CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int usb_driver_set_configuration(struct usb_device *udev, int config)
{
struct set_config_request *req;
req = kmalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
req->udev = udev;
req->config = config;
INIT_WORK(&req->work, driver_set_config_work);
spin_lock(&set_config_lock);
list_add(&req->node, &set_config_list);
spin_unlock(&set_config_lock);
usb_get_dev(udev);
schedule_work(&req->work);
return 0;
}
|
int usb_driver_set_configuration(struct usb_device *udev, int config)
{
struct set_config_request *req;
req = kmalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
req->udev = udev;
req->config = config;
INIT_WORK(&req->work, driver_set_config_work);
spin_lock(&set_config_lock);
list_add(&req->node, &set_config_list);
spin_unlock(&set_config_lock);
usb_get_dev(udev);
schedule_work(&req->work);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5327/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
static int tcm_loop_driver_probe(struct device *dev)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba;
struct Scsi_Host *sh;
int error;
tl_hba = to_tcm_loop_hba(dev);
sh = scsi_host_alloc(&tcm_loop_driver_template,
sizeof(struct tcm_loop_hba));
if (!sh) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate struct scsi_host\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
tl_hba->sh = sh;
/*
* Assign the struct tcm_loop_hba pointer to struct Scsi_Host->hostdata
*/
*((struct tcm_loop_hba **)sh->hostdata) = tl_hba;
/*
* Setup single ID, Channel and LUN for now..
*/
sh->max_id = 2;
sh->max_lun = 0;
sh->max_channel = 0;
sh->max_cmd_len = TL_SCSI_MAX_CMD_LEN;
error = scsi_add_host(sh, &tl_hba->dev);
if (error) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: scsi_add_host failed\n", __func__);
scsi_host_put(sh);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int tcm_loop_driver_probe(struct device *dev)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba;
struct Scsi_Host *sh;
int error;
tl_hba = to_tcm_loop_hba(dev);
sh = scsi_host_alloc(&tcm_loop_driver_template,
sizeof(struct tcm_loop_hba));
if (!sh) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate struct scsi_host\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
tl_hba->sh = sh;
/*
* Assign the struct tcm_loop_hba pointer to struct Scsi_Host->hostdata
*/
*((struct tcm_loop_hba **)sh->hostdata) = tl_hba;
/*
* Setup single ID, Channel and LUN for now..
*/
sh->max_id = 2;
sh->max_lun = 0;
sh->max_channel = 0;
sh->max_cmd_len = TL_SCSI_MAX_CMD_LEN;
error = scsi_add_host(sh, &tl_hba->dev);
if (error) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: scsi_add_host failed\n", __func__);
scsi_host_put(sh);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9228
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9228/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/3b63d12038c8d8fc278e81c942fa9bec7c704c8b
|
3b63d12038c8d8fc278e81c942fa9bec7c704c8b
|
fix #60 : invalid state(CCS_VALUE) in parse_char_class()
|
add_ctype_to_cc(CClassNode* cc, int ctype, int not, ScanEnv* env)
{
int c, r;
const OnigCodePoint *ranges;
OnigCodePoint sb_out;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
r = ONIGENC_GET_CTYPE_CODE_RANGE(enc, ctype, &sb_out, &ranges);
if (r == 0) {
return add_ctype_to_cc_by_range(cc, ctype, not, env->enc, sb_out, ranges);
}
else if (r != ONIG_NO_SUPPORT_CONFIG) {
return r;
}
r = 0;
switch (ctype) {
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ALPHA:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_BLANK:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_CNTRL:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_DIGIT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_LOWER:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_PUNCT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_SPACE:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_UPPER:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_XDIGIT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ASCII:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ALNUM:
if (not != 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
break;
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_GRAPH:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_PRINT:
if (not != 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
break;
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_WORD:
if (not == 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (IS_CODE_SB_WORD(enc, c)) BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if ((ONIGENC_CODE_TO_MBCLEN(enc, c) > 0) /* check invalid code point */
&& ! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
break;
default:
return ONIGERR_PARSER_BUG;
break;
}
return r;
}
|
add_ctype_to_cc(CClassNode* cc, int ctype, int not, ScanEnv* env)
{
int c, r;
const OnigCodePoint *ranges;
OnigCodePoint sb_out;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
r = ONIGENC_GET_CTYPE_CODE_RANGE(enc, ctype, &sb_out, &ranges);
if (r == 0) {
return add_ctype_to_cc_by_range(cc, ctype, not, env->enc, sb_out, ranges);
}
else if (r != ONIG_NO_SUPPORT_CONFIG) {
return r;
}
r = 0;
switch (ctype) {
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ALPHA:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_BLANK:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_CNTRL:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_DIGIT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_LOWER:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_PUNCT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_SPACE:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_UPPER:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_XDIGIT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ASCII:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_ALNUM:
if (not != 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
break;
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_GRAPH:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_PRINT:
if (not != 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_CTYPE(enc, (OnigCodePoint )c, ctype))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
break;
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_WORD:
if (not == 0) {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if (IS_CODE_SB_WORD(enc, c)) BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
ADD_ALL_MULTI_BYTE_RANGE(enc, cc->mbuf);
}
else {
for (c = 0; c < SINGLE_BYTE_SIZE; c++) {
if ((ONIGENC_CODE_TO_MBCLEN(enc, c) > 0) /* check invalid code point */
&& ! ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c))
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, c);
}
}
break;
default:
return ONIGERR_PARSER_BUG;
break;
}
return r;
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15855/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/xkbcommon/libxkbcommon/commit/917636b1d0d70205a13f89062b95e3a0fc31d4ff
|
917636b1d0d70205a13f89062b95e3a0fc31d4ff
|
xkbcomp: fix crash when parsing an xkb_geometry section
xkb_geometry sections are ignored; previously the had done so by
returning NULL for the section's XkbFile, however some sections of the
code do not expect this. Instead, create an XkbFile for it, it will
never be processes and discarded later.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]>
|
CompileKeymap(XkbFile *file, struct xkb_keymap *keymap, enum merge_mode merge)
{
bool ok;
XkbFile *files[LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE + 1] = { NULL };
enum xkb_file_type type;
struct xkb_context *ctx = keymap->ctx;
/* Collect section files and check for duplicates. */
for (file = (XkbFile *) file->defs; file;
file = (XkbFile *) file->common.next) {
if (file->file_type < FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE ||
file->file_type > LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE) {
if (file->file_type == FILE_TYPE_GEOMETRY) {
log_vrb(ctx, 1,
"Geometry sections are not supported; ignoring\n");
} else {
log_err(ctx, "Cannot define %s in a keymap file\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
}
continue;
}
if (files[file->file_type]) {
log_err(ctx,
"More than one %s section in keymap file; "
"All sections after the first ignored\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
files[file->file_type] = file;
}
/*
* Check that all required section were provided.
* Report everything before failing.
*/
ok = true;
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
if (files[type] == NULL) {
log_err(ctx, "Required section %s missing from keymap\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
ok = false;
}
}
if (!ok)
return false;
/* Compile sections. */
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
log_dbg(ctx, "Compiling %s \"%s\"\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type), files[type]->name);
ok = compile_file_fns[type](files[type], keymap, merge);
if (!ok) {
log_err(ctx, "Failed to compile %s\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
return false;
}
}
return UpdateDerivedKeymapFields(keymap);
}
|
CompileKeymap(XkbFile *file, struct xkb_keymap *keymap, enum merge_mode merge)
{
bool ok;
XkbFile *files[LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE + 1] = { NULL };
enum xkb_file_type type;
struct xkb_context *ctx = keymap->ctx;
/* Collect section files and check for duplicates. */
for (file = (XkbFile *) file->defs; file;
file = (XkbFile *) file->common.next) {
if (file->file_type < FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE ||
file->file_type > LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE) {
log_err(ctx, "Cannot define %s in a keymap file\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
if (files[file->file_type]) {
log_err(ctx,
"More than one %s section in keymap file; "
"All sections after the first ignored\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
files[file->file_type] = file;
}
/*
* Check that all required section were provided.
* Report everything before failing.
*/
ok = true;
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
if (files[type] == NULL) {
log_err(ctx, "Required section %s missing from keymap\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
ok = false;
}
}
if (!ok)
return false;
/* Compile sections. */
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
log_dbg(ctx, "Compiling %s \"%s\"\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type), files[type]->name);
ok = compile_file_fns[type](files[type], keymap, merge);
if (!ok) {
log_err(ctx, "Failed to compile %s\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
return false;
}
}
return UpdateDerivedKeymapFields(keymap);
}
|
C
|
libxkbcommon
| 1 |
CVE-2018-21017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-21017/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c
|
d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c
|
prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
|
GF_Box *dvcC_New()
{
GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *tmp = (GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DVCC;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
GF_Box *dvcC_New()
{
GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *tmp = (GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DVCC;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8655
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8655/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void packet_cached_dev_reset(struct packet_sock *po)
{
RCU_INIT_POINTER(po->cached_dev, NULL);
}
|
static void packet_cached_dev_reset(struct packet_sock *po)
{
RCU_INIT_POINTER(po->cached_dev, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0205/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7ada876a8703f23befbb20a7465a702ee39b1704
|
7ada876a8703f23befbb20a7465a702ee39b1704
|
futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void get_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
{
if (!key->both.ptr)
return;
switch (key->both.offset & (FUT_OFF_INODE|FUT_OFF_MMSHARED)) {
case FUT_OFF_INODE:
atomic_inc(&key->shared.inode->i_count);
break;
case FUT_OFF_MMSHARED:
atomic_inc(&key->private.mm->mm_count);
break;
}
}
|
static void get_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
{
if (!key->both.ptr)
return;
switch (key->both.offset & (FUT_OFF_INODE|FUT_OFF_MMSHARED)) {
case FUT_OFF_INODE:
atomic_inc(&key->shared.inode->i_count);
break;
case FUT_OFF_MMSHARED:
atomic_inc(&key->private.mm->mm_count);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool HaveOnlyLoopbackAddresses() {
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
struct ifaddrs* interface_addr = NULL;
int rv = getifaddrs(&interface_addr);
if (rv != 0) {
DVLOG(1) << "getifaddrs() failed with errno = " << errno;
return false;
}
bool result = true;
for (struct ifaddrs* interface = interface_addr;
interface != NULL;
interface = interface->ifa_next) {
if (!(IFF_UP & interface->ifa_flags))
continue;
if (IFF_LOOPBACK & interface->ifa_flags)
continue;
const struct sockaddr* addr = interface->ifa_addr;
if (!addr)
continue;
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
const struct sockaddr_in6* addr_in6 =
reinterpret_cast<const struct sockaddr_in6*>(addr);
const struct in6_addr* sin6_addr = &addr_in6->sin6_addr;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(sin6_addr) || IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(sin6_addr))
continue;
}
if (addr->sa_family != AF_INET6 && addr->sa_family != AF_INET)
continue;
result = false;
break;
}
freeifaddrs(interface_addr);
return result;
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
#endif // defined(various platforms)
}
|
bool HaveOnlyLoopbackAddresses() {
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
struct ifaddrs* interface_addr = NULL;
int rv = getifaddrs(&interface_addr);
if (rv != 0) {
DVLOG(1) << "getifaddrs() failed with errno = " << errno;
return false;
}
bool result = true;
for (struct ifaddrs* interface = interface_addr;
interface != NULL;
interface = interface->ifa_next) {
if (!(IFF_UP & interface->ifa_flags))
continue;
if (IFF_LOOPBACK & interface->ifa_flags)
continue;
const struct sockaddr* addr = interface->ifa_addr;
if (!addr)
continue;
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
const struct sockaddr_in6* addr_in6 =
reinterpret_cast<const struct sockaddr_in6*>(addr);
const struct in6_addr* sin6_addr = &addr_in6->sin6_addr;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(sin6_addr) || IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(sin6_addr))
continue;
}
if (addr->sa_family != AF_INET6 && addr->sa_family != AF_INET)
continue;
result = false;
break;
}
freeifaddrs(interface_addr);
return result;
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
#endif // defined(various platforms)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16075
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16075/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFastMobileScrolling(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetFastMobileScrollingEnabled(enable);
}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFastMobileScrolling(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetFastMobileScrollingEnabled(enable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0895/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/23803a58e481e464a787e4b2c461af9e62f03905
|
23803a58e481e464a787e4b2c461af9e62f03905
|
Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PathIsWritable(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return access(path.value().c_str(), W_OK) == 0;
}
|
bool PathIsWritable(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return access(path.value().c_str(), W_OK) == 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4544
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4544/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=082aecfc3a753ad03be82cf14f03ac065723ec92
|
082aecfc3a753ad03be82cf14f03ac065723ec92
| null |
static void exif_thumbnail_build(image_info_type *ImageInfo TSRMLS_DC) {
size_t new_size, new_move, new_value;
char *new_data;
void *value_ptr;
int i, byte_count;
image_info_list *info_list;
image_info_data *info_data;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
char tagname[64];
#endif
if (!ImageInfo->read_thumbnail || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) {
return; /* ignore this call */
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: filetype = %d", ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype);
#endif
switch(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype) {
default:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG:
/* done */
break;
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM:
info_list = &ImageInfo->info_list[SECTION_THUMBNAIL];
new_size = 8 + 2 + info_list->count * 12 + 4;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: size of signature + directory(%d): 0x%02X", info_list->count, new_size);
#endif
new_value= new_size; /* offset for ifd values outside ifd directory */
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
if (byte_count > 4) {
new_size += byte_count;
}
}
new_move = new_size;
new_data = safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, 1, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size, new_size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data = new_data;
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data + new_move, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size += new_size;
/* fill in data */
if (ImageInfo->motorola_intel) {
memmove(new_data, "MM\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x08", 8);
} else {
memmove(new_data, "II\x2a\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00", 8);
}
new_data += 8;
php_ifd_set16u(new_data, info_list->count, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
new_data += 2;
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: process tag(x%04X=%s): %s%s (%d bytes)", info_data->tag, exif_get_tagname(info_data->tag, tagname, -12, tag_table_IFD TSRMLS_CC), (info_data->length>1)&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_STRING?"ARRAY OF ":"", exif_get_tagformat(info_data->format), byte_count);
#endif
if (info_data->tag==TAG_STRIP_OFFSETS || info_data->tag==TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT) {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, TAG_FMT_ULONG, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, 1, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 8, new_move, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
} else {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, info_data->format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, info_data->length, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
value_ptr = exif_ifd_make_value(info_data, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
if (byte_count <= 4) {
memmove(new_data+8, value_ptr, 4);
} else {
php_ifd_set32u(new_data+8, new_value, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: writing with value offset: 0x%04X + 0x%02X", new_value, byte_count);
#endif
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data+new_value, value_ptr, byte_count);
new_value += byte_count;
}
efree(value_ptr);
}
new_data += 12;
}
memset(new_data, 0, 4); /* next ifd pointer */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: created");
#endif
break;
}
}
|
static void exif_thumbnail_build(image_info_type *ImageInfo TSRMLS_DC) {
size_t new_size, new_move, new_value;
char *new_data;
void *value_ptr;
int i, byte_count;
image_info_list *info_list;
image_info_data *info_data;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
char tagname[64];
#endif
if (!ImageInfo->read_thumbnail || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) {
return; /* ignore this call */
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: filetype = %d", ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype);
#endif
switch(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype) {
default:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG:
/* done */
break;
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM:
info_list = &ImageInfo->info_list[SECTION_THUMBNAIL];
new_size = 8 + 2 + info_list->count * 12 + 4;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: size of signature + directory(%d): 0x%02X", info_list->count, new_size);
#endif
new_value= new_size; /* offset for ifd values outside ifd directory */
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
if (byte_count > 4) {
new_size += byte_count;
}
}
new_move = new_size;
new_data = safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, 1, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size, new_size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data = new_data;
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data + new_move, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size += new_size;
/* fill in data */
if (ImageInfo->motorola_intel) {
memmove(new_data, "MM\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x08", 8);
} else {
memmove(new_data, "II\x2a\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00", 8);
}
new_data += 8;
php_ifd_set16u(new_data, info_list->count, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
new_data += 2;
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: process tag(x%04X=%s): %s%s (%d bytes)", info_data->tag, exif_get_tagname(info_data->tag, tagname, -12, tag_table_IFD TSRMLS_CC), (info_data->length>1)&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_STRING?"ARRAY OF ":"", exif_get_tagformat(info_data->format), byte_count);
#endif
if (info_data->tag==TAG_STRIP_OFFSETS || info_data->tag==TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT) {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, TAG_FMT_ULONG, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, 1, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 8, new_move, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
} else {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, info_data->format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, info_data->length, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
value_ptr = exif_ifd_make_value(info_data, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
if (byte_count <= 4) {
memmove(new_data+8, value_ptr, 4);
} else {
php_ifd_set32u(new_data+8, new_value, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: writing with value offset: 0x%04X + 0x%02X", new_value, byte_count);
#endif
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data+new_value, value_ptr, byte_count);
new_value += byte_count;
}
efree(value_ptr);
}
new_data += 12;
}
memset(new_data, 0, 4); /* next ifd pointer */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: created");
#endif
break;
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::RemovePendingView() {
DCHECK(pending_views_);
pending_views_--;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::RemovePendingView() {
DCHECK(pending_views_);
pending_views_--;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage3D(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const char* func_name = "glTexImage3D";
const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage3D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage3D*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage3D",
"widthXheight", c.width * c.height, "depth", c.depth);
texture_state_.tex_image_failed = true;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint internal_format = static_cast<GLint>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_id);
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_offset);
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || depth < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
PixelStoreParams params;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer) {
if (pixels_shm_id)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
if (buffer->GetMappedRange()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"pixel unpack buffer should not be mapped to client memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
params = state_.GetUnpackParams(ContextState::k3D);
} else {
if (!pixels_shm_id && pixels_shm_offset)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
params.alignment = state_.unpack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size;
uint32_t skip_size;
uint32_t padding;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, depth,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
nullptr,
nullptr,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
const void* pixels;
if (pixels_shm_id) {
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
} else {
pixels = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(pixels_shm_offset);
}
uint32_t num_pixels;
if (workarounds().simulate_out_of_memory_on_large_textures &&
(!base::CheckMul(width, height).AssignIfValid(&num_pixels) ||
(num_pixels >= 4096 * 4096))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, func_name, "synthetic out of memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments args = {
target, level, internal_format, width, height, depth, border, format, type,
pixels, pixels_size, padding,
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments::kTexImage3D };
texture_manager()->ValidateAndDoTexImage(
&texture_state_, &state_, error_state_.get(), &framebuffer_state_,
func_name, args);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage3D(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const char* func_name = "glTexImage3D";
const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage3D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage3D*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage3D",
"widthXheight", c.width * c.height, "depth", c.depth);
texture_state_.tex_image_failed = true;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint internal_format = static_cast<GLint>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_id);
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_offset);
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || depth < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
PixelStoreParams params;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer) {
if (pixels_shm_id)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
if (buffer->GetMappedRange()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"pixel unpack buffer should not be mapped to client memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
params = state_.GetUnpackParams(ContextState::k3D);
} else {
if (!pixels_shm_id && pixels_shm_offset)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
params.alignment = state_.unpack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size;
uint32_t skip_size;
uint32_t padding;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, depth,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
nullptr,
nullptr,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
const void* pixels;
if (pixels_shm_id) {
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
} else {
pixels = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(pixels_shm_offset);
}
uint32_t num_pixels;
if (workarounds().simulate_out_of_memory_on_large_textures &&
(!base::CheckMul(width, height).AssignIfValid(&num_pixels) ||
(num_pixels >= 4096 * 4096))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, func_name, "synthetic out of memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments args = {
target, level, internal_format, width, height, depth, border, format, type,
pixels, pixels_size, padding,
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments::kTexImage3D };
texture_manager()->ValidateAndDoTexImage(
&texture_state_, &state_, error_state_.get(), &framebuffer_state_,
func_name, args);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15420/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
|
TestNavigationThrottleInstaller(
WebContents* web_contents,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_start_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_redirect_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_fail_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_process_result,
const GURL& expected_start_url = GURL())
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
will_start_result_(will_start_result),
will_redirect_result_(will_redirect_result),
will_fail_result_(will_fail_result),
will_process_result_(will_process_result),
expected_start_url_(expected_start_url),
weak_factory_(this) {}
|
TestNavigationThrottleInstaller(
WebContents* web_contents,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_start_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_redirect_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_fail_result,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult will_process_result,
const GURL& expected_start_url = GURL())
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
will_start_result_(will_start_result),
will_redirect_result_(will_redirect_result),
will_fail_result_(will_fail_result),
will_process_result_(will_process_result),
expected_start_url_(expected_start_url),
weak_factory_(this) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3927/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
[skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void GraphicsContext::platformDestroy()
{
}
|
void GraphicsContext::platformDestroy()
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
Clipboard: Opt out of PNG Encoding filters.
