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anyatrānubhūtaviṣayābhya iti vacanāt / anyathā hi yadi sārūpyāt sarvatra prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate tadānyatrānubhūtaviṣayābhya iti pratiṣedho 'narthakaḥ syāt | [This is clear] from the statement "apart from [cognitions] of apprehended objects." For otherwise, if validity were ascertained everywhere through similarity, then the exclusion "[apart from cognitions] of apprehended objects" would be meaningless. |
tasmād abhyāsabalāt protsāritabhrāntinimittamupajāyate yat tatsvata eva pramāṇam iti sthitam | Therefore it is established that what arises with grounds for error eliminated through the force of repetition is valid by itself alone. |
vailakṣaṇyāpratītau tu vijātīyārthaśaṅkayā / kāryāvabhāsivijñānād ṛte mānāviniścayaḥ | But when distinctness is not cognized, due to suspicion of a heterogeneous object, there is no certainty of validity without a cognition revealing the effect. |
tasmin sadapi mānatvaṃ viniścetuṃ na śakyate / | [Even] when validity is present in that [cognition], it cannot be ascertained. |
uttarādyakriyājñānāt kevalaṃ tat pratīyate // | It is recognized only through the cognition of the subsequent resultant activity. |
ataś ca prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tat saṃvādamapekṣate / | For this reason, that first cognition requires corroboration. |
saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyastathaiva na // | But the corroboration [itself] does not likewise require another corroboration through [another] corroboration. |
yatra hy anubhūtam api prāmāṇyaṃ bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvād viniścetuṃ na śakyate tatra parato 'rthakriyājñānād niścīyate, tāvanmatreṇaiva ca puruṣasyābhīṣṭārthasaṃsiddher ākāṅkṣā vinivṛtteti na punaḥ saṃvādenāpy aparaḥ saṃvādas tathaiva ādyajñānavadapekṣaṇīyaḥ // | Indeed, where validity, even though apprehended, cannot be ascertained due to the presence of causes of error, there it is ascertained extrinsically through the cognition of [its] resultant activity; and since the person's desired object is accomplished by just that much, the desire [for further proof] ceases; hence another corroboration through [another] corroboration is not required in the same way as [it was] for the initial cognition. |
bhrāntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā / | Its [i.e., the second cognition's] validity is intrinsic due to the absence of causes of error. |
prathamasya tadābhāve pradveṣo bhrāntisambhavāt // | For the first [cognition], in the absence of that [intrinsic validity], there is hostility [towards its self-validity] due to the possibility of error. |
nanu ca yat sandigdhārthāvinābhāvitvenāniścitārthaprāpaṇasāmarthyaṃ jñānam, tad anumānavan na pramāṇaṃ prāpnoti. tathā hi anumānasyārthāvinābhāvasaṃśaye sati na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, evaṃ pratyakṣe 'pi na prāpnoti. | "But that cognition which, due to having doubtful invariable concomitance with [its] object, has uncertain capacity to lead to [its] object, would turn out to be non-valid like inference. For just as inference is not considered valid when there is doubt about [its] invariable concomitance with [its] object, similarly perception too would turn out to be [non-valid]." |
naiṣa doṣaḥ. | This is not a fault. |
Here are the sentence pairs with precise translations: | null |
na hy anumānavad arthanāntarīyakam ātmānam upadarśayat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam, kiṃ tarhi pratibhāsamānārthavasāyaṃ kurvatu. | [A] perception is not considered valid because it shows itself as necessarily connected with its object like an inference, but rather [it is valid when] it produces an ascertainment of the appearing object. |
