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varṇeṣu vyajyamānasya nāsya pratyāyanāṅgatā / | If this [sphoṭa] were manifested in letters, it could not be a factor in conveying [meaning] |
anyāviśeṣānnānyatra sadbhāvāccāsya nityatā // | Due to [its] non-distinctness from other things and due to [its] non-existence elsewhere, it cannot be eternal |
tadānupūrvī varṇānāṃ hrasvadīrghaplutāś ca ye / | The sequence of letters, and those [properties] which are short, long and prolated |
kālasya pravibhāgās te na yuktā dhvanyupādhayaḥ // | These are divisions of time [and] are not proper attributes of sound |
tasmān na padadharmo 'sti nityaste kaścid īdṛśaḥ / tenānityaṃ padaṃ siddhaṃ varṇānityatvavādinām // | Therefore there exists no such eternal property of words for you; hence for those who maintain the non-eternality of letters, the non-eternality of words is established |
paradharmo 'pi cāṅgatvaṃ bhavedaśvajavādivat / yadi vyaktiḥ prakalpeta vyañjakaiḥ pratyayair iha // | And if manifestation were assumed [to occur] here through manifesting cognitions, [sphoṭa] could not be a property of something else, like the speed of a horse |
pūrvam eveti / ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām / | [As discussed] previously in the examination of the six categories |
vyajyate naca kenacid iti / | [When it is said that] "it is not manifested by anything" |
asattvādeva, sattve 'pi nityasya vyakter niyatatvāt / | [It is] because of [its] non-existence; moreover, even if it existed, the manifestation of what is eternal would [have to] be fixed |
anyasmād aviśeṣo anyaviśeṣaḥ | [Being] not different from other [things], [means] non-difference from others. |
tathā hi bījāṅkuralatādiṣu yo vyajyate kālasyātmā tatas tasya varṇeṣu vyajyamānasya kālātmano na kaścid viṣayo 'sti | For indeed, the nature of Time that manifests in [phenomena] such as seed-sprout-creeper has no differentiation from that [nature of Time] which manifests in the letters. |
na yuktā iti / kālasyāsattvāt, sattve 'pyabhyugatamavibhāgatvam iti | [These are] not justified, because Time does not exist, and even if it did exist, its indivisibility has [already] been accepted. |
śeṣaṃ subodham | The remainder is easily understood. |
nityatāyāṃ tu sarveṣām arthāpattirapākṛtā | The presumption [that was] put forward regarding the eternality of all [things] has been refuted. |
arthapratītirūpatvam anityeṣu hi sādhitam | It has indeed been established that the nature of meaning-comprehension [exists only] in non-eternal [things]. |
yo yadvivakṣāsambhūtavivakṣāntaratastaḥ varṇa utpadyate tasya śrutistansamanantaram | When a letter-sound arises from a different 'desire to speak' that has emerged from [another] 'desire to speak', its hearing [occurs] immediately after that. |
pūrvavarṇavidudbhūtasaṃvinnātidrutaśrutiḥ | The cognition arising from the cognition of the preceding letter is not heard too quickly. |
so 'pekṣya tat smṛtiṃ paścāt kurute smṛtimātmani | That [letter-sound], depending on the memory of that [previous letter], later produces a memory of itself. |
tat samutthāpakagrāhijñānāni prati janyatā | [It has] the nature of being produced in relation to the cognitions that give rise to and grasp it. |
hetutā vānupūrvīyaṃ varṇeṣu puruṣāśrayā // | [The] sequential order of phonemes may be dependent on [the] human [speaker]. |
ataḥ pratipadaṃ bhinnā varṇā iti parisphuṭam / | Hence it is clearly evident that phonemes vary with each word. |
damo mado latā tāla ityādikramabhedataḥ // īdṛśena krameṇaite tvarthabhedopapādakaḥ / | As in [the cases of] "dama"-"mada", "latā"-"tāla" and so forth, where these [phonemes] produce different meanings through such different sequences. |
ata eva nirartheha sphoṭasyāpi prakalpanā // | Therefore, the postulation of sphoṭa is indeed meaningless in this context. |
arthāpattir apākṛteti / tathā hi hastakampāder ityādinā vyabhicārasya bādhakasya ca pramāṇasya varṇanāt / | [The objection that] "arthāpatti [presumption] has been refuted" [is valid], since deviation and contradiction have been described through examples like hand-trembling and so forth. |
