CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ChromeURLRequestContext* ResourceMessageFilter::GetRequestContextForURL(
const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(ChromeThread::CurrentlyOn(ChromeThread::IO));
URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter =
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) ?
extensions_request_context_ : request_context_;
return static_cast<ChromeURLRequestContext*>(
context_getter->GetURLRequestContext());
}
|
ChromeURLRequestContext* ResourceMessageFilter::GetRequestContextForURL(
const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(ChromeThread::CurrentlyOn(ChromeThread::IO));
URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter =
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) ?
extensions_request_context_ : request_context_;
return static_cast<ChromeURLRequestContext*>(
context_getter->GetURLRequestContext());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_exchange_id *exid)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
__be32 *p;
char *major_id;
char *server_scope;
int major_id_sz;
int server_scope_sz;
int status = 0;
uint64_t minor_id = 0;
if (nfserr)
return nfserr;
major_id = utsname()->nodename;
major_id_sz = strlen(major_id);
server_scope = utsname()->nodename;
server_scope_sz = strlen(server_scope);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr,
8 /* eir_clientid */ +
4 /* eir_sequenceid */ +
4 /* eir_flags */ +
4 /* spr_how */);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &exid->clientid, 8);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->seqid);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->flags);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->spa_how);
switch (exid->spa_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
break;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
/* spo_must_enforce bitmap: */
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
exid->spo_must_enforce[0],
exid->spo_must_enforce[1],
exid->spo_must_enforce[2]);
if (status)
goto out;
/* spo_must_allow bitmap: */
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
exid->spo_must_allow[0],
exid->spo_must_allow[1],
exid->spo_must_allow[2]);
if (status)
goto out;
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
}
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr,
8 /* so_minor_id */ +
4 /* so_major_id.len */ +
(XDR_QUADLEN(major_id_sz) * 4) +
4 /* eir_server_scope.len */ +
(XDR_QUADLEN(server_scope_sz) * 4) +
4 /* eir_server_impl_id.count (0) */);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
/* The server_owner struct */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, minor_id); /* Minor id */
/* major id */
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, major_id, major_id_sz);
/* Server scope */
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, server_scope, server_scope_sz);
/* Implementation id */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* zero length nfs_impl_id4 array */
return 0;
out:
return status;
}
|
nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_exchange_id *exid)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
__be32 *p;
char *major_id;
char *server_scope;
int major_id_sz;
int server_scope_sz;
int status = 0;
uint64_t minor_id = 0;
if (nfserr)
return nfserr;
major_id = utsname()->nodename;
major_id_sz = strlen(major_id);
server_scope = utsname()->nodename;
server_scope_sz = strlen(server_scope);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr,
8 /* eir_clientid */ +
4 /* eir_sequenceid */ +
4 /* eir_flags */ +
4 /* spr_how */);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &exid->clientid, 8);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->seqid);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->flags);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(exid->spa_how);
switch (exid->spa_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
break;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
/* spo_must_enforce bitmap: */
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
exid->spo_must_enforce[0],
exid->spo_must_enforce[1],
exid->spo_must_enforce[2]);
if (status)
goto out;
/* spo_must_allow bitmap: */
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
exid->spo_must_allow[0],
exid->spo_must_allow[1],
exid->spo_must_allow[2]);
if (status)
goto out;
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
}
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr,
8 /* so_minor_id */ +
4 /* so_major_id.len */ +
(XDR_QUADLEN(major_id_sz) * 4) +
4 /* eir_server_scope.len */ +
(XDR_QUADLEN(server_scope_sz) * 4) +
4 /* eir_server_impl_id.count (0) */);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
/* The server_owner struct */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, minor_id); /* Minor id */
/* major id */
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, major_id, major_id_sz);
/* Server scope */
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, server_scope, server_scope_sz);
/* Implementation id */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* zero length nfs_impl_id4 array */
return 0;
out:
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11447
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11447/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8c10b9247509c0484b55330458846115131ec2ae
|
8c10b9247509c0484b55330458846115131ec2ae
|
Fixed potential memory leak.
|
static Image *ReadSCREENSHOTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
{
BITMAPINFO
bmi;
DISPLAY_DEVICE
device;
HBITMAP
bitmap,
bitmapOld;
HDC
bitmapDC,
hDC;
Image
*screen;
int
i;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
RGBTRIPLE
*p;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
i=0;
device.cb = sizeof(device);
image=(Image *) NULL;
while(EnumDisplayDevices(NULL,i,&device,0) && ++i)
{
if ((device.StateFlags & DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE) != DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE)
continue;
hDC=CreateDC(device.DeviceName,device.DeviceName,NULL,NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
screen=AcquireImage(image_info);
screen->columns=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,HORZRES);
screen->rows=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,VERTRES);
screen->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=screen;
else
AppendImageToList(&image,screen);
status=SetImageExtent(screen,screen->columns,screen->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
bitmapDC=CreateCompatibleDC(hDC);
if (bitmapDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmi,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
bmi.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
bmi.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) screen->columns;
bmi.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) screen->rows;
bmi.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
bmi.bmiHeader.biBitCount=24;
bmi.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
bitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&bmi,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &p,NULL,0);
if (bitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
bitmapOld=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmap);
if (bitmapOld == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
BitBlt(bitmapDC,0,0,(int) screen->columns,(int) screen->rows,hDC,0,0,
SRCCOPY);
(void) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmapOld);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) screen->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(screen,0,y,screen->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) screen->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(screen,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
}
}
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*option;
XImportInfo
ximage_info;
(void) exception;
XGetImportInfo(&ximage_info);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:screen");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.screen=IsMagickTrue(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:silent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.silent=IsMagickTrue(option);
image=XImportImage(image_info,&ximage_info);
}
#endif
return(image);
}
|
static Image *ReadSCREENSHOTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
{
BITMAPINFO
bmi;
DISPLAY_DEVICE
device;
HBITMAP
bitmap,
bitmapOld;
HDC
bitmapDC,
hDC;
Image
*screen;
int
i;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
RGBTRIPLE
*p;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
i=0;
device.cb = sizeof(device);
image=(Image *) NULL;
while(EnumDisplayDevices(NULL,i,&device,0) && ++i)
{
if ((device.StateFlags & DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE) != DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE)
continue;
hDC=CreateDC(device.DeviceName,device.DeviceName,NULL,NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
screen=AcquireImage(image_info);
screen->columns=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,HORZRES);
screen->rows=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,VERTRES);
screen->storage_class=DirectClass;
status=SetImageExtent(screen,screen->columns,screen->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=screen;
else
AppendImageToList(&image,screen);
bitmapDC=CreateCompatibleDC(hDC);
if (bitmapDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmi,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
bmi.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
bmi.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) screen->columns;
bmi.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) screen->rows;
bmi.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
bmi.bmiHeader.biBitCount=24;
bmi.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
bitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&bmi,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &p,NULL,0);
if (bitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
bitmapOld=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmap);
if (bitmapOld == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
BitBlt(bitmapDC,0,0,(int) screen->columns,(int) screen->rows,hDC,0,0,
SRCCOPY);
(void) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmapOld);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) screen->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(screen,0,y,screen->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) screen->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(screen,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
}
}
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*option;
XImportInfo
ximage_info;
(void) exception;
XGetImportInfo(&ximage_info);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:screen");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.screen=IsMagickTrue(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:silent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.silent=IsMagickTrue(option);
image=XImportImage(image_info,&ximage_info);
}
#endif
return(image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
vpx_codec_err_t DecodeOneFrame() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder_->DecodeFrame(video_->cxdata(), video_->frame_size());
CheckDecodedFrames();
if (res == VPX_CODEC_OK)
video_->Next();
return res;
}
|
vpx_codec_err_t DecodeOneFrame() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder_->DecodeFrame(video_->cxdata(), video_->frame_size());
CheckDecodedFrames();
if (res == VPX_CODEC_OK)
video_->Next();
return res;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2874/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e
|
c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e
|
DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
DevToolsWindow* OpenDevToolWindowOnWebContents(
content::WebContents* contents) {
content::WindowedNotificationObserver observer(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
DevToolsWindow* window = DevToolsWindow::OpenDevToolsWindow(
contents->GetRenderViewHost());
observer.Wait();
return window;
}
|
DevToolsWindow* OpenDevToolWindowOnWebContents(
content::WebContents* contents) {
content::WindowedNotificationObserver observer(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
DevToolsWindow* window = DevToolsWindow::OpenDevToolsWindow(
contents->GetRenderViewHost());
observer.Wait();
return window;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
__xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
unsigned char *ea_name;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
ea_name = SGI_ACL_FILE;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
ea_name = SGI_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
struct xfs_acl *xfs_acl;
int len = XFS_ACL_MAX_SIZE(ip->i_mount);
xfs_acl = kmem_zalloc_large(len, KM_SLEEP);
if (!xfs_acl)
return -ENOMEM;
xfs_acl_to_disk(xfs_acl, acl);
/* subtract away the unused acl entries */
len -= sizeof(struct xfs_acl_entry) *
(XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(ip->i_mount) - acl->a_count);
error = xfs_attr_set(ip, ea_name, (unsigned char *)xfs_acl,
len, ATTR_ROOT);
kmem_free(xfs_acl);
} else {
/*
* A NULL ACL argument means we want to remove the ACL.
*/
error = xfs_attr_remove(ip, ea_name, ATTR_ROOT);
/*
* If the attribute didn't exist to start with that's fine.
*/
if (error == -ENOATTR)
error = 0;
}
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
|
__xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
unsigned char *ea_name;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
ea_name = SGI_ACL_FILE;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
ea_name = SGI_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
struct xfs_acl *xfs_acl;
int len = XFS_ACL_MAX_SIZE(ip->i_mount);
xfs_acl = kmem_zalloc_large(len, KM_SLEEP);
if (!xfs_acl)
return -ENOMEM;
xfs_acl_to_disk(xfs_acl, acl);
/* subtract away the unused acl entries */
len -= sizeof(struct xfs_acl_entry) *
(XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(ip->i_mount) - acl->a_count);
error = xfs_attr_set(ip, ea_name, (unsigned char *)xfs_acl,
len, ATTR_ROOT);
kmem_free(xfs_acl);
} else {
/*
* A NULL ACL argument means we want to remove the ACL.
*/
error = xfs_attr_remove(ip, ea_name, ATTR_ROOT);
/*
* If the attribute didn't exist to start with that's fine.
