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evaṃ tāvad anaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam, idānīmiṣṭavighātakāditvād viruddhatvam asya pratipādayann āha apicetyādi / | Thus far inconclusiveness has been established; now showing its contradictoriness due to being destructive of what is desired etc., he says "moreover" etc. |
apicānāditā siddhyed evaṃ nānarasaṃśrayaḥ / | Moreover, in this way beginninglessness might be established, [but] not impersonality. |
tasmād akṛtakatve vā syād anyo 'pyāgamo 'kṛtaḥ | Therefore, if [the Veda] is uncreated, then any other text might also be uncreated. |
tathāhyapauruṣeyatvam asya sādhayitum iṣṭam, tac ca na siddham, kiṃ tarhi anāditvamātram aniṣṭam eva siddhyati | For [the opponent] wishes to prove this [text] to be non-human in origin, but that is not established; rather, only its beginninglessness - which is undesired - is proved. |
syād etat anāditve siddhe sāmarthyād akṛtakatvaṃ siddhyatyeva, nahi kṛtakasyānāditvaṃ yujyate | One might argue that "when beginninglessness is proved, then by implication non-createdness is also proved, because what is created cannot be beginningless." |
tasmād anāditvādyadyatkṛtakatvaṃ syāt tadā pārasīkādivyavahārasyāpi syāt | Therefore, if non-createdness were to follow from beginninglessness, then the customs of the Pārasīkas and others would also [be uncreated]. |
etad eva darśayati | [The author] shows exactly this. |
tathā hi pārasīkādivyavahārāḥ parāśrayāḥ / nāstikānāṃ ca siddhāntaḥ parasaṃskārabhāvikaḥ | For the customs of the Pārasīkas and others are dependent on others, and the doctrine of the atheists arises from the impressions of others. |
parāśrayā iti parapuruṣasaṃksāreṇa pravṛttā ity arthaḥ | "Dependent on others" means "proceeding through the impressions of other persons." |
parasaṃskārabhāvika iti parasaṃskāreṇa bhāvaḥ sa yasyāsti sa tathoktaḥ | "Arising from others' impressions" means "that which has its existence through the impressions of others is called thus." |
parasaṃskāreṇa vā bhavituṃ śīlam asyeti parasaṃskārabhāvī, tataḥ svārthe ko vidheyaḥ | Or [it means] "that which has the nature of coming into being through others' impressions is parasaṃskārabhāvī" - what is to be prescribed in this sense? |
tathā hi ye 'pi tāvat svapratibhāracitasaṅketāḥ siddhāntāḥ, teṣām api yathāśrutārthavikalpavaśenaiva pravṛtteḥ parasaṃskārabalenaiva pravṛttiḥ prāyeṇa, yathā darśanavṛttīnāṃ lokavyavahārāṇām | For even those doctrines that are composed from one's own insight, since they proceed by way of conceptual understanding of things as heard, generally proceed by the force of others' impressions, just like the customs of people based on direct perception. |
bhavatu sarveṣām apauruṣeyatvam iti cedityāha | If one argues "let all [texts] be without human authorship," [the author] replies. |
avaitathyanimittaṃ hi yatno 'yaṃ bhavato 'khilaḥ | For this entire effort of yours is aimed at [establishing] truthfulness. |
kālatvapuruṣatvādau saṃdigdhavyatirekitā | With regard to [properties] like being time or being a person, there is doubt about their absence [in the case of the Veda]. |
pūrvavat karaṇāśakter narāṇām aprasādhanāt | Because, as [shown] before, it has not been proved that men are incapable of doing [this work]. |
vyakteś ca pratiṣiddhatvād vaktā kartaiva gamyatām | Since the idea of 'manifestation' has also been rejected, the speaker himself should be understood as the 'author' [of the Veda]. |
tat prayogadvaye 'pyuktaṃ sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam | Thus, in both arguments, the example [cited] is devoid of the probandum. |
sarveṣāṃ hi narāṇāṃ karaṇaśaktiprasādhanaṃ viparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇam, tasya cānupadarśanāt sarvahetūnāṃ sādhyaviparyaye vyatirekaḥ saṃdigdhaṃityanaikāntikatā | The proof that all men lack the capacity [to compose the Veda] would have served as evidence refuting the contrary conclusion; but since this [incapacity] has not been demonstrated, the exclusion of all reasons in the case of the contrary of the probandum remains doubtful, hence [the reason is] inconclusive. |
