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tatra yadi nāmānāditvamātreṇa buddhāder vedādhyāyibhiḥ saha sāmyamupavarṇitam, tathāpi nānāditvāt prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati, prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyayor anāditvāvirodhāt. | Even if similarity between Buddha etc. and Vedic scholars is described merely based on beginninglessness, validity is not established from beginninglessness alone, since there is no contradiction between beginninglessness and [both] validity and invalidity. |
idānīm abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigraha{tva}syāsiddhatāparihāreṇa sarvajñasyābhāva{vaṃ}prasādhayan vedasya tato viśeṣam āha sarvajñatvam ityādi | Now, while establishing the non-existence of the omniscient one by removing the inadmissibility of [his] being the object of the means of cognition of non-existence, [the author] states the difference of the Veda from that [omniscient one], beginning with "sarvajñatvam". |
sarvajñatvaṃ ca buddhāder yā ca vedasya nityatā | [Both] the omniscience of Buddha etc. and the eternality of the Veda... |
tulye jalpanti ye tebhyo viśeṣaḥ kathyate 'dhunā | To those who declare [these] to be equal, the difference is now being explained. |
tathā hi sarvadarśī pratyakṣānumānaśabdopamānārthāpattīnāṃ madhye naikenāpi pramāṇena siddhaḥ | For indeed, the all-seeing one is not established by even one among perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, and presumption. |
tat katham abhāvapramaṇagrāsīkṛtamūrter asatas tasya pramāṇabhūtenāgopālāṅganādipratītena vedena sāmyaṃ bhaviṣyatīti | How then could there be equality between such a non-existent one whose form is consumed by the means of cognition of non-existence and the Veda which is recognized as authoritative by everyone down to the cowherd women? |
dṛṣṭo na caikadeśo 'sti liṅgaṃ vā yo 'numāpayet | Neither is [he] seen, nor is there any mark that could lead to inference. |
tathā hy arvāgdarśinaḥ pratyakṣaṃ trividham, indriyajñānaṃ mānasaṃ sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ ceti | For indeed, perception for those of limited vision is threefold: sense-knowledge, mental [perception], and self-awareness of all minds and mental factors. |
tad etat trividham api na sarvajñam avagamayitum alam, atadviṣayatvāt | None of these three is capable of making known the omniscient one, because he is not their object. |
indriyajñānaṃ hi rūpādiviṣayapañcakaniyatam ato na tena parasantānasamavāyino buddhidharmā viṣayīkriyante | For sense-knowledge is restricted to the five objects beginning with form, therefore mental properties inherent in another's continuum cannot be objectified by it. |
nāpi mānasena, tasya indriyajñānaparigṛhītaviṣayānantaraviṣayagrāhītvenendriyajñānavat pratiniyatarūpādiviṣayatvāt | Nor [can he be known] by mental [perception], because it, by grasping objects immediately after objects grasped by sense-knowledge, like sense-knowledge has objects restricted to particular forms etc. |
nāpi svasaṃvedanena, tasya svasantānavartivartamānacittacaittaviṣayatvāt. | Nor [can He be known] through self-cognition, because this [self-cognition] has as its object only present mind and mental factors occurring in one's own continuum. |
ato na tena parasantānavartinaḥ svasantānikāścānāgatāścetodharmāḥ śakyante vedayitum. | Therefore through this [self-cognition] neither mental phenomena occurring in others' continua nor future mental phenomena occurring in one's own continuum can be known. |
yogijñānasyaiva ca sādhyatvān na tena grahaṇāgrahaṇacintāvatarati. nāpy anumānena, tad dhi trividhaliṅgasamāśrayam iṣyate saugataiḥ. | And since yogic knowledge itself is yet to be proven, the question of apprehension or non-apprehension through it does not arise. Nor [can He be known] through inference, for that [inference] is accepted by the Buddhists as being based on three kinds of logical marks. |
tatra vidhisādhanasyātrādhikārānānupalabdhis tāvad ihādhikriyate. | Among these, since what is required here is a positive proof, non-apprehension is not applicable in this case. |
