgatasalilādis tadupadeṣṭeti | [Namely that] the Buddha directly knew the true nature of all things, because he taught things [that were] unheard of, not inferred, and not contrary [to reality], just as one who has directly perceived water [can] teach about it. |
ayam eva digambarāṇāṃ jinasarvajñatāsādhanāya heturupatiṣṭhate | This very same reasoning applies to the Digambaras' proof of Jina's omniscience. |
tataś ca tadavastha eva saṃdehaḥ | Therefore the doubt remains in exactly the same state. |
tathā jinasarvajñatāsādhanāya digambaraiḥ sādhane kṛte yāni dūṣaṇāni śākyair upādīyante tadupadiṣṭānāṃ syād vādādīnām ayogānnāsau sarvajña iti | Similarly, when the Digambaras present their proof for Jina's omniscience, the Buddhists raise objections [saying] "he cannot be omniscient because his teachings about syādvāda and other [doctrines] are impossible." |
tāni śākyaiḥ sugatasarvajñasādhane kṛte jainā abhyupādadate nāsau sarvajñas tadudiṣṭānāṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgādīnām ayogād iti | When the Buddhists present [their] proof of Buddha's omniscience, the Jainas employ these same [objections, saying] "he cannot be omniscient because his teachings about momentariness and other [doctrines] are impossible." |
tataśca yathā bimbasannidhānāntaraṃ pratibimbodaya evam eṣāṃ sādhanadūṣaṇānantaraṃ parasparapratyanīkabhūtāni sādhanadūṣaṇānyupatiṣṭhanta iti | And thus, just as after the presence of an object [comes] the arising of [its] reflection, so after their proofs and refutations arise mutually opposed proofs and refutations. |
tat katham ebhiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇair anavasthitaiḥ pratibimbodayenaiva grastair nirṇayaḥ kriyate kasyacit sarvajñatvena | Therefore how can any determination be made about anyone's omniscience through these uncertain proofs and refutations which are consumed by the very arising of [their] reflections? |
evaṃ sarvajñakalpeṣu nihateṣu parasparam / alpaśeṣīkṛtān sarvān vedavādī haniṣyati // | "In this way, [after] the pseudo-omniscient persons have been beaten off by each other, the upholder of the Veda shall defeat all [of them who have been] reduced to a few." |
yathā nakuladantāgraspṛṣṭā yā kācid auṣadhiḥ / sarvaṃ sarpaviṣaṃ hanti krīḍadbhir api yojitā // | "Just as any herb that has been touched by the tip of a mongoose's teeth removes all snake poison, even when applied playfully," |
vedavādimukhasthaivaṃ yuktilaukikavaidikī / yā kācid api śākyādisarpajñānaviṣāpahā // | "similarly, any secular or Vedic argument situated in the mouth of a Vedic scholar removes the poison of the snake-like knowledge of the Śākyas [Buddhists] and others." |
yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇaḥ / nihantuṃ hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati // | "Who indeed would postulate [as omniscient] one whose [alleged omniscience] can be defeated by reasons characterized by knowability, measurability, substantiality and so forth?" |
ekenaiva pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate / nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate // | "[That person] by whom an omniscient one is postulated through a single means of valid cognition must surely think that [such a being] perceives all tastes and other [objects] through the eye." |
yasya hi jñeyatvādayaḥ sapakṣavipakṣasādhāraṇatvenāpratītāḥ santo bādhakā bhavanti, so 'tyantāsambhavīti na prekṣāvatābhyupeyaḥ / | "Since reasons like 'knowability' and others, being unestablished as common to both similar and dissimilar instances, serve as refuting factors, such [an omniscient one] is utterly impossible and cannot be accepted by rational people." |
nacāpyete 'naikāntikā bhavanti / | "Nor are these [reasons] inconclusive." |
tathā hi sarvapadārthajñānāt sarvajña iṣyate, tac ca sakalavastuparijñānaṃ kadācid indriyajñānena vā bhavet, manojñānena vā / | "For [someone] is considered omniscient due to knowledge of all entities, and this complete knowledge of all things would have to be either through sense perception or through mental perception." |
