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atrāpi yaḥ punaḥ śaṅkāṃ kaścit prakurute jaḍaḥ | If even after this some foolish person generates doubt |
saṃśayātmakatā yena manye taṃ prati ninditā | [It is] with reference to such a person that the state of being doubtful has been condemned by [the Unborn One] |
pratipāditametad yathā kāraṇaśuddhisaṃvādajñānābhyāṃ śaṅkā nivartate / | It has been explained how doubt ceases through [both] the purity of the cause and the knowledge of conformity [with reality]. |
yat punar uktaṃ tathāca vāsudevenetyādi, tat kevalamātmano bhaktivādāvalambanaṃ prakaṭitaṃ na vastusthitiḥ / | What has been stated [by the opponent] that "thus [it was said] by Vāsudeva" and so forth merely reveals his own adherence to the doctrine of devotion (bhakti-vāda), not the actual state of things. |
nahi vacanamātrānniryuktikāt parasya prekṣāvato vyutthitacetasas tatsvabhāvanirṇayo jñāyate / | For a mere statement without reasoning does not convince a discerning person whose mind has risen [above ordinary understanding] about the determination of its true nature. |
tathā hi vāsudevavacanamanyenābhisambandhinā vyavasthitatvād avirodhīti darśayann āha atrāpītyādi / | Thus [the author], showing that Vāsudeva's statement is not contradictory because it was established in a different context, says "even in this case" and so forth. |
atra śuddhisaṃvādadarśane, yo bhavadvidhaḥ śaṅkāṃ kurute saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaiva hītyevam, taṃ prati, ajena viṣṇunā, saṃśayātmakatā ninditeti sambhāvyate / | In this case, regarding [the perception of] purity and conformity, one who, like yourself, raises doubt [saying] that "even after conformity, conformity must be sought again in the same way" - against such a one, it appears that suspicious-mindedness was condemned by the unborn Viṣṇu. |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedāpekṣāprakalpite / prāmāṇyaniścaye 'nyasmād vyaktaṃ prāmāṇyaniścitiḥ // | When the ascertainment of validity is conceived as dependent upon distinctions of place, time, person, and circumstance, [then] the determination of validity clearly [comes] from something other [than itself]. |
tathā hi deśakālādau bādhābhāvatsuniścitau / pramāṇāntarataḥ prāñce jñāne prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | For when the absence of sublation in place, time, etc. has been well ascertained through other means of knowledge, [then] the ascertainment of validity [occurs] in the initial cognition. |
anena svavacanavirodhaṃ pratipādayati / | Through this [the author] demonstrates the self-contradiction [in the opponent's position]. |
tathā hi deśakālanarāvasthāpekṣayā prāmāṇyaniścaye prakalpyamāne parataeveti spaṣṭam uktaṃ bhavati / | For when the ascertainment of validity is conceived as dependent on place, time, person and circumstance, it is clearly stated [that it is] from something external indeed. |
yato deśakālādau prāmāṇāntarato bādhāyā abhāve niścite sati prācye prathame jñāne prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagamyamānaḥ kathaṃ parato nābhyupagataḥsyāt / | Because when the absence of sublation regarding place, time, etc. has been ascertained through other means of knowledge, how could the ascertainment of validity in the initial first cognition, when accepted, not be accepted [as coming] from something external? |
avaśyaṃ hi pramāṇāntarato bādhāyā abhāvo niśca{śce---}yaḥ | Indeed, the absence of sublation must necessarily be ascertained through other means of cognition |
tathā hi svataḥprāmāṇye 'bhyupagamyamāne sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgo mābhūd ityavaśyaṃ tvayā vaktavyaṃ yatra bādhā nāsti tasyaiva svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ nānyasyeti | For when self-validity [of cognition] is accepted, to avoid the consequence that all cognitions would be valid, you must necessarily state that "self-validity belongs only to that [cognition] where there is no sublation, not to others" |
sa ca bādhāyā abhāvo 'nupalambhamātrān na śakyate niścetuṃ vyabhicārād iti sāmarthyānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhato niśceyaḥ, tasyaiva bādhābhāvena vyāptatvāt | And this absence of sublation cannot be ascertained through mere non-apprehension due to [possible] deviation; rather it must be ascertained through non-apprehension of what is capable of being apprehended, because only that [latter type of non-apprehension] has pervasion with absence of sublation |
