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atra cānavasthādoṣaḥ pūrvam eva parihṛtaḥ, tasmād yat pramāṇaṃ na tat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatim apekṣata ityetad anaikāntikam, niścayārthaṃ pramāṇātarasyāpekṣaṇāt // | And the fault of infinite regress has already been refuted earlier. Therefore, the [claim] that "what is valid does not require correspondence with another means of knowledge" is inconclusive, because another means of knowledge is required for the purpose of certainty. |
etad eva darśayati sthite hītyādi / | This very [point] is shown [in the following]: |
sthite hi tasya mānatve niścayaḥ kriyate 'nayā / na tvapūrvaṃ pramāṇatvamanayā tasya janyate // | When its validity is established, certainty about it is produced by this [confirmation], but this [confirmation] does not generate any new validity in it. |
etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ bhavati yatrāpi syāt paricchedaḥ pramāṇair uttarottarair ityādi / | By this, that [argument] is also refuted which states that "even where there is determination through successive means of knowledge..." |
nahyanyato mānaniścaye tasya pūrvasya jñānasyārthaprāpaṇaśaktilakṣaṇaṃ mānatvam apaiti // | For when certainty about validity [comes] from another [source], the validity of that prior cognition - which consists in its capacity to lead to its object - does not disappear. |
sakṛjjātavinaṣṭe ca bhavennārthe pramāṇatā ityatrāha sakṛdityādi / sakṛjjātāvinaṣṭe ca syād evārthe pramāṇatā / aniścite 'pi sāstyeva niścayo 'pyuditakramāt // | Even in the case of an object that is destroyed as soon as it arises, there would indeed be validity [in its cognition]. Even when [validity] is uncertain, it still exists, [and] certainty [about it arises] through the process described. |
seti / mānatā // | "sā" [means] validity. |
uditam eva kramaṃ darśayann āha yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvād ityādi / | [The author], showing the previously stated sequence, speaks [starting with] "yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvāt" etc. |
yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvādijñānaṃ niścayastataḥ / | If there is cognition of the purity of causes and other [factors], then certainty follows from that. |
yadi cārthakriyā prāptā sākṣādvā{gdā---}hādilakṣaṇā // yadvābhyāsavatī vṛttir nirapekṣā pralodaye / | When effective action is directly obtained, characterized by burning etc., or when repeated functioning [occurs] independently at the time of awakening, |
sarvopāyaviyoge tu na pramāṇaviniścayaḥ // | But when there is absence of all these means, there is no certainty of valid cognition. |
ataḥ pramāṇatā tasmin vidyamānāpyaniścitā / avidyamānakalpeti naivāstītyapadiśyate // | Therefore, even though validity exists in that [cognition], it remains uncertain [and] is considered as if non-existent; thus it is declared that it does not exist. |
yadi cārthakriyā prāpteti / tadā niścayas tata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | "If effective action is obtained" — this is to be connected with [the phrase] "then certainty [follows] from that." |
nanu cārthakriyājñānasyānyaviṣayatvāt pūrvapratyayaprāmāṇyasya siddhis tato na yuktā / | [Objection:] Since the cognition of effective action has a different object, the establishment of the validity of the previous cognition from that [effective action] is not reasonable. |
tathā hi avayavidravyāsambhavājjalaviṣayaṃ locanajñānaṃ rūpamātragrāhi, sta {strā---} nādyarthakriyājñānaṃ tu sparśamātragocaram iti katham anyālambanaṃ jñānam anyaviṣayasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ śodhayed atiprasaṅgāt / | For instance, due to the impossibility of composite substances, visual cognition of water grasps only color, while the cognition of effective action such as bathing has only touch as its object. Thus, how can a cognition with one object verify the validity of a cognition with another object? [If it could], there would be [unwanted] over-application. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This is not a fault. |
ekasantānavartino viṣayadvayasyāvinābhāvād anyālambanam api jñānamanyaviṣayasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhayiṣyati / | When two objects occurring in the same santāna [stream of consciousness] are invariably concomitant, the cognition of one object will establish the validity of the cognition of the other object. |
nahi tau rūpasparśau vinirbhāgena vartete, ekasāmagryadhīnatvāt / | Those two [i.e., the] color and touch do not exist separately from each other, because [they are] dependent on the same causal complex. |
