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yāvad guṇādhāra ityasau nāvagamyate // | until he is recognized as being the receptacle of excellences. |
yadi sattāmātreṇa guṇā doṣābhāvaniścayāya vyāpriyeraṃs tadāptasammate puṃsi na kasyacid doṣābhāvaṃ prati saṃśayaviparyāsau prāpnutaḥ, niścayena tayor bādhitatvāt, nacaivaṃ bhavati, tat tasmād yāvadguṇavattāniścayo na jāyate tāvad doṣābhāvaviṣayau saṃśayaviparyāsau bhavata eveti na sattāmātreṇa vyāpriyante guṇāḥ // | If excellences were to function by their mere presence in bringing about certainty regarding the absence of defects, then in [the case of] a person recognized as āpta, no one could have doubt or misconception regarding the absence of defects, as both [doubt and misconception] would be precluded by [that] certainty; but this is not so; therefore, as long as certainty about the presence of excellences does not arise, doubt and misconception regarding the absence of defects do indeed occur; hence excellences do not function by their mere presence. |
doṣābhāve 'py athājñāne svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / tathāpi vimatir na syāt pūrvavat tatra vaktari // | Even if there were certainty regarding self-validity [of cognitions] when there is no knowledge of the absence of defects, there still could not be contrary cognition regarding that speaker, as [stated] before. |
athāpi syāt mā bhūd guṇānāṃ vyāpāro doṣābhāvaniścayāya, tathāpy aniścitād eva doṣābhāvāt prāmāṇyaniścayo bhaviṣyatīti. | One might argue: "Let it be that excellences have no operation in bringing about certainty regarding the absence of defects; even so, certainty regarding validity would follow from the [mere] uncertain absence of defects." |
etad apy ayuktam, pūrvavat tatrāptasammate vaktari vimatyabhāvaprasaṅgāt. na hi tadvākyasya svataḥprāmāṇyaniścaye sati tasmin vaktari kimayaṃ satyavādī na vā, naiva veti matir yuktā / vimatiśabdenātra saṃśayaviparyāsau vivakṣitau / | This too is incorrect, because as before, it would result in the absence of contrary cognition regarding that speaker recognized as āpta; for when there is certainty regarding the self-validity of his statement, such notions about that speaker as "is he truthful or not, or is he not [truthful] at all?" would not be possible; here by the word "vimati" both doubt and misconception are meant; |
viparītākārā matir vimatir iti kṛtvā saṃśayasyobhayāṃśāvalambitvena viparītākārasambhavāt // | since "vimati" means a cognition of contrary form, and since doubt, by depending on both alternatives, can have a contrary form. |
tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ / | Therefore, from the excellences [follows] the absence of defects, [and] from that absence [follows something else]. |
ityādi, tad api doṣābhāvaniścaye saty ayuktam eveti darśayati doṣābhāvasyetyādi / doṣābhāvasya cājñānād apramādvayanāstitā / | [All] this and so forth is also incorrect when there is certainty about the absence of defects, [as] he shows [with the words] beginning with "doṣābhāvasya"; and due to the non-knowledge of the absence of defects, there is no non-existence of the two forms of invalid cognition. |
athāpramādvayāsattāpratītāvapi gamyate | Even when there is [supposed] cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition, it cannot be accepted |
yadi hi saṃśayaviparyāsābhyām apavādabhūtābhyāṃ rahitaṃ jñānaṃ siddhyettadā tat pramāṇaṃ bhavet | If there would arise a cognition free from doubt and misconception, which are [its] contradictories, then that [cognition] would be valid |
anyathāpavādasamākrānte viṣaye katham utsargo niviśeta | Otherwise, when the subject matter is affected by contradictories, how could the general rule apply? |
tayoś ca saṃśayaviparyāsayor doṣahetutvād doṣābhāvāniścaye tayor abhāvaniścayo na yujyate | And since both doubt and misconception are caused by defects, there can be no certainty about their absence when there is no certainty about the absence of defects |
apramādvayanāstiteti saṃśayaviparyayanāstitā | "The absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition" means the absence of doubt and misconception |
tām eva vimatiṃ darśayati kimasya vacanaṃ mānam ityādi | [The text] shows this very uncertainty [by saying] "Is his statement valid?" etc. |
