CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-5773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5773/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
|
static char * php_zipobj_get_filename(ze_zip_object *obj TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!obj) {
return NULL;
}
if (obj->filename) {
return obj->filename;
}
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
static char * php_zipobj_get_filename(ze_zip_object *obj TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!obj) {
return NULL;
}
if (obj->filename) {
return obj->filename;
}
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4119
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
void sspi_SecBufferFree(PSecBuffer SecBuffer)
{
free(SecBuffer->pvBuffer);
SecBuffer->pvBuffer = NULL;
SecBuffer->cbBuffer = 0;
}
|
void sspi_SecBufferFree(PSecBuffer SecBuffer)
{
free(SecBuffer->pvBuffer);
SecBuffer->pvBuffer = NULL;
SecBuffer->cbBuffer = 0;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ap_control_domain_mask_show(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
if (ap_configuration != NULL) { /* QCI not supported */
if (test_facility(76)) { /* format 1 - 256 bit domain field */
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
"0x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x\n",
ap_configuration->adm[0], ap_configuration->adm[1],
ap_configuration->adm[2], ap_configuration->adm[3],
ap_configuration->adm[4], ap_configuration->adm[5],
ap_configuration->adm[6], ap_configuration->adm[7]);
} else { /* format 0 - 16 bit domain field */
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%08x%08x\n",
ap_configuration->adm[0], ap_configuration->adm[1]);
}
} else {
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "not supported\n");
}
}
|
static ssize_t ap_control_domain_mask_show(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
if (ap_configuration != NULL) { /* QCI not supported */
if (test_facility(76)) { /* format 1 - 256 bit domain field */
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
"0x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x\n",
ap_configuration->adm[0], ap_configuration->adm[1],
ap_configuration->adm[2], ap_configuration->adm[3],
ap_configuration->adm[4], ap_configuration->adm[5],
ap_configuration->adm[6], ap_configuration->adm[7]);
} else { /* format 0 - 16 bit domain field */
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%08x%08x\n",
ap_configuration->adm[0], ap_configuration->adm[1]);
}
} else {
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "not supported\n");
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2006-4192
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2006-4192/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gst-plugins-bad/commit/?id=bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
|
bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
| null |
void CSoundFile::SetCurrentOrder(UINT nPos)
{
while ((nPos < MAX_ORDERS) && (Order[nPos] == 0xFE)) nPos++;
if ((nPos >= MAX_ORDERS) || (Order[nPos] >= MAX_PATTERNS)) return;
for (UINT j=0; j<MAX_CHANNELS; j++)
{
Chn[j].nPeriod = 0;
Chn[j].nNote = 0;
Chn[j].nPortamentoDest = 0;
Chn[j].nCommand = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoopCount = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoop = 0;
Chn[j].nTremorCount = 0;
}
if (!nPos)
{
SetCurrentPos(0);
} else
{
m_nNextPattern = nPos;
m_nRow = m_nNextRow = 0;
m_nPattern = 0;
m_nTickCount = m_nMusicSpeed;
m_nBufferCount = 0;
m_nTotalCount = 0;
m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_nFrameDelay = 0;
}
m_dwSongFlags &= ~(SONG_PATTERNLOOP|SONG_CPUVERYHIGH|SONG_FADINGSONG|SONG_ENDREACHED|SONG_GLOBALFADE);
}
|
void CSoundFile::SetCurrentOrder(UINT nPos)
{
while ((nPos < MAX_ORDERS) && (Order[nPos] == 0xFE)) nPos++;
if ((nPos >= MAX_ORDERS) || (Order[nPos] >= MAX_PATTERNS)) return;
for (UINT j=0; j<MAX_CHANNELS; j++)
{
Chn[j].nPeriod = 0;
Chn[j].nNote = 0;
Chn[j].nPortamentoDest = 0;
Chn[j].nCommand = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoopCount = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoop = 0;
Chn[j].nTremorCount = 0;
}
if (!nPos)
{
SetCurrentPos(0);
} else
{
m_nNextPattern = nPos;
m_nRow = m_nNextRow = 0;
m_nPattern = 0;
m_nTickCount = m_nMusicSpeed;
m_nBufferCount = 0;
m_nTotalCount = 0;
m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_nFrameDelay = 0;
}
m_dwSongFlags &= ~(SONG_PATTERNLOOP|SONG_CPUVERYHIGH|SONG_FADINGSONG|SONG_ENDREACHED|SONG_GLOBALFADE);
}
|
CPP
|
gstreamer
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11383
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11383/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
|
INST_HANDLER (lpm) { // LPM
ut16 ins = (((ut16) buf[1]) << 8) | ((ut16) buf[0]);
__generic_ld_st (
op, "prog",
'z', // index register Y/Z
1, // use RAMP* registers
(ins & 0xfe0f) == 0x9005
? 1 // post incremented
: 0, // no increment
0, // not offset
0); // load operation (!st)
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,",
(ins == 0x95c8)
? 0 // LPM (r0)
: ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) // LPM Rd
| ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4));
}
|
INST_HANDLER (lpm) { // LPM
ut16 ins = (((ut16) buf[1]) << 8) | ((ut16) buf[0]);
__generic_ld_st (
op, "prog",
'z', // index register Y/Z
1, // use RAMP* registers
(ins & 0xfe0f) == 0x9005
? 1 // post incremented
: 0, // no increment
0, // not offset
0); // load operation (!st)
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,",
(ins == 0x95c8)
? 0 // LPM (r0)
: ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) // LPM Rd
| ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4));
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8067/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4baad50297d84bde1a7ad45e50c73adae4a2192
|
c4baad50297d84bde1a7ad45e50c73adae4a2192
|
virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
|
static int add_port(struct ports_device *portdev, u32 id)
{
char debugfs_name[16];
struct port *port;
struct port_buffer *buf;
dev_t devt;
unsigned int nr_added_bufs;
int err;
port = kmalloc(sizeof(*port), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!port) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
kref_init(&port->kref);
port->portdev = portdev;
port->id = id;
port->name = NULL;
port->inbuf = NULL;
port->cons.hvc = NULL;
port->async_queue = NULL;
port->cons.ws.ws_row = port->cons.ws.ws_col = 0;
port->host_connected = port->guest_connected = false;
port->stats = (struct port_stats) { 0 };
port->outvq_full = false;
port->in_vq = portdev->in_vqs[port->id];
port->out_vq = portdev->out_vqs[port->id];
port->cdev = cdev_alloc();
if (!port->cdev) {
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev, "Error allocating cdev\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_port;
}
port->cdev->ops = &port_fops;
devt = MKDEV(portdev->chr_major, id);
err = cdev_add(port->cdev, devt, 1);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev,
"Error %d adding cdev for port %u\n", err, id);
goto free_cdev;
}
port->dev = device_create(pdrvdata.class, &port->portdev->vdev->dev,
devt, port, "vport%up%u",
port->portdev->vdev->index, id);
if (IS_ERR(port->dev)) {
err = PTR_ERR(port->dev);
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev,
"Error %d creating device for port %u\n",
err, id);
goto free_cdev;
}
spin_lock_init(&port->inbuf_lock);
spin_lock_init(&port->outvq_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&port->waitqueue);
/* Fill the in_vq with buffers so the host can send us data. */
nr_added_bufs = fill_queue(port->in_vq, &port->inbuf_lock);
if (!nr_added_bufs) {
dev_err(port->dev, "Error allocating inbufs\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_device;
}
if (is_rproc_serial(port->portdev->vdev))
/*
* For rproc_serial assume remote processor is connected.
* rproc_serial does not want the console port, only
* the generic port implementation.
*/
port->host_connected = true;
else if (!use_multiport(port->portdev)) {
/*
* If we're not using multiport support,
* this has to be a console port.
*/
err = init_port_console(port);
if (err)
goto free_inbufs;
}
spin_lock_irq(&portdev->ports_lock);
list_add_tail(&port->list, &port->portdev->ports);
spin_unlock_irq(&portdev->ports_lock);
/*
* Tell the Host we're set so that it can send us various
* configuration parameters for this port (eg, port name,
* caching, whether this is a console port, etc.)
*/
send_control_msg(port, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY, 1);
if (pdrvdata.debugfs_dir) {
/*
* Finally, create the debugfs file that we can use to
* inspect a port's state at any time
*/
snprintf(debugfs_name, sizeof(debugfs_name), "vport%up%u",
port->portdev->vdev->index, id);
port->debugfs_file = debugfs_create_file(debugfs_name, 0444,
pdrvdata.debugfs_dir,
port,
&port_debugfs_ops);
}
return 0;
free_inbufs:
while ((buf = virtqueue_detach_unused_buf(port->in_vq)))
free_buf(buf, true);
free_device:
device_destroy(pdrvdata.class, port->dev->devt);
free_cdev:
cdev_del(port->cdev);
free_port:
kfree(port);
fail:
/* The host might want to notify management sw about port add failure */
__send_control_msg(portdev, id, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY, 0);
return err;
}
|
static int add_port(struct ports_device *portdev, u32 id)
{
char debugfs_name[16];
struct port *port;
struct port_buffer *buf;
dev_t devt;
unsigned int nr_added_bufs;
int err;
port = kmalloc(sizeof(*port), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!port) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
kref_init(&port->kref);
port->portdev = portdev;
port->id = id;
port->name = NULL;
port->inbuf = NULL;
port->cons.hvc = NULL;
port->async_queue = NULL;
port->cons.ws.ws_row = port->cons.ws.ws_col = 0;
port->host_connected = port->guest_connected = false;
port->stats = (struct port_stats) { 0 };
port->outvq_full = false;
port->in_vq = portdev->in_vqs[port->id];
port->out_vq = portdev->out_vqs[port->id];
port->cdev = cdev_alloc();
if (!port->cdev) {
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev, "Error allocating cdev\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_port;
}
port->cdev->ops = &port_fops;
devt = MKDEV(portdev->chr_major, id);
err = cdev_add(port->cdev, devt, 1);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev,
"Error %d adding cdev for port %u\n", err, id);
goto free_cdev;
}
port->dev = device_create(pdrvdata.class, &port->portdev->vdev->dev,
devt, port, "vport%up%u",
port->portdev->vdev->index, id);
if (IS_ERR(port->dev)) {
err = PTR_ERR(port->dev);
dev_err(&port->portdev->vdev->dev,
"Error %d creating device for port %u\n",
err, id);
goto free_cdev;
}
spin_lock_init(&port->inbuf_lock);
spin_lock_init(&port->outvq_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&port->waitqueue);
/* Fill the in_vq with buffers so the host can send us data. */
nr_added_bufs = fill_queue(port->in_vq, &port->inbuf_lock);
if (!nr_added_bufs) {
dev_err(port->dev, "Error allocating inbufs\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_device;
}
if (is_rproc_serial(port->portdev->vdev))
/*
* For rproc_serial assume remote processor is connected.
* rproc_serial does not want the console port, only
* the generic port implementation.
*/
port->host_connected = true;
else if (!use_multiport(port->portdev)) {
/*
* If we're not using multiport support,
* this has to be a console port.
*/
err = init_port_console(port);
if (err)
goto free_inbufs;
}
spin_lock_irq(&portdev->ports_lock);
list_add_tail(&port->list, &port->portdev->ports);
spin_unlock_irq(&portdev->ports_lock);
/*
* Tell the Host we're set so that it can send us various
* configuration parameters for this port (eg, port name,
* caching, whether this is a console port, etc.)
*/
send_control_msg(port, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY, 1);
if (pdrvdata.debugfs_dir) {
/*
* Finally, create the debugfs file that we can use to
* inspect a port's state at any time
*/
snprintf(debugfs_name, sizeof(debugfs_name), "vport%up%u",
port->portdev->vdev->index, id);
port->debugfs_file = debugfs_create_file(debugfs_name, 0444,
pdrvdata.debugfs_dir,
port,
&port_debugfs_ops);
}
return 0;
free_inbufs:
while ((buf = virtqueue_detach_unused_buf(port->in_vq)))
free_buf(buf, true);
free_device:
device_destroy(pdrvdata.class, port->dev->devt);
free_cdev:
cdev_del(port->cdev);
free_port:
kfree(port);
fail:
/* The host might want to notify management sw about port add failure */
__send_control_msg(portdev, id, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY, 0);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
Improve handling and testing of reparse points.
BUG=28804
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553080
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37286 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResolveNTFunctionPtr(const char* name, void* ptr) {
HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(sandbox::kNtdllName);
FARPROC* function_ptr = reinterpret_cast<FARPROC*>(ptr);
*function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name);
if (*function_ptr)
return;
*function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name);
CHECK(*function_ptr);
}
|
void ResolveNTFunctionPtr(const char* name, void* ptr) {
HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(sandbox::kNtdllName);
FARPROC* function_ptr = reinterpret_cast<FARPROC*>(ptr);
*function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name);
if (*function_ptr)
return;
*function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name);
CHECK(*function_ptr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err metx_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 size, i;
GF_Err e;
char *str;
GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox*)s;
e = gf_isom_base_sample_entry_read((GF_SampleEntryBox *)ptr, bs);
if (e) return e;
size = (u32) ptr->size - 8;
str = gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*size);
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->content_encoding = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if ((ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_METX) || (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP)) {
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
}
else {
if (i) ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
}
ptr->size = size;
gf_free(str);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, metx_AddBox);
}
|
GF_Err metx_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 size, i;
GF_Err e;
char *str;
GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox*)s;
e = gf_isom_base_sample_entry_read((GF_SampleEntryBox *)ptr, bs);
if (e) return e;
size = (u32) ptr->size - 8;
str = gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*size);
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->content_encoding = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if ((ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_METX) || (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP)) {
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
}
else {
if (i) ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
}
ptr->size = size;
gf_free(str);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, metx_AddBox);
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ea4ba8af75eb37860c15d02af94f272e5bbc235
|
3ea4ba8af75eb37860c15d02af94f272e5bbc235
|
Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FileSystemOperation::DoCopy(const StatusCallback& callback) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Copy(
&operation_context_,
src_util_, dest_util_,
src_path_, dest_path_,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
|
void FileSystemOperation::DoCopy(const StatusCallback& callback) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Copy(
&operation_context_,
src_util_, dest_util_,
src_path_, dest_path_,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4302/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/05caadc7eedbef471ac9610809ba683f0c698700
|
05caadc7eedbef471ac9610809ba683f0c698700
|
Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
|
lzss_emit_literal(struct rar *rar, uint8_t literal)
{
*lzss_current_pointer(&rar->lzss) = literal;
rar->lzss.position++;
}
|
lzss_emit_literal(struct rar *rar, uint8_t literal)
{
*lzss_current_pointer(&rar->lzss) = literal;
rar->lzss.position++;
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
sk = ps->sock;
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
struct pppox_sock *po;
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to ppp\n",
session->name, data_len);
/* We need to forget all info related to the L2TP packet
* gathered in the skb as we are going to reuse the same
* skb for the inner packet.
* Namely we need to:
* - reset xfrm (IPSec) information as it applies to
* the outer L2TP packet and not to the inner one
* - release the dst to force a route lookup on the inner
* IP packet since skb->dst currently points to the dst
* of the UDP tunnel
* - reset netfilter information as it doesn't apply
* to the inner packet either
*/
secpath_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
po = pppox_sk(sk);
ppp_input(&po->chan, skb);
} else {
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: socket not bound\n",
session->name);
/* Not bound. Nothing we can do, so discard. */
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
return;
no_sock:
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
sk = ps->sock;
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
struct pppox_sock *po;
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to ppp\n",
session->name, data_len);
/* We need to forget all info related to the L2TP packet
* gathered in the skb as we are going to reuse the same
* skb for the inner packet.
* Namely we need to:
* - reset xfrm (IPSec) information as it applies to
* the outer L2TP packet and not to the inner one
* - release the dst to force a route lookup on the inner
* IP packet since skb->dst currently points to the dst
* of the UDP tunnel
* - reset netfilter information as it doesn't apply
* to the inner packet either
*/
secpath_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
po = pppox_sk(sk);
ppp_input(&po->chan, skb);
} else {
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: socket not bound\n",
session->name);
/* Not bound. Nothing we can do, so discard. */
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
return;
no_sock:
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1696/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
[Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
TestNativeHandler::TestNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetWakeEventPage", "test",
base::Bind(&TestNativeHandler::GetWakeEventPage, base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
TestNativeHandler::TestNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetWakeEventPage",
base::Bind(&TestNativeHandler::GetWakeEventPage, base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
Scheduler/child/TimeSource could be replaced with base/time/DefaultTickClock.