tatra pūrvasya jñānasyānarthe 'pyartharūpeṇa pravṛttidarśanād uttarakālabhāvinas tadviṣayāvinābhūtasparśagrāhiṇo jñānān na niścayotpattir apekṣyante / | In this case, even if the first cognition is objectless, since it proceeds in the form of an object, certainty does not depend on the later cognition that apprehends the touch which is invariably concomitant with that object. |
nanvevam api kṣaṇikatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ pūrvajñānaparigṛhītarūpāvinābhāvisparśo naivottarajñānapravṛttyā viṣayīkṛta iti kathaṃ tato viniścayaḥ / | "Even so, since all entities are momentary, the touch that is invariably concomitant with the color grasped by the previous cognition cannot be made an object by the operation of the later cognition—so how [can] certainty [arise] from that?" |
naiṣa doṣaḥ uttareṣāṃ rūpādikṣaṇānāṃ pūrvajñānagṛhītai rūpādikṣaṇair aviśiṣṭārthakriyāvāñchāyām abhinnayogakṣematvād aikyem eva vyavahriyate / | This is not a fault, because the subsequent color-moments are treated as identical with the color-moments grasped by the previous cognition, since they share the same fate in regard to the desire for effective action. |
nahyarvāg darśanānāṃ kṣaṇair vyavahāraḥ / | For those of limited vision do not deal with moments. |
athavā pūrvajñānaparicchinnarūpādyarthāvinābhāvād uttarajñānaviṣayasya tat kāraṇatayā satyapi bhedavyavahāre tato niścayo na virudhyate // | Or, because the object of the later cognition is invariably concomitant with the color etc. determined by the previous cognition, even though there is a treatment of difference due to that [previous cognition] being the cause [of the later one], certainty arising from that is not contradicted. |
śrotrabuddher api vyaktā netrādimati{tarābhira---}saṅgatiḥ / | The auditory cognition also has clear connection with [cognitions] through the eye and other [senses]. |
ekasāmagryadhīṇaṃ hi rūpaśabdādi vartate // | For color, sound, etc. exist dependent on the same causal complex. |
parasparavinirbhāgāt saṃtatyānyonyakāraṇam / teṣām astyeva sambandhas tadevaṃ suparisphuṭam // | Because of [their] mutual inseparability, [they are] reciprocal causes in the continuum; thus it is very clear that there is indeed a connection among them. |
taddhiyām api taddvārā dhūmendhanavikāravat | Through these [connections] there is also a relation among their cognitions, just as between smoke and the transformation of fuel |
śrotradhīs tat pramāṇaṃ syāt tadanyamatisaṅgateḥ | Thus auditory cognition would be valid due to [its] connection with other cognitions |
itarābhiścakṣurādidhībhir asaṅgatir naiva siddhā | [The claim that] there is no connection with other cognitions like visual cognition etc. is not established |
tathā hi vīṇādiśabdasya tat sambandhinaś ca rūpāder ekasāmagryadhīnatvāt parasparābhir vibhāgalakṣaṇo dhūmendhanavikārayor iva sambandho 'styeva | For the sound of the vīṇā and its associated color etc. depend on the same causal complex, and therefore there exists a relation of mutual inseparability between them, just as between smoke and the transformation of fuel |
prabandhavṛttyapekṣāyāṃ ca pūrvapūrvaḥ kalāpo 'nyasyottarottarasya kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti sākṣāc ca kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇo 'pi sambandho 'styeva | And with respect to their sequential occurrence, each preceding aggregate becomes the cause of each succeeding one, so there exists also a direct causal relationship [between them] |
tataś ca tadgrāhiṇām api jñānāṃ taddvārakapāramparyeṇa sambandho 'sti | Therefore there is also a connection among the cognitions that grasp these [qualities], mediated by that [causal relationship] |
tattasmāc chrotradhīḥ pramāṇaṃ bhavatyeva, tadanyābhiścakṣurādimatibhir yathoktasambandhasadbhāvāt | Therefore auditory cognition is indeed valid, due to having the aforementioned connection with other cognitions like visual cognition etc. |
tathā hi dūrād vīṇādiśabdaśravaṇāt tadarthino veṇvādiśabdasādharmyād upajātasaṃśayasya puṃsaḥ pravṛttau vīṇārūpadarśanādyaḥ prāgupajātaḥ saṃśayaḥ kimayam vīṇādhvaniruta veṇugītādiśabda iti sa vyāvartate | For when someone who desires [to find] it hears the sound of a vīṇā from afar, and due to its similarity with the sound of a flute etc. a doubt arises, [and] when he proceeds [toward it], the previously arisen doubt "is this the sound of a vīṇā or the sound of a flute or singing?" is removed by seeing the form of the vīṇā |
