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naca tebhya uttarakālabhāvibhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ prathamasya prāmāṇyaṃ yuktaṃ teṣāṃ gṛhītaviṣayatvena svayam evāpramāṇatvāt // | The validity of [this] first cognition cannot be due to those subsequent cognitions, because they themselves are invalid, since they [merely] apprehend what has already been apprehended. |
nanu ca dṛśyata eva santamasādipradeśe prathamajñānagṛhītasyāpyarthasyottarottarataḥ pramāṇāt paricchedaḥ spaṣṭālokavasthāyām | [But] it is actually seen that in places [covered] with darkness, an object that has been [vaguely] apprehended by the first cognition is [later] clearly apprehended by subsequent valid cognitions when bright light appears. |
yatrāpi syāt paricchedaḥ pramāṇair uttaraiḥ punaḥ | Even where there might be apprehension again through subsequent valid cognitions... |
pūrvasya jñānasyānavadhṛtārthatvād aprāmāṇyam eveti bhāvaḥ | ...the first cognition lacks validity precisely because of its uncertain apprehension of the object. |
sakṛjjātavinaṣṭe ca bhavennārthe pramāṇatā netrādibhir asaṅgateti | No validity could belong to [the cognition of] an object that is destroyed immediately upon arising, [since it is] not corroborated by the eyes and other [means of cognition]. |
ekaviṣayatvenāsambandhāt | [This is] because of [their] lack of connection through having the same object. |
prayogaḥ yat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatinirapekṣaṃ tatsvata eva pramāṇam | Whatever does not depend on corroboration by other means of valid cognition is self-validating by its very nature. |
śrotrajñānāntareṇāsyāḥ sambandhāccet pramāṇatā siddhā vede 'pi tajjanyavijñānāntarasaṅgateḥ | If the validity [of auditory cognition] were due to its connection with another auditory cognition, then the validity of the Veda too would be established through corroboration by another cognition produced by it. |
sādhanāntarajanyā tu buddhir nāsti dvayor api hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvādo 'to na vāñchyate | In both cases, there is no cognition produced by other means; therefore, corroboration by cognitions produced by other causes is not required. |
tathā hyekasminnapi śabde babhubhiḥ śrūyamāṇe śrotrajñānāntarapravṛtter asyāḥ śrotradhiyaḥ pramāṇāntarasaṅgatyapekṣayā samyaktvam avasīyate | Thus indeed, when a single sound is heard by many [people], due to the operation of multiple auditory cognitions, the correctness of this auditory cognition is established through its dependence on corroboration by other means of valid cognition. |
vedajanyavijñānāntarasambandhāt / | Due to the connection with another cognition produced by the Veda. |
dvayor apīti śrotrabuddhivedārthabuddhyoḥ / | "In both cases," i.e., in [the case of] the auditory cognition and the cognition of the Vedic meaning. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati pramāṇāntarasaṅgatinirapekṣatvādityatra sādhanāntarajanyaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ vivakṣitam, natvekasādhanasādhyam, tena hetoḥ saviśeṣaṇatvān na sādhanavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasyeti bhāvaḥ / | This is what is meant: In [the statement] "due to not requiring corroboration from other means of cognition," what is meant by "other means of cognition" are those produced by different means of validation, not [those] produced by the same means. Therefore, since the reason is qualified, the example is not devoid of the probandum. |
hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvāda iti / | [The compound means] "corroboration of cognitions produced by other causes." |
hetvantareṇa kṛtaṃ ca tat jñānaṃ ceti tathoktam tasya saṃvāda iti vigrahaḥ // | The compound analysis is: saṃvāda [corroboration] of that jñāna [cognition] which is kṛta [produced] by hetvantara [other causes]. |
athaikasādhanasādhyapramāṇāntarapravṛttimātreṇāpi parataḥ prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, tadā siddhasādhyateti manyamāna āha yathetyādi / | [The opponent], thinking that "if validity from an external source is accepted even merely through the operation of other means of cognition produced by the same means, then [our argument] would prove what is [already] proven," states "yathā" etc. |
