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tathā lokāyataṃ prati tat prāmāṇyapratipādanaṃ na kartavyam, svata eva prāmāṇyaniścayād iti samānam. | Similarly, the validity [of Inference] need not be expounded to the Lokāyata [Materialist], since [its] validity is established by itself. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ, yato 'numānasya tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhaliṅganiścayād utpatter antareṇāpy arthakriyāsaṃvādaṃ pāramparyeṇa tathāvidhavastupratibaddhajanmatayād tadarthāvyabhicāritvaṃ niścitam iti svataḥprāmāṇyam ucyate. | This is not a fault, since the self-validity of Inference means this: from the ascertainment of a probans bound [to the probandum] through identity or causation, even without [direct] practical confirmation, its non-deviation from its object is established due to its being produced mediately through connection with such an object. |
tadutpattihetuliṅgasvarūpāparijñānād vādino 'trānutpanna evānumāne parasparaṃ vipravadante, tadūtpanne, tat svarūpādiniścayāt. | Due to ignorance of the nature of the causally-related probans, disputants quarrel with each other before the Inference has arisen, [but not] after it has arisen due to certainty about its nature. |
ata evācāryās tadutpattihetuliṅgasvarūpavyutpādanam eva kurvanti lakṣaṇe. | For this very reason, the teachers explain the nature of the causally-related probans in [their] definitions. |
kathaṃ hi nāma viparītaliṅgasvarūpāvadhāraṇād anumānotpattir bhaviṣyatīti. | For how indeed could an Inference arise from the ascertainment of a probans of contrary nature? |
yadapi lokāyataṃ praty anumānasya prāmāṇyapratipādanaṃ na kartavyam iti codyate, tad apy ayuktam. | And as for the objection that "the validity of Inference should not be demonstrated to the Lokāyata," that too is incorrect. |
na hy asmābhir anumānasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, kiṃ tarhi vyavahāraḥ. | For we are not proving the validity of Inference, but rather [its] use. |
tathā hi mithyārthaśāstraśravaṇād vyāmūḍho lokāyataḥ siddhe 'py anumānasya prāmāṇye sāṅkyavan na tadvyavahāraṃ pravartayati, tasya viṣayopadarśanena viṣayī vyavahāraḥ sādhyate. | For even when Inference's validity is established, the Lokāyata, deluded by hearing false doctrines about objects, does not engage in its use as the Sāṃkhyas do; [therefore] by showing him its domain, [its] practical use is demonstrated. |
yad yata utpannam, tat tatprāpaṇaśaktiyuktam, yathā pratyakṣaṃ svārthasya. | Whatever arises from something is endowed with the power to reach that [source], just as perception [leads to] its object. |
anumeyād utpannaṃ cedaṃ tatpratibaddhaliṅgadarśanadvārāyātaṃ liṅgijñānam ity evaṃ saṅketaviṣayakathanena samaye pravartanāt. | This cognition of the thing possessing the probandum [liṅgin] has arisen from the inferable [object] through the perception of the probans [liṅga] which is connected with it, [and this is understood] through the explanation of conventional usage. |
tathā hi pratyakṣe 'rthāvyabhicāranibandhana evānena prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ. | For thus in the case of perception, [the Materialist] has established the usage of validity solely on the basis of non-deviation from the object. |
yathoktam arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇatā | As has been stated: "Even in perception, validity [exists] because of [perception's] absence when the object is absent." |
na ca codanājanitāyā buddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ siddham, yenātrāpy anumānavat prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ sādhyata iti syāt, tatra pratibandhāsiddheḥ prāmāṇyasyaiva sādhyatvād iti na samānam. | And the validity of cognition produced by scriptural injunction is not established, whereby one might argue that here too, as in inference, the usage of validity is proven - [but] this is not the same [case], because there the connection is not established, since validity itself is what is to be proven. |
