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prāmāṇyasyeti prāmāṇyavyavasthānasya | [The word] "prāmāṇyasya" [means] "of the establishment of validity." |
tadeva hīti | [The phrase] "tadeva hi" [refers to] validity itself. |
vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyasyānavasthānāt | Because when the pervader ceases, the pervaded cannot persist. |
syād etat vināśyatāṃ nāma ko doṣa ity āha ko hītyādi | One might object thus: "Let it be destroyed - what indeed is the harm?" - [to this] he says [the verse] beginning with "ko hi." |
yena tatsiddhyupāyo 'pi svoktyaivāsya vinaśyati // | [This is] that by which even the means of establishing it is destroyed by his own statement. |
mūlam prāmāṇyam, tac ca sāpekṣatvenāpahriyate, tasya tadvyāpakaviruddhatvāt / | The root [here] is validity (prāmāṇya), and it is nullified by [the notion of] dependence, because it is contrary to that which pervades it. |
tathā hi nirapekṣatvena prāmāṇyaṃ vyāptam, tacca kathaṃ svavyāpakaviruddhe sāpekṣatve satyavasthāṃ labheta / | For validity is pervaded by independence, so how could this [validity] maintain its position when there is dependence, which contradicts independence that pervades it? |
yenetyādinā prāmāṇyasyānapekṣatvena vyāptiṃ darśayati yeneti / | By [the word] "yena" etc., [the text] shows the pervasion of validity by independence. |
yasmād ity arthaḥ // | The meaning [of yena] is "because." |
kathaṃ vinaśyatītyāha sāpekṣaṃ hīti / | [If one asks] "How is it destroyed?", [the answer is given by the words] "because [it is] dependent." |
na vyavasthāpyata iti / anavasthā syāt / bhavatvanavasthādoṣa ity āha anavasthita ityādi / | [It means] "it cannot be established", [because] there would be infinite regress. [If one says] "let there be the fault of infinite regress", [the text] states "anavasthita" etc. |
anavasthito 'pariniścito hetur yasya vādinaḥ sa tathoktaḥ / | One whose reason is not established [and] not ascertained is called thus. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati jñāto hi jñāpako vyāpyam arthaṃ jñāpayati, na sattāmātreṇa, tataśca vādī svayam eva tāvad apratipannaḥ kathaṃ parapratipādanāya sādhanam upādāsyate // | This means that an indicator indicates the pervaded object only when it is [itself] known, not by mere existence, and therefore how can a disputant who himself has not understood [the reason] employ that proof to convince others? |
ityevamityādinā dūṣaṇam ārabhate / ityevam iṣyate 'rthaścennatu cāvyatirekiṇī / | With [the words] "ityevam" etc., [the author] begins the refutation [of the previous argument]. |
tasya bhāvātmatābhāve bhāvo na syāt sakārakaḥ | In the absence of its positive entity-nature, that entity would not be an active agent. |
tatra svābhāvikīti ko 'rtho 'bhipretaḥ | Here, what is meant by the term "svābhāvikī" [inherent]? |
kiṃ nityatvena nirhetukatvāt svabhāvikī | Is it "inherent" because [it is] eternal and without cause? |
āhosvid anityāpi satī svahetubhyo jñānānāṃ svabhāvaniṣpattikāla eva bhavati na tūttarakālaṃ hetvantareṇādhīyata iti kṛtvā svābhāvikī | Or is it "inherent" in the sense that, even though non-eternal, it arises at the very time when cognitions are produced from their causes, and is not imposed later by other causes? |
tatra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ | Here, the first alternative is not [acceptable]. |
tathā hi sā vyatiriktā vā bhaved avyatiriktā vā yadvobhayānubhayasvabhāveti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ | For [the capacity] would be either different [from cognition], or non-different, or both, or neither - [these are] the four possibilities. |
tatra na tāvad āyaḥ, sambandhasiddheḥ padārthasyākārakatvaprasaṅgāccetyādinā sarvapadārthānām avyatiriktaiva śaktir iva bahuśaḥ pratipāditatvāt | The first [alternative] is not [acceptable], because it has been established many times that the capacity of all things is non-different [from them], due to [arguments about] the impossibility of establishing a connection and the consequent non-agency of entities. |