*/
if (error == -ENOATTR)
error = 0;
}
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6135/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
|
void WebContentsImpl::WasShown() {
const Visibility previous_visibility = GetVisibility();
controller_.SetActive(true);
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
view->Show();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
view->SetActive(true);
#endif
}
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(true);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasShown(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
last_active_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
should_normally_be_visible_ = true;
NotifyVisibilityChanged(previous_visibility);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::WasShown() {
const Visibility previous_visibility = GetVisibility();
controller_.SetActive(true);
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
view->Show();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
view->SetActive(true);
#endif
}
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(true);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasShown(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
last_active_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
should_normally_be_visible_ = true;
NotifyVisibilityChanged(previous_visibility);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5044/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
void FakeCentral::GetLastWrittenDescriptorValue(
const std::string& descriptor_id,
const std::string& characteristic_id,
const std::string& service_id,
const std::string& peripheral_address,
GetLastWrittenDescriptorValueCallback callback) {
FakeRemoteGattDescriptor* fake_remote_gatt_descriptor =
GetFakeRemoteGattDescriptor(peripheral_address, service_id,
characteristic_id, descriptor_id);
if (!fake_remote_gatt_descriptor) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, base::nullopt);
}
std::move(callback).Run(true,
fake_remote_gatt_descriptor->last_written_value());
}
|
void FakeCentral::GetLastWrittenDescriptorValue(
const std::string& descriptor_id,
const std::string& characteristic_id,
const std::string& service_id,
const std::string& peripheral_address,
GetLastWrittenDescriptorValueCallback callback) {
FakeRemoteGattDescriptor* fake_remote_gatt_descriptor =
GetFakeRemoteGattDescriptor(peripheral_address, service_id,
characteristic_id, descriptor_id);
if (!fake_remote_gatt_descriptor) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, base::nullopt);
}
std::move(callback).Run(true,
fake_remote_gatt_descriptor->last_written_value());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int rtnl_port_self_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct nlattr *port_self;
int err;
port_self = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_PORT_SELF);
if (!port_self)
return -EMSGSIZE;
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_port(dev, PORT_SELF_VF, skb);
if (err) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, port_self);
return (err == -EMSGSIZE) ? err : 0;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, port_self);
return 0;
}
|
static int rtnl_port_self_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct nlattr *port_self;
int err;
port_self = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_PORT_SELF);
if (!port_self)
return -EMSGSIZE;
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_port(dev, PORT_SELF_VF, skb);
if (err) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, port_self);
return (err == -EMSGSIZE) ? err : 0;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, port_self);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607;hp=093fc3b098dc5fadef5d8ad4b225db9fb124758b
|
f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
| null |
move_to_root(cmap_splay *tree, unsigned int x)
{
if (x == EMPTY)
return;
do
{
unsigned int z, zp;
unsigned int y = tree[x].parent;
if (y == EMPTY)
break;
z = tree[y].parent;
if (z == EMPTY)
{
/* Case 3 */
tree[x].parent = EMPTY;
tree[y].parent = x;
if (tree[y].left == x)
{
/* Case 3 */
tree[y].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[y].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].left].parent = y;
tree[x].right = y;
}
else
{
/* Case 3 - reflected */
assert(tree[y].right == x);
tree[y].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[y].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].right].parent = y;
tree[x].left = y;
}
break;
}
zp = tree[z].parent;
tree[x].parent = zp;
if (zp != EMPTY) {
if (tree[zp].left == z)
tree[zp].left = x;
else
{
assert(tree[zp].right == z);
tree[zp].right = x;
}
}
tree[y].parent = x;
if (tree[y].left == x)
{
tree[y].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[y].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].left].parent = y;
tree[x].right = y;
if (tree[z].left == y)
{
/* Case 1 */
tree[z].parent = y;
tree[z].left = tree[y].right;
if (tree[z].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].left].parent = z;
tree[y].right = z;
}
else
{
/* Case 2 - reflected */
assert(tree[z].right == y);
tree[z].parent = x;
tree[z].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[z].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].right].parent = z;
tree[x].left = z;
}
}
else
{
assert(tree[y].right == x);
tree[y].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[y].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].right].parent = y;
tree[x].left = y;
if (tree[z].left == y)
{
/* Case 2 */
tree[z].parent = x;
tree[z].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[z].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].left].parent = z;
tree[x].right = z;
}
else
{
/* Case 1 - reflected */
assert(tree[z].right == y);
tree[z].parent = y;
tree[z].right = tree[y].left;
if (tree[z].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].right].parent = z;
tree[y].left = z;
}
}
} while (1);
}
|
move_to_root(cmap_splay *tree, unsigned int x)
{
if (x == EMPTY)
return;
do
{
unsigned int z, zp;
unsigned int y = tree[x].parent;
if (y == EMPTY)
break;
z = tree[y].parent;
if (z == EMPTY)
{
/* Case 3 */
tree[x].parent = EMPTY;
tree[y].parent = x;
if (tree[y].left == x)
{
/* Case 3 */
tree[y].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[y].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].left].parent = y;
tree[x].right = y;
}
else
{
/* Case 3 - reflected */
assert(tree[y].right == x);
tree[y].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[y].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].right].parent = y;
tree[x].left = y;
}
break;
}
zp = tree[z].parent;
tree[x].parent = zp;
if (zp != EMPTY) {
if (tree[zp].left == z)
tree[zp].left = x;
else
{
assert(tree[zp].right == z);
tree[zp].right = x;
}
}
tree[y].parent = x;
if (tree[y].left == x)
{
tree[y].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[y].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].left].parent = y;
tree[x].right = y;
if (tree[z].left == y)
{
/* Case 1 */
tree[z].parent = y;
tree[z].left = tree[y].right;
if (tree[z].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].left].parent = z;
tree[y].right = z;
}
else
{
/* Case 2 - reflected */
assert(tree[z].right == y);
tree[z].parent = x;
tree[z].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[z].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].right].parent = z;
tree[x].left = z;
}
}
else
{
assert(tree[y].right == x);
tree[y].right = tree[x].left;
if (tree[y].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[y].right].parent = y;
tree[x].left = y;
if (tree[z].left == y)
{
/* Case 2 */
tree[z].parent = x;
tree[z].left = tree[x].right;
if (tree[z].left != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].left].parent = z;
tree[x].right = z;
}
else
{
/* Case 1 - reflected */
assert(tree[z].right == y);
tree[z].parent = y;
tree[z].right = tree[y].left;
if (tree[z].right != EMPTY)
tree[tree[z].right].parent = z;
tree[y].left = z;
}
}
} while (1);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5035/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::CancelPendingReload() {
DCHECK(pending_reload_ != ReloadType::NONE);
pending_reload_ = ReloadType::NONE;
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::CancelPendingReload() {
DCHECK(pending_reload_ != ReloadType::NONE);
pending_reload_ = ReloadType::NONE;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6386/
|
CWE-772
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/?id=737c3350850ca4dbc5633b3bdb4118176ce59920
|
737c3350850ca4dbc5633b3bdb4118176ce59920
| null |
int vrend_create_shader(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
const struct pipe_stream_output_info *so_info,
const char *shd_text, uint32_t offlen, uint32_t num_tokens,
uint32_t type, uint32_t pkt_length)
{
struct vrend_shader_selector *sel = NULL;
int ret_handle;
bool new_shader = true, long_shader = false;
bool finished = false;
int ret;
if (type > PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY)
return EINVAL;
if (offlen & VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT)
new_shader = false;
else if (((offlen + 3) / 4) > pkt_length)
long_shader = true;
/* if we have an in progress one - don't allow a new shader
of that type or a different handle. */
if (ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type]) {
if (new_shader == true)
return EINVAL;
if (handle != ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type])
return EINVAL;
}
if (new_shader) {
sel = vrend_create_shader_state(ctx, so_info, type);
if (sel == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (long_shader) {
sel->buf_len = ((offlen + 3) / 4) * 4; /* round up buffer size */
sel->tmp_buf = malloc(sel->buf_len);
if (!sel->tmp_buf) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset = pkt_length * 4;
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = handle;
} else
finished = true;
} else {
sel = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (!sel) {
fprintf(stderr, "got continuation without original shader %d\n", handle);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
offlen &= ~VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT;
if (offlen != sel->buf_offset) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got mismatched shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
offlen, sel->buf_offset);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
/*make sure no overflow */
if (pkt_length * 4 < pkt_length ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < pkt_length * 4 ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < sel->buf_offset) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if ((pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset) > sel->buf_len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got too large shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset, sel->buf_len);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf + sel->buf_offset, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset += pkt_length * 4;
if (sel->buf_offset >= sel->buf_len) {
finished = true;
shd_text = sel->tmp_buf;
}
}
if (finished) {
struct tgsi_token *tokens;
tokens = calloc(num_tokens + 10, sizeof(struct tgsi_token));
if (!tokens) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_dump_shaders)
fprintf(stderr,"shader\n%s\n", shd_text);
if (!tgsi_text_translate((const char *)shd_text, tokens, num_tokens + 10)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_finish_shader(ctx, sel, tokens)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
} else {
free(sel->tmp_buf);
sel->tmp_buf = NULL;
}
free(tokens);
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = 0;
}
if (new_shader) {
ret_handle = vrend_renderer_object_insert(ctx, sel, sizeof(*sel), handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (ret_handle == 0) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
if (new_shader)
vrend_destroy_shader_selector(sel);
else
vrend_renderer_object_destroy(ctx, handle);
return ret;
}
|
int vrend_create_shader(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
const struct pipe_stream_output_info *so_info,
const char *shd_text, uint32_t offlen, uint32_t num_tokens,
uint32_t type, uint32_t pkt_length)
{
struct vrend_shader_selector *sel = NULL;
int ret_handle;
bool new_shader = true, long_shader = false;
bool finished = false;
int ret;
if (type > PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY)
return EINVAL;
if (offlen & VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT)
new_shader = false;
else if (((offlen + 3) / 4) > pkt_length)
long_shader = true;
/* if we have an in progress one - don't allow a new shader
of that type or a different handle. */
if (ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type]) {
if (new_shader == true)
return EINVAL;
if (handle != ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type])
return EINVAL;
}
if (new_shader) {
sel = vrend_create_shader_state(ctx, so_info, type);
if (sel == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (long_shader) {
sel->buf_len = ((offlen + 3) / 4) * 4; /* round up buffer size */
sel->tmp_buf = malloc(sel->buf_len);
if (!sel->tmp_buf) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset = pkt_length * 4;
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = handle;
} else
finished = true;
} else {
sel = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (!sel) {
fprintf(stderr, "got continuation without original shader %d\n", handle);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
offlen &= ~VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT;
if (offlen != sel->buf_offset) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got mismatched shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
offlen, sel->buf_offset);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
/*make sure no overflow */
if (pkt_length * 4 < pkt_length ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < pkt_length * 4 ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < sel->buf_offset) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if ((pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset) > sel->buf_len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got too large shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset, sel->buf_len);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf + sel->buf_offset, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset += pkt_length * 4;
if (sel->buf_offset >= sel->buf_len) {
finished = true;
shd_text = sel->tmp_buf;
}
}
if (finished) {
struct tgsi_token *tokens;
tokens = calloc(num_tokens + 10, sizeof(struct tgsi_token));
if (!tokens) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_dump_shaders)
fprintf(stderr,"shader\n%s\n", shd_text);
if (!tgsi_text_translate((const char *)shd_text, tokens, num_tokens + 10)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_finish_shader(ctx, sel, tokens)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
} else {
free(sel->tmp_buf);
sel->tmp_buf = NULL;
}
free(tokens);
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = 0;
}
if (new_shader) {
ret_handle = vrend_renderer_object_insert(ctx, sel, sizeof(*sel), handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (ret_handle == 0) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
if (new_shader)
vrend_destroy_shader_selector(sel);
else
vrend_renderer_object_destroy(ctx, handle);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
virglrenderer
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, int active)
{
u8 *p = object;
if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->objsize - 1);
p[s->objsize - 1] = POISON_END;
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
memset(p + s->objsize,
active ? SLUB_RED_ACTIVE : SLUB_RED_INACTIVE,
s->inuse - s->objsize);
}
|
static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, int active)
{
u8 *p = object;
if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->objsize - 1);
p[s->objsize - 1] = POISON_END;
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
memset(p + s->objsize,
active ? SLUB_RED_ACTIVE : SLUB_RED_INACTIVE,
s->inuse - s->objsize);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
static ssize_t stream_ssl_read_cb(RedsStream *s, void *buf, size_t size)
{
int return_code;
SPICE_GNUC_UNUSED int ssl_error;
return_code = SSL_read(s->ssl, buf, size);
if (return_code < 0) {
ssl_error = SSL_get_error(s->ssl, return_code);
}
return return_code;
}
|
static ssize_t stream_ssl_read_cb(RedsStream *s, void *buf, size_t size)
{
int return_code;
SPICE_GNUC_UNUSED int ssl_error;
return_code = SSL_read(s->ssl, buf, size);
if (return_code < 0) {
ssl_error = SSL_get_error(s->ssl, return_code);
}
return return_code;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6074
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6074/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c59ad14fc61393a50b2ca3e89c7ecaba7028c4c4
|
c59ad14fc61393a50b2ca3e89c7ecaba7028c4c4
|
DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
|
void HeadlessPrintManager::OnShowInvalidPrinterSettingsError() {
ReleaseJob(INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS);
}
|
void HeadlessPrintManager::OnShowInvalidPrinterSettingsError() {
ReleaseJob(INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int closing_count() const { return closing_count_; }
|
int closing_count() const { return closing_count_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
gpu: Use GetUniformSetup computed result size.
