sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
nātikrāmati / ko 'sau pumān iti śeṣaḥ | "Does not go beyond" - [here] "who?" [refers to] the person [i.e.,] the observer |
atha tṛtīye 'pi jñāne dvitīyajñānavad bādhakāpekṣā kasmān na bhavati yena parīkṣakajñānatrayaṃ nityaṃ yataḥ syād | "Why in the case of the third cognition also is there no need for a sublating [cognition] as in the case of the second cognition, due to which there would [only] be three cognitions for the investigator?" |
ajāto 'nutpanno bādho yasya pramātuḥ | [That cognition] whose sublation has not arisen [or] not been produced for the knower |
kasmānnāśaṅkyam ity āha | Why should it not be suspected? [Thus he] says: |
utprekṣate hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam / sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṃśayātmā kṣayaṃ vrajet | One who through delusion imagines a sublating [cognition] even when it has not arisen, being of a doubting nature in all dealings, would go to destruction |
kṣayam nāśam | kṣaya [means] destruction |
tatvabhraṃśāt | Due to falling away from truth |
tathāca vāsudevena ninditā saṃśayātmatā | And thus by Vāsudeva a doubting nature was condemned |
nāyaṃ loko 'sti kaunteya na paraḥ saṃśayātmanaḥ | "Neither this world nor the next exists, O son of Kuntī, for one of doubting nature" |
vāsudeveneti | [By] Vāsudeva means [by] Viṣṇu |
kunterapatyaṃ kaunteyo 'rjunaḥ | The son of Kunti [means] Kaunteya [means] Arjuna |
yadyevaṃ prathame 'pi jñāne bādhāśaṅkā na prāpnoti, tataś ca sarvajñāne 'pi prāmāṇyaprasaṅga ityāśaṅkyāha yāvānetyādi | "If that is so, then there should be no suspicion of sublation regarding even the first cognition; and thus there would follow [the unwanted consequence of] validity of all cognitions," [thinking] thus [someone] raises an objection beginning with 'yāvān'. |
kadācit syād apītyevaṃ na bhūyastatra vastuni / utprekṣamāṇaiḥ sthātavyaṃ nātmakāmaiḥ pramātṛbhiḥ | When a certain sublation is possible [for a cognition], and on being sought for is not found, then regarding that object, investigators who desire their own welfare should not persist in imagining [that] "it might appear at some time." |
yatra yasyāṃ matau yāvānevāpavādaḥ sambhāvyate, tāvatyevāpavāde 'nviṣṭe 'nupajāte ca, tadātmani tatra matau, sa nāstītyeva gamyata ityadhyāhāryam | Wherever, regarding whatever cognition, whatever extent of sublation is possible, when exactly that much sublation has been sought for and is not found, then regarding that cognition itself, [the conclusion] "it [i.e., the sublater] does not exist" should be understood [as implied]. |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedāḥ saṃvyavahārataḥ / siddhā eva hi ye yasmiṃste 'pekṣyā bādhakārthinā | The differences of place, time, person and circumstance are established through practical experience; these indeed should be considered by one seeking sublation. |
deśaś ca kālaś ca naraścāvasthā ceti tathoktāḥ, tāsāṃ bhedā iti samāsaḥ | [The expression] "place and time and person and circumstance" thus stated, [and] "differences of these" - this is the compound analysis. |
ete ca deśādibhedāḥ kasyacideva kecid bādhakā natu sarve sarvasya tena na sarvatra sarveṣām āśaṅkā kāryetyetad darśayann āha dūradeśetyādi | And these differences of place etc. - only some [of them] are sublaters of something, but not all [are sublaters] of everything; therefore suspicion of all [sublaters] should not be entertained everywhere - showing this, he states [the verse] beginning with "dūradeśa". |
dūradeśavyavasthānād asamyagdarśane bhavet | Due to being situated at a distant place, there might be incorrect perception. |
anyāśaṅkāṃ kvacit tatra samīpagatimātrakam // | [There is] misconception of something else in some cases [which depends on] mere proximity. |
apavādāvadhiḥ kālanarāvasthāntare na tu / | The limit of sublation [does] not [exist] in [cases of] different states of time and person. |
anyāśaṅkā anyasya jalāder āśaṅkā / kvacid iti marīcikādau / | "Misconception of something else" means apprehension of water etc. [as being something else], [occurring] in some cases such as mirages. |
samīpagatimātrakam iti apavādāvadhir iti sambandhaḥ / | The connection [of the terms] is that "mere proximity" is the limit of sublation. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | This is what is being said. |
