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na tāvad bhāvam eva karoti, tasya niṣpannatvāt / anyasya ca karaṇe bhāvasya na kiñcit kṛtam iti tadavasthatvāt / | It cannot produce the existing thing itself, because that [thing] is already produced; and if it produces something else, nothing is done to the [original] thing, as it remains in the same state. |
bhāvasya vināśābhāvādakiñcitkaro vināśahetur iti carvitametat sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa / | [The point] that the cause of destruction is ineffective due to the absence of destruction of the existing thing has been thoroughly discussed in the examination of permanent entities. |
kiñca prakṛtyā bhāvo 'sthirasvabhāvo vā syāt, sthirasvabhāvo vā / | Moreover, by its nature, an entity must be either impermanent in nature or permanent in nature. |
tatra yadi prakṛtyaivāsthirātmā bhāvaḥ svahetor utpannaḥ, tadā tena svabhāvaniṣpatter ūrdhvaṃ svayaṃ na sthātavyam eveti tasyākiñcitkarau dvāvapi sthitirnāśahetū / atha prakṛtyā sthirātmā bhāvaḥ, tathāpi tasya svabhāvānyathātvāsambhavān na kaścid vināśakaḥ, svayam eva sthāvaratvānnāpi kaścit sthāpakaḥ, ityubhayathā sthitināśahetū akiñcitkarau / | If an entity arising from its cause is inherently impermanent, then after its nature is accomplished it cannot continue to exist by itself, hence both causes—that of continuation and that of destruction—are ineffective for it; if, on the other hand, the entity is inherently permanent, then because its nature cannot be altered, there can be no destroyer, and because it is naturally stable, there can be no maintainer—thus in both cases the causes of continuation and destruction are ineffective. |
nāpyasadāśrayata iti pakṣaḥ / | Nor [is it correct to maintain] the position that [capacity] has a non-existent substrate. |
tasya sarvasvabhāvarahitatvenādheyatvavyāpārayor asambhavācchaśaviṣāṇavad ityasiddham āśritatvaṃ śakteḥ / | Because being devoid of all nature, it [the non-existent] cannot receive anything or perform any function—like a hare's horn—thus the subsistence of capacity [in it] is unestablished. |
siddhau vānaikāntikatvamāśritānām api rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭe sahotpattidarśanāt / | And even if [subsistence] were established, [the reasoning] would be inconclusive, because color and other [qualities], though [supposedly] subsistent [in something else], are seen to arise together with the pot. |
aprāmāṇye 'pi prasaṅgāc ca / | And because the same [problem] would apply to invalidity as well. |
tathāhyaprāmāṇyam api viparītārthaparicchedotpādikā śaktiḥ | Invalidity [consists in] the capacity that produces wrong apprehension of objects. |
śakteś ca vijñānāśritāyāḥ kālatraye 'pyakaraṇāt prāmāṇyavad aprāmāṇyātmikā śaktiḥ svata eva prasajyeta | And since the capacity residing in cognition is not produced at any of the three times, the capacity consisting of invalidity would have to be inherent [in cognition] by itself, just like validity. |
kiñca yadi kālatraye 'pi jñānasya śaktir na prādurbhavati, tadā sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ vijñānaṃ prāpnoti | Moreover, if the capacity of cognition does not manifest at any of the three times, then cognition would become devoid of all capacity. |
yasya hi yo dharmaḥ kālatraye 'pi na saṃjāyate, sa kathaṃ tasya sambhavet, yathākāśasya mūrttatvam | For when a property is not produced in something at any of the three times, how could it belong to it? – just as corporeality [cannot belong] to ākāśa. |
kuto vā śaktibhir idamatyadbhutamindrajālaṃ śikṣitam, yenaitā vijñānasya kālatrayepyasamāsāditasambhavā api satyastena saha saṅgatimanubhavantīti | And where have these capacities learned this most wonderful magic, whereby they experience connection with cognition even though their existence is never obtained at any of the three times? |
kimapyetan mahadbhūtaṃ nityatvād anubhavantīti cet | If [you say] that "they experience some great wonder due to their eternality," |
na | [we say] no, |
sarvasya śaktiyogitāprasaṅgāt | because it would result in everything having such capacities, |
niyāmakābhāvāt | due to the absence of any restricting factor. |
nahyanāyattasya pratiniyatapadārthayogitāyāṃ kiñcitkāraṇaṃ niyāmakaṃ paśyāmo yenaitā vijñānasya bhaveyur nānyasyeti | For we do not see any restricting cause for something independent to have connection with only specific things, by which these [capacities] would belong to cognition and not to anything else. |