[email protected]
BUG=468936
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1016193003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#321489}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers() {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
int this_frame_number = frame_number_++;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("test_gpu", "SwapBuffersLatency",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"GLImpl", static_cast<int>(gfx::GetGLImplementation()),
"width", (is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_.width() :
surface_->GetSize().width()));
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers",
"offscreen", is_offscreen,
"frame", this_frame_number);
{
TRACE_EVENT_SYNTHETIC_DELAY("gpu.PresentingFrame");
}
ScopedGPUTrace scoped_gpu_trace(gpu_tracer_.get(), kTraceDecoder,
"gpu_toplevel", "SwapBuffer");
bool is_tracing;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("gpu.debug"),
&is_tracing);
if (is_tracing) {
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, GetBackbufferServiceId());
gpu_state_tracer_->TakeSnapshotWithCurrentFramebuffer(
is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_ : surface_->GetSize());
}
if (is_offscreen) {
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "Offscreen",
"width", offscreen_size_.width(), "height", offscreen_size_.height());
if (offscreen_size_ != offscreen_saved_color_texture_->size()) {
if (workarounds().needs_offscreen_buffer_workaround) {
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->Create();
glFinish();
}
DCHECK(offscreen_saved_color_format_);
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_saved_color_format_, false);
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_saved_color_texture_.get());
if (offscreen_size_.width() != 0 && offscreen_size_.height() != 0) {
if (offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->CheckStatus() !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "because offscreen saved FBO was incomplete.";
LoseContext(GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB);
return;
}
{
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this,
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->id());
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, 0);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT);
RestoreClearState();
}
}
UpdateParentTextureInfo();
}
if (offscreen_size_.width() == 0 || offscreen_size_.height() == 0)
return;
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers", GetErrorState());
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, true, false);
} else {
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this,
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->id());
if (offscreen_target_buffer_preserved_) {
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->Copy(
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->size(),
offscreen_saved_color_format_);
} else {
if (!!offscreen_saved_color_texture_info_.get())
offscreen_saved_color_texture_info_->texture()->
SetServiceId(offscreen_target_color_texture_->id());
offscreen_saved_color_texture_.swap(offscreen_target_color_texture_);
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_target_color_texture_.get());
}
if (!feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_angle)
glFlush();
}
} else {
if (!surface_->SwapBuffers()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Context lost because SwapBuffers failed.";
LoseContext(GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB);
}
}
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers() {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
int this_frame_number = frame_number_++;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("test_gpu", "SwapBuffersLatency",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"GLImpl", static_cast<int>(gfx::GetGLImplementation()),
"width", (is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_.width() :
surface_->GetSize().width()));
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers",
"offscreen", is_offscreen,
"frame", this_frame_number);
{
TRACE_EVENT_SYNTHETIC_DELAY("gpu.PresentingFrame");
}
ScopedGPUTrace scoped_gpu_trace(gpu_tracer_.get(), kTraceDecoder,
"gpu_toplevel", "SwapBuffer");
bool is_tracing;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("gpu.debug"),
&is_tracing);
if (is_tracing) {
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, GetBackbufferServiceId());
gpu_state_tracer_->TakeSnapshotWithCurrentFramebuffer(
is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_ : surface_->GetSize());
}
if (is_offscreen) {
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "Offscreen",
"width", offscreen_size_.width(), "height", offscreen_size_.height());
if (offscreen_size_ != offscreen_saved_color_texture_->size()) {
if (workarounds().needs_offscreen_buffer_workaround) {
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->Create();
glFinish();
}
DCHECK(offscreen_saved_color_format_);
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_saved_color_format_, false);
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_saved_color_texture_.get());
if (offscreen_size_.width() != 0 && offscreen_size_.height() != 0) {
if (offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->CheckStatus() !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "because offscreen saved FBO was incomplete.";
LoseContext(GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB);
return;
}
{
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this,
offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->id());
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, 0);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT);
RestoreClearState();
}
}
UpdateParentTextureInfo();
}
if (offscreen_size_.width() == 0 || offscreen_size_.height() == 0)
return;
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffers", GetErrorState());
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, true, false);
} else {
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this,
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->id());
if (offscreen_target_buffer_preserved_) {
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->Copy(
offscreen_saved_color_texture_->size(),
offscreen_saved_color_format_);
} else {
if (!!offscreen_saved_color_texture_info_.get())
offscreen_saved_color_texture_info_->texture()->
SetServiceId(offscreen_target_color_texture_->id());
offscreen_saved_color_texture_.swap(offscreen_target_color_texture_);
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_target_color_texture_.get());
}
if (!feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_angle)
glFlush();
}
} else {
if (!surface_->SwapBuffers()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Context lost because SwapBuffers failed.";
LoseContext(GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB);
}
}
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2915
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2915/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::SetScreenshotManager(
WebContentsScreenshotManager* manager) {
screenshot_manager_.reset(manager ? manager :
new WebContentsScreenshotManager(this));
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::SetScreenshotManager(
WebContentsScreenshotManager* manager) {
screenshot_manager_.reset(manager ? manager :
new WebContentsScreenshotManager(this));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6076
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6076/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f8f6ed59949be4451ee2f5443d8a313f102fde60
|
f8f6ed59949be4451ee2f5443d8a313f102fde60
|
Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
|
const char* RemoveURLWhitespace(const char* input,
int input_len,
CanonOutputT<char>* buffer,
int* output_len,
bool* potentially_dangling_markup) {
return DoRemoveURLWhitespace(input, input_len, buffer, output_len,
potentially_dangling_markup);
}
|
const char* RemoveURLWhitespace(const char* input,
int input_len,
CanonOutputT<char>* buffer,
int* output_len,
bool* potentially_dangling_markup) {
return DoRemoveURLWhitespace(input, input_len, buffer, output_len,
potentially_dangling_markup);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
void TestRenderWidgetHostView::UnlockMouse() {
}
|
void TestRenderWidgetHostView::UnlockMouse() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
|
ofputil_ipfix_stats_from_nx(struct ofputil_ipfix_stats *is,
const struct nx_ipfix_stats_reply *reply)
{
is->collector_set_id = ntohl(reply->collector_set_id);
is->total_flows = ntohll(reply->total_flows);
is->current_flows = ntohll(reply->current_flows);
is->pkts = ntohll(reply->pkts);
is->ipv4_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv4_pkts);
is->ipv6_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv6_pkts);
is->error_pkts = ntohll(reply->error_pkts);
is->ipv4_error_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv4_error_pkts);
is->ipv6_error_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv6_error_pkts);
is->tx_pkts = ntohll(reply->tx_pkts);
is->tx_errors = ntohll(reply->tx_errors);
return 0;
}
|
ofputil_ipfix_stats_from_nx(struct ofputil_ipfix_stats *is,
const struct nx_ipfix_stats_reply *reply)
{
is->collector_set_id = ntohl(reply->collector_set_id);
is->total_flows = ntohll(reply->total_flows);
is->current_flows = ntohll(reply->current_flows);
is->pkts = ntohll(reply->pkts);
is->ipv4_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv4_pkts);
is->ipv6_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv6_pkts);
is->error_pkts = ntohll(reply->error_pkts);
is->ipv4_error_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv4_error_pkts);
is->ipv6_error_pkts = ntohll(reply->ipv6_error_pkts);
is->tx_pkts = ntohll(reply->tx_pkts);
is->tx_errors = ntohll(reply->tx_errors);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearUnclearedRenderbuffers(
GLenum target, FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* info) {
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
GLbitfield clear_bits = 0;
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0)) {
glClearColor(
0, 0, 0,
(GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
info->GetColorAttachmentFormat()) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
glColorMask(true, true, true, true);
clear_bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearStencil(0);
glStencilMask(-1);
clear_bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearDepth(1.0f);
glDepthMask(true);
clear_bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
}
glDisable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
glClear(clear_bits);
info->MarkAttachedRenderbuffersAsCleared();
RestoreClearState();
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearUnclearedRenderbuffers(
GLenum target, FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* info) {
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
GLbitfield clear_bits = 0;
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0)) {
glClearColor(
0, 0, 0,
(GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
info->GetColorAttachmentFormat()) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
glColorMask(true, true, true, true);
clear_bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearStencil(0);
glStencilMask(-1);
clear_bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearDepth(1.0f);
glDepthMask(true);
clear_bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
}
glDisable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
glClear(clear_bits);
info->MarkAttachedRenderbuffersAsCleared();
RestoreClearState();
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0592/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/acc192347665943ca674acf117e4f74a88436922
|
acc192347665943ca674acf117e4f74a88436922
|
FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
|
FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mWriteBuffer(NULL),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
auth_pin_reset(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int type,
struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* Oberthur unblock style: PUK value is a SOPIN */
rv = auth_pin_reset_oberthur_style(card, SC_AC_CHV, data, tries_left);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Oberthur style 'PIN RESET' failed");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
|
auth_pin_reset(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int type,
struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* Oberthur unblock style: PUK value is a SOPIN */
rv = auth_pin_reset_oberthur_style(card, SC_AC_CHV, data, tries_left);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Oberthur style 'PIN RESET' failed");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static int cm_migrate(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
if (cm_id->state == IB_CM_ESTABLISHED &&
(cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT ||
cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_IDLE)) {
cm_id->lap_state = IB_CM_LAP_IDLE;
cm_id_priv->av = cm_id_priv->alt_av;
} else
ret = -EINVAL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
|
static int cm_migrate(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
if (cm_id->state == IB_CM_ESTABLISHED &&
(cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT ||
cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_IDLE)) {
cm_id->lap_state = IB_CM_LAP_IDLE;
cm_id_priv->av = cm_id_priv->alt_av;
} else
ret = -EINVAL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13106/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commits/master
|
master
|
Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
ulong post_word_load(void)
{
void* addr = (void *) (gd->ram_size - BOOTCOUNT_ADDR + POST_WORD_OFF);
return in_le32(addr);
}
|
ulong post_word_load(void)
{
void* addr = (void *) (gd->ram_size - BOOTCOUNT_ADDR + POST_WORD_OFF);
return in_le32(addr);
}
|
C
|
u-boot
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9940
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9940/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t type_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
switch (rdev->desc->type) {
case REGULATOR_VOLTAGE:
return sprintf(buf, "voltage\n");
case REGULATOR_CURRENT:
return sprintf(buf, "current\n");
}
return sprintf(buf, "unknown\n");
}
|
static ssize_t type_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
switch (rdev->desc->type) {
case REGULATOR_VOLTAGE:
return sprintf(buf, "voltage\n");
case REGULATOR_CURRENT:
return sprintf(buf, "current\n");
}
return sprintf(buf, "unknown\n");
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3835/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
OMX_U32 omx_venc::dev_set_message_thread_id(pthread_t tid)
{
return handle->venc_set_message_thread_id(tid);
}
|
OMX_U32 omx_venc::dev_set_message_thread_id(pthread_t tid)
{
return handle->venc_set_message_thread_id(tid);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
Implement NPN_RemoveProperty
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43315
Reviewed by Sam Weinig.
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Plugins/NPJSObject.cpp:
(WebKit::NPJSObject::removeProperty):
Try to remove the property.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::npClass):
Add NP_RemoveProperty.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::NP_RemoveProperty):
Call NPJSObject::removeProperty.
* WebProcess/Plugins/Netscape/NetscapeBrowserFuncs.cpp:
(WebKit::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Call the NPClass::removeProperty function.
WebKitTools:
* DumpRenderTree/DumpRenderTree.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.cpp:
(PluginTest::NPN_GetStringIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_GetIntIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Add NPN_ helpers.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.h:
Support more NPClass functions.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/Tests/NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp: Added.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPRuntimeRemoveProperty):
Test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::hasMethod):
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::invoke):
Add a testRemoveProperty method.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPP_GetValue):
Return the test object.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/win/TestNetscapePlugin.vcproj:
* DumpRenderTree/qt/TestNetscapePlugin/TestNetscapePlugin.pro:
* GNUmakefile.am:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
LayoutTests:
Add a test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property-expected.txt: Added.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool NPN_Invoke(NPP, NPObject *npObject, NPIdentifier methodName, const NPVariant* arguments, uint32_t argumentCount, NPVariant* result)
{
if (npObject->_class->invoke)
return npObject->_class->invoke(npObject, methodName, arguments, argumentCount, result);
return false;
}
|
static bool NPN_Invoke(NPP, NPObject *npObject, NPIdentifier methodName, const NPVariant* arguments, uint32_t argumentCount, NPVariant* result)
{
if (npObject->_class->invoke)
return npObject->_class->invoke(npObject, methodName, arguments, argumentCount, result);
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3363
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3363/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33
|
70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33
|
cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
tlink_rb_search(struct rb_root *root, uid_t uid)
{
struct rb_node *node = root->rb_node;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (node) {
tlink = rb_entry(node, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
if (tlink->tl_uid > uid)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (tlink->tl_uid < uid)
node = node->rb_right;
else
return tlink;
}
return NULL;
}
|
tlink_rb_search(struct rb_root *root, uid_t uid)
{
struct rb_node *node = root->rb_node;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (node) {
tlink = rb_entry(node, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
if (tlink->tl_uid > uid)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (tlink->tl_uid < uid)
node = node->rb_right;
else
return tlink;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1791/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc
|
98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc
|
Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
/*
* For extended master secret we've already digested cached
* records.
*/
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
} else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
|
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
/*
* For extended master secret we've already digested cached
* records.