Set the PNG encoder's FilterFlag to kNone from the default kAll.
The clipboard should prefer faster encode time over encode size for image/png,
so set all clipboard image decoding to skip testing of different PNG encoding
filters, which takes a lot of time for not too much compression ratio benefit
in the common case.
Benchmarking with a random-pixel 8k by 4k px image
(https://www.photopea.com/clipboard_img.html), and fZLibLevel = 1, here's some
encode times (seconds) varying flags:
* kNone: 2.98 (trials: 3.00814, 2.98265, 2.99636, 2.9877, 2.96517, 2.99467)
* kSub: 3.03 (trials: 3.02345, 3.04085, 3.00886, 3.0587, 3.03992, 3.02549)
* kAll: 4.12 (trials: 4.12813, 4.12552, 4.08524, 4.13283, 4.15013, 4.11719)
Using kNone would save ~28% encode time over the current kAll.
This will be most visible for pasting of extremely large photos.
Bug: 1004867
Change-Id: I37a848498da425249e57171ae2ca3f0595c6b793
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1827953
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#700598}
|
File* DataObjectItem::GetAsFile() const {
if (Kind() != kFileKind)
return nullptr;
if (source_ == kInternalSource) {
if (file_)
return file_.Get();
DCHECK(shared_buffer_);
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK_EQ(source_, kClipboardSource);
if (GetType() == kMimeTypeImagePng) {
SkBitmap bitmap = SystemClipboard::GetInstance().ReadImage(
mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
SkPixmap pixmap;
bitmap.peekPixels(&pixmap);
// Set encoding options to favor speed over size.
SkPngEncoder::Options options;
options.fZLibLevel = 1;
options.fFilterFlags = SkPngEncoder::FilterFlag::kNone;
Vector<uint8_t> png_data;
if (!ImageEncoder::Encode(&png_data, pixmap, options))
return nullptr;
auto data = std::make_unique<BlobData>();
data->SetContentType(kMimeTypeImagePng);
data->AppendBytes(png_data.data(), png_data.size());
const uint64_t length = data->length();
auto blob = BlobDataHandle::Create(std::move(data), length);
return File::Create("image.png", base::Time::Now().ToDoubleT() * 1000.0,
std::move(blob));
}
return nullptr;
}
|
File* DataObjectItem::GetAsFile() const {
if (Kind() != kFileKind)
return nullptr;
if (source_ == kInternalSource) {
if (file_)
return file_.Get();
DCHECK(shared_buffer_);
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK_EQ(source_, kClipboardSource);
if (GetType() == kMimeTypeImagePng) {
SkBitmap bitmap = SystemClipboard::GetInstance().ReadImage(
mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
SkPixmap pixmap;
bitmap.peekPixels(&pixmap);
Vector<uint8_t> png_data;
SkPngEncoder::Options options;
options.fZLibLevel = 1; // Fastest compression.
if (!ImageEncoder::Encode(&png_data, pixmap, options))
return nullptr;
auto data = std::make_unique<BlobData>();
data->SetContentType(kMimeTypeImagePng);
data->AppendBytes(png_data.data(), png_data.size());
const uint64_t length = data->length();
auto blob = BlobDataHandle::Create(std::move(data), length);
return File::Create("image.png", base::Time::Now().ToDoubleT() * 1000.0,
std::move(blob));
}
return nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0812/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
|
static audio_format_t out_get_format(const struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct stream_out *out = (struct stream_out *)stream;
return out->format;
}
|
static audio_format_t out_get_format(const struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct stream_out *out = (struct stream_out *)stream;
return out->format;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1805/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
pipe_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = file->private_data;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
pipe->readers--;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
pipe->writers--;
if (pipe->readers || pipe->writers) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLOUT | POLLRDNORM | POLLWRNORM | POLLERR | POLLHUP);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_writers, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
}
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
put_pipe_info(inode, pipe);
return 0;
}
|
pipe_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = file->private_data;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
pipe->readers--;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
pipe->writers--;
if (pipe->readers || pipe->writers) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLOUT | POLLRDNORM | POLLWRNORM | POLLERR | POLLHUP);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_writers, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
}
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
put_pipe_info(inode, pipe);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8839/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
int ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *head,
unsigned from,
unsigned to,
int *partial,
int (*fn)(handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *bh))
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned block_start, block_end;
unsigned blocksize = head->b_size;
int err, ret = 0;
struct buffer_head *next;
for (bh = head, block_start = 0;
ret == 0 && (bh != head || !block_start);
block_start = block_end, bh = next) {
next = bh->b_this_page;
block_end = block_start + blocksize;
if (block_end <= from || block_start >= to) {
if (partial && !buffer_uptodate(bh))
*partial = 1;
continue;
}
err = (*fn)(handle, bh);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
}
return ret;
}
|
int ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *head,
unsigned from,
unsigned to,
int *partial,
int (*fn)(handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *bh))
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned block_start, block_end;
unsigned blocksize = head->b_size;
int err, ret = 0;
struct buffer_head *next;
for (bh = head, block_start = 0;
ret == 0 && (bh != head || !block_start);
block_start = block_end, bh = next) {
next = bh->b_this_page;
block_end = block_start + blocksize;
if (block_end <= from || block_start >= to) {
if (partial && !buffer_uptodate(bh))
*partial = 1;
continue;
}
err = (*fn)(handle, bh);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0838/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int XKeyEventType(ui::EventType type) {
switch (type) {
case ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED:
return KeyPress;
case ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED:
return KeyRelease;
default:
return 0;
}
}
|
int XKeyEventType(ui::EventType type) {
switch (type) {
case ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED:
return KeyPress;
case ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED:
return KeyRelease;
default:
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16058
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16058/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/commit/d150b60e1e14c261b113f55681419ad1dfa8a76c
|
d150b60e1e14c261b113f55681419ad1dfa8a76c
|
Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
|
static int pam_vprompt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int style, char **response,
const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
int r = PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
const struct pam_conv *conv;
struct pam_message msg;
struct pam_response *resp = NULL;
struct pam_message *(msgp[1]);
char text[128];
vsnprintf(text, sizeof text, fmt, args);
msgp[0] = &msg;
msg.msg_style = style;
msg.msg = text;
if (PAM_SUCCESS != pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (const void **) &conv)
|| NULL == conv || NULL == conv->conv
|| conv->conv(1, (const struct pam_message **) msgp, &resp, conv->appdata_ptr)
|| NULL == resp) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL != response) {
if (resp[0].resp) {
*response = strdup(resp[0].resp);
if (NULL == *response) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "strdup() failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
} else {
*response = NULL;
}
}
r = PAM_SUCCESS;
err:
if (resp) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(&resp[0].resp, sizeof resp[0].resp);
free(&resp[0]);
}
return r;
}
|
static int pam_vprompt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int style, char **response,
const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
int r = PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
const struct pam_conv *conv;
struct pam_message msg;
struct pam_response *resp = NULL;
struct pam_message *(msgp[1]);
char text[128];
vsnprintf(text, sizeof text, fmt, args);
msgp[0] = &msg;
msg.msg_style = style;
msg.msg = text;
if (PAM_SUCCESS != pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (const void **) &conv)
|| NULL == conv || NULL == conv->conv
|| conv->conv(1, (const struct pam_message **) msgp, &resp, conv->appdata_ptr)
|| NULL == resp) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL != response) {
if (resp[0].resp) {
*response = strdup(resp[0].resp);
if (NULL == *response) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "strdup() failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
} else {
*response = NULL;
}
}
r = PAM_SUCCESS;
err:
if (resp) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(&resp[0].resp, sizeof resp[0].resp);
free(&resp[0]);
}
return r;
}
|
C
|
pam_p11
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3830
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3830/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/8e438e153f661e9df8db0ac41d587e940352df06
|
8e438e153f661e9df8db0ac41d587e940352df06
|
SoftAAC2: fix crash on all-zero adts buffer
Bug: 29153599
Change-Id: I1cb81c054098b86cf24f024f8479909ca7bc85a6
|
void SoftAAC2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
UCHAR* inBuffer[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS];
UINT inBufferLength[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
UINT bytesValid[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || mEndOfInput) && !outQueue.empty()) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
mEndOfInput = (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) != 0;
if (mInputBufferCount == 0 && !(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
ALOGE("first buffer should have OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG set");
inHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
}
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) != 0) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_ConfigRaw(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_ConfigRaw decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
mInputBufferCount++;
mOutputBufferCount++; // fake increase of outputBufferCount to keep the counters aligned
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
configureDownmix();
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate && mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGI("Initially configuring decoder: %d Hz, %d channels",
mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
continue;
}
if (mIsADTS) {
size_t adtsHeaderSize = 0;
const uint8_t *adtsHeader = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
bool signalError = false;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < 7) {
ALOGE("Audio data too short to contain even the ADTS header. "
"Got %d bytes.", inHeader->nFilledLen);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
bool protectionAbsent = (adtsHeader[1] & 1);
unsigned aac_frame_length =
((adtsHeader[3] & 3) << 11)
| (adtsHeader[4] << 3)
| (adtsHeader[5] >> 5);
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < aac_frame_length) {
ALOGE("Not enough audio data for the complete frame. "
"Got %d bytes, frame size according to the ADTS "
"header is %u bytes.",
inHeader->nFilledLen, aac_frame_length);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
adtsHeaderSize = (protectionAbsent ? 7 : 9);
if (aac_frame_length < adtsHeaderSize) {
signalError = true;
} else {
inBuffer[0] = (UCHAR *)adtsHeader + adtsHeaderSize;
inBufferLength[0] = aac_frame_length - adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nOffset += adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= adtsHeaderSize;
}
}
}
if (signalError) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt, ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
return;
}
mBufferSizes.add(inBufferLength[0]);
if (mLastInHeader != inHeader) {
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
} else {
int64_t currentTime = mBufferTimestamps.top();
currentTime += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
mBufferTimestamps.add(currentTime);
}
} else {
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mBufferSizes.add(inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
bytesValid[0] = inBufferLength[0];
INT prevSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
INT prevNumChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacDecoder_Fill(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength,
bytesValid);
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
UINT inBufferUsedLength = inBufferLength[0] - bytesValid[0];
inHeader->nFilledLen -= inBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nOffset += inBufferUsedLength;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr;
int numLoops = 0;
do {
if (outputDelayRingBufferSpaceLeft() <
(mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
ALOGV("skipping decode: not enough space left in ringbuffer");
break;
}
int numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes;
decoderErr = aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
0 /* flags */);
numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes - numConsumed;
numLoops++;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_NOT_ENOUGH_BITS) {
break;
}
mDecodedSizes.add(numConsumed);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
if (bytesValid[0] != 0) {
ALOGE("bytesValid[0] != 0 should never happen");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
size_t numOutBytes =
mStreamInfo->frameSize * sizeof(int16_t) * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK) {
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
} else {
ALOGW("AAC decoder returned error 0x%4.4x, substituting silence", decoderErr);
memset(tmpOutBuffer, 0, numOutBytes); // TODO: check for overflow
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader) {
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
}
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_TPDEC_CLEAR_BUFFER, 1);
mBufferSizes.pop();
int n = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < numLoops; i++) {
n += mDecodedSizes.itemAt(mDecodedSizes.size() - numLoops + i);
}
mBufferSizes.add(n);
}
/*
* AAC+/eAAC+ streams can be signalled in two ways: either explicitly
* or implicitly, according to MPEG4 spec. AAC+/eAAC+ is a dual
* rate system and the sampling rate in the final output is actually
* doubled compared with the core AAC decoder sampling rate.
*
* Explicit signalling is done by explicitly defining SBR audio object
* type in the bitstream. Implicit signalling is done by embedding
* SBR content in AAC extension payload specific to SBR, and hence
* requires an AAC decoder to perform pre-checks on actual audio frames.
*
* Thus, we could not say for sure whether a stream is
* AAC+/eAAC+ until the first data frame is decoded.
