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īdṛk cāsāvarthaśceti tathoktaḥ, īdṛgiti / | And such an object is spoken of thus, namely as "such." |
avicāraramaṇīyaḥ / | [This is] pleasing only when not examined. |
anyathā dhūmādāvapi vikalpaḥ śakyate kartum kim aindriyako dhūmo liṅgatvenopātta, āhosvid vijñānaprakṛtikālādipariṇāmaḥ, kiṃvāvayavī paramāṇubhir ārabdho 'nārabdho vetyādi{:} vikalpo{lpe---} 'nyatarasiddhatādidoṣaḥ syāt // | Otherwise, even regarding smoke [etc.], one could raise doubts [such as]: "Is the smoke taken as a reason something perceptible to the senses, or is it a transformation of consciousness, primordial matter, time, etc.? Is it something composite made up of atoms or not?" - and such doubts would lead to the fallacy of [the reason being] unestablished for one party or another. |
prayatnānantarajñānaṃ kṛtakānityasādhanam ityatrāha prayatnetyādi / prayatnānantarajñānakāryārambhakatā naca / | Here [the opponent] says regarding "[being] cognized immediately after effort" as proving [something's being] produced and non-eternal: "And [there is no] causality of cognition immediately following effort." |
prayatnānatarajñānabhavaṃ kāryaṃ tasyārambhakatā pratisaṅkhyādinodhāder na siddheti sambandhaḥ / | The connection is that the causality of intentional destruction etc. is not established for that effect which is cognition occurring immediately after effort. |
yadi hi sautrāntikanayena pratisaṅkhyādinirodhādinā vyabhicāra, udbhāvyate / | If indeed the deviation through intentional destruction etc. is pointed out according to the Sautrāntika view... |
tadā na siddho vyabhicāras teṣāṃ matena pratisaṅkhyānirodhādeḥ saṃvṛtisattvāt / | Then the deviation is not established, because according to their view intentional destruction etc. have only conventional existence. |
naca sāṃvṛtaṃ kasyacit kāryasyārambhakaṃ yuktaṃ tallakṣaṇahāniprasaṅgāt / | And what is conventional cannot reasonably be the producer of any effect, because [this would lead to] the loss of its defining characteristic. |
tathā hi yadarthakriyākāri tadeva paramārthas tadanyat tu saṃvṛtisaditi paramārthasaṃvṛtisator lakṣaṇam // | For indeed, this is the definition of ultimate and conventional existence: that which performs a causal function is ultimate, while what is other than that is conventional. |
pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak | Pratisaṅkhyānirodha is that [state of] dissociation [which occurs] one by one |
utpādātyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisaṅkhyayā | The other [type of] nirodha, [called] apratisaṅkhyā[nirodha], is an absolute obstruction to arising [of dharmas] |
tasmād ajñātasiddhāntāḥ plavante 'līkamāninaḥ | Therefore those who do not know the [proper] doctrine float about [in confusion], having false pride |
nirodhād iti pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhau | "[Regarding] nirodha" [refers to] the two [types of] nirodha: pratisaṅkhyānirodha and apratisaṅkhyānirodha |
sakleśair vastubhir yo vibhāgaḥ sa pratisaṅkhyayā prajñayā prāpyata iti kṛtvā pratisaṅkhyānirodha ucyate | That separation from defiled objects which is attained through discriminating wisdom (pratisaṅkhyā) is called pratisaṅkhyānirodha |
sa ca pratisaṃyogidravyaṃ bhinnaḥ | And it is different [for each] associated substance |
yāvanti hi saṃyogindriyāṇi tāvanti visaṃyogadravyāṇi | For there are as many dissociated substances as there are associated sense-faculties |
apratisaṅkhyānirodhas tu anāgatānāṃ dharmāṇām utpādasyātyantavighnabhūto dharmo visaṃyogād anyo yaḥ sa ucyate | But apratisaṅkhyānirodha is called that dharma which is different from dissociation [and] which serves as an absolute obstruction to the arising of future dharmas |
sa ca na pratisaṅkhyayā labhyate | And it is not obtained through discrimination (pratisaṅkhyā) |
kiṃ tarhi pratyayavaikalyād ato 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ucyate | Rather, [it occurs] due to the absence of conditions, therefore it is called apratisaṅkhyānirodha |
bhavennāma nāsvabhāvau, tathāpi na vyabhicāra ityādarśayann āha nāsvabhāvādityādi / | Even if [these two] were to have no independent nature, there would still be no deviation [in our reasoning] - this is what [the author] shows by stating "nāsvabhāvāt" and so forth. |