*/
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
} else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2010-3702
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-3702/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
|
e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
| null |
GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef *xref, Dict *resDict, GfxResources *nextA) :
gStateCache(2, xref) {
Object obj1, obj2;
Ref r;
if (resDict) {
fonts = NULL;
resDict->lookupNF("Font", &obj1);
if (obj1.isRef()) {
obj1.fetch(xref, &obj2);
if (obj2.isDict()) {
r = obj1.getRef();
fonts = new GfxFontDict(xref, &r, obj2.getDict());
}
obj2.free();
} else if (obj1.isDict()) {
fonts = new GfxFontDict(xref, NULL, obj1.getDict());
}
obj1.free();
resDict->lookup("XObject", &xObjDict);
resDict->lookup("ColorSpace", &colorSpaceDict);
resDict->lookup("Pattern", &patternDict);
resDict->lookup("Shading", &shadingDict);
resDict->lookup("ExtGState", &gStateDict);
resDict->lookup("Properties", &propertiesDict);
} else {
fonts = NULL;
xObjDict.initNull();
colorSpaceDict.initNull();
patternDict.initNull();
shadingDict.initNull();
gStateDict.initNull();
propertiesDict.initNull();
}
next = nextA;
}
|
GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef *xref, Dict *resDict, GfxResources *nextA) :
gStateCache(2, xref) {
Object obj1, obj2;
Ref r;
if (resDict) {
fonts = NULL;
resDict->lookupNF("Font", &obj1);
if (obj1.isRef()) {
obj1.fetch(xref, &obj2);
if (obj2.isDict()) {
r = obj1.getRef();
fonts = new GfxFontDict(xref, &r, obj2.getDict());
}
obj2.free();
} else if (obj1.isDict()) {
fonts = new GfxFontDict(xref, NULL, obj1.getDict());
}
obj1.free();
resDict->lookup("XObject", &xObjDict);
resDict->lookup("ColorSpace", &colorSpaceDict);
resDict->lookup("Pattern", &patternDict);
resDict->lookup("Shading", &shadingDict);
resDict->lookup("ExtGState", &gStateDict);
resDict->lookup("Properties", &propertiesDict);
} else {
fonts = NULL;
xObjDict.initNull();
colorSpaceDict.initNull();
patternDict.initNull();
shadingDict.initNull();
gStateDict.initNull();
propertiesDict.initNull();
}
next = nextA;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1444
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1444/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
fst_clear_intr(struct fst_card_info *card)
{
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
(void) readb(card->ctlmem);
} else {
/* Poke the appropriate PLX chip register (same as enabling interrupts)
*/
outw(0x0543, card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9052);
}
}
|
fst_clear_intr(struct fst_card_info *card)
{
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
(void) readb(card->ctlmem);
} else {
/* Poke the appropriate PLX chip register (same as enabling interrupts)
*/
outw(0x0543, card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9052);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::~ChromeWebUIControllerFactory() {
}
|
ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::~ChromeWebUIControllerFactory() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0891/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58936737b65052775b67b1409b87edbbbc09f72b
|
58936737b65052775b67b1409b87edbbbc09f72b
|
Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int BlobURLRequestJob::ComputeBytesToRead() const {
int64 current_item_length = item_length_list_[current_item_index_];
int64 item_remaining = current_item_length - current_item_offset_;
int64 buf_remaining = read_buf_->BytesRemaining();
int64 max_remaining = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
int64 min = std::min(std::min(std::min(item_remaining,
buf_remaining),
remaining_bytes_),
max_remaining);
return static_cast<int>(min);
}
|
int BlobURLRequestJob::ComputeBytesToRead() const {
int64 current_item_remaining_bytes =
item_length_list_[current_item_index_] - current_item_offset_;
int64 remaining_bytes = std::min(current_item_remaining_bytes,
remaining_bytes_);
return static_cast<int>(std::min(
static_cast<int64>(read_buf_->BytesRemaining()),
remaining_bytes));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5216/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
[pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
|
void PDFiumEngine::SearchUsingICU(const base::string16& term,
bool case_sensitive,
bool first_search,
int character_to_start_searching_from,
int current_page) {
base::string16 page_text;
int text_length = pages_[current_page]->GetCharCount();
if (character_to_start_searching_from) {
text_length -= character_to_start_searching_from;
} else if (!first_search &&
last_character_index_to_search_ != -1 &&
current_page == last_page_to_search_) {
text_length = last_character_index_to_search_;
}
if (text_length <= 0)
return;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferAdapter<base::string16> api_string_adapter(&page_text,
text_length,
false);
unsigned short* data =
reinterpret_cast<unsigned short*>(api_string_adapter.GetData());
int written = FPDFText_GetText(pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(),
character_to_start_searching_from,
text_length,
data);
api_string_adapter.Close(written);
std::vector<PDFEngine::Client::SearchStringResult> results;
client_->SearchString(
page_text.c_str(), term.c_str(), case_sensitive, &results);
for (const auto& result : results) {
int temp_start = result.start_index + character_to_start_searching_from;
int start = FPDFText_GetCharIndexFromTextIndex(
pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(), temp_start);
int end = FPDFText_GetCharIndexFromTextIndex(
pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(),
temp_start + result.length);
AddFindResult(PDFiumRange(pages_[current_page], start, end - start));
}
}
|
void PDFiumEngine::SearchUsingICU(const base::string16& term,
bool case_sensitive,
bool first_search,
int character_to_start_searching_from,
int current_page) {
base::string16 page_text;
int text_length = pages_[current_page]->GetCharCount();
if (character_to_start_searching_from) {
text_length -= character_to_start_searching_from;
} else if (!first_search &&
last_character_index_to_search_ != -1 &&
current_page == last_page_to_search_) {
text_length = last_character_index_to_search_;
}
if (text_length <= 0)
return;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferAdapter<base::string16> api_string_adapter(&page_text,
text_length,
false);
unsigned short* data =
reinterpret_cast<unsigned short*>(api_string_adapter.GetData());
int written = FPDFText_GetText(pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(),
character_to_start_searching_from,
text_length,
data);
api_string_adapter.Close(written);
std::vector<PDFEngine::Client::SearchStringResult> results;
client_->SearchString(
page_text.c_str(), term.c_str(), case_sensitive, &results);
for (const auto& result : results) {
int temp_start = result.start_index + character_to_start_searching_from;
int start = FPDFText_GetCharIndexFromTextIndex(
pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(), temp_start);
int end = FPDFText_GetCharIndexFromTextIndex(
pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(),
temp_start + result.length);
AddFindResult(PDFiumRange(pages_[current_page], start, end - start));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13225/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
|
extern void onig_add_end_call(void (*func)(void))
{
EndCallListItemType* item;
item = (EndCallListItemType* )xmalloc(sizeof(*item));
if (item == 0) return ;
item->next = EndCallTop;
item->func = func;
EndCallTop = item;
}
|
extern void onig_add_end_call(void (*func)(void))
{
EndCallListItemType* item;
item = (EndCallListItemType* )xmalloc(sizeof(*item));
if (item == 0) return ;
item->next = EndCallTop;
item->func = func;
EndCallTop = item;
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset > 0 && offset < end_offset) {
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
}
return offset;
}
|
dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset < end_offset)
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 1 |
CVE-2011-1080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1080/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a
|
d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a
|
bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
static int copy_counters_to_user(struct ebt_table *t,
const struct ebt_counter *oldcounters,
void __user *user, unsigned int num_counters,
unsigned int nentries)
{
struct ebt_counter *counterstmp;
int ret = 0;
/* userspace might not need the counters */
if (num_counters == 0)
return 0;
if (num_counters != nentries) {
BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
counterstmp = vmalloc(nentries * sizeof(*counterstmp));
if (!counterstmp)
return -ENOMEM;
write_lock_bh(&t->lock);
get_counters(oldcounters, counterstmp, nentries);
write_unlock_bh(&t->lock);
if (copy_to_user(user, counterstmp,
nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter)))
ret = -EFAULT;
vfree(counterstmp);
return ret;
}
|
static int copy_counters_to_user(struct ebt_table *t,
const struct ebt_counter *oldcounters,
void __user *user, unsigned int num_counters,
unsigned int nentries)
{
struct ebt_counter *counterstmp;
int ret = 0;
/* userspace might not need the counters */
if (num_counters == 0)
return 0;
if (num_counters != nentries) {
BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
counterstmp = vmalloc(nentries * sizeof(*counterstmp));
if (!counterstmp)
return -ENOMEM;
write_lock_bh(&t->lock);
get_counters(oldcounters, counterstmp, nentries);
write_unlock_bh(&t->lock);
if (copy_to_user(user, counterstmp,
nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter)))
ret = -EFAULT;
vfree(counterstmp);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __init dccp_v4_init(void)
{
int err = proto_register(&dccp_v4_prot, 1);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = inet_add_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (err != 0)
goto out_proto_unregister;
inet_register_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
err = register_pernet_subsys(&dccp_v4_ops);
if (err)
goto out_destroy_ctl_sock;
out:
return err;
out_destroy_ctl_sock:
inet_unregister_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
inet_del_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
out_proto_unregister:
proto_unregister(&dccp_v4_prot);
goto out;
}
|
static int __init dccp_v4_init(void)
{
int err = proto_register(&dccp_v4_prot, 1);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = inet_add_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (err != 0)
goto out_proto_unregister;
inet_register_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
err = register_pernet_subsys(&dccp_v4_ops);
if (err)
goto out_destroy_ctl_sock;
out:
return err;
out_destroy_ctl_sock:
inet_unregister_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
inet_del_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
out_proto_unregister:
proto_unregister(&dccp_v4_prot);
goto out;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
GfxColorSpace *GfxCalRGBColorSpace::copy() {
GfxCalRGBColorSpace *cs;
int i;
cs = new GfxCalRGBColorSpace();
cs->whiteX = whiteX;
cs->whiteY = whiteY;
cs->whiteZ = whiteZ;
cs->blackX = blackX;
cs->blackY = blackY;
cs->blackZ = blackZ;
cs->gammaR = gammaR;
cs->gammaG = gammaG;
cs->gammaB = gammaB;
for (i = 0; i < 9; ++i) {
cs->mat[i] = mat[i];
}
return cs;
}
|
GfxColorSpace *GfxCalRGBColorSpace::copy() {
GfxCalRGBColorSpace *cs;
int i;
cs = new GfxCalRGBColorSpace();
cs->whiteX = whiteX;
cs->whiteY = whiteY;
cs->whiteZ = whiteZ;
cs->blackX = blackX;
cs->blackY = blackY;
cs->blackZ = blackZ;
cs->gammaR = gammaR;
cs->gammaG = gammaG;
cs->gammaB = gammaB;
for (i = 0; i < 9; ++i) {
cs->mat[i] = mat[i];
}
return cs;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10133
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10133/
|
CWE-119
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mujs.git;a=commit;h=77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24
|
77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24
| null |
void js_free(js_State *J, void *ptr)
{
J->alloc(J->actx, ptr, 0);
}
|
void js_free(js_State *J, void *ptr)
{
J->alloc(J->actx, ptr, 0);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2799/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void webkit_web_view_load_string(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* content, const gchar* mimeType, const gchar* encoding, const gchar* baseUri)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
g_return_if_fail(content);
WebKitWebFrame* frame = webView->priv->mainFrame;
webkit_web_frame_load_string(frame, content, mimeType, encoding, baseUri);
}
|
void webkit_web_view_load_string(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* content, const gchar* mimeType, const gchar* encoding, const gchar* baseUri)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
g_return_if_fail(content);
WebKitWebFrame* frame = webView->priv->mainFrame;
webkit_web_frame_load_string(frame, content, mimeType, encoding, baseUri);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
void ConversionContext::SwitchToChunkState(const PaintChunk& chunk) {
chunk_to_layer_mapper_.SwitchToChunk(chunk);
const auto& chunk_state = chunk.properties;
SwitchToEffect(chunk_state.Effect());
SwitchToClip(chunk_state.Clip());
SwitchToTransform(chunk_state.Transform());
}
|
void ConversionContext::SwitchToChunkState(const PaintChunk& chunk) {
chunk_to_layer_mapper_.SwitchToChunk(chunk);
const auto& chunk_state = chunk.properties;
SwitchToEffect(chunk_state.Effect());
SwitchToClip(chunk_state.Clip());
SwitchToTransform(chunk_state.Transform());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::show(WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
DCHECK(!did_show_) << "received extraneous Show call";
DCHECK(opener_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
if (did_show_)
return;
did_show_ = true;
if (content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->AllowPopup(creator_url_))
opened_by_user_gesture_ = true;
if (!opened_by_user_gesture_) {
if (policy != WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab)
policy = WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewPopup;
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ShowView(opener_id_, routing_id_,
NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy), initial_pos_,
opened_by_user_gesture_));
SetPendingWindowRect(initial_pos_);
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::show(WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
DCHECK(!did_show_) << "received extraneous Show call";
DCHECK(opener_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
if (did_show_)
return;
did_show_ = true;
if (content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->AllowPopup(creator_url_))
opened_by_user_gesture_ = true;
if (!opened_by_user_gesture_) {
if (policy != WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab)
policy = WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewPopup;
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ShowView(opener_id_, routing_id_,
NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy), initial_pos_,
opened_by_user_gesture_));
SetPendingWindowRect(initial_pos_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1601/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_propagate_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault)
{
if (mmu_is_nested(vcpu) && !fault->nested_page_fault)
vcpu->arch.nested_mmu.inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
else
vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
}
|
void kvm_propagate_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault)
{
if (mmu_is_nested(vcpu) && !fault->nested_page_fault)
vcpu->arch.nested_mmu.inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
else
vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1f6ba4c1c488be710013f8548ff5513b32a7f3b
|
a1f6ba4c1c488be710013f8548ff5513b32a7f3b
|
Define DEBUG_GL_COMMANDS only in debug builds.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=74083
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
No tests added as this change does not affect functionality.