vivādo bhrāntito yasmāt sā ca niścayabādhitā | Since dispute [arises] from misconception, and that [misconception] is negated by certainty, |
niścinvantas tatastatvaṃ vivaderan na vādinaḥ | therefore disputants who have ascertained the truth would not engage in dispute. |
anena vivādasya niścayaviruddhabhrāntikāryasyopalambhān niścayābhāvasiddhim ādarśayann anumānaviruddhatvaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāyā darśayati. | By this, showing that dispute is perceived as the effect of misconception which is contrary to certainty, [and thereby] showing the establishment of the absence of certainty, [the author] demonstrates that the claim of self-validity [of cognitions] is contrary to inference. |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyasya viniścaye / na visaṃvādabhākvacid bhaved niścayavṛttitaḥ | If there were certainty about the self-validity of all means of knowledge, then due to the operation of [this] certainty, there could never be any disagreement. |
apramāṇe pramāṇatvabuddhyā vṛtto hi vañcyate | For [one] who proceeds with the understanding of validity in what is invalid is indeed deceived. |
svataḥprāmāṇyabodhāt tu viparīto na kaścana // | When [there is] conviction regarding inherent validity, no one can be opposed to it. |
visaṃvādo hi niścayaviruddhāyā bhrānteḥ kāryatvena pratītaḥ, sa ca svataḥprāmāṇyābhyupagame sati na prāpnoti. | Disagreement is recognized as the effect of misconception [which is] contrary to certainty, and this [disagreement] cannot occur when inherent validity [of cognition] is accepted. |
niścayena tat kāraṇasya bhrānter apanītatvāt. | Because through [such] certainty, the misconception [which is] the cause of that [disagreement] would have been removed. |
viparīta iti visaṃvādabhāk. | 'Opposed' means [one who is] subject to disagreement. |
nanv apramāṇato vṛtto vidaṃ vā kaṃ{visaṃvādaṃ}sam aśnute / niścayaḥ paratas tasya bādhakāt pratyayān mataḥ // | [One who] proceeds from invalid cognition indeed encounters disagreement; the certainty of its [invalidity] is understood to come from external [causes] through subsequent sublating cognition. |
pramāṇataḥ pravṛttas tu na visaṃvādam aśnute / | But [one who] proceeds from valid cognition does not encounter disagreement. |
asyaiva ceṣyate 'smābhiḥ svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | And it is regarding this [valid cognition] that we accept the certainty of inherent validity. |
visaṃvādo hy apramāṇāt pravṛttasya bhavati / | For disagreement occurs to [one who] proceeds from invalid cognition. |
tasya cāpramāṇasya parato niścayo 'bhyupagata eva / | And it is already accepted that the certainty of that invalidity [comes] from external [causes]. |
yatpunaḥ pramāṇaṃ na tataḥ pravṛttasya visaṃvādo 'sti / | But as for valid cognition, there is no disagreement for [one who] proceeds from that. |
tasyaiva ca svataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭam iti kathaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāyā anumānabādhā // | And since inherent validity is accepted for that [valid cognition] alone, how can there be refutation of the assertion of inherent validity through inference? |
nābhiprāyetyādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with [the words] "nābhiprāya" etc. |
nābhiprāyāparijñānād idaṃ hyatra vivakṣitam | This [objection arises] from not understanding [our] intention; for what is meant here [is as follows] |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyasya viniścaye niyate yatra naivāsti svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ | In regard to the determination of the self-validity of all means of knowledge, where there is definitely no determination of self-validity |