nāpi kāryam, pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanatvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasya viprakarṣiṇā sarvajñena saha kasyacit kāryakāraṇabhāvāsiddheḥ. | Nor [can there be inference through] effect, because causal relations are established through perception or non-perception, and no causal relation with a remote omniscient being can be established. |
svabhāvo 'pi hetur na sarvadarśinaḥ sattāṃ sādhayati, tadapratyakṣatve svabhāvasya tadavyatirekiṇo grahītum aśakyatvāt. | Neither can a reason based on essential nature prove the existence of the all-knowing one, because when He is imperceptible, [His] essential nature, which is inseparable from Him, cannot be grasped. |
tasmād dṛṣṭaḥ prasiddho liṅgabhūta ekadeśaḥ pakṣadharmaḥ sa na sambhavati, nirūpyamāṇo yaḥ sarvajñam anumāpayet. | Therefore there cannot exist such a perceived, well-known logical mark that is a property present in the subject [and] that could, upon examination, lead to the inference of an omniscient being. |
kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetus trayīṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate, asiddhiṃ viruddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ca. tathā hi hetur ucyamāno bhāvadharmo vābhidhīyeta, abhāvadharmo vā, yadvobhayadharma iti pakṣatrayam. | Moreover, any reason given to prove the existence of an omniscient being cannot escape the three types of fallacies: inadmissibility, contradiction, and inconclusiveness. For when a reason is stated, it must be stated either as a property of a positive entity, or as a property of a negative entity, or as a property of both - these are the three alternatives. |
tatra sarvajñe dharmiṇi na bhāvadharmaḥ prativādiprasiddhaḥ sambhavati, tasyaiva dharmiṇaḥ sādhyatvena siddhatvāt siddhau vāvivādaprasaṅgāt. | In this regard, for the subject "omniscient being," no property of a positive entity can be admitted by both parties, because that very subject itself is yet to be proven; or if [it were] proven, there would be no dispute. |
yo hi bhāvadharmaṃ tatrecchati sa kathaṃ vādī taṃ necchet, nirāśrayasya dharmamātrasya grahītum aśakyatvāt. | For how could a disputant who accepts a positive property there [in the omniscient being] not accept Him [the omniscient being Himself], since a mere property without a substrate cannot be grasped? |
nāpy abhāvadharmo hetuḥ sarvajñasiddhaye yuktaḥ, tasya bhāvaviparītasādhakatvena viruddhatvāt. | Nor is a reason consisting of a property belonging to a negative entity suitable for establishing [the existence of] an omniscient being, because it would be contradictory by proving the opposite of existence. |
nāpy ubhayadharmaḥ, tasyānaikāntikatvāt. | Nor [can it be] a property belonging to both [positive and negative entities], because that would be inconclusive. |
kathaṃ hi nāma bhāvābhāvadharmo bhāvadharmasiddhāv abhāvākhyavipakṣavṛttivyavacchedalabhyam, bhāvād vyabhicāritvalakṣaṇaṃ hetutvam anubhavet. | For how indeed could a property belonging to both existence and non-existence possess the characteristic of being a valid reason, which requires non-deviation from existence and exclusion from the counter-instances termed non-existence? |
tasmāt triprakāro 'py ekadeśo liṅgabhūto nāsty anumāpaka iti nānumānataḥ sarvajñasya siddhiḥ. | Therefore, none of the three types of partial indicators can serve as that which causes inference, [and] thus there is no establishment of an omniscient being through inference. |
śabdād api na sarvajñāvasāyo 'stīti darśayati na cāgamavidhir ityādi. | [The text] shows that there is also no determination of an omniscient being through verbal testimony, [stating] "nor through scriptural injunction" and so forth. |
śabdāsannikṛṣṭe 'rthe yaj jāyate jñānam. | Verbal cognition is that knowledge which arises regarding objects not in immediate proximity through words. |
tac ca dvividhaṃ nityaśabdajanitaṃ pauruṣeyadhvanihetukaṃ ca. | And that [verbal cognition] is of two kinds: that produced by eternal words and that caused by human utterances. |
tatra tathāvidhasya sarvajñapratipādakasyāgamasya nityasyābhāvān na tāvad ādyaṃ sambhavati. | Of these, the first is not possible since there exists no eternal scripture establishing [the existence of] such an omniscient being. |