sa copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhaḥ saṃvādavijñānato nānyo yukta iti pramāṇāntarata eva prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt | And this "non-apprehension of what is capable of being apprehended" can logically be nothing other than [what follows] from the cognition of correspondence [with reality]; thus the certainty of validity would necessarily be accepted [as coming] from other means of cognition |
ṛṇādivyavahāras tu yo vākyatrayayogyavān | As for transactions concerning debt etc. which are suitable for three statements |
arthipratyarthinau tatra smṛtvā smṛtvā parisphuṭam | There the plaintiff and defendant [make statements] clearly after recalling [the facts] |
nahi sūkṣmekṣikāṃ kartuṃ labhete tatra vastuni | [They] do not get time to make a subtle examination of the matter |
vastusthityā pramāṇaṃ tu vyavasthāpyaṃ chalānnanu | But validity [of cognition] must be determined according to the real state of things, not through sophistry |
prakṛtāpratirūpo 'to vyavahāra udāhṛtaḥ | Therefore the transactions cited are not analogous to the present topic |
vastusvabhāvapratibaddhāyāṃ pramāsthitau prakṛtāyāṃ icchāmātraviracitasaṅketapratibaddhasya chalātmano yadṛṇādivyavahārasyodāharaṇaṃ tat kevalaṃ bhavataḥ prakṛtānabhijṇyatāṃ prakaṭayati | When the topic under discussion is the status of valid cognition, which is bound to the real nature of things, citing the example of debt-related transactions, which are sophistical and bound by conventions created by mere wish, only reveals your ignorance of the topic under discussion |
trisatyatāpi devānām | Even the "triple truth" of the gods |
ādyānniścitya sadbhāve naiva syāt parato 'pyasau | If certainty does not arise from the first [statement], it cannot arise from later ones either |
ādyād iti prathamādvacanānniściterasadbhāvo sati parataḥ uttarakālabhāvino vacanadvayāt asau niścitir naiva syād viśeṣābhāvāt | "From the first" means from the first statement; if certainty does not exist [arising] from that, then that certainty cannot arise from later [statements], i.e. from the two statements occurring afterwards, due to absence of any special [distinguishing] feature |
etad eva darśayati tadīyam ityādi / | This very [point] is shown [by the words] "tadīyam" etc. |
tadīyam eva yenedaṃ vacanadvayamuttaram / tadādye pratyayābhāve ko viśeṣas tadanyayoḥ // | Since these two later statements belong to those same [persons], if there is no confidence in the first [statement], what distinction [could there be] in the other two? |
uttaram iti / paścātkālabhāvi / | "Later" means [that which is] occurring at a subsequent time. |
niścayābhāve / | "[No] confidence" [means] absence of certainty. |
tadanyayor iti / tasmād anyayor uttarakālabhāvinor ity arthaḥ / | "In the other two" means in the two others subsequent to that [first one], i.e., the two occurring at a later time. |
yo hyekaṃ vacanaṃ dvitīyaṃ ca mithyā vadet sa tṛtīyam api kiṃ na vadet, kastadānīṃ tasya pratiroddhā, yena tṛtīyāt sampratyayo jāyate // | For [if] someone would speak falsely [in] one statement and a second [statement], why would he not speak [falsely in] a third? Who then would be his restrainer, by virtue of which conviction should arise from the third? |
ataḥ pūrvoktāyā yuktyā tvatpakṣe 'pyanavasthitiḥ / | Therefore, according to the reasoning stated before, there is infinite regress in your position also. |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve yathāyogamataḥ sthiteḥ // | [And therefore] validity and invalidity remain as they are according to [their] proper application. |
pūrvoktā yuktiḥ "tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ bhavatocyate / bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaram iṣyata" // | The previously stated reasoning [was]: "Thus indeed, according to you, [something] is declared valid due to absence of invalidation; but the absence of invalidation is accepted as another means of knowledge, termed 'absence'." |
ityādinoktā // | [This] was stated through [the words] beginning with "iti." |
nityam āptapraṇītaṃ cetyādāvāha vākyam ityādi | [Regarding] "eternal [and] composed by trustworthy persons" and so forth, [the text] states "vākya" ["word"] etc. |