tathā hi arthakriyārthino 'bhimatam arthaṃ prāpayat pramāṇām ucyate. | For [a cognition] is called valid when it delivers the desired object to one who seeks purposeful action. |
na cārthadeśaṃ puruṣam upasarpavad arthaṃ vā puruṣadeśam ānayat tat prāpakaṃ bhavati, api tu puruṣaṃ pravartayat. | And this delivery [of the object] does not occur by bringing the person to the location of the object or by bringing the object to the location of the person, but rather by prompting the person to act. |
taṃ ca puruṣaṃ na hastena gṛhītvā pravartayati, kiṃ tarhi pravṛttiviṣayam upadarśayat. | And it does not prompt the person by taking [their] hand, but rather by showing [them] the object of activity. |
tac copadarśanaṃ pratibhāsamānārthāvasāyād, nānyat. yatra ca saṃśayaḥ, tatrāvaśyaṃ pratibhāsamānākārāvasāyo 'sti. | And this showing [consists of] nothing other than the ascertainment of the appearing object. And where there is doubt, there is necessarily an ascertainment of the appearing form. |
tadanavasāye tadvimarśāyogāt. | Because without such ascertainment, reflection upon it would be impossible. |
tataś caitāvatā pratyakṣavyāpāraparisamāptaiḥ paścād arthāvinābhāvasaṃśayo bhavan na pratyakṣavyāpāram uparuṇaddhīti, saty api saṃśayodaye bhavaty eva, prāmāṇyaṃ pratyakṣasya. | And since the operation of perception is complete with just this much, a subsequent doubt about the invariable connection with the object does not obstruct the operation of perception; thus even when doubt arises, the validity of perception remains. |
yat tu pratibhāsamānapadārthaviruddhākārāvasāyākrāntam udeti, tan na pramāṇam, yathā marīcikāgrāhijñānaṃ jalāvasāyākrāntam, tatra yathoktapramāṇavyāpārābhāvāt. | However, that [perception] which arises as affected by the ascertainment of a form contrary to the appearing object is not valid, like the cognition that grasps a mirage [when it is] affected by the ascertainment of water, because in that case the aforementioned operation of valid cognition is absent. |
yac ca śaṅke pītajñānaṃ maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇijñānam, tad apy apramāṇam eva, tatra yathārthaṃ pratibhāsāvasāyayor abhāvāt. | And that cognition of yellow in a conch-shell or cognition of a gem in [its] radiance is also certainly invalid, because in those cases both the appearance and the ascertainment are not in accordance with reality. |
pratibhāsavaśād dhi pratyakṣasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe, na tv arthāvisaṃvādamātrāt. na cātra yathā svabhāvadeśakālāvasthitavastupratibhāso 'sti, na vā deśakālaḥ sa eva bhavati, deśakālayor api vastusvabhāvabhedakatvāt. | For the apprehension or non-apprehension of perception depends on [what is] appearing, not merely on non-contradiction with the object. And here there is neither an appearance of the object as it exists in its own nature, place and time, nor is the place and time the same, since both place and time are differentiators of the nature of objects. |
anyathā hi bhedavyavahārocchedaḥ syāt. | If [things were] otherwise, there would be an end to all practical dealings based on difference. |
anumānasya tu vikalpātmakatvena sāmānyaviṣayatvān na pratibhāsavaśād vastuviṣayatvavyavasthā, vastuno 'pratibhāsāt, kiṃ tarhi niścayavaśāt. | As for inference, since it is conceptual in nature and has generalities as its object, [its] object-relatedness is not determined by [actual] appearance [of the object], due to the non-appearance of the [real] object, but rather by conviction. |
niścayaiḥ | By [means of] convictions |
yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham | "How can that form which is not determined through convictions be their object?" |
