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tathā hi utpannaṃ vā jñānam ātmānaṃ kuryād anutpannaṃ vā / | For thus: would cognition produce itself when [already] produced or when not [yet] produced? |
na tāvad utpannaṃ, tadātmano 'pyekayogakṣamatayotpannatvāt / | [It cannot be] when [already] produced, because it would [then] be produced while being on the same level as itself; |
naca yo yena sahaikayogagakṣemo na bhavati sa tatsvabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | and that which cannot exist on the same level with something cannot logically have the same nature as that [thing], as [this would lead to] an absurd consequence; |
nacotpannasya svabhāvasya karaṇaṃ yuktamatiśayasyābhāvāt / | nor is it logical to bring about a nature that is [already] produced, because of the absence of any additional distinction; |
karaṇāvirāmaprasaṅgāc ca / | and because [this would lead to] the unwanted consequence of endless production; |
nāpyanutpannam iti pakṣo 'sattvāt / | nor [can it be] when not [yet] produced, because of [its] non-existence; |
nahyasato vyāpāro yuktas tasya sarvasāmarthyopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇatvāt / | for an operation of what is non-existent is not possible, since it is characterized by the absence of all capacity and designation; |
vyāpāre satyasattvahāniprasaṅgāt / | because if there were an operation [of the non-existent], it would lead to the unwanted consequence of losing its non-existence. |
idam eva hi sattvalakṣaṇaṃ yadarthakriyākāritvam / | Indeed, the very defining characteristic of existence [of things] is [their] capacity to produce effects. |
tasmān na sāmyaṃ dṛṣṭāntasya dārṣṭāntikena // | Therefore, there is no similarity between the example and that which is to be exemplified. |
tenātra jñāyamānatvaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ upayujyate / | Therefore, in this case, the state of being cognized is useful for [establishing] validity. |
viṣayānubhavo yasmād ajñāto naiva labhyate // | Because an experience of objects cannot be obtained without [itself] being cognized. |
nanu ca yadi jñānaṃ svasaṃvidā svata eva siddham, tarhi svata eva jñānaṃ pramāṇam ityāśaṅkyāha etāvadityādi / | [One might] object: "If cognition is established by self-awareness alone, then cognition would be valid by itself" — [responding to] this objection, [the author] states "etāvat" etc. |
etāvat tu bhaved atra grahaṇe 'pi svasaṃvidaḥ / bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvāt tathātve na viniścayaḥ // | However, even in this case of self-awareness grasping [itself], there can be no certainty about its validity due to the possible presence of causes of error. |
tadā cārthatayā bhāvo 'pyasmān naivāsīyate / | And then, [the presence of] a real entity cannot be ascertained from this [cognition]. |
sādṛśyād upalambhena tadanyāropasambhavāt // | Because apprehension can occur due to similarity, and there is the possibility of superimposition of something else. |
nahyanubhūtam ityevaṃ sarvātmanā niścayo jāyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvān niścayotpatter iti bahudhā pratipāditaṃ, tena gṛhītam api jñānasya svasaṃvido 'rthapramāṇasāmarthyaṃ bhrāntikāraṇasyāpramāṇasārūpyānabhyāsādeḥ sadbhāvān niścayānutpatter aniścitam ity ucyate / | Certainty does not arise in all aspects merely from something being experienced, because the arising of certainty depends on other causes — this has been explained many times. Therefore, even when cognition is grasped by self-awareness, its capacity to be a valid means of knowing objects remains uncertain, due to the presence of causes of error such as similarity [with invalid cognition], lack of repeated experience, etc., which prevent certainty from arising. |
niścayānubhavayor bhedāt / | Because certainty and [mere] experience are different. |
tataś ca samāropavyavacchedena parataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭamityadoṣaḥ / | Therefore, since validity [is established] through the exclusion of superimposition by external [means], it is acceptable that validity is extrinsic — hence there is no fault [in this position]. |
