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tathā hi na tatra guṇāvadhāraṇaṃ sambhavati yāvad arthakriyāsaṃvādāt samyaktvaṃ nāvasīyate, tataścāvasthite samyaktve paścāt kālabhāvikāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇamakiñcitkaram eva / | Indeed, in such cases the recognition of [causal] perfection is not possible until correctness is ascertained through conformity with effective action, and thus, once correctness is established, the subsequent recognition of the temporal causal perfection serves no purpose whatsoever. |
yat punar viprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tasya kāraṇaguṇaniścayāt prāmāṇyaniścaya iti darśayann āha viprakṛṣṭe hītyādi / | Showing that for cognition relating to remote objects, validity is ascertained through certainty about the perfection of causes, [the author] states "in the case of remote [objects]" etc. |
yadviprakṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ sauvarṇaśaṅkhagrāhijñānaṃ tasya tajjanyatvāt viśuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt, sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaśuklaśaṅkhagrāhijñānavat prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / | The cognition grasping a golden conch-shell as a remote object has its validity ascertained because it is produced by that [cause] and because it is produced by perfect causes, just like the cognition grasping a white conch-shell as a proximate object. |
prayogaḥ yad viśuddhakāraṇajanitaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ, yathā sannikṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ śuklaśaṅkhagrāhivijñānaṃ, viśuddhakāraṇajanitaṃ cedaṃ viprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ pītākāraśaṅkhāvabhāsi vijñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The formal reasoning: Whatever is produced by perfect causes is valid, just as the cognition grasping a white conch-shell as a proximate object; and this cognition appearing as a yellow-formed conch-shell relating to a remote object is produced by perfect causes - this is a reason based on essential nature. |
nanu cāsiddho hetuḥ / | [Objection:] "But the reason is not established!" |
tathā hi kāraṇaśuddhir nārthasaṃvādamantareṇāvadhārayituṃ śakyate, atīndriyatvād indriyāṇām / | For the perfection of causes cannot be ascertained without conformity to objects, because the sense organs are beyond the senses. |
arthasaṃvādāpekṣāyāṃ ca tadeva prāmāṇyaṃ niścitam iti kāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇamanarthakam eva syāt / | And when conformity to objects is required, that itself constitutes established validity, so the recognition of causal perfection would be completely purposeless. |
tasya prāmāṇyaniścayottarakālabhāvitvāt / | Because it [i.e., recognition of causal perfection] would occur after the ascertainment of validity. |
athāpi syād ekadā sannikṛṣṭaviṣayād vijñānād arthakriyāsaṃvādato guṇattāṃ niścityānyadā viprakṛṣṭaviṣayasyāpi jñānasya saṃvādamantareṇaiva kālāntareṇa guṇavattāyā niścitatvāt tataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayo bhaviṣyatīti / | [One might say:] "Sometimes, having ascertained perfection from a cognition of a proximate object through conformity with effective action, at other times, even without conformity, the perfection [of causes] for cognition of a remote object will be ascertained after some time, and from that validity will be ascertained." |
tadetad asamyak / | This [argument] is incorrect. |
nahi kṣaṇakṣayiṇāṃ bhāvānām ekarūpaivaṃ pravṛttiḥ sambhavati / | Because for momentarily perishing entities, activity of exactly the same form is not possible. |
aparāparapratyayopayogena pratikṣaṇaṃ bhinnaśaktitvādityetat sarvamāśaṅkhyāha sitasādhyakriyāvāptyetyādi / | Having anticipated all this [objection] that "because [the causes] would have different potencies in each moment due to the influence of successive conditions," [the author] states [the verses] beginning with "sitasādhyakriyāvāptyā." |
