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arthaniścayalakṣaṇe svakārye tu kartavye jñānaṃ nāpekṣata iti svatastaducyate | However, in producing its own effect, namely the determination of the object, cognition does not depend [on anything else], hence it is called "self-sufficient." |
tadetad asamyak | This [argument] is incorrect. |
prāmāṇyaniścayamantareṇa svārthaniścayasyaivāsambhavāt | Because the determination of its own object is impossible without the determination of [its] validity. |
saṃśayādiviṣayīkṛtasya ca kathaṃ kārye nirapekṣatā, pramāṇāntaragrahaṇāpekṣāyāṃ vā kathaṃ svapakṣe anavasthā na syād iti yatkiñcidetat | How can something that is the object of doubt etc. be independent in producing its effect? And if it depends on the apprehension of other means of knowledge, how would infinite regress not occur in your position? Thus this [argument] is worthless. |
kiñcetyādinā hetos tadbhāvaniyatatvād ityetasyānaikāntikatām udbhāvayati | With [the words] beginning with "kiñca," [the author] shows the inconclusiveness of the reason "because it is restricted to its presence." |
tathā saṃvādasāmarthyam niścayamanyata iti vartate | Similarly, "the capacity for correspondence" and "determination from another" are to be understood. |
samaṃ dvayam iti pramāṇamapramāṇaṃ ca | "Both would be equal" means both validity and invalidity. |
viparyayād iti / aprāmāṇyāt / | "[From] its contrary," i.e., from invalidity. |
na nityatvācchaktīnāṃ svābhāvikatvaṃ nāpi svahetubhya evotpatter uttarakālaṃ kāraṇāntarānapekṣaṇāt / kiṃ tarhi / | The inherent nature of capacities [exists] neither due to their eternality, nor due to their arising from their own causes alone, nor [does it arise] later due to non-dependence on other causes. [Then] what [is it]? |
svabhāvata eva bhāvānāṃ pratiniyatarūpāḥ śaktayaḥ samudbhavantīti svābhāvikatvam āsām / | The capacities of entities arise with their specific forms from [their] own nature alone - this is their inherent nature. |
tathā hi yadeva svātmani rūpam asti kāraṇānāṃ tadeva taiḥ kārye samādhīyate, yathā kāpālairupajanyamāne ghaṭe rūpādayaḥ svaguṇadvāreṇaiva prārabhyante, udakādyāharaṇaśaktis tu tair ātmanyavidyamānatvānnādhīyate ghaṭe, svata eva tu sā tasya prādurbhavati | Indeed, whatever form exists in the causes themselves, that very [form] is imparted by them to the effect, just as when a pot is being produced from potsherds, color and other [properties] are initiated through their own qualities alone, but the capacity to hold water and so forth, not being present in them [potsherds], is not imparted to the pot [by them] - rather it manifests in it by itself. |
tathā jñāne 'pi tat kāraṇair indriyādibhir arthaparicchedaśaktirātmanyavidyamānatvānnādhīyate, svata eva sā tasya bhavatīti / | Similarly, in cognition too, the capacity for object-determination is not imparted by its causes like sense organs and so forth, since it is not present in them - rather it arises in it by itself. |
ataḥ svābhāvikī śaktir iti tasyāpyetat pralāpamātram / | Therefore [the claim that] "capacity is inherent" - this too is mere prattle. |
anena nyāyenāprāmāṇyasyāpi svata eva prasaṅgāt / | Because by this reasoning, invalidity too would follow [to be] inherent. |
tathā hi tadapi viparītārthaparicchedādiśaktilakṣaṇam, na ca nayanādīnāṃ tathāvidhaśaktiyogo 'stīti / | For that [invalidity] too is characterized by the capacity for apprehending objects incorrectly and so forth, and such capacity is not connected with eyes and other [sense organs]. |
kiñca yadyātmanyavidyamānaṃ rūpaṃ kāraṇair nādhīyate kārye, tadā katham indriyādayo jñāne rūpatāmātmanyasatīmādadhati vijñāne | Moreover, if a form not present in [something] is not imparted to the effect by causes, then how do sense organs and others impart cognitionhood, which was not present in itself, to consciousness? |
tathāvidyamānāpi sā tairādhīyate, arthaparicchedaśaktiṃ kiṃ nādadhīran / | Just as that [cognitionhood], though not present [originally], is imparted by them, why would they not impart the capacity for object-determination? |
kiñca yadi tāvad avyatirekiṇyaḥ śaktayo bhāvādabhyupagamyante, tadā bhāvasvarūpavat tāsām api hetupratibaddhair ātmasthitir iti kutaḥ svābhāvikatvam āsām / | Furthermore, if capacities are accepted as non-different from the entity, then like the nature of the entity, their self-existence too would be dependent on causes - so how could they be inherent? |