yathoktam svarūpasya svato gatiḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti | As has been declared: "The cognition [of an object] is grasped by itself, but its validity [is established] through practical activity." |
tathā tva iti prāmāṇye | [This applies] thus regarding [its] validity. |
apramāṇaṃ punaṇ svārthe ityādāvāha ābhyāsikam ityādi | Regarding invalidity in relation to its own object, [the text] states [what follows] about repeated [cognition]. |
ābhyāsikaṃ yathā jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ gamyate svataḥ | Just as repeated cognition is understood as valid by itself, |
mithyājñānaṃ tathā kiñcid apramāṇaṃ svataḥ sthitam | Similarly, some false cognition [can be] established as invalid by itself. |
abhyāse bhavamābhyāsikam | [The term] ābhyāsika [means] that which occurs through repetition. |
yathābhyāsabalāt prāmāṇyaṃ kvacit svata eva niścīyate ityuktam, tathā mithyātvam api kasyacit svata evāvasīyate | Just as validity is determined by itself in some cases through the power of repetition, as stated [before], similarly the falsity of some [cognition] is also determined by itself. |
tathā ca dṛśyanta eva taimirikādayaḥ kecid abhyāsabalāt kleśoṇḍrakādivijñānam utpādasamantaram eva mithyātvena niścinvantaḥ | Thus indeed, some people suffering from eye disease are seen to determine the falsity of cognitions such as [seeing] tufts of hair immediately upon their arising, through the power of repeated experience. |
tadatrāpyanyathābhāve dhīr yathā duṣṭakāraṇa ityādāvāha bādhakāraṇetyādi | Regarding [the view] that cognition is otherwise due to defective causes and so forth, [the text] states [what follows] about sublating causes. |
bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñāne 'pyuktānavasthitiḥ | Even in the cognition of defectiveness due to sublating causes, the previously mentioned infinite regress [applies]. |
tāvatā tasya mithyātvaṃ grahītuṃ tan na pāryate | Therefore its falsity cannot be grasped merely through that [cognition]. |
ukteti "tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ bhavatocyate / bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaramiṣyata" | As has been stated: "Thus indeed, [something] is said to be valid due to the absence of sublation, but the absence of sublation itself is accepted as another means of knowledge, namely non-cognition." |
ityādinā / taditi / | [The answer] begins with these words "tat" [as follows]. |
tasmāt // | Hence [follows this explanation]. |
utpattyavastham evedaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate / | This [cognition] cannot be determined to be valid at the time of [its] origination. |
na tāvad avikalpatvād aniṣṭeścātmasaṃvidaḥ // | [This is] not [possible] firstly due to [its] being non-conceptual and because self-cognition is not accepted. |
nāpi jñānāntareṇaiva tatkāle 'sannidhānataḥ / | Nor [is it possible] through another cognition, due to [its] non-presence at that time. |
tasyāpyavyaktabhāvatvād aniṣṭāpattito 'pi vā // | Also because its existence is not manifested, or due to [the resulting] undesirable consequence. |
utpattyavasthāyāṃ kimātmanaiva pramāṇam iti niścīyate, āhosvid vijñānāntareṇa sahakālabhāvinā, yadvottarakālabhāvineti pakṣāḥ / | At the time of origination, is it determined to be valid by itself, or by another simultaneously occurring cognition, or by a subsequently occurring cognition? These are the alternatives. |
tatra na tāvad ātmanaiva sarvajñānānām ātmani nirvikalpatvāt pramāṇam ityeva grahaṇam anupapannam / | Among these, firstly, it cannot be grasped as valid by itself, because all cognitions are non-conceptual with regard to themselves. |
nāpi pareṇa saṃvedanaṃ jñānasyeṣṭam, nityaṃ buddheḥ parokṣatvābhyupagamāt / | Nor is the apprehension of a cognition by another [cognition] accepted, because it is acknowledged that cognition is always imperceptible. |