yatra ca deśe mṛdaṅgādipratiśabdaśravaṇāt pravṛttasya tadarthādhigatir na bhavati tatra visaṃvādād aprāmāṇyaṃ pratyeti | And in a place where someone who proceeds upon hearing what [seems to be] the echo of a drum etc. does not find that object, there he concludes the invalidity [of the cognition] due to the lack of corroboration |
sādhanāntarajanyā tu buddhireṣā viniścitā | But this cognition produced by other means of knowledge is ascertained [to be valid] |
salilajñānamādyamutpadyate 'kṣijam | The first cognition of water arises [as being] produced by the eye |
pānasnānādinirbhāsaṃ jihvākāyāśritaṃ param | Then [arise] later cognitions relating to drinking and bathing, dependent upon the tongue and body [respectively] |
hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvādas tena vāñchyate | Therefore, corroboration through cognitions produced by other causes is desired |
eṣā vīṇādirūpagrāhiṇī | This [cognition] apprehending the form of the lute and other [objects] |
yathā tvekendriyādhīnavijñānāntarasaṅgatiḥ | Just as there is corroboration by other cognitions dependent on [different] sense organs |
eṣa na dṛśyate | This [corroboration] is not seen [in the case of the Veda] |
nānendriyādhīnā vijñānāntarasaṅgatiḥ | [There is] no corroboration by other cognitions dependent on sense organs |
katham asau pratyakṣe kāraṇaṃ klṛpteḥ | How is this [corroboration] established as a cause in perception? |
rūpaviṣayaṃ cakṣurvijñānam | [It is] visual cognition having color as its object |
param uttarakālabhāvi | "Later" means occurring at a subsequent time |
ekenāpi tu vākyena deśakālanarādiṣu labhyate nārthasaṃvādaḥ sarvasmin saṃśayodayāt | Even with a single sentence, no corroboration of meaning is obtained across places, times and people, because doubt arises in all [cases] |
agnihotrād bhavet svarga itītthaṃ śrūyate samam / niścayāṅgaviyuktaṃ hi ga{śa---}bdadardduramātrakam // | Though the same [statement] "svarga [heaven] comes from agnihotra" is heard [by all], [it is] indeed devoid of elements of certainty, [being] merely like the croaking of frogs. |
[p.804] anenāsiddhatāmarthasaṃvādasyāha / | By this [verse] he states the non-establishment of factual corroboration. |
tathāhyagnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyato vākyāt prekṣāvato niścayakāraṇabhāvāt saṃśayo jāyata eveti na deśakālādau saṃvādasiddhiḥ // | Thus indeed, from the statement "heaven comes from agnihotra," since [there is] no cause for certainty for a discerning person, doubt necessarily arises; hence there is no establishment of corroboration across space, time, etc. |
nāpi narāntare sarvatra saṃvādo labhyata iti darśayann āha svargādāvityādi / | Speaking thus, he shows that corroboration is not found uniformly among different people. |
svargādau matabhedaś ca viprāṇām api dṛśyate / | Even among brāhmaṇas, difference of opinion is seen regarding svarga [heaven] and such things. |
labhyate nārthasaṃvādas tasmād iha narādiṣu // | Therefore, factual corroboration is not found here among people and others. |
tathā hi manuṣyātiśāyipuruṣaviśeṣaniketaḥ sumerugiriśikharādideśaviśeṣo 'dhimānuṣasukhādhiṣṭhāno nānopakaranasamṛddhaḥ svarga iti niruktakārādayo varṇayanti / | Thus indeed, the author of the Nirukta and others describe svarga as "the abode of special beings superior to humans, [located in] specific places like the peak of Mount Sumeru, established as [the place of] superhuman pleasures, abundant with various amenities." |
prītiviśeṣo manuṣyāṇām eva svarga iti mīmāṃsakāḥ / | The Mīmāṃsakas [say] that svarga is "a special kind of pleasure exclusively for humans." |
yāge 'pi vipratipattir dṛśyate / | Disagreement is seen regarding sacrifice as well. |
śrūyate hi purākāle piṣṭamayaḥ paśur yenāyajanta yajvāna iti / | For it is heard that in ancient times, sacrificers performed sacrifice with animals made of flour. |
anyais tu durātmabhirniṣkṛpaiḥ prāṇiviśeṣa eva paśur iti varṇitam // | While other wicked and cruel [people] have declared that "only a specific living being [is what is meant by] the sacrificial animal." |
codanājanite jñāne dārḍhyaṃ prāgapahastitam / saṃdigdho hi tathābhāvas tadgrāhyasyānyasāmyataḥ // | The firmness of the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction has been already rejected, because such firmness is [always] doubtful, as what is apprehended by it is similar to other [things]. |
prāgiti / | [The word] "prāk" [means "already"]. |
śrutiparīkṣāyām / anyasāmyata iti / | [This was discussed] in the examination of the Revealed Word. [The phrase] "similar to others" [means...] |