yathā tvekendriyādhīnavijñānāntarasaṅgatiḥ / pratyakṣe kāraṇaṃ klṛptā tathā vede 'pi kathyatām // | "Just as in perception there is an established cause in the form of corroboration by another cognition dependent on the same sense organ, let the same be stated for the Veda as well." |
śrotrajñānāntareṇāsyāḥ sambandhāccet pramāṇateti vacanāt // | From the statement that [its] validity [comes] from its connection with another auditory cognition. |
kathaṃ vede kathanīyam ityata āha ekenaiva hītyādi / | [To the question] "How can this be stated regarding the Veda?" [the author] says "ekenaiva hi" etc. |
ekenaiva hi vākyena deśakālana{lāntaḥ---}rādiṣu / labhyamāne 'rthasaṃvāde na mṛgyaṃ kāraṇāntaram // | "Indeed, when the corroboration of meaning is obtained through a single sentence across different places, times, and [different] people, no other cause need be sought." |
tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yadutpannaṃ vijñānaṃ na visaṃvadet / deśāntarādivijñānaiḥ pramāṇaṃ tadasaṃśayam // | "Therefore, when a firmly produced cognition does not conflict with cognitions [arising] in other places and so forth, that [cognition] is undoubtedly valid." |
dṛḍham iti | [The word] "dṛḍham" [means] firm, [i.e.] free from uncertainty and mistake. |
ādiśabdena narāntarādivijñānaparigrahaḥ | By the word "ādi" [here], cognitions from other persons and so forth are included. |
nacāsiddhatāsya hetor iti darśayann āha sādhyetyādi | [The author], showing that this reason is not inadmissible, states [the verse beginning with] "sādhyā." |
sādhyā na cānumānena śabdādīnāṃ pramāṇatā | The validity of verbal and other cognitions is not to be proved by means of inference. |
pratyakṣasyāpi sā mābhūt tat sādhyaivāviśeṣataḥ | For [if that were accepted], then the validity of sense-perception also would have to be proved [by inference], as there is no distinction [between them]. |
na tāvat pratyakṣeṇa sādhyā vedārthasyātīndriyatvād iti bhāvaḥ | The meaning is that [the validity] cannot be proved by perception, because the content of the Veda is beyond the senses. |
nāpyanumānenātiprasaṅgāt | Nor [can it be proved] by inference, because of [unwanted] overextension. |
śabdānām iti vaidikānām iti śeṣaḥ | [In the phrase] "śabdānām," [the word] "vaidikānām" [should be] supplied. |
prakaraṇād vā viśeṣagatiḥ | Or the specific meaning may be understood from the context. |
syād etad iṣyata eva pratyakṣasyāpyanumānasādhyā pramāṇatā | If it were accepted that the validity even of perception is to be proved by inference. |
pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ yena cānyena sādhyate / tasyāpyanyena sādhyatvād anavasthā prasajyate // | If the validity of a means of valid cognition is to be proved by another [means of valid cognition], and if that [other one's validity] too needs to be proved by yet another, then an infinite regress would result. |
anyenāsādhitā cetsyāt sādhakasya pramāṇatā / | If the validity of the proving [cognition] were not established by another [cognition]... |
pratyakṣavat tasyāpyanumānasyāpareṇānumānena pramāṇatāyāṃ sādhyāyām anavasthā syāt / athānumānākhyasya sādhanasya prāmāṇyaṃ nānyena sādhyate tadā sādhyasyāpi pratyakṣādeḥ sā sādhyā mābhūd aviśeṣāt // | If, like perception, that inference too would need its validity proved by another inference, then there would be infinite regress. If the validity of the proving [cognition] called "inference" is not proved by another [cognition], then the validity of perception etc. that is to be proved should also not be proved [by another cognition], since there is no difference [between the cases]. |
nanvityādinā bauddho hetvasiddhimeva samarthayate / | With [the words] beginning with "nanu", the Buddhist supports the inadmissibility of the reason. |
nanu pramāṇamityevaṃ pratyakṣādi na gṛhyate / | [One might object:] "Indeed, perception etc. are not [immediately] grasped as [being] valid means of cognition." |
yadi pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇāntarāpekṣā na syāt tadā pramāṇam ityeṣu pratyakṣādiṣu niścayo na syāt / | If means of valid cognition did not depend on other means of valid cognition, then there would be no certainty about perception etc. being valid means of cognition. |
tataś ca sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ // | And from that would follow the destruction of all practical activity. |
pramāṇaṃ grahaṇād ityādinā pratividhatte / | [The opponent] responds with [the words] beginning with "the means of valid cognition [exists] before apprehension." |