atha vyatirekiṇyas tadā svayam eva bhāvān na svāśrayais tāsāṃ sambandhaḥ siddhyati, teṣāṃ tadanupakārakatvāt / | If [they are] different [from the entity], then since they would exist independently, their connection with their substrates would not be established, because these [substrates] would not be helpful to them. |
nacānupakāraka āśrayo yukte 'tiprasaṅgāt / | And what is not helpful cannot be a substrate, because [if it were] there would be unwanted consequences. |
kiñcānimittāḥ svātantryeṇaitā bhavatyo na deśakālaniyamam apekṣeran / | Moreover, since these [cognitions] would be without cause, acting independently, they would not depend on restrictions of time and place. |
tathā hi yasya yatkiñcit kvacidāyattamanāyattaṃ vā bhūtvopalīyate / | For indeed, whatever thing, having come into existence [either] dependent or independent on something, ceases to exist. |
na vā yat punar anāyattaṃ, svātantryeṇa pravṛttam tat kimiti kadācit kvacid viramet / tataśca pratiniyataśaktiyogitā bhāvānāṃ na syāt / | And that which is independent [of anything else] and operates by itself autonomously - why should it ever cease [to operate] at any time or place? And consequently, things would not possess their fixed capacities. |
anyathā sarvasya sarvatropayogaḥ syād iti / | Otherwise, everything would be applicable everywhere. |
anye tu manyante tat kāryadarśanamāśrityedam ucyate svataḥ sarvapramāṇānām ityādi / | Others, however, think [thus]: "This statement about all pramāṇas [being valid] inherently is made based on the observation of their effects." |
yataḥ sarva eva bhāvāḥ santa eva kāraṇaiḥ kriyante kāryotpādaniyamāt / | Because all entities, only as existing things, are produced by causes, due to the rule of effect-production. |
nahyasanto vyomakusumādayaḥ kvacid api śakyante kartum, sikatāsu vā tailam / | For non-existent things like sky-flowers cannot be produced anywhere, nor [can] oil [be produced] from sand. |
asata utpattau sarvasyāsattve 'tiśayābhāvāt sarvadā sarvatra cotpattiḥ syāditi / | If there were production from the non-existent, since everything would be equally non-existent and there would be no distinction [between them], production would occur at all times and all places. |
tadetad ayuktam / | This [position] is not correct. |
kāraṇavaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt / | Because it would lead to the futility of causes. |
asattāvadbhavanmate na kiñcit kriyate / | According to your view, nothing that is non-existent is produced. |
sato 'pi sarvanirāśaṃsatvān na kiñcit kartavyam astīti kiṃ hi kurvaṃs tasya tat kārakaṃ bhavet / | And for what exists, since it has no need of anything, there is nothing to be produced [for it]; for what [action] could [something] perform by which it would become its agent? |
ataḥ kāryakāraṇatvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Therefore, [this] leads to the absence of the relation between cause and effect. |
abhivyaktiḥ sataḥ kriyata iti cen na / | If [you say] that "the manifestation of what exists is produced," [we say] no. |
tasyā api sadasattvena karaṇavirodhāt / | Because the production of that [manifestation] too is contradictory due to [the problem of its] existence or non-existence. |
yatas tatrāpīdaṃ vikalpadvayam avatarati kiṃ sā satī kriyate, āhosvid asatīti / | For in that case too these two alternatives arise: is it produced as [something] existent, or is it [produced] as [something] non-existent? |
prathame pakṣe 'tiśayābhāvāt karaṇānupapattir ityuktam / | In the first case, due to the absence of any addition [to what already exists], production is impossible, as has been stated. |
tatrāpyabhivyaktyāśrayaṇe 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ / | And if one resorts to [the idea of] manifestation in that case too, an infinite regress would follow. |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣo 'sataḥ kriyānabhyupagamāt / | Nor [is] the second alternative [acceptable], because [you] do not accept the production of what is non-existent. |
abhyupagame vā bhaktyāpyasataḥ karaṇaprasaṅgāt / | Or if [you] did accept [it], it would follow that even in the case of an existent entity, what is produced would be non-existent. |