pūrvavad iti / vedādhyayanavācyatvasādhanavat | "[The expression] 'as before' [means] as in the case of proving that it is spoken of as Vedic study." |
sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam iti / vartamānakālavat prākṛtanaravadityetat | "[The expression] 'the example is devoid of the probandum' [refers to] this [example] like 'the common man of the present time.'" |
naropadeśāpekṣatvāt kṛtakasya ca sādhanāt / svārthe vaktranapekṣatvaṃ dharmidṛṣṭāntayor na ca | Because it depends on human instruction and because it has been proved to be produced [by effort], independence from a speaker does not exist in either the subject or the example. |
dharmidṛṣṭāntayor iti | "[The expression] 'in the subject and example' [means the following]:" |
sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi cetyarthaḥ // tatkṛtaḥ pratyaya ityādāvāha nityatve 'stu ityādi / nityatve 'ste ca vākyasya dharmidṛṣṭāntayor api / nityavākyodbhavatvasya spaṣṭāsiddhiḥ pratīyate | "[It means] in the subject to be proved and in the example subject." Since the eternality of sentences has been rejected, the property of 'originating from eternal sentences' is clearly recognized as unestablished in both the subject and the example. |
itthaṃ cāpauruṣeyatve codanāyā aniścite / sandigdhāsiddhatā doṣaḥ paścimeṣvapi hetuṣu | Thus, since the non-human origin of the injunction remains uncertain, the subsequent reasons also have the defect of being doubtfully established. |
atrāpi hetor asiddhatā dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalatā pūrvavat / | Here also, as [was] before, the Reason is 'inadmissible', and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'. |
dharmidṛṣṭāntayor iti saptamī nityavākyodbhavatvasyodbhavatvasyetyetad apekṣā / | The Locative ending in [the compound] 'dharmidṛṣṭāntayoḥ' is with reference to [the property of] 'being produced from eternal sentences'. |
vākyasyeti nityatva ityetad apekṣā sambandhaṣaṣṭhī / | [The word] 'vākyasya' is to be construed with 'nityatve'; [it is] a Genitive ending denoting relationship. |
nityavākyodbhavatvasyetyasiddhyapekṣā ṣaṣṭhī / | [The compound] 'nityavākyodbhavatvasya' is connected with [the word] 'asiddhiḥ'. |
paścimeṣviti doṣavarjitaiḥ kāraṇair janyamānatvād ityādiṣu ca / | [The word] 'paścimeṣu' [refers to] the subsequent Reasons such as 'being produced by causes free from defects' and so forth. |
nityā tāvat svarūpeṇa tat kṛtāto matiḥ kutaḥ // nahi śīryata ityuktaḥ puruṣaś ca śrutāvalam / purastasyoditā bādhā suvyaktā tadasiddhatā // | Since [the Veda] is eternal by its very nature, how can there be any cognition produced by it? Indeed, it has been stated repeatedly in the śruti that "the Puruṣa does not perish"; [but] the refutation of this has been stated before, [and thus] its inadmissibility is quite evident. |
pratyakṣaṃ tatra tenāyaṃ bādhābhāvo 'vasīyate // | Therefore, through this [argument], the absence of refutation is determined by direct perception. |
etaduktaṃ bhavati / | This is what is being stated. |
spaṣṭaṃ hi hetubalapravṛttānumānataḥ sarvapadārthavyāpini kṣaṇabhaṅge prasādhite satiye 'yaṃ nityatvenābhyupagatā śrutiḥ sā tāvad budhyata iti svarūpagrahaṇam abhidheyavyudāsārtham / | For when it has been clearly established through inference based on the force of [valid] reasons that momentary destruction pervades all entities, this śruti, which had been accepted as eternal, is [now] understood [as non-eternal]; here the term 'svarūpa' [by its very nature] is used for the purpose of excluding [what is] to be expressed. |
tat kṛtāto matiḥ kuta iti / | "How can there be any cognition produced by it?" - that is [to say], there cannot be [any such cognition]. |
naivetyarthaḥ / etanānāptāpraṇītoktijanyatvādityetasyāśrayāsiddhatoktā / | [This means] "no" - [namely that] the reason "because [it is] produced by statements not coming from an unreliable person" is inadmissible with respect to its substratum. |