ayamatra tāvat samudāyārthaḥ / | This, then, is the summary of the entire argument. |
vaktṛsantāne prativarṇaṃ tat samutthāpakāni jñātāni pūrvapūrvasamanantarapratyayajanyāni vivakśāto bhavanti, tataśca varṇāḥ, teca śrotṛsantāni pūrvapūrvavarṇagrāhivijñānsahakāriṇaḥ svaviṣayābhijñānāni kramavattati janayanti sākṣāt, tataś ca paścādāvāt svasvaviṣayāṃ smṛtiṃ kramabhāvinīṃ janayanti pāramparyeṇa / | In the speaker's continuum, cognitions that produce each phoneme arise from [the speaker's] desire to speak, each generated by its immediately preceding cognition; from these arise the phonemes; and these directly generate sequential cognitions in the hearer's continuum, each assisted by the previous phoneme-grasping cognitions [and] having their own objects; thereafter they indirectly generate sequential memories pertaining to their respective objects. |
tataś ca vaktṛsantānabhāvīni svasamutthāpakāni jñānāni nyapekṣayā teṣāṃ janyatā, śrotṛsantānabhāvīni vānya tanya pekśya hetutā, saiva teṣām anupūrvī / | Thus, in relation to the cognitions occurring in the speaker's continuum which give rise to them, these [memories] have the nature of effects, while in relation to the cognitions occurring in the hearer's continuum, they have the nature of causes - this alone is their sequential order. |
sadā smaya ityādau sakārādeḥ paro 'kārādiḥ sakāravivakṣāsambhūtavivakṣāntaratas tataḥ utpadyate | In words like "sadā" and "smaya", after the initial [letter] 's', there is the vowel 'a', [which] arises from another desire [to speak] born from the desire to pronounce 's' |
yasya sakārāder vivakṣā yadvivakṣā tataḥ sambhūtaṃ yadvivakṣāntaraṃ tat tathoktam | What is meant is this: from whichever desire to pronounce [a letter] like 's', whatever [new] desire arises from that, that subsequent desire [to speak] is what is being referred to |
etad uktaṃ bhavati | This is what is being stated |
tasya śrutiḥ utpadyata iti sambandhaḥ | Its hearing is produced - this is the syntactic connection |
nātidrutaśrutir iti / drutaśruteḥ smṛtijanatā samarthatvāt | [It should be] "not heard too quickly", because quick hearing is not capable of generating remembrance |
uttarottaro varṇaḥ tu smṛtipūrvapūrvasmṛtim apekṣya tatsahakāreṇa svaviṣayāṃ smṛtiṃ samutthāpayati | Each subsequent letter, however, depending on the remembrance of the previous [letters], produces with their assistance the remembrance of its own object |
anyadharmo 'pi na hetu{ra}pakṣadharmatvāt / | [The reason] cannot be the property of something else, because [such a property] cannot be a property of the subject [pakṣa]. |
yathā bāhupadaṃ caya{ghaṭa---}syānityatvādau sādhe / | Just as [the property of having] arms and feet [cannot be the reason] when proving the non-eternality of a jar. |
abhāvadharmo 'pi na bhavati / | [The reason] also cannot be the property of an absence [abhāva]. |
tasya viparītasādhakatvāt / | Because that [would] prove the opposite [of what is intended]. |
ubhayadharmo 'pi na bhavati / | [The reason] also cannot be a property of both [presence and absence]. |
tasya vyabhicāritvāt / | Because that would be inconclusive [vyabhicārin]. |
svabhāvahetor vā tasya siddhir bhavetkāryahetor vā / | Would the proof of that [sphoṭa] be through a nature-based reason [svabhāvahetu] or through an effect-based reason [kāryahetu]? |
na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tasyātīndriyatvāt tatsvabhāvāsiddheḥ / | First, [it cannot be] the former option, because due to its being beyond the senses [atīndriya], its nature cannot be established. |
siddhau vā vyartho hetuḥ paryeṣaṇe, yat tatsvabhāvasya siddhatvāt / | And if [its nature] were established, the reason would be pointless in the investigation, since its nature would [already] be established. |
tadarthatvāc ca prayāsasya / | And because the effort [of reasoning] is for the sake of that [establishment of its nature]. |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣo 'tīndriyeṇa saha kāryakāraṇabhāvāsiddheḥ / | Nor is the second view [tenable], because no causal relation can be established with what is beyond the senses. |