kāmalākrāntanetrotthavijñānaṃ neti gamyate // itthaṃ kāraṇasaṃśuddhau praṇītāyāṃ tadeva yā / | It is understood that [we] do not [mean] the cognition arising from an eye affected by jaundice; when the purity of the cause is thus established. |
viśuddhakāraṇotpādāt tvasyāḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / niṣpāditakriye kambau sitākāramatoriva // | The ascertainment of its validity [comes] from the arising of pure causes, just as in [the case of] a conch shell whose whiteness has produced its effect. |
anenaitad āha nahyasmābhiḥ kālāntarabhāvino viprakṛṣṭaviṣayasya jñānasya kāraṇapariśuddhyā prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate, yenāsiddhatā hetor bhavet, pratikṣaṇamaparāparapratyayopayogena bhinnaśaktisambhavād iti / | By this [he] says: We do not ascertain the validity of cognition of a remote object occurring at a different time through the purity of [its] cause (which would make the reason inadmissible due to the possibility of different potencies arising from successive conditions in each moment). |
na vā tasyāmevāvasthāyāṃ kāraṇāntarathātvaṃ sambhavati mābhūt sannikṛṣṭārthaviṣayajñānasyārthakriyāvisaṃvāda iti // | Nor is it possible that there be a change in the cause at that very moment, [for] then there would be no non-deviation from effective action of the cognition of the proximate object. |
kṣudādyanupaghātādivacanādidam uktavān / bhāṣyakāro 'pyato mohād anavastheha codyate // | The Bhāṣyakāra has stated this same [point] through mentioning the non-affliction by hunger etc.; hence it is through delusion that an infinite regress is objected to here. |
anena pratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodho 'pi pratipāditaḥ / | By this, self-contradiction in [their own] proposition is also demonstrated. |
tathā hi bhāṣyakāreṇoktam yadā kṣudādibhir upahataṃ mano bhavatīndriyaṃ vā, saukṣyādibhir vā bāhyo viṣayaḥ, tato mithyājñānam, anupahateṣu samyagjñānam / | For thus the Bhāṣyakāra has stated: "When the mind or sense organ is afflicted by hunger etc., or when the external object [is affected] by minuteness etc., then [there is] false cognition; when they are unafflicted, [there is] right cognition. |
indriyamano'rthasannikarṣo hi jñānasya hetuḥ, asati tasminnajñānād gato hi doṣo mithyājñānasya hetuḥ, duṣṭeṣu hi jñānaṃ mithyā bhavati, doṣāpagame sampratipattidarśanāt / | For the contact of sense organ, mind and object is the cause of cognition; when that is absent, [there is] no cognition; hence a defect becomes the cause of false cognition; for when [these factors] are defective, cognition becomes false, as seen from the occurrence of correct cognition when the defect is removed. |
kathaṃ duṣṭāvagama iti cetprayatnenānvicchanto na ceddoṣamavagacchema pramāṇābhāvād aduṣṭam iti manyemahīti / | If [it is asked] "How is the defect known?", [the answer is that] if while investigating carefully we do not apprehend any defect, then due to absence of evidence [for defect], we consider [the cause] to be undefective." |
anena hi granthena bhāṣyakṛtā kāraṇaśuddhijñānāt prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ spaṣṭamākhyātaḥ / | For by this passage, the Bhāṣyakāra has clearly stated that the ascertainment of validity [comes] from the knowledge of the purity of the cause. |
anyathā{pra}yatnenānvicchanta ityanena kiṃ darśitaṃ bhavet / | If this were not [what was] meant, then what would be the purpose of the phrase "searching with effort"? |
tataś ca svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāvyāghātaḥ // | And thus [there would be] a contradiction of the claim of self-validity [of cognitions]. |
yaduktam "saṃvādaguṇavijñāne kena vābhyadhike mate" iti / | As has been stated: "On what grounds are the corroborative cognition and the cognition of excellence considered superior [to the initial cognition]?" |