nāpi jñānāntareṇa samānakālabhāvinā, yugapad vijñānadvayānutpatteḥ / | Nor [can it be determined] by another simultaneously occurring cognition, because two cognitions cannot arise simultaneously. |
nāpi bhinnakālabhāvinā, tasyāpi jñānāntarasyāsiddhau tadgrāhyasyāsiddhau tadgrāhyasyāpi jñānasyāvyaktavyaktikatvenāsiddhes tasyāpi jñānāntareṇa siddhāviṣyamāṇāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt // | Nor [can cognition be established] by another cognition occurring at a different time, because if that other cognition is not established, what is to be cognized by it cannot be established; and because the cognition that is to be cognized would [then] have an unmanifested manifestation; and if that [cognition] too would have to be established by yet another cognition, an infinite regress would result. |
ato yatrāpi mithyātvam ityādāv āha vede 'pītyādi / | Therefore, in this context too, [the text] states regarding the falsity [of the Veda] etc., starting with "in the Veda also." |
taduktātmādyapohena tasmān mānaṃ na yujyate // | Therefore, through the rejection of the [concept of] soul and other things mentioned therein, it is established that [the Veda] cannot be a valid means of knowledge. |
pauruṣeyatvasiddheś ca śaṅkyā duṣṭanimittatā / vahneriva svataḥ śaktir mithyājñāneṣu vā bhavet // | And since it has been established that [the Veda] has human authorship, the defectiveness of [its] source is suspect. If validity were an inherent capacity [in cognitions], like the burning capacity of fire, then such [validity] would have to exist in false cognitions as well. |
codanāprabhavaṃ jñānam ato duṣṭanimittakam / śaṅkyate dṛṣṭadoṣāc ca śaṅkyadoṣaṃ na bhidyate // | Therefore the knowledge arising from Vedic injunctions is suspected to have a defective source, and what is suspected to be defective does not differ from what is observed to be defective. |
nahi sādharmyamātraṃ bauddhair vede bādhakaṃ pramāṇam ucyate / kiṃ tarhi taduktasyātmasāmānyādeḥ padārthasya pramāṇabādhanāt / | The Buddhists do not claim that mere similarity is what invalidates the Veda; rather, [they claim that] the entities mentioned therein, such as the soul, universals, and so forth, are contradicted by [valid] means of knowledge. |
etac cātmaparīkṣādau pratipāditam / kiñca śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatvasya sādhitatvāt, satyapi vāpauruṣeyatve dāvavanhyādivan mithyātvakāraṇatāsambhavāt, aprāmāṇyamasya sambhāvyata ityevam ucyate, na sādharmyamātram / | This has been explained in the examination of the soul and other [topics]. Moreover, since in the examination of scripture the human authorship of the Vedas has been established, or even if they were authorless, the possibility of causes of falsity exists—as in the case of forest fires and such—it is thus said that its invalidity is possible, not [merely based on] similarity alone. |
syād etat yadi nāma sambhāvyate tathāpi sambhāvanāmātrāt katham aprāmāṇyam asya siddhyatītyāha dṛṣṭadoṣāc ca śaṅkyadoṣaṃ na bhidyata iti / śaṅkyā doṣā yasmin vākye tat tathā / | One might object: "Even if this is possible, how can invalidity be established from mere possibility?" To this [the text] responds "what is suspected to be defective does not differ from what is observed to be defective." [The compound] śaṅkyadoṣa [means] "that in which defects are suspected." |
na bhidyata iti / ubhayasyāpi prāmāṇyaṃ sadvyavahāraniṣedhayogyatayā tulyatvāt // | "Does not differ" [means] because the validity of both is equally capable of being negated in actual practice. |
tasmāt svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ vedasyāpi na yujyate / | Therefore intrinsic validity is not possible for the Veda either. |
tena niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam iṣyatām // | Therefore, [you should] please accept that [the Veda] has been composed and expounded by those who are definitely known to be free from defects. |