pramāṇaṃ grahaṇāt pūrvaṃ svarūpeṇa pratiṣṭhitam / | A means of valid cognition is established in its own form prior to [its] apprehension. |
nirapekṣaṃ ca tat svārthe pramite mīyate paraiḥ //2910/ | And it is independent with regard to its own object; [only] after [the object] has been cognized is it [the means of cognition itself] cognized by others. |
etaduktaṃ bhavati yadyapi pramāṇaṃ svarūpaniścayaṃ prati pramāṇāntaramapekṣate tathāpi na vyavahārocchedaḥ, arthaparicchedaṃ prati pramāṇāntaranirapekṣatvāt, arthaścetparicchinnas tadā tāvataiva sarvavyavahāraparisamāptir itikiṃ svarūpaṃ prati niścayaniścayanirūpaṇayā, arthaniścayārthatvād asyā iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | This means [the following]: Even though a means of cognition (pramāṇa) depends on another means of cognition with regard to the definite cognition of its own form, nevertheless there is no interruption of practical activity, because [it] is independent of another means of cognition with regard to the apprehension of [its] object; and if the object has been apprehended, then by that alone all practical activity is completed – so what [use] is there in examining certainty regarding [its] own form, since the purpose of this [examination] is [only] the definite cognition of the object? |
avayavārthas tūcyate grahaṇā [p.768] t pūrvam iti / pramāṇam etad ityato niścayāt pūrvam ity arthaḥ / | The meaning of the constituent parts is now explained: "Before the cognition" means before the certainty [arises] that "this is a means of valid cognition." |
svarūpeṇeti arthaparicchedātmanā / | "In its own form" means in the form of object-apprehension. |
nirapekṣam iti svārthaparicchedaṃ prati pramāṇāntaraṃ nāpekṣata ity arthaḥ / tat svārthe pramite niścite tūttarakālamanumānād iti pramāṇaiḥ pramīyate / | "Independent" means that it does not depend on another means of cognition with respect to the apprehension of its own object. When its object has been cognized [and] ascertained, then at a later time it [itself] is cognized through inference and other means of cognition. |
yathoktam vo 'pyasmād ajñātād eva labhyate // | As has been stated: "[Knowledge] is obtained from this [cognition] even while it is itself unknown." |
sugamam // | This is easily understood. |
yadyevaṃ pramāṇamapyanayā nītyā svata eva prasajyata ityāśaṅkyāha apramāṇam ityādi / | If this is so, then invalidity too would follow automatically by the same principle – anticipating this objection, he states "invalid cognition" etc. |
apramāṇaṃ punaḥ svārthe pramāṇam iva hi sthitam / | "An invalid cognition, like a valid cognition, indeed operates on its object, |
mithyātvaṃ tasya gṛhyeta na pramāṇāntarādṛte // | [but] its falsity cannot be apprehended without another means of cognition." |
apramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇavadābhātīti na tat sattāmātreṇa svārthaṃ paricchinatti tasmān mithyātvam mithyārthapariccheditvam asya pramāṇāntaraṃ vinā grahītuṃ na śakyata iti paratas tadvyavasthāpyate // | For an invalid cognition appears like a valid cognition and therefore apprehends its object by its mere existence; hence its falsity – [that is], its nature of apprehending an unreal object – cannot be grasped without another means of cognition; it will be established later that this [falsity] is [determined] from something external. |
na hyarthasyānyathābhāvaḥ pūrveṇāttas tathātvavat | The false nature of an object is not apprehended by the former [cognition, i.e., invalid cognition] in the way that [its] true nature [is apprehended by valid cognition] |
tadatrāpyanyathābhāve dhīr yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe tāvatā caiva mithyātvaṃ gṛhyate nānyahetukam | Only when there arises either a cognition of [something] being otherwise, or a cognition of [its] cause being defective, is falsity apprehended - [and] not due to any other reason |
utpattyavasthamevedaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate | At the very moment of [its] origination, this [valid cognition] is recognized as being valid |
pūrveṇeti apramāṇena | By "the former" [is meant] by the invalid cognition |
ātta iti gṛhītaḥ | "Ātta" means "apprehended" |