kapālālokarāśyādi tathājñānanibandhanam // | [The cognition of] potsherds, masses of light and so forth is the basis for such knowledge. |
prayatnānantarīyakāviti / neti sambandhaḥ / | [The words] "prayatnānantarīyakau" are to be connected with "na" [in the verse]. |
kutaḥ asvabhāvāt / | Why? Because [they are] without independent nature. |
tathā hi vastusattāpratiṣedhamātraṃ nāśaḥ, ākāśaṃ ca spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram, tataścaitau svanāśau dvāvapi niḥsvabhāvau, tat kathamanayoḥ prayatnāntarīyakatā bhavet, svabhāvasyaivārthakriyākāritvāt / | For destruction is merely the negation of an entity's existence, and ākāśa is merely the absence of tangibility; therefore these two, [both] destruction and [ākāśa], are devoid of independent nature. So how could these two have the property of following from effort, since only something with an independent nature can perform a causal function? |
kimidānīṃ tarhi vināśādivijñānanibandhanam ity āha kapāletyādi / | [If one asks:] "What then is the basis for the cognition of destruction and so forth?" [The author] states "kapāla" and so forth. |
ādiśabdena tamorāśigrahaṇam // | By the word "ādi" [in the verse], masses of darkness are included. |
yaduktam aviśeṣe 'pi nānityaṃ na nityaṃ vastu tanmametyādi / | As for what was stated [earlier]: "Even without distinction, a thing cannot be either eternal or non-eternal" and so forth. |
tatrāha ekasyetyādi / | To this [the author] responds with "ekasya" and so forth. |
anityatāvikalpyaivam ityādāvāha tādavasthetyādi / tādavasthyapratikṣepamātraṃ cānityate 'psitā / | Regarding what was stated beginning with "In this way non-eternality must be analyzed", [the author] states "tādavasthya" and so forth. And non-eternality is desired [to be understood] as merely the rejection of [an entity's] continued existence in the same state. |
tādavasthyapratiṣedhamātram evānityatā sādhyatveneṣṭā, tatrāpi pradīpa udāharaṇaṃ sādhyānvitamastyeveti kutaḥ sādhyahīnatā dṛṣṭāntasya // | The non-eternality that is intended as [our] probandum is merely the negation of [an entity's] continuing state, and in this regard the lamp serves as an example that indeed possesses the probandum – so how could the example be devoid of the probandum? |
jvālāder ityādinā paramatena pradīpāder api dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyahīnatāmāśaṅkate | With [the words] beginning with "jvālādeḥ", [the author] raises the opponent's view that even the example of the lamp and similar [things] is devoid of the probandum. |
jvālāder api nāśitvaṃ natvasiddhaṃ pratikṣaṇam | The destructibility of flames and such [things] is not established [to occur] in each moment. |
atha yugapat kasmāt sarve na visarpantītyāha uttarāvayavair ityādi | [He] asks: "Why do not all [parts] spread simultaneously?" [and responds] with [the words] beginning with "uttarāvayavaiḥ". |
nanu yadi prasarpaṇadharmāṇas te tat samīpavarti tṛṇatūlādi kiṃ na dahantītyāha | [He] asks: "If these [parts] have the property of spreading, then why do they not burn the grass, cotton and such [things] that are nearby?" |
saṃkrāntāvapītyādi | [He responds with the words] beginning with "saṃkrāntāvapi". |
saṃhatāvasthāyām eva upalabdhavṛttayo bhavanti / natu viprakīrṇāvasthāyām iti bhāvaḥ | They become perceptibly active only in their consolidated state, not in their scattered state – this is the meaning. |
tadetad ityādinā pratividhatte | [He] responds to this with [the words] beginning with "tadetad". |
dāhavṛttiprasaṅgo 'yaṃ pūrvavan na nivartate | This problem regarding the burning activity is not resolved, [just] as before. |
avyāhataśaktīnām iti jvālādyavayavānām | [This refers to] "of [those] having unimpeded powers," [meaning] of the parts [such as] flame and so forth. |
pūrvavad iti saṃhatāvasthadaviśeṣāt | [It is] "as before," since there is no difference in the state of aggregation. |
atha viśeṣo 'bhyupagamyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgo durnivāra iti darśayati | If a difference is admitted [between the states], then the undesirable consequence of loss of eternality becomes unavoidable - this is what [the text] shows. |
subodham | This is easily understood. |