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānānapekṣayā janmānantaramevātastadaprāmāṇyaniścayāt | [there is invalidity], because immediately after its arising, without dependence on knowledge of defects arising from causes [showing] the object to be otherwise, there is determination of its invalidity |
apramāṇe pramāṇatvaviparyāso na saṅgataḥ | In an invalid [cognition], the reversal of validity is not possible |
ato 'saṃvādino naiva kaścid varteta tadgateḥ | Therefore no one would ever act on [a cognition] that is non-conforming, due to understanding its [non-conforming] nature |
idamatra vivakṣitam yadi bhavatā sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyamabhyupagamyate, tadā prāmāṇyaniścayotpādena pramāṇaṃ vyāptam ityabhyupagataṃ syāt | What is meant here is this: if you accept the self-validity of all means of knowledge, then you must accept that [valid] cognition is pervaded by the arising of certainty about [its] validity |
tataś ca yatraiva pramāṇavyāpakaḥ prāmāṇyaniścayo nodeti tatra sāmarthyāt aprāmāṇyam avatiṣṭhate | And consequently, wherever the certainty of validity that pervades [valid] cognition does not arise, there by implication invalidity remains |
pramāṇāpramāṇayoḥ parasparavyavacchedarūpatvāt | Because validity and invalidity have the nature of mutual exclusion |
tataś cāprāmāṇyam api svata eva sāmarthyādāpatitam, visaṃvādakāraṇadoṣaparijñānānapekṣaṇāt, prāmāṇyaniścayānutpatter ivāprāmāṇyasya niścitatvāt | Therefore invalidity too follows by implication as inherent, without depending on knowledge of defects in causes leading to non-conformity, since invalidity is determined just from the non-arising of certainty about validity |
evaṃ ca sati janmottaram eva prāmāṇyaniścayotpādānutpādābhyāṃ prāmāṇyetarayor niścitatvād apramāṇāt pariniścitā naiva kasyacit prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttir eva sambhavatīti kuto visaṃvādasambhava iti | This being so, immediately after [a cognition's] arising, due to the arising or non-arising of certainty about validity, since validity or its opposite is determined, no activity of any rational person could possibly arise from an invalid [cognition] - so how could there be any possibility of non-conformity? |
tadgater iti visaṃvāditvagater niścayād ity arthaḥ | [The word] "tadgateḥ" means "from the determination of understanding [its] non-conformity" |
ete ca pratijñādoṣodbhāvanamukhena hetor avyāptiprakāśanāddhetudoṣā eva draṣṭavyāḥ, na tu pratijñādoṣāḥ / | All these [defects] that have been pointed out through the exposition of defects in the proposition should be understood as defects of the reason [itself], as [they] show [its] non-pervasion [with the probandum], [and] not as defects of the proposition. |
anyathā hi pratijñāyā asādhanāṅgatvāt taddoṣodbhāvanaṃ prativādino nigrahasthānaṃ syāt // | Since the proposition is not an integral part of the proof, pointing out its defects would [otherwise] constitute a point of defeat for the opponent. |
janmātiriktakālaś ca kriyākālo na vidyate / | There exists no time for action separate from the moment of birth [for the jar]. |
kṣaṇikatvād ghaṭādīnām ityasiddhaṃ nidarśanam // | Due to the momentariness of jars and similar [things], the example is inadmissible. |
nanu ca janmottarakālaṃ ghaṭādayo dṛśyante eva kulālādyanapekṣā madhūdakādyarthakriyākāriṇaḥ, tat kathaṃ teṣāṃ janmātiriktaḥ kālo na vidyata ity āha | [The opponent] says: "But jars and similar [things] are indeed seen after their birth performing useful functions like [holding] honey, water, etc., independent of the potter and others; so how can it be said that there is no time [for them] separate from birth?" |
teṣām ityādi / | [The answer begins with] "teṣām" [and so forth]. |
teṣām uttarakālaṃ hi kulālādyanapekṣiṇām / svopādānādyapekṣatvāt svato nāsti pravartanam // | After their birth, though [they are] independent of the potter and others, [jars] have no independent operation because [they] depend on their own material causes and other [factors]. |