*/
if (mInputBufferCount <= 2 || mOutputBufferCount > 1) { // TODO: <= 1
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate != prevSampleRate ||
mStreamInfo->numChannels != prevNumChannels) {
ALOGI("Reconfiguring decoder: %d->%d Hz, %d->%d channels",
prevSampleRate, mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
prevNumChannels, mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
} else if (!mStreamInfo->sampleRate || !mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGW("Invalid AAC stream");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else {
ALOGV("inHeader->nFilledLen = %d", inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0);
}
} while (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK);
}
int32_t outputDelay = mStreamInfo->outputDelay * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (!mEndOfInput && mOutputDelayCompensated < outputDelay) {
int32_t toCompensate = outputDelay - mOutputDelayCompensated;
int32_t discard = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (discard > toCompensate) {
discard = toCompensate;
}
int32_t discarded = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(0, discard);
mOutputDelayCompensated += discarded;
continue;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
while (mOutputDelayCompensated > 0) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
AACDEC_FLUSH);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
int32_t tmpOutBufferSamples = mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (tmpOutBufferSamples > mOutputDelayCompensated) {
tmpOutBufferSamples = mOutputDelayCompensated;
}
outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer, tmpOutBufferSamples);
mOutputDelayCompensated -= tmpOutBufferSamples;
}
}
while (!outQueue.empty()
&& outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable()
>= mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (outHeader->nOffset != 0) {
ALOGE("outHeader->nOffset != 0 is not handled");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
INT_PCM *outBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset);
int samplesize = mStreamInfo->numChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (outHeader->nOffset
+ mStreamInfo->frameSize * samplesize
> outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("buffer overflow");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
int available = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
int numSamples = outHeader->nAllocLen / sizeof(int16_t);
if (numSamples > available) {
numSamples = available;
}
int64_t currentTime = 0;
if (available) {
int numFrames = numSamples / (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
numSamples = numFrames * (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
ALOGV("%d samples available (%d), or %d frames",
numSamples, available, numFrames);
int64_t *nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
currentTime = *nextTimeStamp;
int32_t *currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
for (int i = 0; i < numFrames; i++) {
int32_t decodedSize = mDecodedSizes.itemAt(0);
mDecodedSizes.removeAt(0);
ALOGV("decoded %d of %d", decodedSize, *currentBufLeft);
if (*currentBufLeft > decodedSize) {
*currentBufLeft -= decodedSize;
*nextTimeStamp += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
ALOGV("adjusted nextTimeStamp/size to %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
} else {
if (mBufferTimestamps.size() > 0) {
mBufferTimestamps.removeAt(0);
nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
mBufferSizes.removeAt(0);
currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
ALOGV("moved to next time/size: %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
}
numFrames = i + 1;
numSamples = numFrames * mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
break;
}
}
ALOGV("getting %d from ringbuffer", numSamples);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, numSamples);
if (ns != numSamples) {
ALOGE("not a complete frame of samples available");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numSamples * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mEndOfInput && !outQueue.empty() && outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable() == 0) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mEndOfOutput = true;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = currentTime;
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
ALOGV("out timestamp %lld / %d", outHeader->nTimeStamp, outHeader->nFilledLen);
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
int ringBufAvail = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (!outQueue.empty()
&& ringBufAvail < mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
if (!mEndOfOutput) {
mEndOfOutput = true;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
INT_PCM *outBuffer = reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer
+ outHeader->nOffset);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, ringBufAvail);
if (ns < 0) {
ns = 0;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = ns;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mBufferTimestamps.itemAt(0);
mBufferTimestamps.clear();
mBufferSizes.clear();
mDecodedSizes.clear();
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
break; // if outQueue not empty but no more output
}
}
}
}
|
void SoftAAC2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
UCHAR* inBuffer[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS];
UINT inBufferLength[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
UINT bytesValid[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || mEndOfInput) && !outQueue.empty()) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
mEndOfInput = (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) != 0;
if (mInputBufferCount == 0 && !(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
ALOGE("first buffer should have OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG set");
inHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
}
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) != 0) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_ConfigRaw(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_ConfigRaw decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
mInputBufferCount++;
mOutputBufferCount++; // fake increase of outputBufferCount to keep the counters aligned
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
configureDownmix();
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate && mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGI("Initially configuring decoder: %d Hz, %d channels",
mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
continue;
}
if (mIsADTS) {
size_t adtsHeaderSize = 0;
const uint8_t *adtsHeader = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
bool signalError = false;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < 7) {
ALOGE("Audio data too short to contain even the ADTS header. "
"Got %d bytes.", inHeader->nFilledLen);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
bool protectionAbsent = (adtsHeader[1] & 1);
unsigned aac_frame_length =
((adtsHeader[3] & 3) << 11)
| (adtsHeader[4] << 3)
| (adtsHeader[5] >> 5);
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < aac_frame_length) {
ALOGE("Not enough audio data for the complete frame. "
"Got %d bytes, frame size according to the ADTS "
"header is %u bytes.",
inHeader->nFilledLen, aac_frame_length);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
adtsHeaderSize = (protectionAbsent ? 7 : 9);
inBuffer[0] = (UCHAR *)adtsHeader + adtsHeaderSize;
inBufferLength[0] = aac_frame_length - adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nOffset += adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= adtsHeaderSize;
}
}
if (signalError) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt, ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
return;
}
mBufferSizes.add(inBufferLength[0]);
if (mLastInHeader != inHeader) {
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
} else {
int64_t currentTime = mBufferTimestamps.top();
currentTime += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
mBufferTimestamps.add(currentTime);
}
} else {
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mBufferSizes.add(inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
bytesValid[0] = inBufferLength[0];
INT prevSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
INT prevNumChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacDecoder_Fill(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength,
bytesValid);
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
UINT inBufferUsedLength = inBufferLength[0] - bytesValid[0];
inHeader->nFilledLen -= inBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nOffset += inBufferUsedLength;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr;
int numLoops = 0;
do {
if (outputDelayRingBufferSpaceLeft() <
(mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
ALOGV("skipping decode: not enough space left in ringbuffer");
break;
}
int numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes;
decoderErr = aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
0 /* flags */);
numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes - numConsumed;
numLoops++;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_NOT_ENOUGH_BITS) {
break;
}
mDecodedSizes.add(numConsumed);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
if (bytesValid[0] != 0) {
ALOGE("bytesValid[0] != 0 should never happen");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
size_t numOutBytes =
mStreamInfo->frameSize * sizeof(int16_t) * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK) {
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
} else {
ALOGW("AAC decoder returned error 0x%4.4x, substituting silence", decoderErr);
memset(tmpOutBuffer, 0, numOutBytes); // TODO: check for overflow
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader) {
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
}
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_TPDEC_CLEAR_BUFFER, 1);
mBufferSizes.pop();
int n = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < numLoops; i++) {
n += mDecodedSizes.itemAt(mDecodedSizes.size() - numLoops + i);
}
mBufferSizes.add(n);
}
/*
* AAC+/eAAC+ streams can be signalled in two ways: either explicitly
* or implicitly, according to MPEG4 spec. AAC+/eAAC+ is a dual
* rate system and the sampling rate in the final output is actually
* doubled compared with the core AAC decoder sampling rate.
*
* Explicit signalling is done by explicitly defining SBR audio object
* type in the bitstream. Implicit signalling is done by embedding
* SBR content in AAC extension payload specific to SBR, and hence
* requires an AAC decoder to perform pre-checks on actual audio frames.
*
* Thus, we could not say for sure whether a stream is
* AAC+/eAAC+ until the first data frame is decoded.
*/
if (mInputBufferCount <= 2 || mOutputBufferCount > 1) { // TODO: <= 1
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate != prevSampleRate ||
mStreamInfo->numChannels != prevNumChannels) {
ALOGI("Reconfiguring decoder: %d->%d Hz, %d->%d channels",
prevSampleRate, mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
prevNumChannels, mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
} else if (!mStreamInfo->sampleRate || !mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGW("Invalid AAC stream");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else {
ALOGV("inHeader->nFilledLen = %d", inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0);
}
} while (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK);
}
int32_t outputDelay = mStreamInfo->outputDelay * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (!mEndOfInput && mOutputDelayCompensated < outputDelay) {
int32_t toCompensate = outputDelay - mOutputDelayCompensated;
int32_t discard = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (discard > toCompensate) {
discard = toCompensate;
}
int32_t discarded = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(0, discard);
mOutputDelayCompensated += discarded;
continue;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
while (mOutputDelayCompensated > 0) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
AACDEC_FLUSH);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
int32_t tmpOutBufferSamples = mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (tmpOutBufferSamples > mOutputDelayCompensated) {
tmpOutBufferSamples = mOutputDelayCompensated;
}
outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer, tmpOutBufferSamples);
mOutputDelayCompensated -= tmpOutBufferSamples;
}
}
while (!outQueue.empty()
&& outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable()
>= mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (outHeader->nOffset != 0) {
ALOGE("outHeader->nOffset != 0 is not handled");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
INT_PCM *outBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset);
int samplesize = mStreamInfo->numChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (outHeader->nOffset
+ mStreamInfo->frameSize * samplesize
> outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("buffer overflow");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
int available = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
int numSamples = outHeader->nAllocLen / sizeof(int16_t);
if (numSamples > available) {
numSamples = available;
}
int64_t currentTime = 0;
if (available) {
int numFrames = numSamples / (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
numSamples = numFrames * (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
ALOGV("%d samples available (%d), or %d frames",
numSamples, available, numFrames);
int64_t *nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
currentTime = *nextTimeStamp;
int32_t *currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
for (int i = 0; i < numFrames; i++) {
int32_t decodedSize = mDecodedSizes.itemAt(0);
mDecodedSizes.removeAt(0);
ALOGV("decoded %d of %d", decodedSize, *currentBufLeft);
if (*currentBufLeft > decodedSize) {
*currentBufLeft -= decodedSize;
*nextTimeStamp += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
ALOGV("adjusted nextTimeStamp/size to %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
} else {
if (mBufferTimestamps.size() > 0) {
mBufferTimestamps.removeAt(0);
nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
mBufferSizes.removeAt(0);
currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
ALOGV("moved to next time/size: %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
}
numFrames = i + 1;
numSamples = numFrames * mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
break;
}
}
ALOGV("getting %d from ringbuffer", numSamples);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, numSamples);
if (ns != numSamples) {
ALOGE("not a complete frame of samples available");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numSamples * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mEndOfInput && !outQueue.empty() && outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable() == 0) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mEndOfOutput = true;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = currentTime;
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
ALOGV("out timestamp %lld / %d", outHeader->nTimeStamp, outHeader->nFilledLen);
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
int ringBufAvail = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (!outQueue.empty()
&& ringBufAvail < mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
if (!mEndOfOutput) {
mEndOfOutput = true;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
INT_PCM *outBuffer = reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer
+ outHeader->nOffset);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, ringBufAvail);
if (ns < 0) {
ns = 0;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = ns;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mBufferTimestamps.itemAt(0);
mBufferTimestamps.clear();
mBufferSizes.clear();
mDecodedSizes.clear();
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
break; // if outQueue not empty but no more output
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-8825
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8825/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/dinhviethoa/libetpan/commit/1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d
|
1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d
|
Fixed crash #274
|
int mailimf_msg_id_list_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, clist ** result)
{
return mailimf_struct_multiple_parse(message, length, indx,
result,
(mailimf_struct_parser *)
mailimf_unstrict_msg_id_parse,
(mailimf_struct_destructor *)
mailimf_msg_id_free);
}
|
int mailimf_msg_id_list_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, clist ** result)
{
return mailimf_struct_multiple_parse(message, length, indx,
result,
(mailimf_struct_parser *)
mailimf_unstrict_msg_id_parse,
(mailimf_struct_destructor *)
mailimf_msg_id_free);
}
|
C
|
libetpan
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
Implement new websocket handshake based on draft-hixie-thewebsocketprotocol-76
BUG=none
TEST=net_unittests passes
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1108002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42736 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int WebSocketExperimentTask::DoWebSocketReceivePushMessage(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
DCHECK(websocket_);
if (received_messages_.size() != 1)
return net::ERR_INVALID_RESPONSE;
push_message_ = received_messages_.front();
received_messages_.pop_front();
next_state_ = STATE_WEBSOCKET_ECHO_BACK_MESSAGE;
return net::OK;
}
|
int WebSocketExperimentTask::DoWebSocketReceivePushMessage(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
DCHECK(websocket_);
if (received_messages_.size() != 1)
return net::ERR_INVALID_RESPONSE;
push_message_ = received_messages_.front();
received_messages_.pop_front();
next_state_ = STATE_WEBSOCKET_ECHO_BACK_MESSAGE;
return net::OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10360
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10360/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/a642587a9c9e2dd7feacdf513c3643ce26ad3c22
|
a642587a9c9e2dd7feacdf513c3643ce26ad3c22
|
Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
|
do_note_freebsd_version(struct magic_set *ms, int swap, void *v)
{
uint32_t desc;
memcpy(&desc, v, sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, ", for FreeBSD") == -1)
return;
/*
* Contents is __FreeBSD_version, whose relation to OS
* versions is defined by a huge table in the Porter's
* Handbook. This is the general scheme:
*
* Releases:
* Mmp000 (before 4.10)
* Mmi0p0 (before 5.0)
* Mmm0p0
*
* Development branches:
* Mmpxxx (before 4.6)
* Mmp1xx (before 4.10)
* Mmi1xx (before 5.0)
* M000xx (pre-M.0)
* Mmm1xx
*
* M = major version
* m = minor version
* i = minor version increment (491000 -> 4.10)
* p = patchlevel
* x = revision
*
* The first release of FreeBSD to use ELF by default
* was version 3.0.
*/
if (desc == 460002) {
if (file_printf(ms, " 4.6.2") == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 460100) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 1000 % 10 > 0)
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if ((desc % 1000 > 0) || (desc % 100000 == 0))
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 500000) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10 + desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 100 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 1000 % 100) == -1)
return;
if ((desc / 100 % 10 > 0) ||
(desc % 100000 / 100 == 0)) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
}
}
|
do_note_freebsd_version(struct magic_set *ms, int swap, void *v)
{
uint32_t desc;
memcpy(&desc, v, sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, ", for FreeBSD") == -1)
return;
/*
* Contents is __FreeBSD_version, whose relation to OS
* versions is defined by a huge table in the Porter's
* Handbook. This is the general scheme:
*
* Releases:
* Mmp000 (before 4.10)
* Mmi0p0 (before 5.0)
* Mmm0p0
*
* Development branches:
* Mmpxxx (before 4.6)
* Mmp1xx (before 4.10)
* Mmi1xx (before 5.0)
* M000xx (pre-M.0)
* Mmm1xx
*
* M = major version
* m = minor version
* i = minor version increment (491000 -> 4.10)
* p = patchlevel
* x = revision
*
* The first release of FreeBSD to use ELF by default
* was version 3.0.
*/
if (desc == 460002) {
if (file_printf(ms, " 4.6.2") == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 460100) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 1000 % 10 > 0)
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if ((desc % 1000 > 0) || (desc % 100000 == 0))
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 500000) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10 + desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 100 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 1000 % 100) == -1)
return;
if ((desc / 100 % 10 > 0) ||
(desc % 100000 / 100 == 0)) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
}
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45bae236b03f577ed6682ef4c7ef3ee006de5e5a
|
45bae236b03f577ed6682ef4c7ef3ee006de5e5a
|
Copy setup.exe rather than moving it since it is created outside of the target directory heirarchy (regression introduced in r75899).
BUG=82424
TEST=Install system-level Chrome as some admin user X. Switch to admin user Y and try to uninstall.
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7011018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85159 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AddUninstallShortcutWorkItems(const InstallerState& installer_state,
const FilePath& setup_path,
const Version& new_version,
WorkItemList* install_list,
const Product& product) {
HKEY reg_root = installer_state.root_key();
BrowserDistribution* browser_dist = product.distribution();
DCHECK(browser_dist);
FilePath install_path(installer_state.target_path());
FilePath installer_path(installer_state.GetInstallerDirectory(new_version));
installer_path = installer_path.Append(setup_path.BaseName());
CommandLine uninstall_arguments(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM);
AppendUninstallCommandLineFlags(installer_state, product,
&uninstall_arguments);
if (product.is_chrome() &&
installer_state.operation() != InstallerState::UNINSTALL) {
const Products& products = installer_state.products();
for (size_t i = 0; i < products.size(); ++i) {
const Product& p = *products[i];
if (!p.is_chrome() && !p.ShouldCreateUninstallEntry())
p.AppendUninstallFlags(&uninstall_arguments);
}
}
std::wstring update_state_key(browser_dist->GetStateKey());
install_list->AddCreateRegKeyWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key,
installer::kUninstallStringField, installer_path.value(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key,
installer::kUninstallArgumentsField,
uninstall_arguments.command_line_string(), true);
if (!installer_state.is_msi() && product.ShouldCreateUninstallEntry()) {
CommandLine quoted_uninstall_cmd(installer_path);
DCHECK_EQ(quoted_uninstall_cmd.command_line_string()[0], '"');
quoted_uninstall_cmd.AppendArguments(uninstall_arguments, false);
std::wstring uninstall_reg = browser_dist->GetUninstallRegPath();
install_list->AddCreateRegKeyWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
installer::kUninstallDisplayNameField,
browser_dist->GetAppShortCutName(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root,
uninstall_reg, installer::kUninstallStringField,
quoted_uninstall_cmd.command_line_string(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root,
uninstall_reg,
L"InstallLocation",
install_path.value(),
true);
FilePath chrome_icon(install_path.Append(installer::kChromeExe));
ShellUtil::GetChromeIcon(product.distribution(), chrome_icon.value());
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"DisplayIcon", chrome_icon.value(),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"NoModify", static_cast<DWORD>(1),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"NoRepair", static_cast<DWORD>(1),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"Publisher",
browser_dist->GetPublisherName(),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"Version",
UTF8ToWide(new_version.GetString()),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"DisplayVersion",
UTF8ToWide(new_version.GetString()),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"InstallDate",
InstallUtil::GetCurrentDate(),
false);
}
}
|
void AddUninstallShortcutWorkItems(const InstallerState& installer_state,
const FilePath& setup_path,
const Version& new_version,
WorkItemList* install_list,
const Product& product) {
HKEY reg_root = installer_state.root_key();
BrowserDistribution* browser_dist = product.distribution();
DCHECK(browser_dist);
FilePath install_path(installer_state.target_path());
FilePath installer_path(installer_state.GetInstallerDirectory(new_version));
installer_path = installer_path.Append(setup_path.BaseName());
CommandLine uninstall_arguments(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM);
AppendUninstallCommandLineFlags(installer_state, product,
&uninstall_arguments);
if (product.is_chrome() &&
installer_state.operation() != InstallerState::UNINSTALL) {
const Products& products = installer_state.products();
for (size_t i = 0; i < products.size(); ++i) {
const Product& p = *products[i];
if (!p.is_chrome() && !p.ShouldCreateUninstallEntry())
p.AppendUninstallFlags(&uninstall_arguments);
}
}
std::wstring update_state_key(browser_dist->GetStateKey());
install_list->AddCreateRegKeyWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key,
installer::kUninstallStringField, installer_path.value(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, update_state_key,
installer::kUninstallArgumentsField,
uninstall_arguments.command_line_string(), true);
if (!installer_state.is_msi() && product.ShouldCreateUninstallEntry()) {
CommandLine quoted_uninstall_cmd(installer_path);
DCHECK_EQ(quoted_uninstall_cmd.command_line_string()[0], '"');
quoted_uninstall_cmd.AppendArguments(uninstall_arguments, false);
std::wstring uninstall_reg = browser_dist->GetUninstallRegPath();
install_list->AddCreateRegKeyWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
installer::kUninstallDisplayNameField,
browser_dist->GetAppShortCutName(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root,
uninstall_reg, installer::kUninstallStringField,
quoted_uninstall_cmd.command_line_string(), true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root,
uninstall_reg,
L"InstallLocation",
install_path.value(),
true);
FilePath chrome_icon(install_path.Append(installer::kChromeExe));
ShellUtil::GetChromeIcon(product.distribution(), chrome_icon.value());
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"DisplayIcon", chrome_icon.value(),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"NoModify", static_cast<DWORD>(1),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"NoRepair", static_cast<DWORD>(1),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"Publisher",
browser_dist->GetPublisherName(),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"Version",
UTF8ToWide(new_version.GetString()),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"DisplayVersion",
UTF8ToWide(new_version.GetString()),
true);
install_list->AddSetRegValueWorkItem(reg_root, uninstall_reg,
L"InstallDate",
InstallUtil::GetCurrentDate(),
false);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram(GLuint program_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram");
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glLinkProgram");
if (!program) {
return;
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(program, program_id, "glLinkProgram");
ShaderTranslator* vertex_translator = NULL;
ShaderTranslator* fragment_translator = NULL;
if (use_shader_translator_) {
vertex_translator = vertex_translator_.get();
fragment_translator = fragment_translator_.get();
}
if (program->Link(shader_manager(),
vertex_translator,
fragment_translator,
workarounds().count_all_in_varyings_packing ?