tathātvavad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ | "Like [its] true nature" is an example based on dissimilarity |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā pramāṇena tathātvamāttaṃ na tathā mithyātvamapramāṇeneti na samānam | This is what is meant: just as true nature is apprehended by valid cognition, falsity is not [apprehended] in the same way by invalid cognition - thus they are not equivalent |
tathā hi utpattyavastham eva pramāṇaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate natvapramāṇamapramāṇamiti tasya nityaṃ pramāṇavadavabhāsanāditi bhāvaḥ | For indeed, a valid cognition is recognized as valid at the very moment of [its] origination, but an invalid cognition is not [recognized] as invalid [at that time], because it always appears similar to a valid cognition |
tadityādinā parato 'prāmāṇyamupasaṃharati | With [the words] beginning with "tad," he concludes [the discussion of] the extrinsic [nature] of invalidity |
yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe dhīriti sambandhaḥ | "Or a cognition of [its] cause being defective" - this is how [the words] are to be connected |
tāvatā caiva iti | It is precisely at that point [that] the falsity of the cognition becomes apprehended. |
anyathā bhāvadhiyā duṣṭakāraṇadhiyā ca syād etat | This [occurs] through the cognition that [things are] otherwise and through the cognition of [there being] a defective cause. |
yadyetayor dhiyoḥ samyaktvaṃ gṛhītaṃ bhavettadābhyāṃ mithyātvaṃ gṛhyeta tathā ca samyaktvagrahaṇāya pramāṇāntarāpekṣāyāmanavasthā syād ityata āha utpattyavastham ityādi | If the correctness of these two cognitions were to be grasped, then falsity would be grasped through these two [cognitions], and thus due to requiring another means of valid cognition for grasping [their] correctness, there would be infinite regress - therefore he says "at the time of arising" etc. |
arthānyathājñānaṃ duṣṭakāraṇajñānaṃ ca | [By "it" is meant] the cognition that things are otherwise and the cognition of [there being] a defective cause. |
tena nānavasthā iti bhāvaḥ | Therefore there is no infinite regress - this is the meaning. |
yaduktaṃ bauddhādīnāṃ mithyārthaṃ vaidikaṃ vaco vākyatvād agniḥ śīta ityādi puruṣavākyavad ityādi sādhanaṃ, tasyānaikāntikateti darśayann āha ato yatrāpītyādi | [The author], showing that the Buddhists' and others' argument that "Vedic statements are false because they are statements, like human statements such as 'fire is cold' etc." is inconclusive, states "therefore even where" etc. |
yatrāpi iti codanādau | "Even where" [means] in cases like Vedic injunctions etc. |
etad dvayam iti anyathātvajñānaṃ duṣṭakāraṇajñānaṃ ca | "These two" [means] the cognition that [things are] otherwise and the cognition of [there being] a defective cause. |
sādharmyamātrakam iti asatyārthena puṃvākyena vākyatvādinā tulyatvam | "Mere similarity" [means] similarity with human statements through [properties] like being statements etc., [which statements are] false in meaning. |
kasmān na vācyam ityatropapattim āha tatre tyādi | [To the question] "Why should [mere similarity] not be stated?" he gives the explanation in "in that case" etc. |
sarvaṃ pramāṇamithyātvaṃ sādhayantyavipaścitaḥ // teṣām ātmavadhāyaiva tādṛksādhanakalpanam / | The ignorant [people] who try to prove the falsity of all means of valid cognition - for them such reasoning leads only to their own destruction. |
utpadyate parasyāpi pratibimbena tādṛśam // | For the opponent also, a similar [argument] arises [like] a reflection. |
tena ca pratiṣiddhatvād ayathābhūtasādhanam / | And being refuted by this [counter-argument], [it becomes] a means of proving what is not true. |
yadyapramāṇasādharmyamātreṇāpramāṇaṃ syāt tadā sarvatra pramāṇānām aprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ śakyate hi sarvatra vastutvādinā sādharmyaṃ vaktum iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | If something were invalid merely due to similarity with an invalid means of cognition, then invalidity would follow for all means of valid cognition, since some similarity like "being an entity" can be stated in all cases - this is the meaning in brief. |
katham ātmavadhāya bhavatītyāha utpadyata ityādi / parasyāpīti / | [Someone asks:] "How does it lead to their own destruction?" [The answer is given with] "For the other party also" etc. |
mīmāṃsakasya / | [Namely] of the Mīmāṃsaka. |