kṛtaścāsāvākhyātaśceti vigrahaḥ / | [The compound] kṛtākhyāta [means] 'composed and expounded'. |
ākhyāto vyākhyātaḥ, nirdoṣaiḥ puruṣaiḥ kṛtākhyāta iti tṛtīyāsamāsaḥ, tadbhāvas tattvaṃ, niścitaṃ ca tannirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | ākhyāta [means] 'explained'; [in] 'composed and expounded by persons free from defects' [we have] an instrumental tatpuruṣa compound; tadbhāva [means] 'the state of that'; niścita [means] 'definitely known' [and modifies] 'the state of being composed and expounded by those free from defects'. |
tadetad iṣyatām, vedasya prāmāṇyasiddhaya iti sambandhaḥ / | This should be accepted for the establishment of the validity of the Veda. |
tataścaivamiṣyamāṇe parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ syād aniṣyamāṇe tvaprāmāṇyam eveti bhāvaḥ // | Thus if this is accepted, the validity would be extrinsic; if not accepted, there would be no validity at all. |
rāgadveṣādiyuktā hi pravaktāro yathā yathā / tathā tathā hi rakṣanti svādhyāyaṃ sutarāṃ nanu // | As expounders [of the Veda] who are affected by attachment, aversion, etc. appear, people protect the Vedic recitation all the more carefully. |
iti yasya hi saṃrabdhāḥ santi randhragaveṣiṇaḥ / kathaṃ na nāma nirdoṣaṃ sa paṭhed vedamādṛtaḥ // | When someone has zealous fault-finders [watching over them], how could they not read the Veda carefully and without errors? |
śuddhāścedabhyudāsīnāḥ syur vedādhyāyino narāḥ / ācakṣīran parair evaṃ na te vedaṃ vināśitam // | If pure but indifferent Vedic scholars existed, they might not notice the Veda being corrupted by others. |
tataḥ kālena mahatā tūpekṣitavināśitaḥ / anya eva bhaved vedaḥ pratikañcukatāṃ gataḥ // | Then over a long time, [the Veda], neglected and corrupted, would become something else entirely, reduced to a mere semblance [of itself]. |
rāgadveṣādiyuktāṃś ca rundhadbhir vedanāśinaḥ / sarvadā rakṣito vedaḥ svarūpaṃ na prahāsyati // | But when the Veda is constantly protected by those who restrain the corrupters [who are] affected by attachment and aversion, it will not lose its true form. |
kasyādhyetuḥ kiṃ smṛtimevāti durbalam, ko vā kuto 'dhītatvān, ko vā svarasyodāttādeḥ kṣāmatāmanyathātvaṃ kurvīta, apadam eva vā kaḥ padatvena bhittvā paṭhed ityeva yasya vedapāṭhakasya randhraṃ nirūpayanto vedādhyāyino narāḥ saṃrabdhāḥ samārabdhavīryāḥ santi, sa kathaṃ vedapāṭhako vedamādarān na paṭhet / | When zealous Vedic scholars are examining every weakness of a Vedic reciter [asking]: "Which student has weak memory? Who learned [the Veda] from whom? Who might make mistakes in high pitch and other accents? Who might read by wrongly breaking up non-words as if they were words?" - how could such a reciter not study the Veda with care? |
tataścāsya vedasyāprāmāṇyāśaṅkāyā abhāvāt kimiti niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam iṣyatām ityabhiprāyaḥ / | Thus, since there can be no suspicion regarding the validity of this Veda, why should [one] accept the view that [the Veda] "is known to be composed by someone definitely free from defects"? |
tathā hi yadi vedādhyāyinaḥ śuddadhiyo 'pi parair vināśyamānān vedanānaudāsīnyamālambamānā nācakṣīraṃs tadā sambhāvyate 'nya evāyaṃ vedaḥ praticchāyatāṃ yāta iti / | For if the students of the Veda, though pure-minded, remained indifferent and did not notice [when] the Vedas were being corrupted by others, then it would be possible that this Veda might become merely a shadow [of its original form]. |
yāvatā tair viśuddhadhībhir vedavināśino narān rāgādiparītacetaso rundhadbhir nivārayadbhiḥ sadaivāyaṃ saṃrakṣito veda iti sa katham ātmasvarūpaṃ jahyāt // | However, since those pure-minded ones have always protected this Veda by restraining and preventing people with minds afflicted by passion and other [defects] from corrupting the Veda, how could it lose its original form? |
iṣyate ca jagat sarvaṃ na kadācid anīdṛśam / | And it is held that this entire world has never been different from what [it is now]. |
naitad evam ityādinā pratividhatte / | [He] responds with "this is not so" and so forth. |
