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ataḥ svataḥprāmāṇyamity ucyate / guṇais tu doṣanirākaraṇam eva kriyata ityatas tannirghātāya prāmāṇyaṃ guṇānapekṣate nātmapratilambhāyeti / | Therefore it is said that [cognition] is self-valid. The excellences only serve to remove defects; hence validity requires excellences for removing those [defects], not for establishing its own nature. |
tadetad asamyak / | This [view] is incorrect. |
yato na bodhātmakatvam eva prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam / | Because it is not correct [to say] that validity consists merely in having the nature of consciousness, |
viparyayajñāne 'pi sambhavāt / | because [then validity] would exist even in erroneous cognitions. |
bodhaviśeṣaḥ prāmāṭam iti cet, na tarhi vaktavyam tac ca jñānāṃ svābhāvikam eva na guṇakṛtam, guṇābhāve 'pi viparyayajñāne sadbhāvād iti / | If [you say] that validity is a particular kind of cognition, then it should not be claimed that "validity is natural to cognitions and not produced by excellences, because it exists even in erroneous cognitions in the absence of excellences." |
tathā hi yadi bodhaviśeṣaḥ prāmāṇyamiṣṭaṃ syāt tadā tasyaiva guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāropadarśanaṃ yuktaṃ nānyasya / naca viparyayajñāne 'pi sadbhāvādityanena bodhaviśeṣasya guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāro darśitaḥ / kiṃ tarhi bodhasāmānyasya / | For if validity were accepted to be a particular kind of cognition, then showing the deviation would only be justified regarding its being produced by excellences, not regarding anything else. And by saying "it exists even in erroneous cognitions," the deviation shown is not regarding the particular kind of cognition being produced by excellences, but rather regarding cognition in general. |
naca pareṇa bodhasāmānyaṃ guṇakṛtam iṣyate / | And the opponent does not maintain that cognition in general is produced by excellences. |
naca tasya guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāraḥ śakyate pratipādayitum / | And it is not possible to demonstrate deviation regarding its being produced by excellences. |
nacāpyasmābhir guṇakṛtatvena parataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭaṃ, yatas tanniṣedhena bhavadbhiḥ svato vyavasthāpyate / kiṃ tarhi anubhūto 'pyasau bodhaviśeṣaḥ kvacid bhrāntinimittasadbhāvādyathānubhavaṃ naniścayam utpādayatīti / | Nor do we maintain that extrinsic validity is due to being produced by excellences, by denying which you establish [validity as] intrinsic. Rather, [we maintain that] even though experienced, that particular cognition, due to the presence of causes of error, does not generate certainty in accordance with the experience. |
atas tanniścayotpatteḥ parata iti vyavasthāpyate / | Therefore it is established that [validity is] extrinsic due to the arising of that certainty. |
kiṃ cāprāmāṇye 'pi śakyam evaṃ kalpayitum / | Further, the same [reasoning] can also be applied to invalidity (aprāmāṇya); |
bodhātmakatvaṃ nāmāprāmāṇyam, tac ca jñānanāṃ svābhāvikaṃ na doṣakṛtam, doṣābhāve 'pi samyagjñāne sambhavād ityataḥ svato 'prāmāṇyamucyate, doṣais tu guṇanirākaraṇam eva kriyata ityatas tannirākaraṇāyāprāmāṇyaṃ doṣānapekṣate nātmapratilambhāyeti / | Invalidity consists in being of the nature of consciousness (bodhātmakatva), and this is natural to cognitions and not produced by defects, because it exists even in right cognition where there are no defects; therefore invalidity is said to be intrinsic (svataḥ), while defects only serve to negate the excellences; hence invalidity depends on defects for negating those [excellences], not for its own origination. |
tasmād yatkiñcid etat / | Therefore this [explanation previously given by others] is worthless. |
uveyakastvāha--- na bodhātmakatvaṃ nāma jñānānāṃ prāmāṇyam, kiṃ tarhi---, arthāvisaṃvāditvam / | Ubeyaka, however, says: "The validity of cognitions consists not in their being of the nature of consciousness, but rather in [their] non-deviation from objects (arthāvisaṃvāditva). |
tathā hi satyapi bodhātmakatve yatrārthāvisaṃvāditvaṃ nāsti tatrāprāmāṇyam, yathā śuktikāyāṃ rajatajñānasya / | For even when consciousness is present, where there is no non-deviation from objects, there is invalidity, as in the case of silver-cognition regarding a mother-of-pearl; |