tataś cānumānasya tadābhāsaśūnyasyāpi nāntarīyakārthadarśanabalenotpatteḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhāt prāmāṇyam ity avaśyaṃ tatrāvinābhāvaniścayo 'pekṣaṇīyaḥ. | Therefore, even though inference is devoid of the appearance [of its object], because it arises through the force of perceiving invariably connected things [and] is thus indirectly bound to the real object, [its] validity [depends on this, and] thus certainty about the invariable connection is necessarily required in this case. |
anyathānumānasyotpattyasambhavād iti nānumānatulyaṃ pratyakṣam | Because otherwise inference could not arise at all, perception is not equivalent to inference. |
nanu tasya pramāṇatve vijñānasyāviniścite / kathaṃ tatra pravarteta prekṣāvānīpsitāgateḥ | "If the validity of that cognition is not ascertained, how could a rational person engage in activity there, [since] what is desired has not been cognized?" |
tathā hi prekṣāpūrvakāriṇaḥ prāmāṇyaniścaye sati pravṛttyā bhavitavyam, pravṛttau ca satyāṃ prāmāṇyaniścaya itītaretarāśrayāt kathaṃ prekṣāvata īpsitārthāviniścaye sati pravṛttiḥ syāt | For indeed, a person who acts with deliberation must have activity when there is certainty about validity, and certainty about validity [comes] when there is activity - thus due to this mutual dependence, how could a rational person have activity when there is no certainty about the desired object? |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with the following. |
ucyate saṃśayenaiva vartate 'sau vicakṣaṇaḥ | It is said: "That clever person acts even through doubt alone." |
vaicakṣaṇyakṣatis tasya nacaivamanuṣajyate // | [And] this does not detract from his cleverness. |
dvividhā hi pravṛttir arthakriyārthā prāmāṇyaniścayārthā ca. | Activity is of two kinds: [one] aimed at practical results and [one] aimed at ascertaining validity. |
tatrādyā pravṛttiḥ saty api saṃśaye yathā bhavati, tathā pratipāditam, pratibhāsamānārthāvasāyamātreṇaiva pratyakṣasya pravartakatvāt. | As for the first [kind of activity], it has been explained how it occurs even when doubt exists, since sense-perception prompts [action] merely through the apprehension of the appearing object. |
tena vaicakṣaṇyakṣatir evaṃ sati nānuṣajyate, arthasaṃśayenāpi kṛṣīvalādīnām iva pravṛttidarśanād ity abhiprāyaḥ. | Therefore, in this case, no loss of cleverness follows, since activity is observed even in farmers and others despite uncertainty about the outcome - this is the intended meaning. |
na ca kṛṣīvalādīnām upāyāniścayena pravṛttair yuktā prekṣāpūrvakāriteti yuktaṃ vaktum, upeyāpekṣatvād upāyasya. | And it would not be right to say that farmers and others are considered deliberate agents only when they act with certainty about the means, since means depend on what is to be achieved. |
upeyāniścaye tanniścayāyogāt. | When there is uncertainty about the goal, certainty about that [means] is impossible. |
dvitīyāpi pravṛttiḥ saty api prāmāṇyasaṃśaye sutarāṃ yuktaiveti darśayann āha saṃśayenetyādi. | [The author] shows that the second kind of activity is even more appropriate when there is doubt about validity, saying "through doubt" etc. |
yato yasmāt prāmāṇyaniścayaṃ prati saṃśayena pravṛtter evopāyatā tena puruṣeṇa niścitā, tataś copāyaviṣaye saṃśayābhāvāt pravṛttir yuktaiva // | Since that person has determined that proceeding through doubt is itself the means toward ascertaining validity, and hence there is no doubt regarding the means, activity is indeed appropriate. |
kathaṃ sā tenopāyatā niścitety āha sandehena pravṛttāv ityādi / | [If one asks:] "How is that means-nature determined by him?" [The author] states "When proceeding through doubt" etc. |
sandehena pravṛttau me phalaprāptir bhavedyadi / prāmāṇyaniścayas tatra jñāta eva bhaviṣyati // | "If, when I proceed [to act] through doubt, I obtain the result, then certainty about validity will definitely be known in that case." |
nānyatheti nacāpyevam anuyogo 'tra yuktimān / upāye vartate kasmād iti nahyanyathāgatiḥ // | It cannot be [understood] otherwise. Nor is it reasonable to raise the question "why does one resort to this means?" since there is no other way. |
