sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
nahi tenāpāditā satī vyaktir nāpāditā bhavet / | For surely the manifestation, when produced by that [Letter], cannot fail to be produced. |
tathā hi tadvyaktyāvartanamātraphalānyuttarottaravarṇotccāraṇāni, samānaśaktikatvāt sarveṣāṃ, taccāvartamekenaiva punaḥ punar āvarttyamānena kartuṃ śakyata iti śeṣavarṇoccāravaiyarthyam / | Thus the utterances of subsequent Letters would have only the effect of repeating that manifestation, since all [Letters] possess the same potency, and this repetition can be accomplished by the same single [Letter] being repeated again and again, hence the utterance of the remaining Letters would be pointless. |
nāpyuttarottaravarṇānāṃ bhinnaśaktikatvamabhyupagantavyam / | Nor should the subsequent Letters be accepted as having different potencies. |
niraṃśake viśeṣāntarasyādhātumaśakyatvād viśeṣāntarakaraṇāsambhave bhinna{ca---}śaktikalpanāvaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt // | Because in what is partless, other distinctive features cannot be introduced, and when the creation of new features is impossible, the postulation of different potencies would necessarily be futile. |
etac ca satā{tyā---}mabhivyaktau sarvaṃ sambhavet saiva tu na sambhavatīti darśayann āha viṣayendriyetyādi / | All this would be possible if manifestation existed, but that very [manifestation] is not possible - showing this, he says [beginning with] "viṣayendriya" [in the next verse]. |
viṣayendriyasaṃskārarūpā vyaktiś ca varṇavat / | The manifestation, as in the case of Letters, can only be in the form of modification of the object or sense-organ. |
asyāpi pratiṣeddhavyā tadābhāse 'pi cetasi // | And this [manifestation] too must be denied, even in the case of the cognition that appears to apprehend it. |
varṇavad iti / | [The phrase] "as in the case of Letters" [means what was explained above]. |
yathā varṇeṣu vijñānajananayogyāyogyasvabhāvavikalpena viṣayendriyasaṃskārarūpābhivyaktir dūṣitā tathehāpi dūṣaṇīyetyarthaḥ / | Just as in the case of letters, the manifestation in the form of a refinement of object and sense-organ has been refuted through [showing] the impossibility of alternatives regarding [their] nature as capable or incapable of generating cognition, so too it should be refuted here. |
tadābhāse 'pīti / sphoṭābhāve 'pi ayaṃ cābhyupagamavādaḥ / | [This applies] even in the appearance of that [sphoṭa], even in the absence of sphoṭa. And this is an argument based on provisional acceptance. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi hi varṇavyatirekaiṇāparaḥ sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdātmāvabhāseta tato 'syābhivyaktiḥ sambhaved vyakter upalabdhirūpatvāt / | This is what is being said: If indeed there were to appear a verbal entity called "sphoṭa" distinct from the letters, then its manifestation would be possible, since manifestation is of the nature of apprehension. |
yāvatā nāvabhāsata iti pūrvamāveditam avabhāsatāṃ nāma tathāpi prakṛtyopalabhyānupalabhyasvabhāvasyobhayathāpyabhivyaktir na yukteti // | However, [such an entity] does not appear [in consciousness], as explained before. Let it appear - even then, manifestation would not be logical for that which by nature is both apprehensible and non-apprehensible in both ways. |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃhṛtya vināpi sphoṭenārthapratipatter upapattikramaṃ darśayati / tasmāt pratyakṣataḥ pūrvaṃ kramajñāneṣu yat padam / samastavarṇavijñānaṃ tadarthajñānakāraṇam // | Having concluded with "therefore" etc., [the author] shows the sequence of proof for comprehension of meaning even without sphoṭa: "Therefore, the word which [appears] in sequential cognitions after direct perception, [as] the cognition of all letters together - that is the cause of the cognition of meaning." |