They both are totally same and TimeSource is removed.
BUG=494892
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1163143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333035}
|
void TaskQueue::PumpQueue() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
PumpQueueLocked();
}
|
void TaskQueue::PumpQueue() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
PumpQueueLocked();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW10_SET_VLAN_PCP(uint8_t pcp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
return decode_set_vlan_pcp(pcp, true, out);
}
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW10_SET_VLAN_PCP(uint8_t pcp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
return decode_set_vlan_pcp(pcp, true, out);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::RecognitionAllowedCallback(int session_id,
bool ask_user,
bool is_allowed) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter == sessions_.end())
return;
Session* session = iter->second.get();
if (session->abort_requested)
return;
if (ask_user) {
SpeechRecognitionSessionContext& context = session->context;
context.label = media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
context.render_process_id, context.render_frame_id, requester_id_,
session_id, StreamControls(true, false), context.security_origin,
base::BindOnce(
&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::MediaRequestPermissionCallback,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id));
return;
}
if (is_allowed) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_START));
} else {
OnRecognitionError(
session_id, blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionError(
blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionErrorCode::kNotAllowed,
blink::mojom::SpeechAudioErrorDetails::kNone));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_ABORT));
}
}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::RecognitionAllowedCallback(int session_id,
bool ask_user,
bool is_allowed) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter == sessions_.end())
return;
Session* session = iter->second.get();
if (session->abort_requested)
return;
if (ask_user) {
SpeechRecognitionSessionContext& context = session->context;
context.label = media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
context.render_process_id, context.render_frame_id, session_id,
StreamControls(true, false), context.security_origin,
base::BindOnce(
&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::MediaRequestPermissionCallback,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id));
return;
}
if (is_allowed) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_START));
} else {
OnRecognitionError(
session_id, blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionError(
blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionErrorCode::kNotAllowed,
blink::mojom::SpeechAudioErrorDetails::kNone));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_ABORT));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-10021
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10021/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
int sas_eh_abort_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
int res;
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
struct Scsi_Host *host = cmd->device->host;
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(host->transportt);
if (!i->dft->lldd_abort_task)
return FAILED;
res = i->dft->lldd_abort_task(task);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_SUCC || res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE)
return SUCCESS;
return FAILED;
}
|
int sas_eh_abort_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
int res;
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
struct Scsi_Host *host = cmd->device->host;
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(host->transportt);
if (!i->dft->lldd_abort_task)
return FAILED;
res = i->dft->lldd_abort_task(task);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_SUCC || res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE)
return SUCCESS;
return FAILED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7530
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7530/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/b5ed738f8060266bf4ae521f7e3ed145aa4498a3
|
b5ed738f8060266bf4ae521f7e3ed145aa4498a3
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
|
MagickExport void SetQuantumScale(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const double scale)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->scale=scale;
}
|
MagickExport void SetQuantumScale(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const double scale)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->scale=scale;
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0250
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0250/
| null |
https://github.com/corosync/corosync/commit/b3f456a8ceefac6e9f2e9acc2ea0c159d412b595
|
b3f456a8ceefac6e9f2e9acc2ea0c159d412b595
|
totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <[email protected]>
|
static int encrypt_and_sign_nss_2_2 (
struct crypto_instance *instance,
const unsigned char *buf_in,
const size_t buf_in_len,
unsigned char *buf_out,
size_t *buf_out_len)
{
if (encrypt_nss(instance,
buf_in, buf_in_len,
buf_out + sizeof(struct crypto_config_header), buf_out_len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
*buf_out_len += sizeof(struct crypto_config_header);
if (hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type]) {
if (calculate_nss_hash(instance, buf_out, *buf_out_len, buf_out + *buf_out_len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
*buf_out_len += hash_len[instance->crypto_hash_type];
}
return 0;
}
|
static int encrypt_and_sign_nss_2_2 (
struct crypto_instance *instance,
const unsigned char *buf_in,
const size_t buf_in_len,
unsigned char *buf_out,
size_t *buf_out_len)
{
if (encrypt_nss(instance,
buf_in, buf_in_len,
buf_out + sizeof(struct crypto_config_header), buf_out_len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
*buf_out_len += sizeof(struct crypto_config_header);
if (hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type]) {
if (calculate_nss_hash(instance, buf_out, *buf_out_len, buf_out + *buf_out_len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
*buf_out_len += hash_len[instance->crypto_hash_type];
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
corosync
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0494/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
|
1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
| null |
read_response_body (struct http_stat *hs, int sock, FILE *fp, wgint contlen,
wgint contrange, bool chunked_transfer_encoding,
char *url, char *warc_timestamp_str, char *warc_request_uuid,
ip_address *warc_ip, char *type, int statcode, char *head)
{
int warc_payload_offset = 0;
FILE *warc_tmp = NULL;
int warcerr = 0;
int flags = 0;
if (opt.warc_filename != NULL)
{
/* Open a temporary file where we can write the response before we
add it to the WARC record. */
warc_tmp = warc_tempfile ();
if (warc_tmp == NULL)
warcerr = WARC_TMP_FOPENERR;
if (warcerr == 0)
{
/* We should keep the response headers for the WARC record. */
int head_len = strlen (head);
int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (head, 1, head_len, warc_tmp);
if (warc_tmp_written != head_len)
warcerr = WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR;
warc_payload_offset = head_len;
}
if (warcerr != 0)
{
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
return warcerr;
}
}
if (fp != NULL)
{
/* This confuses the timestamping code that checks for file size.
#### The timestamping code should be smarter about file size. */
if (opt.save_headers && hs->restval == 0)
fwrite (head, 1, strlen (head), fp);
}
/* Read the response body. */
if (contlen != -1)
/* If content-length is present, read that much; otherwise, read
until EOF. The HTTP spec doesn't require the server to
actually close the connection when it's done sending data. */
flags |= rb_read_exactly;
if (fp != NULL && hs->restval > 0 && contrange == 0)
/* If the server ignored our range request, instruct fd_read_body
to skip the first RESTVAL bytes of body. */
flags |= rb_skip_startpos;
if (chunked_transfer_encoding)
flags |= rb_chunked_transfer_encoding;
if (hs->remote_encoding == ENC_GZIP)
flags |= rb_compressed_gzip;
hs->len = hs->restval;
hs->rd_size = 0;
/* Download the response body and write it to fp.
If we are working on a WARC file, we simultaneously write the
response body to warc_tmp. */
hs->res = fd_read_body (hs->local_file, sock, fp, contlen != -1 ? contlen : 0,
hs->restval, &hs->rd_size, &hs->len, &hs->dltime,
flags, warc_tmp);
if (hs->res >= 0)
{
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
{
/* Create a response record and write it to the WARC file.
Note: per the WARC standard, the request and response should share
the same date header. We re-use the timestamp of the request.
The response record should also refer to the uuid of the request. */
bool r = warc_write_response_record (url, warc_timestamp_str,
warc_request_uuid, warc_ip,
warc_tmp, warc_payload_offset,
type, statcode, hs->newloc);
/* warc_write_response_record has closed warc_tmp. */
if (! r)
return WARC_ERR;
}
return RETRFINISHED;
}
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
if (hs->res == -2)
{
/* Error while writing to fd. */
return FWRITEERR;
}
else if (hs->res == -3)
{
/* Error while writing to warc_tmp. */
return WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR;
}
else
{
/* A read error! */
hs->rderrmsg = xstrdup (fd_errstr (sock));
return RETRFINISHED;
}
}
|
read_response_body (struct http_stat *hs, int sock, FILE *fp, wgint contlen,
wgint contrange, bool chunked_transfer_encoding,
char *url, char *warc_timestamp_str, char *warc_request_uuid,
ip_address *warc_ip, char *type, int statcode, char *head)
{
int warc_payload_offset = 0;
FILE *warc_tmp = NULL;
int warcerr = 0;
int flags = 0;
if (opt.warc_filename != NULL)
{
/* Open a temporary file where we can write the response before we
add it to the WARC record. */
warc_tmp = warc_tempfile ();
if (warc_tmp == NULL)
warcerr = WARC_TMP_FOPENERR;
if (warcerr == 0)
{
/* We should keep the response headers for the WARC record. */
int head_len = strlen (head);
int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (head, 1, head_len, warc_tmp);
if (warc_tmp_written != head_len)
warcerr = WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR;
warc_payload_offset = head_len;
}
if (warcerr != 0)
{
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
return warcerr;
}
}
if (fp != NULL)
{
/* This confuses the timestamping code that checks for file size.
#### The timestamping code should be smarter about file size. */
if (opt.save_headers && hs->restval == 0)
fwrite (head, 1, strlen (head), fp);
}
/* Read the response body. */
if (contlen != -1)
/* If content-length is present, read that much; otherwise, read
until EOF. The HTTP spec doesn't require the server to
actually close the connection when it's done sending data. */
flags |= rb_read_exactly;
if (fp != NULL && hs->restval > 0 && contrange == 0)
/* If the server ignored our range request, instruct fd_read_body
to skip the first RESTVAL bytes of body. */
flags |= rb_skip_startpos;
if (chunked_transfer_encoding)
flags |= rb_chunked_transfer_encoding;
if (hs->remote_encoding == ENC_GZIP)
flags |= rb_compressed_gzip;
hs->len = hs->restval;
hs->rd_size = 0;
/* Download the response body and write it to fp.
If we are working on a WARC file, we simultaneously write the
response body to warc_tmp. */
hs->res = fd_read_body (hs->local_file, sock, fp, contlen != -1 ? contlen : 0,
hs->restval, &hs->rd_size, &hs->len, &hs->dltime,
flags, warc_tmp);
if (hs->res >= 0)
{
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
{
/* Create a response record and write it to the WARC file.
Note: per the WARC standard, the request and response should share
the same date header. We re-use the timestamp of the request.
The response record should also refer to the uuid of the request. */
bool r = warc_write_response_record (url, warc_timestamp_str,
warc_request_uuid, warc_ip,
warc_tmp, warc_payload_offset,
type, statcode, hs->newloc);
/* warc_write_response_record has closed warc_tmp. */
if (! r)
return WARC_ERR;
}
return RETRFINISHED;
}
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
if (hs->res == -2)
{
/* Error while writing to fd. */
return FWRITEERR;
}
else if (hs->res == -3)
{
/* Error while writing to warc_tmp. */
return WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR;
}
else
{
/* A read error! */
hs->rderrmsg = xstrdup (fd_errstr (sock));
return RETRFINISHED;
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3097/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SessionService::UpdateSelectedTabIndex(
std::vector<SessionWindow*>* windows) {
for (std::vector<SessionWindow*>::const_iterator i = windows->begin();
i != windows->end(); ++i) {
int new_index = 0;
for (std::vector<SessionTab*>::const_iterator j = (*i)->tabs.begin();
j != (*i)->tabs.end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->tab_visual_index == (*i)->selected_tab_index) {
new_index = static_cast<int>(j - (*i)->tabs.begin());
break;
}
}
(*i)->selected_tab_index = new_index;
}
}
|
void SessionService::UpdateSelectedTabIndex(
std::vector<SessionWindow*>* windows) {
for (std::vector<SessionWindow*>::const_iterator i = windows->begin();
i != windows->end(); ++i) {
int new_index = 0;
for (std::vector<SessionTab*>::const_iterator j = (*i)->tabs.begin();
j != (*i)->tabs.end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->tab_visual_index == (*i)->selected_tab_index) {
new_index = static_cast<int>(j - (*i)->tabs.begin());
break;
}
}
(*i)->selected_tab_index = new_index;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
const char *FS_ReferencedPakPureChecksums( void ) {
static char info[BIG_INFO_STRING];
searchpath_t *search;
int nFlags, numPaks, checksum;
info[0] = 0;
checksum = fs_checksumFeed;
numPaks = 0;
for ( nFlags = FS_GENERAL_REF; nFlags; nFlags = nFlags >> 1 ) {
for ( search = fs_searchpaths ; search ; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack && ( search->pack->referenced & nFlags ) ) {
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va( "%i ", search->pack->pure_checksum ) );
checksum ^= search->pack->pure_checksum;
numPaks++;
}
}
}
checksum ^= numPaks;
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va( "%i ", checksum ) );
return info;
}
|
const char *FS_ReferencedPakPureChecksums( void ) {
static char info[BIG_INFO_STRING];
searchpath_t *search;
int nFlags, numPaks, checksum;
info[0] = 0;
checksum = fs_checksumFeed;
numPaks = 0;
for ( nFlags = FS_GENERAL_REF; nFlags; nFlags = nFlags >> 1 ) {
for ( search = fs_searchpaths ; search ; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack && ( search->pack->referenced & nFlags ) ) {
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va( "%i ", search->pack->pure_checksum ) );
checksum ^= search->pack->pure_checksum;
numPaks++;
}
}
}
checksum ^= numPaks;
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va( "%i ", checksum ) );
return info;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::resumeTransformFeedback() {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (transform_feedback_binding_ &&
transform_feedback_binding_->GetProgram() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "resumeTransformFeedback",
"the program object is not active");
return;
}
ContextGL()->ResumeTransformFeedback();
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::resumeTransformFeedback() {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (transform_feedback_binding_ &&
transform_feedback_binding_->GetProgram() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "resumeTransformFeedback",
"the program object is not active");
return;
}
ContextGL()->ResumeTransformFeedback();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_port_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
struct snd_seq_port_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.addr.client != client->number) /* only set our own ports ! */
return -EPERM;
port = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(client, info.addr.port);
if (port) {
snd_seq_set_port_info(port, &info);
snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_port_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
struct snd_seq_port_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.addr.client != client->number) /* only set our own ports ! */
return -EPERM;
port = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(client, info.addr.port);
if (port) {
snd_seq_set_port_info(port, &info);
snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3760/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/37c88107679d36c419572732b4af6e18bb2f7dce
|
37c88107679d36c419572732b4af6e18bb2f7dce
|
Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
|
bool btif_config_set_bin(const char *section, const char *key, const uint8_t *value, size_t length) {
const char *lookup = "0123456789abcdef";
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
if (length > 0)
assert(value != NULL);
char *str = (char *)osi_calloc(length * 2 + 1);
if (!str)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
str[(i * 2) + 0] = lookup[(value[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
str[(i * 2) + 1] = lookup[value[i] & 0x0F];
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
config_set_string(config, section, key, str);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
osi_free(str);
return true;
}
|
bool btif_config_set_bin(const char *section, const char *key, const uint8_t *value, size_t length) {
const char *lookup = "0123456789abcdef";
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
if (length > 0)
assert(value != NULL);
char *str = (char *)osi_calloc(length * 2 + 1);
if (!str)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
str[(i * 2) + 0] = lookup[(value[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
str[(i * 2) + 1] = lookup[value[i] & 0x0F];
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
config_set_string(config, section, key, str);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
osi_free(str);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16513/
|
CWE-704
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498
|
b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498
| null |
static int devicenvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
int i, code;
ref narray;
os_ptr op = osp;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &narray);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_is_array(&narray))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (num_comps < r_size(&narray))
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
op -= r_size(&narray) - 1;
for (i=0;i < r_size(&narray); i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (values[i] > 1.0)
values[i] = 1.0;
if (values[i] < 0.0)
values[i] = 0.0;
op++;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int devicenvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
int i, code;
ref narray;
os_ptr op = osp;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &narray);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_is_array(&narray))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (num_comps < r_size(&narray))
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
op -= r_size(&narray) - 1;
for (i=0;i < r_size(&narray); i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (values[i] > 1.0)
values[i] = 1.0;
if (values[i] < 0.0)
values[i] = 0.0;
op++;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20961
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20961/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void f_midi_drop_out_substreams(struct f_midi *midi)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < midi->in_ports; i++) {
struct gmidi_in_port *port = midi->in_ports_array + i;
struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream = port->substream;
if (port->active && substream)
snd_rawmidi_drop_output(substream);
}
}
|
static void f_midi_drop_out_substreams(struct f_midi *midi)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < midi->in_ports; i++) {
struct gmidi_in_port *port = midi->in_ports_array + i;
struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream = port->substream;
if (port->active && substream)
snd_rawmidi_drop_output(substream);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::BitField field) const {
return GetField(metahandle, field, false);
}
|
bool Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::BitField field) const {
return GetField(metahandle, field, false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15538/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fb254aa983bf190cfd685d40c64a480a9bafaee
|
1fb254aa983bf190cfd685d40c64a480a9bafaee
|
xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]>
|
xfs_setup_iops(
struct xfs_inode *ip)
{
struct inode *inode = &ip->i_vnode;
switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
inode->i_op = &xfs_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &xfs_file_operations;
if (IS_DAX(inode))
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &xfs_dax_aops;
else
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &xfs_address_space_operations;
break;
case S_IFDIR:
if (xfs_sb_version_hasasciici(&XFS_M(inode->i_sb)->m_sb))
inode->i_op = &xfs_dir_ci_inode_operations;
else