yac copaniṣadādau paṭhyate "yaḥ satyavāk satyasaṅkalpaḥ satyakāmaḥ so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ" ityevamādi, so 'py arthavādo draṣṭavyaḥ. | And what is read in the Upaniṣads and other [texts], "He who is truthful in speech, truthful in resolve, truthful in desires - he should be sought after, he should be known" and so forth, that too should be understood as mere eulogy. |
yac ca pauruṣeyaṃ vacanam ucyate sa bhagavāṃs tathāgatorhena samyak sambuddha iti tasyāpramāṇatvāt kathaṃ tenāsatyena sa pratyāyyeta. | And as for the human statement that is uttered, "That blessed one, the Tathāgata, the Arhat, is fully enlightened" - since that [statement] is not a valid means of knowledge, how could he be proven through that unreliable [statement]? |
syād etan na yataḥ kutaścid vacanāt sarvajño 'smābhiḥ pratīyate. | This might be [objected]: "We do not accept [the existence of] an omniscient being from just any random statement." |
kiṃ tarhi tenaiva bhagavatoktena / sarvajño 'haṃ sarvadarśī, nāsti tathāgatasya kiñcid ajñātam ityādi / | [We rely] rather on that very statement of the Blessed One [which says]: "I am omniscient, all-seeing; there is nothing unknown to the Tathāgata," and so forth. |
atha tadvacanenaiva sarvajño 'nyaiḥ pratīyate / | Thus His omniscience is accepted by others solely on the basis of His own statement. |
evaṃ satītaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ prāpnoti // | If this is so, the fault of mutual dependence would arise. |
katham ity āha sarvajñoktatayetyādi / | [Someone asks] "How?" [The other] responds with [the words] beginning with "sarvajñoktatayā." |
sarvajñoktatayā vākyaṃ satyaṃ tena tadastitā / | "The statement is true because it was spoken by an omniscient one, and his existence [is proven] by that [statement]. |
kathaṃ tadubhayaṃ siddhyet siddhān mūlāntarādṛte // | How can both of these be established without [recourse to] some other established basis?" |
tathā hi na tāvat tadvacanasya prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate yāvat sarvajñoktametad ityevaṃ nāvagamyeta / | For indeed, the validity of his statement cannot be ascertained until it is understood that this was spoken by an omniscient one. |
tasya ca sarvajñasyāvagatis tata eva vacanād iti vyaktam itaretarāśrayatvam / | And the understanding that he is omniscient [comes] from that very statement - thus there is clear mutual dependence. |
niścitāt kāraṇāntarād vinetyarthaḥ // | The meaning is "without some other established cause." |
athāpi syācchrāvakā{ka---}cchāriputrāder vacanāt sarvajño 'vasīyate, yatas tenoktam sarvajño 'yaṃ śākyakulanandana iti, atrāha asarvajñapraṇītāttvityādi / | Even if it might be [argued] that [his] omniscience is established from the words of disciples like Śāriputra, since he said "This joy of the Śākya clan is omniscient," to this [the author] responds with [the words] beginning with "asarvajñapraṇītāttva." |
asarvajñapraṇītāt tu vacanān mūlavarjitāt | [Words] uttered by non-omniscient [persons], lacking foundation, do not differ from one's own words. |
sarvajñamavagacchantaḥ svavākyāt kiṃ na jāyate | Why should [knowledge of] the omniscient one not arise from their own words? |
nahyānāsāditapramāṇābhāvasyānyavākyasya svavacanāt kaścid viśeṣo 'sti | Indeed, there is no difference between one's own words and the words of others whose reliability has not been established. |
yena bauddhāḥ svavacanād eva sarvajñaṃ na pratipadyante, anyavacanāt pratiyantīti na kiñcit kāraṇam utpaśyāmo 'nyatra jāḍyāt | Thus we see no reason, except stupidity, why Buddhists should not understand [the existence of] the omniscient one from their own words, [rather than] understanding [it] from others' words. |
atha matamaparimitās tathāgatā abhūvan, bhaviṣyantāś ca | [If] the view is held that there have been and will be unlimited Tathāgatas, |
tataścaikasya tadanyavacanāt sarvajñatāvasīyate | and thus the omniscience of one [Tathāgata] is established from the words of another, |
anyasyāpyanyavacanād ityatrāha sarvajñā bahava ityādi | and [the omniscience] of another from another's words - regarding this [he] states "many omniscient ones" etc. |