vināpi bodhakatvaṃ yatrārthāvisaṃvāditvam asti tatra prāmāṇyaṃ yathāgnau dhūmasya, tasmād anvayavyatirekābhyām avisaṃvāditvam eva prāmāṇyaṃ siddham / | And even without consciousness, where there is non-deviation from objects, there is validity, as in [the case of inferring] smoke from fire; therefore through positive and negative concomitance, validity is established as consisting in non-deviation [from objects] alone. |
tac ca jñānam atmīyād eva hetor upajāyate / | And that cognition arises only from its own cause. |
svaśabdasyātmīyavacanatvāt / svataḥ ātmīyāddhetor ity arthaḥ / | Because the word 'sva' [means] 'belonging to oneself'; thus 'svataḥ' means 'from its own cause'. |
nahi svato 'satī śaktir ityādinā paścād arddhena sāmagryantarād bhāvaniṣedhe heturuktaḥ / | By [the statement] beginning with "a capacity not existing inherently" in the latter half [of the text], the reason is given for denying [its] production from other causal assemblages. |
nahi svato 'satī kartum anyena vijñānasāmagryantarātiriktena śakyata ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that what does not exist inherently cannot be produced by anything else [i.e.] by anything other than the causal assemblage of cognition. |
syād etat vijñānahetave 'pi pramāṇāpramānasādhāraṇāḥ tat kathaṃ vijñānahetumātrapratibaddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt | [One might object:] Since the causes of cognition are common to both valid and invalid cognitions, how could validity be dependent merely on [something's] being a cause of cognition? |
tasmāt sāmagryantarajanyam eva prāmāṇyaṃ natu jñānahetumātrajanyam | Therefore validity must arise from other causal factors, not merely from the cause of cognition alone. |
tac ca sāmagryantaraṃ guṇasahitam eva, indriyādiguṇāścāsya kāraṇam iti | And these other causal factors must be accompanied by excellences, such that the excellences of the sense organs and other [instruments] are [their] cause. |
śābde cāptapraṇītatvam eva kāraṇaguṇatvena vyavahārānniścitam | In the case of verbal cognition, being composed by a trustworthy person is established through practice as the excellence of the cause. |
vede ca ta{dasa}dbhāvād aprāmāṇyaṃ prasaktam iti | [Therefore] due to the absence of such [a trustworthy composer] in the Veda, invalidity would follow. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ | This is not a fault. |
sāmagryantarajanyatvāsiddhatvāt | Because it cannot be proved that [validity] is produced by other causal factors. |
nahi vidhimukhena guṇānāṃ prāmāṇyākhyakāryotpattau vyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavati | For it is not possible to recognize any positive operation of excellences in producing the effect called validity. |
indriyādisvarūpam eva hyanyanirapekṣamarthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam | For it is the nature of sense organs and other [instruments] alone, independent of anything else, that produces cognition conforming to reality. |
añjanādīnāṃ tu doṣāpagame vyāpāro na guṇādhāne | The function of eye-salves and such things is [only] in removing defects, not in producing excellences. |
athāpi syād indriyādisvarūpamaprāmāṇye 'pyastīti sarvatra prāmāṇyotpattiprasaṅgo 'vikalakāraṇatvāt | [One might object:] Since the nature of sense organs and other [instruments] exists even in invalid [cognition], validity would arise in all cases due to the cause being complete. |
naitad asti / doṣasamavadhāne tu sāmagryantarād vilakṣaṇakāryotpattir bhaviṣyati | This is not so, because when defects are present, different effects arise from other causal factors. |
syād etat viparyayaḥ kasmān na vijñāyate indriyādisvarūpam evānyanirapekṣaṃ vyabhicārijñānotpādakaṃ, guṇasamavadhāne tu sāmagryantaram arthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam iti | [One might ask:] Why not accept the opposite - that the nature of sense organs and other [instruments] alone, independently, produces erroneous cognition, while when excellences are present, other causal factors produce cognition conforming to reality? |
satyam evam etat, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tu vijñānotpādakam eva trairūpyamanumānādau prāmāṇyotpādakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti pratyakṣe 'pi ca sambhavāt tadevotpādakaṃ kalpyate | True, this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it is observed in inference that the three-fold characteristic which produces cognition also produces validity, and since this is possible in perception too, that same [cause] is assumed to be the producer [of validity]. |