nahi tatra samīpagatānāṃ kālādyapekṣā sambhavati / | Indeed, in these cases of proximity, there can be no dependence on time and other [factors]. |
evaṃ kālādiṣvapi / | Similarly also in [cases involving] time etc. |
yatra yasyaiva bhrāntinimittatvaṃ sambhavati tasyaivāpekṣā kāryā nānyasyetyetad udāharaṇena darśayati // | Where there is possibility of something being the cause of error, investigation should be done with respect to that alone, not anything else - this is what is shown through examples. |
tatra kālaviśeṣamadhikṛtyāha evaṃ santamasa ityādi / | Regarding this, speaking with reference to a particular time, [the text] states "similarly in darkness" etc. |
evaṃ santamase kāle yo gavāśvādisaṃśayaḥ / bhrānter vā nirṇayas tatra prakāśībhavanāvadhiḥ // | Similarly, at a time of darkness, whatever doubt [arises] about [whether something is] a cow, horse etc., or [whatever] determination [follows] from error, there the limit [of these] is the occurrence of light. |
saṅgataṃ tamo yasmin kale sa tathoktaḥ // | [That time] in which dense darkness has gathered is called 'saṅtamasakāla'. |
naraviśeṣamadhikṛtyāha tathetyādi / tathā hi candradigmohavedavarṇasvarādiṣu / puruṣāntarasampraśnād anyathātvāvadhāraṇam // | With reference to particular persons, [he] speaks thus: "Indeed, regarding [misconceptions about] the moon, directions, Vedic letters and accents, and such things, the determination that [reality is] otherwise [comes] from questioning other persons." |
taimirikādīnāṃ dvicandrādijñāneṣu puruṣāntaraparipraśnādevānyathātvan iścaye bhavati, na tatra kālādyapekṣā // | For those suffering from eye disease and similar [conditions], in [their] cognitions of two moons and such things, the determination that [reality is] otherwise comes solely from questioning other persons; there is no dependence on Time and other [factors] in this case. |
rāgadveṣamadonmādakṣuttṛṣṇādikṣatendriyaiḥ / durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe tadabhāvād viparyayaḥ // | "When objects that are difficult to cognize are [wrongly] cognized by those whose senses are impaired by passion, hatred, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst and the like, the opposite [correct cognition comes about] from the cessation of those [conditions]." |
tadabhāvād iti / rāgādyavasthāyā abhāvāt // | 'From their cessation' means from the cessation of the state of passion and other [such conditions]. |
ṛṇādivyavahāre 'pi dvayor vivadamānayoḥ / ekaṃ pratyarthino vākyaṃ dve vākye pūrvavādinaḥ // | "In transactions concerning debt and other [matters], when two parties are disputing, there is one statement from the defendant and two statements from the plaintiff." |
anavasthābhayād eva na vākyaṃ likhyate 'dhikam / | "It is precisely from fear of infinite regress that no additional statement is recorded." |
evaṃ jñānatrayasyaiva sarvatra vikriyeṣyate / | "Thus, in all cases, only a sequence of three cognitions is accepted." |
trisatyatāpi devānām ata evābhidhīyate // | "And it is precisely for this reason that the deities are called 'possessing three truths' (trisatya)." |
tena svataḥpramāṇatve nānavasthobhayor api / | "Therefore, when the validity [of cognition] is self-established, there is no infinite regress for either [party]." |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve yathāyogamataḥ sthite // | Thus validity and invalidity [of cognitions] remain as they happen to be in reality. |
kiñca yadi nāma pratyakṣādeḥ parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati na tu śābdasya, tathāpyasmat pakṣasiddhireva / | Moreover, even if it be proved that the validity of sense-perception and other pramāṇas is due to extraneous causes, but not [that] of verbal cognition, even then our position becomes established. |