* platform/graphics/opengl/TextureMapperGL.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@102359 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void TextureMapperGL::bindSurface(BitmapTexture *surfacePointer)
{
BitmapTextureGL* surface = static_cast<BitmapTextureGL*>(surfacePointer);
if (!surface) {
GL_CMD(glBindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, 0))
data().projectionMatrix = createProjectionMatrix(viewportSize(), true).multiply(transform());
GL_CMD(glStencilFunc(data().globalGLData.stencilIndex > 1 ? GL_EQUAL : GL_ALWAYS, data().globalGLData.stencilIndex - 1, data().globalGLData.stencilIndex - 1))
GL_CMD(glStencilOp(GL_KEEP, GL_KEEP, GL_KEEP))
GL_CMD(glViewport(0, 0, viewportSize().width(), viewportSize().height()))
return;
}
surface->bind();
}
|
void TextureMapperGL::bindSurface(BitmapTexture *surfacePointer)
{
BitmapTextureGL* surface = static_cast<BitmapTextureGL*>(surfacePointer);
if (!surface) {
GL_CMD(glBindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, 0))
data().projectionMatrix = createProjectionMatrix(viewportSize(), true).multiply(transform());
GL_CMD(glStencilFunc(data().globalGLData.stencilIndex > 1 ? GL_EQUAL : GL_ALWAYS, data().globalGLData.stencilIndex - 1, data().globalGLData.stencilIndex - 1))
GL_CMD(glStencilOp(GL_KEEP, GL_KEEP, GL_KEEP))
GL_CMD(glViewport(0, 0, viewportSize().width(), viewportSize().height()))
return;
}
surface->bind();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0823
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0823/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce
|
ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce
|
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void release_task_mempolicy(struct proc_maps_private *priv)
{
mpol_put(priv->task_mempolicy);
}
|
static void release_task_mempolicy(struct proc_maps_private *priv)
{
mpol_put(priv->task_mempolicy);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0281/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
snmp_input(int operation, netsnmp_session * session, int reqid, netsnmp_pdu * pdu, void *magic)
{
return 1;
}
|
snmp_input(int operation, netsnmp_session * session, int reqid, netsnmp_pdu * pdu, void *magic)
{
return 1;
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::CaptureProfilePhoto(
Browser* browser,
DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
chromeos::TakePhotoDialog* take_photo_dialog =
new chromeos::TakePhotoDialog(NULL);
take_photo_dialog->AddObserver(new PhotoCaptureObserver(
this, reply_message));
views::Widget* window = browser::CreateViewsWindow(
browser->window()->GetNativeHandle(), take_photo_dialog, STYLE_GENERIC);
window->SetAlwaysOnTop(true);
window->Show();
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::CaptureProfilePhoto(
Browser* browser,
DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
chromeos::TakePhotoDialog* take_photo_dialog =
new chromeos::TakePhotoDialog(NULL);
take_photo_dialog->AddObserver(new PhotoCaptureObserver(
this, reply_message));
views::Widget* window = browser::CreateViewsWindow(
browser->window()->GetNativeHandle(), take_photo_dialog, STYLE_GENERIC);
window->SetAlwaysOnTop(true);
window->Show();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_set_document_root(request_rec *r, const char *document_root)
{
core_request_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->request_config);
conf->document_root = document_root;
}
|
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_set_document_root(request_rec *r, const char *document_root)
{
core_request_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->request_config);
conf->document_root = document_root;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tipc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int lvl, int opt,
char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tsk_set_importance(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
tsk_set_unreliable(tsk, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
tsk_set_unreturnable(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
static int tipc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int lvl, int opt,
char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tsk_set_importance(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
tsk_set_unreliable(tsk, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
tsk_set_unreturnable(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4591
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4591/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d3e91a89b7adbc2831334def9e494dd9892f9af
|
7d3e91a89b7adbc2831334def9e494dd9892f9af
|
NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static struct nfs4_createdata *nfs4_alloc_createdata(struct inode *dir,
struct qstr *name, struct iattr *sattr, u32 ftype)
{
struct nfs4_createdata *data;
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (data != NULL) {
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
data->msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CREATE];
data->msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
data->msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
data->arg.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir);
data->arg.server = server;
data->arg.name = name;
data->arg.attrs = sattr;
data->arg.ftype = ftype;
data->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
data->res.server = server;
data->res.fh = &data->fh;
data->res.fattr = &data->fattr;
nfs_fattr_init(data->res.fattr);
}
return data;
}
|
static struct nfs4_createdata *nfs4_alloc_createdata(struct inode *dir,
struct qstr *name, struct iattr *sattr, u32 ftype)
{
struct nfs4_createdata *data;
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (data != NULL) {
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
data->msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CREATE];
data->msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
data->msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
data->arg.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir);
data->arg.server = server;
data->arg.name = name;
data->arg.attrs = sattr;
data->arg.ftype = ftype;
data->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
data->res.server = server;
data->res.fh = &data->fh;
data->res.fattr = &data->fattr;
nfs_fattr_init(data->res.fattr);
}
return data;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9665/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
|
b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
| null |
Render_Gray_Glyph( RAS_ARG )
{
Long pixel_width;
FT_Error error;
Set_High_Precision( RAS_VARS ras.outline.flags &
FT_OUTLINE_HIGH_PRECISION );
ras.scale_shift = ras.precision_shift + 1;
if ( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_IGNORE_DROPOUTS )
ras.dropOutControl = 2;
else
{
if ( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_SMART_DROPOUTS )
ras.dropOutControl = 4;
else
ras.dropOutControl = 0;
if ( !( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_INCLUDE_STUBS ) )
ras.dropOutControl += 1;
}
ras.second_pass = !( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_SINGLE_PASS );
/* Vertical Sweep */
ras.band_top = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_min = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_max = 2 * ras.target.rows - 1;
ras.bWidth = ras.gray_width;
pixel_width = 2 * ( ( ras.target.width + 3 ) >> 2 );
if ( ras.bWidth > pixel_width )
ras.bWidth = pixel_width;
ras.bWidth = ras.bWidth * 8;
ras.bTarget = (Byte*)ras.gray_lines;
ras.gTarget = (Byte*)ras.target.buffer;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Init = Vertical_Gray_Sweep_Init;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Span = Vertical_Sweep_Span;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Drop = Vertical_Sweep_Drop;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Step = Vertical_Gray_Sweep_Step;
error = Render_Single_Pass( RAS_VARS 0 );
if ( error )
return error;
/* Horizontal Sweep */
if ( ras.second_pass && ras.dropOutControl != 2 )
{
ras.Proc_Sweep_Init = Horizontal_Sweep_Init;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Span = Horizontal_Gray_Sweep_Span;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Drop = Horizontal_Gray_Sweep_Drop;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Step = Horizontal_Sweep_Step;
ras.band_top = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_min = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_max = ras.target.width * 2 - 1;
error = Render_Single_Pass( RAS_VARS 1 );
if ( error )
return error;
}
return Raster_Err_None;
}
|
Render_Gray_Glyph( RAS_ARG )
{
Long pixel_width;
FT_Error error;
Set_High_Precision( RAS_VARS ras.outline.flags &
FT_OUTLINE_HIGH_PRECISION );
ras.scale_shift = ras.precision_shift + 1;
if ( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_IGNORE_DROPOUTS )
ras.dropOutControl = 2;
else
{
if ( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_SMART_DROPOUTS )
ras.dropOutControl = 4;
else
ras.dropOutControl = 0;
if ( !( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_INCLUDE_STUBS ) )
ras.dropOutControl += 1;
}
ras.second_pass = !( ras.outline.flags & FT_OUTLINE_SINGLE_PASS );
/* Vertical Sweep */
ras.band_top = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_min = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_max = 2 * ras.target.rows - 1;
ras.bWidth = ras.gray_width;
pixel_width = 2 * ( ( ras.target.width + 3 ) >> 2 );
if ( ras.bWidth > pixel_width )
ras.bWidth = pixel_width;
ras.bWidth = ras.bWidth * 8;
ras.bTarget = (Byte*)ras.gray_lines;
ras.gTarget = (Byte*)ras.target.buffer;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Init = Vertical_Gray_Sweep_Init;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Span = Vertical_Sweep_Span;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Drop = Vertical_Sweep_Drop;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Step = Vertical_Gray_Sweep_Step;
error = Render_Single_Pass( RAS_VARS 0 );
if ( error )
return error;
/* Horizontal Sweep */
if ( ras.second_pass && ras.dropOutControl != 2 )
{
ras.Proc_Sweep_Init = Horizontal_Sweep_Init;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Span = Horizontal_Gray_Sweep_Span;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Drop = Horizontal_Gray_Sweep_Drop;
ras.Proc_Sweep_Step = Horizontal_Sweep_Step;
ras.band_top = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_min = 0;
ras.band_stack[0].y_max = ras.target.width * 2 - 1;
error = Render_Single_Pass( RAS_VARS 1 );
if ( error )
return error;
}
return Raster_Err_None;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5735
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5735/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/pornel/pngquant/commit/b7c217680cda02dddced245d237ebe8c383be285
|
b7c217680cda02dddced245d237ebe8c383be285
|
Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
|
static void rwpng_error_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
rwpng_png_image *mainprog_ptr;
/* This function, aside from the extra step of retrieving the "error
* pointer" (below) and the fact that it exists within the application
* rather than within libpng, is essentially identical to libpng's
* default error handler. The second point is critical: since both
* setjmp() and longjmp() are called from the same code, they are
* guaranteed to have compatible notions of how big a jmp_buf is,
* regardless of whether _BSD_SOURCE or anything else has (or has not)
* been defined. */
fprintf(stderr, " error: %s (libpng failed)\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
mainprog_ptr = png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr);
if (mainprog_ptr == NULL) abort();
longjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf, 1);
}
|
static void rwpng_error_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
rwpng_png_image *mainprog_ptr;
/* This function, aside from the extra step of retrieving the "error
* pointer" (below) and the fact that it exists within the application
* rather than within libpng, is essentially identical to libpng's
* default error handler. The second point is critical: since both
* setjmp() and longjmp() are called from the same code, they are
* guaranteed to have compatible notions of how big a jmp_buf is,
* regardless of whether _BSD_SOURCE or anything else has (or has not)
* been defined. */
fprintf(stderr, " error: %s (libpng failed)\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
mainprog_ptr = png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr);
if (mainprog_ptr == NULL) abort();
longjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf, 1);
}
|
C
|
pngquant
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6838a29ecb484c97e4efef9429643b9851fba6e
|
e6838a29ecb484c97e4efef9429643b9851fba6e
|
nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
|
static bool nfsd_needs_lockd(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V3)
return (nfsd_versions[2] != NULL) || (nfsd_versions[3] != NULL);
#else
return (nfsd_versions[2] != NULL);
#endif
}
|
static bool nfsd_needs_lockd(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V3)
return (nfsd_versions[2] != NULL) || (nfsd_versions[3] != NULL);
#else
return (nfsd_versions[2] != NULL);
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
SetClientPointer(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr device)
{
int rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, device, DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!IsMaster(device)) {
ErrorF("[dix] Need master device for ClientPointer. This is a bug.\n");
return BadDevice;
}
else if (!device->spriteInfo->spriteOwner) {
ErrorF("[dix] Device %d does not have a sprite. "
"Cannot be ClientPointer\n", device->id);
return BadDevice;
}
client->clientPtr = device;
return Success;
}
|
SetClientPointer(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr device)
{
int rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, device, DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!IsMaster(device)) {
ErrorF("[dix] Need master device for ClientPointer. This is a bug.\n");
return BadDevice;
}
else if (!device->spriteInfo->spriteOwner) {
ErrorF("[dix] Device %d does not have a sprite. "
"Cannot be ClientPointer\n", device->id);
return BadDevice;
}
client->clientPtr = device;
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4485
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4485/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd
|
b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd
|
net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int llc_wait_data(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
int rc;
while (1) {
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
rc = sock_error(sk);
if (rc)
break;
rc = 0;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
rc = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
rc = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
rc = 0;
if (sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo, NULL))
break;
}
return rc;
}
|
static int llc_wait_data(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
int rc;
while (1) {
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
rc = sock_error(sk);
if (rc)
break;
rc = 0;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
rc = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
rc = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
rc = 0;
if (sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo, NULL))
break;
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18187/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/83c9f495ffe70c7dd280b41fdfd4881485a3bc28
|
83c9f495ffe70c7dd280b41fdfd4881485a3bc28
|
Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
|
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
/*
* 0 . 1 ext identifier
* 2 . 3 ext length
* 4 . 5 protocol list length
* 6 . 6 protocol name length
* 7 . 7+n protocol name
*/
buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF );
*olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF );
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF );
buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 );
}
|
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
/*
* 0 . 1 ext identifier
* 2 . 3 ext length
* 4 . 5 protocol list length
* 6 . 6 protocol name length
* 7 . 7+n protocol name
*/
buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF );
*olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF );
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF );
buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 );
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=a890a2f9137ac3cf5b607649e66a6f3a5512d8dc
|
a890a2f9137ac3cf5b607649e66a6f3a5512d8dc
| null |
static inline void vring_used_idx_set(VirtQueue *vq, uint16_t val)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, idx);
stw_phys(&address_space_memory, pa, val);
}
|
static inline void vring_used_idx_set(VirtQueue *vq, uint16_t val)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, idx);
stw_phys(&address_space_memory, pa, val);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int __cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct bf_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
unsigned int bsize = BF_BLOCK_SIZE;
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
u64 *src = (u64 *)walk->src.virt.addr;
u64 *dst = (u64 *)walk->dst.virt.addr;
u64 *iv = (u64 *)walk->iv;
do {
*dst = *src ^ *iv;
blowfish_enc_blk(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)dst);
iv = dst;
src += 1;
dst += 1;
nbytes -= bsize;
} while (nbytes >= bsize);
*(u64 *)walk->iv = *iv;
return nbytes;
}
|
static unsigned int __cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct bf_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
unsigned int bsize = BF_BLOCK_SIZE;
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
u64 *src = (u64 *)walk->src.virt.addr;
u64 *dst = (u64 *)walk->dst.virt.addr;
u64 *iv = (u64 *)walk->iv;
do {
*dst = *src ^ *iv;
blowfish_enc_blk(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)dst);
iv = dst;
src += 1;
dst += 1;
nbytes -= bsize;
} while (nbytes >= bsize);
*(u64 *)walk->iv = *iv;
return nbytes;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18445
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18445/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
{
struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs);
if (!p)
return -ENOENT;
return p - env->subprog_info;
}
|
static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
{
struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs);
if (!p)
return -ENOENT;
return p - env->subprog_info;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::CreateWebUI(const GURL& url,
const std::string& frame_name) {
WebUIImpl* web_ui = new WebUIImpl(this, frame_name);
WebUIController* controller = WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->
CreateWebUIControllerForURL(web_ui, url);
if (controller) {
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(new GenericHandler());
web_ui->SetController(controller);
return web_ui;
}
delete web_ui;
return NULL;
}
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::CreateWebUI(const GURL& url,
const std::string& frame_name) {
WebUIImpl* web_ui = new WebUIImpl(this, frame_name);
WebUIController* controller = WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->
CreateWebUIControllerForURL(web_ui, url);
if (controller) {
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(new GenericHandler());
web_ui->SetController(controller);
return web_ui;
}
delete web_ui;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int rps_ipi_queued(struct softnet_data *sd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
struct softnet_data *mysd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
if (sd != mysd) {
sd->rps_ipi_next = mysd->rps_ipi_list;
mysd->rps_ipi_list = sd;
__raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_RX_SOFTIRQ);
return 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_RPS */
return 0;
}
|
static int rps_ipi_queued(struct softnet_data *sd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
struct softnet_data *mysd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
if (sd != mysd) {
sd->rps_ipi_next = mysd->rps_ipi_list;
mysd->rps_ipi_list = sd;
__raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_RX_SOFTIRQ);
return 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_RPS */
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2440
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2440/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a
|
a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a
|
Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
|
int IPCThreadState::setupPolling(int* fd)
{
if (mProcess->mDriverFD <= 0) {
return -EBADF;
}
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ENTER_LOOPER);
*fd = mProcess->mDriverFD;
return 0;
}
|
int IPCThreadState::setupPolling(int* fd)
{
if (mProcess->mDriverFD <= 0) {
return -EBADF;
}
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ENTER_LOOPER);
*fd = mProcess->mDriverFD;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
gpu: Use GetUniformSetup computed result size.