vākyaṃ nityaṃ purāsmābhir vistareṇa nirākṛtam | The eternal word has been refuted by us previously in detail. |
kṣīṇaniḥśeṣadoṣaś ca nāptosti bhavataḥ smṛtau | And in your doctrine, there exists no trustworthy person whose defects have been completely eliminated. |
akṣīṇāvṛtirāśis tu kīdṛgāpto bhaviṣyati | Moreover, how can [one] be trustworthy when [his] mass of obscurations has not been eliminated? |
tasya sambhāvyate doṣād anyathāpi vaco yataḥ | Because due to [his] defects, [his] speech could be otherwise [i.e., false]. |
purā śrutiparīkṣāyām nityaṃ vākyaṃ vistareṇa nirastamityasiddhatvāt kutas tasya svataḥprāmāṇyacintāvatāro bhavet | Previously in the examination of scripture, the eternal word was refuted in detail, so given its non-establishment, how could there be any investigation of its self-sufficient validity? |
āptasya svayam anabhyupagamāt praṇītam api vākyam asiddham eva | Since [you] yourselves do not accept [the existence of] a trustworthy person, even a statement composed [by such a person] is not established. |
tathā hi yasyānṛtahetavo rāgādayo doṣāḥ niḥśeṣaṃ prahīṇāḥ sa evāpto yuktaḥ | For only he whose sources of untruth—the defects such as attachment and so forth—have been completely abandoned is properly [called] trustworthy. |
anyathā rāgādibhir doṣair anṛtahetubhiḥ parītacetasaḥ katham āptatvaṃ setsyati | Otherwise, how could trustworthiness be established for one whose mind is surrounded by defects such as attachment which are causes of untruth? |
naca bhavadbhiḥ prahīṇāśeṣakleśajālaḥ kaścinnaro 'bhyupagamyate | And you [Mīmāṃsakas] do not accept [the existence of] any person who has abandoned the entire web of afflictions. |
yenāptavacanaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhaved bhavatām | Therefore how could the word of a trustworthy person be a valid means of knowledge for you? |
kiñca bhavatu nāmāptas tathāpi tasya vacanam asiddham eveti darśayati jāte 'pītyādi | Moreover, even if there were a trustworthy person, nevertheless his statement would not be established—this is what [the text] shows [beginning with] "even if born..." |
jāte 'pyāpte tadīyo 'sau guṇaughaḥ kena śakyate jñātum āptapraṇīte syād yato vākye 'vadhāraṇam | Even if a trustworthy person were born, who would be able to know that mass of his qualities, whereby there could be certainty regarding [his] words composed by a trustworthy person? |
yo 'pyatīndriyadṛkpaśyet tadīyaguṇasampadam tasyāpyāptapraṇītena vacasā kiṃ prayojanam | Even if someone with supernatural vision could see his collection of qualities, what use would that person have for words composed by a trustworthy person? |
sa hi vākyanirāśaṃsaḥ svayam arthaṃ prapadyate | For such a one, being independent of words, understands objects by himself. |
anyo 'pyāptāparijñānāt tato 'rthaṃ nāvagāchati | And another [person], due to not recognizing the trustworthy person, does not understand objects from him. |
nahyāptamanavadhārya tadīyametad vacanamityevam avadhārayituṃ śakyam | For without ascertaining [who] the trustworthy person [is], it is not possible to ascertain "this is his statement." |
na cāptāvadhāraṇaṃ sambhavati | And ascertainment of a trustworthy person is not possible. |
tathā hi yastāvat kṣīṇaniḥśeṣadoṣo 'tīndriyārthadarśī sa yadyapyāptamavadhārayati tathāpi tadvacanamakiñcitkaram eva | For even if one whose defects are completely eliminated and who sees supersensuous objects ascertains [who] the trustworthy person [is], nevertheless his word accomplishes nothing. |
svayaṃ sarvārthapratyakṣadarśitvena tadvacanād apravṛtter atas tasya tadavadhāraṇam anarthakam | Because of seeing all objects directly himself, [he has] no inclination toward that [person's] word, therefore his ascertainment of that [trustworthy person] is purposeless. |
yaścānyo 'rvāgdarśī sa naivāptāvadhāraṇapaṭur iti nāsau svatas tadvacanād artham avagacchati | And one who has ordinary vision is not capable of ascertaining [who] the trustworthy person [is], so he does not understand objects from that [person's] word by himself. |
aniścitatvāt | Because of [its] uncertainty. |
svataḥprāmāṇyavāde ca svato niścayajātitaḥ / | Under the theory of svataḥ-prāmāṇya [self-validity], the certainty [arises] from the birth [of the cognition] itself. |