tathā{hi---} sarvo 'yamārambhaścodanāyāḥ prāmāṇyapratipādanaphalaḥ, śābdasya ca pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇye siddhe siddham eva codanāyāḥ prāmāṇyamiti kimasmākam anyeṣāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyaprasiddhaye prayāseneti manyamānaḥ śābdasya pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayannāha nityam ityādi / | For this entire undertaking is aimed at establishing the validity of Vedic injunction, and when the intrinsic validity of verbal cognition as a pramāṇa is established, the validity of Vedic injunction becomes automatically established; [thus] thinking "what need is there for our effort to establish the intrinsic validity of other [pramāṇas]?", [the author] proceeds to establish the intrinsic validity of verbal cognition, saying "nityam" etc. |
nityamāptapraṇītaṃ vā vākyaṃ yaccāvadhāryate / śrotruccārayitṛbhyāṃ tan na manāgapi dūṣyate // | That sentence which is ascertained to be either eternal or uttered by a trustworthy person is not vitiated in the slightest by [any defects of] the hearer or speaker. |
ye vidyāguravas tatra sahādhyāyina eva ca / | [For] the teachers of knowledge and fellow-students there [are present]. |
ato guṇaniṣiddhair vā doṣair vākyaṃ na dṛṣyate / yadvā karturabhāve te na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ // | Therefore the sentence is not affected by defects which are prevented by [these] qualities; or alternatively, in the absence of an author, these defects cannot exist as they would have no substratum. |
dvividhaṃ hi śābdaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam, nityavākyajanitaṃ āptapraṇītavākyahetukaṃ ca / | For verbal cognition as a valid means of knowledge is of two kinds: [that] produced by eternal sentences and [that] caused by sentences uttered by trustworthy persons. |
tatraitasmin dvividhe 'pi kāraṇasyāduṣṭatvaṃ pratipādayati / | In both these types [the text] establishes the faultlessness of the cause. |
tathā hi yattāvannityaṃ vākyaṃ tasya śrotṛvaktṛkṛto na doṣaḥ sambhavati / | For indeed, in that sentence which is eternal, no defect created by hearer or speaker is possible. |
nityaṃ vidyāgurubhir adhyāpakair adhyetṛbhiś ca pālyamānatvāt / | Because [such sentences] are eternally preserved by teachers of knowledge, instructors and students. |
yadapyāptoktam, tatra guṇaiḥ kṛpādibhir doṣāṇāṃ niṣiddhatvāt | [As for what is] spoken by a reliable person, in that case the defects are negated by [their] virtues like compassion and so forth. |
doṣā hi rāgādayaḥ puruṣadharmatvāt kartāramevāśritāḥ | The defects such as attachment and so forth, being properties of persons, reside only in the maker [of statements]. |
tadānāśritatvaprasaṅgāt | Therefore, when there is no substratum [for the defects, they cannot exist]. |
nanu cāptavākyasya guṇair doṣāṇāṃ nirākaraṇāt prāmāṇyābhyupagame guṇebhyaḥ prāmāṇyamabhyupagataṃ syāt, tataścāvasthādoṣo 'trāpi sambhavedityāśaṅkyāha tatretyādi | [One might object:] "Since in the case of statements by reliable persons, the defects are negated by virtues, wouldn't this mean that validity comes from the virtues? And if so, wouldn't this lead to a logical flaw?" - [To address] this objection, [the author] states what follows. |
tatrāptokter dvayaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ doṣābhāvaguṇātmakam | In the case of statements by reliable persons, two things are observed: the absence of defects and the presence of virtues. |
guṇebhyaś ca pramāṇatvaṃ yathā nāsti tathoditam // guṇavattvādato vaktur na doṣās tannirākṛtāḥ | It has been explained how validity does not come from virtues; and due to the speaker's possession of virtues, there are no defects [in their statements], [as] these are negated by those [virtues]. |
svato vākyaṃ pramāṇaṃ ca doṣābhāvopalakṣitam | The statement is valid intrinsically, and [this validity] is merely indicated by the absence of defects. |
doṣābhāvaguṇāvātmā svabhāvo yasya dvayasya tat tathoktam / tathoditam iti evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnā pratyakṣādipramāṇatetyādinā | That which has as its nature both the absence of defects and [presence of] virtues - this is what has been stated thus, as [previously discussed] regarding whether validity of perception etc. depends on virtues. |
tannirākṛtā iti guṇanirākṛtāḥ | "Negated by them" means "negated by the virtues." |
doṣābhāvopalakṣitam iti doṣarahitaguṇānāṃ doṣaniṣedhamātra eva vyāpāro na prāmāṇyādhāna ityabhiprāyaḥ | "Indicated by the absence of defects" means that the function of virtues that are free from defects is merely the negation of defects, not the bestowing of validity. |