agnihotrāt svargo na bhavatītyādipauruṣeyavacanasamudbhūtapratītyā tulyatvāt // | ...because it is equal to the notion arising from human statements such as "the Agnihotra does not lead to heaven." |
kiñca vāṅ{mātra}metadbhavatām yathā codanājanitā buddhir deśādiṣu na visaṃvadatīti darśayati asarvadarśibhir ityādi / | Moreover, it is merely your assertion that "the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction does not contradict [itself] in different places and so forth." This is what is shown by [the verse beginning with] "asarvadarśibhiḥ." |
asarvadarśibhir vipraiḥ kuta etad viniścitam / codanājanitā buddhiḥ sarvasaṃvādinīti ca // | How has this been determined by brāhmaṇas, who are not omniscient, that "the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is consistent in all [times and places]"? |
sādhyā na cānumānenetyādāvāha niścitetyādi / | [The opponent] states this in [the passage beginning with] "it cannot be established through inference." |
śuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt tat pramāṇaṃ tadanyavat // | [Something is] a valid means of knowledge because it is produced from pure causes, like other [valid means of knowledge]. |
aniṣṭāpattir hi prasaṅga ucyate, na ca pratyakṣasyānumānataḥ prāmāṇyasiddhir neṣṭā, yena prasaṅgāpādanaṃ syāt / | A reductio ad absurdum is said to be that which points to an undesirable consequence; but the establishment of the validity of perception through inference is not undesirable, so this cannot be [considered] a reductio ad absurdum. |
yathā cānumānena pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate tathā pūrvam uktam / tadeva smārayati śuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt pramāṇam iti / | How the validity of perception can be proved by inference has been explained before; this is what is recalled [here] through [the words] "because it arises from pure causes, it is valid." |
tadanyavad iti / | [It is valid] like other [cognitions]. |
sannikṛṣṭaviṣayagrāhipratyakṣavat // | [It is valid] like perception that grasps objects in immediate proximity. |
pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ yena cānyena sādhyata ityādāvāha sarvasyetyādi / sarvasya ca na sādhyeyaṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ pramā / | Regarding [the objection] "by what other [means] is the validity of valid cognitions proved?", [the author] states "sarvasya" etc. The validity of all [cognitions] need not be proved by other means of valid cognition. |
yasmād arthakriyājñāne bhrāntir nāstīti sādhitam // yathā cārthakriyājñāne bhrāntir nāsti tathā pūrvaṃ ucyate vastusaṃvāda ityādinā prasādhitam / tenārthakriyājñānasaṃvādāt prāmāṇye nānavasthā bhavati // | Because it has been established that there is no error in the cognition of purposeful action. How there is no error in the cognition of purposeful action has been established earlier through [the discussion of] "correspondence with reality" etc. Therefore, due to the correspondence with the cognition of purposeful action, there is no infinite regress in [establishing] validity. |
anumānenāpi sādhye na bhavatyeveti darśayati ātmetyādi / | [The text] beginning with "ātmā" shows that there is indeed no [infinite regress] even when [validity] is established through inference. |
ātmā ca svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ ceti tathoktam, tadākhyā yasya liṅgasyeti vigrahaḥ / | "Ātmā" means nature and effect; this is called thus - this is the analysis of "of which inferential mark." |
niścito 'vyabhicāro yasya liṅgasya tat tathoktam / | That inferential mark whose non-deviation has been ascertained is called thus. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhyāṃ pratibaddhasvabhāvakāryākhyaliṅganiścayabalenopajāyamānamanumānaṃ vibhramakāraṇābhāvāt svata eva pramāṇam iti nānavasthā // | This means: When an inference arises through the force of ascertainment of an inferential mark characterized as nature or effect [and] bound by relations of identity or causation, it is valid by itself due to the absence of causes of error. Thus there is no infinite regress. |
kvacit tu vividhabhrāntinimittabalabhāvinī / | However, in some cases, [an error] arising from the force of various causes of illusion [needs to be removed by another cognition]. |
bhrāntirutsāryate 'nena yasmāt tatra na niścayaḥ // | [The illusion] is removed by this [means], because there is no certainty in that [case]. |
abhyāsāder niścayakāraṇasyābhāvāt kvacid ādye pratyakṣe bhrāntir utpadyata iti na tasya siddhyet svata eva pramāṇatā // | Due to the absence of means of certainty such as repeated [cognition], an illusion arises in some cases in the initial perception, [and] therefore its validity cannot be established from itself alone. |