yaduktam "sambandhākaraṇānyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā" iti, tatrāha sambandhasya ca nityatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ purā tataḥ | [Regarding] what was said [by the opponent]: "The eternality of sentences must be asserted following the same reasoning as [that of] the relationship [between word and meaning]" - to this [the author] replies: "The eternality of the relationship was refuted earlier, therefore [this argument fails]." |
bhavanmatena vākyam eva na sambhavati, yasya tvayā nityatvaṃ prasādhyate | According to your view, the sentence itself, whose eternality you are trying to establish, is not even possible. |
kiṃ kadācid varṇamātram evāviśiṣṭaṃ vākyaṃ syāt | Is the sentence merely the unqualified letters alone? |
yadvā varṇā eva viśiṣṭāḥ kramavartino vākyam | Or are the letters themselves, qualified by occurring in sequence, the sentence? |
athavā varṇebhyo bhedinaḥ sphoṭākhyasya vākyatvam iti pakṣatrayam | Or is that which is called sphoṭa, [which is] distinct from the letters, the sentence? These are the three positions. |
varṇānāṃ kramaśūnyānāṃ vācakatvaṃ na vidyate | Letters devoid of sequence have no expressive power. |
nātaste tādṛśā vākyaṃ kramo 'pyeṣāṃ na vidyate | Therefore such [letters] cannot be a sentence, nor can they even have sequence. |
vyāpter nityatayā caiṣāṃ deśakālakramo na hi / lipivat phalapuṣpādibhedavaccopapadyate // | Since these [letters] are all-pervading and eternal, there cannot be any sequence of space and time [in them], as [there is] in written letters or as in the differentiation of fruits, flowers and so forth. |
svābhāvike krame caiṣāṃ sara ityevasambhavet / natu syād rasa ityādiḥ sthitakramavirodhataḥ // | If the sequence of these [letters] were inherent [in them], then only [the form] "sara" would be possible, [but] never [the form] "rasa" etc., due to contradiction with the established sequence. |
sthitā rephādayaścānye naivānyakramayoginaḥ / jāyante vāyuto varṇā nityatvaikatvasādhanam // | The letter ra and others that exist elsewhere cannot join in any other sequence, [nor can] letters arise from air, [this being] proof of [their] eternality and oneness. |
anyathā pratyabhijñānaṃ nityatvaikatvasādhanam / vyabhicāri tvayaivoktaṃ bhaved bhede 'pi vartanāt // | Otherwise, [the argument of] recognition that you yourself stated as proof of eternality and oneness would be inconclusive, since it would occur even in [cases of] difference. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe prāha kramo 'pyeṣāṃ na vidyata iti | Regarding the second view also, [the text] states that "there is no sequence of these [letters]." |
tathā hi dvividha eva bhāvānāṃ kramaḥ, deśakṛto vā pipīlikālipyakṣarādivat, kālakṛto vā yathā bījāṅkurakāṇḍapuṣpaphalādīnām, na tāvad ādyaḥ kramo varṇānāṃ sambhavati, vyāpteḥ, sarvagatatvād varṇānām, nahyākāśavat sakaladeśāvaṣṭambhenāvasthitasya deśavicchedakṛtaḥ kramo yuktaḥ, sarveṣām ekanabhodeśāvasthānāt | For indeed, sequence of entities is only of two kinds: either spatial, as in ant-trails and written letters etc., or temporal, as in [the series of] seed-sprout-stem-flower-fruit etc. The first kind of sequence is not possible for letters because of [their] pervasiveness, since letters are all-pervading; just as for space, which exists pervading all places, spatial separation-based sequence is not logical, since all [letters] exist in the same space. |
nāpi kālakṛtaḥ, nityatvena sarveṣāṃ samakālatvāt | Nor [is their sequence] temporally created, since due to [their] eternality, they are all simultaneous. |
kiñca puruṣakṛto vā kramo bhavet svābhāviko vā | Moreover, the sequence would either be man-made or inherent [in the letters]. |
na tāvat puruṣakṛta iṣṭaḥ, vedasya pauruṣeyatvaprasaṅgāt | It is not accepted to be man-made, because [that would lead to] the unwanted conclusion that the Veda is of human origin. |
atha svābhāvikaḥ, tadā sara ityeva nityaṃ bhavet, na kadācid rasa iti | If [the sequence is] inherent, then it would always only be "sara", never "rasa". |
nacāpi pratipadaṃ bhinnā varṇā ityabhyupeyam, pratyabhijñayā varṇānāṃ nityatvasya siddhatvāt / | Nor can it be admitted that the letters [appearing] in different words are different, because the eternality of letters has been proved through [their] recognition [as being the same everywhere]. |