tatra saṃvādaṃ prati pūrvam uktam, guṇajñānaṃ pratyāha duṣṭetyādi / | Regarding this, the [answer] concerning corroborative cognition has been stated before; now [the author] speaks about the cognition of excellence, [beginning with] "duṣṭa" etc. |
mānateti / | [The word] "mānatā" [means] validity. |
ādyasyeti / arthajñānasya / | [The word] "ādyasya" [refers to] the cognition of the object. |
taddhi kāraṇaśuddhijñānāt prathamabhāvitvād ādyam / | Indeed, it is called "initial" because it occurs before the cognition of the purity of the cause. |
taditi tasmāt // | [The word] "tat" [means] "therefore." |
evam ityādinā pravṛtter adṛ{du}ṣṭatāṃ darśayati / | With [the words] beginning with "evam," [the author] shows the faultlessness of the activity. |
evaṃ cārthakriyājñānāddhetuśuddhiviniścitau / akṛtārthakriye vṛtter arthavācyopapadyate // | Thus, when the purity of the cause is ascertained through the cognition of effective action, in a case where no effective action has [yet] been accomplished, the operation [of cognition] cannot be criticized. |
akṛtārthakriya iti / | [The word] "akṛtārtha" [means] |
akṛtā arthakriyā yena sa tathoktaḥ / | One by whom an effective action has not been performed is called thus. |
avācyeti / | [The word] "avācyā" [means] "not to be deprecated" |
prāmāṇyaniścayapūrvatvād asyā iti manyate // | It is considered thus because it is preceded by the ascertainment of validity. |
yadi svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ tadapodyate // | If self-validity of cognitions is established as a universal rule, [and] it is negated by either an annulment or the knowledge of defective causes, |
bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvāt pramāṇatā / | [then] validity [would be] due to the absence of both annulment and knowledge of defective causes; |
prāptaivaṃ ca parasmāt te bhavet prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | and thus for you the certainty of validity would arise from external [factors]. |
tathā hi tadabhāvo 'yam abhāvākhyaṃ pramāntaram / tvatpakṣe 'nupalambhākhyamanumānaṃ tu manmate // | For this absence is indeed another means of valid cognition called 'absence', which in your view is called 'non-apprehension', but in our view [is called] 'inference'. |
atra prathamena ślokena parapakṣānuvādaḥ, dvitīyādinā dūṣaṇam / | Here, the first verse [presents] the restatement of the opponent's view, [and] with the second [verse] begins the refutation. |
yadi hi bādhakādipratyayena prāmāṇyamapodyate, evaṃ sati bādhakādipratyayābhāvāt prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt / | If validity is indeed negated by the cognition of annulment etc., then in such a case, the certainty of validity would be admitted [to arise] from the absence of cognition of annulment etc. |
abhāvasyāpi pramāṇāntaratveneṣṭatvāt / | Because absence too is accepted as a separate means of valid cognition. |
asmatpakṣe tvanupalabdhisaṃjñake 'numāne 'ntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaram | According to our view, the [form of cognition] called 'non-apprehension' (anupalabdhi) is included under 'inference' (anumāna) and is not a separate means of valid cognition. |
tathā hi tvadupavarṇitayaivopapattyā viparīto 'pyutsargāpavādaḥ śakyate kalpayitum iti darśayati anayaivetyādi | Thus, by the very same reasoning that you have described, even the opposite [position regarding] general rule and exception can be established, as [the author] shows beginning with "by this very [reasoning]." |
anayaivopapattyā syād aprāmāṇyam api svataḥ / tatrāpi śakyate vaktuṃ yasmān nyāyo 'yamīdṛśaḥ | By this very same reasoning, invalidity too could be [considered] intrinsic, and this too can be stated because such is the logical argument. |
tasmāt svato 'pramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvād apodyate | Therefore, intrinsic invalidity is established as the universal rule, [and] it is discarded due to the absence of [both] invalidating factors and the cognition of defectiveness in the cause. |