Program::kCountAll : Program::kCountOnlyStaticallyUsed,
shader_cache_callback_)) {
if (program == state_.current_program.get()) {
if (workarounds().use_current_program_after_successful_link)
glUseProgram(program->service_id());
if (workarounds().clear_uniforms_before_first_program_use)
program_manager()->ClearUniforms(program);
}
}
};
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram(GLuint program_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram");
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glLinkProgram");
if (!program) {
return;
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(program, program_id, "glLinkProgram");
ShaderTranslator* vertex_translator = NULL;
ShaderTranslator* fragment_translator = NULL;
if (use_shader_translator_) {
vertex_translator = vertex_translator_.get();
fragment_translator = fragment_translator_.get();
}
if (program->Link(shader_manager(),
vertex_translator,
fragment_translator,
workarounds().count_all_in_varyings_packing ?
Program::kCountAll : Program::kCountOnlyStaticallyUsed,
shader_cache_callback_)) {
if (program == state_.current_program.get()) {
if (workarounds().use_current_program_after_successful_link)
glUseProgram(program->service_id());
if (workarounds().clear_uniforms_before_first_program_use)
program_manager()->ClearUniforms(program);
}
}
};
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12183
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12183/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=55caa8b08c84af2b50fbc936cf334a5a93dd7db5
|
55caa8b08c84af2b50fbc936cf334a5a93dd7db5
| null |
CursorFreeWindow(void *data, XID id)
{
WindowPtr pWindow = (WindowPtr) data;
CursorEventPtr e, next;
for (e = cursorEvents; e; e = next) {
next = e->next;
if (e->pWindow == pWindow) {
FreeResource(e->clientResource, 0);
}
}
return 1;
}
|
CursorFreeWindow(void *data, XID id)
{
WindowPtr pWindow = (WindowPtr) data;
CursorEventPtr e, next;
for (e = cursorEvents; e; e = next) {
next = e->next;
if (e->pWindow == pWindow) {
FreeResource(e->clientResource, 0);
}
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
get_modifiers(char *buf, int16 *weight, bool *prefix)
{
*weight = 0;
*prefix = false;
if (!t_iseq(buf, ':'))
return buf;
buf++;
while (*buf && pg_mblen(buf) == 1)
{
switch (*buf)
{
case 'a':
case 'A':
*weight |= 1 << 3;
break;
case 'b':
case 'B':
*weight |= 1 << 2;
break;
case 'c':
case 'C':
*weight |= 1 << 1;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
*weight |= 1;
break;
case '*':
*prefix = true;
break;
default:
return buf;
}
buf++;
}
return buf;
}
|
get_modifiers(char *buf, int16 *weight, bool *prefix)
{
*weight = 0;
*prefix = false;
if (!t_iseq(buf, ':'))
return buf;
buf++;
while (*buf && pg_mblen(buf) == 1)
{
switch (*buf)
{
case 'a':
case 'A':
*weight |= 1 << 3;
break;
case 'b':
case 'B':
*weight |= 1 << 2;
break;
case 'c':
case 'C':
*weight |= 1 << 1;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
*weight |= 1;
break;
case '*':
*prefix = true;
break;
default:
return buf;
}
buf++;
}
return buf;
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::paintFillLayer(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const Color& c, const FillLayer* fillLayer, const LayoutRect& rect,
BackgroundBleedAvoidance bleedAvoidance, CompositeOperator op, RenderObject* backgroundObject)
{
paintFillLayerExtended(paintInfo, c, fillLayer, rect, bleedAvoidance, 0, IntSize(), op, backgroundObject);
}
|
void RenderBox::paintFillLayer(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const Color& c, const FillLayer* fillLayer, const LayoutRect& rect,
BackgroundBleedAvoidance bleedAvoidance, CompositeOperator op, RenderObject* backgroundObject)
{
paintFillLayerExtended(paintInfo, c, fillLayer, rect, bleedAvoidance, 0, IntSize(), op, backgroundObject);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
CompositorLock::~CompositorLock() {
CancelLock();
}
|
CompositorLock::~CompositorLock() {
CancelLock();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
strncpy(raead.type, "aead", sizeof(raead.type));
strncpy(raead.geniv, aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>", sizeof(raead.geniv));
raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_aead), &raead))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
|
static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
snprintf(raead.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "aead");
snprintf(raead.geniv, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>");
raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_aead), &raead))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<XPathNSResolver> Document::createNSResolver(Node* nodeResolver)
{
if (!m_xpathEvaluator)
m_xpathEvaluator = XPathEvaluator::create();
return m_xpathEvaluator->createNSResolver(nodeResolver);
}
|
PassRefPtr<XPathNSResolver> Document::createNSResolver(Node* nodeResolver)
{
if (!m_xpathEvaluator)
m_xpathEvaluator = XPathEvaluator::create();
return m_xpathEvaluator->createNSResolver(nodeResolver);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
int result;
size_t len;
char *str;
if (clp->cl_owner_id != NULL)
return 0;
if (nfs4_client_id_uniquifier[0] != '\0')
return nfs4_init_uniquifier_client_string(clp);
len = 10 + 10 + 1 + 10 + 1 +
strlen(clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename) + 1;
if (len > NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT + 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Since this string is allocated at mount time, and held until the
* nfs_client is destroyed, we can use GFP_KERNEL here w/o worrying
* about a memory-reclaim deadlock.
*/
str = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
result = scnprintf(str, len, "Linux NFSv%u.%u %s",
clp->rpc_ops->version, clp->cl_minorversion,
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename);
if (result >= len) {
kfree(str);
return -EINVAL;
}
clp->cl_owner_id = str;
return 0;
}
|
nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
int result;
size_t len;
char *str;
if (clp->cl_owner_id != NULL)
return 0;
if (nfs4_client_id_uniquifier[0] != '\0')
return nfs4_init_uniquifier_client_string(clp);
len = 10 + 10 + 1 + 10 + 1 +
strlen(clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename) + 1;
if (len > NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT + 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Since this string is allocated at mount time, and held until the
* nfs_client is destroyed, we can use GFP_KERNEL here w/o worrying
* about a memory-reclaim deadlock.
*/
str = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
result = scnprintf(str, len, "Linux NFSv%u.%u %s",
clp->rpc_ops->version, clp->cl_minorversion,
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename);
if (result >= len) {
kfree(str);
return -EINVAL;
}
clp->cl_owner_id = str;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2150/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b
|
af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b
|
xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
|
static int bar_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u32 value, void *data)
{
struct pci_bar_info *bar = data;
if (unlikely(!bar)) {
pr_warn(DRV_NAME ": driver data not found for %s\n",
pci_name(dev));
return XEN_PCI_ERR_op_failed;
}
/* A write to obtain the length must happen as a 32-bit write.
* This does not (yet) support writing individual bytes
*/
if (value == ~0)
bar->which = 1;
else {
u32 tmpval;
pci_read_config_dword(dev, offset, &tmpval);
if (tmpval != bar->val && value == bar->val) {
/* Allow restoration of bar value. */
pci_write_config_dword(dev, offset, bar->val);
}
bar->which = 0;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int bar_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u32 value, void *data)
{
struct pci_bar_info *bar = data;
if (unlikely(!bar)) {
pr_warn(DRV_NAME ": driver data not found for %s\n",
pci_name(dev));
return XEN_PCI_ERR_op_failed;
}
/* A write to obtain the length must happen as a 32-bit write.
* This does not (yet) support writing individual bytes
*/
if (value == ~0)
bar->which = 1;
else {
u32 tmpval;
pci_read_config_dword(dev, offset, &tmpval);
if (tmpval != bar->val && value == bar->val) {
/* Allow restoration of bar value. */
pci_write_config_dword(dev, offset, bar->val);
}
bar->which = 0;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8374/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
noinline int can_nocow_extent(struct inode *inode, u64 offset, u64 *len,
u64 *orig_start, u64 *orig_block_len,
u64 *ram_bytes)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_path *path;
int ret;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct extent_io_tree *io_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key key;
u64 disk_bytenr;
u64 backref_offset;
u64 extent_end;
u64 num_bytes;
int slot;
int found_type;
bool nocow = (BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = btrfs_lookup_file_extent(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
offset, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
slot = path->slots[0];
if (ret == 1) {
if (slot == 0) {
/* can't find the item, must cow */
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
slot--;
}
ret = 0;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) ||
key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
/* not our file or wrong item type, must cow */
goto out;
}
if (key.offset > offset) {
/* Wrong offset, must cow */
goto out;
}
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
found_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
if (found_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG &&
found_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
/* not a regular extent, must cow */
goto out;
}
if (!nocow && found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG)
goto out;
extent_end = key.offset + btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_end <= offset)
goto out;
disk_bytenr = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
if (disk_bytenr == 0)
goto out;
if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi))
goto out;
backref_offset = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
if (orig_start) {
*orig_start = key.offset - backref_offset;
*orig_block_len = btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
*ram_bytes = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
}
if (btrfs_extent_readonly(root, disk_bytenr))
goto out;
num_bytes = min(offset + *len, extent_end) - offset;
if (!nocow && found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
u64 range_end;
range_end = round_up(offset + num_bytes, root->sectorsize) - 1;
ret = test_range_bit(io_tree, offset, range_end,
EXTENT_DELALLOC, 0, NULL);
if (ret) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* look for other files referencing this extent, if we
* find any we must cow
*/
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_cross_ref_exist(trans, root, btrfs_ino(inode),
key.offset - backref_offset, disk_bytenr);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (ret) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/*
* adjust disk_bytenr and num_bytes to cover just the bytes
* in this extent we are about to write. If there
* are any csums in that range we have to cow in order
* to keep the csums correct
*/
disk_bytenr += backref_offset;
disk_bytenr += offset - key.offset;
if (csum_exist_in_range(root, disk_bytenr, num_bytes))
goto out;
/*
* all of the above have passed, it is safe to overwrite this extent
* without cow
*/
*len = num_bytes;
ret = 1;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
|
noinline int can_nocow_extent(struct inode *inode, u64 offset, u64 *len,
u64 *orig_start, u64 *orig_block_len,
u64 *ram_bytes)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_path *path;
int ret;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct extent_io_tree *io_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key key;
u64 disk_bytenr;
u64 backref_offset;
u64 extent_end;
u64 num_bytes;
int slot;
int found_type;
bool nocow = (BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = btrfs_lookup_file_extent(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
offset, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
slot = path->slots[0];
if (ret == 1) {
if (slot == 0) {
/* can't find the item, must cow */
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
slot--;
}
ret = 0;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) ||
key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
/* not our file or wrong item type, must cow */
goto out;
}
if (key.offset > offset) {
/* Wrong offset, must cow */
goto out;
}
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
found_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
if (found_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG &&
found_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
/* not a regular extent, must cow */
goto out;
}
if (!nocow && found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG)
goto out;
extent_end = key.offset + btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_end <= offset)
goto out;
disk_bytenr = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
if (disk_bytenr == 0)
goto out;
if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi))
goto out;
backref_offset = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
if (orig_start) {
*orig_start = key.offset - backref_offset;
*orig_block_len = btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
*ram_bytes = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
}
if (btrfs_extent_readonly(root, disk_bytenr))
goto out;
num_bytes = min(offset + *len, extent_end) - offset;
if (!nocow && found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
u64 range_end;
range_end = round_up(offset + num_bytes, root->sectorsize) - 1;
ret = test_range_bit(io_tree, offset, range_end,
EXTENT_DELALLOC, 0, NULL);
if (ret) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* look for other files referencing this extent, if we
* find any we must cow
*/
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_cross_ref_exist(trans, root, btrfs_ino(inode),
key.offset - backref_offset, disk_bytenr);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (ret) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/*
* adjust disk_bytenr and num_bytes to cover just the bytes
* in this extent we are about to write. If there
* are any csums in that range we have to cow in order
* to keep the csums correct
*/
disk_bytenr += backref_offset;
disk_bytenr += offset - key.offset;
if (csum_exist_in_range(root, disk_bytenr, num_bytes))
goto out;
/*
* all of the above have passed, it is safe to overwrite this extent
* without cow
*/
*len = num_bytes;
ret = 1;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3302/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea702b80e0bbb2448e201472127288beb82ca2fe
|
ea702b80e0bbb2448e201472127288beb82ca2fe
|
cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
wait_for_free_request(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, const int timeout,
const int optype)
{
return wait_for_free_credits(server, timeout,
server->ops->get_credits_field(server, optype));
}
|
wait_for_free_request(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, const int timeout,
const int optype)
{
return wait_for_free_credits(server, timeout,
server->ops->get_credits_field(server, optype));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct vmcs02_list *item, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) {
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &item->vmcs02)
free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02);
list_del(&item->list);
kfree(item);
}
vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01)
free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
}
|
static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct vmcs02_list *item, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) {
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &item->vmcs02)
free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02);
list_del(&item->list);
kfree(item);
}
vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01)
free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15921/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ceabee6c59943bdd5e1da1a6a20dc7ee5f8113a2
|
ceabee6c59943bdd5e1da1a6a20dc7ee5f8113a2
|
genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int genl_allocate_reserve_groups(int n_groups, int *first_id)
{
unsigned long *new_groups;
int start = 0;
int i;
int id;
bool fits;
do {
if (start == 0)
id = find_first_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs *
BITS_PER_LONG);
else
id = find_next_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG,
start);
fits = true;
for (i = id;
i < min_t(int, id + n_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG);
i++) {
if (test_bit(i, mc_groups)) {
start = i;
fits = false;
break;
}
}
if (id + n_groups > mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG) {
unsigned long new_longs = mc_groups_longs +
BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups);
size_t nlen = new_longs * sizeof(unsigned long);
if (mc_groups == &mc_group_start) {
new_groups = kzalloc(nlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
*mc_groups = mc_group_start;
} else {
new_groups = krealloc(mc_groups, nlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups); i++)
mc_groups[mc_groups_longs + i] = 0;
}
mc_groups_longs = new_longs;
}
} while (!fits);
for (i = id; i < id + n_groups; i++)
set_bit(i, mc_groups);
*first_id = id;
return 0;
}
|
static int genl_allocate_reserve_groups(int n_groups, int *first_id)
{
unsigned long *new_groups;
int start = 0;
int i;
int id;
bool fits;
do {
if (start == 0)
id = find_first_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs *
BITS_PER_LONG);
else
id = find_next_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG,
start);
fits = true;
for (i = id;
i < min_t(int, id + n_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG);
i++) {
if (test_bit(i, mc_groups)) {
start = i;
fits = false;
break;
}
}
if (id + n_groups > mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG) {
unsigned long new_longs = mc_groups_longs +
BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups);
size_t nlen = new_longs * sizeof(unsigned long);
if (mc_groups == &mc_group_start) {
new_groups = kzalloc(nlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
*mc_groups = mc_group_start;
} else {
new_groups = krealloc(mc_groups, nlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups); i++)
mc_groups[mc_groups_longs + i] = 0;
}
mc_groups_longs = new_longs;
}
} while (!fits);
for (i = id; i < id + n_groups; i++)
set_bit(i, mc_groups);
*first_id = id;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4650
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4650/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> [2.6.31+]
|
static long fuse_file_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
return -EACCES;
if (is_bad_inode(inode))
return -EIO;
return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags);
}
|
static long fuse_file_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
return -EACCES;
if (is_bad_inode(inode))
return -EIO;
return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18257
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18257/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b86e33075ed1909d8002745b56ecf73b833db143
|
b86e33075ed1909d8002745b56ecf73b833db143
|
f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
static int f2fs_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, struct page *page,
unsigned nr_pages)
{
struct bio *bio = NULL;
unsigned page_idx;
sector_t last_block_in_bio = 0;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
const unsigned blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned blocksize = 1 << blkbits;
sector_t block_in_file;
sector_t last_block;
sector_t last_block_in_file;
sector_t block_nr;
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
map.m_pblk = 0;
map.m_lblk = 0;
map.m_len = 0;
map.m_flags = 0;
map.m_next_pgofs = NULL;
for (page_idx = 0; nr_pages; page_idx++, nr_pages--) {
prefetchw(&page->flags);
if (pages) {
page = list_last_entry(pages, struct page, lru);
list_del(&page->lru);
if (add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping,
page->index,
readahead_gfp_mask(mapping)))
goto next_page;
}
block_in_file = (sector_t)page->index;
last_block = block_in_file + nr_pages;
last_block_in_file = (i_size_read(inode) + blocksize - 1) >>
blkbits;
if (last_block > last_block_in_file)
last_block = last_block_in_file;
/*
* Map blocks using the previous result first.
*/
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) &&
block_in_file > map.m_lblk &&
block_in_file < (map.m_lblk + map.m_len))
goto got_it;
/*
* Then do more f2fs_map_blocks() calls until we are
* done with this page.