bādhavarjanādityetasya ca svarūpato 'siddhatāṃ niścitāṃ darśayann āha nahi śīryata ityādi / | [The author], showing the definite invalidity in itself of the reason "because [it is] free from annulment," states "na hi śīryate" etc. |
aśīryo 'yaṃ nahi śīryate avināśī vā are ayam ātmeti vede paṭhyate / | It is read in the Veda: "This [is] imperishable, indeed it does not perish" and "O friend, this Self is indeed indestructible." |
nanu ca codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhur iti vacanād vaidikaikadeśaviśeṣa eva codanocyate, na tu sarvo vedaḥ, codanājanitā buddhiḥ pakṣīkṛtā / | [Someone objects:] "Due to the statement that 'they call codanā that statement which prompts action,' only a specific portion of the Veda is called codanā, not the entire Veda, and [it is] the cognition produced by codanā [that] is made the subject [of inference]." |
tasmād anyārthasya vedasya bādhāyām api na codanāyā bādheti hetoḥ siddhir eva / | Therefore, even when there is invalidation of the Veda regarding other matters, there is no invalidation of codanā - thus the reason is indeed established. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ codanāgrahaṇena kvacit sarvam eva vaidikaṃ vākyam ucyate, na tu sarvadā pravartakam eva / | This is not a fault - by the term codanā sometimes the entire Vedic sentence is indeed meant, not always only that which prompts [action]. |
anyathā na hiṃsyād bhūtyānītyetad vākyaṃ codanā na syāt, apravartakatvāt / | Otherwise the sentence "One should not injure living beings" would not be codanā, because it does not prompt [to action]. |
yac coktaṃ bhāṣye ubhayam iha codanayā lakṣyate 'rtho 'narthaś ca iti, tad api viruddhyeta, na hi codanānarthe pravartayati, yena tayānartho lakṣyata iti syāt / | And what is stated in the Bhāṣya - "Both are here indicated by codanā - the beneficial and the harmful" - that too would be contradicted, because codanā does not prompt towards harm, by which [fact] it could be [said] that harm is indicated by it. |
kiṃ ca yad etad aparam uktaṃ bhāṣye viplavate khalvapi kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayo natu vedavacanasya mithyāvasāye kiñcana pramāṇam astīti / | Moreover, this other [statement] is stated in the Bhāṣya: "Indeed some cognition from human-made statements may be uncertain, but there is no means of knowledge [showing] the falsity of Vedic statements." |
asya nityasya tāvad bādhanāccodanāyām api bādhā sambhāvyamānā durvāraiva / | Since this eternal [Veda] is thus invalidated, the possibility of invalidation even in codanā is indeed unavoidable. |
tathā hi kumārilenoktam --- akartṛkatvasiddhyā ca hetutvaṃ sādhayiṣyate / | For thus Kumārila has stated: "And through establishing [its] authorlessness, [its] status as a valid means [of knowledge] will be proven." |
yathācākartṛkasyāpi nityapuruṣādiviṣayasya vedavacaso bādhā parisphuṭā samīkṣyate / | It is clearly observed that there is rejection of Vedic statements concerning the eternal Soul and such things, even though [these statements are] not authored by any person. |
tathāgnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādāvapi vā{sā---}śaṅkā durvārairveti sphuṭā tāvat sandigdhāsiddhatā pūrvoktaiva / | Similarly, in [statements] like "Heaven results from the Agnihotra sacrifice," the suspicion [of falsity] is inevitable; therefore, as stated before, there is clearly doubtful inadmissibility [of the reason]. |
ata eva punar nirvartya sandigdhasiddhatām eva draḍhayann āha karāmalakavadityādi / | For this very reason, returning [to the topic] and reinforcing the doubtful inadmissibility [of the reason], he speaks [the words] beginning with "like [seeing] a myrobalan fruit in one's palm." |
tatreti / | [As stated] in that [context]. |
deśakālanarāntare / | In different places, times, and among different people. |
avijñātatadarthāś ca pāpaniṣyandayogataḥ / tathaivāmī pravartante prāṇihiṃsādikalmaṣe // | And these [people], ignorant of its meaning, engage in sinful acts like killing living beings, due to the connection with the fruition of [their] evil [deeds]. |