athāpi syāt yathā śrotrādijñānasya kādācitkatvena kāraṇāntarasāpekṣatvasiddhau sāmarthyācchrotrāder indriyasya siddhir bhavati, tathātrāpyarthapratītiṃ dharmiṇīṃ kṛtvā, varṇāviśeṣe 'pi saro rasa ityādāvarthapratītibhedāt sphoṭākhyaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ kalpayiṣyāma iti / | [One might argue that] "just as in the case of auditory and other cognitions, their occasional nature establishes their dependence on other causes, and from this capability the existence of organs like the ear is established, similarly here too, taking meaning-comprehension as the subject, since there are different meanings comprehended even when the letters are the same - as in [the words] 'sara' and 'rasa' - we shall postulate another cause called sphoṭa." |
etadapyasamyak / | This too is incorrect. |
varṇāviśeṣasyāsiddhatvāt / | Because no entity distinct from the letters is established. |
tathā hi sāmpratam eva pratipāditam varṇā eva pratipadaṃ bhinnāḥ kāryakāraṇabhedād arthapratītau samarthā ityanarthākalpaneti / | For it has just been established that the letters themselves, being different in each word, are capable of producing the comprehension of meaning through differences in the causal relationship, [therefore] this [sphoṭa] is a needless assumption. |
evam anumeyatve doṣā vācyā ityabhiprāyaḥ / | Thus the same objections apply to [the view that] sphoṭa can be inferred. |
athāpi syān nāsāvanumeyaḥ, kiṃ tarhi ---, atyantādṛśya ity āha adṛśyatve tu naivāyam iti / | [If] it might be argued that "it is not to be inferred, but rather it is absolutely imperceptible," [we] say that "if it is imperceptible, then this [sphoṭa] cannot [function at all]." |
yathā liṅgam ajñātaṃ jñāpakaṃ na bhavati tadvadayam api syād ajñātatvāt / | Just as an unknown inferential mark cannot produce knowledge, similarly this [sphoṭa] too cannot [produce knowledge] due to being unknown. |
sattāmātreṇa tajjñānaṃ hetubhāvavyavasthiteḥ / | [If it be argued that] "the cognition [arises] from its mere existence due to its being established as a cause," |
tasya jñāpakateṣṭā cennetravat sarvadā bhavet / | [then we reply that] if its capacity to produce cognition is accepted, it would, like the eye, [produce cognition] at all times. |
sa{ṅketā}navabodhe 'pi varṇānām aśrutāvapi / tadbhāvyartheṣu vijñānaṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ / | Even without understanding the convention and without hearing the letters, there would be cognition of the meanings to be produced by it, due to the presence of the efficient cause. |
tathā hi nityasattvo 'yaṃ nacāpekṣāsya kācana / | For this [sphoṭa] has eternal existence and has no dependence on anything whatsoever. |
dhvanisaṃketavarṇaiś ca tadvyaktir nāpyadarśanāt // | [There] cannot be manifestation of it [i.e., sphoṭa] through sound, convention, or letters, because of [its] non-perception. |
jñānaṃ hi vyaktirityāhus tajjñānaṃ naca vidyate / | For they say manifestation is cognition, yet no cognition of it [i.e., sphoṭa] exists. |
tato nirarthakaivāsya vyañjakasyāpi kalpanā // | Therefore, even the postulation of its manifester is entirely futile. |
atha sattāmātreṇa cakṣurādīndriyavadajñāto 'pyarthapratītihetur bhavet / | [If one argues that] "by [its] mere existence, even though unknown, it could be the cause of meaning-comprehension, just like the visual and other sense organs," |
evaṃ tarhi tadbhāvi jñānaṃ sarvadā bhavet / | then in that case, the cognition arising from it would exist at all times. |
tathā saṅketagrahaṇādikamantareṇa tadbhāvi jñānaṃ syāt / | Thus, the cognition arising from it would exist even without grasping the convention and other [prerequisites]. |
etadeva saṅketetyādi pradarśayati / | This very [point] is shown by [the words] "convention" and so forth. |
tatropapattim āha tathāhīti / | On this [matter], [the author] states the reasoning with [the words] "for thus." |