[email protected]
BUG=468936
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1016193003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#321489}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckUniformForApiType(
const Program::UniformInfo* info,
const char* function_name,
Program::UniformApiType api_type) {
DCHECK(info);
if ((api_type & info->accepts_api_type) == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"wrong uniform function for type");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckUniformForApiType(
const Program::UniformInfo* info,
const char* function_name,
Program::UniformApiType api_type) {
DCHECK(info);
if ((api_type & info->accepts_api_type) == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"wrong uniform function for type");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
cancel_file_info_for_file (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file)
{
if (directory->details->get_info_file == file)
{
file_info_cancel (directory);
}
}
|
cancel_file_info_for_file (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file)
{
if (directory->details->get_info_file == file)
{
file_info_cancel (directory);
}
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18216/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/853bc26a7ea39e354b9f8889ae7ad1492ffa28d2
|
853bc26a7ea39e354b9f8889ae7ad1492ffa28d2
|
ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void o2nm_undepend_this_node(void)
{
struct o2nm_node *local_node;
local_node = o2nm_get_node_by_num(o2nm_this_node());
BUG_ON(!local_node);
o2nm_undepend_item(&local_node->nd_item);
o2nm_node_put(local_node);
}
|
void o2nm_undepend_this_node(void)
{
struct o2nm_node *local_node;
local_node = o2nm_get_node_by_num(o2nm_this_node());
BUG_ON(!local_node);
o2nm_undepend_item(&local_node->nd_item);
o2nm_node_put(local_node);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14357/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
static void cmd_parse_myrights(struct ImapData *idata, const char *s)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling MYRIGHTS\n");
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
/* zero out current rights set */
memset(idata->ctx->rights, 0, sizeof(idata->ctx->rights));
while (*s && !isspace((unsigned char) *s))
{
switch (*s)
{
case 'a':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_ADMIN);
break;
case 'e':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_EXPUNGE);
break;
case 'i':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_INSERT);
break;
case 'k':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_CREATE);
break;
case 'l':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_LOOKUP);
break;
case 'p':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_POST);
break;
case 'r':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_READ);
break;
case 's':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_SEEN);
break;
case 't':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELETE);
break;
case 'w':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_WRITE);
break;
case 'x':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELMX);
break;
/* obsolete rights */
case 'c':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_CREATE);
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELMX);
break;
case 'd':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELETE);
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_EXPUNGE);
break;
default:
mutt_debug(1, "Unknown right: %c\n", *s);
}
s++;
}
}
|
static void cmd_parse_myrights(struct ImapData *idata, const char *s)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling MYRIGHTS\n");
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
/* zero out current rights set */
memset(idata->ctx->rights, 0, sizeof(idata->ctx->rights));
while (*s && !isspace((unsigned char) *s))
{
switch (*s)
{
case 'a':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_ADMIN);
break;
case 'e':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_EXPUNGE);
break;
case 'i':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_INSERT);
break;
case 'k':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_CREATE);
break;
case 'l':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_LOOKUP);
break;
case 'p':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_POST);
break;
case 'r':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_READ);
break;
case 's':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_SEEN);
break;
case 't':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELETE);
break;
case 'w':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_WRITE);
break;
case 'x':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELMX);
break;
/* obsolete rights */
case 'c':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_CREATE);
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELMX);
break;
case 'd':
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_DELETE);
mutt_bit_set(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_EXPUNGE);
break;
default:
mutt_debug(1, "Unknown right: %c\n", *s);
}
s++;
}
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
RenderThreadImpl::render_frame_message_filter() {
if (!render_frame_message_filter_)
GetChannel()->GetRemoteAssociatedInterface(&render_frame_message_filter_);
return render_frame_message_filter_.get();
}
|
RenderThreadImpl::render_frame_message_filter() {
if (!render_frame_message_filter_)
GetChannel()->GetRemoteAssociatedInterface(&render_frame_message_filter_);
return render_frame_message_filter_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
void PeopleHandler::UpdateSyncStatus() {
FireWebUIListener("sync-status-changed", *GetSyncStatusDictionary());
}
|
void PeopleHandler::UpdateSyncStatus() {
FireWebUIListener("sync-status-changed", *GetSyncStatusDictionary());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_do_find_root_sec(struct nfs_server *server,
struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
int mv = server->nfs_client->cl_minorversion;
return nfs_v4_minor_ops[mv]->find_root_sec(server, fhandle, info);
}
|
static int nfs4_do_find_root_sec(struct nfs_server *server,
struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
int mv = server->nfs_client->cl_minorversion;
return nfs_v4_minor_ops[mv]->find_root_sec(server, fhandle, info);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11338
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11338/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/54655623a82632e7624714d7b2a3e039dc5faa7e
|
54655623a82632e7624714d7b2a3e039dc5faa7e
|
avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void set_deblocking_bypass(HEVCContext *s, int x0, int y0, int log2_cb_size)
{
int cb_size = 1 << log2_cb_size;
int log2_min_pu_size = s->ps.sps->log2_min_pu_size;
int min_pu_width = s->ps.sps->min_pu_width;
int x_end = FFMIN(x0 + cb_size, s->ps.sps->width);
int y_end = FFMIN(y0 + cb_size, s->ps.sps->height);
int i, j;
for (j = (y0 >> log2_min_pu_size); j < (y_end >> log2_min_pu_size); j++)
for (i = (x0 >> log2_min_pu_size); i < (x_end >> log2_min_pu_size); i++)
s->is_pcm[i + j * min_pu_width] = 2;
}
|
static void set_deblocking_bypass(HEVCContext *s, int x0, int y0, int log2_cb_size)
{
int cb_size = 1 << log2_cb_size;
int log2_min_pu_size = s->ps.sps->log2_min_pu_size;
int min_pu_width = s->ps.sps->min_pu_width;
int x_end = FFMIN(x0 + cb_size, s->ps.sps->width);
int y_end = FFMIN(y0 + cb_size, s->ps.sps->height);
int i, j;
for (j = (y0 >> log2_min_pu_size); j < (y_end >> log2_min_pu_size); j++)
for (i = (x0 >> log2_min_pu_size); i < (x_end >> log2_min_pu_size); i++)
s->is_pcm[i + j * min_pu_width] = 2;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
void InputHandler::SynthesizeTapGesture(
double x,
double y,
Maybe<int> duration,
Maybe<int> tap_count,
Maybe<std::string> gesture_source_type,
std::unique_ptr<SynthesizeTapGestureCallback> callback) {
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
SyntheticTapGestureParams gesture_params;
const int kDefaultDuration = 50;
const int kDefaultTapCount = 1;
gesture_params.position = CssPixelsToPointF(x, y, page_scale_factor_);
if (!PointIsWithinContents(gesture_params.position)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Position out of bounds"));
return;
}
gesture_params.duration_ms = duration.fromMaybe(kDefaultDuration);
if (!StringToGestureSourceType(
std::move(gesture_source_type),
gesture_params.gesture_source_type)) {
callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("Unknown gestureSourceType"));
return;
}
int count = tap_count.fromMaybe(kDefaultTapCount);
if (!count) {
callback->sendSuccess();
return;
}
TapGestureResponse* response =
new TapGestureResponse(std::move(callback), count);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->QueueSyntheticGesture(
SyntheticGesture::Create(gesture_params),
base::BindOnce(&TapGestureResponse::OnGestureResult,
base::Unretained(response)));
}
}
|
void InputHandler::SynthesizeTapGesture(
double x,
double y,
Maybe<int> duration,
Maybe<int> tap_count,
Maybe<std::string> gesture_source_type,
std::unique_ptr<SynthesizeTapGestureCallback> callback) {
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
SyntheticTapGestureParams gesture_params;
const int kDefaultDuration = 50;
const int kDefaultTapCount = 1;
gesture_params.position = CssPixelsToPointF(x, y, page_scale_factor_);
if (!PointIsWithinContents(gesture_params.position)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Position out of bounds"));
return;
}
gesture_params.duration_ms = duration.fromMaybe(kDefaultDuration);
if (!StringToGestureSourceType(
std::move(gesture_source_type),
gesture_params.gesture_source_type)) {
callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("Unknown gestureSourceType"));
return;
}
int count = tap_count.fromMaybe(kDefaultTapCount);
if (!count) {
callback->sendSuccess();
return;
}
TapGestureResponse* response =
new TapGestureResponse(std::move(callback), count);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->QueueSyntheticGesture(
SyntheticGesture::Create(gesture_params),
base::BindOnce(&TapGestureResponse::OnGestureResult,
base::Unretained(response)));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6051/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0da6dcdbe8e34740133773d20cc466b89d399d0a
|
0da6dcdbe8e34740133773d20cc466b89d399d0a
|
Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
|
static bool StartsMultiLineCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start) {
return (start + 1 < string.length() && string[start] == '/' &&
string[start + 1] == '*');
}
|
static bool StartsMultiLineCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start) {
return (start + 1 < string.length() && string[start] == '/' &&
string[start + 1] == '*');
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a
|
aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a
|
POSIX: make sure that we never pass directory descriptors into the sandbox.