na tāvad indriyajñānena, tasya pratiniyatārthaviṣayatvād ayuktamaśeṣārthaviṣayatvam / | "[It cannot occur] firstly through sense perception, because due to its being restricted to specific objects, its having all things as objects is impossible." |
tathā hi cakṣurādijñānāni pratiniyataviṣayagrahaṇasvābhāvānyeva svakāraṇair indriyair niyāmakair janitāni, tataścānatikrāntasvaviṣayamaryādāni loke 'tipratītānīti na yuktam etair aśeṣārthagrahaṇam / | "For perceptions through the eyes and other [senses] have the inherent nature of grasping only restricted objects, being produced by their respective causes, the limiting sense organs, and therefore, since they are well-known in the world as not transgressing the boundaries of their objects, the grasping of all things through these [senses] is impossible." |
anyathā hyanekendriyavaiyarthyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | Otherwise [if one sense could apprehend everything] there would result the uselessness of multiple sense organs. |
tataścaikenaiva jñānena sarvadharmān bhinnendriyagrāhyānapi rasarūpādīn jānātītyevaṃ yena bauddhena kalpyate, ekena sarvaṃ jānāti sarvamekena paśyatīti vacanānnūnaṃ sa vādī bauddhaścakṣuṣā karaṇabhūtena taddūrapravṛttena jñānena sarvadharmān rasādīnavagacchatīti prāptam / | Consequently, the Buddhist who assumes that through a single cognition one can know all properties including taste, form etc. that are [normally] grasped by different sense organs - as evident from his statement "Through one [faculty] he knows all, through one he sees everything" - would have to accept that through visual cognition functioning as an instrument at a distance, one apprehends all properties including taste etc. |
na caitacchakyate vaktum / | And this cannot be asserted. |
mābhūd ekena jñānena yugapad aśeṣādarthasya grahaṇam, anekena bhaviṣyatīti / | Let it not be [argued] that "Though there may not be simultaneous apprehension of all objects through a single cognition, it will happen through multiple [cognitions]." |
yato yugapad anekavijñānāsambhavāt / | Because multiple cognitions cannot exist simultaneously. |
sambhave 'pi na sarvapadārthagrahaṇam asti, paracittasyendriyajñānāviṣayatvāt, agocaraprāptasya ca dūrasūkṣmavyavahitāder arthasya tena grahītum aśakyatvāt // | Even if [multiple simultaneous cognitions] were possible, there could not be apprehension of all things, because another's mind is not an object of sense cognition, and because objects beyond reach - such as those that are remote, subtle, or hidden - cannot be grasped by it. |
syād etat yadi nāma cakṣurādijñānāṃ vijātīyārthagrahaṇam idānīṃ na dṛśyate tathāpi kālāntare kadācid vijātīyārthagrahaṇamabhūt kasyacid iti sambhāvyata ity āha yajjātīyair ityādi / | One might object: "Even if apprehension of heterogeneous objects through visual etc. cognitions is not observed now, it is possible that at some other time someone had [such] apprehension of heterogeneous objects" - [to this] he says [the verse beginning with] "yajjātīyaiḥ." |
hetupratibaddho hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiniyamo nākasmikaḥ, anyathā sarvasya sarvasvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ, tataś ca tathāvidhahetupratibaddhātmalābhasya katham anyathātvaṃ kadācid api sambhāvyam, nahi dhūmaketupratibaddhātmasaṃsthiteranyato dhūmasyodbhavaḥ sambhāvyata iti bhāvaḥ / | For the fixed nature of things is bound to [specific] causes, not random - otherwise everything would have every nature. And thus, how could that which has its nature bound to such causes ever possibly be otherwise? For instance, smoke, which has its existence bound to fire as its cause, cannot possibly arise from anything else. |
nāpi manojñāneneti pakṣaḥ / | Nor [can we accept] the position that [it occurs] through mental cognition. |
tathā hi yadyapi tat sarvārthaviṣayam, tathāpi na tasya svātantryeṇārthagrahaṇavyāpāro 'sti, abdhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / | For although that [mental cognition] has all things as its objects, nevertheless it has no independent operation in grasping objects, because [if it did] there would result the non-existence of blind, deaf and [similar persons]. |