athāpi syāt saṅketābhivyakta evāsāvarthapratītiheturiṣṭo na sattāmātreṇa, tena na bhavati yathoktadoṣaprasaṅga ity āha dhvanisaṅketavarṇair ityādi / | If one might argue that "this [sphoṭa] is accepted as the cause of meaning-comprehension only when manifested through convention, not by mere existence, therefore the aforementioned fault does not arise," [the author] responds with [the words] "through sound, convention, and letters" and so forth. |
adarśanāditi / anupalabdheḥ / | [It is] "because of non-perception," [that is,] because of non-apprehension. |
adṛśyatvenābhimatatvāc ca / | And because it is accepted as being imperceptible. |
etad eva jñānaṃ hītyādinā darśayati // syād etat bhāsamāno na lakṣyata ityetad asiddham / | [He] shows this very [point about] cognition through [the words] beginning with "hi" [and explains that] this [claim that] "it appears [but] is not perceived" is unproven. |
tathā hi pūrvapūrvavarṇāhitasaṃskārāyām āvṛttasaṃskāraparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'kalaḥ pratibhāsata evetyāha nādenetyādi / | For thus [they say that] when the impressions deposited by each preceding letter have matured through repetition in consciousness, the indivisible word manifests itself, as [he] states beginning with "nādena." |
ityetad api tenātra nirnimittaṃ prakalpitam / | This [claim] too has been posited by him here without [valid] cause. |
tasyām api na śabdo 'nyo bhāsamāno hi lakṣyate // | For even in that [consciousness], no word different [from the letters] is perceived to appear. |
āvṛttaḥ sañjātaḥ sarvabuddhyāhitaḥ saṃskāraparipāko yasyāṃ buddhau sā tathoktā / | That consciousness in which the maturation of impressions deposited by cognitions of all [letters] has arisen through repetition is described thus. |
nirnimittam iti varṇā eva hi yathānubhavaṃ paścāt saṅkalanāpratyayena smārtenāvasīyanta ityabhiprāyaḥ / | "Without [valid] cause" means that the letters themselves, after being experienced, are later apprehended through a synthetic cognition based on memory. |
tathā hi naivāntyavarṇapratipatter ūrdhvamanyamakalaṃ śabdātmānamupalakṣayāmo nāpi svayam ayaṃ vaktā vibhāvayati / | For indeed, neither do we perceive, nor does the speaker himself discern, any other indivisible word-essence after the cognition of the final letter. |
kevalam evaṃ yadi syāt sādhu me syād iti kalyāṇakāmatāmūḍham atiratyā{ntyā---}yāṃ buddhau samāptakālaḥ śabdo bhavatīti svapnāyate // | [They] merely dream, confused by a desire for benefit [thinking] "if it were thus, it would be good for me," that the word exists as complete in the final consciousness. |
janyatāṃ vyajyatāṃ vāpi dhvanibhiḥ kramabhāvibhiḥ / ye 'pi sphoṭasya manyante kramas teṣāṃ virudhyate // | Whether [they think] the sphoṭa is produced or manifested by sounds occurring in sequence, for those who accept [the existence of] sphoṭa, this sequence contradicts [their theory]. |
nahi krameṇa yujyete vyaktijātī niraṃśake / | For neither manifestation nor origination in sequence is possible in [something] that is partless. |
ekarūpābahir bhāvāt te syātāṃ sarvathaiva hi // | Since they [i.e. the manifested and unmanifested] would not exist outside of the single form, they would indeed exist in every way. |
vaibhāṣikā hi kecit padakāryābhidhānena vākyasphoṭamanityatvājjanyaṃ pratipannāḥ / | Some Vaibhāṣikas indeed accept that the sentence-sphoṭa is produced from the effect of words due to [its] non-permanence. |
niraṃśaka iti / niravayave vastuni / | "Indivisible" means "in a substance without parts." |
ekasmād rūpājjñātād vyaktādvājātāvyaktābhimatasyāpi rūpasyābahir bhāvāt / | Because the form that is considered unproduced or unmanifested cannot exist outside of the single form that is known or manifested. |
te jātivyaktī sarvasyaiva syātām / | Those two [namely] production and manifestation would exist for everything. |
tataś ca śeṣavarṇādiprayogavaiyarthyaṃ syāt // | And consequently, the use of remaining letters etc. would be purposeless. |