inode->i_op = &xfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &xfs_dir_file_operations;
break;
case S_IFLNK:
if (ip->i_df.if_flags & XFS_IFINLINE)
inode->i_op = &xfs_inline_symlink_inode_operations;
else
inode->i_op = &xfs_symlink_inode_operations;
break;
default:
inode->i_op = &xfs_inode_operations;
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, inode->i_rdev);
break;
}
}
|
xfs_setup_iops(
struct xfs_inode *ip)
{
struct inode *inode = &ip->i_vnode;
switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
inode->i_op = &xfs_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &xfs_file_operations;
if (IS_DAX(inode))
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &xfs_dax_aops;
else
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &xfs_address_space_operations;
break;
case S_IFDIR:
if (xfs_sb_version_hasasciici(&XFS_M(inode->i_sb)->m_sb))
inode->i_op = &xfs_dir_ci_inode_operations;
else
inode->i_op = &xfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &xfs_dir_file_operations;
break;
case S_IFLNK:
if (ip->i_df.if_flags & XFS_IFINLINE)
inode->i_op = &xfs_inline_symlink_inode_operations;
else
inode->i_op = &xfs_symlink_inode_operations;
break;
default:
inode->i_op = &xfs_inode_operations;
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, inode->i_rdev);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3760/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Bluetooth/+/122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
|
static int getConnectionStateNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jbyteArray address) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return JNI_FALSE;
jbyte *addr = env->GetByteArrayElements(address, NULL);
if (addr == NULL) {
jniThrowIOException(env, EINVAL);
return JNI_FALSE;
}
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->get_connection_state((bt_bdaddr_t *)addr);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
return ret;
}
|
static int getConnectionStateNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jbyteArray address) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return JNI_FALSE;
jbyte *addr = env->GetByteArrayElements(address, NULL);
if (addr == NULL) {
jniThrowIOException(env, EINVAL);
return JNI_FALSE;
}
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->get_connection_state((bt_bdaddr_t *)addr);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void CallWithScriptStateVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
impl->callWithScriptStateVoidMethod(script_state);
}
|
static void CallWithScriptStateVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
impl->callWithScriptStateVoidMethod(script_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static inline int ablkcipher_next_fast(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
walk->src.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->in);
walk->src.offset = offset_in_page(walk->in.offset);
walk->dst.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->out);
walk->dst.offset = offset_in_page(walk->out.offset);
return 0;
}
|
static inline int ablkcipher_next_fast(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
walk->src.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->in);
walk->src.offset = offset_in_page(walk->in.offset);
walk->dst.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->out);
walk->dst.offset = offset_in_page(walk->out.offset);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7186
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7186/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/DanBloomberg/leptonica/commit/ee301cb2029db8a6289c5295daa42bba7715e99a
|
ee301cb2029db8a6289c5295daa42bba7715e99a
|
Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
|
selCopy(SEL *sel)
{
l_int32 sx, sy, cx, cy, i, j;
SEL *csel;
PROCNAME("selCopy");
if (!sel)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((csel = (SEL *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(SEL))) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("csel not made", procName, NULL);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, &cy, &cx);
csel->sy = sy;
csel->sx = sx;
csel->cy = cy;
csel->cx = cx;
if ((csel->data = create2dIntArray(sy, sx)) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(csel);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel data not made", procName, NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++)
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++)
csel->data[i][j] = sel->data[i][j];
if (sel->name)
csel->name = stringNew(sel->name);
return csel;
}
|
selCopy(SEL *sel)
{
l_int32 sx, sy, cx, cy, i, j;
SEL *csel;
PROCNAME("selCopy");
if (!sel)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((csel = (SEL *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(SEL))) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("csel not made", procName, NULL);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, &cy, &cx);
csel->sy = sy;
csel->sx = sx;
csel->cy = cy;
csel->cx = cx;
if ((csel->data = create2dIntArray(sy, sx)) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(csel);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel data not made", procName, NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++)
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++)
csel->data[i][j] = sel->data[i][j];
if (sel->name)
csel->name = stringNew(sel->name);
return csel;
}
|
C
|
leptonica
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
construct_mac_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len, size_t le_tlv_len,
unsigned char *mac_tlv, size_t * mac_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
unsigned char mac[4096] = { 0 };
size_t mac_len;
unsigned char icv[16] = { 0 };
int i = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 15 : 7);
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (0 == data_tlv_len && 0 == le_tlv_len) {
mac_len = block_size;
}
else {
/* padding */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len) = 0x80;
if ((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) % block_size)
mac_len = (((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) / block_size) +
1) * block_size + block_size;
else
mac_len = data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1 + block_size;
memset((apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1),
0, (mac_len - (data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1)));
}
/* increase icv */
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
if (exdata->icv_mac[i] == 0xff) {
exdata->icv_mac[i] = 0;
}
else {
exdata->icv_mac[i]++;
break;
}
}
/* calculate MAC */
memset(icv, 0, sizeof(icv));
memcpy(icv, exdata->icv_mac, 16);
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type) {
aes128_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 16, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
memcpy(mac_tlv + 2, &mac[mac_len - 16], 8);
}
else {
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp[8] = { 0 };
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
des_decrypt_cbc(&exdata->sk_mac[8], 8, iv, &mac[mac_len - 8], 8, tmp);
memset(iv, 0x00, sizeof iv);
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, iv, tmp, 8, mac_tlv + 2);
}
*mac_tlv_len = 2 + 8;
return 0;
}
|
construct_mac_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len, size_t le_tlv_len,
unsigned char *mac_tlv, size_t * mac_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
unsigned char mac[4096] = { 0 };
size_t mac_len;
unsigned char icv[16] = { 0 };
int i = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 15 : 7);
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (0 == data_tlv_len && 0 == le_tlv_len) {
mac_len = block_size;
}
else {
/* padding */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len) = 0x80;
if ((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) % block_size)
mac_len = (((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) / block_size) +
1) * block_size + block_size;
else
mac_len = data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1 + block_size;
memset((apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1),
0, (mac_len - (data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1)));
}
/* increase icv */
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
if (exdata->icv_mac[i] == 0xff) {
exdata->icv_mac[i] = 0;
}
else {
exdata->icv_mac[i]++;
break;
}
}
/* calculate MAC */
memset(icv, 0, sizeof(icv));
memcpy(icv, exdata->icv_mac, 16);
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type) {
aes128_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 16, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
memcpy(mac_tlv + 2, &mac[mac_len - 16], 8);
}
else {
unsigned char iv[8] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp[8] = { 0 };
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
des_decrypt_cbc(&exdata->sk_mac[8], 8, iv, &mac[mac_len - 8], 8, tmp);
memset(iv, 0x00, 8);
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, iv, tmp, 8, mac_tlv + 2);
}
*mac_tlv_len = 2 + 8;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 1 |
CVE-2010-2520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2520/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
|
888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
| null |
Ins_ROLL( INS_ARG )
{
FT_Long A, B, C;
FT_UNUSED_EXEC;
A = args[2];
B = args[1];
C = args[0];
args[2] = C;
args[1] = A;
args[0] = B;
}
|
Ins_ROLL( INS_ARG )
{
FT_Long A, B, C;
FT_UNUSED_EXEC;
A = args[2];
B = args[1];
C = args[0];
args[2] = C;
args[1] = A;
args[0] = B;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
{
struct path path;
int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
if (!error) {
audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
error = vfs_open(&path, file, current_cred());
path_put(&path);
}
return error;
}
|
static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
{
struct path path;
int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
if (!error) {
audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
error = vfs_open(&path, file, current_cred());
path_put(&path);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12896/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/78c9c4dfbf8c04883941445a195276bb4bb92c76
|
78c9c4dfbf8c04883941445a195276bb4bb92c76
|
posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
static int posix_get_coarse_res(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
*tp = ktime_to_timespec64(KTIME_LOW_RES);
return 0;
}
|
static int posix_get_coarse_res(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
*tp = ktime_to_timespec64(KTIME_LOW_RES);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2495
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2495/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
{
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
|
static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
{
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5104/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
void InterstitialPageImpl::UnderlyingContentObserver::WebContentsDestroyed() {
interstitial_->OnNavigatingAwayOrTabClosing();
}
|
void InterstitialPageImpl::UnderlyingContentObserver::WebContentsDestroyed() {
interstitial_->OnNavigatingAwayOrTabClosing();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool Textfield::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
const bool had_focus = HasFocus();
bool handled = controller_ && controller_->HandleMouseEvent(this, event);
if (!handled &&
(event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() || event.IsOnlyRightMouseButton())) {
if (!had_focus)
RequestFocus();
ShowImeIfNeeded();
}
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!handled && !had_focus && event.IsOnlyMiddleMouseButton())
RequestFocus();
#endif
return selection_controller_.OnMousePressed(
event, handled,
had_focus ? SelectionController::FOCUSED
: SelectionController::UNFOCUSED);
}
|
bool Textfield::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
const bool had_focus = HasFocus();
bool handled = controller_ && controller_->HandleMouseEvent(this, event);
if (!handled &&
(event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() || event.IsOnlyRightMouseButton())) {
if (!had_focus)
RequestFocus();
ShowImeIfNeeded();
}
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!handled && !had_focus && event.IsOnlyMiddleMouseButton())
RequestFocus();
#endif
return selection_controller_.OnMousePressed(
event, handled,
had_focus ? SelectionController::FOCUSED
: SelectionController::UNFOCUSED);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1743
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
bool SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::CalledOnValidThread() const {
return thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread();
}
|
bool SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::CalledOnValidThread() const {
return thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2143
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2143/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git&a=commit&h=932ded2ed51e8333852e370c7a6dad75d9f236f9
|
932ded2ed51e8333852e370c7a6dad75d9f236f9
| null |
px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
{
int i;
uint32 count,
salt,
l,
r0,
r1,
keybuf[2];
char *p;
uint8 *q;
static char output[21];
if (!des_initialised)
des_init();
/*
* Copy the key, shifting each character up by one bit and padding with
* zeros.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8)
{
*q++ = *key << 1;
if (*key != '\0')
key++;
}
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
#ifndef DISABLE_XDES
if (*setting == _PASSWORD_EFMT1)
{
/*
* "new"-style: setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of
* salt key - unlimited characters
*/
for (i = 1, count = 0L; i < 5; i++)
count |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 1) * 6;
for (i = 5, salt = 0L; i < 9; i++)
salt |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 5) * 6;
while (*key)
{
/*
* Encrypt the key with itself.
*/
if (des_cipher((char *) keybuf, (char *) keybuf, 0L, 1))
return (NULL);
/*
* And XOR with the next 8 characters of the key.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8 && *key)
*q++ ^= *key++ << 1;
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
return (NULL);
}
strncpy(output, setting, 9);
/*
* Double check that we weren't given a short setting. If we were, the
* above code will probably have created weird values for count and
* salt, but we don't really care. Just make sure the output string
* doesn't have an extra NUL in it.
*/
output[9] = '\0';
p = output + strlen(output);
}
else
#endif /* !DISABLE_XDES */
{
/*
* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt key - up to 8 characters
*/
count = 25;
salt = (ascii_to_bin(setting[1]) << 6)
| ascii_to_bin(setting[0]);
output[0] = setting[0];
/*
* If the encrypted password that the salt was extracted from is only
* 1 character long, the salt will be corrupted. We need to ensure
* that the output string doesn't have an extra NUL in it!
*/
output[1] = setting[1] ? setting[1] : output[0];
p = output + 2;
}
setup_salt(salt);
/*
* Do it.
*/
if (do_des(0L, 0L, &r0, &r1, count))
return (NULL);
/*
* Now encode the result...
*/
l = (r0 >> 8);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = (r0 << 16) | ((r1 >> 16) & 0xffff);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = r1 << 2;
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
*p = 0;
return (output);
}
|
px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
{
int i;
uint32 count,
salt,
l,
r0,
r1,
keybuf[2];
char *p;
uint8 *q;
static char output[21];
if (!des_initialised)
des_init();
/*
* Copy the key, shifting each character up by one bit and padding with
* zeros.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8)
{
if ((*q++ = *key << 1))
key++;
}
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
#ifndef DISABLE_XDES
if (*setting == _PASSWORD_EFMT1)
{
/*
* "new"-style: setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of
* salt key - unlimited characters
*/
for (i = 1, count = 0L; i < 5; i++)
count |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 1) * 6;
for (i = 5, salt = 0L; i < 9; i++)
salt |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 5) * 6;
while (*key)
{
/*
* Encrypt the key with itself.
*/
if (des_cipher((char *) keybuf, (char *) keybuf, 0L, 1))
return (NULL);
/*
* And XOR with the next 8 characters of the key.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8 && *key)
*q++ ^= *key++ << 1;
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
return (NULL);
}
strncpy(output, setting, 9);
/*
* Double check that we weren't given a short setting. If we were, the
* above code will probably have created weird values for count and
* salt, but we don't really care. Just make sure the output string
* doesn't have an extra NUL in it.
*/
output[9] = '\0';
p = output + strlen(output);
}
else
#endif /* !DISABLE_XDES */
{
/*
* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt key - up to 8 characters
*/
count = 25;
salt = (ascii_to_bin(setting[1]) << 6)
| ascii_to_bin(setting[0]);
output[0] = setting[0];
/*
* If the encrypted password that the salt was extracted from is only
* 1 character long, the salt will be corrupted. We need to ensure
* that the output string doesn't have an extra NUL in it!
*/
output[1] = setting[1] ? setting[1] : output[0];
p = output + 2;
}
setup_salt(salt);
/*
* Do it.
*/
if (do_des(0L, 0L, &r0, &r1, count))
return (NULL);
/*
* Now encode the result...
*/
l = (r0 >> 8);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = (r0 << 16) | ((r1 >> 16) & 0xffff);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = r1 << 2;
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
*p = 0;
return (output);
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0380
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0380/
|
CWE-532
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
|
rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (smartlist_contains_int_as_string(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
p->virtual_port))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (smartlist_contains_int_as_string(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
p->virtual_port))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
|
char* String8::lockBuffer(size_t size)
{
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(mString)
->editResize(size+1);
if (buf) {
char* str = (char*)buf->data();
mString = str;
return str;
}
return NULL;
}
|
char* String8::lockBuffer(size_t size)
{
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(mString)
->editResize(size+1);
if (buf) {
char* str = (char*)buf->data();
mString = str;
return str;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
base::FilePath GetBlacklistPath() {
base::FilePath blacklist_dir;
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &blacklist_dir);
return blacklist_dir.AppendASCII(kBlacklistFilename);
}
|
base::FilePath GetBlacklistPath() {
base::FilePath blacklist_dir;
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &blacklist_dir);
return blacklist_dir.AppendASCII(kBlacklistFilename);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Tab* TabStrip::FindTabForEventFrom(const gfx::Point& point,
int start,
int delta) {
if (start == tab_count())
start += delta;
for (int i = start; i >= 0 && i < tab_count(); i += delta) {
if (IsPointInTab(tab_at(i), point))
return tab_at(i);
}
return NULL;
}
|
Tab* TabStrip::FindTabForEventFrom(const gfx::Point& point,
int start,
int delta) {
if (start == tab_count())
start += delta;
for (int i = start; i >= 0 && i < tab_count(); i += delta) {
if (IsPointInTab(tab_at(i), point))
return tab_at(i);
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE(const struct nx_action_resubmit *nar,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_resubmit *resubmit;
if (nar->pad[0] || nar->pad[1] || nar->pad[2]) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
resubmit = ofpact_put_RESUBMIT(out);
resubmit->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE;
resubmit->in_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(nar->in_port));
resubmit->table_id = nar->table;
return 0;
}
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE(const struct nx_action_resubmit *nar,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_resubmit *resubmit;
if (nar->pad[0] || nar->pad[1] || nar->pad[2]) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
resubmit = ofpact_put_RESUBMIT(out);
resubmit->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE;
resubmit->in_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(nar->in_port));
resubmit->table_id = nar->table;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static int lxc_mount_auto_mounts(struct lxc_conf *conf, int flags, struct lxc_handler *handler)
{
int r;
size_t i;
static struct {
int match_mask;
int match_flag;
const char *source;
const char *destination;
const char *fstype;
unsigned long flags;
const char *options;
} default_mounts[] = {
/* Read-only bind-mounting... In older kernels, doing that required
* to do one MS_BIND mount and then MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY the same
* one. According to mount(2) manpage, MS_BIND honors MS_RDONLY from
* kernel 2.6.26 onwards. However, this apparently does not work on
* kernel 3.8. Unfortunately, on that very same kernel, doing the
* same trick as above doesn't seem to work either, there one needs
* to ALSO specify MS_BIND for the remount, otherwise the entire
* fs is remounted read-only or the mount fails because it's busy...
* MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY seems to work for kernels as low as
* 2.6.32...
*/
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
/* proc/tty is used as a temporary placeholder for proc/sys/net which we'll move back in a few steps */
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys/net", "%r/proc/tty", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys", "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/tty", "%r/proc/sys/net", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_RW, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys", "%r/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net/devices/virtual/net", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC, NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }
};
for (i = 0; default_mounts[i].match_mask; i++) {
if ((flags & default_mounts[i].match_mask) == default_mounts[i].match_flag) {
char *source = NULL;
char *destination = NULL;
int saved_errno;
unsigned long mflags;
if (default_mounts[i].source) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
source = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].source);
if (!source) {
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
return -1;
}
}
if (default_mounts[i].destination) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
destination = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].destination);
if (!destination) {
saved_errno = errno;
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
free(source);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
mflags = add_required_remount_flags(source, destination,
default_mounts[i].flags);
r = safe_mount(source, destination, default_mounts[i].fstype, mflags, default_mounts[i].options, conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : NULL);
saved_errno = errno;
if (r < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
INFO("Mount source or target for %s on %s doesn't exist. Skipping.", source, destination);
r = 0;
}
else if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("error mounting %s on %s flags %lu", source, destination, mflags);
free(source);
free(destination);
if (r < 0) {
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
}
if (flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK) {
int cg_flags;
cg_flags = flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK;
/* If the type of cgroup mount was not specified, it depends on the
* container's capabilities as to what makes sense: if we have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the read-only part can be remounted read-write
* anyway, so we may as well default to read-write; then the admin
* will not be given a false sense of security. (And if they really
* want mixed r/o r/w, then they can explicitly specify :mixed.)
* OTOH, if the container lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN, do only default to
* :mixed, because then the container can't remount it read-write. */
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC || cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_NOSPEC) {
int has_sys_admin = 0;
if (!lxc_list_empty(&conf->keepcaps)) {
has_sys_admin = in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->keepcaps);
} else {
has_sys_admin = !in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->caps);
}
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC) {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED;
} else {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED;
}
}
if (!cgroup_mount(conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", handler, cg_flags)) {
SYSERROR("error mounting /sys/fs/cgroup");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int lxc_mount_auto_mounts(struct lxc_conf *conf, int flags, struct lxc_handler *handler)
{
int r;
size_t i;
static struct {
int match_mask;
int match_flag;
const char *source;
const char *destination;
const char *fstype;
unsigned long flags;
const char *options;
} default_mounts[] = {
/* Read-only bind-mounting... In older kernels, doing that required
* to do one MS_BIND mount and then MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY the same
* one. According to mount(2) manpage, MS_BIND honors MS_RDONLY from
* kernel 2.6.26 onwards. However, this apparently does not work on
* kernel 3.8. Unfortunately, on that very same kernel, doing the
* same trick as above doesn't seem to work either, there one needs
* to ALSO specify MS_BIND for the remount, otherwise the entire
* fs is remounted read-only or the mount fails because it's busy...
* MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY seems to work for kernels as low as
* 2.6.32...
*/
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys/net", "%r/proc/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys", "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/net", "%r/proc/sys/net", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_RW, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys", "%r/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net/devices/virtual/net", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC, NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }
};
for (i = 0; default_mounts[i].match_mask; i++) {
if ((flags & default_mounts[i].match_mask) == default_mounts[i].match_flag) {
char *source = NULL;
char *destination = NULL;
int saved_errno;
unsigned long mflags;
if (default_mounts[i].source) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
source = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].source);
if (!source) {
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
return -1;
}
}
if (default_mounts[i].destination) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
destination = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].destination);
if (!destination) {
saved_errno = errno;
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
free(source);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
mflags = add_required_remount_flags(source, destination,
default_mounts[i].flags);
r = mount(source, destination, default_mounts[i].fstype, mflags, default_mounts[i].options);
saved_errno = errno;
if (r < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
INFO("Mount source or target for %s on %s doesn't exist. Skipping.", source, destination);
r = 0;
}
else if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("error mounting %s on %s flags %lu", source, destination, mflags);
free(source);
free(destination);
if (r < 0) {
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
}
if (flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK) {
int cg_flags;
cg_flags = flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK;
/* If the type of cgroup mount was not specified, it depends on the
* container's capabilities as to what makes sense: if we have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the read-only part can be remounted read-write
* anyway, so we may as well default to read-write; then the admin
* will not be given a false sense of security. (And if they really
* want mixed r/o r/w, then they can explicitly specify :mixed.)
* OTOH, if the container lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN, do only default to
* :mixed, because then the container can't remount it read-write. */
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC || cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_NOSPEC) {
int has_sys_admin = 0;
if (!lxc_list_empty(&conf->keepcaps)) {
has_sys_admin = in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->keepcaps);
} else {
has_sys_admin = !in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->caps);
}
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC) {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED;
} else {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED;
}
}
if (!cgroup_mount(conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", handler, cg_flags)) {
SYSERROR("error mounting /sys/fs/cgroup");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0281/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
queue_local_notify(xmlNode * notify_src, const char *client_id, gboolean sync_reply, gboolean from_peer)
{
cib_local_notify_t *notify = calloc(1, sizeof(cib_local_notify_t));
notify->notify_src = notify_src;
notify->client_id = strdup(client_id);
notify->sync_reply = sync_reply;
notify->from_peer = from_peer;
if (!local_notify_queue) {
local_notify_queue = g_hash_table_new_full(g_direct_hash,
g_direct_equal, NULL, local_notify_destroy_callback);
}
g_hash_table_insert(local_notify_queue, GINT_TO_POINTER(cib_local_bcast_num), notify);
}
|
queue_local_notify(xmlNode * notify_src, const char *client_id, gboolean sync_reply, gboolean from_peer)
{
cib_local_notify_t *notify = calloc(1, sizeof(cib_local_notify_t));
notify->notify_src = notify_src;
notify->client_id = strdup(client_id);
notify->sync_reply = sync_reply;
notify->from_peer = from_peer;
if (!local_notify_queue) {
local_notify_queue = g_hash_table_new_full(g_direct_hash,
g_direct_equal, NULL, local_notify_destroy_callback);
}
g_hash_table_insert(local_notify_queue, GINT_TO_POINTER(cib_local_bcast_num), notify);
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5307/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
{
u64 guest_efer;
u64 ignore_bits;
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
/*
* NX is emulated; LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless
* outside long mode
*/
ignore_bits = EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
#endif
guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
/*
* On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
* On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
* atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
*/
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer ||
(enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
if (guest_efer != host_efer)
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
guest_efer, host_efer);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
{
u64 guest_efer;
u64 ignore_bits;
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
/*
* NX is emulated; LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless
* outside long mode
*/
ignore_bits = EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
#endif
guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
/*
* On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
* On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
* atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
*/
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer ||
(enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
if (guest_efer != host_efer)
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
guest_efer, host_efer);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
static int _step_limits_match(void *x, void *key)
{
job_mem_limits_t *job_limits_ptr = (job_mem_limits_t *) x;
step_loc_t *step_ptr = (step_loc_t *) key;
if ((job_limits_ptr->job_id == step_ptr->jobid) &&
(job_limits_ptr->step_id == step_ptr->stepid))
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
static int _step_limits_match(void *x, void *key)
{
job_mem_limits_t *job_limits_ptr = (job_mem_limits_t *) x;
step_loc_t *step_ptr = (step_loc_t *) key;
if ((job_limits_ptr->job_id == step_ptr->jobid) &&
(job_limits_ptr->step_id == step_ptr->stepid))
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2015
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2015/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
const char *name = dentry->d_name.name;
int namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned short reclen;
int csum_size = 0;
int err;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(namelen);
if (!de) {
err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode,
bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size,
name, namelen, &de);
if (err)
return err;
}
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
/* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */
ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, name, namelen);
/*
* XXX shouldn't update any times until successful
* completion of syscall, but too many callers depend
* on this.
*
* XXX similarly, too many callers depend on
* ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error
* recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can
* happen is that the times are slightly out of date
* and/or different from the directory change time.
*/
dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
dir->i_version++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh);
if (err)
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return 0;
}
|
static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
const char *name = dentry->d_name.name;
int namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned short reclen;
int csum_size = 0;
int err;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(namelen);
if (!de) {
err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode,
bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size,
name, namelen, &de);
if (err)
return err;
}
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
/* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */
ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, name, namelen);
/*
* XXX shouldn't update any times until successful
* completion of syscall, but too many callers depend
* on this.
*
* XXX similarly, too many callers depend on
* ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error
* recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can
* happen is that the times are slightly out of date
* and/or different from the directory change time.
*/
dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
dir->i_version++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh);
if (err)
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ != 0)
mask_ = (1 << UUT_->use_highbd_) - 1;
else
mask_ = 255;
#endif
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (i & 1) {
input_[i] = 255;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = mask_;
#endif
} else {
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = prng.Rand16() & mask_;
#endif
}
}
}
|
virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i)
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5546
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5546/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f
|
c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f
|
mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void do_drain(void *arg)
{
struct kmem_cache *cachep = arg;
struct array_cache *ac;
int node = numa_mem_id();
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
LIST_HEAD(list);
check_irq_off();
ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
n = get_node(cachep, node);
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
free_block(cachep, ac->entry, ac->avail, node, &list);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
slabs_destroy(cachep, &list);
ac->avail = 0;
}
|
static void do_drain(void *arg)
{
struct kmem_cache *cachep = arg;
struct array_cache *ac;
int node = numa_mem_id();
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
LIST_HEAD(list);
check_irq_off();
ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
n = get_node(cachep, node);
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
free_block(cachep, ac->entry, ac->avail, node, &list);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
slabs_destroy(cachep, &list);
ac->avail = 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ProfileSyncService::OnClearServerDataSucceeded() {
clear_server_data_timer_.Stop();
if (clear_server_data_state_ != CLEAR_SUCCEEDED) {
clear_server_data_state_ = CLEAR_SUCCEEDED;
NotifyObservers();
}
}
|
void ProfileSyncService::OnClearServerDataSucceeded() {
clear_server_data_timer_.Stop();
if (clear_server_data_state_ != CLEAR_SUCCEEDED) {
clear_server_data_state_ = CLEAR_SUCCEEDED;
NotifyObservers();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int decode_reclaim_complete(struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *dummy)
{
return decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_RECLAIM_COMPLETE);
}
|
static int decode_reclaim_complete(struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *dummy)
{
return decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_RECLAIM_COMPLETE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16253
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16253/
|
CWE-347
|
https://github.com/igrr/axtls-8266/commit/5efe2947ab45e81d84b5f707c51d1c64be52f36c
|
5efe2947ab45e81d84b5f707c51d1c64be52f36c
|
Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
|
static int x509_v3_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
int ret = X509_OK;
int lenSeq = 0;
if ((offset = asn1_is_basic_constraints(cert, offset)) == 0)
goto end_contraints;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_present = true;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_is_critical =
asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
/* Assign Defaults in case not specified
basic_constraint_cA will already by zero by virtue of the calloc */
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_cA = 0;
/* basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint is unlimited by default.
10000 is just a large number (limits.h is not already included) */
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint = 10000;
if ((asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) < 0) ||
((lenSeq = asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
/* If the Sequence Length is greater than zero,
continue with the basic_constraint_cA */
if ((lenSeq>0)&&(asn1_get_bool(cert, &offset,
&x509_ctx->basic_constraint_cA) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
/* If the Sequence Length is greater than 3, it has more content than
the basic_constraint_cA bool, so grab the pathLenConstraint */
if ((lenSeq>3) && (asn1_get_int(cert, &offset,
&x509_ctx->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
end_contraints:
return ret;
}
|
static int x509_v3_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
int ret = X509_OK;
int lenSeq = 0;
if ((offset = asn1_is_basic_constraints(cert, offset)) == 0)
goto end_contraints;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_present = true;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_is_critical =
asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
/* Assign Defaults in case not specified
basic_constraint_cA will already by zero by virtue of the calloc */
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_cA = 0;
/* basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint is unlimited by default.