nanu ca doṣābhāvaniścayāt prāmāṇye 'bhyupagamyamāne 'pyanavasthaiveti paramatamāśaṅkayann āha doṣābhāva ityādi | [The opponent], anticipating the other view that "even if validity is accepted based on the certainty of absence of defects, there would still be infinite regress," states [the verse beginning with] "doṣābhāva." |
doṣābhāvo guṇebhyaścedāptavākyeṣu gamyate | If the absence of defects in the statements of trustworthy persons is ascertained from [their] excellences, |
tathā hi doṣābhāvo guṇaparijñānānniśceyaḥ, guṇaparijñānasya ca punar api doṣābhāvāt prāmāṇyam avaseyam, tatrāpi doṣābhāvo guṇebhyaḥ parijñeyaḥ, punas tatrāpyevam ityevaṃ saiva sarvavyavasthālopinyanavasthā tadavasthā | For the absence of defects would be ascertained from the knowledge of excellences, and the validity of that knowledge of excellences would again have to be determined from the absence of defects, and there again the absence of defects would have to be known from excellences, and so on—thus the same infinite regress that destroys all practical affairs would remain. |
naiṣa doṣa ityādinā pratividhatte | [The Mīmāṃsaka] responds with [the verse beginning] "naiṣa doṣa." |
naiṣa doṣo guṇajñānaṃ tadā naiva hyapekṣyate | This is not a fault, for the knowledge of excellences is not required at that time. |
jñāyamānatayā naiva guṇāstatropakāriṇaḥ | The excellences are not operative there by way of being known. |
sattāmātreṇa te sarve doṣavyāvartanakṣamāḥ | By their mere presence, they all are capable of preventing defects. |
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsu na jāyate | When they [excellences] are present, knowledge of human defects does not arise. |
teṣu satsviti guṇeṣu | "When they are present" [means] when the excellences are present. |
yadi nāma na jāyate tataḥ kimityata āha doṣaiśceti | [If someone asks:] "If [such knowledge] does not arise, then what?" To this [the author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "doṣaiśca." |
doṣaiścājñāyamānatvān na prāmāṇyamapodyate | Because defects are not known, validity is not negated. |
anapoditasiddhaṃ ca tadihāpi svataḥ sthitam // | [Being] not set aside, it stands established by itself here also. |
na prāmāṇyamapodyata iti sambandhaḥ / | "The validity is not set aside" – such is the syntactical connection. |
kasmāt ajñāyamānatvāt guṇaniṣiddhatvād doṣāṇām abhāvādevājñāyamānatvam / | Why [is it not set aside]? Because [the defects] are not cognized; due to [their] being negated by excellences, the defects are non-existent and therefore not cognized. |
anapoditasiddhaṃ ceti anapoditatvāt siddham utsargasyāpavādavirahe nisargasiddhatvāt / | "Not being set aside" means [it is] established because of not being set aside, [and] because when there is no exception to a general rule, it becomes naturally established. |
ihāpīti / | [This is what is meant] by "here also." |
āptavākye na kevalam apauruṣeya ityapiśabdaḥ // | The word "api" [indicates that this applies] not only to the non-human [Veda] but also to the words of reliable persons. |
nanu ca yadi nāma kvacit pauruṣeye vākye doṣā na jñāyante tathāpi sambhāvyanta eva teṣāṃ tadāśritatvāt / | [The objector:] Even if defects are not perceived in some human utterances, they are still suspected because they [inherently] reside in such [utterances]. |
tataś ca yathā guṇāḥ sattāmātreṇa doṣavyāvartanakṣamās tathā doṣā api guṇavyāvartanasamarthā iti tat kimucyate doṣaiścājñāyamānatvān na prāmāṇyamapodyata iti, etad āśaṅkyāha doṣāḥ santītyādi / | Thus, just as excellences are capable of negating defects by their mere existence, defects too might be capable of negating excellences; so why is it said that "due to defects not being cognized, validity is not set aside"? Anticipating this [objection], he states "doṣāḥ santi" etc. |
doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeye tu śaṅkyate / | In human utterances, there is doubt whether defects exist or do not exist. |
vede karturabhāvāc ca doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ // | But in the Veda, due to the absence of an author, we do not even have suspicion of defects. |