doṣābhāvāpramābhāvaguṇabhāveṣu triṣvapi | [Regarding] all three - the absence of defects, the absence of invalid cognitions, and the presence of excellences |
doṣābhāve apramāṇadvayābhāve guṇeṣu cāvaśyaṃ pratītiḥ niścayavyākhyābhyupagantavyā | The cognition of the absence of defects, the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition, and the presence of excellences must necessarily be admitted to be [requiring] certainty |
anyathā prāmāṇyaniścayāyogād iti pratipāditatvāt | Because otherwise there could be no certainty regarding validity, as has been explained |
yadi nāmābhyupagatā tataḥ kimityāha setyādi | [One asks:] "If these are admitted, then what?" - thus he states "If" etc. |
yathārthaniścayāyāṅgamapramāṇaṃ kathaṃ bhavet // saiṣā triṣvapi yathokteṣu pratītiḥ prāmāṇyāṅgatveneṣṭā kimapramāṇamāhosvit pramāṇam iti kalpanādvayam / | How can something invalid be a factor in the ascertainment of truth? Regarding this cognition of the three factors mentioned before, which is accepted as contributing to validity, [there arise] two alternatives: "Is it invalid or is it valid?" |
yadyādyaḥ kalpas tadā prāmāṇyaniścayāṅgaṃ na prāpnoti svayam apramāṇatvāt / | If [it is] the first alternative, then it cannot be a factor in ascertaining validity, because it is itself invalid. |
nahyapramāṇatvena gṛhītaḥ sākṣī vyavahāre niścayāṅgaṃ bhavati // | For indeed, a witness who has been considered untrustworthy cannot be a factor in determining [the truth] in a transaction. |
prāmāṇye parataḥ prāpte tat prāmāṇyaviniścayaḥ / | If validity is derived from external [sources], then the ascertainment of that validity [would also have to come from external sources]. |
kathaṃ vā gamyate tasyāḥ pratīteḥ sā pramātmatā // bādhakapratyayābhāvād iti cetso 'pi kiṃ pramā / na veti doṣaḥ sarvo 'pi punaratrānuvartate // | How then is the validity of that cognition ascertained? If [one says] "from the absence of contradictory cognitions," then [the question arises]: "Is that [absence] itself valid or not?" Thus all the previous objections recur here again. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā paratas tasya vivakṣitasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaprasṅgo 'navasthādoṣaś ca / | If the second alternative is accepted, then the validity of the intended cognition would be extrinsic, and [there would be] the fault of infinite regress. |
tāmevānavasthāṃ pratipipādayiṣuḥ san pṛcchati kathaṃ vetyādi / | Desiring to demonstrate this very infinite regress, [the author] asks "how then" etc. |
so 'pīti / bādhakapratyayābhāvaḥ // | "That also" refers to the absence of contradictory cognition. |
katham asau doṣo 'trāpyanuvartata ity āha prāmāṇya ityādi / | [When asked] "How does that fault apply here also?" [the author] states "prāmāṇya" etc. |
prāmāṇye parataḥprāptā prastutasya pramāṇatā / | The validity of the cognition under discussion would [have to] be derived from external [sources]. |
yathārthajñānahetutvamapramāṇasya vā kutaḥ | How can an invalid cognition be the cause of right knowledge? |
asyāpi gamyate kena prāmāṇyamiti cintyate | How is the validity of this [cognition] also apprehended? This needs to be considered. |
bādhakapratyayāsattvādityaniṣṭā prasajyate | An undesirable conclusion follows from [assuming] the absence of contradicting cognitions. |
subodham | This is easily understood. |
asyāpīti bādhakapratyayābhāvasya | [This refers to] the absence of contradicting cognitions. |
apramāṇadvayāsattvaṃ tenotsargo 'napoditaḥ | Therefore the absence of the two types of invalid cognition [follows], [and thus] the general rule remains unrefuted. |
sarvatraivaṃ pramāṇatvaṃ niścitaṃ cedihāpyasau pūrvodito doṣagaṇaḥ prasaktā cānavasthitiḥ | If validity is thus determined everywhere, then here too the previously mentioned collection of faults applies and an infinite regress follows. |
pūrvodita iti | [This refers to] what was mentioned before. |
guṇādīnāṃ parasantānavartināmargāgdarśanasyātīndriyatvāt tadaniścaye doṣābhāvasyāpyaniścayād apramāṇadvayāsattvamapyaniścitam iti na guṇādibhyaḥprāmāṇyaṃ siddhyet | Since excellences etc. occurring in others' mental continua are beyond the senses of those with limited vision, there is uncertainty about them; due to uncertainty about the absence of defects, the absence of two types of invalid cognition is also uncertain - thus validity cannot be established from excellences etc. |