sarvajñā bahavaḥ kalpyāścaikasarvajñasiddhaye | Many omniscient ones would have to be assumed for the establishment of [even] one omniscient one. |
ekasarvajñasiddhaye sarvajñaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalapuruṣāyuṣasaṃkṣaye 'pi nārvāg darśanasya sarvajñaniścayotpattisambhava iti sarvajñāḥ kalpyāḥ prasajyeran | [If] for establishing one omniscient one, one follows a series of omniscient ones, even with the exhaustion of a person's entire lifespan, there could be no arising of certainty about the omniscient one for [a person of] limited vision; thus multiple omniscient ones would have to be assumed. |
sarvajño 'yam iti hyevaṃ tat kālair api boddhibhiḥ / tajjñānajñeyavijñānaśūnyair jñātuṃ na śakyate | "This one is omniscient" - thus [he] cannot be known even by [his] contemporaries who lack the knowledge of his cognitions and objects of cognition. |
sarvajño nāvabuddhaś ca yenaiva syān na taṃ prati / tadvākyānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ mūlājñāne 'nyavākyavat | For one who has not recognized the omniscient one, his words cannot be authoritative, just like others' words when the foundation is unknown. |
tasya sarvajñasya jñānaṃ tajjñānaṃ tadeva jñeyaṃ paricchedyaṃ yasya vijñānasya tat tathā tac ca tadvijñānaṃ ceti tathoktam, tena śūnyāḥ rahitāḥ | [They are] devoid of that knowledge which has for its object the knowledge of that omniscient one, thus it is stated - [they are] empty of that consciousness. |
athavā tajjñānasya yadvijñeyaṃ tena śūnyāḥ, asarvajñā ity arthaḥ | Or, [they are] empty of what is to be known through his knowledge, meaning [they are] non-omniscient. |
nahi śarīramātradarśanāt sarvajña ityevam avasātuṃ pāryate | Indeed, one cannot conclude "he is omniscient" merely from seeing [his] body. |
viśiṣṭajñānasambandhagrahaṇānantarīyakatvād asyāvasāyasya | Because this conclusion must be preceded by grasping the connection with exceptional knowledge |
tac ca viśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ sakalapadārthaviṣayaṃ sādhakam | And this exceptional knowledge must have all things as its object in order to be [effectively] proving [omniscience] |
sakalapadārthaviṣayatā tasya tadgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇamantareṇāvasātuṃ na śakyate | This fact of [a cognition] having all things as its object cannot be ascertained without grasping the objects that are comprehended by that [cognition] |
nahi daṇḍipratyayo daṇḍagrahaṇamantareṇa bhavati | For indeed, the cognition of [a man] with a stick is not possible without grasping [the concept of] stick |
prayogaḥ yasya yadgrahaṇopādhiravagrahas tasya tadupādhigrahaṇābhāve grahaṇaṃ na bhavati, tadyathā daṇḍagrahaṇopādhidaṇḍi grahaṇaṃ na daṇḍirūpāgrahe bhavati, nāsti ca sarvajñajñānagrahaṇasya jñeyagrahaṇopādhir jñeyarūpodhigrahaṇam arvāg darśinām iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | Application [of the argument]: When the grasping of something has the grasping of something else as its qualifying condition, there can be no grasping of the former without grasping that qualifying condition - just as the grasping of [a man] with a stick, which has the grasping of the stick as its qualifying condition, does not occur without grasping the form of the stick; and those of limited vision do not have the grasping of knowable objects, which is the qualifying condition for grasping the knowledge of the omniscient one - [this constitutes] non-apprehension of the pervader |
upādhigrahaṇenopādhimad grahaṇasya vyāptatvāt | Because the grasping of what has a qualifying condition is pervaded by the grasping of the qualifying condition |
tasya cehābhāvaḥ | And there is absence of that [pervader] in this case |
tataś ca tadānīṃ sannihitenāpyasarvavidā yenaiva sarvajño nāvadhāryate, taṃ prati sarvajñavākyānām api satāmaniścitatvād aprāmāṇyam eva, mūlasya prāmāṇyaniścayakāraṇasya sarvajñajñānaniścayasyābhāvāt | Therefore, even for one who was present at that time, if he is not omniscient, by whom the omniscient one cannot be ascertained, for him even the statements of omniscient beings, though existent, [must remain] uncertain and thus unreliable, due to the absence of ascertainment of the omniscient one's knowledge, which is the root cause for ascertaining reliability |