BUG=43304
http://codereview.chromium.org/2733011/show
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@49446 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void HandleFontOpenRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter,
std::vector<int>& fds) {
uint32_t fileid;
if (!pickle.ReadUInt32(&iter, &fileid))
return;
const int result_fd = font_config_->Open(fileid);
Pickle reply;
if (result_fd == -1) {
reply.WriteBool(false);
} else {
reply.WriteBool(true);
}
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, result_fd);
if (result_fd >= 0)
close(result_fd);
}
|
void HandleFontOpenRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter,
std::vector<int>& fds) {
uint32_t fileid;
if (!pickle.ReadUInt32(&iter, &fileid))
return;
const int result_fd = font_config_->Open(fileid);
Pickle reply;
if (result_fd == -1) {
reply.WriteBool(false);
} else {
reply.WriteBool(true);
}
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, result_fd);
if (result_fd >= 0)
close(result_fd);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4247
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4247/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fc29bacedeabb278080e31bb9c1ecb49f143c3b
|
1fc29bacedeabb278080e31bb9c1ecb49f143c3b
|
cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
static int cifs_parse_security_flavors(char *value,
struct smb_vol *vol)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
switch (match_token(value, cifs_secflavor_tokens, args)) {
case Opt_sec_krb5:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_krb5i:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_krb5p:
/* vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5; */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Krb5 cifs privacy not supported\n");
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmssp:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmsspi:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_ntlm:
/* ntlm is default so can be turned off too */
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmi:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2i:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
case Opt_sec_lanman:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN;
break;
#endif
case Opt_sec_none:
vol->nullauth = 1;
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security option: %s\n", value);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int cifs_parse_security_flavors(char *value,
struct smb_vol *vol)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
switch (match_token(value, cifs_secflavor_tokens, args)) {
case Opt_sec_krb5:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_krb5i:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_krb5p:
/* vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5; */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Krb5 cifs privacy not supported\n");
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmssp:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmsspi:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_ntlm:
/* ntlm is default so can be turned off too */
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmi:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2i:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
case Opt_sec_lanman:
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN;
break;
#endif
case Opt_sec_none:
vol->nullauth = 1;
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security option: %s\n", value);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2349/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e755d9faf5c7d75a8ea290892cb1b5cc07c412ec
|
e755d9faf5c7d75a8ea290892cb1b5cc07c412ec
|
cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool HandleContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
return true;
}
|
bool HandleContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10746/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
|
virDomainSendProcessSignal(virDomainPtr domain,
long long pid_value,
unsigned int signum,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "pid=%lld, signum=%u flags=%x",
pid_value, signum, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckNonZeroArgGoto(pid_value, error);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainSendProcessSignal) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainSendProcessSignal(domain,
pid_value,
signum,
flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
|
virDomainSendProcessSignal(virDomainPtr domain,
long long pid_value,
unsigned int signum,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "pid=%lld, signum=%u flags=%x",
pid_value, signum, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckNonZeroArgGoto(pid_value, error);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainSendProcessSignal) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainSendProcessSignal(domain,
pid_value,
signum,
flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
|
C
|
libvirt
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4300/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/e79ef306afe332faf22e9b442a2c6b59cb175573
|
e79ef306afe332faf22e9b442a2c6b59cb175573
|
Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
|
seek_pack(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
int64_t pack_offset;
if (zip->pack_stream_remaining <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
zip->pack_stream_inbytes_remaining =
zip->si.pi.sizes[zip->pack_stream_index];
pack_offset = zip->si.pi.positions[zip->pack_stream_index];
if (zip->stream_offset != pack_offset) {
if (0 > __archive_read_seek(a, pack_offset + zip->seek_base,
SEEK_SET))
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
zip->stream_offset = pack_offset;
}
zip->pack_stream_index++;
zip->pack_stream_remaining--;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
seek_pack(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
int64_t pack_offset;
if (zip->pack_stream_remaining <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
zip->pack_stream_inbytes_remaining =
zip->si.pi.sizes[zip->pack_stream_index];
pack_offset = zip->si.pi.positions[zip->pack_stream_index];
if (zip->stream_offset != pack_offset) {
if (0 > __archive_read_seek(a, pack_offset + zip->seek_base,
SEEK_SET))
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
zip->stream_offset = pack_offset;
}
zip->pack_stream_index++;
zip->pack_stream_remaining--;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethod();
}
|
static void ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7526
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7526/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce
|
8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce
| null |
rsa_check_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
{
gcry_err_code_t rc;
RSA_secret_key sk = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
/* To check the key we need the optional parameters. */
rc = sexp_extract_param (keyparms, NULL, "nedpqu",
&sk.n, &sk.e, &sk.d, &sk.p, &sk.q, &sk.u,
NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (!check_secret_key (&sk))
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
leave:
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.n);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.e);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.d);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.p);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.q);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.u);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("rsa_testkey => %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
|
rsa_check_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
{
gcry_err_code_t rc;
RSA_secret_key sk = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
/* To check the key we need the optional parameters. */
rc = sexp_extract_param (keyparms, NULL, "nedpqu",
&sk.n, &sk.e, &sk.d, &sk.p, &sk.q, &sk.u,
NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (!check_secret_key (&sk))
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
leave:
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.n);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.e);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.d);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.p);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.q);
_gcry_mpi_release (sk.u);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("rsa_testkey => %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
|
C
|
gnupg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0823
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0823/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce
|
ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce
|
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
enum clear_refs_types type;
int itype;
int rv;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1)
count = sizeof(buffer) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
rv = kstrtoint(strstrip(buffer), 10, &itype);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
type = (enum clear_refs_types)itype;
if (type < CLEAR_REFS_ALL || type >= CLEAR_REFS_LAST)
return -EINVAL;
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) {
soft_dirty_cleared = true;
pr_warn_once("The pagemap bits 55-60 has changed their meaning!"
" See the linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for "
"details.\n");
}
task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
struct clear_refs_private cp = {
.type = type,
};
struct mm_walk clear_refs_walk = {
.pmd_entry = clear_refs_pte_range,
.test_walk = clear_refs_test_walk,
.mm = mm,
.private = &cp,
};
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_MM_HIWATER_RSS) {
/*
* Writing 5 to /proc/pid/clear_refs resets the peak
* resident set size to this mm's current rss value.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
reset_mm_hiwater_rss(mm);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
goto out_mm;
}
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) {
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY))
continue;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_SOFTDIRTY;
vma_set_page_prot(vma);
}
downgrade_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
break;
}
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, 0, -1);
}
walk_page_range(0, ~0UL, &clear_refs_walk);
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY)
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, 0, -1);
flush_tlb_mm(mm);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out_mm:
mmput(mm);
}
put_task_struct(task);
return count;
}
|
static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
enum clear_refs_types type;
int itype;
int rv;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1)
count = sizeof(buffer) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
rv = kstrtoint(strstrip(buffer), 10, &itype);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
type = (enum clear_refs_types)itype;
if (type < CLEAR_REFS_ALL || type >= CLEAR_REFS_LAST)
return -EINVAL;
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) {
soft_dirty_cleared = true;
pr_warn_once("The pagemap bits 55-60 has changed their meaning!"
" See the linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for "
"details.\n");
}
task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
struct clear_refs_private cp = {
.type = type,
};
struct mm_walk clear_refs_walk = {
.pmd_entry = clear_refs_pte_range,
.test_walk = clear_refs_test_walk,
.mm = mm,
.private = &cp,
};
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_MM_HIWATER_RSS) {
/*
* Writing 5 to /proc/pid/clear_refs resets the peak
* resident set size to this mm's current rss value.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
reset_mm_hiwater_rss(mm);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
goto out_mm;
}
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) {
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY))
continue;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_SOFTDIRTY;
vma_set_page_prot(vma);
}
downgrade_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
break;
}
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, 0, -1);
}
walk_page_range(0, ~0UL, &clear_refs_walk);
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY)
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, 0, -1);
flush_tlb_mm(mm);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out_mm:
mmput(mm);
}
put_task_struct(task);
return count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14357/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
void imap_expunge_mailbox(struct ImapData *idata)
{
struct Header *h = NULL;
int cacheno;
short old_sort;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
idata->hcache = imap_hcache_open(idata, NULL);
#endif
old_sort = Sort;
Sort = SORT_ORDER;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < idata->ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
h = idata->ctx->hdrs[i];
if (h->index == INT_MAX)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Expunging message UID %u.\n", HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
h->active = false;
idata->ctx->size -= h->content->length;
imap_cache_del(idata, h);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_del(idata, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
#endif
/* free cached body from disk, if necessary */
cacheno = HEADER_DATA(h)->uid % IMAP_CACHE_LEN;
if (idata->cache[cacheno].uid == HEADER_DATA(h)->uid &&
idata->cache[cacheno].path)
{
unlink(idata->cache[cacheno].path);
FREE(&idata->cache[cacheno].path);
}
mutt_hash_int_delete(idata->uid_hash, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid, h);
imap_free_header_data((struct ImapHeaderData **) &h->data);
}
else
{
h->index = i;
/* NeoMutt has several places where it turns off h->active as a
* hack. For example to avoid FLAG updates, or to exclude from
* imap_exec_msgset.
*
* Unfortunately, when a reopen is allowed and the IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING
* flag becomes set (e.g. a flag update to a modified header),
* this function will be called by imap_cmd_finish().
*
* The mx_update_tables() will free and remove these "inactive" headers,
* despite that an EXPUNGE was not received for them.
* This would result in memory leaks and segfaults due to dangling
* pointers in the msn_index and uid_hash.
*
* So this is another hack to work around the hacks. We don't want to
* remove the messages, so make sure active is on.
*/
h->active = true;
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_close(idata);
#endif
/* We may be called on to expunge at any time. We can't rely on the caller
* to always know to rethread */
mx_update_tables(idata->ctx, false);
Sort = old_sort;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 1);
}
|
void imap_expunge_mailbox(struct ImapData *idata)
{
struct Header *h = NULL;
int cacheno;
short old_sort;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
idata->hcache = imap_hcache_open(idata, NULL);
#endif
old_sort = Sort;
Sort = SORT_ORDER;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < idata->ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
h = idata->ctx->hdrs[i];
if (h->index == INT_MAX)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Expunging message UID %u.\n", HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
h->active = false;
idata->ctx->size -= h->content->length;
imap_cache_del(idata, h);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_del(idata, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
#endif
/* free cached body from disk, if necessary */
cacheno = HEADER_DATA(h)->uid % IMAP_CACHE_LEN;
if (idata->cache[cacheno].uid == HEADER_DATA(h)->uid &&
idata->cache[cacheno].path)
{
unlink(idata->cache[cacheno].path);
FREE(&idata->cache[cacheno].path);
}
mutt_hash_int_delete(idata->uid_hash, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid, h);
imap_free_header_data((struct ImapHeaderData **) &h->data);
}
else
{
h->index = i;
/* NeoMutt has several places where it turns off h->active as a
* hack. For example to avoid FLAG updates, or to exclude from
* imap_exec_msgset.
*
* Unfortunately, when a reopen is allowed and the IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING
* flag becomes set (e.g. a flag update to a modified header),
* this function will be called by imap_cmd_finish().
*
* The mx_update_tables() will free and remove these "inactive" headers,
* despite that an EXPUNGE was not received for them.
* This would result in memory leaks and segfaults due to dangling
* pointers in the msn_index and uid_hash.
*
* So this is another hack to work around the hacks. We don't want to
* remove the messages, so make sure active is on.
*/
h->active = true;
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_close(idata);
#endif
/* We may be called on to expunge at any time. We can't rely on the caller
* to always know to rethread */
mx_update_tables(idata->ctx, false);
Sort = old_sort;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 1);
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c1864079c441ea2e08f882acaaf441f78a6de3d
|
3c1864079c441ea2e08f882acaaf441f78a6de3d
|
REGRESSION(r93902): Can't open external links on gmail
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67234
<rdar://problem/10053636>
Reviewed by Alexey Proskuryakov.
* Shared/cf/ArgumentCodersCF.cpp:
(CoreIPC::decode):
If we encounter an empty URL string, create an empty url by using NSURL, just
like we do in WebCore when converting an empty KURL to an NSURL.