tataś ca pratyāsannanibandhanābhāvāt sarvasyaivaitāḥ prāpnuvantītyuktam etat | Therefore, due to the absence of any proximate limiting factor, these [capacities] would belong to everything – this has [thus] been stated. |
na cāpi tāsām akiñcitkaraḥ kaścid āśrayo yukto nityatvena kasyacit svabhāviśeṣasya kartavyasyābhāvād iyalaṃ bahunā // | Nor can there be any substratum for these [capacities], since [such a substratum] would serve no purpose, [and] because, being eternal, there cannot be any additional characteristic to be produced [in them] — but enough of [this] lengthy [discussion]. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | This is what has been stated. |
atha svataḥprāmāṇyamityanenāyam artho 'bhipretaḥ, jātānām uttarakālaṃ svata eva kāraṇāntarānapekṣāṇāṃ svakārye vṛttiḥ hetubhāva iti yāvat / | By the phrase "svataḥprāmāṇya" [self-validity], this meaning is intended: after [cognitions] have arisen, their operation towards their own effects occurs independently, without requiring other causes — that is to say, [this refers to] their causal efficacy. |
tena yathoktadoṣānavasara ityabhiprāyaḥ parasya / | Thus the opponent's intention is [to show] that there is no occasion for the previously mentioned faults. |
tatra pramāṇānāṃ svakāryaṃ svagataprāmāṇyaniścayo 'rthaniścayo vā / | In this regard, the proper effect of the pramāṇas is either the determination of their own validity or the determination of [their] object. |
etasmin svakārye kartavye na hetum apekṣante // | In bringing about this proper effect, they do not depend on [any other] cause. |
kutas tarhyeṣāṃ vyapekṣetyāha ātmalābhe hītyādi / | [Question:] "From where then is their dependence?" — thus he states [the answer beginning with] "ātmalābhe hi." |
sāmānyena bhāvānām ātmalābhaṃ prati kāraṇāntarāpekṣitāṃ pratipādya jñāne 'pi | Having established that entities in general depend on other causes for obtaining their own existence, [the same applies] also to cognition. |
svaguṇeṣviti / niścayajanmāpekṣayā"dhārasaptamī / | In [the phrase] "svaguṇeṣu," the locative case ending is used with reference to the basis of certainty. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati jñānānāṃ ye svagatā guṇā aviparītabodhātmakatvaṃ viśuddhakāraṇajanitatvam ityevamādayas teṣu niścayotpāde kartavye na tveṣāṃ vyapekṣāstīti // | This is what is stated: cognitions do not require any other causes for producing certainty regarding their inherent qualities — such qualities as being of the nature of non-erroneous awareness and being produced by perfect causes. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi teṣāṃ tatra hetubhāvo bhavatītyāha janane hītyādi / | If that is so, how then are these [cognitions] causally active in that [process]? [The author] speaks of this in [the phrase] "in producing indeed." |
prāmāṇyaṃ cārthaś ca prameya iti prāmāṇyārthau anayorviniścitiḥ / | 'Prāmāṇyārtha' [should be analyzed as] validity (prāmāṇya) and object (artha) [which is] to be known (prameya) - [there is] determination of these two. |
tasyā janana iti sambandhaḥ / | [This stands] in relation to the production of that [determination]. |
arthāniścitiḥ ālocanāpekṣayocyate / | The non-determination of the object is spoken of with reference to mere perception. |
anyeṣāṃ svayam eva niścayātmakatvāt / | Because the other [cognitions] are by their very nature determinative. |
hetubhāva ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is 'being a cause.' |
mṛtpiṇḍa ityādinā ghaṭādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaṃ vyācaṣṭe / | [The author] explains the example "like a jar etc." with [the words] beginning with "lump of clay." |
evaṃ pratijñārthāvirodhaṃ samarthyaṃ hetostadbhāvaniyatatvād ityasya vyāptiṃ prasādhayanna āha ante cāvaśyam eva tadityādi / | Having thus established the non-contradiction of the meaning of [his] thesis, [and] while proving the pervasion of [the reason] "because it is restricted to that existence," he says "and necessarily that at the end, etc." |
taditi / | [Regarding the word] 'tat' [it means validity]. |
kasmād avaśyamante 'ṅgīkartavyam ity āha parādhīna ityādi | Why must [this] necessarily be accepted? [The author] says [beginning with] "parādhīna" [in response]. |
etad eva darśayati maulike cedityādi | [The author] shows this very [point, beginning with] "maulike ca". |