arthāvisaṃvāditvam eva jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ taccātmīyād eva hetos tasyopajāyata | The validity of cognition consists in [its] being in conformity with the real state of things, and it arises from its own cause alone. |
viparyayajñānarūpaṃ tu kāryamindriyādisvarūpādanutpadyamānaṃ sāmagryantaraṃ kalpayatītyanavadyam iti | As for erroneous cognition, [being] an effect not produced from the nature of sense-organs etc., it requires the assumption of other causal conditions - [this explanation is] unobjectionable. |
tadetat sarvaṃ nānavadyam | All this is not free from objections. |
jñānasyaiva heyopādeyavastuni pravṛttau prādhānyāt | Because cognition alone has primacy in [causing] activity towards objects to be rejected or accepted. |
tathā hi satyapyavinābhāvini dhūmādau na tāvat puruṣasyārthe pravṛttir bhavati yāvad vijñānotpādo na bhavati | For even when smoke, which is invariably concomitant [with fire], is present, a person does not engage in activity towards the object until the cognition [of smoke] arises. |
tasmāt pravṛttau jñānasyāvyavahitaṃ kārakatvam iti tadeva pramāṇam | Therefore cognition is the immediate cause of activity, [and] hence that alone is the valid means of knowledge. |
pravṛttes tatpradhānatvāddheyopādeyavastuni | [It is valid] because it is primary in [causing] activity towards objects to be rejected or accepted. |
śaktiś ca padārthānām ātmabhūtaiveti kas tasyā arthāntarādutpattimicchedyena sā niṣidhyeta | And since the capacity of things constitutes their very nature, who would desire its production from something else, that it should need to be denied? |
sā ca pramāṇasyātmabhūtāpi satī bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvadanadhigatatatkāryair avamātuṃ na pāryata | And although this [validity] constitutes the very nature of the valid means of knowledge, it cannot be ascertained through its effects due to the presence of causes of error. |
ato niścayāpekṣayā parataḥprāmāṇyam ity ucyate notpattyapekṣayā | Therefore validity is said to be dependent on external [factors] with respect to ascertainment, not with respect to origination. |
tena kāraṇāntarād utpādapratiṣedhavaiyarthyaṃ vivādābhāvāt | Therefore the denial of [validity's] production from other causes is pointless, as there is no dispute [about this]. |
niścayastu śaktīnāṃ parato bhavadbhir apīṣyata eva | [The] certainty regarding the capacities [of things] is indeed accepted by you also [to come] from external [sources] |
yathoktam "śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ" iti | As has been stated [by Kumārila]: "The capacities of all entities are established through presumption based on [their] effects" |
yaś ca "nahi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena pāryate" ityeṣa sāmagryantarād bhāvaniṣedhāya hetur upavarṇyate 'sāvapramāṇe 'pi samāna iti tadapi svata eva prasajyeta | And that argument which states "a capacity that does not exist inherently cannot be produced by anything else" - which is presented as a reason for denying [validity] arising from other causal conditions - that would apply equally to invalidity itself |
navā sa hetur vyabhicārāt | That reason is not [valid] due to its being inconclusive |
yaccoktam "nahi vidhimukhena guṇānām aprāmāṇyotpattau vyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavatīti", etad apyanvayavacanam unmīlitārthaṃ na jñāyate | And what was stated that "excellences are never recognized as having a positive operation in producing invalidity" - the meaning of this positive statement is not clear |
ko 'yaṃ vidhimukhena vyāpāro nāma | What indeed is this so-called "positive operation"? |
yadi tāvad idaṃ cedaṃ kariṣyāmīti kāryotpādāya buddhipūrvā pravṛttiḥ, sānendriyādiṣvapi sambhavati | If firstly it means intentional activity for producing an effect [thinking] "I shall do this and this", that is not possible even for sense organs and such |
nahi bhāvānāṃ prekṣāpūrvakāritāsti, sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvena samīhāvyāpārayor asambhavāt | For things do not have purposeful agency, because all entities being momentary, both effort and activity are impossible |