yathā bimbādanantaraṃ pratibimbamutpadyate, tathā bauddhopanyastasādhanānantaraṃ pratisādhanaṃ mīmāṃsakasyodetītyarthaḥ / | Just as a reflection appears after [the appearance of] the reflected object, similarly after the Buddhist's argument arises the Mīmāṃsaka's counter-argument. |
tathā hi śakyamidam abhidhātum amṛṣā vaidikaṃ vacaḥ, vacanatvādibhyaḥ, agniruṣṇo bhāsvara ityādipuruṣavacanavad iti / | For thus it can be stated: "Vedic statements are not false, because they are statements, etc., like human statements such as 'Fire is hot [and] bright' and so forth." |
tenaivaṃvidhena pratipramāṇena pratiṣiddhatvāt vyāhatatvāt, ayathābhūtācodanetyasyārthasya yat sādhanam upanyastaṃ bauddhādinā tan na codanāṃ bādhituṃ kṣamam, kutaḥ ---, autsargikapramāṇatvāt / | Being refuted by such a counter-proof, being contradicted, the argument presented by the Buddhist and others to prove that Vedic injunction is false is not capable of invalidating the Vedic injunction - why? - because of [its] inherent validity. |
ausargikaṃ pramāṇaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yasya tat tathoktaṃ tadbhāvas tatvam // | That which has validity as its inherent nature is called thus - this is its essential nature. |
atrābhidhīyate yeṣāṃ jātānāṃ sthitiriṣyate / teṣām eva tu nanveṣā vyavasthā sanibandhanā // | For those [entities] which are accepted to persist after being produced, this distinction indeed has [some] basis. |
sanibandhaneti / vastvadhiṣṭhānā / | "Has [some] basis" means [it] is based on a real entity. |
asato vyāpārāyogād iti bhāvaḥ // | Because what is non-existent cannot have any operation - this is the meaning. |
kā punar asau vyavasthetyādi ātmalābha ityādi / | "What then is this distinction?" [is the question, to which the answer begins with] "securing existence" etc. |
ātmalābhe ghaṭādīnāṃ kāraṇāpekṣiteṣyate / | For securing existence, things like jars are accepted to depend on causes; |
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu // | but once they have secured existence, [their] operation towards their own effects is by themselves. |
yattu jñānaṃ tvayāpīṣṭaṃ janmānantaramasthiram / labdhātmano 'sataḥ paścād vyāpārastasya kīdṛśaḥ // | But that cognition which even you accept as non-lasting after [its] birth - what kind of operation could it have after becoming non-existent, though having [once] secured existence? |
asataḥ kīdṛśo vyāpāra iti / | [The question is:] "What kind of operation could the non-existent have?" |
naiva kaścit sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvād asattvasyeti bhāvaḥ / | None whatsoever, because non-existence is devoid of all capacity - this is the meaning. |
sattve 'pi vā nirīhatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ naiva vyāpāraḥ siddhyet / | Or even if [it] existed, since all entities are without effort, no operation could be established. |
na ca jñānasya kiñcitkāryamasti yatra vyāpriyeta / | And there is no effect whatsoever of cognition towards which [that cognition] could operate. |
svārthaparicchedātmakamasteti cet / | [If you say:] "But there is [an effect] in the form of comprehension of its own object." |
na / | No. |
jñānaparyāyatvād asyātmānam eva karotīti cuvyāhṛtam etat / | Since this is synonymous with cognition, [your statement] amounts to the self-contradictory claim that [cognition] produces itself. |
pramāṇam etad iti niścayajananaṃ svakāryam iti cen na / | [If you say:] "The production of certainty that 'this is valid knowledge' is its effect" - no. |
kvacid aniścayād viparyayadarśanāc ca / | Because in some cases there is no certainty, and [in others] the opposite is observed. |
anenātrāpi pratijñārthe pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ pratipāditaḥ / | By this it has also been shown that [your] proposition here contradicts perception and other [means of valid knowledge]. |
tathāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhenānyopalambhātmanā pratyakṣeṇāsato vyāpārābhāvo niścitaḥ / | Moreover, through perception consisting in non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility and apprehension of something else, the absence of activity of what is non-existent is established. |
nairūpyāc ca viyadambhojavad anumānato 'pi siddhaḥ / | And due to [its] formlessness, [this] is established through inference as well, like [in the case of] a sky-lotus. |
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