*/
map.m_flags = 0;
if (block_in_file < last_block) {
map.m_lblk = block_in_file;
map.m_len = last_block - block_in_file;
if (f2fs_map_blocks(inode, &map, 0,
F2FS_GET_BLOCK_READ))
goto set_error_page;
}
got_it:
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED)) {
block_nr = map.m_pblk + block_in_file - map.m_lblk;
SetPageMappedToDisk(page);
if (!PageUptodate(page) && !cleancache_get_page(page)) {
SetPageUptodate(page);
goto confused;
}
} else {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
}
/*
* This page will go to BIO. Do we need to send this
* BIO off first?
*/
if (bio && (last_block_in_bio != block_nr - 1 ||
!__same_bdev(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr, bio))) {
submit_and_realloc:
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
if (bio == NULL) {
bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, block_nr, nr_pages);
if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
bio = NULL;
goto set_error_page;
}
bio_set_op_attrs(bio, REQ_OP_READ, 0);
}
if (bio_add_page(bio, page, blocksize, 0) < blocksize)
goto submit_and_realloc;
last_block_in_bio = block_nr;
goto next_page;
set_error_page:
SetPageError(page);
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
confused:
if (bio) {
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
unlock_page(page);
next_page:
if (pages)
put_page(page);
}
BUG_ON(pages && !list_empty(pages));
if (bio)
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
return 0;
}
|
static int f2fs_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, struct page *page,
unsigned nr_pages)
{
struct bio *bio = NULL;
unsigned page_idx;
sector_t last_block_in_bio = 0;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
const unsigned blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned blocksize = 1 << blkbits;
sector_t block_in_file;
sector_t last_block;
sector_t last_block_in_file;
sector_t block_nr;
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
map.m_pblk = 0;
map.m_lblk = 0;
map.m_len = 0;
map.m_flags = 0;
map.m_next_pgofs = NULL;
for (page_idx = 0; nr_pages; page_idx++, nr_pages--) {
prefetchw(&page->flags);
if (pages) {
page = list_last_entry(pages, struct page, lru);
list_del(&page->lru);
if (add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping,
page->index,
readahead_gfp_mask(mapping)))
goto next_page;
}
block_in_file = (sector_t)page->index;
last_block = block_in_file + nr_pages;
last_block_in_file = (i_size_read(inode) + blocksize - 1) >>
blkbits;
if (last_block > last_block_in_file)
last_block = last_block_in_file;
/*
* Map blocks using the previous result first.
*/
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) &&
block_in_file > map.m_lblk &&
block_in_file < (map.m_lblk + map.m_len))
goto got_it;
/*
* Then do more f2fs_map_blocks() calls until we are
* done with this page.
*/
map.m_flags = 0;
if (block_in_file < last_block) {
map.m_lblk = block_in_file;
map.m_len = last_block - block_in_file;
if (f2fs_map_blocks(inode, &map, 0,
F2FS_GET_BLOCK_READ))
goto set_error_page;
}
got_it:
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED)) {
block_nr = map.m_pblk + block_in_file - map.m_lblk;
SetPageMappedToDisk(page);
if (!PageUptodate(page) && !cleancache_get_page(page)) {
SetPageUptodate(page);
goto confused;
}
} else {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
}
/*
* This page will go to BIO. Do we need to send this
* BIO off first?
*/
if (bio && (last_block_in_bio != block_nr - 1 ||
!__same_bdev(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr, bio))) {
submit_and_realloc:
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
if (bio == NULL) {
bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, block_nr, nr_pages);
if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
bio = NULL;
goto set_error_page;
}
bio_set_op_attrs(bio, REQ_OP_READ, 0);
}
if (bio_add_page(bio, page, blocksize, 0) < blocksize)
goto submit_and_realloc;
last_block_in_bio = block_nr;
goto next_page;
set_error_page:
SetPageError(page);
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
confused:
if (bio) {
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
unlock_page(page);
next_page:
if (pages)
put_page(page);
}
BUG_ON(pages && !list_empty(pages));
if (bio)
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1789/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
|
a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
| null |
Splash::Splash(SplashBitmap *bitmapA, GBool vectorAntialiasA,
SplashScreen *screenA) {
int i;
bitmap = bitmapA;
inShading = gFalse;
vectorAntialias = vectorAntialiasA;
state = new SplashState(bitmap->width, bitmap->height, vectorAntialias,
screenA);
if (vectorAntialias) {
aaBuf = new SplashBitmap(splashAASize * bitmap->width, splashAASize,
1, splashModeMono1, gFalse);
for (i = 0; i <= splashAASize * splashAASize; ++i) {
aaGamma[i] = (Guchar)splashRound(
splashPow((SplashCoord)i /
(SplashCoord)(splashAASize * splashAASize),
splashAAGamma) * 255);
}
} else {
aaBuf = NULL;
}
minLineWidth = 0;
clearModRegion();
debugMode = gFalse;
}
|
Splash::Splash(SplashBitmap *bitmapA, GBool vectorAntialiasA,
SplashScreen *screenA) {
int i;
bitmap = bitmapA;
inShading = gFalse;
vectorAntialias = vectorAntialiasA;
state = new SplashState(bitmap->width, bitmap->height, vectorAntialias,
screenA);
if (vectorAntialias) {
aaBuf = new SplashBitmap(splashAASize * bitmap->width, splashAASize,
1, splashModeMono1, gFalse);
for (i = 0; i <= splashAASize * splashAASize; ++i) {
aaGamma[i] = (Guchar)splashRound(
splashPow((SplashCoord)i /
(SplashCoord)(splashAASize * splashAASize),
splashAAGamma) * 255);
}
} else {
aaBuf = NULL;
}
minLineWidth = 0;
clearModRegion();
debugMode = gFalse;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserActionButton::SetButtonPushed() {
SetState(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED);
menu_visible_ = true;
}
|
void BrowserActionButton::SetButtonPushed() {
SetState(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED);
menu_visible_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15393
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15393/
|
CWE-668
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8ef19900d003ff7078fe4fcec8f63496b18f0dc
|
a8ef19900d003ff7078fe4fcec8f63496b18f0dc
|
[DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
|
DevToolsToolboxDelegate::PreHandleKeyboardEvent(
content::WebContents* source,
const content::NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
BrowserWindow* window = GetInspectedBrowserWindow();
if (window)
return window->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(event);
return content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult::NOT_HANDLED;
}
|
DevToolsToolboxDelegate::PreHandleKeyboardEvent(
content::WebContents* source,
const content::NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
BrowserWindow* window = GetInspectedBrowserWindow();
if (window)
return window->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(event);
return content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult::NOT_HANDLED;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2922/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a
|
6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a
|
ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool ndisc_suppress_frag_ndisc(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev);
if (!idev)
return true;
if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED &&
idev->cnf.suppress_frag_ndisc) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Received fragmented ndisc packet. Carefully consider disabling suppress_frag_ndisc.\n");
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool ndisc_suppress_frag_ndisc(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev);
if (!idev)
return true;
if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED &&
idev->cnf.suppress_frag_ndisc) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Received fragmented ndisc packet. Carefully consider disabling suppress_frag_ndisc.\n");
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewTest::ClearHistory() {
RenderViewImpl* impl = static_cast<RenderViewImpl*>(view_);
impl->page_id_ = -1;
impl->history_list_offset_ = -1;
impl->history_list_length_ = 0;
impl->history_page_ids_.clear();
}
|
void RenderViewTest::ClearHistory() {
RenderViewImpl* impl = static_cast<RenderViewImpl*>(view_);
impl->page_id_ = -1;
impl->history_list_offset_ = -1;
impl->history_list_length_ = 0;
impl->history_page_ids_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8087/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
|
static void mac80211_hwsim_sta_notify(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
enum sta_notify_cmd cmd,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
hwsim_check_magic(vif);
switch (cmd) {
case STA_NOTIFY_SLEEP:
case STA_NOTIFY_AWAKE:
/* TODO: make good use of these flags */
break;
default:
WARN(1, "Invalid sta notify: %d\n", cmd);
break;
}
}
|
static void mac80211_hwsim_sta_notify(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
enum sta_notify_cmd cmd,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
hwsim_check_magic(vif);
switch (cmd) {
case STA_NOTIFY_SLEEP:
case STA_NOTIFY_AWAKE:
/* TODO: make good use of these flags */
break;
default:
WARN(1, "Invalid sta notify: %d\n", cmd);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0918/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b
|
0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b
|
Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnCut() {
if (!webview())
return;
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Cut"));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnCut() {
if (!webview())
return;
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Cut"));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int ax25_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int res = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCOUTQ: {
long amount;
amount = sk->sk_sndbuf - sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
if (amount < 0)
amount = 0;
res = put_user(amount, (int __user *)argp);
break;
}
case TIOCINQ: {
struct sk_buff *skb;
long amount = 0L;
/* These two are safe on a single CPU system as only user tasks fiddle here */
if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL)
amount = skb->len;
res = put_user(amount, (int __user *) argp);
break;
}
case SIOCGSTAMP:
res = sock_get_timestamp(sk, argp);
break;
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
res = sock_get_timestampns(sk, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25ADDUID: /* Add a uid to the uid/call map table */
case SIOCAX25DELUID: /* Delete a uid from the uid/call map table */
case SIOCAX25GETUID: {
struct sockaddr_ax25 sax25;
if (copy_from_user(&sax25, argp, sizeof(sax25))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
res = ax25_uid_ioctl(cmd, &sax25);
break;
}
case SIOCAX25NOUID: { /* Set the default policy (default/bar) */
long amount;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (get_user(amount, (long __user *)argp)) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (amount < 0 || amount > AX25_NOUID_BLOCK) {
res = -EINVAL;
break;
}
ax25_uid_policy = amount;
res = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
case SIOCAX25OPTRT:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
res = ax25_rt_ioctl(cmd, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25CTLCON:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
res = ax25_ctl_ioctl(cmd, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25GETINFO:
case SIOCAX25GETINFOOLD: {
ax25_cb *ax25 = sk_to_ax25(sk);
struct ax25_info_struct ax25_info;
ax25_info.t1 = ax25->t1 / HZ;
ax25_info.t2 = ax25->t2 / HZ;
ax25_info.t3 = ax25->t3 / HZ;
ax25_info.idle = ax25->idle / (60 * HZ);
ax25_info.n2 = ax25->n2;
ax25_info.t1timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t1timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.t2timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t2timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.t3timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t3timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.idletimer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->idletimer) / (60 * HZ);
ax25_info.n2count = ax25->n2count;
ax25_info.state = ax25->state;
ax25_info.rcv_q = sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk);
ax25_info.snd_q = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
ax25_info.vs = ax25->vs;
ax25_info.vr = ax25->vr;
ax25_info.va = ax25->va;
ax25_info.vs_max = ax25->vs; /* reserved */
ax25_info.paclen = ax25->paclen;
ax25_info.window = ax25->window;
/* old structure? */
if (cmd == SIOCAX25GETINFOOLD) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s uses old SIOCAX25GETINFO\n",
current->comm);
warned=1;
}
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ax25_info, sizeof(struct ax25_info_struct_deprecated))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ax25_info, sizeof(struct ax25_info_struct))) {
res = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
res = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCAX25ADDFWD:
case SIOCAX25DELFWD: {
struct ax25_fwd_struct ax25_fwd;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ax25_fwd, argp, sizeof(ax25_fwd))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
res = ax25_fwd_ioctl(cmd, &ax25_fwd);
break;
}
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCGIFMETRIC:
case SIOCSIFMETRIC:
res = -EINVAL;
break;
default:
res = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
static int ax25_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int res = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCOUTQ: {
long amount;
amount = sk->sk_sndbuf - sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
if (amount < 0)
amount = 0;
res = put_user(amount, (int __user *)argp);
break;
}
case TIOCINQ: {
struct sk_buff *skb;
long amount = 0L;
/* These two are safe on a single CPU system as only user tasks fiddle here */
if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL)
amount = skb->len;
res = put_user(amount, (int __user *) argp);
break;
}
case SIOCGSTAMP:
res = sock_get_timestamp(sk, argp);
break;
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
res = sock_get_timestampns(sk, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25ADDUID: /* Add a uid to the uid/call map table */
case SIOCAX25DELUID: /* Delete a uid from the uid/call map table */
case SIOCAX25GETUID: {
struct sockaddr_ax25 sax25;
if (copy_from_user(&sax25, argp, sizeof(sax25))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
res = ax25_uid_ioctl(cmd, &sax25);
break;
}
case SIOCAX25NOUID: { /* Set the default policy (default/bar) */
long amount;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (get_user(amount, (long __user *)argp)) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (amount < 0 || amount > AX25_NOUID_BLOCK) {
res = -EINVAL;
break;
}
ax25_uid_policy = amount;
res = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
case SIOCAX25OPTRT:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
res = ax25_rt_ioctl(cmd, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25CTLCON:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
res = ax25_ctl_ioctl(cmd, argp);
break;
case SIOCAX25GETINFO:
case SIOCAX25GETINFOOLD: {
ax25_cb *ax25 = sk_to_ax25(sk);
struct ax25_info_struct ax25_info;
ax25_info.t1 = ax25->t1 / HZ;
ax25_info.t2 = ax25->t2 / HZ;
ax25_info.t3 = ax25->t3 / HZ;
ax25_info.idle = ax25->idle / (60 * HZ);
ax25_info.n2 = ax25->n2;
ax25_info.t1timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t1timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.t2timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t2timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.t3timer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->t3timer) / HZ;
ax25_info.idletimer = ax25_display_timer(&ax25->idletimer) / (60 * HZ);
ax25_info.n2count = ax25->n2count;
ax25_info.state = ax25->state;
ax25_info.rcv_q = sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk);
ax25_info.snd_q = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
ax25_info.vs = ax25->vs;
ax25_info.vr = ax25->vr;
ax25_info.va = ax25->va;
ax25_info.vs_max = ax25->vs; /* reserved */
ax25_info.paclen = ax25->paclen;
ax25_info.window = ax25->window;
/* old structure? */
if (cmd == SIOCAX25GETINFOOLD) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s uses old SIOCAX25GETINFO\n",
current->comm);
warned=1;
}
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ax25_info, sizeof(struct ax25_info_struct_deprecated))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ax25_info, sizeof(struct ax25_info_struct))) {
res = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
res = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCAX25ADDFWD:
case SIOCAX25DELFWD: {
struct ax25_fwd_struct ax25_fwd;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
res = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ax25_fwd, argp, sizeof(ax25_fwd))) {
res = -EFAULT;
break;
}
res = ax25_fwd_ioctl(cmd, &ax25_fwd);
break;
}
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCGIFMETRIC:
case SIOCSIFMETRIC:
res = -EINVAL;
break;
default:
res = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static void *fpid_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
if (list_empty(&ftrace_pids) && (!*pos))
return (void *) 1;
return seq_list_start(&ftrace_pids, *pos);
}
|
static void *fpid_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
if (list_empty(&ftrace_pids) && (!*pos))
return (void *) 1;
return seq_list_start(&ftrace_pids, *pos);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::DidCallAddSearchProvider() {
UseCounter::Count(GetFrame(), WebFeature::kExternalAddSearchProvider);
}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::DidCallAddSearchProvider() {
UseCounter::Count(GetFrame(), WebFeature::kExternalAddSearchProvider);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool cgfs_create_legacy(void *hdata, pid_t pid)
{
struct cgfs_data *d = hdata;
struct cgroup_process_info *i;
if (!d)
return false;
i = d->info;
if (lxc_cgroup_create_legacy(i, d->name, pid) < 0) {
ERROR("failed to create legacy ns cgroups for '%s'", d->name);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static inline bool cgfs_create_legacy(void *hdata, pid_t pid)
{
struct cgfs_data *d = hdata;
struct cgroup_process_info *i;
if (!d)
return false;
i = d->info;
if (lxc_cgroup_create_legacy(i, d->name, pid) < 0) {
ERROR("failed to create legacy ns cgroups for '%s'", d->name);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8807
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8807/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/commit/176f8a075a963ffbfa56f1c460c15f6a1a6af5a7
|
176f8a075a963ffbfa56f1c460c15f6a1a6af5a7
|
Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429
|
vbf_stp_fetch(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
const char *p;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
/*
* The VCL variables beresp.do_g[un]zip tells us how we want the
* object processed before it is stored.
*
* The backend Content-Encoding header tells us what we are going
* to receive, which we classify in the following three classes:
*
* "Content-Encoding: gzip" --> object is gzip'ed.
* no Content-Encoding --> object is not gzip'ed.