kāryakāraṇasamartho hi svabhāvaśaktis tasya ca svabhāvasya bhāvātmatāyā abhāve sati sa bhāvaḥ kārako na syāt | For capacity is the efficiency of a nature to [act as] cause and effect, and if this nature were not of the nature of a positive entity, that entity could not be an active agent. |
tataścāsyāvastutvaprasaṅga iti bhāvaḥ | And consequently, it would follow that it [would become] a non-entity. |
athāvyatirikteti pakṣas tadā svābhāvikī na syāt, arthasya hetubalabhāvitvenānityatvāt tadavyatiriktāyā api śaktir hetubalabhāvitvenānityatāprasaṅgāt | If [one takes] the position that [capacity] is non-different, then it could not be inherent, because the thing is non-eternal through being brought about by the power of [its] cause, and thus the capacity, being non-different from it, would consequently be non-eternal through being brought about by the power of [its] cause. |
anyathā hi bhinnayogakṣematvād abhedo na syāt | For otherwise, due to having different fates, there could not be non-difference. |
svābhāvikyāṃ hi śaktu syān nityatā hetutāthavā | For if [the capacity] were inherent, it would [have to] be either eternal or causeless. |
pramāṇānāṃ ca tādātmyānnityatāhetute dhruvam | And due to [their] identity with the means of valid cognition, [both] eternality and causelessness would certainly [apply to them too]. |
ahetutve sadābhāvo 'bhāvo vā / | If [the pramāṇas] are without cause, they must either exist permanently or not exist at all. |
nityatve tu sadābhāvo 'nusiddha eveti noktaḥ / | Since it is well established that in case of eternality [something] must exist permanently, this has not been separately stated. |
aparam api prasaṅgam āha ata ityādi / | Another undesirable consequence is stated [beginning with] "ataḥ" etc. |
tadāyattam iti / pramāṇāyattam / | "Tadāyattam" [means] dependent on the pramāṇas. |
etena yathāyogaṃ pratyakṣānumānavirodhau pratijñāyā darśitau / | By this, the contradiction of the proposition with both perception and inference has been shown as applicable. |
tathā hi pramāṇānāṃ svarūpaṃ kādācitkaṃ pratyakṣata eva siddham / anumānato 'pi kāryakramato 'numitam tataśca tasya nityatvābhyupagamaḥ sphuṭataram eva pramāṇābhyāṃ bādhyata iti // | For the occasional nature of the essential form of the pramāṇas is established directly through perception, and is also inferred from the sequential nature of [their] effects, and therefore the acceptance of their eternality is very clearly contradicted by these two pramāṇas. |
pramāṇānām ityādinā parasya yathoktaprasaṅgadvayasamarthānopāyamāśaṅkate / | With [the words] beginning with "pramāṇānām," the opponent anticipates a way to justify [his position against] the two aforementioned undesirable consequences. |
yadā hi vyañjakaiḥ pramāṇasvarūpaṃ vyajyate tadā tadupalabhyate nānyadeti / | For when the essential nature of a pramāṇa is manifested by manifesting agents, only then is it apprehended, not otherwise. |
tena satyapi nityatve na sarvadopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / | Therefore, even though [the pramāṇa] is eternal, there is no undesirable consequence of [its] being apprehended at all times. |
nāpi kāryasya sadā sadbhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, kāraṇāntarāpekṣasya kāryārambhakatvābhyupagamāt, na kevalam asya / | Nor is there an undesirable consequence of [its] effect existing at all times, because it is accepted that [something] which depends on other causes initiates effects, not [operating] by itself alone. |
tena kāraṇāntarasannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṃ kāryasya kādācitkatā bhavatīti bhāvaḥ // | Thus [it follows that] the effect occurs only occasionally, due to the presence or absence of auxiliary causes. |
vyaktītyādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with [the words] beginning with "vyakti." |
tasmāt tadrūpakāryāṇāṃ nityaṃ syād upalambhanam // | Therefore, there would always be perception of effects of that nature. |