avyaktavyaktikatvena vyakto 'rtho na prasiddhyati / | Due to [its] having an unmanifested manifestation, a manifested object cannot be established. |
parapratyakṣavat tasmāj jñānaṃ jñātamitīṣyatām // | Therefore, it must be accepted that cognition is [itself] cognized, just like the perception [occurring] in others. |
avyaktā vyaktir yasyārthasya sa tathoktaḥ / | That thing whose manifestation is unmanifested is called thus [avyaktavyaktika]. |
avaśyaṃ hi jñānaṃ jñātavyam / | For cognition must necessarily be cognized. |
tadajñāne sarvājñānaprasaṅgāt / | Because if it [cognition] were not cognized, there would follow the non-cognition of everything. |
tathāhyarthābhivyaktir eva jñānam ucyate nānyat, tasyāścābhivyakteḥ parokṣatve 'rthasyāpi parokṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | For thus, what is called cognition is nothing but the manifestation of an object, and if that manifestation were imperceptible, the object too would become imperceptible. |
yathā parasantānavartipratyayaviṣayasyārthasyāvyaktavyaktitvāt / | Just as [occurs with] an object that is the content of a cognition occurring in another's mental continuum, due to [its] having an unmanifested manifestation. |
prayogaḥ yadyasyāvyaktavyaktikaṃ vastu tat tasya pratyakṣaṃ na bhavati, yathā parasantānavartinaiva pratyakṣeṇa viṣayīkṛtam anyasya, avyaktavyaktikaṃ ca vivādāspadībhūtaṃ vijñānaṃ kasyacid iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The formal argument [is as follows]: Whatever thing has an unmanifested manifestation for someone is not perceptible to that [person], as [in the case of] what is objectified by a perception occurring in another's mental continuum [being imperceptible] to someone else; and the cognition under dispute has an unmanifested manifestation for someone - thus [this is] the apprehension of something contrary to the pervader. |
nacānaikāntiko hetuḥ, tasya vastuno vyaktyutpādamantareṇa pratyakṣatve sarveṣāṃ pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt / | The reason [given here] cannot be [regarded as] inconclusive, because if a thing were perceptible without the arising of its manifestation, it would lead to the undesirable consequence that everything would be perceptible. |
nacaivaṃ bhavati / | But this is not the case. |
tasmād viparyayaḥ // | Therefore, [the situation is] the opposite. |
svayaṃ tu jaḍarūpatvāc cakṣurādibhir indriyaiḥ / | Due to being themselves of insentient nature, the eye and other sense organs [do not perceive objects]. |
gṛhyante viṣayā naivaṃ teṣāṃ jñāne tu hetutā // | Objects are not grasped in this way [by the senses]; rather, these [organs] are [merely] causes in [their] cognition. |
viṣayavajjaḍarūpatvāc cakṣurādīnāṃ na viṣayagrahaṇaṃ mukhyato 'sti, kevalaṃ vijñānaṃ prati hetubhāvamātreṇa teṣāṃ viṣayagrahaṇaṃ kalpitamityajñātair eva tair viṣayajñānotpādakatayā viṣayā gṛhyante iti syāt, nanvevaṃ vijñānena viṣayasya kiñcitkriyate, yenājñātam api cakṣurādivad viṣayaṃ gṛhṇātīti syāt / | Since the eye and other [sense organs] are of insentient nature like [their] objects, they do not directly grasp objects; their grasping of objects is merely postulated through their being causes with respect to cognition, such that objects are grasped by them—though themselves uncognized—through their capacity to produce cognition of objects; but then [one might ask] whether cognition does something to the object, by which it might grasp the object—though itself uncognized—like the eye and other [sense organs]. |
abhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti cet / | If [someone says] that manifestation is produced [by cognition]. |
na / | No. |
jñānaparyāyatvāt / | Because [manifestation] is synonymous with cognition. |
abhivyaktirupalabdhiḥ paracchittiḥ saṃvedanam ityevamādayaḥ paryāyā ucyante, nārthāntaram / | [Terms] such as "abhivyakti" [manifestation], "upalabdhi" [apprehension], "paricchitti" [determination], "saṃvedana" [awareness] and so forth are said to be synonyms, not different things. |
na ca svātmanaḥ karaṇaṃ yuktam / | And cognition cannot be an instrument [of knowledge] of itself; |
svātmani kāritravirodhāt / | because there is a contradiction in [something having] an operation upon itself; |
utpannānutpannāvasthayoḥ sadasattvāc ca / | and because [things] in the state of being produced are existent, while [those] in the state of being not produced are non-existent; |
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