tataścendriyāder api vidhimukhena vyāpārasambhavāt kāraṇatvaṃ na syāt | Therefore since positive operation is impossible even for sense organs etc., they could not be causes |
athendriyādi vināpi kriyākhyavyāpārasamāveśaṃ sattāmātreṇa kāryotpattau vyāpriyata iti kāraṇam iṣyate, tadetad guṇeṣvapi samānam | If it is accepted that sense organs etc. operate towards producing effects merely by their presence without any operation called activity, then this applies equally to excellences also |
nahi sarvakāraṇānāṃ kāryotpattau niyataḥ svasattāsannidhānavyatirekeṇānyovyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavati | For all causes are not necessarily recognized to have any operation in producing effects apart from the presence of their own existence |
atha guṇasannidhāne doṣanivṛttau satyāṃ prāmāṇyamupajāyata iti doṣanivṛttyā vyavahṛtatvāt sākṣād vidhimukhena guṇānāṃ vyāpāro na sambhavatītyucyate, tadetad doṣeṣvapi samānam | If it is said that "when excellences are present and defects cease, validity arises, and since [excellences] operate through the removal of defects, there can be no direct positive operation of excellences" - this applies equally to defects also |
tathā hi doṣasannidhāne 'pi guṇanivṛttau satyāmaprāmāṇyamupajāyata iti doṣāṇām api vidhimukhenāprāmāṇyotpattau vyāpāro na syāt / | For when defects are present, even then [it is only] when the excellences disappear that invalidity arises; thus the defects would have no positive operation in bringing about invalidity. |
tataścāprāmāṇyam api svataḥ prasajyeta, aviśeṣāt / | And thus invalidity also would be inherent [like validity], there being no difference [between the two cases]. |
nahi doṣā guṇān nirākṛtya sākṣād aprāmāṇye vyāpriyamāṇāḥ samālakṣyante / | For defects are never observed to set aside excellences and operate directly towards [bringing about] invalidity. |
tasmāt tadbhāvābhāvānuvidhānavyatirekeṇa nānyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ sambhavatīti doṣavad guṇānām api kāraṇatvaṃ samānam / | Therefore, no causal relationship is possible except through conformity with presence and absence [of the effect]; thus the causal nature of excellences is the same as [that of] defects. |
yaccoktam indriyādirūpam evānyanirapekṣam arthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam iti, tadapyayuktam / | And what has been said - that "the mere form of the sense organs and other [means of cognition], independent of anything else, produces cognitions that do not contradict their objects" - that too is incorrect. |
avikalakāraṇatvena sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt / | Because [in that case] all cognitions would be valid, since [they would have] an unimpaired cause. |
bodharūpatāvat / | Just like [their] nature of being consciousness. |
yathā bodharūpatā jñānānāṃ samanantarapratyayapratibaddhā satī doṣādisamavadhāne 'pyavikalakāraṇatayā sarvatra jñāne bhavati tathārthāvisaṃvāditvam api syāt / | Just as the nature of being consciousness in cognitions, being connected with the immediately preceding cognition, exists in all cognitions through [having] an unimpaired cause even when defects are present, similarly [their] non-contradiction with objects would also exist [in all cases]. |
syād etat doṣair aprāmāṇyasyotpāde sāmānyam avikalakāraṇamapi nopajāyate, prāmāṇyetarayorekatra jñāne viruddhayor ayogāt, bodharūpatā tu niṣpratidvandvā sarvatra bhavatyeveti / | One might say: "When defects produce invalidity, even an unimpaired general cause does not arise, because validity and its opposite, being mutually contradictory, cannot exist in one cognition, whereas the nature of being consciousness, having no opposite, exists everywhere." |
yadyevaṃ na tarhīndriya{sva}rūpam evānyanirapekṣaṃ kāraṇaṃ siddhyati, satyapi tasminnavikale prāmāṇyākhyakāryānutpatteḥ / | If this is so, then the mere nature of the sense organ by itself cannot be established as an independent cause, because even when it exists unimpaired, [its] effect called validity does not arise. |
nahyanyanirapekṣasya kadācid ajanakatvaṃ yuktam / nāpi yadyasmin satyapi na bhavati tat tanmātrakāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | That which is independent of anything else can never fail to be productive [of its effect]; and when something does not occur even in the presence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as its sole cause, as [this would lead to] undesired consequences. |