mūlam prathamaṃ jñānam, tatra bhavaṃ maulikam | The initial [or] first cognition is primary; that which exists therein is "maulika". |
tat samavāyīti yāvat | That is to say, [that which is] inherent in that [initial cognition]. |
tathā hi parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ kadācid arthakriyāsaṃvādajñānād vā, bhavet kāraṇaguṇaparijñānād vā, tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣa iti darśayann āha yathaivetyādi | Indeed, extrinsic validity could arise either from the knowledge of correspondence with practical efficacy, or from the comprehension of the qualities of the cause; regarding these [alternatives], [the author], showing that the first position is not [tenable], speaks [beginning with] "yathaiva". |
athāpi syād arthakriyāsaṃvādijñānasya svata eva prāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ tenānavasthā na bhaviṣyatīty āha kasyacid ityādi | Even if it might be argued that the validity of knowledge corresponding to practical efficacy is accepted as intrinsic, [and] therefore there will be no infinite regress, [the author] speaks [beginning with] "kasyacid". |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe 'navasthādoṣaṃ pratipādayann āha evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnetyādi | Explaining the fault of infinite regress in the second position also, [the author] speaks [beginning with] "evaṃ yadi guṇādhīna". |
guṇāś ca na pramāṇena vinā santi kadācana | And qualities never exist without [being known through] a means of valid knowledge. |
tato guṇaparicchedipramāṇāntaramicchataḥ / tasyāpyanyaparicchinnaguṇāyattā pramāṇatā | Therefore, for one who desires another means of valid knowledge to ascertain the qualities, the validity of that [means of knowledge] too depends on qualities ascertained by something else. |
guṇādhīneti | [Beginning with] "guṇādhīna" [as stated above]. |
kāraṇaguṇaparijñānāyattā / pramāṇateti / pramāṇatāniścayaḥ / | [This is] dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause. 'Pramāṇatā' means certainty regarding [its] validity. |
na santīti / sadvyavahārā{ra---}yogyā na santītyarthaḥ / | 'Na santi' means [they] could not become fit for being regarded as existent. |
tasyāpi guṇaparicchedinaḥ pramāṇasya / | 'Tasyāpi' [refers to] the cognition that apprehends the perfection. |
anyaparicchinnaguṇāyatteti / anyena pramāṇena paricchinno yo guṇastanniścayāyattaṃ prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ // | 'Anyaparicchinnaguṇāyatta' means that the validity is dependent upon the certainty of the perfection [which is] apprehended by another means of cognition. |
atra dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā"dya iti / | Here [the author] presents an example beginning with 'yathādya'. |
yathā"dye ca tathānyatretyanavasthaiva pūrvavat / | Just as in the case of the initial [cognition], so too in other [cases], there would be infinite regress, as before. |
tatra tatraivam icchanto na vyavasthāṃ labhemahi // | Seeking [validation] thus in each case, we would not obtain any stable ground. |
guṇajñānaṃ guṇāyattaprāmāṇyamatha neṣyate / ādyamapyarthavijñānaṃ nāpekṣeta guṇapramām // | If the cognition of perfection is not accepted as having its validity dependent upon perfections [in its cause], then even the initial cognition of the object should not require valid cognition of perfection [in its cause]. |
ato dūram api dhyātvā prāmāṇyaṃ yatsvataḥ kvacit / avaśyābhyupagantavyaṃ tatraivādau varaṃ sthitam // | Therefore, even after considering [the matter] at length, if self-validity of cognition must necessarily be accepted at some point, it is better to accept it at the very beginning. |
yathā prathame jñāne pramāṇāntaraparicchinnaguṇāyattā pramāṇatā tathānyatrāpītyarthaḥ / | The meaning is that just as in the first cognition the validity is dependent upon perfections apprehended by another means of cognition, so it is in other [cognitions] as well. |
pūrvavad iti / saṃvādataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayavat / | [It is] "as before," just as in the case of certainty of validity [arising] from corroboration. |
pūrvapūrvasmin guṇajñāne / | [This applies] to each preceding cognition of perfections. |