na hy upāyād vinā kaścid upeyaṃ pratipadyate / | For indeed, no one can attain the goal without [proper] means. |
iti saṃdehavṛtto 'pi prekṣāvattāṃ jahāti na // | Thus, even one who acts based on doubt does not lose [his] rationality. |
sandehavṛtto 'pīti / | [The phrase] "even one who acts based on doubt" |
prāmāṇyasandehena pravṛtto 'pītyarthaḥ / | means "even one who acts while having doubt about [the cognition's] validity." |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood. |
nanu cārthakriyābhāsi jñānaṃ svapne 'pi vidyate / | "But surely, cognition appearing to [show] effective action exists even in dreams; |
naca tasya pramāṇatvaṃ taddhetoḥ prathamasya ca // | and neither it nor its cause, the prior [cognition], has validity." |
taddhetoḥ prathamasyeti / arthakriyājñānahetoḥ / | [The phrase] "its cause, the prior [cognition]" [means] the cause of the cognition of effective action. |
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte. | [This] is refuted by [the statement] "not so" and what follows. |
naivaṃ bhrāntā hi sāvasthā sarvā bāhyānibandhanā / | [It] cannot be so, since that entire state is illusory [and] without external basis. |
na bāhyavastusaṃvādas tāsvavasthāsu vidyate // | In those states, there exists no conformity with external objects. |
svasaṃviditarūpāś ca cittacaittāvilakṣaṇaḥ / | And [they] are known in their own forms, not different from mind and mental states. |
avasthādvayabhedo 'pi spaṣṭaṃ tena pratīyate // | Therefore, the difference between the two states is clearly perceived. |
yadi tāvad bāhyārtha{vādinaṃ}bauddhaṃ prati codyate tadāsiddham iti prathamena ślokena darśitam / | If [this] is objected against the Buddhist who maintains [the existence of] external objects, then [the reason is] "unestablished" - this is shown by the first verse. |
tathā hi tena bāhyārthavādinārthasaṃvādāt prāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ nārthakriyājñānasaṃvādāt | Indeed, that proponent of external objects accepts validity based on conformity with objects, not on conformity with the cognition of effective action. |
naca svapno 'rthsaṃvādo 'sti sarvasyā evasvapnāvasthāyā bhrāntatvena sarveṣāmavisaṃvādāt tatra | And there is no conformity with objects in dreams, since the entire dream state is accepted by all to be illusory, [leading to] non-conformity of all [cognitions] therein. |
sarvavijñānānām arthamantareṇaivotpatter nirviṣayatvam | [Due to] the arising of all cognitions without [external] objects, [there is] objectlessness. |
tena jāgradavasthāyāṃ bhāvina eva jñānasya prāmāṇyalakṣaṇāvatārān nānena vyabhicāro yukta iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore, since the characteristics of validity apply only to cognitions in the waking state, it is not proper [to claim] that this [reason] is inconclusive. |
kiñca apravṛtti{tta---}mapūrvakam asthiraṃ vyākulaṃ ca svapne 'rthakriyājñānam | Moreover, the cognition of effective action in dreams is unprecedented, unstable, and confused. |
tadviparītaṃ jāgradavasthāyām iti tathāvidhasya prāmāṇye kutaḥ svapnenānaikāntaḥ / | [It is] the opposite in the waking state, so how can there be non-conclusiveness regarding the validity of such [cognition] based on dreams? |
atha yogācāraṃ prati codyate, tatrāpīdaṃ prakṛtānupayogi / | If, however, [this] is objected against the Yogācāra, even then this is irrelevant to the present context. |
tathā hi sāṃvyavahārikasyedaṃ pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam --- pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam | For this definition of valid cognition is for practical purposes: "Valid cognition is non-deceiving awareness." |
tatra cārthakriyānirbhāsijñānasaṃvedanam evāvisaṃvādaḥ, tadāvirbhāve lokasya tathā vyavahārāt / | And in this context, non-deception consists only in the awareness of cognition that manifests effective action, since people behave accordingly when it appears. |