vyaktiś ca hetvantarāpekṣā ceti vyaktihetvantarāpekṣe / | [There are two concepts here:] manifestation and dependence on other causes. |
pūrvaṃ hi śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa vyaktir nityasya nirastā / hetvantarāpekṣā cānupakāryasyāyukteti pratipāditam / | Previously, in the examination of śruti, the manifestation of what is eternal has been refuted in detail; and it has been established that what cannot be assisted cannot depend on other causes. |
tadrūpakāryāṇām iti / teṣām pramāṇānām / | [The phrase] "effects of that nature" [refers to] those pramāṇas. |
ubhayapakṣas tu virodhādyathoktapakṣadvayabhāvidoṣaprasaṅgān na yuktaḥ / nāpyanubhayapakṣaḥ parasparavyavacchedarūpāṇām ekaniṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvān na tadānīm eva vihitasya niṣedho yuktaḥ, ekatra vidhipratiṣedhayor virodhād iti bhāvaḥ / | The view of both [difference and non-difference] is not tenable due to contradiction and the occurrence of the faults previously mentioned in both positions. Nor is the view of neither [difference nor non-difference] tenable, because among mutually exclusive things, the negation of one necessarily implies the affirmation of the other; thus the negation of what has just been affirmed is not logical, as affirmation and negation regarding the same thing are contradictory. |
sphuṭataratvād dūṣaṇasyaitannoktam // | This [objection] has not been stated [in the text] because the refutation is quite obvious. |
idānīm antimaṃ pakṣatrayamabhyupagamya dūṣaṇam āha pṛthaktvam ityādi / | Now, having provisionally accepted the last three positions, [the author] states their refutation beginning with "pṛthaktvam." |
pṛthaktvam ubhayātmatvaṃ vāstu śaktes tathāpi tat / | Let there be either difference or both-ness of the power, even then that [is not tenable]. |
pṛthaktvam vyatirekapakṣaḥ / | This is the view [advocating] difference. |
ubhayātmakagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / anubhayātmakapakṣāṅgīkāro 'pi draṣṭavyaḥ / yadvā tasyāpyubhayarūpapratiṣedhasvabhāvatayobhayātmakatvam astyeva / | The term "having both natures" is illustrative. The view of "having neither nature" should also be understood [as included]. Or alternatively, that [view] too has the nature of both because it consists in the negation of both forms. |
asmin pakṣatraye 'pi nityayā śaktyā jñānasya sambandhānnityatvaṃ syāt // | In all these three views, [the] cognition must be eternal due to its relation with [the] eternal capacity. |
katham ity āha anyathā hītyādi / | [Someone] asks "How [is that so]?" [The author] says "Because otherwise..." etc. |
anyathā hi yadi śaktisambaddhaṃ jñānam anityaṃ bhavet tadā śakter nityatvaṃ na prāpnoti / | For if it were otherwise, [that is] if the cognition connected with capacity were non-eternal, then capacity could not be eternal. |
kutaḥ ekarūpāsamanvayāt / ekasvabhāvānugamābhāvād ity arthaḥ / | "Why?" Because of non-continuance in one form. The meaning is: because of the absence of continuance of one nature. |
tamevaikarūpāsamanvayaṃ darśayati kadācid ityādi / | [The author] shows this very non-continuance in one form [through the words] beginning with "sometimes." |
anitye hi vijñāne sati śaktes tajjñānasambandhāsambaddhasvabhāvadvayaṃ syāt, na caikasya parasparaviruddhasvabhāvadvayasambhavo yuktaḥ, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | For if cognition is non-eternal, then capacity would have two natures: one connected with that cognition and [one] not connected [with it]. And it is not reasonable for one [thing] to have two mutually contradictory natures, because [this] would result in the loss of [its] unity. |
bhedavyavahārocchedāpatteś ca // | And because [this] would result in the destruction of all practical dealings based on difference. |
dvitīyaṃ vikalpamadhikṛtyāha athetyādi / | [The author] speaks about the second alternative [beginning with the words] "now if..." |