kiñcārthāntarabhūtā vā bhāvādabhivyaktiḥ kriyeta anarthāntarabhūtā vā / | Moreover, is the manifestation produced as something different from the entity or as something non-different? |
yadyarthāntarabhūtā kriyeta tadā bhāvasya na kiñcit kṛtaṃ syāt / | If it is produced as something different, then nothing would be done to the entity [itself]. |
nahyanyasya karaṇe 'nyatkṛtaṃ nāma, atiprasaṅgāt / | For when one thing is produced, another thing cannot be said to be produced, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
tat sambandhinyabhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti cen na / | If [you say] that "the manifestation is produced in what is related [to the entity]," [we say] no. |
anupakāryatayā tat sambandhitvāsiddheḥ / | Because its being related [to the entity] is not established, as it cannot be benefited [by the manifestation]. |
upakāre vābhyupagamyamāne tasyāpyarthāntaratve 'navasthāprasaṅgāt sambandhāsiddhiḥ / | If a benefit is admitted [to exist] and if that [benefit] is something different [from the entity], an infinite regress would result; therefore the relationship cannot be established. |
anarthāntaratve 'pi kāraṇānāṃ vaiyarthyaprasaṅgaḥ / | Even if [the manifestation] is not different [from the entity], the causes would become purposeless. |
bhāvād evāśrayabhūtād upakārasvabhāvāyā abhivyakter utpādānnityābhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, svabhāvasyābhivyaktikāraṇasya sarvadā vidyamānatvāt / | If the manifestation, which has the nature of a benefit, arises from the entity that serves as its substrate, then manifestation would occur eternally, since the cause of manifestation, [namely] the nature [of the entity], would always be present. |
nāpyanupakāryasya parāpekṣā yukteti pratipāditaṃ bahudhā / | It has been explained many times that what cannot be benefited cannot reasonably depend on anything else. |
athānarthāntarabhūtābhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti pakṣaḥ, so 'pyayukto 'tiśayābhāvāt / | If one takes the position that "a manifestation which is not different [from the entity] is produced," this too is unreasonable due to the absence of any distinction. |
tathāhyanarthāntarabhūtā kriyata iti bhāvasvabhāvaḥ kriyata ityuktaṃ bhavati / | For to say "that which is not different [from the entity] is produced" amounts to saying "the nature of the entity is produced." |
tasya ca sattvena sarvaniraśaṃsatvāt karaṇamayuktamityetad eva cintyate / | And since this [nature] exists [already], making everything complete, its production would be unreasonable - this is what is being considered. |
kiñca abhivyaktivadbhāvasyāpyasataḥ karaṇaṃ syād avyatirekāt / | Moreover, like the manifestation, the entity too would have to be non-existent when produced, due to their non-difference. |
bhāvasvabhāvavadvābhivyakter api satyā eva karaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, na caitad api yuktam, atiśayābhāvāt / | Or, like the nature of the entity, the manifestation too would have to be already existent when produced - but this is not reasonable either, due to the absence of any distinction. |
anavasthāprasaṅgādityuktam / | As has been said, [this would lead to] an infinite regress. |
sadarthaviṣaye ca kāraṇavyāpāra iṣyamāṇe kāraṇānāṃ kāryakriyānuparamaprasaṅgaḥ / kiṃ hi tadopalabdhe kāraṇāni nivartteran / kāryasattām iti cen na / | Further, if it is maintained that the cause operates upon [something] that already exists, then there would be no cessation of the causes' production of effects; for upon obtaining what would the causes cease to operate? If [you say] "upon obtaining the existence of the effect," [then] no; |
bhavanmatyā tasyāḥ prāgapi bhāvāt / | because according to your view, that [existence] would be there even before. |
tasmād asadevotpadyate, yasya kāraṇam asti / na vyomakusumādi / | Therefore, only that non-existent thing is produced which has a cause, not [things] like the sky-lotus; |
tadutpādanasamarthakāraṇābhāvād iti / | because there are no causes capable of producing those [latter things]. |
ataḥ kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamāt kāryakāraṇabhāvaniyamo bhaviṣyati / | Thus, due to the restriction of causal power, there will be a restriction of the causal relationship. |