* anything else --> do nothing wrt gzip
*
*/
/* We do nothing unless the param is set */
if (!cache_param->http_gzip_support)
bo->do_gzip = bo->do_gunzip = 0;
if (bo->htc->content_length == 0)
http_Unset(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding);
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE) {
bo->is_gzip =
http_HdrIs(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding, "gzip");
bo->is_gunzip =
!http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding, NULL);
assert(bo->is_gzip == 0 || bo->is_gunzip == 0);
}
/* We won't gunzip unless it is non-empty and gzip'ed */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE ||
bo->htc->content_length == 0 ||
(bo->do_gunzip && !bo->is_gzip))
bo->do_gunzip = 0;
/* We wont gzip unless it is non-empty and ungzip'ed */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE ||
bo->htc->content_length == 0 ||
(bo->do_gzip && !bo->is_gunzip))
bo->do_gzip = 0;
/* But we can't do both at the same time */
assert(bo->do_gzip == 0 || bo->do_gunzip == 0);
if (bo->do_gunzip || (bo->is_gzip && bo->do_esi))
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_gunzip, 1);
if (bo->htc->content_length != 0) {
if (bo->do_esi && bo->do_gzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->do_esi && bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->do_esi) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi, 1);
} else if (bo->do_gzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_testgunzip, 1);
}
}
if (bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_PRIVATE)
AN(bo->uncacheable);
/* No reason to try streaming a non-existing body */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE)
bo->do_stream = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->boc->len_so_far = 0;
if (VFP_Open(bo->vfc)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Fetch pipeline failed to open");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
VFP_Close(bo->vfc);
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
if (bo->do_esi)
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_ESIPROC, 1);
if (bo->do_gzip || (bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip))
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_GZIPED, 1);
if (bo->do_gzip || bo->do_gunzip)
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_CHGGZIP, 1);
if (!(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_PASS) &&
http_IsStatus(bo->beresp, 200) && (
http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_Last_Modified, &p) ||
http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_ETag, &p)))
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_IMSCAND, 1);
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE &&
VDI_GetBody(bo->wrk, bo) != 0) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc,
"GetBody failed - workspace_backend overflow?");
VFP_Close(bo->vfc);
bo->htc->doclose = SC_OVERLOAD;
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
assert(bo->fetch_objcore->boc->refcount >= 1);
assert(bo->fetch_objcore->boc->state == BOS_REQ_DONE);
if (bo->do_stream) {
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_PREP_STREAM);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_STREAM);
}
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_Fetch_Body, "%u %s %s",
bo->htc->body_status, body_status_2str(bo->htc->body_status),
bo->do_stream ? "stream" : "-");
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE) {
assert(bo->htc->body_status != BS_ERROR);
return (F_STP_FETCHBODY);
}
AZ(bo->vfc->failed);
return (F_STP_FETCHEND);
}
|
vbf_stp_fetch(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
const char *p;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
/*
* The VCL variables beresp.do_g[un]zip tells us how we want the
* object processed before it is stored.
*
* The backend Content-Encoding header tells us what we are going
* to receive, which we classify in the following three classes:
*
* "Content-Encoding: gzip" --> object is gzip'ed.
* no Content-Encoding --> object is not gzip'ed.
* anything else --> do nothing wrt gzip
*
*/
/* We do nothing unless the param is set */
if (!cache_param->http_gzip_support)
bo->do_gzip = bo->do_gunzip = 0;
if (bo->htc->content_length == 0)
http_Unset(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding);
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE) {
bo->is_gzip =
http_HdrIs(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding, "gzip");
bo->is_gunzip =
!http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_Content_Encoding, NULL);
assert(bo->is_gzip == 0 || bo->is_gunzip == 0);
}
/* We won't gunzip unless it is non-empty and gzip'ed */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE ||
bo->htc->content_length == 0 ||
(bo->do_gunzip && !bo->is_gzip))
bo->do_gunzip = 0;
/* We wont gzip unless it is non-empty and ungzip'ed */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE ||
bo->htc->content_length == 0 ||
(bo->do_gzip && !bo->is_gunzip))
bo->do_gzip = 0;
/* But we can't do both at the same time */
assert(bo->do_gzip == 0 || bo->do_gunzip == 0);
if (bo->do_gunzip || (bo->is_gzip && bo->do_esi))
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_gunzip, 1);
if (bo->htc->content_length != 0) {
if (bo->do_esi && bo->do_gzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->do_esi && bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->do_esi) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_esi, 1);
} else if (bo->do_gzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_gzip, 1);
} else if (bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip) {
vbf_vfp_push(bo, &vfp_testgunzip, 1);
}
}
if (bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_PRIVATE)
AN(bo->uncacheable);
/* No reason to try streaming a non-existing body */
if (bo->htc->body_status == BS_NONE)
bo->do_stream = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->boc->len_so_far = 0;
if (VFP_Open(bo->vfc)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Fetch pipeline failed to open");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
VFP_Close(bo->vfc);
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
if (bo->do_esi)
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_ESIPROC, 1);
if (bo->do_gzip || (bo->is_gzip && !bo->do_gunzip))
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_GZIPED, 1);
if (bo->do_gzip || bo->do_gunzip)
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_CHGGZIP, 1);
if (!(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_PASS) &&
http_IsStatus(bo->beresp, 200) && (
http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_Last_Modified, &p) ||
http_GetHdr(bo->beresp, H_ETag, &p)))
ObjSetFlag(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OF_IMSCAND, 1);
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE &&
VDI_GetBody(bo->wrk, bo) != 0) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc,
"GetBody failed - workspace_backend overflow?");
VFP_Close(bo->vfc);
bo->htc->doclose = SC_OVERLOAD;
VDI_Finish(bo->wrk, bo);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
}
assert(bo->fetch_objcore->boc->refcount >= 1);
assert(bo->fetch_objcore->boc->state == BOS_REQ_DONE);
if (bo->do_stream) {
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_PREP_STREAM);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_STREAM);
}
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_Fetch_Body, "%u %s %s",
bo->htc->body_status, body_status_2str(bo->htc->body_status),
bo->do_stream ? "stream" : "-");
if (bo->htc->body_status != BS_NONE) {
assert(bo->htc->body_status != BS_ERROR);
return (F_STP_FETCHBODY);
}
AZ(bo->vfc->failed);
return (F_STP_FETCHEND);
}
|
C
|
varnish-cache
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> [email protected]
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
DVLOG(1) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
|
void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
DVLOG(1) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
GLenum GetDrawFramebufferTarget() const {
return SupportsSeparateFramebufferBinds() ?
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
}
|
GLenum GetDrawFramebufferTarget() const {
return SupportsSeparateFramebufferBinds() ?
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3924/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::stop()
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
return stop_l();
}
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::stop()
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
return stop_l();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
|
long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
{
return m_timecodeScale;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
CC: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void gen_rot_rm_im(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot, int op1, int op2,
int is_right)
{
int mask = (ot == MO_64 ? 0x3f : 0x1f);
int shift;
/* load */
if (op1 == OR_TMP0) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, op1);
}
op2 &= mask;
if (op2 != 0) {
switch (ot) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_32:
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_rotri_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, op2);
} else {
tcg_gen_rotli_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, op2);
}
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
#endif
default:
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_rotri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
} else {
tcg_gen_rotli_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
}
break;
case MO_8:
mask = 7;
goto do_shifts;
case MO_16:
mask = 15;
do_shifts:
shift = op2 & mask;
if (is_right) {
shift = mask + 1 - shift;
}
gen_extu(ot, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_shli_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T0, shift);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, mask + 1 - shift);
tcg_gen_or_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
break;
}
}
/* store */
gen_op_st_rm_T0_A0(s, ot, op1);
if (op2 != 0) {
/* Compute the flags into CC_SRC. */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
/* The value that was "rotated out" is now present at the other end
of the word. Compute C into CC_DST and O into CC_SRC2. Note that
since we've computed the flags into CC_SRC, these variables are
currently dead. */
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_T0, mask - 1);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0, mask);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_cc_dst, 1);
} else {
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_T0, mask);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0, 1);
}
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_src2, 1);
tcg_gen_xor_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_dst);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_ADCOX);
}
}
|
static void gen_rot_rm_im(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot, int op1, int op2,
int is_right)
{
int mask = (ot == MO_64 ? 0x3f : 0x1f);
int shift;
/* load */
if (op1 == OR_TMP0) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, op1);
}
op2 &= mask;
if (op2 != 0) {
switch (ot) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_32:
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_rotri_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, op2);
} else {
tcg_gen_rotli_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, op2);
}
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
#endif
default:
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_rotri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
} else {
tcg_gen_rotli_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
}
break;
case MO_8:
mask = 7;
goto do_shifts;
case MO_16:
mask = 15;
do_shifts:
shift = op2 & mask;
if (is_right) {
shift = mask + 1 - shift;
}
gen_extu(ot, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_shli_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T0, shift);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, mask + 1 - shift);
tcg_gen_or_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
break;
}
}
/* store */
gen_op_st_rm_T0_A0(s, ot, op1);
if (op2 != 0) {
/* Compute the flags into CC_SRC. */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
/* The value that was "rotated out" is now present at the other end
of the word. Compute C into CC_DST and O into CC_SRC2. Note that
since we've computed the flags into CC_SRC, these variables are
currently dead. */
if (is_right) {
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_T0, mask - 1);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0, mask);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_cc_dst, 1);
} else {
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_T0, mask);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0, 1);
}
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_src2, 1);
tcg_gen_xor_tl(cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_src2, cpu_cc_dst);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_ADCOX);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf
|
1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf
|
Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
|
status_t Parcel::read(FlattenableHelperInterface& val) const
{
const size_t len = this->readInt32();
const size_t fd_count = this->readInt32();
if ((len > INT32_MAX) || (fd_count >= gMaxFds)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
void const* const buf = this->readInplace(pad_size(len));
if (buf == NULL)
return BAD_VALUE;
int* fds = NULL;
if (fd_count) {
fds = new (std::nothrow) int[fd_count];
if (fds == nullptr) {
ALOGE("read: failed to allocate requested %zu fds", fd_count);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
}
status_t err = NO_ERROR;
for (size_t i=0 ; i<fd_count && err==NO_ERROR ; i++) {
fds[i] = dup(this->readFileDescriptor());
if (fds[i] < 0) {
err = BAD_VALUE;
ALOGE("dup() failed in Parcel::read, i is %zu, fds[i] is %d, fd_count is %zu, error: %s",
i, fds[i], fd_count, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (err == NO_ERROR) {
err = val.unflatten(buf, len, fds, fd_count);
}
if (fd_count) {
delete [] fds;
}
return err;
}
|
status_t Parcel::read(FlattenableHelperInterface& val) const
{
const size_t len = this->readInt32();
const size_t fd_count = this->readInt32();
if ((len > INT32_MAX) || (fd_count >= gMaxFds)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
void const* const buf = this->readInplace(pad_size(len));
if (buf == NULL)
return BAD_VALUE;
int* fds = NULL;
if (fd_count) {
fds = new (std::nothrow) int[fd_count];
if (fds == nullptr) {
ALOGE("read: failed to allocate requested %zu fds", fd_count);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
}
status_t err = NO_ERROR;
for (size_t i=0 ; i<fd_count && err==NO_ERROR ; i++) {
fds[i] = dup(this->readFileDescriptor());
if (fds[i] < 0) {
err = BAD_VALUE;
ALOGE("dup() failed in Parcel::read, i is %zu, fds[i] is %d, fd_count is %zu, error: %s",
i, fds[i], fd_count, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (err == NO_ERROR) {
err = val.unflatten(buf, len, fds, fd_count);
}
if (fd_count) {
delete [] fds;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3122
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3122/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/57e68e9cd65b4b8eb4045a1e0d0746458502554c
|
57e68e9cd65b4b8eb4045a1e0d0746458502554c
|
mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page)
{
/* Serialize with page migration */
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
if (!TestSetPageMlocked(page)) {
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page), NR_MLOCK,
hpage_nr_pages(page));
count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGMLOCKED);
if (!isolate_lru_page(page))
putback_lru_page(page);
}
}
|
void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page)
{
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
if (!TestSetPageMlocked(page)) {
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page), NR_MLOCK,
hpage_nr_pages(page));
count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGMLOCKED);
if (!isolate_lru_page(page))
putback_lru_page(page);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-12897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12897/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
static int parse_q922_addr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int *dlci,
u_int *addr_len, uint8_t *flags, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT))
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[1]) || length < 2)
return -1;
*addr_len = 2;
*dlci = ((p[0] & 0xFC) << 2) | ((p[1] & 0xF0) >> 4);
flags[0] = p[0] & 0x02; /* populate the first flag fields */
flags[1] = p[1] & 0x0c;
flags[2] = 0; /* clear the rest of the flags */
flags[3] = 0;
if (p[1] & FR_EA_BIT)
return 1; /* 2-byte Q.922 address */
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
(*addr_len)++; /* 3- or 4-byte Q.922 address */
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0) {
*dlci = (*dlci << 7) | (p[0] >> 1);
(*addr_len)++; /* 4-byte Q.922 address */
p++;
length--;
}
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0)
return 0; /* more than 4 bytes of Q.922 address? */
flags[3] = p[0] & 0x02;
*dlci = (*dlci << 6) | (p[0] >> 2);
return 1;
}
|
static int parse_q922_addr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int *dlci,
u_int *addr_len, uint8_t *flags, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT))
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[1]) || length < 2)
return -1;
*addr_len = 2;
*dlci = ((p[0] & 0xFC) << 2) | ((p[1] & 0xF0) >> 4);
flags[0] = p[0] & 0x02; /* populate the first flag fields */
flags[1] = p[1] & 0x0c;
flags[2] = 0; /* clear the rest of the flags */
flags[3] = 0;
if (p[1] & FR_EA_BIT)
return 1; /* 2-byte Q.922 address */
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
(*addr_len)++; /* 3- or 4-byte Q.922 address */
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0) {
*dlci = (*dlci << 7) | (p[0] >> 1);
(*addr_len)++; /* 4-byte Q.922 address */
p++;
length--;
}
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0)
return 0; /* more than 4 bytes of Q.922 address? */
flags[3] = p[0] & 0x02;
*dlci = (*dlci << 6) | (p[0] >> 2);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
|
long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2887
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2887/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01924fbe6c0e0f059ca46a03f9f6b2670ae3e0fa
|
01924fbe6c0e0f059ca46a03f9f6b2670ae3e0fa
|
Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WaitUntilReceivedGesture(ui::EventType type) {
wait_until_event_ = type;
run_loop_.reset(new base::RunLoop());
run_loop_->Run();
}
|
void WaitUntilReceivedGesture(ui::EventType type) {
wait_until_event_ = type;
run_loop_.reset(new base::RunLoop());
run_loop_->Run();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void emmh32_setseed(emmh32_context *context, u8 *pkey, int keylen,
struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
/* take the keying material, expand if necessary, truncate at 16-bytes */
/* run through AES counter mode to generate context->coeff[] */
int i,j;
u32 counter;
u8 *cipher, plain[16];
crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, pkey, 16);
counter = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff); ) {
aes_counter[15] = (u8)(counter >> 0);
aes_counter[14] = (u8)(counter >> 8);
aes_counter[13] = (u8)(counter >> 16);
aes_counter[12] = (u8)(counter >> 24);
counter++;
memcpy (plain, aes_counter, 16);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, plain, plain);
cipher = plain;
for (j = 0; (j < 16) && (i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff)); ) {
context->coeff[i++] = ntohl(*(__be32 *)&cipher[j]);
j += 4;
}
}
}
|
static void emmh32_setseed(emmh32_context *context, u8 *pkey, int keylen,
struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
/* take the keying material, expand if necessary, truncate at 16-bytes */
/* run through AES counter mode to generate context->coeff[] */
int i,j;
u32 counter;
u8 *cipher, plain[16];
crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, pkey, 16);
counter = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff); ) {