10000 is just a large number (limits.h is not already included) */
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint = 10000;
if ((asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) < 0) ||
((lenSeq = asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
/* If the Sequence Length is greater than zero,
continue with the basic_constraint_cA */
if ((lenSeq>0)&&(asn1_get_bool(cert, &offset,
&x509_ctx->basic_constraint_cA) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
/* If the Sequence Length is greater than 3, it has more content than
the basic_constraint_cA bool, so grab the pathLenConstraint */
if ((lenSeq>3) && (asn1_get_int(cert, &offset,
&x509_ctx->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint) < 0))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
end_contraints:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
axtls-8266
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
gfx::Size AutofillDialogViews::NotificationArea::GetPreferredSize() const {
gfx::Size size = views::View::GetPreferredSize();
size.set_width(1);
return size;
}
|
gfx::Size AutofillDialogViews::NotificationArea::GetPreferredSize() const {
gfx::Size size = views::View::GetPreferredSize();
size.set_width(1);
return size;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5131/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d0c31f0342cefc46a3b3d80359a9779d044d4c0d
|
d0c31f0342cefc46a3b3d80359a9779d044d4c0d
|
Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool FileReaderLoader::isCompleted() const
{
return m_bytesLoaded == m_totalBytes;
}
|
bool FileReaderLoader::isCompleted() const
{
return m_bytesLoaded == m_totalBytes;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *child)
{
user_disable_single_step(child);
}
|
void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *child)
{
user_disable_single_step(child);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserTabStripController::StartHighlightTabsForCommand(
TabStripModel::ContextMenuCommand command_id,
BaseTab* tab) {
if (command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseOtherTabs ||
command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseTabsToRight) {
int model_index = tabstrip_->GetModelIndexOfBaseTab(tab);
if (IsValidIndex(model_index)) {
std::vector<int> indices =
model_->GetIndicesClosedByCommand(model_index, command_id);
for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator i(indices.begin());
i != indices.end(); ++i) {
tabstrip_->StartHighlight(*i);
}
}
}
}
|
void BrowserTabStripController::StartHighlightTabsForCommand(
TabStripModel::ContextMenuCommand command_id,
BaseTab* tab) {
if (command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseOtherTabs ||
command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseTabsToRight) {
int model_index = tabstrip_->GetModelIndexOfBaseTab(tab);
if (IsValidIndex(model_index)) {
std::vector<int> indices =
model_->GetIndicesClosedByCommand(model_index, command_id);
for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator i(indices.begin());
i != indices.end(); ++i) {
tabstrip_->StartHighlight(*i);
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5797
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
Fixing BadMessageCallback usage by SessionStorage
TBR: [email protected]
Bug: 916523
Change-Id: I027cc818cfba917906844ad2ec0edd7fa4761bd1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401604
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621772}
|
StoragePartitionImpl::StoragePartitionImpl(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
storage::SpecialStoragePolicy* special_storage_policy)
: partition_path_(partition_path),
special_storage_policy_(special_storage_policy),
network_context_client_binding_(this),
browser_context_(browser_context),
deletion_helpers_running_(0),
weak_factory_(this) {}
|
StoragePartitionImpl::StoragePartitionImpl(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
storage::SpecialStoragePolicy* special_storage_policy)
: partition_path_(partition_path),
special_storage_policy_(special_storage_policy),
network_context_client_binding_(this),
browser_context_(browser_context),
deletion_helpers_running_(0),
weak_factory_(this) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1191/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/madler/pigz/commit/fdad1406b3ec809f4954ff7cdf9e99eb18c2458f
|
fdad1406b3ec809f4954ff7cdf9e99eb18c2458f
|
When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
|
local void free_track(struct mem_track_s *mem, void *ptr)
{
size_t size;
if (ptr != NULL) {
size = MALLOC_SIZE(ptr);
mem_track_grab(mem);
mem->num--;
mem->size -= size;
mem_track_drop(mem);
free(ptr);
}
}
|
local void free_track(struct mem_track_s *mem, void *ptr)
{
size_t size;
if (ptr != NULL) {
size = MALLOC_SIZE(ptr);
mem_track_grab(mem);
mem->num--;
mem->size -= size;
mem_track_drop(mem);
free(ptr);
}
}
|
C
|
pigz
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
PictOpValid(CARD8 op)
{
if ( /*PictOpMinimum <= op && */ op <= PictOpMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpDisjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpDisjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpConjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpConjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpBlendMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpBlendMaximum)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
|
PictOpValid(CARD8 op)
{
if ( /*PictOpMinimum <= op && */ op <= PictOpMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpDisjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpDisjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpConjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpConjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpBlendMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpBlendMaximum)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0044/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
|
int drm_mode_getencoder(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_get_encoder *enc_resp = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_encoder *encoder;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, enc_resp->encoder_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_ENCODER);
if (!obj) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
encoder = obj_to_encoder(obj);
if (encoder->crtc)
enc_resp->crtc_id = encoder->crtc->base.id;
else
enc_resp->crtc_id = 0;
enc_resp->encoder_type = encoder->encoder_type;
enc_resp->encoder_id = encoder->base.id;
enc_resp->possible_crtcs = encoder->possible_crtcs;
enc_resp->possible_clones = encoder->possible_clones;
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
int drm_mode_getencoder(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_get_encoder *enc_resp = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_encoder *encoder;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, enc_resp->encoder_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_ENCODER);
if (!obj) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
encoder = obj_to_encoder(obj);
if (encoder->crtc)
enc_resp->crtc_id = encoder->crtc->base.id;
else
enc_resp->crtc_id = 0;
enc_resp->encoder_type = encoder->encoder_type;
enc_resp->encoder_id = encoder->base.id;
enc_resp->possible_crtcs = encoder->possible_crtcs;
enc_resp->possible_clones = encoder->possible_clones;
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int list_readers(void)
{
unsigned int i, rcount = sc_ctx_get_reader_count(ctx);
if (rcount == 0) {
printf("No smart card readers found.\n");
return 0;
}
printf("# Detected readers (%s)\n", ctx->reader_driver->short_name);
printf("Nr. Card Features Name\n");
for (i = 0; i < rcount; i++) {
sc_reader_t *reader = sc_ctx_get_reader(ctx, i);
int state = sc_detect_card_presence(reader);
printf("%-5d%-6s%-10s%s\n", i, state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT ? "Yes":"No",
reader->capabilities & SC_READER_CAP_PIN_PAD ? "PIN pad":"",
reader->name);
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT && verbose) {
struct sc_card *card;
int r;
char tmp[SC_MAX_ATR_SIZE*3];
sc_bin_to_hex(reader->atr.value, reader->atr.len, tmp, sizeof(tmp) - 1, ':');
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_EXCLUSIVE)
printf(" %s [EXCLUSIVE]\n", tmp);
else {
if ((r = sc_connect_card(reader, &card)) != SC_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, " failed: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
} else {
printf(" %s %s %s\n", tmp, card->name ? card->name : "", state & SC_READER_CARD_INUSE ? "[IN USE]" : "");
sc_disconnect_card(card);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int list_readers(void)
{
unsigned int i, rcount = sc_ctx_get_reader_count(ctx);
if (rcount == 0) {
printf("No smart card readers found.\n");
return 0;
}
printf("# Detected readers (%s)\n", ctx->reader_driver->short_name);
printf("Nr. Card Features Name\n");
for (i = 0; i < rcount; i++) {
sc_reader_t *reader = sc_ctx_get_reader(ctx, i);
int state = sc_detect_card_presence(reader);
printf("%-5d%-6s%-10s%s\n", i, state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT ? "Yes":"No",
reader->capabilities & SC_READER_CAP_PIN_PAD ? "PIN pad":"",
reader->name);
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT && verbose) {
struct sc_card *card;
int r;
char tmp[SC_MAX_ATR_SIZE*3];
sc_bin_to_hex(reader->atr.value, reader->atr.len, tmp, sizeof(tmp) - 1, ':');
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_EXCLUSIVE)
printf(" %s [EXCLUSIVE]\n", tmp);
else {
if ((r = sc_connect_card(reader, &card)) != SC_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, " failed: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
} else {
printf(" %s %s %s\n", tmp, card->name ? card->name : "", state & SC_READER_CARD_INUSE ? "[IN USE]" : "");
sc_disconnect_card(card);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Element::reportMemoryUsage(MemoryObjectInfo* memoryObjectInfo) const
{
MemoryClassInfo info(memoryObjectInfo, this, WebCoreMemoryTypes::DOM);
ContainerNode::reportMemoryUsage(memoryObjectInfo);
info.addMember(m_tagName, "tagName");
info.addMember(m_elementData, "elementData");
}
|
void Element::reportMemoryUsage(MemoryObjectInfo* memoryObjectInfo) const
{
MemoryClassInfo info(memoryObjectInfo, this, WebCoreMemoryTypes::DOM);
ContainerNode::reportMemoryUsage(memoryObjectInfo);
info.addMember(m_tagName, "tagName");
info.addMember(m_elementData, "elementData");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7534/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/430403b0029b37decf216d57f810899cab2317dd
|
430403b0029b37decf216d57f810899cab2317dd
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
|
MagickExport void SetQuantumMinIsWhite(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickBooleanType min_is_white)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->min_is_white=min_is_white;
}
|
MagickExport void SetQuantumMinIsWhite(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickBooleanType min_is_white)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->min_is_white=min_is_white;
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
[BlackBerry] willComposite() and didComposite() are now in InspectorController
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110343
Patch by Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> on 2013-02-21
Reviewed by Carlos Garcia Campos.
This was changed in r142879.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::willComposite):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::didComposite):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@143584 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool WebPagePrivate::compositorDrawsRootLayer() const
{
if (!m_mainFrame)
return false;
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->isCurrentThread())
return m_compositor && m_compositor->drawsRootLayer();
RenderView* renderView = m_mainFrame->contentRenderer();
if (!renderView || !renderView->layer() || !renderView->layer()->backing())
return false;
return !renderView->layer()->backing()->paintingGoesToWindow();
#else
return false;
#endif
}
|
bool WebPagePrivate::compositorDrawsRootLayer() const
{
if (!m_mainFrame)
return false;
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->isCurrentThread())
return m_compositor && m_compositor->drawsRootLayer();
RenderView* renderView = m_mainFrame->contentRenderer();
if (!renderView || !renderView->layer() || !renderView->layer()->backing())
return false;
return !renderView->layer()->backing()->paintingGoesToWindow();
#else
return false;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2854
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2854/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/108a923ac784e62ca84b45cb6241f77a942e233a
|
108a923ac784e62ca84b45cb6241f77a942e233a
|
Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int bytes_per_row() const { return bytes_per_row_; }
|
int bytes_per_row() const { return bytes_per_row_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6991
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6991/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
|
static SQLITE_NOINLINE void autoIncrementEnd(Parse *pParse){
AutoincInfo *p;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
assert( v );
for(p = pParse->pAinc; p; p = p->pNext){
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList autoIncEnd[] = {
/* 0 */ {OP_NotNull, 0, 2, 0},
/* 1 */ {OP_NewRowid, 0, 0, 0},
/* 2 */ {OP_MakeRecord, 0, 2, 0},
/* 3 */ {OP_Insert, 0, 0, 0},
/* 4 */ {OP_Close, 0, 0, 0}
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
Db *pDb = &db->aDb[p->iDb];
int iRec;
int memId = p->regCtr;
iRec = sqlite3GetTempReg(pParse);
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, 0, pDb->pSchema) );
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, 0, p->iDb, pDb->pSchema->pSeqTab, OP_OpenWrite);
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(autoIncEnd), autoIncEnd, iLn);
if( aOp==0 ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = memId+1;
aOp[1].p2 = memId+1;
aOp[2].p1 = memId-1;
aOp[2].p3 = iRec;
aOp[3].p2 = iRec;
aOp[3].p3 = memId+1;
aOp[3].p5 = OPFLAG_APPEND;
sqlite3ReleaseTempReg(pParse, iRec);
}
}
|
static SQLITE_NOINLINE void autoIncrementEnd(Parse *pParse){
AutoincInfo *p;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
assert( v );
for(p = pParse->pAinc; p; p = p->pNext){
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList autoIncEnd[] = {
/* 0 */ {OP_NotNull, 0, 2, 0},
/* 1 */ {OP_NewRowid, 0, 0, 0},
/* 2 */ {OP_MakeRecord, 0, 2, 0},
/* 3 */ {OP_Insert, 0, 0, 0},
/* 4 */ {OP_Close, 0, 0, 0}
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
Db *pDb = &db->aDb[p->iDb];
int iRec;
int memId = p->regCtr;
iRec = sqlite3GetTempReg(pParse);
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, 0, pDb->pSchema) );
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, 0, p->iDb, pDb->pSchema->pSeqTab, OP_OpenWrite);
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(autoIncEnd), autoIncEnd, iLn);
if( aOp==0 ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = memId+1;
aOp[1].p2 = memId+1;
aOp[2].p1 = memId-1;
aOp[2].p3 = iRec;
aOp[3].p2 = iRec;
aOp[3].p3 = memId+1;
aOp[3].p5 = OPFLAG_APPEND;
sqlite3ReleaseTempReg(pParse, iRec);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1767/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794
|
c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794
|
gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __init ipgre_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "GRE over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
err = register_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = inet_add_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
if (err < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre init: can't add protocol\n");
goto add_proto_failed;
}
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto rtnl_link_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_tap_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto tap_ops_failed;
out:
return err;
tap_ops_failed:
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
rtnl_link_failed:
inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
add_proto_failed:
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
goto out;
}
|
static int __init ipgre_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "GRE over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
if (inet_add_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre init: can't add protocol\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto gen_device_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto rtnl_link_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_tap_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto tap_ops_failed;
out:
return err;
tap_ops_failed:
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
rtnl_link_failed:
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
gen_device_failed:
inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
goto out;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void StringOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueStringOrNull(info, impl->stringOrNullAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
|
static void StringOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueStringOrNull(info, impl->stringOrNullAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
|
parse_intel_port_stats_rfc2819_property(const struct ofpbuf *payload,
struct ofputil_port_stats *ops)
{
const struct intel_port_stats_rfc2819 *rfc2819 = payload->data;
if (payload->size != sizeof *rfc2819) {
return OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_LEN;
}
ops->stats.rx_1_to_64_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1_to_64_packets);
ops->stats.rx_65_to_127_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_65_to_127_packets);
ops->stats.rx_128_to_255_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_128_to_255_packets);
ops->stats.rx_256_to_511_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_256_to_511_packets);
ops->stats.rx_512_to_1023_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_512_to_1023_packets);
ops->stats.rx_1024_to_1522_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1024_to_1522_packets);
ops->stats.rx_1523_to_max_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1523_to_max_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1_to_64_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1_to_64_packets);
ops->stats.tx_65_to_127_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_65_to_127_packets);
ops->stats.tx_128_to_255_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_128_to_255_packets);
ops->stats.tx_256_to_511_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_256_to_511_packets);
ops->stats.tx_512_to_1023_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_512_to_1023_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1024_to_1522_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1024_to_1522_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1523_to_max_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1523_to_max_packets);
ops->stats.tx_multicast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_multicast_packets);
ops->stats.rx_broadcast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_broadcast_packets);
ops->stats.tx_broadcast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_broadcast_packets);
ops->stats.rx_undersized_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_undersized_errors);
ops->stats.rx_oversize_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_oversize_errors);
ops->stats.rx_fragmented_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_fragmented_errors);
ops->stats.rx_jabber_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_jabber_errors);
return 0;
}
|
parse_intel_port_stats_rfc2819_property(const struct ofpbuf *payload,
struct ofputil_port_stats *ops)
{
const struct intel_port_stats_rfc2819 *rfc2819 = payload->data;
if (payload->size != sizeof *rfc2819) {
return OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_LEN;
}
ops->stats.rx_1_to_64_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1_to_64_packets);
ops->stats.rx_65_to_127_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_65_to_127_packets);
ops->stats.rx_128_to_255_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_128_to_255_packets);
ops->stats.rx_256_to_511_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_256_to_511_packets);
ops->stats.rx_512_to_1023_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_512_to_1023_packets);
ops->stats.rx_1024_to_1522_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1024_to_1522_packets);
ops->stats.rx_1523_to_max_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->rx_1523_to_max_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1_to_64_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1_to_64_packets);
ops->stats.tx_65_to_127_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_65_to_127_packets);
ops->stats.tx_128_to_255_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_128_to_255_packets);
ops->stats.tx_256_to_511_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_256_to_511_packets);
ops->stats.tx_512_to_1023_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_512_to_1023_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1024_to_1522_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1024_to_1522_packets);
ops->stats.tx_1523_to_max_packets =
ntohll(rfc2819->tx_1523_to_max_packets);
ops->stats.tx_multicast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_multicast_packets);
ops->stats.rx_broadcast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_broadcast_packets);
ops->stats.tx_broadcast_packets = ntohll(rfc2819->tx_broadcast_packets);
ops->stats.rx_undersized_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_undersized_errors);
ops->stats.rx_oversize_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_oversize_errors);
ops->stats.rx_fragmented_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_fragmented_errors);
ops->stats.rx_jabber_errors = ntohll(rfc2819->rx_jabber_errors);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::didCreateScriptContext(WebFrame* frame,
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context,
int extension_group,
int world_id) {
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->DidCreateScriptContext(
frame, context, extension_group, world_id);
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::didCreateScriptContext(WebFrame* frame,
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context,
int extension_group,
int world_id) {
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->DidCreateScriptContext(
frame, context, extension_group, world_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2015
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2015/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir,
int *inlined)
{
struct super_block *sb;
struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE];
struct buffer_head *bh, *ret = NULL;
ext4_lblk_t start, block, b;
const u8 *name = d_name->name;
int ra_max = 0; /* Number of bh's in the readahead
buffer, bh_use[] */
int ra_ptr = 0; /* Current index into readahead
buffer */
int num = 0;
ext4_lblk_t nblocks;
int i, err;
int namelen;
*res_dir = NULL;
sb = dir->i_sb;
namelen = d_name->len;
if (namelen > EXT4_NAME_LEN)
return NULL;
if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) {
int has_inline_data = 1;
ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, d_name, res_dir,
&has_inline_data);
if (has_inline_data) {
if (inlined)
*inlined = 1;
return ret;
}
}
if ((namelen <= 2) && (name[0] == '.') &&
(name[1] == '.' || name[1] == '\0')) {
/*
* "." or ".." will only be in the first block
* NFS may look up ".."; "." should be handled by the VFS
*/
block = start = 0;
nblocks = 1;
goto restart;
}
if (is_dx(dir)) {
bh = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, d_name, res_dir, &err);
/*
* On success, or if the error was file not found,
* return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the
* old fashioned way.
*/
if (bh || (err != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR))
return bh;
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "ext4_find_entry: dx failed, "
"falling back\n"));
}
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
start = EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup;
if (start >= nblocks)
start = 0;
block = start;
restart:
do {
/*
* We deal with the read-ahead logic here.
*/
if (ra_ptr >= ra_max) {
/* Refill the readahead buffer */
ra_ptr = 0;
b = block;
for (ra_max = 0; ra_max < NAMEI_RA_SIZE; ra_max++) {
/*
* Terminate if we reach the end of the
* directory and must wrap, or if our
* search has finished at this block.