tat pratiṣedhasyaiva ca sādhayitumiṣṭatvāt, anyathā pratyabhijñānaṃ vyabhicāri syāt // | And it is the denial of this [sameness] that would need to be proved [by the opponent]; otherwise, recognition [as the reason for eternality] would become inconclusive. |
athāpi syād abhivyaktikramas tarhi vākyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha nacetyādi / naca vyaktikramo vākyaṃ nitye vyaktiniṣedhanāt / | [If] it might be argued that "the sentence shall consist in the sequential order of manifestation [of letters]," [the author] states "nor..." etc. The sequence of manifestation cannot constitute the sentence, because manifestation is denied in what is eternal. |
vākyatāyogatas tasmānnityatvaṃ nopapadyate // caśabdānnāpi varṇebhyo bhinnaṃ sphoṭākhyaṃ vākyam iti sūcayati / tasya mīmāṃsakair eva nirastatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore, eternality is not possible due to the impossibility of [its] being a sentence. The particle 'ca' indicates that the sentence cannot be the sphoṭa [either], as something different from the letters, the idea being that this [concept] has been rejected by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. |
nitye vyaktiniṣedhanād iti / nityasya vyakter niṣiddhatvād ity arthaḥ // | [The phrase] "because manifestation is denied in what is eternal" means that manifestation of what is eternal has been shown to be impossible. |
yathā vṛddhādayaḥ śabdā icchāviracitārthakāḥ / svargayāgādayaḥ śabdāḥ sambhāvyante tathaiva ca // | Just as technical terms like 'vṛddhi' have their meanings created by [human] will, similarly words like 'svarga' and 'yāga' may also be considered [to be such]. |
nacotpādyakathārūpanāṭakākhyāyikādiṣu / nityaḥ śabdārthasambandho vāstavo 'sti vivakṣitaḥ // | And in created narratives such as dramas, plays and stories, no real and eternal connection between words and meanings is intended. |
icchayā racito 'rtho yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | Those whose meanings are created by will are called thus. |
utpādyā svayam apūrvaiva puruṣeṇa yā kathā mahāśvetādikā, saiva rūpaṃsvabhāvo yeṣāṃ nāṭakākhyāyikādīnāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | [This refers to] stories created anew by a person, like that of Mahāśvetā, and dramas and narratives which have the same nature are described thus. |
naca teṣu nityaḥ śabdārthasambandho 'sti nivakṣitaḥ śaktilakṣaṇas tadvad vede 'pisambhāvyata iti bhāvaḥ // | In these [works], no eternal connection between words and meanings in the form of inherent potency is intended; similarly, [such absence of eternal connection] may be considered [to exist] in the Veda as well—this is the idea. |
tatrāpītyādinā paramatena dṛṣṭāntāsiddhimāśaṅkate / | [The opponent] raises a doubt about the invalidity of the example according to the other view, [beginning with] "tatrāpi." |
tatrāpi śaktinityatvaṃ niyogasya tvanityatā / | Even in these [cases], the potency [of words] is eternal, [while] the application is non-eternal. |
tadvaśād eva nityāyāṃ śaktau bhrāntiḥ pravartate // | Due to that [non-eternal application] alone, confusion arises regarding the eternal potency. |
tatrāpyutpādyakathādiṣu nityā śaktiriṣṭaiva, kintvasatyevārthe yo niyogaḥ puruṣaiḥ kriyate, so 'nityas tadvaśād eva nityāyāṃ śaktau pratītivibhramo bhavati, tasmād asiddho dṛṣṭānta iti // | Even in those created stories and such, the potency is indeed accepted as eternal, but the application which is made by people even when the referent is non-existent is non-eternal; due to that alone confusion in the cognition of the eternal potency arises; therefore the example is invalid. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with [the section beginning with] "nanu." |
nanu bāhye na tatrāsti vyaktiḥ kvārthe prakalpyate / vikalpapratibimbe cet tadvadvede 'pi śaṅkyate // | [Objection:] Indeed, there is no external manifestation there - to what referent could [meaning] be attributed? If [you say] it is attributed to the reflection in conceptual thought, then the same could be suspected for the Veda as well. |
bāhya iti / mahāśvetādirity arthaḥ // | By "external" [is meant things] like Mahāśvetā - that is the meaning. |
atīndriyārthasambandhāṃ ko vā śaktiṃ prapadyate / nāto vede niyogo 'pi narāyattaḥ prakalpyate // | Who indeed can comprehend the potency [which consists in] the relation with supersensible objects? Therefore, even the application in the Veda is not considered to be dependent on humans. |