pāratantrye cendriyajñānaparigṛhītārthaviṣayatvād dūrasūkṣmavyavahitaparacittāder arthasyendriyajñānaṃ{nā} viṣayīkṛtasya tena paricchedo na prāpnoti // | In [the case of] dependence, since [mental perception] has as its objects only those things that have been apprehended by sense-perception, there can be no apprehension through it [i.e., mental perception] of objects such as those that are remote, subtle, hidden, or [like] another's thoughts, etc., which have not been made objects of sense-perception. |
ye 'pi sātiśayā dṛṣṭāḥ prajñāmedhābalair narāḥ / stokastokāntaratvena natvatīndriyadarśanāt // | Those persons who have been observed to be superior [to others] are so only due to [their] intelligence, memory and strength, [which differ] by small degrees, not due to [their ability for] super-sensuous perception. |
prājño 'pi hi naraḥ sūkṣmānarthān draṣṭuṃ kṣamo 'pi san / svajātīran atikrānnatiśete parānnarān // | Even an intelligent man, though capable of perceiving subtle things, excels other men [only] without transcending the limitations of his own species. |
nahi kasyacid abhyāse 'pyatīndriyārthadarśitvam upalabdham / | Indeed, no one has been found to possess the ability to perceive super-sensuous objects, even through practice. |
tathā hi naro 'tiprājño 'pi nipuṇabuddhigamyatayā sūkṣmānarthānupalabddhuṃ samartho 'pi svajātiḥ manuṣyajātibhāvinīḥ prakṛtīradivyacakṣuṣṭvādilakṣaṇā anativartamāna etābhyāṃ narānaratiśayāno dṛśyate natu divyacakṣuṣṭvādinā yuktaḥ kaścid dṛśyate iti yāvat / | Thus indeed, even a highly intelligent man, though capable of apprehending subtle things through keen intellect, is seen to excel other men [only] while not transcending the natural limitations of his human species characterized by the lack of divine vision etc., and no one is ever seen to be endowed with divine vision and such [powers]. |
śrotragamyeṣu śabdeṣu dūrasūkṣmopalabdhibhiḥ / puruṣātiśayo dṛṣṭo na rūpādyupalambhanāt // | Among sounds that are perceptible to the ear, human superiority is observed in the apprehension of distant and subtle [sounds], not in the apprehension of color and other [non-auditory objects]. |
cakṣuṣāpi ca dūrasthasūkṣmarūpaprakāśanam / kriyate 'tiśayaprāptyā natu śabdādidarśanam // | And with the eye too, through attainment of excellence, the perception of remote and subtle forms is achieved, not the perception of sound and other [non-visual objects]. |
dūrasūkṣmeṣūpalabdhayo jñānāni, tābhir itītthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā, kvacid dūrasūkṣmopalabdhita iti yāvat, tato hetau pañcamī vidhāyādyāditvāt tasir vidheyaḥ / | The cognitions [are] apprehensions of distant and subtle [objects]; the instrumental case ending here indicates qualification; in some places [the reading is] "dūrasūkṣmopalabdhitaḥ," meaning the ablative case indicating cause; the suffix "tasi" should be prescribed according to the rule concerning "vidhāyādi." |
natu śabdādidarśanam cakṣuṣā kriyata iti sambandhaḥ // | The perception of sound etc. is not accomplished by the eyes—this is the connection [of ideas]. |
evaṃ śāstravicāreṣu dṛśyate 'tiśayo mahān / | Similarly, great superiority is observed in [matters of] doctrinal discussions. |
natu śāstrāntarajñānaṃ ta{smā}nmātreṇaiva labhyate // | Knowledge of other śāstras cannot be acquired by that [knowledge] alone. |
jñātvā vyākāraṇaṃ dūraṃ buddhiḥ śabdāpaśabdayoḥ / | Having learned grammar, [one's] intelligence extends far in [distinguishing] correct and incorrect words; |
prakṛṣyate na nakṣatratithigrahaṇanirṇaye // | [but] it does not extend to determining [matters of] stars, dates, and eclipses. |
jyotir vicca prakṛṣṭo 'pi candrārkagrahaṇādikam {vit---} / na bhavatyādiśabdānāṃ sādhutvaṃ jñātumarhati // | And even an expert in astronomy, though superior in [knowledge of] moon, sun, eclipses and such things, is not capable of determining the correctness of words like "bhavati" and others. |