*/
if (b >= nblocks || (num && block == start)) {
bh_use[ra_max] = NULL;
break;
}
num++;
bh = ext4_getblk(NULL, dir, b++, 0, &err);
bh_use[ra_max] = bh;
if (bh)
ll_rw_block(READ | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO,
1, &bh);
}
}
if ((bh = bh_use[ra_ptr++]) == NULL)
goto next;
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
/* read error, skip block & hope for the best */
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "reading directory lblock %lu",
(unsigned long) block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!is_dx_internal_node(dir, block,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir);
if (i == 1) {
EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block;
ret = bh;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
} else {
brelse(bh);
if (i < 0)
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
next:
if (++block >= nblocks)
block = 0;
} while (block != start);
/*
* If the directory has grown while we were searching, then
* search the last part of the directory before giving up.
*/
block = nblocks;
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
if (block < nblocks) {
start = 0;
goto restart;
}
cleanup_and_exit:
/* Clean up the read-ahead blocks */
for (; ra_ptr < ra_max; ra_ptr++)
brelse(bh_use[ra_ptr]);
return ret;
}
|
static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir,
int *inlined)
{
struct super_block *sb;
struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE];
struct buffer_head *bh, *ret = NULL;
ext4_lblk_t start, block, b;
const u8 *name = d_name->name;
int ra_max = 0; /* Number of bh's in the readahead
buffer, bh_use[] */
int ra_ptr = 0; /* Current index into readahead
buffer */
int num = 0;
ext4_lblk_t nblocks;
int i, err;
int namelen;
*res_dir = NULL;
sb = dir->i_sb;
namelen = d_name->len;
if (namelen > EXT4_NAME_LEN)
return NULL;
if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) {
int has_inline_data = 1;
ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, d_name, res_dir,
&has_inline_data);
if (has_inline_data) {
if (inlined)
*inlined = 1;
return ret;
}
}
if ((namelen <= 2) && (name[0] == '.') &&
(name[1] == '.' || name[1] == '\0')) {
/*
* "." or ".." will only be in the first block
* NFS may look up ".."; "." should be handled by the VFS
*/
block = start = 0;
nblocks = 1;
goto restart;
}
if (is_dx(dir)) {
bh = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, d_name, res_dir, &err);
/*
* On success, or if the error was file not found,
* return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the
* old fashioned way.
*/
if (bh || (err != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR))
return bh;
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "ext4_find_entry: dx failed, "
"falling back\n"));
}
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
start = EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup;
if (start >= nblocks)
start = 0;
block = start;
restart:
do {
/*
* We deal with the read-ahead logic here.
*/
if (ra_ptr >= ra_max) {
/* Refill the readahead buffer */
ra_ptr = 0;
b = block;
for (ra_max = 0; ra_max < NAMEI_RA_SIZE; ra_max++) {
/*
* Terminate if we reach the end of the
* directory and must wrap, or if our
* search has finished at this block.
*/
if (b >= nblocks || (num && block == start)) {
bh_use[ra_max] = NULL;
break;
}
num++;
bh = ext4_getblk(NULL, dir, b++, 0, &err);
bh_use[ra_max] = bh;
if (bh)
ll_rw_block(READ | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO,
1, &bh);
}
}
if ((bh = bh_use[ra_ptr++]) == NULL)
goto next;
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
/* read error, skip block & hope for the best */
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "reading directory lblock %lu",
(unsigned long) block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!is_dx_internal_node(dir, block,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir);
if (i == 1) {
EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block;
ret = bh;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
} else {
brelse(bh);
if (i < 0)
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
next:
if (++block >= nblocks)
block = 0;
} while (block != start);
/*
* If the directory has grown while we were searching, then
* search the last part of the directory before giving up.
*/
block = nblocks;
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
if (block < nblocks) {
start = 0;
goto restart;
}
cleanup_and_exit:
/* Clean up the read-ahead blocks */
for (; ra_ptr < ra_max; ra_ptr++)
brelse(bh_use[ra_ptr]);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12249
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12249/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
`mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
|
mrb_mod_append_features(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value klass;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "C", &klass);
mrb_include_module(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mod;
}
|
mrb_mod_append_features(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value klass;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "C", &klass);
mrb_include_module(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mod;
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2017/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void dev_addr_flush(struct net_device *dev)
{
/* rtnl_mutex must be held here */
__hw_addr_flush(&dev->dev_addrs);
dev->dev_addr = NULL;
}
|
static void dev_addr_flush(struct net_device *dev)
{
/* rtnl_mutex must be held here */
__hw_addr_flush(&dev->dev_addrs);
dev->dev_addr = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5670
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5670/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=7f2e4f4f553f6836be7683f66226afac3fa979b8
|
7f2e4f4f553f6836be7683f66226afac3fa979b8
| null |
hash_init( hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
int sz = INITIAL_HT_SIZE;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
ht->size = sz;
ht->limit = sz / 3;
ht->used = 0;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( ht->table, sz ) )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
|
hash_init( hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
int sz = INITIAL_HT_SIZE;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
ht->size = sz;
ht->limit = sz / 3;
ht->used = 0;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( ht->table, sz ) )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const
bool HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus() const
{
return false;
}
|
bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const
{
if (!fastHasAttribute(autofocusAttr))
return false;
if (hasTagName(inputTag))
return !toHTMLInputElement(this)->isInputTypeHidden();
if (hasTagName(selectTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(keygenTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(buttonTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(textareaTag))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
int GahpClient::ec2_vm_start( const char * service_url,
const char * publickeyfile,
const char * privatekeyfile,
const char * ami_id,
const char * keypair,
const char * user_data,
const char * user_data_file,
const char * instance_type,
const char * availability_zone,
const char * vpc_subnet,
const char * vpc_ip,
StringList & groupnames,
char * &instance_id,
char * &error_code)
{
static const char* command = "EC2_VM_START";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( (service_url == NULL) || (publickeyfile == NULL) || (privatekeyfile == NULL) || (ami_id == NULL) ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !keypair ) keypair = NULLSTRING;
if ( !user_data ) user_data = NULLSTRING;
if ( !user_data_file ) user_data_file = NULLSTRING;
if ( !instance_type ) instance_type = NULLSTRING;
if ( !availability_zone || 0==strlen(availability_zone) ) availability_zone = NULLSTRING;
if ( !vpc_subnet || 0==strlen(vpc_subnet) ) vpc_subnet = NULLSTRING;
if ( !vpc_ip || 0==strlen(vpc_ip) ) vpc_ip = NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(publickeyfile) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(privatekeyfile) );
char* esc4 = strdup( escapeGahpString(ami_id) );
char* esc5 = strdup( escapeGahpString(keypair) );
char* esc6 = strdup( escapeGahpString(user_data) );
char* esc7 = strdup( escapeGahpString(user_data_file) );
char* esc8 = strdup( escapeGahpString(instance_type) );
char* esc9 = strdup( escapeGahpString(availability_zone) );
char* esc10 = strdup( escapeGahpString(vpc_subnet) );
char* esc11 = strdup( escapeGahpString(vpc_ip) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3, esc4, esc5, esc6, esc7, esc8, esc9, esc10, esc11 );
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
free( esc4 );
free( esc5 );
free( esc6 );
free( esc7 );
free( esc8 );
free( esc9 );
free( esc10 );
free( esc11 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char * group_name;
int cnt = 0;
char * esc_groupname;
groupnames.rewind();
if ( groupnames.number() > 0 ) {
while ( (group_name = groupnames.next()) ) {
esc_groupname = strdup( escapeGahpString(group_name) );
sprintf_cat(reqline, " %s", esc_groupname);
cnt++;
free( esc_groupname );
}
}
ASSERT( cnt == groupnames.number() );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if ( result->argc == 2 ) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
rc = 1;
} else {
error_string = "";
}
} else if ( result->argc == 3 ) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
instance_id = strdup(result->argv[2]);
} else if ( result->argc == 4 ) {
rc = atoi( result->argv[1] );
error_code = strdup(result->argv[2]);
error_string = result->argv[3];
} else {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
int GahpClient::ec2_vm_start( const char * service_url,
const char * publickeyfile,
const char * privatekeyfile,
const char * ami_id,
const char * keypair,
const char * user_data,
const char * user_data_file,
const char * instance_type,
const char * availability_zone,
const char * vpc_subnet,
const char * vpc_ip,
StringList & groupnames,
char * &instance_id,
char * &error_code)
{
static const char* command = "EC2_VM_START";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( (service_url == NULL) || (publickeyfile == NULL) || (privatekeyfile == NULL) || (ami_id == NULL) ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !keypair ) keypair = NULLSTRING;
if ( !user_data ) user_data = NULLSTRING;
if ( !user_data_file ) user_data_file = NULLSTRING;
if ( !instance_type ) instance_type = NULLSTRING;
if ( !availability_zone || 0==strlen(availability_zone) ) availability_zone = NULLSTRING;
if ( !vpc_subnet || 0==strlen(vpc_subnet) ) vpc_subnet = NULLSTRING;
if ( !vpc_ip || 0==strlen(vpc_ip) ) vpc_ip = NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(publickeyfile) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(privatekeyfile) );
char* esc4 = strdup( escapeGahpString(ami_id) );
char* esc5 = strdup( escapeGahpString(keypair) );
char* esc6 = strdup( escapeGahpString(user_data) );
char* esc7 = strdup( escapeGahpString(user_data_file) );
char* esc8 = strdup( escapeGahpString(instance_type) );
char* esc9 = strdup( escapeGahpString(availability_zone) );
char* esc10 = strdup( escapeGahpString(vpc_subnet) );
char* esc11 = strdup( escapeGahpString(vpc_ip) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3, esc4, esc5, esc6, esc7, esc8, esc9, esc10, esc11 );
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
free( esc4 );
free( esc5 );
free( esc6 );
free( esc7 );
free( esc8 );
free( esc9 );
free( esc10 );
free( esc11 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char * group_name;
int cnt = 0;
char * esc_groupname;
groupnames.rewind();
if ( groupnames.number() > 0 ) {
while ( (group_name = groupnames.next()) ) {
esc_groupname = strdup( escapeGahpString(group_name) );
sprintf_cat(reqline, " %s", esc_groupname);
cnt++;
free( esc_groupname );
}
}
ASSERT( cnt == groupnames.number() );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if ( result->argc == 2 ) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
rc = 1;
} else {
error_string = "";
}
} else if ( result->argc == 3 ) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
instance_id = strdup(result->argv[2]);
} else if ( result->argc == 4 ) {
rc = atoi( result->argv[1] );
error_code = strdup(result->argv[2]);
error_string = result->argv[3];
} else {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorRecalculateStylesEvent::Data(
LocalFrame* frame) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(frame));
SetCallStack(value.get());
return value;
}
|
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorRecalculateStylesEvent::Data(
LocalFrame* frame) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(frame));
SetCallStack(value.get());
return value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1800
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1800/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
[Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setAlertDialog(QDeclarativeComponent* alertDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->alertDialog == alertDialog)
return;
d->alertDialog = alertDialog;
emit alertDialogChanged();
}
|
void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setAlertDialog(QDeclarativeComponent* alertDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->alertDialog == alertDialog)
return;
d->alertDialog = alertDialog;
emit alertDialogChanged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
void AutofillDialogViews::StyledLabelLinkClicked(const gfx::Range& range,
int event_flags) {
delegate_->LegalDocumentLinkClicked(range);
}
|
void AutofillDialogViews::StyledLabelLinkClicked(const gfx::Range& range,
int event_flags) {
delegate_->LegalDocumentLinkClicked(range);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldStartDownload(int32 download_id) {
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetActiveDownloadItem(download_id);
if (!download)
return false;
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
VLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << "() Start SB URL check for download = "
<< download->DebugString(false);
service->CheckDownloadUrl(
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*download),
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadUrlDone,
this,
download->GetId()));
return false;
}
#endif
CheckDownloadUrlDone(download_id, DownloadProtectionService::SAFE);
return false;
}
|
bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldStartDownload(int32 download_id) {
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetActiveDownloadItem(download_id);
if (!download)
return false;
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
VLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << "() Start SB URL check for download = "
<< download->DebugString(false);
service->CheckDownloadUrl(
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*download),
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadUrlDone,
this,
download->GetId()));
return false;
}
#endif
CheckDownloadUrlDone(download_id, DownloadProtectionService::SAFE);
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4611
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4611/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93
|
0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93
|
perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int is_limited_pmc(int pmcnum)
{
return (ppmu->flags & PPMU_LIMITED_PMC5_6)
&& (pmcnum == 5 || pmcnum == 6);
}
|
static int is_limited_pmc(int pmcnum)
{
return (ppmu->flags & PPMU_LIMITED_PMC5_6)
&& (pmcnum == 5 || pmcnum == 6);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static void analyzeOneTable(
Parse *pParse, /* Parser context */
Table *pTab, /* Table whose indices are to be analyzed */
Index *pOnlyIdx, /* If not NULL, only analyze this one index */
int iStatCur, /* Index of VdbeCursor that writes the sqlite_stat1 table */
int iMem, /* Available memory locations begin here */
int iTab /* Next available cursor */
){
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db; /* Database handle */
Index *pIdx; /* An index to being analyzed */
int iIdxCur; /* Cursor open on index being analyzed */
int iTabCur; /* Table cursor */
Vdbe *v; /* The virtual machine being built up */
int i; /* Loop counter */
int jZeroRows = -1; /* Jump from here if number of rows is zero */
int iDb; /* Index of database containing pTab */
u8 needTableCnt = 1; /* True to count the table */
int regNewRowid = iMem++; /* Rowid for the inserted record */
int regStat4 = iMem++; /* Register to hold Stat4Accum object */
int regChng = iMem++; /* Index of changed index field */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
int regRowid = iMem++; /* Rowid argument passed to stat_push() */
#endif
int regTemp = iMem++; /* Temporary use register */
int regTabname = iMem++; /* Register containing table name */
int regIdxname = iMem++; /* Register containing index name */
int regStat1 = iMem++; /* Value for the stat column of sqlite_stat1 */
int regPrev = iMem; /* MUST BE LAST (see below) */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
Table *pStat1 = 0;
#endif
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, iMem);
v = sqlite3GetVdbe(pParse);
if( v==0 || NEVER(pTab==0) ){
return;
}
if( pTab->tnum==0 ){
/* Do not gather statistics on views or virtual tables */
return;
}
if( sqlite3_strlike("sqlite\\_%", pTab->zName, '\\')==0 ){
/* Do not gather statistics on system tables */
return;
}
assert( sqlite3BtreeHoldsAllMutexes(db) );
iDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
assert( iDb>=0 );
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTHORIZATION
if( sqlite3AuthCheck(pParse, SQLITE_ANALYZE, pTab->zName, 0,
db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName ) ){
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
if( db->xPreUpdateCallback ){
pStat1 = (Table*)sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(Table) + 13);
if( pStat1==0 ) return;
pStat1->zName = (char*)&pStat1[1];
memcpy(pStat1->zName, "sqlite_stat1", 13);
pStat1->nCol = 3;
pStat1->iPKey = -1;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(pParse->pVdbe, OP_Noop, 0, 0, 0,(char*)pStat1,P4_DYNBLOB);
}
#endif
/* Establish a read-lock on the table at the shared-cache level.