atha śaktiḥ svahetubhyaḥ pramāṇānāṃ prajāyate / jātānāṃ tu svahetubhyo nānyair ādhīyate punaḥ // | The Capacity arises from its own causes along with the pramāṇas, [but] once [these] have arisen from their causes, [this Capacity] cannot be imposed [on them] again by other [causes]. |
tadatretyādinā siddhasādhyatāṃ pakṣadoṣam āha | By [the words] beginning with "tad atra," he states the defect of the position, namely that it proves what is [already] established. |
tadbhāvāntarameveti na tasyātmopadiśyate // | Its nature is not taught as being something different from that [existence]. |
tathā hi sthirāsthirabhāvabhedena dviprakārasyāpi padārthasya niraṃśatvāt sarvātmanā pariniṣpatter nottarakālaṃ pratyayāntareṇātmabhūtā śaktir ādhātuṃ pāryate, ādhānevārthāntarakaraṇam eva syāt, na tu svabhāvabhūtaśaktyādhānam / | Since both kinds of entities—distinguished as permanent and impermanent—are partless, they come into being completely [at once]; therefore, no capacity inherent in their nature can be imposed later by another cause, for such an imposition would result in the creation of a different entity altogether, not in the imposition of a capacity as [part of] its nature. |
bhāvasvabhāvanabhyupagame vā śakter akārakatvaprasaṅga ityuktam // | And if the capacity is not accepted as [part of] the nature of the entity, it follows that it would not be an active agent, as has been stated [before]. |
syād etat mābhūdanaṃśasya vastuna uttarakālaṃ śaktyādhānam, sāṃśasya kasmānna bhavatītyāha | One might say: "Let it be that a capacity cannot be imposed later on an indivisible thing, [but] why can it not [be imposed] on something that has parts?" |
sa vidyata iti / | [The answer is:] "That exists." |
viruddhadharmaprasaṅgaḥ // asthire tu bhāve viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha sādhitetyādi / | [This would lead to] the consequence of contradictory properties. And regarding impermanent entities in particular, he states the refutation beginning with "sādhite." |
kutracitphala iti / arthaniścayādau / | "In some result"—[that is,] in the definite cognition of objects and so forth. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The remaining [portion of the text] is easily understood. |
syād etat yaid bhavatāṃ na vivādaḥ kathaṃ tarhi parataḥprāmāṇyamabhyupagatam ityata āha etāvattvityādi / | [Someone] might object: "If you have no dispute [with us], then why have you accepted the doctrine that the validity of pramāṇas is derived from external [sources]?" To this [the author] says [by referring to the verse about] "this much" etc. |
boddhum iti / niścetum / | "To apprehend" means "to ascertain." |
svata iti / vijñānasvarūpād anubhavamātrād anapekṣitottarakālabhāvikāryasaṃvādāt // | "By itself" means from the mere nature of cognition, from mere experience, without depending on subsequent conformity with [its] effects. |
syād etat vijñānāvyatirekācchakter vijñānagrahaṇe sāpi gṛhītaiva / | [Someone] might object: "Since capacity is not different from cognition, when cognition is apprehended, that [capacity] too must be apprehended." |
ko nāmānubhavātmatvān niścetuṃ kevalāt prabhuḥ // | Who indeed is capable of ascertaining [capacity] from mere experience alone? |
bodhaścāptiś ca bodhāptī, yathāvasthitasya vijñeyasya vastuno ye bodhāptī, tatra tadviṣaye, śaktateti vigrahaḥ / | "Bodha" means apprehension and "āpti" means attainment; [together they refer to] the apprehension and attainment of the cognizable object as it exists; [the compound means] "capable in that regard." |
kevalād iti / sambandhādikāraṇaguṇaparijñānānapekṣāt // | "From mere" means without dependence on the knowledge of causal properties such as relationship and so forth. |
kasmān na prabhur ity āha apramāṇe ityādi / | [Someone] asks "Why is one not capable?" [The author] answers with [the verse beginning with] "in non-valid cognition" etc. |
keśapāśādidarśana iti / keśoṃḍrakādidarśane / | "Seeing hair-nets etc." means in cases of illusory perception such as seeing [what appears to be] a tuft of hair. |