tadarthatvāc cārthapravṛtteḥ / | And it is for this purpose that [beings] engage in activity towards objects. |
tac ca sāṃvyavahārikaṃ jñānaṃ jāgradavasthābhāvyena / | And this practical cognition [exists] only as that which appears during the waking state. |
tatraiva loke sarvavyavahārāṇāṃ pāramārthikatvābhiniveśāt / | Because it is only in that [waking state] that all worldly activities are considered by people to be ultimately real. |
natu svapnāvasthāyām / | But not [those occurring] in the dream state. |
tataś ca jāgratpratyayatve satīti viśeṣaṇasyāśravaṇānnetareṇa vyabhicāraḥ / | Therefore, as long as the qualification "being a waking cognition" has not been mentioned, there would be deviation due to the other [dream state]. |
syān mataṃ paratas tasya prāmāṇyasya viniścaye / prasajyate prameyatvam iti nanvavirodhyadaḥ / | One might think: "When its validity is determined from external [sources], it follows that [the cognition] becomes an object of cognition" – but this is not contradictory. |
syād etat tulye sarvākārataḥ pratibhāse katham ayaṃ bhedo niścīyate, tadā pramāṇāntareṇa mīyamānatvāt tat prameyaṃ prāpnoti, na ca pramāṇam eva prameyaṃ yuktaṃ virodhād iti codyam / | This objection might be raised: "When the appearance is similar in all respects, how is this distinction determined? And then, because it is measured by another means of valid cognition, it becomes an object of cognition, and it is not proper for a means of valid cognition itself to be an object of cognition, due to contradiction." |
nanvavirodhyada iti parihāraḥ / | The response is: "But this is not contradictory." |
ada iti etat / | 'This' means 'that [which was just stated]'. |
apekṣābhedāt kāryakāraṇapitṛputravyapadeśavad avirodhi / | Due to the difference in reference, there is no contradiction, just as in the case of the terms 'cause and effect' and 'father and son'. |
etad eva darśayati tadgrāhyetyādi / | This very [point] is shown [in the section] beginning with "tadgrāhya" [etc.]. |
tadgrāhyavastvapekṣaṃ hi prāmāṇyaṃ tasya gīyate / parato 'vagates tasya prameyatvavyavasthitiḥ // | The validity of [that] cognition is always asserted in reference to the object apprehended by it; and since its validity is apprehended from another [cognition], that [first cognition] becomes established as something to be cognized. |
apekṣābhedataścaivaṃ kāryakāraṇatādivat / pramāṇatvaprameyatvavyavasthā na virudhyate // | And thus, due to different relations, the establishment of [something as] means of cognition and object of cognition is not contradictory, just as in the case of cause and effect and similar [relations]. |
tena jñānena yad grāhyaṃ vastu tadapekṣayā tatpramāṇam eva na prameyam, vyavasthāpakapramāṇāntarāpekṣayā tu prameyam eva na pramāṇam iti na sāṅkaryadoṣaḥ / | When an object is apprehended by that cognition, in relation to that [object] it [the cognition] is only a means of cognition and not an object of cognition, but in relation to another validating means of cognition it is only an object of cognition and not a means of cognition - thus there is no fault of confusion. |
yathā kāryaṃ kāraṇam iti vyapekṣābhedān na saṅkīryate // | Just as [something being both] effect and cause is not confused due to different relations. |
evam arthakriyājñānāt pramāṇatvaviniścaye / nānavasthā parākāṅkṣāvinivṛtter iti sthitam // | Thus it is established that in the determination of validity through the cognition of purposeful action there is no infinite regress, since any further requirement has ceased. |
parākāṅkṣāvinivṛtter iti / | [The phrase] "since any further requirement has ceased." |