** Open a read-only cursor on the table. Also allocate a cursor number
** to use for scanning indexes (iIdxCur). No index cursor is opened at
** this time though. */
sqlite3TableLock(pParse, iDb, pTab->tnum, 0, pTab->zName);
iTabCur = iTab++;
iIdxCur = iTab++;
pParse->nTab = MAX(pParse->nTab, iTab);
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, iTabCur, iDb, pTab, OP_OpenRead);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, regTabname, pTab->zName);
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
int nCol; /* Number of columns in pIdx. "N" */
int addrRewind; /* Address of "OP_Rewind iIdxCur" */
int addrNextRow; /* Address of "next_row:" */
const char *zIdxName; /* Name of the index */
int nColTest; /* Number of columns to test for changes */
if( pOnlyIdx && pOnlyIdx!=pIdx ) continue;
if( pIdx->pPartIdxWhere==0 ) needTableCnt = 0;
if( !HasRowid(pTab) && IsPrimaryKeyIndex(pIdx) ){
nCol = pIdx->nKeyCol;
zIdxName = pTab->zName;
nColTest = nCol - 1;
}else{
nCol = pIdx->nColumn;
zIdxName = pIdx->zName;
nColTest = pIdx->uniqNotNull ? pIdx->nKeyCol-1 : nCol-1;
}
/* Populate the register containing the index name. */
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, regIdxname, zIdxName);
VdbeComment((v, "Analysis for %s.%s", pTab->zName, zIdxName));
/*
** Pseudo-code for loop that calls stat_push():
**
** Rewind csr
** if eof(csr) goto end_of_scan;
** regChng = 0
** goto chng_addr_0;
**
** next_row:
** regChng = 0
** if( idx(0) != regPrev(0) ) goto chng_addr_0
** regChng = 1
** if( idx(1) != regPrev(1) ) goto chng_addr_1
** ...
** regChng = N
** goto chng_addr_N
**
** chng_addr_0:
** regPrev(0) = idx(0)
** chng_addr_1:
** regPrev(1) = idx(1)
** ...
**
** endDistinctTest:
** regRowid = idx(rowid)
** stat_push(P, regChng, regRowid)
** Next csr
** if !eof(csr) goto next_row;
**
** end_of_scan:
*/
/* Make sure there are enough memory cells allocated to accommodate
** the regPrev array and a trailing rowid (the rowid slot is required
** when building a record to insert into the sample column of
** the sqlite_stat4 table. */
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, regPrev+nColTest);
/* Open a read-only cursor on the index being analyzed. */
assert( iDb==sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pIdx->pSchema) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_OpenRead, iIdxCur, pIdx->tnum, iDb);
sqlite3VdbeSetP4KeyInfo(pParse, pIdx);
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pIdx->zName));
/* Invoke the stat_init() function. The arguments are:
**
** (1) the number of columns in the index including the rowid
** (or for a WITHOUT ROWID table, the number of PK columns),
** (2) the number of columns in the key without the rowid/pk
** (3) the number of rows in the index,
**
**
** The third argument is only used for STAT3 and STAT4
*/
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Count, iIdxCur, regStat4+3);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, nCol, regStat4+1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, pIdx->nKeyCol, regStat4+2);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Function0, 0, regStat4+1, regStat4,
(char*)&statInitFuncdef, P4_FUNCDEF);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, 2+IsStat34);
/* Implementation of the following:
**
** Rewind csr
** if eof(csr) goto end_of_scan;
** regChng = 0
** goto next_push_0;
**
*/
addrRewind = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_Rewind, iIdxCur);
VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, 0, regChng);
addrNextRow = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
if( nColTest>0 ){
int endDistinctTest = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
int *aGotoChng; /* Array of jump instruction addresses */
aGotoChng = sqlite3DbMallocRawNN(db, sizeof(int)*nColTest);
if( aGotoChng==0 ) continue;
/*
** next_row:
** regChng = 0
** if( idx(0) != regPrev(0) ) goto chng_addr_0
** regChng = 1
** if( idx(1) != regPrev(1) ) goto chng_addr_1
** ...
** regChng = N
** goto endDistinctTest
*/
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Goto);
addrNextRow = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
if( nColTest==1 && pIdx->nKeyCol==1 && IsUniqueIndex(pIdx) ){
/* For a single-column UNIQUE index, once we have found a non-NULL
** row, we know that all the rest will be distinct, so skip
** subsequent distinctness tests. */
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NotNull, regPrev, endDistinctTest);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
for(i=0; i<nColTest; i++){
char *pColl = (char*)sqlite3LocateCollSeq(pParse, pIdx->azColl[i]);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, i, regChng);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, i, regTemp);
aGotoChng[i] =
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Ne, regTemp, 0, regPrev+i, pColl, P4_COLLSEQ);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, SQLITE_NULLEQ);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, nColTest, regChng);
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, endDistinctTest);
/*
** chng_addr_0:
** regPrev(0) = idx(0)
** chng_addr_1:
** regPrev(1) = idx(1)
** ...
*/
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrNextRow-1);
for(i=0; i<nColTest; i++){
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, aGotoChng[i]);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, i, regPrev+i);
}
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, endDistinctTest);
sqlite3DbFree(db, aGotoChng);
}
/*
** chng_addr_N:
** regRowid = idx(rowid) // STAT34 only
** stat_push(P, regChng, regRowid) // 3rd parameter STAT34 only
** Next csr
** if !eof(csr) goto next_row;
*/
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
assert( regRowid==(regStat4+2) );
if( HasRowid(pTab) ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IdxRowid, iIdxCur, regRowid);
}else{
Index *pPk = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pIdx->pTable);
int j, k, regKey;
regKey = sqlite3GetTempRange(pParse, pPk->nKeyCol);
for(j=0; j<pPk->nKeyCol; j++){
k = sqlite3ColumnOfIndex(pIdx, pPk->aiColumn[j]);
assert( k>=0 && k<pIdx->nColumn );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, k, regKey+j);
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pTab->aCol[pPk->aiColumn[j]].zName));
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regKey, pPk->nKeyCol, regRowid);
sqlite3ReleaseTempRange(pParse, regKey, pPk->nKeyCol);
}
#endif
assert( regChng==(regStat4+1) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Function0, 1, regStat4, regTemp,
(char*)&statPushFuncdef, P4_FUNCDEF);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, 2+IsStat34);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Next, iIdxCur, addrNextRow); VdbeCoverage(v);
/* Add the entry to the stat1 table. */
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_STAT1, regStat1);
assert( "BBB"[0]==SQLITE_AFF_TEXT );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 3, regTemp, "BBB", 0);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur, regTemp, regNewRowid);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
sqlite3VdbeChangeP4(v, -1, (char*)pStat1, P4_TABLE);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_APPEND);
/* Add the entries to the stat3 or stat4 table. */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
{
int regEq = regStat1;
int regLt = regStat1+1;
int regDLt = regStat1+2;
int regSample = regStat1+3;
int regCol = regStat1+4;
int regSampleRowid = regCol + nCol;
int addrNext;
int addrIsNull;
u8 seekOp = HasRowid(pTab) ? OP_NotExists : OP_NotFound;
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, regCol+nCol);
addrNext = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_ROWID, regSampleRowid);
addrIsNull = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, regSampleRowid);
VdbeCoverage(v);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NEQ, regEq);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NLT, regLt);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NDLT, regDLt);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, seekOp, iTabCur, addrNext, regSampleRowid, 0);
VdbeCoverage(v);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3
sqlite3ExprCodeLoadIndexColumn(pParse, pIdx, iTabCur, 0, regSample);
#else
for(i=0; i<nCol; i++){
sqlite3ExprCodeLoadIndexColumn(pParse, pIdx, iTabCur, i, regCol+i);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regCol, nCol, regSample);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 6, regTemp);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur+1, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur+1, regTemp, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Goto, 1, addrNext); /* P1==1 for end-of-loop */
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrIsNull);
}
#endif /* SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4 */
/* End of analysis */
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrRewind);
}
/* Create a single sqlite_stat1 entry containing NULL as the index
** name and the row count as the content.
*/
if( pOnlyIdx==0 && needTableCnt ){
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pTab->zName));
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Count, iTabCur, regStat1);
jZeroRows = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IfNot, regStat1); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, regIdxname);
assert( "BBB"[0]==SQLITE_AFF_TEXT );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 3, regTemp, "BBB", 0);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur, regTemp, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_APPEND);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
sqlite3VdbeChangeP4(v, -1, (char*)pStat1, P4_TABLE);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jZeroRows);
}
}
|
static void analyzeOneTable(
Parse *pParse, /* Parser context */
Table *pTab, /* Table whose indices are to be analyzed */
Index *pOnlyIdx, /* If not NULL, only analyze this one index */
int iStatCur, /* Index of VdbeCursor that writes the sqlite_stat1 table */
int iMem, /* Available memory locations begin here */
int iTab /* Next available cursor */
){
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db; /* Database handle */
Index *pIdx; /* An index to being analyzed */
int iIdxCur; /* Cursor open on index being analyzed */
int iTabCur; /* Table cursor */
Vdbe *v; /* The virtual machine being built up */
int i; /* Loop counter */
int jZeroRows = -1; /* Jump from here if number of rows is zero */
int iDb; /* Index of database containing pTab */
u8 needTableCnt = 1; /* True to count the table */
int regNewRowid = iMem++; /* Rowid for the inserted record */
int regStat4 = iMem++; /* Register to hold Stat4Accum object */
int regChng = iMem++; /* Index of changed index field */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
int regRowid = iMem++; /* Rowid argument passed to stat_push() */
#endif
int regTemp = iMem++; /* Temporary use register */
int regTabname = iMem++; /* Register containing table name */
int regIdxname = iMem++; /* Register containing index name */
int regStat1 = iMem++; /* Value for the stat column of sqlite_stat1 */
int regPrev = iMem; /* MUST BE LAST (see below) */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
Table *pStat1 = 0;
#endif
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, iMem);
v = sqlite3GetVdbe(pParse);
if( v==0 || NEVER(pTab==0) ){
return;
}
if( pTab->tnum==0 ){
/* Do not gather statistics on views or virtual tables */
return;
}
if( sqlite3_strlike("sqlite\\_%", pTab->zName, '\\')==0 ){
/* Do not gather statistics on system tables */
return;
}
assert( sqlite3BtreeHoldsAllMutexes(db) );
iDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
assert( iDb>=0 );
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTHORIZATION
if( sqlite3AuthCheck(pParse, SQLITE_ANALYZE, pTab->zName, 0,
db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName ) ){
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
if( db->xPreUpdateCallback ){
pStat1 = (Table*)sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(Table) + 13);
if( pStat1==0 ) return;
pStat1->zName = (char*)&pStat1[1];
memcpy(pStat1->zName, "sqlite_stat1", 13);
pStat1->nCol = 3;
pStat1->iPKey = -1;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(pParse->pVdbe, OP_Noop, 0, 0, 0,(char*)pStat1,P4_DYNBLOB);
}
#endif
/* Establish a read-lock on the table at the shared-cache level.
** Open a read-only cursor on the table. Also allocate a cursor number
** to use for scanning indexes (iIdxCur). No index cursor is opened at
** this time though. */
sqlite3TableLock(pParse, iDb, pTab->tnum, 0, pTab->zName);
iTabCur = iTab++;
iIdxCur = iTab++;
pParse->nTab = MAX(pParse->nTab, iTab);
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, iTabCur, iDb, pTab, OP_OpenRead);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, regTabname, pTab->zName);
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
int nCol; /* Number of columns in pIdx. "N" */
int addrRewind; /* Address of "OP_Rewind iIdxCur" */
int addrNextRow; /* Address of "next_row:" */
const char *zIdxName; /* Name of the index */
int nColTest; /* Number of columns to test for changes */
if( pOnlyIdx && pOnlyIdx!=pIdx ) continue;
if( pIdx->pPartIdxWhere==0 ) needTableCnt = 0;
if( !HasRowid(pTab) && IsPrimaryKeyIndex(pIdx) ){
nCol = pIdx->nKeyCol;
zIdxName = pTab->zName;
nColTest = nCol - 1;
}else{
nCol = pIdx->nColumn;
zIdxName = pIdx->zName;
nColTest = pIdx->uniqNotNull ? pIdx->nKeyCol-1 : nCol-1;
}
/* Populate the register containing the index name. */
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, regIdxname, zIdxName);
VdbeComment((v, "Analysis for %s.%s", pTab->zName, zIdxName));
/*
** Pseudo-code for loop that calls stat_push():
**
** Rewind csr
** if eof(csr) goto end_of_scan;
** regChng = 0
** goto chng_addr_0;
**
** next_row:
** regChng = 0
** if( idx(0) != regPrev(0) ) goto chng_addr_0
** regChng = 1
** if( idx(1) != regPrev(1) ) goto chng_addr_1
** ...
** regChng = N
** goto chng_addr_N
**
** chng_addr_0:
** regPrev(0) = idx(0)
** chng_addr_1:
** regPrev(1) = idx(1)
** ...
**
** endDistinctTest:
** regRowid = idx(rowid)
** stat_push(P, regChng, regRowid)
** Next csr
** if !eof(csr) goto next_row;
**
** end_of_scan:
*/
/* Make sure there are enough memory cells allocated to accommodate
** the regPrev array and a trailing rowid (the rowid slot is required
** when building a record to insert into the sample column of
** the sqlite_stat4 table. */
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, regPrev+nColTest);
/* Open a read-only cursor on the index being analyzed. */
assert( iDb==sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pIdx->pSchema) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_OpenRead, iIdxCur, pIdx->tnum, iDb);
sqlite3VdbeSetP4KeyInfo(pParse, pIdx);
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pIdx->zName));
/* Invoke the stat_init() function. The arguments are:
**
** (1) the number of columns in the index including the rowid
** (or for a WITHOUT ROWID table, the number of PK columns),
** (2) the number of columns in the key without the rowid/pk
** (3) the number of rows in the index,
**
**
** The third argument is only used for STAT3 and STAT4
*/
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Count, iIdxCur, regStat4+3);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, nCol, regStat4+1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, pIdx->nKeyCol, regStat4+2);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Function0, 0, regStat4+1, regStat4,
(char*)&statInitFuncdef, P4_FUNCDEF);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, 2+IsStat34);
/* Implementation of the following:
**
** Rewind csr
** if eof(csr) goto end_of_scan;
** regChng = 0
** goto next_push_0;
**
*/
addrRewind = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_Rewind, iIdxCur);
VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, 0, regChng);
addrNextRow = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
if( nColTest>0 ){
int endDistinctTest = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
int *aGotoChng; /* Array of jump instruction addresses */
aGotoChng = sqlite3DbMallocRawNN(db, sizeof(int)*nColTest);
if( aGotoChng==0 ) continue;
/*
** next_row:
** regChng = 0
** if( idx(0) != regPrev(0) ) goto chng_addr_0
** regChng = 1
** if( idx(1) != regPrev(1) ) goto chng_addr_1
** ...
** regChng = N
** goto endDistinctTest
*/
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Goto);
addrNextRow = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
if( nColTest==1 && pIdx->nKeyCol==1 && IsUniqueIndex(pIdx) ){
/* For a single-column UNIQUE index, once we have found a non-NULL
** row, we know that all the rest will be distinct, so skip
** subsequent distinctness tests. */
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NotNull, regPrev, endDistinctTest);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
for(i=0; i<nColTest; i++){
char *pColl = (char*)sqlite3LocateCollSeq(pParse, pIdx->azColl[i]);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, i, regChng);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, i, regTemp);
aGotoChng[i] =
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Ne, regTemp, 0, regPrev+i, pColl, P4_COLLSEQ);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, SQLITE_NULLEQ);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, nColTest, regChng);
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, endDistinctTest);
/*
** chng_addr_0:
** regPrev(0) = idx(0)
** chng_addr_1:
** regPrev(1) = idx(1)
** ...
*/
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrNextRow-1);
for(i=0; i<nColTest; i++){
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, aGotoChng[i]);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, i, regPrev+i);
}
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, endDistinctTest);
sqlite3DbFree(db, aGotoChng);
}
/*
** chng_addr_N:
** regRowid = idx(rowid) // STAT34 only
** stat_push(P, regChng, regRowid) // 3rd parameter STAT34 only
** Next csr
** if !eof(csr) goto next_row;
*/
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
assert( regRowid==(regStat4+2) );
if( HasRowid(pTab) ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IdxRowid, iIdxCur, regRowid);
}else{
Index *pPk = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pIdx->pTable);
int j, k, regKey;
regKey = sqlite3GetTempRange(pParse, pPk->nKeyCol);
for(j=0; j<pPk->nKeyCol; j++){
k = sqlite3ColumnOfIndex(pIdx, pPk->aiColumn[j]);
assert( k>=0 && k<pIdx->nColumn );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, k, regKey+j);
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pTab->aCol[pPk->aiColumn[j]].zName));
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regKey, pPk->nKeyCol, regRowid);
sqlite3ReleaseTempRange(pParse, regKey, pPk->nKeyCol);
}
#endif
assert( regChng==(regStat4+1) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Function0, 1, regStat4, regTemp,
(char*)&statPushFuncdef, P4_FUNCDEF);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, 2+IsStat34);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Next, iIdxCur, addrNextRow); VdbeCoverage(v);
/* Add the entry to the stat1 table. */
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_STAT1, regStat1);
assert( "BBB"[0]==SQLITE_AFF_TEXT );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 3, regTemp, "BBB", 0);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur, regTemp, regNewRowid);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
sqlite3VdbeChangeP4(v, -1, (char*)pStat1, P4_TABLE);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_APPEND);
/* Add the entries to the stat3 or stat4 table. */
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4
{
int regEq = regStat1;
int regLt = regStat1+1;
int regDLt = regStat1+2;
int regSample = regStat1+3;
int regCol = regStat1+4;
int regSampleRowid = regCol + nCol;
int addrNext;
int addrIsNull;
u8 seekOp = HasRowid(pTab) ? OP_NotExists : OP_NotFound;
pParse->nMem = MAX(pParse->nMem, regCol+nCol);
addrNext = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_ROWID, regSampleRowid);
addrIsNull = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, regSampleRowid);
VdbeCoverage(v);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NEQ, regEq);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NLT, regLt);
callStatGet(v, regStat4, STAT_GET_NDLT, regDLt);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, seekOp, iTabCur, addrNext, regSampleRowid, 0);
VdbeCoverage(v);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3
sqlite3ExprCodeLoadIndexColumn(pParse, pIdx, iTabCur, 0, regSample);
#else
for(i=0; i<nCol; i++){
sqlite3ExprCodeLoadIndexColumn(pParse, pIdx, iTabCur, i, regCol+i);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regCol, nCol, regSample);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 6, regTemp);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur+1, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur+1, regTemp, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Goto, 1, addrNext); /* P1==1 for end-of-loop */
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrIsNull);
}
#endif /* SQLITE_ENABLE_STAT3_OR_STAT4 */
/* End of analysis */
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrRewind);