vināśasambhavāyogāt kimarthaṃ vinivāraṇam // | Due to the impossibility of [its] destruction, what is there to be prevented? |
niścayajātitaḥ niścayotpatteḥ / | [The term] 'niścayajātitaḥ' [means] 'on account of the arising of certainty.' |
anyathā yadi svato niśceyo notpadyate tadā svataḥprāmāṇyavādo hīyeta // | If, on the other hand, certainty did not arise from [cognition] itself, then the doctrine of svataḥ-prāmāṇya would be abandoned. |
na nāma dūṣyate vākyaṃ doṣair guṇanirākṛtaiḥ / | Indeed, a statement is not vitiated by defects [when these are] nullified by excellences. |
guṇāniścayatas tat tu viniścetuṃ na śakyate // | However, due to the uncertainty about [these] excellences, that [statement] cannot be ascertained. |
yadi nāma doṣair na guṇavad vākyaṃ guṇair doṣāṇāṃ nirākṛtatvāt, tathāpi parasantānavartināṃ guṇānām atīndriyatvāt tadaniścaye guṇavad vākyaṃ niścetuṃ na śakyate, nacāpi niścitaṃ svataḥpramāṇaṃ bhavitum arhati // | Even if indeed a statement possessing excellences is not [vitiated] by defects because the defects are nullified by excellences, nevertheless, since the excellences residing in another's mental continuum are beyond the senses, due to uncertainty about them, the statement possessing excellences cannot be ascertained, nor can what is not ascertained deserve to be self-valid. |
vākyasyākartṛkatvaṃ ca prāgeva vinivāritam / | The non-authorship of statements has already been refuted. |
nātaḥ karturabhāve te na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ // | Therefore, it cannot be [maintained] that "in the absence of an author, defects would have no substratum." |
prāg eveti śruparīkṣāyām // | [The term] 'already' [refers to what was discussed] in the examination of revealed word. |
guṇebhyaś ca pramāṇatvaṃ yathā yuktaṃ tathoditam / | How [validity] arises from excellences has been explained as appropriate. |
guṇānāṃ cāparijñāne doṣābhāvo na lakṣyate // | And when the excellences are not cognized, the absence of defects cannot be perceived. |
svato vākyaṃ pramāṇaṃ taddoṣābhāvopalakṣitam / | [The claim that] a statement, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of those defects, |
na yuktaṃ aparijñānād doṣābhāvo hyalakṣaṇam / | is not correct, because the absence of defects, being uncognized, cannot serve as an indicator. |
tathoditam iti / | Thus it has been stated. |
yaccoktam svato vākyaṃ pramāṇam na doṣābhāvopalakṣitam iti, tadapyayuktam, guṇānām atīndriyatvāt tadaparijñāne doṣābhāvasya guṇabhāvātmakasya lakṣayitum aśakyatvāt / | What has been said—that "a statement valid by itself is not indicated by the absence of defects"—that too is incorrect, because the excellences are beyond the senses, and when they cannot be cognized, the absence of defects, which consists in the presence of excellences, cannot be perceived. |
etad evāha doṣābhāvo hyalakṣaṇam iti / | This is what is expressed by [the words] "the absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator." |
lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇam, na lakṣaṇam alakṣaṇam, upalakṣaṇaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ / | [The word] "lakṣaṇa" [means] "that by which something is indicated"; "alakṣaṇa" [means] "not an indicator"; the meaning is that it cannot serve as an indication. |
aparijñātatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | The idea is that [this is] because of [its] being uncognized. |
nahi daṇḍāparijñāne puṃsāṃ daṇḍīti lakṣyate / | Indeed, when the stick is not cognized, people cannot recognize [someone as] a stick-bearer. |
tallakṣitaṃ svato mānamityetac ca parāhatam // | "[The proposition that] validity is self-indicated" - this has been refuted. |
doṣābhāvaḥ pramābhāvāt pramāṇānniścitātmakaḥ / | The absence of defects [can be ascertained] only through a means of valid cognition, because [it requires] certainty. |
vākyasya lakṣaṇaṃ yuktaṃ parato 'taḥ pramāsthitiḥ // | Therefore the validity of a statement must be [established] through external [means]. |
kiñca bhavatu nāma doṣābhāvo lakṣaṇaṃ tathāpi doṣa eva, svavacanavyāghātaprasaṅgāt / | Moreover, even if absence of defects were to be a defining characteristic, there would still be a fault due to the possibility of self-contradiction. |