rūpam svarūpam, arthaḥ abhidheyaḥ, narāvijñātau rūpārthāvasyeti vigrahaḥ / | 'Rūpa' means form, 'artha' means meaning, [and] this is the analysis of "of which both form and meaning are unknown to people." |
tatra rūpamavijñātam, kimayameva varṇo 'thānyo viśeṣa eva varṇakrama uta neti svataḥ parataś ca niścayāyogāt / | There, the form is unknown because one cannot determine, either by oneself or through others, whether this is indeed the [correct] letter or some other letter, or whether this is indeed the [correct] sequence of letters or not. |
evam arthe 'pyaniścayo draṣṭavyaḥ / tataś ca tamobhūte niścayābhāvenānālokabhūtatvāt / | Similarly, uncertainty should be understood regarding the meaning as well; and therefore, due to the absence of certainty, it is [like] darkness, being devoid of light. |
{pāpaṃ }pūrvapāpābhyāsavāsanā, tanniṣyandaḥ / | 'Pāpa' [means] the impressions from the practice of previous evil deeds, [and] 'niṣyanda' [means] the fruition of that. |
tathaiveti / pārasīkavat // | "Like them" means "like the Pārasīkas." |
dharmaṃ prati na siddhātaś codanānāṃ pramāṇatā / | The validity of the Vedic injunctions regarding dharma has not been established, |
svato 'nyebhyaś ca mandebhyas tadarthānavadhāraṇāt // | since [its] meaning cannot be ascertained either by oneself or from other dull-witted persons. |
dharmagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam, adharmo 'pi grahītavyaḥ // | The term "dharma" is used [here] as an indicator; adharma is also to be included. |
yadyevaṃ kastarhi dharmādivyavasthāśraya ity āha jñānetyādi / | [If someone asks:] "If this is so, then what is the basis for determining dharma and other such matters?" |
iti śrutiparīkśā. | Thus [ends] the examination of śruti. |
antastamaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭamajñānam, jñānālokena vyapāsto dhvasto 'ntastamorāśir yena sa tathoktaḥ / | "Inner darkness" means both painful and non-painful ignorance; one who has dispelled [this] mass of inner darkness through the light of knowledge is thus described. |
viviktānām iti / | The term "viviktānām" means [those who are] discriminating; |
anavadyānām sudhīnām, paśuvadhakāmamithyācārādikalaṅkānaṅkitānām ity arthaḥ / | [The term refers to those who are] blameless, wise, [and] unmarked by the stains of animal slaughter, sexual misconduct and similar [acts]. |
upadeśakṛdiṣyatām iti / | [The phrase] means "let a teacher be sought"; |
evaṃ hi tadapauruṣeyatvaṃ prakalpitaṃ sārthakaṃ bhavatīti bhāvaḥ / | For only in this way does the postulated non-human origin [of the Veda] become meaningful. |
anyathā hi tasminnavijñātārthe tadapārthakam eva syāt / | Otherwise, when its meaning remains uncognized, it [the Veda] would indeed be purposeless. |
anenaitaduktaṃ bhavati yo 'yaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyābhyupagamo bhavatāṃ, sa na vinā sarvajñena yukta ityato 'vaśyaṃ so 'bhyupagantavyaḥ, anyathā tatra prāmāṇyāsiddhir iti pratipāditatvāt / | By this it is stated that this acceptance of self-validity which is yours cannot be justified without [accepting] an omniscient being; therefore he must necessarily be accepted, because otherwise the validity [of the Veda] would not be established. |
tataś ca taduktam eva varaṃ vacanaṃ dharmādisamāśrayo 'stu, kimaparamapramāṇopapannāpauruṣeyatvakalpanayā / | Therefore, let his word alone be the basis for [understanding] dharma and other matters - what is the use of assuming impersonal origin [of the Veda], which cannot be established by any valid means of knowledge? |
yaccoktam yogiratyakṣasamādhigamyo 'pi dharmādir na bhavatīti, tadapi śeṣavat, anumānena yoginaḥ paścāt sādhayiṣyamāṇatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | As for what was said that "dharma and other matters are not accessible even through the direct perception of yogins in meditation" - that too is defective, because it will later be proved through inference that yogins [can have such perception]. |
evaṃ ca pauruṣeyatve vedānām upapādite / svataḥprāmāṇyam apy eṣāṃ pratikṣiptamayatnataḥ // | Thus, when the personal origin of the Vedas has been established, their self-validity also becomes rejected without [additional] effort. |