aes_counter[15] = (u8)(counter >> 0);
aes_counter[14] = (u8)(counter >> 8);
aes_counter[13] = (u8)(counter >> 16);
aes_counter[12] = (u8)(counter >> 24);
counter++;
memcpy (plain, aes_counter, 16);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, plain, plain);
cipher = plain;
for (j = 0; (j < 16) && (i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff)); ) {
context->coeff[i++] = ntohl(*(__be32 *)&cipher[j]);
j += 4;
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void QuotaManager::DidGetDatabaseLRUOrigin(const GURL& origin) {
if (origins_in_use_.find(origin) != origins_in_use_.end() ||
access_notified_origins_.find(origin) != access_notified_origins_.end())
lru_origin_callback_->Run(GURL());
else
lru_origin_callback_->Run(origin);
access_notified_origins_.clear();
lru_origin_callback_.reset();
}
|
void QuotaManager::DidGetDatabaseLRUOrigin(const GURL& origin) {
if (origins_in_use_.find(origin) != origins_in_use_.end() ||
access_notified_origins_.find(origin) != access_notified_origins_.end())
lru_origin_callback_->Run(GURL());
else
lru_origin_callback_->Run(origin);
access_notified_origins_.clear();
lru_origin_callback_.reset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::Destroy() {
scheduler_.reset();
while (!delayed_echos_.empty()) {
delete delayed_echos_.front();
delayed_echos_.pop_front();
}
if (decoder_.get())
decoder_->MakeCurrent();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(DestructionObserver,
destruction_observers_,
OnWillDestroyStub(this));
if (decoder_.get()) {
decoder_->Destroy();
decoder_.reset();
}
command_buffer_.reset();
context_ = NULL;
surface_ = NULL;
channel_->gpu_channel_manager()->gpu_memory_manager()->ScheduleManage();
}
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::Destroy() {
scheduler_.reset();
while (!delayed_echos_.empty()) {
delete delayed_echos_.front();
delayed_echos_.pop_front();
}
if (decoder_.get())
decoder_->MakeCurrent();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(DestructionObserver,
destruction_observers_,
OnWillDestroyStub(this));
if (decoder_.get()) {
decoder_->Destroy();
decoder_.reset();
}
command_buffer_.reset();
context_ = NULL;
surface_ = NULL;
channel_->gpu_channel_manager()->gpu_memory_manager()->ScheduleManage();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14981/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a77d8d97f5a7bced0468f0b08798c83fb67427bc
|
a77d8d97f5a7bced0468f0b08798c83fb67427bc
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1552
|
MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
PixelInfo
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetPixelInfo(image,&mean_pixel);
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
PixelInfo
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetPixelInfo(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.alpha+=pixel.alpha;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(count);
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.alpha=gamma*sum_pixel.alpha;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
SetPixelRed(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red),q);
SetPixelGreen(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green),q);
SetPixelBlue(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.alpha),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(mean_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
|
MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
PixelInfo
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetPixelInfo(image,&mean_pixel);
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
PixelInfo
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetPixelInfo(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.alpha+=pixel.alpha;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=1.0/count;
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.alpha=gamma*sum_pixel.alpha;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
SetPixelRed(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red),q);
SetPixelGreen(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green),q);
SetPixelBlue(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.alpha),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(mean_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDeleteBuffers(
GLsizei n,
const volatile GLuint* buffers) {
if (n < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "n cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLuint> service_ids(n, 0);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
GLuint client_id = buffers[ii];
for (auto& buffer_binding : bound_buffers_) {
if (buffer_binding.second == client_id) {
buffer_binding.second = 0;
}
resources_->mapped_buffer_map.erase(client_id);
}
service_ids[ii] =
resources_->buffer_id_map.GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
resources_->buffer_id_map.RemoveClientID(client_id);
auto is_the_deleted_buffer = [client_id](const auto& update) {
return update.first == client_id;
};
base::EraseIf(buffer_shadow_updates_, is_the_deleted_buffer);
for (PendingQuery& pending_query : pending_queries_) {
base::EraseIf(pending_query.buffer_shadow_updates, is_the_deleted_buffer);
}
}
api()->glDeleteBuffersARBFn(n, service_ids.data());
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDeleteBuffers(
GLsizei n,
const volatile GLuint* buffers) {
if (n < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "n cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLuint> service_ids(n, 0);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
GLuint client_id = buffers[ii];
for (auto& buffer_binding : bound_buffers_) {
if (buffer_binding.second == client_id) {
buffer_binding.second = 0;
}
resources_->mapped_buffer_map.erase(client_id);
}
service_ids[ii] =
resources_->buffer_id_map.GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
resources_->buffer_id_map.RemoveClientID(client_id);
auto is_the_deleted_buffer = [client_id](const auto& update) {
return update.first == client_id;
};
base::EraseIf(buffer_shadow_updates_, is_the_deleted_buffer);
for (PendingQuery& pending_query : pending_queries_) {
base::EraseIf(pending_query.buffer_shadow_updates, is_the_deleted_buffer);
}
}
api()->glDeleteBuffersARBFn(n, service_ids.data());
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4565/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static int __init ib_ucm_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_chrdev_region(IB_UCM_BASE_DEV, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES,
"infiniband_cm");
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't register device number\n");
goto error1;
}
ret = class_create_file(&cm_class, &class_attr_abi_version.attr);
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't create abi_version attribute\n");
goto error2;
}
ret = ib_register_client(&ucm_client);
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't register client\n");
goto error3;
}
return 0;
error3:
class_remove_file(&cm_class, &class_attr_abi_version.attr);
error2:
unregister_chrdev_region(IB_UCM_BASE_DEV, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES);
error1:
return ret;
}
|
static int __init ib_ucm_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_chrdev_region(IB_UCM_BASE_DEV, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES,
"infiniband_cm");
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't register device number\n");
goto error1;
}
ret = class_create_file(&cm_class, &class_attr_abi_version.attr);
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't create abi_version attribute\n");
goto error2;
}
ret = ib_register_client(&ucm_client);
if (ret) {
pr_err("ucm: couldn't register client\n");
goto error3;
}
return 0;
error3:
class_remove_file(&cm_class, &class_attr_abi_version.attr);
error2:
unregister_chrdev_region(IB_UCM_BASE_DEV, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES);
error1:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13093/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff
|
afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff
|
xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
|
xfs_inode_set_eofblocks_tag(
xfs_inode_t *ip)
{
trace_xfs_inode_set_eofblocks_tag(ip);
return __xfs_inode_set_blocks_tag(ip, xfs_queue_eofblocks,
trace_xfs_perag_set_eofblocks,
XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG);
}
|
xfs_inode_set_eofblocks_tag(
xfs_inode_t *ip)
{
trace_xfs_inode_set_eofblocks_tag(ip);
return __xfs_inode_set_blocks_tag(ip, xfs_queue_eofblocks,
trace_xfs_perag_set_eofblocks,
XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int ipv6_create_tempaddr(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, struct inet6_ifaddr *ift)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct in6_addr addr, *tmpaddr;
unsigned long tmp_prefered_lft, tmp_valid_lft, tmp_tstamp, age;
unsigned long regen_advance;
int tmp_plen;
int ret = 0;
u32 addr_flags;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
if (ift) {
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], &ift->addr.s6_addr[8], 8);
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
tmpaddr = &addr;
} else {
tmpaddr = NULL;
}
retry:
in6_dev_hold(idev);
if (idev->cnf.use_tempaddr <= 0) {
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_info("%s: use_tempaddr is disabled\n", __func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (ifp->regen_count++ >= idev->cnf.regen_max_retry) {
idev->cnf.use_tempaddr = -1; /*XXX*/
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_warn("%s: regeneration time exceeded - disabled temporary address support\n",
__func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
memcpy(addr.s6_addr, ifp->addr.s6_addr, 8);
__ipv6_try_regen_rndid(idev, tmpaddr);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], idev->rndid, 8);
age = (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ;
tmp_valid_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->valid_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_valid_lft + age);
tmp_prefered_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->prefered_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_prefered_lft + age -
idev->cnf.max_desync_factor);
tmp_plen = ifp->prefix_len;
tmp_tstamp = ifp->tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
regen_advance = idev->cnf.regen_max_retry *
idev->cnf.dad_transmits *
NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, RETRANS_TIME) / HZ;
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
/* A temporary address is created only if this calculated Preferred
* Lifetime is greater than REGEN_ADVANCE time units. In particular,
* an implementation must not create a temporary address with a zero
* Preferred Lifetime.
* Use age calculation as in addrconf_verify to avoid unnecessary
* temporary addresses being generated.
*/
age = (now - tmp_tstamp + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
if (tmp_prefered_lft <= regen_advance + age) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
addr_flags = IFA_F_TEMPORARY;
/* set in addrconf_prefix_rcv() */
if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)
addr_flags |= IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC;
ift = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, NULL, tmp_plen,
ipv6_addr_scope(&addr), addr_flags,
tmp_valid_lft, tmp_prefered_lft);
if (IS_ERR(ift)) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
pr_info("%s: retry temporary address regeneration\n", __func__);
tmpaddr = &addr;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
goto retry;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
ift->ifpub = ifp;
ift->cstamp = now;
ift->tstamp = tmp_tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
addrconf_dad_start(ift);
in6_ifa_put(ift);
in6_dev_put(idev);
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int ipv6_create_tempaddr(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, struct inet6_ifaddr *ift)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct in6_addr addr, *tmpaddr;
unsigned long tmp_prefered_lft, tmp_valid_lft, tmp_tstamp, age;
unsigned long regen_advance;
int tmp_plen;
int ret = 0;
u32 addr_flags;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
if (ift) {
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], &ift->addr.s6_addr[8], 8);
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
tmpaddr = &addr;
} else {
tmpaddr = NULL;
}
retry:
in6_dev_hold(idev);
if (idev->cnf.use_tempaddr <= 0) {
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_info("%s: use_tempaddr is disabled\n", __func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (ifp->regen_count++ >= idev->cnf.regen_max_retry) {
idev->cnf.use_tempaddr = -1; /*XXX*/
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_warn("%s: regeneration time exceeded - disabled temporary address support\n",
__func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
memcpy(addr.s6_addr, ifp->addr.s6_addr, 8);
__ipv6_try_regen_rndid(idev, tmpaddr);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], idev->rndid, 8);
age = (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ;
tmp_valid_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->valid_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_valid_lft + age);
tmp_prefered_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->prefered_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_prefered_lft + age -
idev->cnf.max_desync_factor);
tmp_plen = ifp->prefix_len;
tmp_tstamp = ifp->tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
regen_advance = idev->cnf.regen_max_retry *
idev->cnf.dad_transmits *
NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, RETRANS_TIME) / HZ;
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
/* A temporary address is created only if this calculated Preferred
* Lifetime is greater than REGEN_ADVANCE time units. In particular,
* an implementation must not create a temporary address with a zero
* Preferred Lifetime.
* Use age calculation as in addrconf_verify to avoid unnecessary
* temporary addresses being generated.
*/
age = (now - tmp_tstamp + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
if (tmp_prefered_lft <= regen_advance + age) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
addr_flags = IFA_F_TEMPORARY;
/* set in addrconf_prefix_rcv() */
if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)
addr_flags |= IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC;
ift = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, NULL, tmp_plen,
ipv6_addr_scope(&addr), addr_flags,
tmp_valid_lft, tmp_prefered_lft);
if (IS_ERR(ift)) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
pr_info("%s: retry temporary address regeneration\n", __func__);
tmpaddr = &addr;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
goto retry;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
ift->ifpub = ifp;
ift->cstamp = now;
ift->tstamp = tmp_tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
addrconf_dad_start(ift);
in6_ifa_put(ift);
in6_dev_put(idev);
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
ReadUserLogState::GetStateString( MyString &str, const char *label ) const
{
str = "";
if ( NULL != label ) {
str.sprintf( "%s:\n", label );
}
str.sprintf_cat (
" BasePath = %s\n"
" CurPath = %s\n"
" UniqId = %s, seq = %d\n"
" rotation = %d; max = %d; offset = %ld; event = %ld; type = %d\n"
" inode = %u; ctime = %d; size = %ld\n",
m_base_path.Value(), m_cur_path.Value(),
m_uniq_id.Value(), m_sequence,
m_cur_rot, m_max_rotations, (long) m_offset,
(long) m_event_num, m_log_type,
(unsigned)m_stat_buf.st_ino, (int)m_stat_buf.st_ctime,
(long)m_stat_buf.st_size );
}
|
ReadUserLogState::GetStateString( MyString &str, const char *label ) const
{
str = "";
if ( NULL != label ) {
str.sprintf( "%s:\n", label );
}
str.sprintf_cat (
" BasePath = %s\n"
" CurPath = %s\n"
" UniqId = %s, seq = %d\n"
" rotation = %d; max = %d; offset = %ld; event = %ld; type = %d\n"
" inode = %u; ctime = %d; size = %ld\n",
m_base_path.Value(), m_cur_path.Value(),
m_uniq_id.Value(), m_sequence,
m_cur_rot, m_max_rotations, (long) m_offset,
(long) m_event_num, m_log_type,
(unsigned)m_stat_buf.st_ino, (int)m_stat_buf.st_ctime,
(long)m_stat_buf.st_size );
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13011/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9f0730bee3eb65d07b49fd468bc2f269173352fe
|
9f0730bee3eb65d07b49fd468bc2f269173352fe
|
CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
fetch_token(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *pptr, u_int idx, u_int len,
u_char *tbuf, size_t tbuflen)
{
size_t toklen = 0;
for (; idx < len; idx++) {
if (!ND_TTEST(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* ran past end of captured data */
return (0);
}
if (!isascii(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not an ASCII character */
return (0);
}
if (isspace(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* end of token */
break;
}
if (!isprint(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not part of a command token or response code */
return (0);
}
if (toklen + 2 > tbuflen) {
/* no room for this character and terminating '\0' */
return (0);
}
tbuf[toklen] = *(pptr + idx);
toklen++;
}
if (toklen == 0) {
/* no token */
return (0);
}
tbuf[toklen] = '\0';
/*
* Skip past any white space after the token, until we see
* an end-of-line (CR or LF).
*/
for (; idx < len; idx++) {
if (!ND_TTEST(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* ran past end of captured data */
break;
}
if (*(pptr + idx) == '\r' || *(pptr + idx) == '\n') {
/* end of line */
break;
}
if (!isascii(*(pptr + idx)) || !isprint(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not a printable ASCII character */
break;
}
if (!isspace(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* beginning of next token */
break;
}
}
return (idx);
}
|
fetch_token(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *pptr, u_int idx, u_int len,
u_char *tbuf, size_t tbuflen)
{
size_t toklen = 0;
for (; idx < len; idx++) {
if (!ND_TTEST(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* ran past end of captured data */
return (0);
}
if (!isascii(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not an ASCII character */
return (0);
}
if (isspace(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* end of token */
break;
}
if (!isprint(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not part of a command token or response code */
return (0);
}
if (toklen + 2 > tbuflen) {
/* no room for this character and terminating '\0' */
return (0);
}
tbuf[toklen] = *(pptr + idx);
toklen++;
}
if (toklen == 0) {
/* no token */
return (0);
}
tbuf[toklen] = '\0';
/*
* Skip past any white space after the token, until we see
* an end-of-line (CR or LF).
*/
for (; idx < len; idx++) {
if (!ND_TTEST(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* ran past end of captured data */
break;
}
if (*(pptr + idx) == '\r' || *(pptr + idx) == '\n') {
/* end of line */
break;
}
if (!isascii(*(pptr + idx)) || !isprint(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* not a printable ASCII character */
break;
}
if (!isspace(*(pptr + idx))) {
/* beginning of next token */
break;
}
}
return (idx);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3698
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3698/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/jpirko/libndp/commit/a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f
|
a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f
|
libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
|
enum ndp_route_preference ndp_msgra_route_preference(struct ndp_msgra *msgra)
{
uint8_t prf = (msgra->ra->nd_ra_flags_reserved >> 3) & 3;
/* rfc4191 says:
* If the Router Lifetime is zero, the preference value MUST be set to
* (00) by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
* If the Reserved (10) value is received, the receiver MUST treat the
* value as if it were (00).
*/
if (prf == 2 || !ndp_msgra_router_lifetime(msgra))
prf = 0;
return prf;
}
|
enum ndp_route_preference ndp_msgra_route_preference(struct ndp_msgra *msgra)
{
uint8_t prf = (msgra->ra->nd_ra_flags_reserved >> 3) & 3;
/* rfc4191 says:
* If the Router Lifetime is zero, the preference value MUST be set to
* (00) by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
* If the Reserved (10) value is received, the receiver MUST treat the
* value as if it were (00).