nanu ca kramavartino hi varṇāḥ krameṇaiva cānubhūtāḥ, yathānubhavaṃ ca smaraṇaṃ, tat kathaṃ samastavarṇanirbhāsi smārttajñānam ekaṃ yujyate sphoṭamantareṇa, na cākrame jñāte kramiṇāṃ varṇānāṃ pratibhāso yukta ityāśaṅkyāha | [Someone] raises this objection: "The letters occur in sequence and are experienced in sequence, and remembrance follows experience, so how can there be a single remembered cognition manifesting all letters without sphoṭa? And when something is cognized as non-sequential, the appearance of sequential letters is not logical." |
antyavarṇe hi vijñāte sarvasaṃskārakāritam / smaraṇaṃ yaugapadyena sarvavarṇeṣu jāyate // | When the final letter is cognized, remembrance caused by all the impressions arises simultaneously for all letters. |
anenaiva {na cai}tadāha prathamamanubhavas tatastatsamanantarabhāvīni smaraṇāni yathānubhavaṃ krameṇaiva jāyante, tataḥ smaraṇebhyaḥ uttarakālaṃ yugapat samastavarṇādhyavasāyi samuccayajñānam aparaṃ smārttam utpadyate, yathā paridṛṣṭārthādhyavasāyitvāt // | By this very [statement] it is said: First there is experience, then remembrances occurring immediately after that arise in sequence according to the experience, then after those remembrances, another remembered cumulative cognition determining all letters simultaneously arises, because it determines previously perceived objects. |
etac ca sarvavādināṃ prasiddham, na mayaiva kalpitam iti darśayati sarveṣu ceti / | And [the author] shows that this is well-known to all disputants, not just invented by [him], by [saying] "and in all [cases]." |
etad iti samuccayajñānam // | "This" refers to the cumulative cognition. |
nacet tadabhyupeyeta kramadṛṣṭeṣu naiva hi / śatādirūpaṃ jāyeta tat samuccayadarśanam // | If this [view] is not accepted, then regarding things seen in sequence, there could not arise that cumulative cognition which [appears] in the form of [numbers like] 'hundred' and so forth. |
yadi hi sarvam eva smaraṇaṃ yathānubhavaṃ krameṇaivaṃ jāyate, tadā kramānubhūteṣu śatādiṣu yugapacchatādivikalpo na syāt / | If indeed every remembrance would arise only in the same sequence as [its original] experience, then regarding things experienced in sequence, like hundreds etc., there could not be a simultaneous conception of hundreds etc. |
śatakoṭyādivikalpānāṃ cotpattikāle bhedo na bhavet // | And there would be no difference at the time of arising between conceptions of 'hundred', 'crore' and so forth. |
tena śrotramanobhyāṃ syāt kramādvarṇeṣu yadyapi / pūrvajñānaṃ parastāt tu yugapat smaraṇaṃ bhavet // | Therefore, although regarding letters there may be initial cognition in sequence through ear and mind, later there occurs simultaneous remembrance [of all of them]. |
yadyevaṃ samuccayajñānam evārthapratītihetuḥ syāt, na te varṇāḥ, teṣāṃ ciraniruddhatvāt, na caitad yuktam, yasmācchabdād anataram arthapratītir bhavantītyākumārametat pratītam ityāśaṅkyāha tadārūḍhā ityādi / | [One might object:] "If this is so, then the cumulative cognition alone would be the cause of meaning-comprehension, not those letters, since they have long ceased to exist. But this is not reasonable, because it is well-known even to children that comprehension of meaning occurs immediately after the word." Anticipating this [objection], he states "tadārūḍhā" etc. |
tadārūḍhās tato varṇā na dūrārthāvabodhanāt / | The letters indeed enter into it [i.e., the cumulative cognition], because the comprehension of meaning is not far removed from them. |
śabdād atha matistena laukikair abhidhīyate // | Therefore ordinary people speak of cognition [as occurring] from the word. |
tasmin samuccayajñāne ārūḍhās tadārūḍhāḥ / | "Enter into it" means "enter into that cumulative cognition." |
laukikair iti / svārthataddhitavidhānam // | Regarding [the word] "laukikaiḥ" - [this is] the formation of a taddhita [suffix] in its own meaning. |
ākāravati vijñāne sarvam etac ca yujyate / | And all this is compatible with [the view that] cognition possesses forms. |
anyathā hi vinaṣṭās te bhāseran smaraṇe katham // | If [the letters] are destroyed, how could they appear in memory? |
nirākāre kasmān na yujyata ity āha anyathā hītyādi / | [Someone asks:] "Why is it not compatible with the formless [cognition]?" [The author] responds with "[If they are destroyed] otherwise etc." |