nahi sarvo bhāvaḥ sarvotpādanasamartho 'ṅgīkriyate / | For not every entity can be accepted as capable of producing everything; |
anādisvahetuparamparayā sarvabhāvānāṃ śakter niyamitatvāt / | because the power of all entities is restricted through a beginningless series of their own causes. |
yadi cāsatprāmāṇyam anyena kartuṃ na śakyata iti svatas tad ucyate, aprāmāṇyam api tarhy anenaiva nyāyena svata eva prāpnotīti yatkiñcid etat / | If it is said that "validity is inherent because if non-existent it could not be produced by anything else," then by this same logic invalidity too would have to be inherent. Hence this [argument] is worthless. |
yo 'pi manyate prāmāṇyaṃ nāma vijñānasyārthaparicchedotpādikā śaktiḥ, śaktiś ca kṣaṇikavijñānāśritatvāt svato 'satī na śakyate kartum / | Some also think that "what is called validity is the cognition's capacity to produce the apprehension of objects, and this capacity, since it rests in momentary cognition, cannot be produced [by anything else] if not existing by itself; |
kālatraye 'pi tasyāḥ kriyānupapatteḥ / | because its production is not possible at any of the three points of time." |
tathā hi na tāvat prāgvijñānotpatteḥ kriyate, āśritatvāt / | [The capacity] cannot be produced before the appearance of cognition, since [it] is dependent [on cognition]. |
na hy āśritasyāśrayābhāve karaṇaṃ yuktam, yathā kuḍyābhāve citrasya, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt / | For indeed, the production of something dependent in the absence of [its] substratum is not possible - just as [the production] of a painting in the absence of a wall [is not possible] - because [this] would lead to [the absurd consequence of its] being non-dependent. |
ata eva sahakaraṇamapyayuktamāśritatvāt / | For this very reason, simultaneous production too is not possible, due to [the capacity's] being dependent. |
na hi kuḍyālekhyayor āśrayāśritayor yugapadārambhaḥ sambhavati / | For indeed, there cannot be simultaneous origination of the substratum and the dependent thing, as in [the case of] a wall and a painting. |
nāpy utpannasya sato vijñānasya paścāt kriyate kṣaṇikatvāt / | Nor can [the capacity] be produced after cognition has already come into existence, because [cognition] is momentary. |
tāvat kālaṃ sthiter abhāvāt / | Because [cognition] cannot persist for that long. |
ataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyam ucyate / | Therefore it is said that "the validity of all means of valid cognition is intrinsic." |
iti tad etad asamyak, tathā hi yat tāvad uktam arthaparicchedotpādikāśaktiḥ prāmāṇyam iti tadasambaddham / | This is incorrect, because what was stated - that "validity consists in the capacity to produce the apprehension of objects" - is irrelevant. |
arthaparicchedasya jñānaparyāyatvāt / | Because "apprehension of objects" is synonymous with "cognition." |
na ca tadeva jñānamāśritā satī śaktis tasyaivotpādikā yujyate anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt samānakālaṃ ca kāryakāraṇabhāvād upapatteḥ / | And a capacity that is dependent on a cognition cannot be productive of that very same cognition, because [this] would lead to [the absurd consequence of its] being non-dependent, and because a cause-effect relationship is possible only when [both terms] exist simultaneously. |
yac coktam āśritatvāt saha prāk ca na kriyata iti tad apy ayuktam, avyatirekādāśritatvāsiddheḥ / | And what was said - that "due to [its] being dependent [the capacity] cannot be produced simultaneously [with cognition] or before [it]" - that too is incorrect, because dependence is not established due to [their] non-difference. |
bhāvasvabhāva eva hi viśiṣṭārthakriyākārī tadbhāvamātrajijñāsāyāṃ śaktir iti vyapadiśyate / | When the inherent nature of an entity [is found to be] capable of producing a specific effect, and there arises a question about that nature alone, [then] that [same nature] is designated as 'śakti' [capacity]. |
nārthāntaram / | [It is] not something different [from the entity]. |
arthāntaratve bhāvasyākārakatvaprasaṅgaḥ sambandhāsiddhiś ceti nirloḍitam etad bahudhā / | If [śakti] were something different [from the entity], it would follow that the entity would cease to be an agent, and there would be no establishment of relation [between them] - this has been discussed many times. |