yadapyuktaṃ kumārileṇa | As has also been stated by Kumārila: |
"tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā / arthānyathātvahetūtvadoṣajñānād apodyate" | "Therefore, the validity of cognition is obtained through its nature as awareness, [and] is discarded through the cognition of defects [consisting in] the cause [of cognition] being different from the object." |
iti, anayāpi hi diśā śakyam api vaktum iti darśayann āha tathā bodhātmakatvenetyādi | Thus, showing that it is possible to speak even in this direction [i.e., regarding invalidity], he states "similarly, through [its] nature as awareness" etc. |
tathā bodhātmakatvena buddheḥ prāptāpramāṇatā / yathārthajñānahetūtthaguṇajñānād apodyate | Similarly, the invalidity of cognition is obtained through its nature as awareness, [and] is discarded through the cognition of [its] conformity to reality and through the cognition of positive qualities arising from [its] cause. |
aprāmāṇye parāyatte bhavatyevānavasthitiḥ | If invalidity were dependent on external [factors], there would indeed be an infinite regress. |
pramāṇādhīnametaddhi svatastaccāpratiṣṭhitam // | Because this [invalidity] is dependent upon valid cognition, and that [valid cognition] itself is not established. |
yathārthajñānaṃ ca arthasaṃvādajñānaṃ, hetūtthaguṇajñānaṃ ca kāraṇasamutthaguṇajñānam iti samāhāradvandvaḥ / | "Yathārthajñāna" is cognition of conformity with reality, and "hetūtthaguṇajñāna" is cognition of qualities arising from causes - these form a copulative compound. |
parāyatte 'pi tasminnityādāvāha / aprāmāṇya ityādi / etaddhīti / aprāmāṇyam / | [The opponent] speaks about [cognition] being dependent on external factors. [The term] "etat" refers to invalidity. |
tacceti / pramāṇam // | [The word] "tat" refers to valid cognition. |
katham apratiṣṭhitam ity āha tathāhītyādi / | [One asks:] "Why is it not established?" [The answer] begins with "tathā hi." |
tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt prāmāṇyaṃ bhavatocyate / | For you assert validity based on the absence of sublating [cognition]. |
bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaramiṣyate // tasyāpi bādhakābhāvāt prāmāṇyamabhidhīyate / | The absence of sublation is also considered a separate means of valid cognition called "non-apprehension," and its validity too is asserted based on the absence of sublating [cognition]. |
tatra tatraivamicchāyāṃ vyavasthā nopalabhyate // | When [validity] is desired in this way in each case, no stable foundation is found. |
yaduktam bādhakaḥ pratyaya ityādi tatrāha anapekṣapramāṇatvam ityādi / | Regarding what was said about sublating cognition, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "anapekṣapramāṇatvam." |
anapekṣapramāṇatvaṃ bādhakapratyaye yataḥ / | Because there is no self-sufficient validity in sublating cognition. |
na siddhaṃ tena naivāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate // | Thus [this] is not established, and this [cognition] does not set aside the preceding cognition. |
abhāvākhyasya pramāṇasyāpekṣitvād anapekṣapramāṇatvam asyāsiddham // | Since the means of cognition called 'non-apprehension' is dependent [on something else], its [claimed] status as an independent means of cognition is not established. |
athāpi bādhakābhāvaṃ vinā prāmāṇyam iṣyate / kvacid ādye tathābhāve pradveṣaḥ kiṃnimittakaḥ // | If validity is admitted in some cases even without [establishing] the absence of a sublating [cognition], then what could be the reason for hostility towards the initial cognition in such a case? |
yadyanavasthābhayāt kvacid vinaiva bādhakābhāvaṃ prāmāṇyam iṣyate tadā prathame 'pi jñāne bādhakābhāvo nāpekṣaṇīyaḥ syāt / | If validity is admitted in some cases without [establishing] the absence of a sublating [cognition] due to fear of infinite regress, then even in the case of the initial cognition, the absence of a sublating [cognition] need not be required. |