svopādānam pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ sajātīyaḥ kṣaṇaḥ / ādiśabdena taddhārakapuruṣādiparigrahaḥ / | 'Their own material causes' [means] the preceding homogeneous moments; by the word 'ādi' [we should] include the person holding [the jar] and other [such factors]. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati uttarakālamanya eva ghaṭādikṣaṇāḥ svopādānādyapekṣā vartamānā dṛśyante na tu kasyacijjanmottarakālamavasthitiḥ siddhā kṣaṇikatvāt sarvabhāvānām iti // | This means: What are seen afterwards are entirely different jar-moments occurring in dependence on their own material causes, etc., but no single [jar] is established as existing after the moment of its birth, because all entities are momentary. |
nacānavasthitiprāptir anyato mānasaṃśritau / | There is no infinite regress when validity depends on something else. |
tasmād arthakriyājñāne svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | Hence certainty regarding self-validity [arises] only when there is cognition of effective action. |
nanu ko 'tiśayas tasya prāktanādasti yena tat / parataḥ pūrvavijñānam iva nābhyupagamyate // | "What peculiar feature does it [the second cognition] have, different from the previous [cognition], on account of which it is not accepted [to be derived] from others like the previous cognition?" |
ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyamabhidhīyate / | It is stated [that] conformity with real objects is called 'validity'; |
tasya cārthakriyābhyāsajñānād anyan na lakṣaṇam // | and it has no other characteristic than the repeated cognition of effective action. |
arthakriyāvabhāsaṃ ca jñānaṃ saṃvedyate sphuṭam / | And cognition manifesting effective action is clearly apprehended; |
niścīyate ca tanmātrabhāvyāmarśanacetasā // | and it becomes ascertained through mental reflection that considers only that [effective action]. |
atas tasya svataḥ samyakprāmāṇyasya viniścayāt / nottarārthakriyāprāptipratyayaḥ samapekṣyate // | Therefore, since its true self-validity has been properly ascertained, no subsequent cognition of the attainment of effective action is required. |
jñānapramāṇabhāve ca tasmin kāryāvabhāsini / pratyaye prathame 'pyasmāddhetoḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | And due to this reason, the ascertainment of validity [occurs] even in that first cognition which manifests the effect, [establishing] the valid nature of the cognition. |
ayamatra saṅkṣepārthaḥ pramāṇaṃ hi nāmāvisaṃvādi jñānam ucyate / pramāṇam avisaṃvādijñānam iti vacanāt / | This here is the brief meaning: what is called 'pramāṇa' is indeed non-contradictory cognition, as per the statement "pramāṇa is non-contradictory cognition." |
na cāvisaṃvādo 'rthakriyālakṣaṇa eva, tadarthatvāt pramāṇacintāyāḥ / yatp 'rthakriyārthī pramāṇam apramāṇaṃ vānveṣate prekṣāvān na vyasanitayā / | And non-contradiction has the characteristic of effective action alone, since the investigation of valid means of knowledge is for that purpose, as a rational person who seeks effective action investigates [whether something is] a valid or invalid means of knowledge, not out of [mere] habit. |
sā cārthakriyā dāhapākādinirbhāsajñānānodayalakṣaṇā, tadutpādādevārthakriyārthinaḥ pravṛttasyākāṅkṣānivṛtteḥ / | That effective action is characterized by the appearance of cognitions of [acts] such as burning and cooking; since only from its arising does the desire cease for one who has undertaken [the action] seeking [that] effective action. |
taccārthakriyājñānamātmasaṃvedanapratyakṣatayā svayam evāvirbhavati, spaṣṭānubhavatvāccānantaraṃ yathānubhavaṃ parāmarśajñānotpattyā niścitam iti svata eva siddham / | And that cognition of effective action appears by itself due to the perceptibility of self-awareness; and due to being a clear experience, it is ascertained through the arising of reflective cognition according to [that] experience - thus it is self-established. |