tataś ca yadetat antyavarṇe hi vijñāte ityādinā kumārilena sphoṭavādinam prati samuccayajñānaṃ varṇitam, tad asman mata eva yujyate na tu bhavatāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ nirākāravādināṃ mata ityuktaṃ bhavati // | Thus, what Kumārila has described regarding cumulative cognition against the Sphoṭa-theorist with [the words] "when the last letter is cognized" etc., that is compatible only with our view, not with your view, [you] Mīmāṃsakas who maintain [cognitions are] formless. |
nanu ca mīmāṃsakānām api yujyata eva, na hi teṣāṃ matena varṇā vinaṣṭāḥ yena na bhāseran / | [One might object:] "But it is indeed compatible with the Mīmāṃsakas' [view] too, because according to their view the letters are not destroyed, so that they could not appear." |
kiṃ tarhi tirobhūtābhivyaktayaḥ santy eva ity etad athetyādinā āśaṅkya netyādinā pariharati / | "What then? [The letters] exist just with their manifestations concealed" - having raised this objection with [the words] "If..." etc., [the author] refutes it with [the words] "No..." etc. |
atha varṇās tirobhūtavyaktayo viditāḥ purā / smaryante 'vasthitā eva na spaṣṭābhaprasaṅgataḥ // | If the letters, whose manifestations are concealed, [were] previously known, [and if] they are remembered while [still] existing, [this leads to] the unwanted consequence of [their being] clear. |
yadi hi ta eva varṇāḥ pūrvam anubhūtāḥ santaḥ paścāt tirobhūtavyaktayaḥ samuccayajñānena gṛhyeran tadā ātmānubhavajñānavat tat samuccayajñānaṃ spaṣṭābhaṃ prāpnoti / | For if those same letters that were previously experienced, having their manifestations [later] concealed, were to be grasped by cumulative cognition, then that cumulative cognition would have to be clear like the cognition of their own experience. |
ākārasya bāhyagatatvāt tasya caikarūpatvāt / | Because the form is external [to consciousness] and because it is of one nature. |
kiñca yadi tirobhūtavyaktayaḥ, kathaṃ bhāseran, vyakter upalabdhisvabhāvatvāt // | Moreover, if [their] manifestations are concealed, how could they appear, since manifestation is of the nature of apprehension? |
apica yady atītasya avasthitiḥ sambhavet tadaitat syād yāvatā atītasya avasthity abhāvād eva na yuktaṃ tasya pratibhāsanam iti darśayati apāstā ityādi / | Moreover, if what is past could persist, then this [claim] might be [true], but since what is past absolutely cannot persist, its appearance is not possible - [the author] shows this with [the words] "rejected" etc. |
apāstā ca sthitiḥ pūrvaṃ tat sthitau smaraṇaṃ bhavet / | And [since their] persistence is rejected previously, memory would occur [only] if they persisted. |
varṇānubhavavijñānakāla evaikahetutaḥ // | [Memory would occur] at the very time of the cognition experiencing the letters, due to [having] one cause. |
pūrvam iti / traikālyaparīkṣāyām / atraiva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha tatsthitāvityādi / | "pūrvam" [refers to what was said] before, [namely] in the examination of the three points of time. Right here [the author] states the refuting argument beginning with "tatsthitau." |
varṇānubhavajñānakāle smaraṇotpattiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | At the very time of the cognition of the experience of phonemes, there would arise the undesired consequence of remembrance – this is the refuting argument. |
ekaheuta iti abhinnakāraṇatvāt // | "Having the same cause" means because [they have] non-different causes. |
atra śābdikāścodayanti yadyeko nāsti sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdātmā tat kathaṃ gaurityekākārā gośabde buddhir bhavatīti, ata āha gaurityādi / | Here the grammarians raise an objection: "If there is no single entity called sphoṭa which is the essence of words, then how does a single unified cognition arise in the form of 'cow' when [hearing] the word 'go'?" Therefore [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "gaur." |