anyavākyavad iti / rathyāpuruṣavākyasyeti | "Like the statements of others," that is, "like the statements of common people" |
sarvaśiṣyair api jñātānārthān saṃvādayannapi / na sarvajño bhaved anyalokajñātārthavarjanāt | Even if someone were to correctly state the objects known by all [his] disciples, he would not be omniscient, because he would lack [knowledge of] objects known by people other than those [disciples] |
naca sarvanarajñātajñeyasaṃvādasambhavaḥ | It is not possible for any comprehension of all things known by all men |
kālatrayatrilokasthair narair na samāgamaḥ | [For] there can be no coming together of men dwelling in the three worlds [and] in the three times |
yannāma tat kālasannihitakiyan mātrajananaparijñātārthān parijñātavāṃstathāpi na sarvajño bhavati, tat kālāsannihitānyalokaparijñātasyārthasyāparijñānāt | Even if someone knows the things known by [only] those people who are present in his time and near to him, he still cannot be omniscient, because [he lacks] knowledge of things known by others who, though contemporary, are in different places |
nahyekadeśaparijñānena sakalajño bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt | For by knowing [only] a part, one does not become knower of the whole, as [this would lead to] an absurd consequence |
nāpi tat kālasannihitāśeṣajanaparijñātārthasaṃvādaḥ sambhavati | Nor is comprehension possible of all things known by all people present in that [same] time and place |
dūrasthānām anarthināṃ ca saṃvādābhāvāt | Because there can be no comprehension of [things known by] those who are far away and those who have no connection [with him] |
syād etat yadā sarva eva janās tathāgataṃ yugapad upetya yadyat praśnayanti tadā sa bhagavāṃs tadaiva vyākarotītyato 'styeva sarvanarajñātajñeyasaṃvāda | It might be [argued] thus: "When all people approach the Tathāgata simultaneously and ask whatever questions [they have], then the Blessed One answers them right then, therefore there is indeed comprehension of all things known by all men" |
nahyatītānāgatavartamānakālavartināṃ nṛṇāṃ samāgamaḥ kvacid api sambhavī nāpi, svargapātālamartyātmakalokatrayasthānām | [But] there can never be any coming together of men existing in past, future and present times, nor of those dwelling in the three worlds consisting of heaven, the netherworld, and the mortal realm |
yadvā lokatrayaṃ kāmarūpārūpadhātutrayātmakaṃ boddhavyam | Or the three worlds should be understood as consisting of the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness |
kiñcijjñope hi śaknoti stokān bhramayituṃ narān / sarvajñaṃ yena gṛhṇīyus te bhaktibhrāntacetasaḥ | For one who knows [only] a little can deceive a few men, whereby they, their minds deluded by devotion, might accept him as omniscient |
bhuktacintatamuṣṭisthadravyasaṃvādanakṣaṃāḥ / kecit kuhakavijñānair dharmādijñānavarjitāḥ // | Some [people], though devoid of knowledge of dharma and related matters, are capable of [correctly] identifying what has been eaten, what is being thought of, and what objects lie within [someone's] closed fist through their knowledge of chiromancy. |
tathā mānyendrajālādikuśalāḥ kecid ajñakam / | Similarly, some [people] who are skilled in magic, illusion and such [arts] [deceive] the ignorant; |
bhrāmayanti janaṃ yena sarvajñāḥ pratibhānti te // | by which means they appear to people as omniscient. |
nahi kiñcin mātrātīndriyapadārthaparijñāmātreṇa dharmādharmādiparijñānaṃ tasya siddhyati, kuhakajñānibhir māyendrajālādikuśalaiścānekāntāt / | Knowledge of merely some supersensuous objects does not establish [one's] knowledge of dharma and adharma, because [this reasoning] is inconclusive due to [the existence of] those skilled in chiromancy, magic, illusion and such [arts]. |
tathā hi mantrauṣadhādiprayogeṇa yathā bhuktam annavyañjanādi, yathā cintitaṃ ca manasā vastu, muṣṭisthaṃ ca dravyaṃ saṃvādayantyeva / | For indeed, through the application of mantras, herbs and such [means], they correctly identify what food and condiments have been eaten, what object has been thought of in [someone's] mind, and what object lies in [their] closed fist; |