tataś ca sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ // | And from this follows the [unwanted] consequence that all cognitions would be valid. |
bādhakaḥ pratyayaścāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate / anapekṣapramāṇatvād yadi śaṅkātra kiṃ bhavet // | If this sublating cognition sets aside the preceding cognition due to having self-sufficient validity, why should there be any doubt about it? |
anapekṣyapramāṇatvaṃ śaṅkyate cātra bādhakam / | And [if] a sublating [cognition] whose validity is independent is suspected here, |
viruddhametadāśaṅkā niścite hi jāyate // | this doubt is contradictory, for a doubt cannot arise regarding what is [already] ascertained. |
yadi bādhakaḥ pratyayo 'napekṣyapramāṇabhāvas tatkathaṃ tatrāpavādāśaṅkā, yenocyate tatrāpi tvapavādasya syād apekṣeti, tataś ca parasparavyāhatam etaduktam anapekṣapramāṇatvam, tatra cāśaṅkyate bādhakam iti / | If the sublating cognition has self-sufficient validity, how can there be any suspicion of its sublation, due to which it is said that "there might be need for another sublating [cognition]"? Therefore these statements are mutually contradictory: that "it has self-sufficient validity" and that "a sublating [cognition] is suspected regarding it." |
tathāhyanapekṣamityanena niścayena viṣayīkṛtamucyate, yatra ca niścayas tatrāśaṅkāyā asambhavaḥ, niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvāt, āśaṅkāyāścobhayāṃśāvalambitvenāropākārapravṛttatvāt // | For what is called "independent" is made an object of certainty, and where there is certainty, doubt is impossible, since certainty and presumption have a sublated-sublating relationship, and since doubt, by depending on both aspects, operates in the form of presumption. |
svataḥprāmāṇyapakṣe 'pi svarasenaiva niścayāt / kasmād bādhakasadbhāvasiddhau yatno vidhīyate // | Even under the theory of intrinsic validity, since certainty arises naturally, why should effort be made to establish the existence of a sublating [cognition]? |
tathā hi svarasenaiva na yasmin mānaniścayaḥ / niścīyate 'tra yatnena sāmarthyāt tatra bādhakaḥ // | For when validity is not naturally ascertained in something, [only] then is a sublating [cognition] ascertained there through effort, by [its own] capacity. |
ataḥ parīkṣakajñānatrayamatra kimucyate / | Why should there be said to be three cognitions of the investigator here? |
naikasyāpyavakāśo 'sti tasminniścayataḥ svataḥ // | There is no room even for a single [cognition], as the certainty [about it] arises by itself. |
yadi cotpadyate śaṅkānupalambhe 'pi saṃśayāt / | If a doubt arises even when there is no perception [of a sublating cognition], due to uncertainty, |
bādhābhāvāvinābhūtaṃ yasmānnānupalambhanam // | because non-perception is not invariably concomitant with the absence of sublation, |
evaṃ sati traye kasmāt paritoṣastvayā kṛtaḥ / | in that case, why are you satisfied with [only] three [cognitions]? |
adṛṣṭāvapi śaṅkyeta bādhā pūrvavadatra hi // | For here, as before, sublation could be suspected even when not seen. |
yāvanna kāryasaṃvādas tāvan na vinivartate / | [The doubt] does not cease until there is conformity with practical efficacy. |
tataścājātabādhenāpyāśaṅkyaṃ bādhakaṃ punaḥ / | Therefore, even when no sublation has arisen, a sublating [cognition] may still be suspected. |
chalena vastunastattvaṃ nahi jātvavatiṣṭhate // | The truth of a thing can never be established through sophistry. |
ājīvitāt samutpannaṃ bādhapratyayavarjitam / | Even if [one has] a cognition that has arisen throughout [one's] life without a sublating awareness, |
śaṅkhe pītanibhaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ nahi jāyate // | [such as] the cognition of a conch-shell as yellow-like, [it] never becomes valid. |