parā anyā cāsāvākāṅkṣā ceti vigrahaḥ / parasmin vā saṃvādādanyasmin ākāṅkṣā parākāṅkṣā, tasyā vinivṛtter iti samāsaḥ / | This is analyzed as: parā [means] "other" and that ākāṅkṣā [means] "requirement"; or parākāṅkṣā [means] requirement for something other than correspondence with reality - thus is the compound analyzed. |
kiñca pramāṇamavisaṃvādijñānam ityanenārthakriyādhigamalakṣaṇaphalaprāpakahetor jñānasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam ucyate / | Moreover, when it is said that "valid cognition is non-contradictory cognition," this states the definition of cognition as the cause that brings about the result characterized by the attainment of purposeful action. |
tataś ca phala{lā---}jñāne lakṣaṇānavatārāt, kathaṃ tasyāpi prāmaṇyamavasīyata ityasya codyasyāvakāśaḥ kathaṃ bhavet / tathāhyaṅkurasya hetur bījam iti lakṣaṇe sati aṅkurasyāpi kathaṃ bījatvam iti kiṃ viduṣāṃ praśno jāyate / | And since this definition does not apply to the cognition of the result, how could there be any room for the objection "how is its validity also ascertained?" For instance, when there is the definition "seed is the cause of sprout," do wise people ask the question "how is the sprout also a seed?" |
yathā ca bījasya tadbhāvo 'ṅkuradarśanādavagamyate tathā pramāṇasyāpi tadbhāvo 'rthakriyālakṣaṇaphaladarśanāt / | And just as the seed's being that [i.e., a cause] is understood from seeing the sprout, so too the valid cognition's being that [i.e., valid] [is understood] from seeing the result characterized by purposeful action. |
na ca tatra phalamanyena pramāṇenāvagamyate yato 'navasthā prasajyate / | And that result is not apprehended by another means of valid cognition, since [if it were] an infinite regress would ensue. |
jñānātmanaḥ phalasya svata eva saṃvedanāt siddheḥ / | Because the result, which is of the nature of cognition, is established through self-cognition alone. |
na ca svarūpe jñānasya bhrāntiḥ sambhavati / | And no error is possible in [a cognition's] cognition of its own nature. |
tadaniścaye svasaṃvedanasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgād iti yat kiñcidetat // | Because if there were uncertainty about that [self-nature], there would follow the non-existence of self-cognition itself. |
samutpanne 'pi vijñāne na tāvad avadhāryate / yāvat kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ na pramāṇāntarādgatam // | Even when a cognition has arisen, its validity is not ascertained until the perfection of [its] cause is known through another means of valid cognition. |
śuddhiḥ saṃvādino jñānād anapekṣāt pratīyate // | [But] the perfection [of the cause] is known from the non-dependent cognition of correspondence. |
sannikṛṣṭe hi viṣaye kāryasaṃvādadṛṣṭitaḥ / | For when the object is proximate, from seeing the correspondence of the effect, |
kāraṇānāṃ viśuddhatvam ayatnenaiva gamyate // | the perfection of the causes is understood without any effort. |
viprakṛṣṭe hi viṣaye tadudbhūtā matiḥ pramā / tajjanyatvādyathaiveyaṃ sannikṛṣṭārthagocaram // | For in the case of a remote object, the cognition arising from it is valid because it is produced by that [perfect cause], just as is this [cognition] which has a proximate object as its sphere. |
dvividhaṃ hi jñānaṃ sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ viprakṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ ca / | For cognition is of two kinds: that which has a proximate object and that which has a remote object. |
tatra yattāvat sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ tasya na kāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇāt prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / | As regards [cognition] relating to proximate objects, its validity is ascertained not through the recognition of the perfection of [its] causes. |
kiṃ tarhi arthakriyāsaṃvādivijñānāt / | Rather, [it is ascertained] from the cognition's conformity with effective action. |
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