tadgrāhyaikārthatābhyāṃ ca śabde syād ekatāmatiḥ // ekā matīrasyetyekamatiḥ, tadbhāvastatvam / | Through being apprehended as one and having a single meaning, there arises the conception of unity in the word. "Ekamatiḥ" means "having a single cognition," and its abstract state [is what is meant]. |
tadgrāhyaikārthatābhyāṃ ceti / | [The compound] "tadgrāhyaikārthatābhyām" has "ca" [indicating it is copulative]. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati ekabuddhigrāhyatvād ekasāsnādimadarthadyotakatvāccaiko gośabda ucyate iti // | This is what is being said: the word "go" is called single because it is apprehended by a single cognition and because it indicates a single object possessing dewlap etc. |
ekamatitvaṃ ca na sarvatra suddham iti darśayati śaighryād ityādi / | [The author] shows that this unity of cognition is not universally valid [by stating the verse] beginning with "śaighryāt." |
śaighryādalpāntaratvāc ca gośabde sā bhaved api / | In the case of the word "go," that [unity of cognition] might exist due to [both] rapidity [of utterance] and the smallness of intervals [between phonemes]. |
devadattādiśabdeṣu spaṣṭo bhedaḥ pratīyate // | But in the case of such words as "Devadatta," the difference [between letters] is clearly perceived. |
śaighryāt drutoccāraṇāt / alpāntaratvam svalpavicchedatvam / | "Śaighrya" [means] quickness of utterance. "Alpāntaratva" [means] the very slight separation between the letter-sounds. |
seti / ekā matiḥ / | "Sā" [means] the unitary conception [i.e.,] the idea of oneness. |
devadattādipare tu prativarṇaṃ śakvanayā sphuṭataraṃ vicchedena pratīyanta iti pakṣaikadeśāsiddham ekamatitvam // | In the case of words like "devadatta," however, the articulations are clearly perceived with distinction for each letter. Hence the [notion of] unitary conception is inadmissible with regard to a part of the subject. |
varṇotthā cārthadhīreṣā tajjñānānantarodbhavāt / | This cognition of meaning arises from the letters, because it appears immediately after the cognition of them. |
yedṛśī sā tadutthā hi dhūmāder eva vahnidhīḥ // | For whatever [cognition] is like that arises from that, just as the cognition of fire [arises] from smoke and other [indicators]. |
prayogaḥ yā buddhir yadvijñānāntaramudbhāvitā sa tatsamutthitā pāramparyeṇa, yathā dhūmādiliṅgajñānād vahnyādiliṅgidhīḥ / | The formulation [is as follows]: Whatever cognition appears after another cognition must be regarded as arising from that [previous cognition] in succession, just as the cognition of the indicated thing (fire) [arises] from the cognition of the indicator (smoke). |
varṇavijñānānantarabhāvinī cārthadhīr iti svabhāvahetuḥ / kāryatāvyavahāraścātra sādhyate / tena sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ // | And the cognition of meaning follows immediately after the cognition of letters - this is a reason based on essential nature. Here what is being established is the relationship of effect. Thus [there is] a difference between what is to be proved and what proves it. |
asiddhatvam asya pariharann āha na varṇetyādi / | [The author], rejecting the inadmissibility of this [argument], states "[na varṇa]" etc. |
na varṇabhinnaśabdābhajñānānantarabhāvinī / | The cognition of meaning does not follow after a cognition of any word distinct from letters. |
arthadhīr vidyate tena nānyaḥ śabdo 'sti vācakaḥ // | Therefore no other word [besides letters] exists as an expressor [of meaning]. |
varṇebhyo bhinno yaḥ śabdātmā tadābhaṃ yajjñānaṃ tadanantarabhāvinī na vidyate, kiṃ tarhi varṇavijñānānantarabhāvinī, ato nāsiddho hetuḥ | The cognition appearing as a verbal entity distinct from the letters [and] following immediately after it does not exist; rather, [what exists is] the cognition following immediately after the cognition of letters. Hence the reason is not inadmissible. |
anena copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhād abhāvavyavahāro 'pi darśitaḥ | By this [argument] it is also shown that non-existence is established through the non-perception of what should be perceptible. |