yadi svata eva prāmāṇyaniścayas tadā niścayena prāmāṇyasya vyāptatvād yatrāniścayas tatra sāmarthyād aprāmāṇyasyāvasthānād bādhakasadbhāvo yatnamantareṇaiva niścita iti tadbhāvasiddhyartho vyartho yatnaḥ, tatra caikasyāpi parīkṣakajñānasyāpekṣāvakāśo naiva sambhavatīti, kiṃ punas trayāṇām | If validity is established by itself, then - since validity is pervaded by certainty - where there is uncertainty, there by implication must be invalidity due to the presence of a sublating [cognition] being established without effort; hence any effort to prove its existence would be futile, and there would be no possibility for even a single investigative cognition, what to speak of three. |
syād etat anupalambhamātreṇa bādhakābhāvo na śakyate niścetum, sato 'pi kasyacid dūrasūkṣmavyavahitasyānupalabdher vādhakābhāvenānupalambhasyāvyāptatvāt, tena bādhakābhāvasiddhaye yatno vidhīyata iti / | One might object thus: "The absence of a sublating [cognition] cannot be ascertained by mere non-perception, because even when something exists, it may not be perceived if it is remote, subtle or hidden, [and] since non-perception is not pervaded by the absence of a sublating [cognition], therefore effort is made to establish the absence of a sublating [cognition]." |
yadyevaṃ parīkṣakajñānatrayaniyamaṃ jahīhi, prathamajñānavadanyatrāpi bādhakasyāśaṅkyamānatvāt | If [what you say] is so, [then] give up the restriction of three cognitions for the investigator, because, as in the case of the first cognition, the possibility of sublation can be suspected in other [cognitions] as well |
yāvaddhi phalajñānaṃ nodeti tāvad bādhāśaṅkā kena nivartatām, yena trayaniyamaḥ syāt | Until the cognition of the result arises, how can the suspicion of sublation be prevented, [in view of] which there could be a restriction to three [cognitions]? |
na hyākrośamātreṇaiva vinā pramāṇaṃ prekṣāvatām āśaṅkānivṛttir yuktā | For mere proclamation without proof cannot reasonably bring about cessation of suspicion in the minds of discerning people |
tathā hi vastusthityā pramāṇacintā, nāyaṃ chalavyavahāraḥ prastuto yena katipayapratyayamātraṃ nirūpyete | For the investigation of valid cognition proceeds according to the reality of things; this is not a mere casuistic discussion where only a few cognitions are examined |
yadi punar jñānatrayodayāvadhimātreṇa prāmāṇyamavatiṣṭhate hanta tarhi yeṣām ājīvitaṃ kāmalopahatacakṣuṣāṃ pītaśaṅkhākāram eva jñānam upajāyate teṣāṃ tadvijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt | If validity [of cognition] were to rest merely on the limitation to the arising of three cognitions, then for those whose eyes are afflicted by jaundice throughout their life, their cognition of a conch-shell as yellow would [have to] be valid |
viśuddhikāraṇābhāvānnopajāyeta bādhakam | Due to absence of the cause of remedy, the sublating [cognition] does not arise |
anyena vā nimittena nātaḥ śaṅkā nivartate | Or due to some other reason, the suspicion does not cease from this |
viśuddheḥ kāraṇaṃ droṇakusumarasaniṣekādi | The cause of remedy [includes things] such as the application of droṇa-flower juice [to the eyes] |
anyena vā nimitteneti yathā marumarīcikānicaye samupajātasalilavibhramasya puṃso 'nupasarpaṇāt salilasvabhāvaviviktamarusthalīnirbhāsi jñānaṃ nopajāyate | "Or due to some other reason" means: for instance, when a person who has the illusion of water arising upon seeing a mass of mirages does not approach [it], the cognition revealing the desert as distinct from the nature of water does not arise |
sanimittaiva teneyam āśaṅkā yatra mohataḥ | Therefore this suspicion, where [it arises] from delusion, always has some cause |
śuddhisaṃvādadṛṣṭau tu nāśaṅkā sudhiyo bhavet | But when there is perception of both purity and correspondence [to reality], no suspicion arises in the mind of the wise |
sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṃśayātmā na jāyate | He does not become doubtful in all [his] dealings |
niḥsaṃśayā hi dhīstasya śuddhisaṃvādadarśane | For his intellect becomes free from doubt upon seeing [both] purity and correspondence [to reality] |
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