* WebKit2.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
Compile ArgumentCodersCF.cpp as Objective-C++ for now.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94246 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void encode(ArgumentEncoder* encoder, CFTypeRef typeRef)
{
CFType type = typeFromCFTypeRef(typeRef);
encoder->encodeEnum(type);
switch (type) {
case CFArray:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFArrayRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFBoolean:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFBooleanRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFData:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDataRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFDate:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDateRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFDictionary:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFNull:
return;
case CFNumber:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFNumberRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFString:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFStringRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFURL:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFURLRef>(typeRef));
return;
#if PLATFORM(MAC)
case SecCertificate:
encode(encoder, (SecCertificateRef)typeRef);
return;
case SecKeychainItem:
encode(encoder, (SecKeychainItemRef)typeRef);
return;
#endif
case Null:
return;
case Unknown:
break;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
|
void encode(ArgumentEncoder* encoder, CFTypeRef typeRef)
{
CFType type = typeFromCFTypeRef(typeRef);
encoder->encodeEnum(type);
switch (type) {
case CFArray:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFArrayRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFBoolean:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFBooleanRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFData:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDataRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFDate:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDateRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFDictionary:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFDictionaryRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFNull:
return;
case CFNumber:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFNumberRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFString:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFStringRef>(typeRef));
return;
case CFURL:
encode(encoder, static_cast<CFURLRef>(typeRef));
return;
#if PLATFORM(MAC)
case SecCertificate:
encode(encoder, (SecCertificateRef)typeRef);
return;
case SecKeychainItem:
encode(encoder, (SecKeychainItemRef)typeRef);
return;
#endif
case Null:
return;
case Unknown:
break;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5375/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
|
static long btrfs_ioctl_add_dev(struct btrfs_root *root, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args *vol_args;
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (atomic_xchg(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running,
1)) {
pr_info("btrfs: dev add/delete/balance/replace/resize operation in progress\n");
return -EINPROGRESS;
}
mutex_lock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
vol_args = memdup_user(arg, sizeof(*vol_args));
if (IS_ERR(vol_args)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vol_args);
goto out;
}
vol_args->name[BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX] = '\0';
ret = btrfs_init_new_device(root, vol_args->name);
kfree(vol_args);
out:
mutex_unlock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
atomic_set(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running, 0);
return ret;
}
|
static long btrfs_ioctl_add_dev(struct btrfs_root *root, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args *vol_args;
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (atomic_xchg(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running,
1)) {
pr_info("btrfs: dev add/delete/balance/replace/resize operation in progress\n");
return -EINPROGRESS;
}
mutex_lock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
vol_args = memdup_user(arg, sizeof(*vol_args));
if (IS_ERR(vol_args)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vol_args);
goto out;
}
vol_args->name[BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX] = '\0';
ret = btrfs_init_new_device(root, vol_args->name);
kfree(vol_args);
out:
mutex_unlock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
atomic_set(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running, 0);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4344/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc
|
a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc
|
Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
|
static int gss_spnegomechglue_init(void)
{
struct gss_mech_config mech_spnego;
memset(&mech_spnego, 0, sizeof(mech_spnego));
mech_spnego.mech = &spnego_mechanism;
mech_spnego.mechNameStr = "spnego";
mech_spnego.mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
return gssint_register_mechinfo(&mech_spnego);
}
|
static int gss_spnegomechglue_init(void)
{
struct gss_mech_config mech_spnego;
memset(&mech_spnego, 0, sizeof(mech_spnego));
mech_spnego.mech = &spnego_mechanism;
mech_spnego.mechNameStr = "spnego";
mech_spnego.mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
return gssint_register_mechinfo(&mech_spnego);
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3835/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
void OMXNodeInstance::addActiveBuffer(OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX::buffer_id id) {
ActiveBuffer active;
active.mPortIndex = portIndex;
active.mID = id;
mActiveBuffers.push(active);
if (portIndex < NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
++mNumPortBuffers[portIndex];
}
}
|
void OMXNodeInstance::addActiveBuffer(OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX::buffer_id id) {
ActiveBuffer active;
active.mPortIndex = portIndex;
active.mID = id;
mActiveBuffers.push(active);
if (portIndex < NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
++mNumPortBuffers[portIndex];
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testInterfaceOrNullAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testInterfaceOrNullAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1622
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1622/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/83a4b3aa72d98fe4176b4a54c8cea227ed966570
|
83a4b3aa72d98fe4176b4a54c8cea227ed966570
|
[Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
|
std::string ModuleSystem::ExceptionHandler::CreateExceptionString(
const v8::TryCatch& try_catch) {
v8::Local<v8::Message> message(try_catch.Message());
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
return "try_catch has no message";
}
std::string resource_name = "<unknown resource>";
if (!message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value resource_name_v8(
message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName());
resource_name.assign(*resource_name_v8, resource_name_v8.length());
}
std::string error_message = "<no error message>";
if (!message->Get().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value error_message_v8(message->Get());
error_message.assign(*error_message_v8, error_message_v8.length());
}
auto maybe = message->GetLineNumber(context_->v8_context());
int line_number = maybe.IsJust() ? maybe.FromJust() : 0;
return base::StringPrintf("%s:%d: %s",
resource_name.c_str(),
line_number,
error_message.c_str());
}
|
std::string ModuleSystem::ExceptionHandler::CreateExceptionString(
const v8::TryCatch& try_catch) {
v8::Local<v8::Message> message(try_catch.Message());
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
return "try_catch has no message";
}
std::string resource_name = "<unknown resource>";
if (!message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value resource_name_v8(
message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName());
resource_name.assign(*resource_name_v8, resource_name_v8.length());
}
std::string error_message = "<no error message>";
if (!message->Get().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value error_message_v8(message->Get());
error_message.assign(*error_message_v8, error_message_v8.length());
}
auto maybe = message->GetLineNumber(context_->v8_context());
int line_number = maybe.IsJust() ? maybe.FromJust() : 0;
return base::StringPrintf("%s:%d: %s",
resource_name.c_str(),
line_number,
error_message.c_str());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void QuotaManager::GetHostUsage(const std::string& host, StorageType type,
HostUsageCallback* callback) {
LazyInitialize();
GetUsageTracker(type)->GetHostUsage(host, callback);
}
|
void QuotaManager::GetHostUsage(const std::string& host, StorageType type,
HostUsageCallback* callback) {
LazyInitialize();
GetUsageTracker(type)->GetHostUsage(host, callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6136/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
if (!context)
return;
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
context->major = major;
context->argv[0] = a1;
context->argv[1] = a2;
context->argv[2] = a3;
context->argv[3] = a4;
state = context->state;
context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
context->prio = 0;
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
}
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
return;
context->serial = 0;
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
context->in_syscall = 1;
context->current_state = state;
context->ppid = 0;
}
|
void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
if (!context)
return;
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
context->major = major;
context->argv[0] = a1;
context->argv[1] = a2;
context->argv[2] = a3;
context->argv[3] = a4;
state = context->state;
context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
context->prio = 0;
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
}
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
return;
context->serial = 0;
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
context->in_syscall = 1;
context->current_state = state;
context->ppid = 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb
|
15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb
|
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
/* Inherit the recordable setting from trace_buffer */
if (ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer))
ring_buffer_record_on(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
else
ring_buffer_record_off(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
swap(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, tr->max_buffer.buffer);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
|
update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
/* Inherit the recordable setting from trace_buffer */
if (ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer))
ring_buffer_record_on(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
else
ring_buffer_record_off(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
swap(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, tr->max_buffer.buffer);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *q, int bidx)
{
int rc;
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *newbuf;
rc = 0;
newbuf = kmem_cache_zalloc(qeth_qdio_outbuf_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!newbuf) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
newbuf->buffer = &q->qdio_bufs[bidx];
skb_queue_head_init(&newbuf->skb_list);
lockdep_set_class(&newbuf->skb_list.lock, &qdio_out_skb_queue_key);
newbuf->q = q;
newbuf->aob = NULL;
newbuf->next_pending = q->bufs[bidx];
atomic_set(&newbuf->state, QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
q->bufs[bidx] = newbuf;
if (q->bufstates) {
q->bufstates[bidx].user = newbuf;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "nbs%d", bidx);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx", (long) newbuf);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx",
(long) newbuf->next_pending);
}
out:
return rc;
}
|
static int qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *q, int bidx)
{
int rc;
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *newbuf;
rc = 0;
newbuf = kmem_cache_zalloc(qeth_qdio_outbuf_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!newbuf) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
newbuf->buffer = &q->qdio_bufs[bidx];
skb_queue_head_init(&newbuf->skb_list);
lockdep_set_class(&newbuf->skb_list.lock, &qdio_out_skb_queue_key);
newbuf->q = q;
newbuf->aob = NULL;
newbuf->next_pending = q->bufs[bidx];
atomic_set(&newbuf->state, QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
q->bufs[bidx] = newbuf;
if (q->bufstates) {
q->bufstates[bidx].user = newbuf;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "nbs%d", bidx);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx", (long) newbuf);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx",
(long) newbuf->next_pending);
}
out:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2865/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/26160ce25e305d686ca5df192378d2f5310ca0ee
|
26160ce25e305d686ca5df192378d2f5310ca0ee
|
shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ShellAuraPlatformData::ShellAuraPlatformData() {
aura::TestScreen* screen = aura::TestScreen::Create();
gfx::Screen::SetScreenInstance(gfx::SCREEN_TYPE_NATIVE, screen);
root_window_.reset(screen->CreateRootWindowForPrimaryDisplay());
root_window_->host()->Show();
root_window_->window()->SetLayoutManager(new FillLayout(root_window_.get()));
focus_client_.reset(new aura::test::TestFocusClient());
aura::client::SetFocusClient(root_window_->window(), focus_client_.get());
activation_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultActivationClient(root_window_->window()));
capture_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultCaptureClient(root_window_->window()));
window_tree_client_.reset(
new aura::test::TestWindowTreeClient(root_window_->window()));
ime_filter_.reset(new MinimalInputEventFilter(root_window_.get()));
}
|
ShellAuraPlatformData::ShellAuraPlatformData() {
aura::TestScreen* screen = aura::TestScreen::Create();
gfx::Screen::SetScreenInstance(gfx::SCREEN_TYPE_NATIVE, screen);
root_window_.reset(screen->CreateRootWindowForPrimaryDisplay());
root_window_->host()->Show();
root_window_->window()->SetLayoutManager(new FillLayout(root_window_.get()));
focus_client_.reset(new aura::test::TestFocusClient());
aura::client::SetFocusClient(root_window_->window(), focus_client_.get());
activation_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultActivationClient(root_window_->window()));
capture_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultCaptureClient(root_window_->window()));
window_tree_client_.reset(
new aura::test::TestWindowTreeClient(root_window_->window()));
ime_filter_.reset(new MinimalInputEventFilter(root_window_.get()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdatePreferredSize(const gfx::Size& pref_size) {
const gfx::Size old_size = GetPreferredSize();
preferred_size_ = pref_size;
OnPreferredSizeChanged(old_size);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdatePreferredSize(const gfx::Size& pref_size) {
const gfx::Size old_size = GetPreferredSize();
preferred_size_ = pref_size;
OnPreferredSizeChanged(old_size);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6991
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6991/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
|
static int compare2pow63(const char *zNum, int incr){
int c = 0;
int i;
/* 012345678901234567 */
const char *pow63 = "922337203685477580";
for(i=0; c==0 && i<18; i++){
c = (zNum[i*incr]-pow63[i])*10;
}
if( c==0 ){
c = zNum[18*incr] - '8';
testcase( c==(-1) );
testcase( c==0 );
testcase( c==(+1) );
}
return c;
}
|
static int compare2pow63(const char *zNum, int incr){
int c = 0;
int i;
/* 012345678901234567 */
const char *pow63 = "922337203685477580";
for(i=0; c==0 && i<18; i++){
c = (zNum[i*incr]-pow63[i])*10;
}
if( c==0 ){
c = zNum[18*incr] - '8';
testcase( c==(-1) );
testcase( c==0 );
testcase( c==(+1) );
}
return c;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4998/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
do_ip6t_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE:
ret = do_replace(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
case IP6T_SO_SET_ADD_COUNTERS:
ret = do_add_counters(sock_net(sk), user, len, 0);
break;
default:
duprintf("do_ip6t_set_ctl: unknown request %i\n", cmd);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
|
do_ip6t_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE:
ret = do_replace(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
case IP6T_SO_SET_ADD_COUNTERS:
ret = do_add_counters(sock_net(sk), user, len, 0);
break;
default:
duprintf("do_ip6t_set_ctl: unknown request %i\n", cmd);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10708
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10708/
|
CWE-476
|
https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737
|
28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737
| null |
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (kex->dh)
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
if (kex->ec_client_key)
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->client_version_string);
free(kex->server_version_string);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
|
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (kex->dh)
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
if (kex->ec_client_key)
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->client_version_string);
free(kex->server_version_string);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
|
C
|
mindrot
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3924/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
|
void AudioFlinger::EffectChain::process_l()
{
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
ALOGW("process_l(): cannot promote mixer thread");
return;
}
bool isGlobalSession = (mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_MIX) ||
(mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_STAGE);
bool doProcess = (thread->type() != ThreadBase::OFFLOAD);
if (!isGlobalSession) {
bool tracksOnSession = (trackCnt() != 0);
if (!tracksOnSession && mTailBufferCount == 0) {
doProcess = false;
}
if (activeTrackCnt() == 0) {
if (tracksOnSession || mTailBufferCount > 0) {
clearInputBuffer_l(thread);
if (mTailBufferCount > 0) {
mTailBufferCount--;
}
}
}
}
size_t size = mEffects.size();
if (doProcess) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->process();
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->updateState();
}
}
|
void AudioFlinger::EffectChain::process_l()
{
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
ALOGW("process_l(): cannot promote mixer thread");
return;
}
bool isGlobalSession = (mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_MIX) ||
(mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_STAGE);
bool doProcess = (thread->type() != ThreadBase::OFFLOAD);
if (!isGlobalSession) {
bool tracksOnSession = (trackCnt() != 0);
if (!tracksOnSession && mTailBufferCount == 0) {
doProcess = false;
}
if (activeTrackCnt() == 0) {
if (tracksOnSession || mTailBufferCount > 0) {
clearInputBuffer_l(thread);
if (mTailBufferCount > 0) {
mTailBufferCount--;
}
}
}
}
size_t size = mEffects.size();
if (doProcess) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->process();
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->updateState();
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.