tathā hi śruteḥ prāmāṇyaṃ yathā syād iti manyamānāḥ sāmānyena sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṃ tu parata ity āhur jaiminīyāḥ / | Thus, wishing that the validity of the śruti be [established], the followers of Jaimini declare that for all pramāṇas in general, validity is intrinsic while invalidity is extrinsic. |
parataḥ kila prāmāṇye 'navasthādidoṣaprasaṅgāt pramāṇetaravyavasthocchedaḥ syāt / | Indeed, if validity were extrinsic, due to the fault of infinite regress and so on, [this] would result in the destruction of the distinction between valid and invalid [cognitions]. |
tathā hi catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ sambhavanti kadācid ubhe 'pi prāmāṇyāprāmāṇye svata eveti prathamaḥ, kadācid aparata eveti dvitīyaḥ, prāmāṇyaṃ parato 'prāmāṇyaṃ tu svata eveti tṛtīyaḥ, etad viparyayaścaturthaḥ / | Thus four positions are possible: first, that sometimes both validity and invalidity are intrinsic; second, that sometimes both are extrinsic; third, that validity is extrinsic while invalidity is intrinsic; and fourth, the reverse of this. |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tathā hi ekavyakyādhāraṃ vā tadubhayaṃ syād vyaktibhedena vā / | Among these, the first position is not [tenable], for both [validity and invalidity] would either have a single instance as their locus or [appear] in different instances. |
na tāvad ekasyāṃ vyaktau parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetaradharmayoḥ sambhavaḥ, virodhāt / | First, it is not possible for both properties - validity and invalidity - which have mutually exclusive characteristics, to exist in a single instance, due to contradiction. |
nāpi vyaktibhedena, niyamakāraṇābhāvānniścayahetusambhavāccāsaṅkīrṇapramāṇāpramāṇavyavasthānābhāvaprasaṅgāt / | Nor [can they exist] in different instances, due to absence of a determining cause and due to the consequence that there would be no unmixed distinction between valid and invalid [cognitions]. |
tathā hi dvayor api svātantryādidaṃ pramāṇameveti niyamo na syāt / | For due to the independence of both [validity and invalidity], there would be no rule [establishing] "this is only a valid cognition." |
bādhasāmānyena ca dvayor api tirohitabhedatvād anyasya cāvadhāraṇakāraṇasyānabhyupagamād vibhāgenāparijñānād idaṃ pramāṇamapramāṇam iti vyavasthā na syāt / | And since the difference between both would be obscured by general invalidation, and since no other determining cause is accepted, due to lack of discriminative knowledge, there could be no determination that "this is valid" [or] "this is invalid." |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ, prāgubhayasvabhāvarahitasya jñānasya niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgāt / nahi parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetarayorabhāve rūpāntaram asya śakyamavadhārayitum ity asaṃśayamasyānupākhyatvam āpadyete / | Nor [is] the second position [tenable], because a cognition lacking both natures initially would result in being natureless. For in the absence of validity and invalidity, which have mutually exclusive characteristics, no other form of it can be determined, thus it would undoubtedly result in its being indescribable. |
svatas tāvad dvayaṃ nāsti virodhātparato na ca / | First, the two [validity and invalidity] cannot exist intrinsically due to contradiction, nor [can they exist] extrinsically. |
niḥsvabhāvatvam evaṃ hi jñānarūpe prasajyate // | In this case, the cognition would necessarily become devoid of [any] essential nature. |
vijñānavyaktibhedena bhavec ced aviruddhatā / tathāpy anyānapekṣatve kiṃkva neti nirūpyate // | Even if it be argued that there would be no contradiction due to different instances of cognition, still, since [the cognition is] independent of anything else, it cannot be determined which [characteristic belongs] where. |
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo 'navasthādoṣāt / | Nor [is] the third alternative [acceptable], due to the fault of infinite regress. |