tathā vedetihāsādijñānātiśayavān api / na sargadevatāpūrvapratyakṣīkaraṇakṣamah // | Similarly, even one possessing superior knowledge of Veda, itihāsas and such texts is not capable of directly perceiving creation, deities, and apūrva. |
jyotir vettīti jyotirvit | [The word] "jyotirvit" [means] "one who knows astronomy." |
vedetihāsādiṣu jñānāni teṣām atiśayaḥ sa vidyate yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | [The compound] "vedetihāsādijñānātiśayavān" is analyzed as "one who possesses superiority in knowledge of Vedas, itihāsas, etc." |
apūrvaśabdena dharmādharmavucyete // | By the word "apūrva," dharma and adharma are meant. |
daśahastāntaraṃ vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati / na yojanamasau gantuṃ śakto 'bhyāsaśatair api // | One who can indeed jump into the sky [to a height of] ten hastas cannot jump [the distance of] a yojana even with hundreds of practices. |
tathā hi yadi nāma kecid upacitaśleṣmavapuṣo hastamātravyomotplavanāsamarthāḥ paścādabhyāsakrameṇa samāsāditagātralāghavaṃ daśahastāntaragaganavilaṅghino jātāḥ, tathāpi na te yojanam ekam api khagapathamutpatituṃ samarthāḥ prayatnaśatenāpi bhavanti // | Thus indeed, even if some people with phlegmatic bodies, [initially] capable of jumping one hasta into the sky, later through gradual practice attain lightness of body and become capable of leaping ten hastas into the sky, even then they cannot, with hundreds of attempts, fly upward [even] one yojana in the path of birds. |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati | [This] is concluded by [the words] beginning with "tasmāt." |
tasmād atiśayajñānair atidūragatair api / kiñcid evādhikaṃ jñātuṃ śakyate na tvatīndriyam // | Therefore, even with superior knowledge [proceeding] very far, only something slightly more can be known, but never that which is beyond the senses. |
atiśayena prakarṣeṇa jñānāni atiśayajñānāni / | [The compound] "atiśayajñānāni" [means] knowledge characterized by superior excellence. |
tṛtīyepi{ti---} yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ / tair iti karaṇatṛīyā // | The compound is formed according to the rule of "tṛtīyā"; the [word] "taiḥ" has instrumental case expressing instrumentality. |
etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha eketyādi / | Explaining this very [point], he speaks beginning with "eka" [in the next verse]. |
ekāpavarakasthasya pratyakṣaṃ yat pravartate / śaktis tatraiva tasya syānnaivāpavarakāntare // | Whatever direct perception occurs for one who is situated in one room, its power extends only there, never to another room. |
ye cārthā dūravicchinnā deśaparvatasāgaraiḥ / varṣadvīpāntarair ye vā kastān paśyedihaiva san // | And what objects are separated by distant lands, mountains, and oceans, or by continents and islands - who could see those while remaining here [in one place]? |
varṣam lokaviśeṣaḥ / | "Varṣa" [means] a particular region of the world. |
yathā bhārataloko bhāratavarṣamity ucyate // | Just as the world of Bhārata is called "Bhāratavarṣa." |
nalartuparṇayoścāsāvaśvākṣahṛdayajñayoḥ / saṃvāhe gacchatorvākyamṛtuparṇena bhāṣitam // | This was the statement spoken by Ṛtuparṇa when he and Nala, [who were] knowers of horses and dice respectively, were traveling together in a chariot. |
sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na jānāti sarvajño nopapadyate / naikatra pariniṣṭhāsti jñānasya puruṣe kvacit // | No one knows everything; an omniscient being is impossible; knowledge does not reach its final completion in any single person. |
saṃvāha iti / rathe / | [The word] 'saṃvāha' [means] chariot. |
tathā hi kila śrūyate nalo nāma rājā babhūva / | Thus indeed it is heard [that] there was a king named Nala. |
sa kilākṣahṛdayānabhijñatayā sakalam eva rājyaṃ dyūtena hārayāmāsa / | He, due to [his] lack of expertise in the essence of dice, lost [his] entire kingdom through gambling. |
tasya ca rājñī damayantī nāma babhūva / | And his queen was named Damayantī. |