naca tat sādhyaṃ phalāntaramākāṅkṣitaṃ puruṣeṇa, yenāparamarthakriyānirbhāsi pratyayāntarodayamanusarato 'navasthā syāt / | Nor is another result to be accomplished desired by a person, by which, seeking the arising of another cognition revealing another effective action, there would be infinite regress. |
tathā hi loke saddhi{vṛddhi}cchedādikaṃ phalamabhivāñchitam, taccāhlāda paritāpādirūpajñānāvirbhāvād evābhinirvṛttam ityetāvataivāhitasantoṣā nivartante janā iti svata eva tasya siddhir ucyate / | For thus in the world, results such as prosperity, increase, and loss are desired, and that is accomplished merely from the appearance of cognitions in the form of joy, distress, etc.; thus people, being satisfied with just this much, desist [from further action] - therefore its accomplishment is said to be self-established. |
yatpunaḥ pūrvakaṃ tat kāraṇabhūtaṃ jñānaṃ tasya na{ca} tat prāpaṇaśaktiḥ prāmāṇyam ucyate / | As for that prior cognition which has become the cause, its validity is said to be [nothing but] that capacity to bring about [the result]. |
sā ca śaktir anabhyāsād aviditakāryair avadhārayituṃ na śakyata ityuttarakāryajñānapravṛttyā niścīyata iti prathamasya parataḥprāmāṇyam ucyate / | And that capacity cannot be ascertained by those who do not know the effects due to lack of practice - thus it is ascertained through the occurrence of the cognition of subsequent effects - therefore the validity of the first [cognition] is said to be dependent on something else. |
ādye hi vastuviṣaye vastusaṃvādalakṣaṇam / dvitīyaṃ na pravarteta tasya hetor asambhavāt // | For if the first [cognition] did not have a real object as its subject, the second [cognition] characterized by conformity with reality would not arise, due to the impossibility of its cause. |
aśokastabakādau hi pāvakādhyavasāyinaḥ / na dāhapākanirbhāsi vijñānaṃ jātu jāyate // jātau vā na vijātīyaṃ jvalanāt tat prasajyate / | For when one determines fire in [regard to] a cluster of aśoka [flowers] etc., a cognition revealing burning and cooking never arises. Or if it does arise, that [object] would turn out to be not different from fire. |
tat kāryayogatāmatralakṣaṇatvād vibhāvasoḥ // | Because fire is characterized merely by connection with those effects. |
yadi hi ādyam prathamaṃ jñānamavastuni pravṛttam abhaviṣyat tadā phalajñānam uttarakālabhāvi nodapatsyata, kāraṇābhāvāt, vastupratibaddhatvād arthakriyājñānasya / | For if the initial first cognition had occurred with respect to a non-entity, then the cognition of the result occurring at a later time would not arise, due to absence of cause, because the cognition of effective action is bound to real entities. |
na hyanagnigrāhiṇo jñānād aśokastabakādāvagnyadhyavasāyena pravṛttasya dāhapākādinirbhāsinaḥ pratyayaḥ prasūyante | When [one has] a cognition that does not grasp real fire, as when engaging with the idea of fire in a bunch of Aśoka blossoms, cognitions relating to burning, cooking and such [activities] do not arise. |
prasave vāgnirevāsau, kutaḥ, dāhapākādikaryotpattihetutvamātralakṣaṇatvād vibhāvasoḥ vahnerity arthaḥ | And if they do arise, it must be [real] fire, because fire (vibhāvasu) is characterized solely by being the cause of effects such as burning and cooking. |
tasmād arthakriyābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ yāvan na jāyate / tāvad ādye 'pramāśaṅkā jāyate bhrāntihetutaḥ | Therefore, as long as a cognition presenting effective action does not arise, there remains suspicion about the invalidity of the initial [cognition] due to possible causes of error. |
anantaraṃ phalādṛṣṭiḥ sādṛśyasyopalambhanam / mater apaṭutetyādi bhrāntikāraṇamatra ca | The causes of error here are: non-perception of immediate effects, observation of mere similarity, dullness of understanding, and so forth. |
kāryāvabhāsivijñāne jāte tvetan na vidyate / sākṣād vastunibaddhāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prativedanāt | However, when cognition presenting the effect arises, these [causes of error] are not present, because there is direct perception of the action which is bound to the real object. |