vṛddhebhyo naca tadbodhas te 'pi hyajñāḥ svataḥ sthitāḥ / | And [this] knowledge [cannot come] from elders, for they too are themselves ignorant. |
sambhāvyā pratipattis tu vyākhyānāt puruṣāśrayāt // | However, comprehension is possible through explanations that depend on humans. |
anenaitadāha svayam eva bhavatā sāmarthyād darśitam, yathā yo 'yaṃ vedārthapratyayo bhavati sa puruṣāśrayād vyākhyānādeva iti | By this [you are answered]. You yourself have implicitly shown that whatever understanding of the Vedic meaning arises [in people], it arises only from explanations that depend on human beings. |
tathā hi prakṛtyaiva tāvat pūrvā śaktir atīndriyārthaśritā, tataścātīndriyāyāṃ śaktau na puruṣakṛto niyogaḥ śabdasya sambhavati | For firstly, by its very nature, the original potency inheres in supersensible objects, and therefore when [dealing with] this supersensible potency, no human-made application of words is possible. |
nāpi vṛddhebhyas tasyāḥ pratītiḥ sambhavati, teṣāṃ sarveṣām evānabhijñatvāt, andhānām iva vacanād rūpaviśeṣapratītiḥ | Nor can understanding of it be obtained from elders, since they are all equally ignorant [of it] - [it would be] like obtaining knowledge of specific colors from the words of blind men. |
tasmāt sāmarthyādiyam arthapratītiḥ puruṣavyākhyānādevāvatiṣṭhate gatyantarābhāvād iti | Therefore, by implication, this understanding of meaning must rest on human explanation alone, as there is no other way. |
nanvityādinā paraścodayati | The opponent raises an objection beginning with "nanu" [as follows]: |
nanu paryanuyogo 'yaṃ kṛtakepyāgame samaḥ | "Surely this counter-question applies equally to scripture that is composed [by humans]." |
na tatra śraddhayā vṛtter arthasaṃśayato 'pi vā | [The answer is:] "No, because in those [scriptures], people proceed through faith, even in cases where the meaning is doubtful." |
nanvayaṃ sāmānyaḥ pauruṣeyeṣvapyāgameṣu prasaṅgaḥ | "Surely this objection applies generally to all scriptures composed by humans." |
tathā hi kimidānīntanāḥ parokṣadeśikānāṃ buddhādivacanānām arthaṃ yathābhiprāyaṃ pratiyanti, āhosvid viparyayam iti | For [one might ask]: "Do modern people understand the meaning of the words of teachers of the supersensible like Buddha according to their [original] intention, or the opposite?" |
na tatretyādinā pratividhatte | [He] answers with [the verse] beginning "na tatra" [as shown above]. |
tatreti | [As stated] in that [verse above]. |
puruṣo yadiṣṭe{pauruṣeye, adṛṣṭe, } heyāditatve sopāye puruṣārthopayogini / | [This refers] to scripture propounded by a personality [puruṣa], which deals with what is to be abandoned and other such matters, along with their remedies, [and is] beneficial for human purposes. |
tathā hi tatra nyāyamevānupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa / | Indeed, there the wise followers of the Buddha proceed only in accordance with reason, not by mere hearsay. |
śraddhayeti / | [It is done] with faith. |
abhisampratyayena yuktinidhyānajena niścayeneti yāvat / pramāṇasiddhaevārthe 'bhisampratyayasya yujyamānatvāt / | [This means] with conviction born from contemplation of reasoning, up to [the point of] certainty, because conviction is appropriate only regarding objects established through valid means of knowledge. |
nānyatra / | [But] not in other cases. |
tatra saṃśayānativṛtteḥ / | Because in those [other cases] doubt does not cease. |
arthasaṃśayato 'pi veti / | Or also due to doubt about the meaning. |
atyantaparokṣe 'rthe svargadevatāpūrvādau / | [This applies] in cases of extremely imperceptible objects such as heaven, deities, and the unseen potency [apūrva]. |
tathā hi tatra pauruṣeye vākye puruṣasya svābhiprāyakathanenāviparītasampradāyasambhavacchrotṛparamparayā cāvicchinnaḥ sampradāyaḥ, samyak sambhāvyate / | Indeed, in the case of statements made by a person, through [that] person's expression of their own intention and through an unbroken lineage of listeners, an uninterrupted tradition becomes properly possible. |
natvevam apauruṣeye tatropadeṣṭur abhāvāt / | But this is not so in the case of scripture not of human origin, because there is no teacher there. |
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