kiñca tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāva ityādinā pradarśitena nyāyena yadi sarvatra prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate tadā pūrvam eva pramāṇaṃ parato 'bhyupagataṃ syād anavasthā ca | Moreover, if validity is determined everywhere through the principle shown in [the statement] "from excellences follows the absence of defects" etc., then the very first cognition would be [accepted as] valid from another [source], and an infinite regress [would follow]. |
prathamapakṣe doṣamāha doṣābhāva ityādi / | [The opponent] points out the fault in the first alternative [by saying] "absence of defects" etc. |
kevalaṃ yadi kalpyeta tat siddhir naiva sambhavet // | If this [absence] is conceived as absolute, then its proof would never be possible. |
abhāvānu{du---}palambhena tat siddhir nāvakalpate / | Its proof is not possible through apprehension because [it is] of the nature of absence. |
anavasthitidoṣāc ca na yuktānupalambhataḥ // | And [its proof is] not possible through non-apprehension due to the fault of infinite regress. |
yadi prasajyapratiṣedhamātramiṣṭaṃ tadā tasya siddhir naiva sambhavet / | If what is intended is mere absolute negation, then its proof would never be possible. |
tathā hi tasya svato vā siddhir bhavet parato vā / | For its proof would have to be either through itself or through something else. |
svato 'pi siddhir bhavanti svayaṃ prakāśātmatayā vā bhavenniścayajananād vā / | Even if [proved] through itself, [that] would have to be either due to its self-luminous nature or due to its generation of certainty. |
parato 'pi kadācid upalambhād vā bhavedanupalambhād veti pakṣāḥ / | And if [proved] through something else, it would have to be either through apprehension or through non-apprehension - these are the alternatives. |
na tāvat svataḥprakāśātmatayā siddhir yuktā, tasyāvastutvāt prakāśātmatāyāś ca vastudharmatvāt / | First, proof through self-luminosity is not possible, because it [negation] is non-existent, while luminosity is a property of existing things. |
jñānam eva hi prakāśātmatayā svasaṃvittyā siddhyati / | For it is cognition alone that is proved through self-apprehension due to [its] self-luminous nature. |
natu vastusvabhāvaniṣedhamātralakṣaṇo 'bhāvaḥ / | But not absence, which is characterized merely as the denial of the nature of things. |
nāpi niścayajananāt svatas tasya siddhiḥ / | Nor is there proof of it through itself by [its] generation of certainty. |
sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād abhāvasya janakatvānupapatteḥ | Since absence [by definition] is characterized by lack of all capacity, it cannot be a producer [of anything] |
janakatve vā vasturūpatvaprasaṅgāt | And if it were a producer, it would [absurdly] follow that it would have the nature of a positive entity |
tasyānādheyātiśayatvena sahakārinirapekṣatvāt tanmātrabhāvinaḥ kāryasyāvirāmaprasaṅgāc ca | And since it cannot have any additional properties produced in it and [thus] is independent of auxiliary causes, it would [absurdly] follow that its effect, being dependent on that [absence] alone, would occur without interruption |
parato 'pyupalambhāt tasya siddhir nāvakalpata, kutaḥ, abhāvāt abhāvātmakatvāt, upalambhasya bhāvaviṣayatvāt | Its establishment through apprehension by something else is also not possible; why? Because being of the nature of absence [i.e. negative], apprehension can only have positive entities as its objects |
nāpyanupalambhas tasya siddhir anavasthāprasaṅgāt | Nor is non-apprehension its proof, as this would lead to infinite regress |
tathāhyanupalambho 'pyabhāvātmakatvāt kathaṃ siddha iti tatrāpīyaṃ svataḥ parata iti cintāvataratyeva | For thus, since non-apprehension too is of the nature of absence, how is it established? The same consideration arises here too: [is it established] by itself or by something else? |
na tāvat svato yathoktadoṣaprasaṅgāt / nāpi parato 'navasthādoṣāt | Not by itself, due to the previously stated faults; nor by something else, due to the fault of infinite regress |
tāmevānavasthāṃ darśayati doṣāpramādvayāsattetyādi | He shows this very infinite regress [in the verse beginning with] "doṣāpramādvayāsattā" |