tathā hi yadi doṣābhāvena prāmāṇyam upalakṣyate tadā spaṣṭam eva parataḥprāmāaṇyam uktaṃ syāt, tataś ca svataḥprāmāṇyamityetad vacanaṃ parāhataṃ syāt / | For if validity is characterized by absence of defects, then clearly validity would be [established] through external [means], and thus the statement that "validity is inherent" would be contradicted. |
etad eva spaṣṭayati doṣābhāvo yadyabhāvākhyena prāmāṇyena niścito bhavet tadāsau lakṣaṇaṃ bhavet, aniścitasya lakṣaṇatvāyogāt, anyasya cābhāvaniścāyakasya pramāṇasyābhāvāt, tataśca parato 'bhāvākhyāt prāmāṇyaṃ sphuṭataramevoktaṃ syāt / | This very point is clarified [thus]: if the absence of defects were to be ascertained through the means of cognition called "non-apprehension", only then could it serve as a characteristic, because what is uncertain cannot serve as a characteristic, and because there is no other means of cognition that could ascertain [such] an absence; therefore it would be clearly stated that validity [comes] from an external [source], namely non-apprehension. |
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsu na jāyate / | [Even] when they [i.e. excellences] are present, knowledge of human defects does not arise. |
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsūpajāyate / | [Even] when they [i.e. excellences] are present, knowledge of human defects does arise. |
na nāma doṣābhāve tu guṇājñāne kathaṃ matiḥ // | Indeed, when there is no cognition of excellences, how can there be cognition of the absence of defects? |
yadi nāma guṇeṣu satsu doṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ notpadyate, guṇānāṃ parasantānavartinām atīndriyatvāt tadaparijñāne sati doṣābhāvaniścayo na prāpnoti guṇabhāvātmakatvād doṣābhāvasya, nahi ghaṭaviviktapradeśāparijñāne ghaṭābhāvo jñātuṃ śakyate // | If, when excellences are present, knowledge of defects does not arise, then - since excellences residing in another's mental continuum are beyond the senses - when these [excellences] are not cognized, there can be no certainty about the absence of defects, because absence of defects consists in the presence of excellences; just as the absence of a pot cannot be known without cognizing the place devoid of the pot. |
etad eva darśayati dveṣetyādi / | This very [point] is shown by [the words] beginning with "dveṣa" [hatred]. |
dveṣamohādayo doṣāḥ kṛpāprajñādibādhitāḥ / | Defects such as hatred, delusion and so forth are [indeed] counteracted by [qualities] such as compassion, wisdom and the like; |
dayādyaniścaye teṣām asattvaṃ hi kathaṃ gatam // | When there is no certainty regarding [qualities] such as compassion and so forth, how indeed can the non-existence of those [defects] be ascertained? |
teṣām iti doṣāṇām // | [The word] 'teṣām' [means] 'of those defects.' |
tadā na vyāpriyante tu jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ / | At that time [of cognizing defects' absence], the virtuous qualities do not function by way of being themselves cognized; |
doṣābhāve tu vijñeye sattāmātropakāriṇaḥ // | But in [the process of] cognizing the absence of defects, [these qualities] help merely through their presence. |
etat tadetyādināśaṅkate / | [Kumārila] raises this doubt beginning with those [words]. |
tadā na vyāpriyante tu jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ / | At that time [of cognizing defects' absence], the virtuous qualities do not function by way of being themselves cognized; |
doṣābhāve tu vijñeye sattāmātropakāriṇaḥ // | But in [the process of] cognizing the absence of defects, [these qualities] help merely through their presence. |
upakāriṇa iti doṣābhāvaniścayaṃ pratyupakāriṇaḥ // | [The word] 'upakāriṇaḥ' [means that] they help in bringing about the certainty regarding the absence of defects. |
yadyevamityādinā pratividhatte / | [He] responds with [the words] beginning with "if this is so." |
yadyevaṃ saṃśayo na syād viparyastā matis tathā / doṣāḥ santyasya no veti santyevetyāptasammate // | If it were so, then in [the case of] a person recognized as āpta ['trustworthy'], there would be neither doubt [of the form] "are there defects in him or not?" nor wrong cognition [of the form] "there certainly are [defects in him]." |
tat saṃdehaviparyāsau bhavataścātra kasyacit / | And yet such doubt and wrong cognition do arise in some [people]; |
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