anenaitad āha yadyapyanubhūtā śaktistathāpyapramāṇasārūpyād bhrānter niścetuṃ na śakyate viṣādiśaktivat / | What is meant by this is [the following]: Even though the Capacity has been apprehended, due to its resemblance to invalid cognition, it cannot be determined with certainty, just like [in the case of] the potency of poison [antidotes]. |
nahyanubhava eva kevalo niścayaheturanyasyāpyabhyāsāder apekṣaṇāt / | For mere apprehension alone cannot be the cause of certainty, since other [factors] such as repeated practice are required. |
yatra hyaṃśe bhrāntinimittena na guṇāntaramāropyate tatraiva niścayaḥ // | For certainty exists only with respect to that aspect where other qualities have not been superimposed by causes of error. |
kutas tarhi sā niścitavyetyāha tasmād ityādi / | "How then is it to be determined with certainty?" - thus [the text] states "therefore" etc. |
anyadveti / hteuśuddhijñānam / | "Some other [factor]" means the knowledge of the purity of the cause. |
na tvasyā ādhānāyeti / | "Not for its infusion" [means what follows]. |
anyadapekṣata iti sambandhaḥ / | This is to be connected with "[something] else is required." |
śakteḥ / | [It refers to] "of the Capacity." |
niścayasya puruṣādhāratvāt tadutpattaye yuktā kāraṇāntarāpekṣā, natvādhānāya, tasya śaktyādhāratvāt, śakteś ca sahabhāvaniṣpattau niṣpannatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | Since certainty resides in the person, it is appropriate that other causes are required for its production, but not for [its] infusion, because that [infusion] resides in the Capacity, and because when the Capacity is produced simultaneously [with cognition], [the infusion] is [also] produced - this is the meaning. |
yathāhītyādinā viṣādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaṃ vyācaṣṭe / | With [the words] beginning with "just as," [the text] explains the example of "like poison, etc." |
tadanyasamatekṣaṇād iti | From seeing its similarity to other things. |
phalānantaratābhāvād iti | Because of the absence of immediate effects. |
mūrcchāsvedalāpāditatphalotpattiniścaye | [Upon] the ascertainment of effects such as fainting, sweating, delirious speech and other such [symptoms]. |
viṣādyātmāviniścaye tādātmyam iti | [This leads to] the ascertainment of its identity as poison or similar [substances]. |
yathāvasthitajñeyavastubodhāptiniścayaḥ | The certainty of obtaining knowledge of the cognizable object as it really exists. |
svavacanavirodhaṃ pratijñāyāḥ pratiapadayann āha kiñcetyādi | [The author] points out the self-contradiction in [the opponent's] proposition by saying "moreover" etc. |
na siddhaṃ parataḥ katham iti | How is it not established from another [source]? |
siddham eva | It is indeed established. |
arthāpatteḥ pramāṇāntaratvād iti bhāvaḥ | The meaning is that presumption (arthāpatti) is a separate means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). |
yaduktam tadeva hi vināśyeteti tasyānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha niṣpannetyādi | [The author] demonstrates the non-conclusiveness of what was stated [earlier], namely that "that very [validity] would be destroyed", by saying "when produced" etc. |
etad eva spaṣṭayann āha na tatsvabhāvetyādi | [The author] explains this very point by stating "na tatsvabhāva" etc. |
tadrūpaniścayārthaṃ tu pratipattāvapekṣyate | For the determination of its nature, [something else] is required in cognition. |
syād etat yadi bhavatāṃ jñānāpekṣayā parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, tadāsmākam api siddhasādhyatā | It might be objected: "If you are trying to prove the extrinsic validity [of cognition] with respect to cognition itself, then for us too this would be proving what is [already] proven." |
tathā hi jñānamapyarthāpattitas tāvat siddham iṣyate, kimaṅga punaḥ tacchaktirūpaṃ prāmāṇyam | For cognition itself is accepted to be established through arthāpatti [presumption], what then to say of its validity, which consists in its capacity? |
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