ato yadanapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyamucyate / tadāptena praṇīte 'pi sutarāṃ siddhyati svataḥ // | Therefore, when validity is ascribed to the Veda due to [its] independence, that [validity] is established all the more by itself, even in what is composed by a trustworthy person. |
evaṃ manyate / | This is what [he] thinks. |
yathoktaṃ bhāṣye "tasmāt pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt / | As it is stated in the Bhāṣya: "Therefore [the Veda] is authoritative due to [its] independence. |
naivaṃ sati pratyayāntaramapekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaraṃ vā svayam pratyayo hyasā"viti // | In this case, neither another cognition nor another person needs to be relied upon, for this [Veda] is indeed cognition by itself." |
api ca kiṃ pramāṇāntaraparicchinne 'rthe pravṛttiriṣṭā, āhosvinneti pakṣadvayam, tatra yadi tāvanneṣṭeti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā vedasya svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ siddham iti darśayati vedārtha iti / | Moreover, are [the Vedic injunctions] operative on objects determined by other means of knowledge, or not? These are the two alternatives. If the second alternative is accepted—that [they] are not—then the self-validity of the Veda is established by itself, [as] the Vedic content shows. |
tayaivāsya pramāṇatvam anuvādatvam anyathā // | Through this very [independence] comes its authority; otherwise [it would be] mere restatement. |
vedārthaḥ agnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādiḥ / | The Vedic content [is statements] such as "Heaven comes from the Agnihotra." |
anyapramāṇair iti / | [The phrase] "by other means of knowledge" [means the following]: |
vedād anyaiḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ saṅgatirekaviṣayatayā sambandhaḥ, tat pratiṣedho 'saṅgatiḥ / | Connection with perception and other [means of knowledge] different from the Veda [means] having the same object; the negation of that is non-connection. |
tayaiveti / asaṅgatyā asyeti / | [The phrase] "through this very" [means] through its non-connection. |
vedasya | [The word] 'asya' [refers to] the Veda. |
atha pravṛttiriṣṭeti pakṣas tadā gṛhītagrāhitvād uttarakālabhāvino jñānasya na prāmāṇyaṃ prāpnotīti darśayann āha anuvādatvamanyatheti | If [this] view is accepted that [the Veda] operates [only on what is already known], then due to [its] grasping what is [already] grasped, the later-occurring cognition would not attain validity - [the author] shows this by saying "otherwise [it would be] reiterative." |
anyathā yadyanyair api pramāṇair avagate 'rthe pramāṇasya pravṛttir iṣyate tadā tasyānyaprakāśitārthaprakāśakatvād anuvādatvam iti smṛtyādivad aprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ | If it is accepted that a means of knowledge operates on an object [already] known through other means of knowledge, then due to its illuminating an object [already] illuminated by others, it would be reiterative and thus invalid like memory and such [other secondary cognitions]. |
tasmād yatpramāṇaṃ na tat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatimapekṣata iti sarvasyaiva pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ prasidham iti bhāvaḥ | Therefore, what is a valid means of knowledge does not depend on corroboration from other means of knowledge - this is the purport - thus the self-validity of every means of knowledge is established. |
etad eva darśayati anyasyāpītyādi | [The author] shows this very [point] through [the verse beginning with] "anyasyāpi." |
anyasyāpi pramāṇatve saṅgatir naiva kāraṇam | "In the validity of other [means of knowledge] too, corroboration is not at all the cause; |
tulyārthānāṃ vikalpena hyekasyaiva pramāṇatā | for among [cognitions] having the same object, through option, validity belongs to only one [of them]." [2898] |
vedād anyasyāpi pratyakṣādeḥ | [The phrase "other"] means [cognitions] other than the Veda, [namely] perception and the rest. |
tulyārthānām iti ekaviṣayapravṛttānām | [The compound] "tulyārthānām" [means] those that operate on one and the same object. |
ekasyaiveti prathamasya | [The phrase] "only one" [refers to] the first [cognition]. |
anyeṣām anuvādatvāt | Because the others are [merely] reiterative. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.