*/
if (prf == 2 || !ndp_msgra_router_lifetime(msgra))
prf = 0;
return prf;
}
|
C
|
libndp
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tun_net_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_tx_stop_all_queues(dev);
return 0;
}
|
static int tun_net_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_tx_stop_all_queues(dev);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0890/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9c887a80115ddc5c011380f132fe4b36359caf0
|
e9c887a80115ddc5c011380f132fe4b36359caf0
|
Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, ImageBitmap* bitmap, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return createImageBitmap(eventTarget, bitmap, 0, 0, bitmap->width(), bitmap->height(), exceptionState);
}
|
ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, ImageBitmap* bitmap, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return createImageBitmap(eventTarget, bitmap, 0, 0, bitmap->width(), bitmap->height(), exceptionState);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6542
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6542/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
|
4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
| null |
static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
{
int i;
assert(!ssh->queueing);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
ssh->queuelen = 0;
ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
}
|
static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
{
int i;
assert(!ssh->queueing);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
ssh->queuelen = 0;
ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
}
|
C
|
tartarus
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5032
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5032/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c90f2cec381a0460e3879eb8efd14bac4488dbe
|
9c90f2cec381a0460e3879eb8efd14bac4488dbe
|
Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
|
void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnDisplayMetricsChanged(
const display::Display& new_display,
uint32_t changed_metrics) {
if (!widget_ || !widget_->IsActive() ||
!WMHelper::GetInstance()->IsTabletModeWindowManagerEnabled()) {
return;
}
const display::Screen* screen = display::Screen::GetScreen();
display::Display current_display =
screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
if (current_display.id() != new_display.id() ||
!(changed_metrics & display::DisplayObserver::DISPLAY_METRIC_ROTATION)) {
return;
}
Orientation target_orientation = SizeToOrientation(new_display.size());
if (orientation_ == target_orientation)
return;
expected_orientation_ = target_orientation;
EnsureCompositorIsLockedForOrientationChange();
}
|
void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnDisplayMetricsChanged(
const display::Display& new_display,
uint32_t changed_metrics) {
if (!widget_ || !widget_->IsActive() ||
!WMHelper::GetInstance()->IsTabletModeWindowManagerEnabled()) {
return;
}
const display::Screen* screen = display::Screen::GetScreen();
display::Display current_display =
screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
if (current_display.id() != new_display.id() ||
!(changed_metrics & display::DisplayObserver::DISPLAY_METRIC_ROTATION)) {
return;
}
Orientation target_orientation = SizeToOrientation(new_display.size());
if (orientation_ == target_orientation)
return;
expected_orientation_ = target_orientation;
EnsureCompositorIsLockedForOrientationChange();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static int uipc_main_init(void)
{
int i;
pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr);
pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE);
pthread_mutex_init(&uipc_main.mutex, &attr);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("### uipc_main_init ###");
/* setup interrupt socket pair */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, uipc_main.signal_fds) < 0)
{
return -1;
}
FD_SET(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &uipc_main.active_set);
uipc_main.max_fd = MAX(uipc_main.max_fd, uipc_main.signal_fds[0]);
for (i=0; i< UIPC_CH_NUM; i++)
{
tUIPC_CHAN *p = &uipc_main.ch[i];
p->srvfd = UIPC_DISCONNECTED;
p->fd = UIPC_DISCONNECTED;
p->task_evt_flags = 0;
pthread_cond_init(&p->cond, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&p->cond_mutex, NULL);
p->cback = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int uipc_main_init(void)
{
int i;
pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr);
pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE);
pthread_mutex_init(&uipc_main.mutex, &attr);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("### uipc_main_init ###");
/* setup interrupt socket pair */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, uipc_main.signal_fds) < 0)
{
return -1;
}
FD_SET(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &uipc_main.active_set);
uipc_main.max_fd = MAX(uipc_main.max_fd, uipc_main.signal_fds[0]);
for (i=0; i< UIPC_CH_NUM; i++)
{
tUIPC_CHAN *p = &uipc_main.ch[i];
p->srvfd = UIPC_DISCONNECTED;
p->fd = UIPC_DISCONNECTED;
p->task_evt_flags = 0;
pthread_cond_init(&p->cond, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&p->cond_mutex, NULL);
p->cback = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1212
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1212/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c08ed56a3e5089b3cc4094e83daae196a6300c4
|
0c08ed56a3e5089b3cc4094e83daae196a6300c4
|
[Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
|
Message(const String& text) : type(MessageTypeText), text(text) {}
|
Message(const String& text) : type(MessageTypeText), text(text) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
void SafeSock::getStat(unsigned long &noMsgs,
unsigned long &noWhole,
unsigned long &noDeleted,
unsigned long &avgMsgSize,
unsigned long &szComplete,
unsigned long &szDeleted)
{
noMsgs = _noMsgs;
noWhole = _whole;
noDeleted = _deleted;
avgMsgSize = _outMsg.getAvgMsgSize();
szComplete = _avgSwhole;
szDeleted = _avgSdeleted;
}
|
void SafeSock::getStat(unsigned long &noMsgs,
unsigned long &noWhole,
unsigned long &noDeleted,
unsigned long &avgMsgSize,
unsigned long &szComplete,
unsigned long &szDeleted)
{
noMsgs = _noMsgs;
noWhole = _whole;
noDeleted = _deleted;
avgMsgSize = _outMsg.getAvgMsgSize();
szComplete = _avgSwhole;
szDeleted = _avgSdeleted;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
u8 kvm_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
u8 mtrr;
mtrr = get_mtrr_type(&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + PAGE_SIZE);
if (mtrr == 0xfe || mtrr == 0xff)
mtrr = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
return mtrr;
}
|
u8 kvm_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
u8 mtrr;
mtrr = get_mtrr_type(&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + PAGE_SIZE);
if (mtrr == 0xfe || mtrr == 0xff)
mtrr = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
return mtrr;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetPrivateNetworkInfo(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
NetworkLibrary* network_library = CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
const chromeos::VirtualNetworkVector& virtual_networks =
network_library->virtual_networks();
if (network_library->virtual_network())
return_value->SetString("connected",
network_library->virtual_network()->service_path());
for (chromeos::VirtualNetworkVector::const_iterator iter =
virtual_networks.begin(); iter != virtual_networks.end(); ++iter) {
const chromeos::VirtualNetwork* virt = *iter;
DictionaryValue* item = new DictionaryValue;
item->SetString("name", virt->name());
item->SetString("provider_type",
VPNProviderTypeToString(virt->provider_type()));
item->SetString("hostname", virt->server_hostname());
item->SetString("key", virt->psk_passphrase());
item->SetString("cert_nss", virt->ca_cert_nss());
item->SetString("cert_id", virt->client_cert_id());
item->SetString("username", virt->username());
item->SetString("password", virt->user_passphrase());
return_value->Set(virt->service_path(), item);
}
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendSuccess(return_value.get());
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetPrivateNetworkInfo(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
NetworkLibrary* network_library = CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
const chromeos::VirtualNetworkVector& virtual_networks =
network_library->virtual_networks();
if (network_library->virtual_network())
return_value->SetString("connected",
network_library->virtual_network()->service_path());
for (chromeos::VirtualNetworkVector::const_iterator iter =
virtual_networks.begin(); iter != virtual_networks.end(); ++iter) {
const chromeos::VirtualNetwork* virt = *iter;
DictionaryValue* item = new DictionaryValue;
item->SetString("name", virt->name());
item->SetString("provider_type",
VPNProviderTypeToString(virt->provider_type()));
item->SetString("hostname", virt->server_hostname());
item->SetString("key", virt->psk_passphrase());
item->SetString("cert_nss", virt->ca_cert_nss());
item->SetString("cert_id", virt->client_cert_id());
item->SetString("username", virt->username());
item->SetString("password", virt->user_passphrase());
return_value->Set(virt->service_path(), item);
}
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendSuccess(return_value.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3835/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
|
void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5185/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
[Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
void AutofillPopupItemView::OnMouseExited(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
AutofillPopupController* controller = popup_view_->controller();
if (controller)
controller->SelectionCleared();
}
|
void AutofillPopupItemView::OnMouseExited(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
AutofillPopupController* controller = popup_view_->controller();
if (controller)
controller->SelectionCleared();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int64 BuildCommitCommand::GetGap() {
return 1LL << 20;
}
|
int64 BuildCommitCommand::GetGap() {
return 1LL << 20;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4462
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4462/
|
CWE-20
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=8f9b304c4f6c0a98dafa61b2c0e4beb3b70e4c84
|
8f9b304c4f6c0a98dafa61b2c0e4beb3b70e4c84
| null |
AviaryScheddPlugin::initialize()
{
static bool skip = false;
if (skip) return; skip = true;
ClassAd *ad = GetNextJob(1);
while (ad != NULL) {
MyString key;
PROC_ID id;
int value;
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_CLUSTER_ID, id.cluster)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_CLUSTER_ID);
}
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_PROC_ID, id.proc)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_PROC_ID);
}
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_JOB_STATUS, value)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_JOB_STATUS);
}
key.sprintf("%d.%d", id.cluster, id.proc);
processJob(key.Value(), ATTR_JOB_STATUS, value);
FreeJobAd(ad);
ad = GetNextJob(0);
}
m_initialized = true;
}
|
AviaryScheddPlugin::initialize()
{
static bool skip = false;
if (skip) return; skip = true;
ClassAd *ad = GetNextJob(1);
while (ad != NULL) {
MyString key;
PROC_ID id;
int value;
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_CLUSTER_ID, id.cluster)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_CLUSTER_ID);
}
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_PROC_ID, id.proc)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_PROC_ID);
}
if (!ad->LookupInteger(ATTR_JOB_STATUS, value)) {
EXCEPT("%s on job is missing or not an integer", ATTR_JOB_STATUS);
}
key.sprintf("%d.%d", id.cluster, id.proc);
processJob(key.Value(), ATTR_JOB_STATUS, value);
FreeJobAd(ad);
ad = GetNextJob(0);
}
m_initialized = true;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3375/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/13d518074a952d33d47c428419693f63389547e9
|
13d518074a952d33d47c428419693f63389547e9
|
epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <[email protected]>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int ep_send_events_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *head,
void *priv)
{
struct ep_send_events_data *esed = priv;
int eventcnt;
unsigned int revents;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event __user *uevent;
poll_table pt;
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
/*
* We can loop without lock because we are passed a task private list.
* Items cannot vanish during the loop because ep_scan_ready_list() is
* holding "mtx" during this call.
*/
for (eventcnt = 0, uevent = esed->events;
!list_empty(head) && eventcnt < esed->maxevents;) {
epi = list_first_entry(head, struct epitem, rdllink);
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
pt._key = epi->event.events;
revents = epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, &pt) &
epi->event.events;
/*
* If the event mask intersect the caller-requested one,
* deliver the event to userspace. Again, ep_scan_ready_list()
* is holding "mtx", so no operations coming from userspace
* can change the item.
*/
if (revents) {
if (__put_user(revents, &uevent->events) ||
__put_user(epi->event.data, &uevent->data)) {
list_add(&epi->rdllink, head);
return eventcnt ? eventcnt : -EFAULT;
}
eventcnt++;
uevent++;
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLONESHOT)
epi->event.events &= EP_PRIVATE_BITS;
else if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLET)) {
/*
* If this file has been added with Level
* Trigger mode, we need to insert back inside
* the ready list, so that the next call to
* epoll_wait() will check again the events
* availability. At this point, no one can insert
* into ep->rdllist besides us. The epoll_ctl()
* callers are locked out by
* ep_scan_ready_list() holding "mtx" and the
* poll callback will queue them in ep->ovflist.
*/
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
}
}
}
return eventcnt;
}
|
static int ep_send_events_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *head,
void *priv)
{
struct ep_send_events_data *esed = priv;
int eventcnt;
unsigned int revents;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event __user *uevent;
poll_table pt;
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
/*
* We can loop without lock because we are passed a task private list.
* Items cannot vanish during the loop because ep_scan_ready_list() is
* holding "mtx" during this call.
*/
for (eventcnt = 0, uevent = esed->events;
!list_empty(head) && eventcnt < esed->maxevents;) {
epi = list_first_entry(head, struct epitem, rdllink);
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
pt._key = epi->event.events;
revents = epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, &pt) &
epi->event.events;
/*
* If the event mask intersect the caller-requested one,
* deliver the event to userspace. Again, ep_scan_ready_list()
* is holding "mtx", so no operations coming from userspace
* can change the item.
*/
if (revents) {
if (__put_user(revents, &uevent->events) ||
__put_user(epi->event.data, &uevent->data)) {
list_add(&epi->rdllink, head);
return eventcnt ? eventcnt : -EFAULT;
}
eventcnt++;
uevent++;
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLONESHOT)
epi->event.events &= EP_PRIVATE_BITS;
else if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLET)) {
/*
* If this file has been added with Level
* Trigger mode, we need to insert back inside
* the ready list, so that the next call to
* epoll_wait() will check again the events
* availability. At this point, no one can insert
* into ep->rdllist besides us. The epoll_ctl()
* callers are locked out by
* ep_scan_ready_list() holding "mtx" and the
* poll callback will queue them in ep->ovflist.
*/
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
}
}
}
return eventcnt;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
bool MaybeGetOverriddenURL(WebDocumentLoader* document_loader, GURL* output) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
if (document_state->was_load_data_with_base_url_request()) {
*output = document_state->data_url();
return true;
}
if (document_loader->HasUnreachableURL()) {
*output = document_loader->UnreachableURL();
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool MaybeGetOverriddenURL(WebDocumentLoader* document_loader, GURL* output) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
if (document_state->was_load_data_with_base_url_request()) {
*output = document_state->data_url();
return true;
}
if (document_loader->HasUnreachableURL()) {
*output = document_loader->UnreachableURL();
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11375/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68
|
041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68
|
Fix crash in anal.avr
|
INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
if (len < 4) {
return;
}
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
|
INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 1 |
CVE-2019-15924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15924/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
|
static bool fm10k_can_reuse_rx_page(struct fm10k_rx_buffer *rx_buffer,
struct page *page,
unsigned int __maybe_unused truesize)
{
/* avoid re-using remote pages */
if (unlikely(fm10k_page_is_reserved(page)))
return false;
#if (PAGE_SIZE < 8192)
/* if we are only owner of page we can reuse it */
if (unlikely(page_count(page) != 1))
return false;
/* flip page offset to other buffer */
rx_buffer->page_offset ^= FM10K_RX_BUFSZ;
#else
/* move offset up to the next cache line */
rx_buffer->page_offset += truesize;
if (rx_buffer->page_offset > (PAGE_SIZE - FM10K_RX_BUFSZ))
return false;
#endif
/* Even if we own the page, we are not allowed to use atomic_set()
* This would break get_page_unless_zero() users.
*/
page_ref_inc(page);
return true;
}
|
static bool fm10k_can_reuse_rx_page(struct fm10k_rx_buffer *rx_buffer,
struct page *page,
unsigned int __maybe_unused truesize)
{
/* avoid re-using remote pages */
if (unlikely(fm10k_page_is_reserved(page)))
return false;
#if (PAGE_SIZE < 8192)
/* if we are only owner of page we can reuse it */
if (unlikely(page_count(page) != 1))
return false;
/* flip page offset to other buffer */
rx_buffer->page_offset ^= FM10K_RX_BUFSZ;
#else
/* move offset up to the next cache line */
rx_buffer->page_offset += truesize;
if (rx_buffer->page_offset > (PAGE_SIZE - FM10K_RX_BUFSZ))
return false;
#endif
/* Even if we own the page, we are not allowed to use atomic_set()
* This would break get_page_unless_zero() users.
*/
page_ref_inc(page);
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16932/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
inputPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr value)
{
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (value == NULL))
return(-1);
if (ctxt->inputNr >= ctxt->inputMax) {
ctxt->inputMax *= 2;
ctxt->inputTab =
(xmlParserInputPtr *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->inputTab,
ctxt->inputMax *
sizeof(ctxt->inputTab[0]));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeInputStream(value);
ctxt->inputMax /= 2;
value = NULL;
return (-1);
}
}
ctxt->inputTab[ctxt->inputNr] = value;
ctxt->input = value;
return (ctxt->inputNr++);
}
|
inputPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr value)
{
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (value == NULL))
return(-1);
if (ctxt->inputNr >= ctxt->inputMax) {
ctxt->inputMax *= 2;
ctxt->inputTab =
(xmlParserInputPtr *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->inputTab,
ctxt->inputMax *
sizeof(ctxt->inputTab[0]));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeInputStream(value);
ctxt->inputMax /= 2;
value = NULL;
return (-1);
}
}
ctxt->inputTab[ctxt->inputNr] = value;
ctxt->input = value;
return (ctxt->inputNr++);
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6057/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
bool PlatformSensorProviderBase::HasSensors() const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
return !sensor_map_.empty();
}
|
bool PlatformSensorProviderBase::HasSensors() const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
return !sensor_map_.empty();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
Add a setDebugDirtyRegion() feature to the client.
Calling remoting.clientSession.setDebugDirtyRegion(true) enables
rendering of each frame's dirty region with an purple, translucent
overlay.
Currently the dirty region is re-rendered immediately for each frame,
with no linger nor fade-out behaviour.
BUG=427659
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/932013002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#317496}
|
~Picture() { decoder_->RecyclePicture(picture_); }
|
~Picture() { decoder_->RecyclePicture(picture_); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6041/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
|
WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
|
WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7804
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7804/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1ddf72180a52d247db88ea42a3e35f824a8fbda1
|
1ddf72180a52d247db88ea42a3e35f824a8fbda2
| null |
void phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *s;
while ((s = zend_memrchr(filename, '/', filename_len))) {
filename_len = s - filename;
if (!filename_len || FAILURE == zend_hash_add_empty_element(&phar->virtual_dirs, filename, filename_len)) {
break;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
|
void phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *s;
while ((s = zend_memrchr(filename, '/', filename_len))) {
filename_len = s - filename;
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_add_empty_element(&phar->virtual_dirs, filename, filename_len)) {
break;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 1 |
CVE-2016-7916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7916/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct file *exe_file;
task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!mm)
return -ENOENT;
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
mmput(mm);
if (exe_file) {
*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
fput(exe_file);
return 0;
} else
return -ENOENT;
}
|
static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct file *exe_file;
task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!mm)
return -ENOENT;
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
mmput(mm);
if (exe_file) {
*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
fput(exe_file);
return 0;
} else
return -ENOENT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16078/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
[AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
|
const char* ValueForType(ServerFieldType type) {
switch (type) {
case EMPTY_TYPE:
return "";
case NO_SERVER_DATA:
case UNKNOWN_TYPE:
return "unknown";
case COMPANY_NAME:
return "RCA";
case NAME_FIRST:
return "Elvis";
case NAME_MIDDLE:
return "Aaron";
case NAME_LAST:
return "Presley";
case NAME_FULL:
return "Elvis Aaron Presley";
case EMAIL_ADDRESS:
return "[email protected]";
case PHONE_HOME_NUMBER:
case PHONE_HOME_WHOLE_NUMBER:
case PHONE_HOME_CITY_AND_NUMBER:
return "2345678901";
case ADDRESS_HOME_STREET_ADDRESS:
return "123 Apple St.\nunit 6";
case ADDRESS_HOME_LINE1:
return "123 Apple St.";
case ADDRESS_HOME_LINE2:
return "unit 6";
case ADDRESS_HOME_CITY:
return "Lubbock";
case ADDRESS_HOME_STATE:
return "Texas";
case ADDRESS_HOME_ZIP:
return "79401";
case ADDRESS_HOME_COUNTRY:
return "US";
case AMBIGUOUS_TYPE:
CreateAmbiguousProfiles();
return "Decca";
default:
NOTREACHED(); // Fall through
return "unexpected!";
}
}
|
const char* ValueForType(ServerFieldType type) {
switch (type) {
case EMPTY_TYPE:
return "";
case NO_SERVER_DATA:
case UNKNOWN_TYPE:
return "unknown";
case COMPANY_NAME:
return "RCA";
case NAME_FIRST:
return "Elvis";
case NAME_MIDDLE:
return "Aaron";
case NAME_LAST:
return "Presley";
case NAME_FULL:
return "Elvis Aaron Presley";
case EMAIL_ADDRESS:
return "[email protected]";
case PHONE_HOME_NUMBER:
case PHONE_HOME_WHOLE_NUMBER:
case PHONE_HOME_CITY_AND_NUMBER:
return "2345678901";
case ADDRESS_HOME_STREET_ADDRESS:
return "123 Apple St.\nunit 6";
case ADDRESS_HOME_LINE1:
return "123 Apple St.";
case ADDRESS_HOME_LINE2:
return "unit 6";
case ADDRESS_HOME_CITY:
return "Lubbock";
case ADDRESS_HOME_STATE:
return "Texas";
case ADDRESS_HOME_ZIP:
return "79401";
case ADDRESS_HOME_COUNTRY:
return "US";
case AMBIGUOUS_TYPE:
CreateAmbiguousProfiles();
return "Decca";
default:
NOTREACHED(); // Fall through
return "unexpected!";
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline void tg3_full_unlock(struct tg3 *tp)
{
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
}
|
static inline void tg3_full_unlock(struct tg3 *tp)
{
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2927/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4d77eed905ce1d00361282e8822a2a3be61d25c0
|
4d77eed905ce1d00361282e8822a2a3be61d25c0
|
Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
template<class T, size_t n> static void removeFromVector(Vector<T*, n> & vec, T* item)
{
size_t size = vec.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i != size; ++i)
if (vec[i] == item) {
vec.remove(i);
break;
}
}
|
template<class T, size_t n> static void removeFromVector(Vector<T*, n> & vec, T* item)
{
size_t size = vec.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i != size; ++i)
if (vec[i] == item) {
vec.remove(i);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.