na caitāvatā te dharmādivido bhavanti / | yet they do not thereby become knowers of dharma and such [matters]. |
yathā kecid indrajālakuśalā vicitrodyānavimānāpsarogaṇadevaputrādikamākāśe darśayantītyanekāntaḥ // | Just as some [people] skilled in magic can show wondrous gardens, celestial vehicles, groups of heavenly nymphs, divine beings and such [things] in the sky, [thus the reasoning is] inconclusive. |
nanu cetihāsapurāṇeṣu brahmādiḥ sarvajñaḥ kīritaḥ, tathā hi brahmaṇo jñānamapratighaṃ vairāgyaṃ ceti tatra paṭhyate, tat katham āgamāt sarvajño na siddha ityatrāha itihāsetyādi / itihāsapurāṇeṣu brahmādir yo 'pi sarvavit / | "But in the itihāsas and purāṇas, Brahmā and others are celebrated as omniscient, for it is read therein that 'Brahmā's knowledge and dispassion are unimpeded' - so how is omniscience not established from scripture?" |
jñānamapratighaṃ yasya vairāgyaṃ ceti kīrittam // gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaḥ so 'pi mantrārthavādavat / | [That description of] "whose knowledge and dispassion are unimpeded" should be understood only in a figurative sense, like the commendatory statements about mantras. |
yadvā prakṛtadharmādijñānā{prati}ghatocyate // jñānamapratighaṃ tasya na tat sarvārthagocaram // | Or alternatively, "unimpeded knowledge" refers to [his] unobstructed knowledge of dharma and such matters under discussion; his unimpeded knowledge does not extend to all objects. |
yathā mantreṣvarthavādanirdeśo bhavati tathetihāsādiṣvapi brahmādeḥ sarvajñatvamarthavādād boddhavyam | Just as there are arthavāda [commendatory] declarations in the mantras, similarly in the Itihāsa and other [texts], the omniscience of Brahmā and others should be understood as arthavāda |
anyārtho hi śabdo 'nyamarthaṃ vadatīti kṛtvārthavāda ucyate | An arthavāda is said [to occur] when words expressing one meaning are taken to express another meaning |
athavā prakṛteṣu dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu jñānasyāpratighatvād asya brahmāder jñānārtha 'pratighatā nirdiṣṭhā | Or [it means that] due to [his] knowledge being unobstructed regarding dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa under discussion, this unobstructedness of Brahmā's and others' knowledge is indicated |
natu sarvārtheṣvapratighātāt | [It is] not [due to] unobstructedness regarding all objects |
na hyapratighatāmātrāt sarvagocaratocyate | For mere unobstructedness does not mean encompassing all objects |
svārtheṣvapyapratighātād bhavatyapratighaṃ hi tat | For that [knowledge] becomes unobstructed [when it is] unobstructed even regarding its own objects |
etacca phaladajñānaṃ yāvaddharmādigocaram | And this knowledge is fruitful only insofar as it concerns dharma and other [such matters] |
natu vṛkṣādibhir jñātaiḥ sarvaiḥ kiñcit prayojanam | But there is no purpose served by knowing all [things] like trees and so forth |
yāvad aupayikajñānaṃ nacaitat pratihanyate | [This] knowledge is not obstructed insofar as it is useful |
tenāpratighavijñānavyapadeśo 'sya labhyate | Therefore the designation of [having] unobstructed knowledge is obtained for this [Brahmā] |
etadācaṣṭe puruṣārthopayogiṣu dharmādiṣu tasyaiva brahmaṇo jñānamapratighaṃ pravartate nānyeṣām ityetad viśeṣakhyāpanāya brahmāder eva svārthāpratighatvād apratighāti jñānam uktaṃ nānyeṣām / | This explains: Regarding dharma and other matters beneficial for human purposes, it is only Brahmā's knowledge that operates unimpededly, not [that] of others. To indicate this specific point, it is said that only Brahmā's knowledge, not [that] of others, is unimpeded due to being unobstructed in relation to its own objects. |
aupayike puruṣārthopayogini dharmādau jñānam aupayikajñānam / | "Aupayika-jñāna" [means] the knowledge of dharma and other such matters that are beneficial for human purposes. |
yāvad iti / | "Yāvat" [means] complete. |
aupayikajñānaviśeṣaṇaṃ caitat // | And this qualifies [the term] "jñānam" [knowledge]. |
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