sāṃśatve 'pi yathā varṇāḥ krameṇa pratipādakāḥ / sphoṭāṃśā api kiṃ naivaṃ kimadṛṣṭāḥ prakalpitāḥ // | Even if [the sphoṭa] has parts, just as letters are expressive in sequence, why would the parts of sphoṭa not be likewise? Why are unseen [parts] assumed? |
te hi sphoṭāṃśāḥ pratyekamanarthakā vā syuḥ sārthakā vā / prathame pakṣe kramabhāvitvād varṇātsa{tma ---}vadapratipādakatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | For those parts of sphoṭa would either be meaningless individually or meaningful. In the first case, because they occur in sequence like letters, [there would be] the undesirable consequence of [their] being non-expressive. |
kalpitaṃ ca vācakatvaṃ syāt atādrūpye tādrūpyāt / | And [their] expressiveness would be assumed because of [their] having that form while not having that form. |
tathā hi arthavānekātmā vākyamucyate, vā {nā---}vayavāḥ svayam anarthakāḥ, teṣu sa ātmā kalpanāropitaḥ syāt, māṇavakādiṣu siṃhatādivat / | For thus a sentence is said to have multiple meanings, or [its] parts are themselves meaningless; that nature would be imaginatively superimposed upon them, like [the nature of] a lion etc. upon boys etc. |
sati ca kalpite vācakatve varaṃ varṇabhāgā eva santu vācakāḥ kimadṛṣṭāḥ sphoṭāṃśāḥ kalpyanta iti | If expressiveness is to be assumed, it would be better that the phoneme-parts themselves be expressive - why should unseen sphoṭa-parts be assumed? |
atha sārthakatvaṃ tadānekakalpanā nirarthikā, tathā hi parisamāptārthaṃ śabdarūpaṃ vākyam ucyate, pratyekaṃ cedarthavanto 'vayavāḥ syus tadā tāvantyeva tāni vākyāni jñātānīti naikā naikāvayavātmā siddhyati | If [the sphoṭa-parts have] meaningfulness, then multiple assumptions become pointless; for a sentence is said to be a word-form conveying a complete meaning, and if each part were meaningful, then there would be as many sentences as those [parts], thus no single entity composed of multiple parts is established. |
ekāvayavapratipattau ca satyāṃ vākyārthapratipattiprasaṅgaḥ | And when there is comprehension of a single part, [unwanted] comprehension of the sentence-meaning would follow. |
yathoktam "pratyekaṃ sārthakatve 'pi mithyānekatvakalpanā | As has been said: "Even if each [part] were meaningful, the assumption of multiplicity would be false; |
ekāvayavagatyā ca vākyārthapratipadbhavet" | and through understanding one part, the sentence-meaning would be understood." |
jātau vyaktau kṛtāyāṃ cedekena dhvaninā sakṛt / nitarāṃ vyaktisiddhyarthaṃ varṇānānyān prayuñjate | "Even when the universal and manifestation have been produced once by a single sound, people employ other phonemes for the sake of clearer manifestation; |
yato duravadhārāsya prakṛtiḥ sā tathā kṛtā | because its nature is such that it is difficult to determine; |
samānavyaktikair varṇair bhūyo 'pi vyajyate paraiḥ | it is manifested again and again by other phonemes with similar manifestations." |
yadyapyekena dhvaninā jātir vyaktir vā sarvātmanā sphoṭasya kṛtā, tathāpi nottaradhvaniprayogavaiyarthyaṃ tasya, spaṣṭavyaktyarthatvāt | Even though the universal or manifestation of the sphoṭa in its entirety is produced by a single sound, still the use of subsequent sounds is not purposeless, because [they serve] for clear manifestation. |
etad eva darśayati yata ityādi | This very [point] is shown by [the phrase] beginning with "yataḥ." |
duravadhāreti / avadhārayitumaśakyā | [The word] "duravadhārā" [means] impossible to determine. |
tasyaivānyasya vaikasya kiṃ nāvṛttau punaḥ punaḥ / vyaktirāvartate tasya nanvevamaviśeṣataḥ // | When that same [Letter] or some other single [Letter] is repeated again and again, is it not [merely] its manifestation that is repeated, there being no difference? |
nanvityāmantraṇe / | The word 'nanu' [here] indicates [polite] address ['Sir']. |
tasyaiva prathamoccaritasya varṇasya, anyasya vā tadantargatasya kasyacid ekasya punaḥ punar, āvṛttyā kiṃ nābhivyaktiḥ kriyate / | When that same Letter first pronounced, or some other single [Letter] contained within it, is repeated again and again, is it not [merely] the manifestation that is being produced? |
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