tasmāt svabhāvabhūtā vijñānasya śaktir abhinnayogakṣematvād vijñānasvabhāvavat prāgvijñānotpatter asatyeva kriyata ityaviruddham / | Therefore, since the capacity of cognition constitutes its very nature and shares the same fate [with it], like the nature of cognition [itself], it is non-existent before the arising of cognition and [then] comes into being - [this is] not contradictory. |
sahaiva ca vijñānenotpadyata ityapi yuktam eva / | And it is indeed appropriate that [the capacity] arises simultaneously with cognition. |
svabhāvabhūtasya dharmasya bhāvena sahaikayogakṣematvāt / | Because a property that constitutes [something's] nature must share a single fate with that entity. |
bhavatu nāma śakter avyatirekaḥ padārthāt, tathāpi sadasator āśritatvam asiddham / | Let it be granted that capacity is non-different from the entity; nevertheless, the dependence [relation] between the existent and non-existent is not established. |
tathā hi sattāvannāśrayate tasya sarvātmanā niṣpatter nirapekṣatvāt / | For it does not depend [on anything] like existence does, because it is completely accomplished and independent. |
nāpi sata āśrayo yuktas tasyākiñcitkaratvāt / | Nor is a substrate appropriate for an existent thing, since it [would] serve no purpose. |
yathā vindhyo himavataḥ / | Like [the idea of] the Vindhya [mountains depending on] the Himālaya [mountains]. |
sthitis tena kriyata iti cet na / | If [you say] "it brings about continuation [of existence]" - no [that is not correct]. |
sthiteḥ sthāturavyatirekāt | Because [there can be] no difference between continued existence (sthiti) and the existent thing (sthātṛ) |
sthātureva hi svabhāvas tathā bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇocyate | For it is indeed the very nature of the existent thing that is spoken of thus, [specifically] with the rejection of all other differences |
naca tenāśrayeṇāvasthāturātmā kriyata ityakiñcikara eva | And the essence of the existent thing is not produced by such a substratum - hence this [argument] is entirely futile |
vyatireke 'pi sthiteḥ sthātuḥ sthāpako 'kiñcitakara eva | Even if continued existence were different from the existent thing, that which brings about existence would be ineffectual |
arthāntarabhūtāyāḥ sthiteḥ kāraṇāt | Because [it would only be] the cause of a continued existence that has become something entirely different |
na cānyasya karaṇenānyasya kiñcitkṛtamityubhayathāpi sthāpakasyākiñcitkaratvam | And since the production of one thing cannot effect anything in another thing, in both cases what brings about [existence] would be ineffectual |
tat sambandhinī sthitiṃ karotīti cet | If [someone argues] that "it produces an existence related to that [thing]" |
na, sthāpyasthāpakayor iva sthitimataḥ sthityā saha sambandhāsiddheḥ, anavasthāprasaṅgaśceti nirloḍitaprāyam etat | [We reply:] no, because the relationship between the existent and existence cannot be established, just as [between] what is made permanent and what makes permanent, and because this would lead to infinite regress - this has been mostly examined [before] |
kiñca padārthasya sthāpikā sthitir arthāntarabhūtāṅgīkriyate, tadā na kasyacit padārthasya vināśaḥ prāpnoti | Moreover, if the continued existence that makes a thing permanent is accepted as something different [from the thing], then destruction could not occur for any thing whatsoever |
sthāpikāyāḥ sthiter vidyamānatvāt | Because the continued existence that makes [things] permanent would [always] be present |
nāpi vināśahetuvaśāt satyām api sthitau vināśo bhaviṣyatīti śakyaṃ vaktum | Nor can it be said that "even when continued existence is present, destruction will occur due to the power of causes of destruction" |
tasyāpyakiñcitkaratvād ayuktaṃ vināśakatvam / | Because that [cause] also is ineffective, [its] being destructive is not logical. |
tathā hi tatrāpyayaṃ vikalpo 'vataratyeva kiṃ bhāvād arthāntarabhūtaṃ vināśaṃ nāśahetuḥ karotyāhosvid bhāvam eva / | For in this case also this alternative inevitably arises: Does the cause of destruction produce destruction as something different from the existing thing, or [does it produce] the existing thing itself? |
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