doṣāpramādvayāsattā gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenetyanavasthitiḥ | The absence of defects and of the two kinds of invalid cognition is known through non-apprehension; [and if] the absence of apprehension [is known] through another [non-apprehension], there is infinite regress |
doṣāś ca apramādvayaṃ ca tayor asatteti samāsaḥ | The compound is to be analyzed as "the absence of defects and of the two kinds of invalid cognition" |
paryudāsdātmakaṃ taccetadviviktānyadarśanāt | If [this] absence is of the nature of relative negation, then its cognition would [be possible] only through perceiving [it as] distinct from other [things] |
doṣābhāvāparijñānaṃ guṇajñānātmakaṃ bhavet | The cognition of the absence of defects would [then] be of the nature of the cognition of excellences |
vivakṣitapramājñānasvarūpaṃ ca prasajyate | And [consequently] it would come to be of the nature of the cognition of the intended valid cognition |
apramāṇadvayāsattvajñānaṃ tadvyatireki ca | And the cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition would be different from that |
apramādvitayāsattve jñāte svātantryato 'thavā pariśiṣṭaḥ pramātmeti bhavato niścayaḥ kutaḥ | Or if the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition were cognized independently, how could you arrive at the conviction that what remains is of the nature of valid [cognition]? |
anyathānupapattyā cennanvarthāpattito bhavet | If [you say it would be] through arthāpatti because [it] cannot be explained otherwise |
doṣābhāvo hi paryudāsavṛttyā guṇātmaka eva bhavet | Through relative negation, the absence of defects would indeed be identical with the nature of excellences |
tataś ca tat parijñānam api guṇajñānātmakaṃ prāpnoti | And consequently, the cognition of that [absence] too would become of the nature of the cognition of excellences |
tac ca neṣṭam "tadā na vyāpriyante ca jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ" iti vacanāt | And this is not desirable, as per the statement that "the excellences do not function as [things] being cognized" |
apramāṇadvayāsattvam api paryudāsapakṣe pramāṇātmakam evāvatiṣṭhate | The absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition too, under the view of relative negation, stands as being identical with valid cognition |
tataścāpramāṇadvayāsattājñānam api vivakṣitapramājñānasvarūpaṃ prasajyate | And therefore the cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition too would [necessarily] be of the nature of the intended valid cognition |
"apramāṇadvayāsattvaṃ tenotsargo 'napoditaḥ" iti na yujyate duḥśliṣṭatvāt | The statement that "there is absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition, therefore the general rule remains unrefuted" is not proper due to [its] being poorly constructed |
tathā hi tasyaiva pramāṇatvena niścitatvāt tasya pramāṇatvaṃ niścīyata itihetuhetumadbhāvena vākyārtho duḥśliṣṭaḥsyād avyatirekāt | For thus, since the very same [cognition] is determined as being valid means of knowledge, if from that its validity is determined, such a meaning of the statement involving cause and effect would be poorly constructed due to [their] non-difference |
kiñca hetuhetumator bhedāt tadvyatireki pramāṇaparijñānavyatireki apramāṇadvayāsattājñānaṃ prasajyate | Moreover, due to the difference between cause and effect, it would follow that the cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition is different from the cognition of valid means of knowledge |
naca paryudāsātmakasya tadvyatirekitā yuktā / | It is not appropriate [to consider] that which is of the nature of paryudāsa [relative negation] as being different from that [valid cognition]. |
apramādvitayāsattve jñāta ityādinābhyupagamyāpramādvayāsattāsiddhiṃ paramatenaiva parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayati anyathānupapattyeti / | [The opponent] admits [the thesis about] "the cognition of the absence of two kinds of invalid cognition" and thereby establishes the extrinsic validity [of cognition] according to the opponent's own view, [arguing] that it cannot be otherwise. |
saṃśayaviparyāsābhyām anyasya jñānasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ muktvā gatyantarāsambhavāt // | Because there is no other possibility except for the self-validity of cognitions other than doubt and error. |