atha guṇajñānasya svata eva prāmāṇyamanavasthābhayād aṅgīkriyate, tadārthavijñāne 'pi kaḥ pradveṣaḥ, yena tasya parataḥprāmāṇyam iṣyate na tu svata iti nahi kiñcit kāraṇamutpaśyāmaḥ / | If the validity of the cognition of perfections is accepted as self-evident due to fear of infinite regress, then what antipathy [could there be] towards the cognition of the object itself, because of which its validity is held to be extrinsic rather than intrinsic? We do not see any reason for this. |
tasmāttīrādarśane ca śakuninā sudūram api gatvā tatraiva punar āgantavyamityalamapratiṣṭhādi{ṣṭita}kupratipattyā / | Therefore, just as a bird, not seeing the [other] shore even after flying far, must return to the same place [from where it started], so too [here] – enough with such ill-founded assumptions. |
etad eva darśayati guṇajñānam ityādi / guṇāyattam guṇaniścayāyattaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yasya tat tathoktam // | This very [point] is shown by [the words] "the cognition of perfection" etc. That which has its validity dependent on the ascertainment of perfection is called "dependent on perfection." |
saṃvādaguṇavijñāne kena vābhyadhikena ca / ādyasya tadadhīnatvaṃ yadbalena bhaviṣyati // | By what superiority could either the corroborative cognition or the cognition of perfection have such power that the initial [cognition] should be dependent on them? |
tasmāt svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / | Therefore it is established that self-validity is the general rule everywhere. |
bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ tadapohyate // | [This validity] is negated by either [the presence of] a sublating factor or the knowledge of defectiveness in [its] cause. |
parāyatte 'pi caitasmin nānavasthā prasajyate / | Even though this [negation] depends on external factors, no infinite regress follows. |
pramāṇādhīnametaddhi svatas tacca pratiṣṭhitam // | For this [negation] depends on valid means of knowledge, and that [validity] is self-established. |
nanu yadi vijñānaṃ svataḥpramāṇam evaṃ sati sarvajñānaprāmāṇyaprasaṅga ityata āha tasmād ityādi / | [Objection:] "If cognition is self-valid, then it would follow that all cognitions would be valid" – to this [objection the author] responds with "therefore" etc. |
utsargaḥ sāmānyena vidhānam, tatra bhavamautsargikam | A general rule [is called] 'utsarga', [and] that which exists in accordance with it [is called] 'autsargika' |
bādhāḥ arthānyathātvāvadhāraṇaṃ kāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānaṃ ceti bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñāne | 'Bādha' [means] the ascertainment that the real state of things is different [from what was cognized], and [it includes] the knowledge that the cause [of cognition] is defective |
nanu ca prāmāṇyamautsargikaṃ sthitaṃ satkathama pohyate | [Objection:] "If validity is established as a general rule, how can it be negated?" |
yadyaprāmāṇyaṃ bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ pratipādyeta, tac ca tābhyāṃ pratipādyamānaṃ parato bhavet | If invalidity were to be established through annulment and knowledge of defective causes, then that invalidity, being thus established, would be dependent on external [factors] |
tatheṣyata eveti cedevaṃ sati prāmāṇyavad atrāpyanavasthābhaved | If one says "that is indeed what we accept," then in this case too, just as with [externally dependent] validity, there would be infinite regress |
bhavedanavasthā, yadyaprāmāṇyamapramāṇato bhavet, yāvatāpramāṇādvijātīyād aprāmāṇyamiṣyate | There would be infinite regress if invalidity were [established] from invalidity, but invalidity is actually held to [arise] from validity, which is of a different kind |
tac ca svata eva pratiṣṭhitam iti kuto 'navasthā | And since that [validity] is self-established, how could there be infinite regress? |
etad eva darśayati pramāṇaṃ hītyādi | This very point is shown [in the following verses beginning with] "pramāṇaṃ hi" |
pramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇena yathā nānyena sādhyate / na sidhyatyapramāṇatvamapramāṇāt tathaiva hi | Just as validity is not established by [another] valid cognition, similarly invalidity is not established by [another] invalid [cognition] |
vijātestvanyahetutvād dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhitā | But due to having a cause of a different kind, [invalidity] has a firmly established root |
vijāter iti / apramāṇasya | 'Of a different kind' [refers to] invalidity |
asya ca dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhitetyanena sambandhaḥ | And this [term] is to be connected with [the phrase] "has a firmly established root" |