nāpyanaikāntika iti darśayann āha kāryatetyādi | [The author now] shows that [the reason] is not inconclusive by stating "kāryatā" etc. |
kāryatāvyavahārāṅgaṃ sarvatraiva viniścitau | In all cases, positive and negative concomitances are definitely established as the basis for treating [something] as an effect. |
anvayavyatirekau hi vyāptis tenena niścitā | For through these [positive and negative concomitances], the invariable concomitance is established. |
kāryatāvyavahārasyāṅgam kāraṇam, kiṃ tat anvayavyatirekāviti | [The term] "basis of treating [something] as an effect" [means] the cause. What is that [cause]? [It is] positive and negative concomitance. |
sāmānādhikaraṇyena sambandhaḥ | [This is] the relation of co-reference. |
tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvamātram eva tat kāryatāvyavahṛter aṅgaṃ nānyat, ataḥ kāryatāvyavahārasya nimittāntarāsambhavo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ | Only this conformity to positive and negative concomitance is the basis for treating [something] as an effect, nothing else. Hence, the impossibility of any other cause for treating [something] as an effect serves as the annulling evidence, [and thus] the invariable concomitance is established. |
syād etat mābhūtsphoṭasya vācakatvaṃ, varṇā eva nityāḥ santo vācakā bhaviṣyanti, teca nityāḥ pratyakṣādipramāṇataḥ siddhā ity āha anityeṣvityādi | One might say: "Let it be that sphoṭa has no expressiveness; the letters themselves, being eternal, will be expressive, and these [letters] are established as eternal through perception and other means of valid cognition." [To this] he states "anityeṣu" etc. |
anityeṣveva varṇeṣu vācakatve prasādhite pratyabhijñānumāne ca niraste nityasādhane | When the expressiveness of non-eternal letters alone has been established, [and] when recognition and inference as means of establishing eternality have been refuted... |
pratyabhijñā cānumānaṃ ceti pratyabhijñānumāne / | Recognition and Inference [together make up the compound] pratyabhijñānumāne. |
kvacit pratyabhijñānānumānam iti pāṭhaḥ, tatra samāhāradvandvo 'pi vidheyaḥ / | In some [textual] variants, the reading is "pratyabhijñānumānam"; in this case it should be treated as a samāhāradvandva compound. |
sahitaśabdalopād viśeṣaṇasamāso vā // | Or [it may be treated as] a karmadhāraya compound, [formed] through the elision of the word "sahita" ["combined"]. |
svavākyādivirodhaścetyādāvāha svavākyādivirodhānām ityādi / | [The author] speaks of "self-contradiction and so forth" in the passage beginning with "svavākyādivirodha." |
svavākyādvirodhānām ajñānāc codanā kṛtā / | The objection [by the opponent] was made due to ignorance of [these] self-contradictions. |
ntiyapakṣe tu sarve te bhavanti bhavatāṃ yataḥ // | Because all these [contradictions] occur in your position regarding the eternality [of words]. |
nityā satī na vāgyuktādyotiketyupapāditam / | It has been established that [words], if eternal, cannot be expressive through speech and other [means]. |
ānupūrvyādyayogena nityaṃ cānupalambhanāt // | [This is] due to the impossibility of sequence and other [features], and due to [their] not being perceived as eternal. |
sarve ta iti / | [The phrase] "sarve te" [means] "all these" [contradictions]. |
ānupūrvyādīti / ādiśabdena krameṇa śrutismṛtī gṛhyete / | [Regarding the compound] "ānupūrvyādi": by the word "ādi" are meant śruti and smṛti in sequence. |
tathā hi nityatvān na kālakṛtānupūrvī, nāpi deśakṛtā vyāpitvāt, nāpyabhivyaktikṛtā abhivyakter apākṛtatvāt / | Thus indeed, due to [words'] eternality, sequence cannot be created by time; nor due to [their] all-pervasiveness can it be created by space; nor can it be created by manifestation, since manifestation has been refuted. |
tathā jñānajanane 'pi na nityānām upayogo 'stīti bahudhā niveditam // | Similarly, in the bringing about of cognitions, eternal [words] can serve no useful purpose, as has been explained on several occasions. |