kiñcedaṃ tāvac ca bhavānvaktum arhati yadyavikalakāraṇaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ kimitidoṣasannidhāne 'pi notpadyata iti / | Moreover, you must explain this: if validity has its complete cause present, why does it not arise even when defects are present? |
svaviruddhakāraṇasya doṣasya sannihitatvād iti cet / aprāmāṇye 'pi tulyam / | If [you say] it is because of the presence of defects which are causes opposed to it, the same applies to invalidity. |
tasyāpi tadānīṃ svaviruddhakāraṇam indriyādisannihitam ityutpattir mābhūt / | At that time, [invalidity] too would not arise because the sense organs etc., which are causes opposed to it, are present. |
kiṃ ca yadi nāma viruddhakāraṇād doṣād bibhyataḥ prāmāṇyasyānutpattum icchā syāt, svakāraṇaṃ tvapratihatasāmarthyaṃ sattādānīṃ kimiti tadupekṣeta / | Furthermore, even if validity were unwilling to arise due to fear of defects which oppose it, why would its own cause, present there with unobstructed power, ignore [producing] it? |
evaṃ hi tenātmano 'pratihataśaktitā prakaṭitā syād yadi svakāryamutpattumanicchadapi haṭhādutpādayet / | Indeed, [the cause's] unobstructed power would be manifested if it forcibly produced its effect even against [the effect's] unwillingness to arise. |
doṣair upahataśaktitvād indriyaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ na janayet, vijñānam api naiva janayed asamārthyāt / | If [you say] the sense organ would not produce validity because its power is obstructed by defects, then due to [this] inability it could not produce cognition either. |
anyathā vijñānahetumātrajanyaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ na siddhyet, tadutpattāvapyanutpatteḥ / | Otherwise, [the claim that] validity is produced solely by the cause of cognition would not be established, as [validity] would not arise even when that [cognition] has arisen. |
yo hi yadutpattāvapi niyamena notpadyate nāsau tena sahaikakāraṇaḥ, yathā kodravāṅkurotpattāvapyanutpadyamānaḥ śālyaṅkuraḥ / | For that which invariably does not arise even when something else arises cannot share the same cause with it, just as a rice sprout which does not arise even when a kodrava sprout has arisen. |
notpadyate ca vijñānotpattāvapi prāmāṇyaṃ niyameneti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ / | And it is observed that validity does not invariably arise even when cognition has arisen - [this is] non-perception of the pervader. |
nāpi tatsvbhāvamakhaṇḍayannātmabhūtāṃ śaktiṃ kaścid upahantuṃ śaknuyāt / | Nor can anyone obstruct an inherent power without destroying the essential nature [of the thing]. |
tataś caivam api śakyate paṭhitum "svataḥ sarvopalabdhīnāṃ prāmāṇyam" iti gṛhyatām / | Therefore it may also be stated thus: "Accept that the validity of all apprehensions is intrinsic." |
syād etat nendriyārdimātraṃ prāmāṇyakāraṇam iṣṭam / kiṃ tarhi viśiṣṭam eva yaddoṣaparahitam, tena yathoktadoṣāprasaṅga iti / | [One might say:] "What is accepted as the cause of validity is not merely the sense-organs etc., but rather specifically those [sense-organs] that are free from defects; therefore the aforementioned objections do not apply." |
yadyevam, sāmagryantaram eva guṇasahitam indriyādiprāmāṇyakāraṇam iti prāptam, guṇasahitasyaiva doṣarahitatvasambhavāt / | If this is so, then it follows that the cause of validity is something different, [namely] the sense-organs etc. accompanied by positive qualities, since freedom from defects is possible only for that which is accompanied by positive qualities. |
tataś ca na vaktavyaṃ sāmagryantarajanyatvāsiddher iti / | Therefore one cannot say that "the [cognition's] validity is not proven to be produced by a different set of causal factors." |
doṣāpagame guṇānāṃ vyāpāro na prāmāṇyotpattāv iti cet / | [If you argue that] "the operation of positive qualities is [only] in the removal of defects, not in the production of validity"— |
tan na / | That is not [correct]. |
apagamasyāvastutvān na tatra kasyacidvyāpāro yuktaḥ / | Since removal is not a real entity, no operation towards it is possible. |
nahyavastuni śaśaviṣāṇādāvanutpādyasvabhāve kasyacid vyāpāraḥ sambhavati / | For no operation is possible towards a non-entity like a hare's horn, which has the nature of something that cannot be produced. |