tasmād eva ca te nyāyād aprāmāṇyamapi svataḥ / | And from that very same reasoning of yours, invalidity too [could be considered as] inherent [in cognitions]. |
prasaktaṃ śakyate vaktuṃ yasmāt tatrāpyadaḥ sphuṭam // | This can be asserted [as] applicable [to invalidity], since this [reasoning] clearly [applies] there as well. |
tasmād doṣebhyo guṇānām abhāvāstadabhāvataḥ / | Therefore, from defects [follows] the absence of excellences, and from that absence [follows] the absence [of validity]. |
yasmād utsargabhāvo 'yaṃ vivakṣāmātranirmitaḥ / śakyo 'bhidhātuṃ vispaṣṭamapramāṇe 'pi mānavat // | Since this general principle is constructed from mere arbitrary intention, it can be clearly stated about invalidity just as [it can be stated] about validity. |
yato bādhātmakasyaiva buddhaḥ prāptā pramāṇatā / yathārthajñānahetūtthaguṇajñānād apodyate // | Since validity is obtained [only] for that which has the nature of contradiction, it is negated by the knowledge of the causes of true cognition and the knowledge of excellences. |
guṇaiścājñāyamānatvān nāprāmāṇyamapodyate / | And because the excellences are not cognized, invalidity is not negated. |
anapoditasiddhaṃ ca svatas tadapi saṃsthitam // | And being non-negated, that [invalidity] too remains established as inherent. |
ada iti / | This [is what is meant by] "adaḥ" [in the previous verse]. |
etat / kiṃ tacchakyate vaktum ityata āha tasmād ityādi / | Question: "What can be asserted here?" Answer: [He] says "therefore" etc. |
mānavaditi / saptamyantād vatiḥ / | [The word] "mānavat" [is formed with] the vati-suffix after a locative case ending. |
tadapīti / | [The word] "tadapi" [refers to] invalidity. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood. |
doṣāḥ santi na santītyādāvāha doṣā ityādi / | [He] speaks about [the issue of whether] defects exist or do not exist, saying "doṣāḥ" etc. |
kartur vedepi siddhatvād doṣāśaṅkā na nāstinaḥ // | Because an author of the Veda has been established, the suspicion of defects is indeed not absent. |
śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vedasya kartuḥ prasādhitatvāt kartur abhāvād ity asiddham, tena prekṣāvatām asmākaṃ vede doṣāśaṅkā na nāsti, apitvasyeva // | Since the existence of an author of the Veda has been proven in the examination of śruti, the claim "because there is no author" is unproven; therefore for us discriminating people, the suspicion of defects in the Veda is indeed not absent, but rather exists. |
ato yadanapekṣatvād ityatrāha ata ityādi / | Therefore regarding the statement "because of [its] independence," [he] says "ataḥ" etc. |
ato yadanapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyamucyate / tadasiddhaṃ yataḥ so 'pi kartāraṃ samapekṣate // | Therefore what is said about the validity of the Veda being due to [its] independence is unproven, because that [Veda] too depends upon an author. |
so 'pīti / vedaḥ // | "That too" [means] the Veda. |
yadi saṃvādivijñānaṃ na vā hetuviśuddhatā / niścitā saṃśayotpattes tadā vede na mānatā // | If there is neither corroborative cognition nor purity of cause, then due to the certain arising of doubt, there is no validity in the Veda. |
yadyarthakriyāsaṃvādijñānaṃ kāraṇaviśuddhijñānaṃ ca dvayam apyetat prāmāṇyaniścayakāraṇaṃ vede nāṅgīkriyate tadā niścayahetuvaikalyād vede prāmāṇyaniścayo na prāpnoti kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasyāsambhavāt // | If both [types of] cognition - the cognition that corresponds to effective action and the cognition of the perfection of causes - which [together] constitute the source for certainty about validity, are not accepted in the case of the Veda, then, due to the absence of causes for certainty, there can be no certainty about [its] validity, since an effect cannot arise without its cause. |
anyasyāpi pramāṇatva ityatrāha anyasyāpītyādi / anyasyāpi pramāṇatve evambhūtaiva saṅgatiḥ / kāraṇaṃ kalpyate yasmānniścayastannibandhanaḥ // | Even in the case of the validity of other [means of knowledge], such a connection [with confirmation] indeed exists, because certainty is dependent on [such] a cause being postulated. |
evambhūtaiveti / | [The term] "such indeed" [refers to what follows]: |
saṃvādaguṇaparijñānalakṣaṇā / | [It means] having the characteristic of conformity [with reality] and cognition of excellence. |
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