naitad evaṃ bhavennāma hyevaṃ pāṭhasya tulyatā / tadarthatattvabodhas tu na vinātyakṣadarśanam // | This cannot be so, for even if the textual reading remains the same, the true understanding of its meaning [cannot be verified] without direct perception. |
evaṃ hi kila kevalapāṭhamātrasya tulyatvaṃ pratipāditam / | Thus indeed, it is said, only the sameness of the mere text has been established. |
nanvathavi{rthādhi---}gamopāyaḥ, tataś ca tadarthamavaśyaṃ niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam asyeṣṭavyam eva // nacāpi pāṭhamātrasyādarśanamātreṇāsarvavidā sarvadeśādau taulyaṃ niścetuṃ śakyata iti darśayati sarve cetyādi / | Moreover, [there is the question of] the means of understanding the meaning, and therefore it must necessarily be accepted that this [Veda] is known to be composed by someone definitely free from defects. And [he] shows with "sarve ca" etc. that one who is not omniscient cannot determine the sameness [of the text] in all places etc. merely by seeing the text alone. |
sarve ca yasya puruṣā deśakālau tathākhilau / karāmalakavadvyaktaṃ vartante 'dhyakṣacetasi // | [Only] one in whose direct perception all persons, places, and times in their entirety exist as clearly as an āmalaka fruit in [one's] hand... |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedena vimatiḥ katham // | How [else could there be] difference of opinion due to differences in place, time, persons, and circumstances? |
atraivopapattim āha anyathetyādi / | Here [the author] states the explanation [of this] with [the words] beginning with "anyathā." |
yadi pāṭhasya tulyatvaṃ bhavet tadā kvacideśādau pāṭhaṃ prati puṃsāṃ vimatiḥ saṃśayo na prāpnoti // | If the reading [of the text] were identical [everywhere], then people could not have differences of opinion [or] doubts regarding the text based on [differences of] place, time, and so forth. |
jagatsadedṛśaṃ ceti na pramāṇam ihāpi vaḥ / | You have no valid means of knowledge here [to prove] that the world has always been like this. |
na yuktādṛṣṭimātreṇa saṃvartasyāpi nāstitā // | The non-existence of the saṃvarta [universal dissolution] cannot be established merely through non-perception. |
īdṛśam eva sarvadā jagadityatra na kiñcit sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti / | There is no valid means of proof establishing that "the world has always been exactly like this." |
yac ca smṛtikārair ucyate | And what is stated by the authors of the Smṛtis... |
"āsīd idam tamobhūtam aprajñātam alakṣaṇam / apravartyam avijñeyaṃ suṣuptam iva sarvataḥ //" | "This [universe] was [once] darkness-become, unknown, without characteristics, immovable, unknowable, as if asleep on all sides." |
tadetad asya dvividhasyāpi saṃvartasya na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti, yena sarvadā jagadīdṛśam eva siddhyet / | There is no valid means of knowledge that could refute these two types of dissolution, by which [one could prove that] the world must always remain exactly as it is now. |
nacādarśanamātreṇa vastūnāṃ nāstitā siddhyati, satyapi vastuni kvacid adarśanāt, vastvabhāvena darśanamātrasya vyāptyasiddheḥ // | The non-existence of things cannot be established by mere non-perception, because sometimes things are not perceived even when they exist, [and] because the pervasion of mere perception with the non-existence of things is not established. |
svataḥprāmāṇyapakṣe tu niścayaṃ kurute svataḥ / vedaḥ svārthasvarūpe ca tan na mohādisambhavaḥ // | However, according to the view of intrinsic validity [of cognition], the Veda produces certainty by itself regarding its own form and meaning, and therefore there can be no possibility of delusion and such [errors]. |
ataścājñānasaṃdehaviparyāsāpade sthite / nopadeśamapekṣeta dvijapoto 'pi kaścana // | Thus, there being no scope for ignorance, doubt, or misconception, not even a Brāhmaṇa child would require any instruction. |