ādye hi jñāne bhranatikāraṇam asti, tathā hi tadanantaraṃ dāhādilakṣaṇasyaphalasyānutpādo bhrāntajñānasādharmyaṃ buddher apāṭavam | For in the initial cognition there are causes of error, namely: the non-arising of effects characterized by burning and such immediately afterwards, similarity with erroneous cognitions, and dullness of understanding. |
ādiśabdenānādare 'nabhyāsa ityādi gṛhyate | By the word "ādi" [and so forth], lack of attention, lack of repeated observation, and such are included. |
phalajñāne tu na kiñcid bhrāntikāraṇaṃ vidyata iti tasya svata eva niścayaḥ | But in the cognition of effects, there exists no cause of error whatsoever, hence its certainty [arises] from itself alone. |
ādye 'pi jñāne yatrābhyāsādinā protsāritaṃ bhrāntinimittaṃ tasya svata eva prāmāṇyam | Even in the case of initial cognition, when the causes of error have been removed through repeated observation and such [means], its validity [arises] from itself alone. |
vṛttāvabhyāsavatyāṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ pratīyate / atadviṣayato jñānād ādye prāpte 'pi tatphale // | When a cognition has been repeated, a distinguishing characteristic is perceived [in it] which differentiates it from cognitions not pertaining to that [same] object, even when its initial effect has [not yet] been obtained. |
abhyāsabalena yathā yogināṃ maṇisyādiṣu vā tadvidāṃ dūrīkṛtabhrāntinimittameva sphuṭapratibhāsaṃ prajāyate vijñānam... | Just as through the power of practice, yogins and experts in gems and coins develop clear cognitions from which all causes of error have been removed... |
evamanyatrāpyabhyāsabalāt sphuṭatarapratibhāsatayā nirastavibhramāśaṅkamupajāyamānamadhyavadhānena sajātīyasādhāraṇādhyavasāyinaṃ na parāmarśapratyayaṃ janayad vijātīyato 'tadviṣayād vyāvṛttamavasīyata iti svata eva tasya prāmāṇyam ucyate | Similarly in other cases also, through repeated practice there arises a clearer cognition free from doubt of error, which immediately produces a determinate awareness common to [objects of] the same kind, and is cognized as distinct from heterogeneous [cognitions] not pertaining to that object - thus its validity is said to be intrinsic. |
yastu manyate abhyāsavatyām api pravṛttau tādrūpyalakṣaṇaliṅgadarśanādanumānata evārthaprāpaṇaśaktilakṣaṇaprāmāṇyaniścaya iti sarvatra parataḥprāmāṇyāvasāyo na kvacid eva svata iti | Some hold that "Even in the case of repeated cognition, the certainty of validity - characterized by the capacity to lead to [knowledge of] the object - comes only from inference based on seeing the mark of similarity, so validity is always known through external means and never intrinsically." |
tan na buddhyāmahe | This [view] we do not understand. |
tathā hi asaṅkīrṇatādrūpyalakṣaṇaliṅganiścaya eva kuto bhavatīti vaktavyam | For it must be explained whence arises the very certainty about that mark characterized by unconfused similarity. |
abhyāsād iti cet, evaṃ tarhi yadyabhyāsabalād vijātīyākāravyavacchedena sajātīyasādhāraṇamasaṅkīrṇaṃ sārūpyamavasīyate bhrāntikāraṇābhāvāt kaḥ prāmāṇye pradveṣo yena tadanubhūtau bhrāntikāraṇavirahe 'pi nādhyavasīyata iti syāt | If [you say] "it comes from repetition," then if through repetition one can cognize unconfused similarity common to [objects of] the same kind by excluding heterogeneous forms due to absence of causes of error, what hostility is there to [intrinsic] validity that one would deny its cognition even in the absence of causes of error? |
api ca kimidaṃ sārūpyaṃ nāma, yadi bodharūpatā, sā mithyājñāne 'pyastītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ | Moreover, what is this so-called 'similarity'? If it is 'being of the nature of cognition', that exists even in false cognition, so the reason is inconclusive. |