anyahetutvād iti hetunirdeśaḥ / | The reason [for this] is stated in the words "because it has another cause." |
anyo hetuḥ pramāṇalakṣaṇo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | [It means] that which has another cause in the form of valid cognition (pramāṇa). |
dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhite 'ti / dṛḍhā anavasthādidoṣair akampyā mūlapratiṣṭhā yasya sa tathā, tadbhāvastattvam // | "[That which] has its root firmly established" means that whose root-establishment is firm [and] unshakeable due to being free from defects such as infinite regress; such is its nature. |
syād etad yadyapyanapekṣyaprāmāṇye bādhakaḥ pratyayaḥ, tathāpyabādhyamānatayā pratīta evānyasyāprāmāṇyamādhātuṃ samartho nānyathetyata āha bādhakapratyayas tāvad ityādi / bādhakapratyayas tāvad arthānyatvāvadhāraṇam / so 'napekṣapramāṇatvāt pūrvajñānamapohate // | [One might say:] "Even if the sublating cognition has validity independent [of other means of knowledge], it can establish the invalidity of another [cognition] only when it is recognized as being itself unsublated, not otherwise." To this [the author] responds: "The sublating cognition is primarily the ascertainment of the object being different [from what was previously cognized]; being independent in its validity, it sets aside the previous cognition." |
apohata iti / | [The word] "apohate" means [it] rejects. |
pratikṣipati pramāṇatvena nirasyatītyarthaḥ // | [It] means [that it] rejects, [that is,] negates [the previous cognition] in terms of its status as valid knowledge. |
syād etad bādhake 'pi pratyaye prathamajñānasyeva bādhakānantaraṃ sambhāvyata eva, tat kathaṃ tatra bādhakāntarāpekṣā nivṛttā, yenāsyā bādhyamānatāniścayo bhaved ityata āha tatrāpītyādi / | [One might say:] "Even in the case of a sublating cognition, just as with the initial cognition, there could be another sublating [cognition] immediately following. How then can the dependence on another sublating [cognition] cease, by which its [own] sublation could be ascertained with certainty?" To this [the author] responds with "tatrāpi" etc. |
tatrāpi kvacid iti / arthānyatvāvadhāraṇalakṣaṇe bādhake pratyaye / | "There, in some cases" [refers to] the sublating cognition characterized by the ascertainment of the object being different [from what was previously cognized]. |
jātāśaṅkasyeti / puṃsaḥ / | "Of one whose doubt has arisen" [refers to] the person. |
prathamena jñānena / | "By the initial cognition." |
sāpīti / apavādāpekṣā / | "sāpi" [means] the dependence upon sublation |
alpeneti / yatneneti śeṣaḥ // | "alpena" [means] with [minimal] effort |
kathaṃ nivartata ity āha bādhakāntaram ityādi | How does it cease? [The author] says "[through] another sublating [cognition]" etc. |
bādhakānataram utpannaṃ yadyasyānviṣyato 'param tato madhyamabādhena pūrvasyaiva pramāṇatā | If while seeking another sublating cognition for it, [such] arises, then due to the middle [cognition] being sublated, the validity of the first [cognition] alone [is established] |
athānurūpayatnena samyaganveṣaṇe kṛte / mūlābhāvān na vijñātaṃ bhaved bādhakabādhakam | If even after proper investigation with appropriate effort, no sublater of the sublating [cognition] is found due to absence of [its] basis |
tato nirapavādatvāt tenaivādyaṃ balīyasā / bādhyate tena tasyaiva pramāṇatvamapohyate | Then due to [its] being unsublated, that very [second cognition], being stronger, sublates the first [cognition]; therefore the validity of that [first cognition] is rejected |
evaṃ parīkṣakajñānatritayaṃ nātivartate | Thus the investigator's [series of] three cognitions does not go beyond [this point] |
yadi nirūpayatas tasyāpi bādhakasya bādhakāntaramutpadyate, tadā madhyamasya tṛtīyena bādhitatvāt prathamam eva pramāṇaṃ bhavet | If upon investigation another sublater of that sublater arises, then due to the middle [cognition] being sublated by the third, the first [cognition] alone becomes valid |
atha notpadyate mūlasya kāraṇasyābhāvāt / tadā tenaiva dvitīyena balīyasādyaṃ bādhyata iti kṛtvā tasya tena prāmāṇyamapohitaṃ bhavati | If [it] does not arise due to the absence of the fundamental cause, then that very second [cognition], being stronger, sublates the first [cognition], and thus its validity becomes rejected |
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