tatrāgatasyāpi tatra daivavaśāt tayā rājñā saha viyogo 'bhūt / | Having arrived there, through the power of fate, [he] became separated from that queen. |
so 'tīva samupajātapriyāvirahaśokāścudurdinavadanaścintājaladhimavagāhamāno 'tiśayasañjātaśarīrakraśmimāparibhramannitas tataḥ katham api saṅkṣepād ṛtuparṇasya rājño 'nujīvṛttimāsthāyāviditasthito 'bhūt / | He, extremely afflicted by grief from separation from [his] beloved, with [his] face clouded by tears, immersing [himself] in an ocean of anxiety, having become exceedingly emaciated in body, wandering here and there, somehow in brief took up service under King Ṛtuparṇa and remained [there] unrecognized. |
sāca tasya rājñī kathaṃ katham api pitṛgṛhamanuprāptā babhūva / | And that queen of his somehow reached [her] father's house. |
śrutam ṛtuparṇena rājñā yathā kila damayantīsvayaṃvareti, sa śrutvā nalena sārathinā tatra gantumabhipratasthe / | King Ṛtuparṇa heard that there was to be Damayantī's self-choice [ceremony], [and] having heard this, he set out to go there with Nala as [his] charioteer. |
ṛtuparṇaścākṣahṛdayajño nāśvahṛdayavedī / | And Ṛtuparṇa was knowledgeable in the essence of dice but not knowledgeable in the essence of horses. |
nalastvaśvahṛdayajño nākṣahṛdayābhijñaḥ / | But Nala was knowledgeable in the essence of horses [but] not expert in the essence of dice. |
sa jñātvā tenābhyadhāyi, bhoḥ kathaya me 'śvahṛdayam iti | Having come to know this, [Nala] said to him: "O [sir], teach me the science of horses." |
nalo 'pyabhihitatvān kathayāmi yadi mama tvamapyakṣahṛdayaṃ kathayasīti | Nala replied: "I shall teach [it] to you if you will teach me the science of dice." |
tata idam ṛtuparṇena kīritam sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na jānātītyādi | Thereupon Ṛtuparṇa said this: "No one knows everything," and so forth. |
tato nalena rājñākṣahṛdayam ṛtuparṇato viditvā punar api tadrājyaṃ jitvā pratyānītam iti vārtā | Then Nala, having learned the science of dice from Ṛtuparṇa, won back his kingdom. Thus [ends] the story. |
kiṃ ca sarvajñena satāvaśyamatītānāgataṃ vastu jñātavyam anyathā hi pratyutpannamātraparijñāne pradeśajñaḥ syān na sarvajñaḥ, na cānāgatādiparijñānaṃ sambhavatīti darśayann āha anāgata ityādi | Moreover, an omniscient being must necessarily know past and future things, for otherwise, if [one] knew only present things, [one] would be a partial knower, not omniscient; and knowledge of future things and so forth is not possible. |
pratyakṣasya vastusāmarthyabalenotpatter anāgatasya cāvastutvān na tatra pratyakṣavyāpāraḥ | Since perception arises through the force of an object's capacity, and since what is future is not [yet] an entity, perception cannot operate there. |
nāpyanumānasya, liṅgābhāvāt | Nor [can there be operation] of inference, due to absence of a sign. |
nahyanāgatavastusambaddhaṃ kvacid viditaṃ liṅgam asti anāgatasyābhāvāt | For there exists no known sign connected with a future thing, because the future is non-existent. |
ādiśabdena dṛṣṭāntaparigrahaḥ | By the word "ādi" [in "anumānādi"], the inclusion of examples is meant. |
anāgatagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam atītasyāpi grahaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam | The mention of the future is merely illustrative; it should be understood as applying to the past as well. |
yatas tatrāpyavastutayā na pratyakṣavyāpāro 'sti | Because there too, due to [its] non-entity status, there can be no operation of perception. |
tasmāt siddhā prameyatvāder hetugaṇasya vyāptiḥ / | Therefore, the pervasion [vyāpti] of the group of reasons beginning with "being knowable" [prameyatva] is established. |
ata eva pūrvoktasyābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvād ityetasya hetor vyāptir uktā bhavati // | From this very [fact], the pervasion of the previously mentioned reason "being the object of the means of cognition of non-existence" becomes established. |
tasmād atīndriyārthānāṃ sākṣād draṣṭā na vidyate / | Therefore, there exists no direct perceiver of objects beyond the senses. |
vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati // | Only he who sees [things] through the eternal word [truly] sees [them]. |
syād etat na nityenaiva vacanena sarvaḥ paśyati / | This might be [objected]: "Not everyone sees [things] through the eternal word alone." |
tathā hi kanakakāśyapamuniprabhṛtipraṇītād vākyācchākyamuniḥ paśyati, tato 'pyanya, iti / | For instance, Śākyamuni [Buddha] sees [things] from the words composed by [sages] like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and others, and others [see things] from his [words]. |
atrāha etadityādi / | To this [objection], [the author] speaks thus: |
etat anantaroktam vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyatīti, asahamāno ya evaṃ manyate bauddhādir na nityena vānena sarvaṃ paśyati, kintu puruṣāntarakṛtena, tadyathā kanakakāśyapādipraṇītenāgamena śākyamunir iti, tasyaivaṃvādinast advākyasyāpramāṇatā vaktavyā tasya puruṣāntarasya vākyaṃ tadvākyam, tenaiva dṛṣṭābhimatapuruṣavākyena tulyatvāt kāraṇāt / | [One] who does not accept this immediately preceding [statement] that "only he who sees through the eternal word sees," and who thinks thus: "The Buddhist and others do not see everything through the eternal word, but through [words] made by other persons - for example, Śākyamuni [sees] through scriptures composed by Kanaka, Kāśyapa and others" - such a speaker must [then] admit the non-authority of those words, [namely] the words of those other persons, because they are equivalent to the words of a person who is [merely] seen and considered [to be omniscient]. |
puruṣasya cāgamakarturapramāṇatā vaktavyeti sambandhaḥ / kathaṃ ---, pūrvokair jñeyaprameyatvādibhir hetubhiḥ // | And the non-authority of the person who composed the scripture must be admitted. Why? Because of the previously stated reasons beginning with "being knowable." |
nanu cānādir buddhaparamparā tat praṇīto 'pi siddhānto 'nādir eva / | [Objection:] "But the succession of Buddhas is beginningless; therefore the doctrine propounded by them is also beginningless." |
tataś ca vedābhiyuktaparamparāvad vedavaccānayor apyanāditvād adoṣatvam evetyatrāha kartṛkṛtrimavākyānām ityādi / | Since both [the Buddhist texts and tradition] are beginningless like the Veda and the tradition of Vedic scholars, they must be free from defects - to this [objection, the Mīmāṃsaka] responds with [the verse] beginning "kartṛkṛtrimavākyānām." |
kartṛkṛtrimavākyānama ucyate yā tvanāditā / | [Regarding] the beginninglessness that is claimed for authored texts... |
apaśyataḥ svayaṃ dharmaṃ tathā śauddhodaner api // | [This applies to] him who did not himself see dharma, namely the son of Śuddhodana [i.e., the Buddha]. |
yathā śauddhādanes tadvākyasya cāprāmāṇyaṃ tathānyeṣāṃ kanakakāśyapādīnāṃ tadvacasāṃ ceti // | Just as [there is] invalidity in [the case of] the son of Śuddhodana and his words, so too [there is invalidity] for others like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and their words. |
aprāmāṇyapadasthatvān na tasmād atiricyate // | Because [they] rest on invalid foundations, [their authority] does not exceed that [invalidity]. |
tataścedṛśāṃ pudgalānāṃ tadvākyānāṃ cānāditā kalpitāpi satī na tasmād aprāmāṇyād atiricyate dūrībhavati / | Therefore, even if the beginninglessness of such persons and their words is assumed, it does not transcend or move away from that invalidity. |
aprāmāṇyapada eva sthitatvāt // | Because [they] remain precisely in [that] state of invalidity. |
ato 'nāditvasāmānyaṃ buddhānām abhidhīyate / mīmāṃsakāyamānais tair yadvedādhyāyinām iva // | Thus, while these [Buddhists] who pose as Mīmāṃsakas claim a common beginninglessness [between Buddhists] and students of the Veda... |
tadajñānaviśeṣatvān na teṣāṃ yāti tulyatām / | Due to the specific nature of their ignorance, [the Buddhist texts] do not achieve equality with them [i.e., the Vedas]. |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve syātām evaṃ hyanādinī // | Thus validity and invalidity would both be beginningless. |
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