atha lohitākāranirbhāsitā, sāśokastabakādigrāhivijñāne vidyata iti vyabhicāra eva | If it is 'appearing as having a red form', that exists in the cognition grasping an aśoka flower cluster etc., so [the reason] deviates [from what is to be proved]. |
athāgnyādipadārthakāryatā, sā kathaṃ niściteti vaktavyam | If it is 'being the effect of fire etc.', then it must be explained how that is ascertained. |
tat siddhyartham aparaliṅgāntaram anusarato 'navasthā syāt | If one seeks another inferential mark to establish that, there would be infinite regress. |
athāpi syād abhyāsabalād eva pratyakṣato liṅgānusaraṇamantareṇāpi svata eva sā siddheti | It might be objected that similarity is established by itself through the force of repetition alone, directly through perception, even without following an inferential mark. |
evaṃ tarhi yadyabhyāsasyedṛśaṃ sāmarthyam abhyupagamyate, tadā mu{śa---}ktiniścayo 'pyabhyāsabalādevāntareṇāpi liṅgānusaraṇaṃ bhavatīti kiṃ nābhyupagamyate | If such a capacity of repetition is admitted, then why is it not admitted that certainty regarding [epistemic] capacity also comes about through the force of repetition alone, without following an inferential mark? |
kiñca yadi tat kāryatā siddhā jñānasya tadā vyāptyanusaraṇam anarthakam, tat kāryatāvasāyād eva tadarthaprāpaṇaśaktisiddher anumānajñānavat | Moreover, if that [cognition's] being an effect is established, then following the pervasion is pointless, since the capacity to reach its object is established merely through ascertaining its being an effect, just like in inferential cognition. |
yathānumānajñānasya vastupratibaddhaliṅgadarśanabalenotpatteḥ pāramparyeṇa vastukāryatāvasāyād eva svataḥprāmāṇyam, na sārūpyabalāt | Just as inferential cognition's self-validity [arises] merely from ascertaining its being an effect of the object indirectly through its arising from the force of perceiving an inferential mark connected to the object, not from the force of similarity. |
anyathā hy anavasthā syāt, tathehāpi svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ syāt | For otherwise there would be infinite regress; similarly in this case too, validity would be established by itself alone. |
tathā hi yatra pakṣadharmatvaniścaye 'pi sādhyārthapratītir na jāyate tatradṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi vyāptimanusaret pratipattā, yathā kṛtakatvānityatvayoḥ | For where, even when the presence in the subject is ascertained, cognition of the probandum does not arise, there the investigator would follow the pervasion in a corroborative instance, as with producedness and impermanence. |
iha tu jñānasya tatkāryasyāvasāyād eva tadarthāvyabhicāritayā tat prāpaṇaśaktiḥ siddheti na tādrūpyaṃ liṅgam | But in this case, since the capacity to reach its object is established merely through ascertaining that cognition as its effect and thus as inseparable from it, similarity is not an inferential mark. |
yady evaṃ katham uktam ācāryeṇa lokāyatam adhikṛtya sa khalu pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ nānumānam iti bruvāṇaḥ kāsāñcid vyaktīnāṃ pravṛttau saṃvādaṃ visaṃvādaṃ copalabhya tallakṣaṇaṃ vyāptyā kathayedyathopadeśaṃ pravartamānasyāvipralambhārtham, tadyathādṛṣṭasādharmyāt tathā prasādhitamanumeyatāṃ nātipatatīti | "If this is so, how [can we explain what] the teacher said regarding the Materialist: 'When he who claims that perception alone is valid, not inference, observes agreement and disagreement in the activity of certain individuals, he would state its definition through pervasion for the sake of non-deception of one proceeding according to instruction, [and] thus what is established through similarity to what has been seen does not escape being something inferred.'" |
svaparasantānavartinīrananubhūtaviṣayā buddhīradhikṛtyaitad uktam | This was stated with reference to cognitions of unapprehended objects occurring in one's own and others' mental continua. |
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