yaccoktam vijñānotpādakam eva trairūpyamanumānādau prāmāṇyotpādakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti, etad apyasiddham / | What has been stated—that "in inference etc., the three-fold characteristic which produces the cognition is seen to produce the validity as well"—that too is not established. |
nahi trairūpyam eva kevalam anumānasyotpādakam kiṃ, tarhi pratipattir gatā apyamūḍhasmṛtisaṃskārā guṇāḥ / tathā hi satyapi trairūpye prabhraṣṭasambandhasmṛtisaṃskārasyāpratītasambandhasya ca pratipatti rnopajāyate 'numānamityato 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vijñānotpādakam eva prāmāṇyotpādakam ityetad asiddham / | For what produces an inference is not merely the three-fold characteristic alone, but rather the positive qualities pertaining to the cognizer [such as] non-delusion and proper memory-impressions. For even when the three-fold characteristic is present, no inferential cognition arises for one who has lost the memory-impression of the relation or has not understood the relation; therefore, by positive and negative concomitance, it is not established that what produces the cognition is the same as what produces the validity. |
ato viparyayo durnivāra eva vyavasthitaḥ / | Therefore, the opposite conclusion stands as irrefutable. |
yaccoktam viparyayajñānarūpaṃ kāryamindriyādisvarūpānnotpadyata iti, tadapyatisāhasam / | What has been stated – that "[the] effect in the form of erroneous cognition does not arise from the mere nature of sense organs etc." – [that statement] is also [too] rash. |
indriyānapekṣasyāpi viparyayajñānasyotpattiprasaṅgāt / | Because [this would lead to] the undesirable consequence that erroneous cognition would arise even without dependence on sense organs. |
nahi yo yataḥ svabhāvānnotpadyate tasya tadapekṣā yuktātiprasaṅgāt / | For that which does not arise from something's nature cannot depend on it, as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence. |
nacendriyanirapekṣaṃ taimirikādidvicandrādijñānam utpadyate / | And the cognition of two moons etc. by someone with eye disease etc. does not arise independently of sense organs. |
kiṃ ca yadyarthāvisaṃvādititvaṃ prāmāṇyamupavarṇyate tadā codanājanitāyā buddheḥ katham arthāvisaṃvāditvam avagatam / yena tatra bhavatām argāg darśināṃ prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ syāt / | Moreover, if validity is described as "non-deviation from the object," then how is the non-deviation from the object of cognition produced by injunction understood? By which [understanding] your practice of [accepting] validity would occur in that case, [you] observers of meaning. |
nahyavidita tatkāryais tacchaktiravadhārayituṃ śakyate, atiprasaṅgāt / tataś ca yasyaiva vedasya prāmāṇyasthirīkaraṇapratyāśayā sarvam etad vāgjālam uparacitaṃ tasyaiva tan na prasiddham iti kevalaṃ tandulārthinā tuṣakaṇdanametat kṛtam ityalam atiprasaṅgena // | For [its] power cannot be determined without knowledge of its effects, as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence. And thus, for that very Veda for which all this web of words has been composed with the expectation of establishing [its] validity, for that very [Veda] this [validity] is not established - thus this is merely like husking chaff when rice is desired. Enough with [this] digression. |
iti svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā // | Thus [ends] the examination of intrinsic validity. |
analpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayaḥ / | [He who has] great compassion [which has] become one with [him through] countless eons. |
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagāda vadatāṃ varaḥ / taṃ sarvajñaṃ praṇamyāyaṃ kriyate tattvasaṅgrahaḥ // | Having bowed to that omniscient one, the best of speakers, who taught dependent origination, this Tattvasaṅgraha is composed. |
ity anena yat sarvajñopadiṣṭatvaṃ pratītyasamutpādasya viśeṣaṇam uktam. | By this [statement], what has been stated [is] the qualification of dependent origination as [being] taught by the omniscient one. |
tat samarthanārthaṃ prastāvamātraṃ racayann āha evam ityādi | [He], composing just an introduction for the purpose of establishing that, speaks thus: |
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