tathā hi na tāvat parato 'pramāṇabhūtāt prāmāṇyamāśaṃsanīyam tasya svayam evāpramāṇatvāt / | For validity cannot be expected from something that is inherently invalid, since it is itself invalid. |
nāpi pramāṇabhūtāt, tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogena parataḥprāmāṇyāśaṃsāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt / | Nor [can validity be expected] from what is valid, because if validity is expected to come from outside for that [valid cognition] too, which faces the same question, an infinite regress would result. |
tataścaikapramāṇavyaktivyavasthāpanāya pramāṇaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalam eva puruṣāyuṣam upayujyate / | And consequently, in following the series of means [of knowledge] to establish the validity of a single instance of cognition, a person's entire lifetime would be consumed. |
tasmād gatyantarāsambhavāt svataḥsarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam, parato 'prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām / | Therefore, since there is no other alternative possible, it must be accepted that the validity of all pramāṇas is intrinsic, [while] invalidity is extrinsic. |
tatra prayogaḥ ye yadbhāvaniyatās te taṃ prati na paramapekṣante, yathākāśamamūrtatvāya, pramāṇabhāvaniyatāś ca vivādāspadībhūtā vijñānādaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | Here is the formal argument: Those things which are inherently restricted to a certain nature do not depend on anything else with respect to that [nature], as [in the case of] space with respect to incorporeality; and these disputed cognitions and other [means of knowledge] are inherently restricted to being valid means of knowledge - thus [this is] the apprehension of something contradictory to the pervader. |
na cāsyānaikāntikatvam, svato 'sambhavino dharmasya pareṇādhātumaśakyatvād ākāśasyeva mūrttatvaṃ yadāha "nahi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartumanyena pāryata" iti. | And this [reason] is not inconclusive, because a property that is impossible by its own nature cannot be imposed by another, just as corporeality [cannot be imposed] on space, as it has been said: "A power that does not exist intrinsically cannot be produced by anything else." |
atra svata ityādinā tucchaṃ pratijñārthaṃ sambhāvayaṃstadvicāradvāreṇa dūṣaṇam ārabhate / | Here, with [the words] beginning with "svataḥ," [the author] commences his refutation by examining [the opponent's view] while considering the insignificant nature of the proposed thesis. |
ityetasya ca vākyasya bhavadbhiḥ ko 'rtha iṣyate | What meaning do you [philosophers] attach to this statement? |
ko 'rtha iṣyata iti praśne para āha meyabodhādika ityādi | To this question "What is the meaning?", the opponent answers [by saying] "meyabodhādika" etc. |
meyabodhādike śaktis teṣāṃ svābhāvikī sthitā | Their inherent capacity is established in [matters like] the cognition of the cognizable and so forth. |
yadi jñānaṃ pramāṇam, tadā tasya meyabodhe prameyaparicchede svābhāvikī śaktiḥ arthaparicchedakatvāj jñānasya | If cognition [itself] is the pramāṇa, then it has an inherent capacity for the cognition of the cognizable [and] for the determination of what is to be cognized, because cognition has the nature of determining objects. |
atha cakṣurādīni tadā teṣāṃ yathārthajñānajanane, codanāyā atīndriyārthādhigame svata eva śaktir ityetad ādiśabdena saṃgṛhītam | If, however, [organs] like the eye [are meant], then they have an inherent capacity for generating accurate cognition, [and] the Vedic injunction has an inherent capacity for understanding supersensible objects - all this is included by the word "ādi." |
atraiva tāvat para upapattim āha na hītyādi | On this very point, the opponent states [his] argument beginning with "na hi." |
etad eva darśayann āha anapekṣatvam evaikam ityādi | Showing this very [point], he says [the verse] beginning with "anapekṣatvam evaika." |
anapekṣatvam evaikaṃ prāmāṇyasya nibandhanam | Independence alone is the foundation of validity. |
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