yathācājñātamūlasya na vināśo 'pi sambhavī / ko vā vināśo nityasya bhaved vajrātiśāyinaḥ // | Just as there cannot be destruction of that whose root [cause] is unknown, how could there be any destruction of what is eternal [and] superior even to diamond [in its indestructibility]? |
abhivyaktyanyathātvaṃ cen nitye sā nanvapākṛtā / | If [you suggest] alteration of manifestation [is possible], has that [possibility] not already been rejected in the case of what is eternal? |
ato rakṣām api prājñyā niṣphalām asya kurvate // | Therefore, the learned ones' efforts to preserve this [Veda] are [actually] fruitless. |
dvijapotaḥ brāhmaṇaśiśuḥ / | "dvijapota" [means] a Brāhmaṇa child. |
evaṃ tāvat svataḥprāmāṇyād vināśo 'sya na sambhavatīti pratipāditam / | Thus far it has been established that destruction of this [Veda] is not possible due to its self-sufficient validity. |
idānīṃ nityatvādapi na sambhavatītyetad darśayituṃ pṛcchati ko vetyādi / | Now, to show that [destruction] is not possible due to its eternality also, he asks "how could there be" etc. |
abhivyaktyanyathātvaṃ ced iti / vināśa iti sambandhaḥ / | "If [there is] alteration of manifestation" etc. - this is to be connected with "destruction" [from the previous verse]. |
abhivyaktiḥ / asyeti vedasya // | "sā" [refers to] manifestation. "asya" [means] of the Veda. |
atīndriyārthadṛktasmād vidhūtāntasmaścayaḥ / vedārthapravibhāgajñaḥ kartā cābhyupagamyatām // | Please accept [there exists] an author [of the Veda] who perceives supersensible objects, who has dispelled the mass of internal darkness, and who knows the divisions of Vedic meaning. |
antastamaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭam ajñānam, tasya cayaḥ saṃhatiḥ, sa vidhūto yena sa tathoktaḥ / | Internal darkness [means] ignorance, both afflicted and unafflicted; its 'mass' [means] accumulation; he by whom this has been dispelled is described thus. |
pravibhāgajñaḥ vyākhyāto / | The one 'who knows the divisions' has been explained. |
vedasyeti śeṣaḥ / | '[Author] of the Veda' is to be supplied. |
tadevaṃ pratijñātārthasya sarvathā pramāṇabādhitatvam, hetoś ca tadbhāvabhāvitvād ityetasyānaikāntikatvaṃ sādhitam / sapakṣasiddhyarthaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ yaḥ saṃdehaparyāsaviṣayair ityādinā pradarśitam iti kṣepārthaḥ / | Thus it has been established that the propositional claim is completely invalidated by valid means of knowledge, and that the reason consisting in 'occurring when that occurs' is inconclusive. And the means of proving [the reason's] presence in similar cases has been shown through [the discussion] beginning with "which [cognition arises] from objects of doubt and error." |
yat tu pakṣacatuṣṭayamupanyasya pakṣatraye doṣābhidhānaṃ kṛtam, tatrāpi na kācid bauddhasya kṛtiḥ, nahi bauddhair eṣāṃ caturṇām ekatamo 'pi pakṣo 'bhīṣṭo 'niyamapakṣasyeṣṭatvāt / | As for presenting four positions and stating defects in three positions, this does not affect the Buddhist at all, since the Buddhists do not accept even one of these four positions, as they maintain the position that there is no fixed rule. |
tathā hi ubhayamapyetat kiñcit svataḥ kiñciparata iti pūrvamupavarṇitam / ata eva pakṣacatuṣṭayopanyāso 'pyayuktaḥ / | For it has been explained before that both [validity and invalidity] are sometimes intrinsic and sometimes extrinsic. Therefore even the presentation of [only] four positions is incorrect. |
pañcamasyāpyaniyamapakṣasya sambhavāt / | Because a fifth position is possible, [namely] that there is no fixed rule. |
apare tvanyathā pratijñārthaṃ varṇayanti bodhātmakatvaṃ nāma prāmāṇyam, tac ca jñānānāṃ svābhāvikam eva, na guṇakṛtaṃ, guṇābhāve 'pi viparyayajñāne bodhātmakatvasambhavāt / | Others, however, explain the propositional claim differently: validity means being of the nature of awareness, and that is indeed natural to cognitions, not produced by [positive] qualities, since even in erroneous cognition, in the absence of [positive] qualities, being of the nature of awareness is possible. |
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