dharmibhedavikalpena yāśrayāsiddhir ucyate / so 'numālakṣaṇājñānād dharmitvaṃ bhāsino yataḥ // | The āśrayāsiddhi [fallacy] which has been claimed through proposing various alternatives regarding the nature of the subject [word], [exists] only due to ignorance of the characteristics of inference, since [only] that which appears [in consciousness] can be a subject. |
avicāraprasiddhortho yoyaṃ jñāne 'vabhāsate / | That object which appears in cognition is well-established without [need for] deliberation. |
śanakāder api proktā tāvan mātrasya dharmitā // tatraiva hi vivādo 'yaṃ sampravṛttaḥ pravādinām / | Even fishermen and such [simple folk] recognize that just this much [i.e., what appears] can be the subject. And yet, it is precisely on this point that dispute has arisen among disputants. |
icchāracitabhede tu na vivādo 'sti kasyacit // | But there can be no dispute for anyone regarding differences that are merely constructed by desire. |
ya eva vādiprativādinoḥ pratibhāsavaśād dharmī siddhaḥ sa eva viśeṣavivādāśrayaḥ, natu svecchopakalpitaḥ, tatra vivādābhāvāt, nahi svecchoparacitadharmiṇi dharmaviśeṣaṃ kalpayanyakiñcinnivāryata iti / | That very subject which is established through the appearance [in consciousness] for both proponent and opponent is alone the basis for dispute about particulars, not [something] constructed by mere wish, because there can be no dispute about that, for nothing prevents anyone from imagining particular properties in a subject constructed by mere wish. |
bhāsita iti / | [It has been] manifested thus. |
bhāsamānasya / etad eva darśayati avicāraprasiddho 'rtha ityādi / sugamam // | [This refers to] what appears [in consciousness]. This very point is shown by [the verse beginning] "avicāraprasiddho'rthaḥ" and so forth. [The meaning is] clear. |
aviśeṣeṇa dharmiṇi nirdiṣṭe yadviśeṣeṇa {vi} kalpanaṃ tad etaj jātyuttaram iti darśayann āha ata ityādi. ato 'viśeṣanirdiṣṭe viśeṣeṇa vikalpanam / | When the subject has been indicated in an unqualified way, the construction of alternatives with qualifications is a futile rejoinder - showing this, he states [the verse beginning with] "ataḥ" and so forth: "Therefore, [proposing] alternatives with qualifications when [something] has been indicated without qualification [is a futile rejoinder]." |
nityanityārthasambaddhacodanājanitā matiḥ | [A] cognition produced by an injunction [that is] connected with eternal and non-eternal objects |
pakṣaś ced āśrayāsiddhiḥ paraṃ praty anuṣajyate | If this is taken as the thesis, then [there would be] āśrayāsiddhi [fallacy] with respect to the opponent |
tādavasthyaṃ ca nityatvaṃ tadanyatvam anityatā | Eternality consists in remaining in the same state, and non-eternality is the opposite of that |
tādavasthyānivṛttau hi kimavasthitam iṣyate | For when the continuing in the same state ceases, what [could possibly] remain [that] is desired [to exist]? |
kimavasthitam iṣyata iti | "What remains [that] is desired [to exist]?" [as stated above] |
avasthāyā avasthāturavyatirekāt, tannivṛttau sāmarthyāt tasyāpi nivṛttiḥ | Because a state is not different from that which possesses the state, when [that state] ceases, by logical necessity that [possessor of the state] also ceases |
anyathā yadekayogakṣemaṃ na bhavati tat kathaṃ tat svabhāvaṃ yuktam iti bhāvaḥ | Otherwise, how could that which does not share the same fortune be properly [considered to have] the same nature? This is the meaning |
svanirbhāsīndriyajñānahetur aindriyako bhavet na ca nitye 'sti hetutvam iti tad dhi prasādhitam | That which is the cause of sense-perception manifesting itself would be perceptible [by the senses], and there is no causality in what is eternal - this indeed has been established |
kāryā caindriyakatvādāvityādāvāha sarveṣām | [This] speaks about perceptibility and so forth [being] the effect of all [things] |
sarveṣāṃ ca prasiddheyam īdṛgarthasya hetutā / dhūmādāvapi sarvatra vikalpo 'yaṃ samo 'nyathā // | If this kind of causality is well-established for all [cases], otherwise this same doubt would apply everywhere, even in [cases like] smoke etc. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.