}
/* Create a single sqlite_stat1 entry containing NULL as the index
** name and the row count as the content.
*/
if( pOnlyIdx==0 && needTableCnt ){
VdbeComment((v, "%s", pTab->zName));
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Count, iTabCur, regStat1);
jZeroRows = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IfNot, regStat1); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, regIdxname);
assert( "BBB"[0]==SQLITE_AFF_TEXT );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_MakeRecord, regTabname, 3, regTemp, "BBB", 0);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, iStatCur, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, iStatCur, regTemp, regNewRowid);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_APPEND);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
sqlite3VdbeChangeP4(v, -1, (char*)pStat1, P4_TABLE);
#endif
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jZeroRows);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5754/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
|
bool ShouldQuicAllowServerMigration(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "allow_server_migration"), "true");
}
|
bool ShouldQuicAllowServerMigration(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "allow_server_migration"), "true");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3083
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3083/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d6b061bf189e0661a3d94d89dbcb2e6f70b433da
|
d6b061bf189e0661a3d94d89dbcb2e6f70b433da
|
Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ClearNetworkingHistorySinceOnIOThread(
ProfileImplIOData* io_data, base::Time time) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
io_data->transport_security_state()->DeleteSince(time);
io_data->http_server_properties()->Clear();
}
|
void ClearNetworkingHistorySinceOnIOThread(
ProfileImplIOData* io_data, base::Time time) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
io_data->transport_security_state()->DeleteSince(time);
io_data->http_server_properties()->Clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1216/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/82eeef54780833a29e88c5677a7cfa11205a9878
|
82eeef54780833a29e88c5677a7cfa11205a9878
|
Reload frame in V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom after js call
[email protected]
BUG=454954
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/901053006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189574 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool V8Window::indexedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, uint32_t index, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = V8Window::findInstanceInPrototypeChain(host, isolate);
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false;
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8Window::toImpl(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
if (!targetWindow->isLocalDOMWindow())
return false;
LocalFrame* target = toLocalDOMWindow(targetWindow)->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader().stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader().didAccessInitialDocument();
Frame* childFrame = target->tree().scopedChild(index);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET
&& childFrame
&& !host->HasRealIndexedProperty(index)
&& !window->HasRealIndexedProperty(index))
return true;
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(isolate, target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
|
bool V8Window::indexedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, uint32_t index, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = V8Window::findInstanceInPrototypeChain(host, isolate);
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false;
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8Window::toImpl(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
if (!targetWindow->isLocalDOMWindow())
return false;
LocalFrame* target = toLocalDOMWindow(targetWindow)->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader().stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader().didAccessInitialDocument();
Frame* childFrame = target->tree().scopedChild(index);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET
&& childFrame
&& !host->HasRealIndexedProperty(index)
&& !window->HasRealIndexedProperty(index))
return true;
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(isolate, target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2304
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2304/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526
|
59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526
|
Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
|
set_xattrs(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
struct archive_entry *entry = a->entry;
static int warning_done = 0;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
int i = archive_entry_xattr_reset(entry);
while (i--) {
const char *name;
const void *value;
size_t size;
archive_entry_xattr_next(entry, &name, &value, &size);
if (name != NULL &&
strncmp(name, "xfsroot.", 8) != 0 &&
strncmp(name, "system.", 7) != 0) {
int e;
#if HAVE_FSETXATTR
if (a->fd >= 0)
e = fsetxattr(a->fd, name, value, size, 0);
else
#elif HAVE_FSETEA
if (a->fd >= 0)
e = fsetea(a->fd, name, value, size, 0);
else
#endif
{
#if HAVE_LSETXATTR
e = lsetxattr(archive_entry_pathname(entry),
name, value, size, 0);
#elif HAVE_LSETEA
e = lsetea(archive_entry_pathname(entry),
name, value, size, 0);
#endif
}
if (e == -1) {
if (errno == ENOTSUP || errno == ENOSYS) {
if (!warning_done) {
warning_done = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Cannot restore extended "
"attributes on this file "
"system");
}
} else
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Failed to set extended attribute");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid extended attribute encountered");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
}
return (ret);
}
|
set_xattrs(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
struct archive_entry *entry = a->entry;
static int warning_done = 0;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
int i = archive_entry_xattr_reset(entry);
while (i--) {
const char *name;
const void *value;
size_t size;
archive_entry_xattr_next(entry, &name, &value, &size);
if (name != NULL &&
strncmp(name, "xfsroot.", 8) != 0 &&
strncmp(name, "system.", 7) != 0) {
int e;
#if HAVE_FSETXATTR
if (a->fd >= 0)
e = fsetxattr(a->fd, name, value, size, 0);
else
#elif HAVE_FSETEA
if (a->fd >= 0)
e = fsetea(a->fd, name, value, size, 0);
else
#endif
{
#if HAVE_LSETXATTR
e = lsetxattr(archive_entry_pathname(entry),
name, value, size, 0);
#elif HAVE_LSETEA
e = lsetea(archive_entry_pathname(entry),
name, value, size, 0);
#endif
}
if (e == -1) {
if (errno == ENOTSUP || errno == ENOSYS) {
if (!warning_done) {
warning_done = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Cannot restore extended "
"attributes on this file "
"system");
}
} else
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Failed to set extended attribute");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid extended attribute encountered");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
}
return (ret);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_import_node)
{
zval *id, *node;
xmlDocPtr docp;
xmlNodePtr nodep, retnodep;
dom_object *intern, *nodeobj;
int ret;
long recursive = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "OO|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &node, dom_node_class_entry, &recursive) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
DOM_GET_OBJ(nodep, node, xmlNodePtr, nodeobj);
if (nodep->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE || nodep->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE
|| nodep->type == XML_DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot import: Node Type Not Supported");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nodep->doc == docp) {
retnodep = nodep;
} else {
if ((recursive == 0) && (nodep->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)) {
recursive = 2;
}
retnodep = xmlDocCopyNode(nodep, docp, recursive);
if (!retnodep) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((retnodep->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) && (nodep->ns != NULL)) {
xmlNsPtr nsptr = NULL;
xmlNodePtr root = xmlDocGetRootElement(docp);
nsptr = xmlSearchNsByHref (nodep->doc, root, nodep->ns->href);
if (nsptr == NULL) {
int errorcode;
nsptr = dom_get_ns(root, (char *) nodep->ns->href, &errorcode, (char *) nodep->ns->prefix);
}
xmlSetNs(retnodep, nsptr);
}
}
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) retnodep, &ret, intern);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_import_node)
{
zval *id, *node;
xmlDocPtr docp;
xmlNodePtr nodep, retnodep;
dom_object *intern, *nodeobj;
int ret;
long recursive = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "OO|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &node, dom_node_class_entry, &recursive) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
DOM_GET_OBJ(nodep, node, xmlNodePtr, nodeobj);
if (nodep->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE || nodep->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE
|| nodep->type == XML_DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot import: Node Type Not Supported");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nodep->doc == docp) {
retnodep = nodep;
} else {
if ((recursive == 0) && (nodep->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)) {
recursive = 2;
}
retnodep = xmlDocCopyNode(nodep, docp, recursive);
if (!retnodep) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((retnodep->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) && (nodep->ns != NULL)) {
xmlNsPtr nsptr = NULL;
xmlNodePtr root = xmlDocGetRootElement(docp);
nsptr = xmlSearchNsByHref (nodep->doc, root, nodep->ns->href);
if (nsptr == NULL) {
int errorcode;
nsptr = dom_get_ns(root, (char *) nodep->ns->href, &errorcode, (char *) nodep->ns->prefix);
}
xmlSetNs(retnodep, nsptr);
}
}
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) retnodep, &ret, intern);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1620
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1620/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b90c7c8c335a2e2a4abdd7bde17a44f92c8b3a54
|
b90c7c8c335a2e2a4abdd7bde17a44f92c8b3a54
|
Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
|
bool GpuProcessHost::Init() {
init_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("gpu", "LaunchGpuProcess", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
if (ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()) {
ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->AddConnectionFilter(
std::make_unique<ConnectionFilterImpl>(process_->GetData().id));
}
process_->GetHost()->CreateChannelMojo();
mode_ = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->GetGpuMode();
DCHECK_NE(mode_, gpu::GpuMode::DISABLED);
if (in_process_) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(GetGpuMainThreadFactory());
gpu::GpuPreferences gpu_preferences = GetGpuPreferencesFromCommandLine();
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuPreferences(&gpu_preferences);
in_process_gpu_thread_.reset(GetGpuMainThreadFactory()(
InProcessChildThreadParams(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
process_->GetInProcessMojoInvitation(),
process_->child_connection()->service_token()),
gpu_preferences));
base::Thread::Options options;
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
options.message_loop_type = base::MessageLoop::TYPE_UI;
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
options.priority = base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY;
#endif
in_process_gpu_thread_->StartWithOptions(options);
OnProcessLaunched(); // Fake a callback that the process is ready.
} else if (!LaunchGpuProcess()) {
return false;
}
process_->child_channel()
->GetAssociatedInterfaceSupport()
->GetRemoteAssociatedInterface(&gpu_main_ptr_);
viz::mojom::GpuHostPtr host_proxy;
gpu_host_binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&host_proxy));
discardable_memory::mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr
discardable_manager_ptr;
auto discardable_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&discardable_manager_ptr);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&BindDiscardableMemoryRequestOnUI,
std::move(discardable_request)));
DCHECK(GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().initialized);
gpu_main_ptr_->CreateGpuService(
mojo::MakeRequest(&gpu_service_ptr_), std::move(host_proxy),
std::move(discardable_manager_ptr), activity_flags_.CloneHandle(),
GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().params.subpixel_rendering);
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
InitOzone();
#endif // defined(USE_OZONE)
return true;
}
|
bool GpuProcessHost::Init() {
init_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("gpu", "LaunchGpuProcess", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
if (ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()) {
ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->AddConnectionFilter(
std::make_unique<ConnectionFilterImpl>(process_->GetData().id));
}
process_->GetHost()->CreateChannelMojo();
mode_ = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->GetGpuMode();
DCHECK_NE(mode_, gpu::GpuMode::DISABLED);
if (in_process_) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(GetGpuMainThreadFactory());
gpu::GpuPreferences gpu_preferences = GetGpuPreferencesFromCommandLine();
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuPreferences(&gpu_preferences);
in_process_gpu_thread_.reset(GetGpuMainThreadFactory()(
InProcessChildThreadParams(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
process_->GetInProcessMojoInvitation(),
process_->child_connection()->service_token()),
gpu_preferences));
base::Thread::Options options;
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
options.message_loop_type = base::MessageLoop::TYPE_UI;
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
options.priority = base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY;
#endif
in_process_gpu_thread_->StartWithOptions(options);
OnProcessLaunched(); // Fake a callback that the process is ready.
} else if (!LaunchGpuProcess()) {
return false;
}
process_->child_channel()
->GetAssociatedInterfaceSupport()
->GetRemoteAssociatedInterface(&gpu_main_ptr_);
viz::mojom::GpuHostPtr host_proxy;
gpu_host_binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&host_proxy));
discardable_memory::mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr
discardable_manager_ptr;
auto discardable_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&discardable_manager_ptr);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&BindDiscardableMemoryRequestOnUI,
std::move(discardable_request)));
DCHECK(GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().initialized);
gpu_main_ptr_->CreateGpuService(
mojo::MakeRequest(&gpu_service_ptr_), std::move(host_proxy),
std::move(discardable_manager_ptr), activity_flags_.CloneHandle(),
GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().params.subpixel_rendering);
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
InitOzone();
#endif // defined(USE_OZONE)
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2121/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/09ca8e1173bcb12e2a449698c9ae3b86a8a10195
|
09ca8e1173bcb12e2a449698c9ae3b86a8a10195
|
KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, u32 id)
{
int r;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *v;
vcpu = kvm_arch_vcpu_create(kvm, id);
if (IS_ERR(vcpu))
return PTR_ERR(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_init(&vcpu->preempt_notifier, &kvm_preempt_ops);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(vcpu);
if (r)
goto vcpu_destroy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) == KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm_for_each_vcpu(r, v, kvm)
if (v->vcpu_id == id) {
r = -EEXIST;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
BUG_ON(kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)]);
/* Now it's all set up, let userspace reach it */
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
r = create_vcpu_fd(vcpu);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)] = vcpu;
smp_wmb();
atomic_inc(&kvm->online_vcpus);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
unlock_vcpu_destroy:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
vcpu_destroy:
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return r;
}
|
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, u32 id)
{
int r;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *v;
vcpu = kvm_arch_vcpu_create(kvm, id);
if (IS_ERR(vcpu))
return PTR_ERR(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_init(&vcpu->preempt_notifier, &kvm_preempt_ops);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(vcpu);
if (r)
goto vcpu_destroy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) == KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm_for_each_vcpu(r, v, kvm)
if (v->vcpu_id == id) {
r = -EEXIST;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
BUG_ON(kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)]);
/* Now it's all set up, let userspace reach it */
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
r = create_vcpu_fd(vcpu);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)] = vcpu;
smp_wmb();
atomic_inc(&kvm->online_vcpus);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
unlock_vcpu_destroy:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
vcpu_destroy:
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6154/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
WebGL2RenderingContextBase::WebGL2RenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes)
: WebGLRenderingContextBase(host,
std::move(context_provider),
using_gpu_compositing,
requested_attributes,
2) {
supported_internal_formats_storage_.insert(
kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage,
kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage +
arraysize(kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage));
}
|
WebGL2RenderingContextBase::WebGL2RenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes)
: WebGLRenderingContextBase(host,
std::move(context_provider),
using_gpu_compositing,
requested_attributes,
2) {
supported_internal_formats_storage_.insert(
kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage,
kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage +
arraysize(kSupportedInternalFormatsStorage));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2206/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
/* Call helper to do the real work for both simulataneous and
* duplicate INIT chunk handling.
*/
return sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
/* Call helper to do the real work for both simulataneous and
* duplicate INIT chunk handling.
*/
return sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14351/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/3c49c44be9b459d9c616bcaef6eb5d51298c1741
|
3c49c44be9b459d9c616bcaef6eb5d51298c1741
|
Ensure litlen isn't larger than our mailbox
|
static void cmd_parse_lsub(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char buf[STRING];
char errstr[STRING];
struct Buffer err, token;
struct Url url;
struct ImapList list;
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_LIST)
{
/* caller will handle response itself */
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
return;
}
if (!ImapCheckSubscribed)
return;
idata->cmdtype = IMAP_CT_LIST;
idata->cmddata = &list;
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
idata->cmddata = NULL;
/* noselect is for a gmail quirk (#3445) */
if (!list.name || list.noselect)
return;
mutt_debug(3, "Subscribing to %s\n", list.name);
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "mailboxes \"", sizeof(buf));
mutt_account_tourl(&idata->conn->account, &url);
/* escape \ and " */
imap_quote_string(errstr, sizeof(errstr), list.name, true);
url.path = errstr + 1;
url.path[strlen(url.path) - 1] = '\0';
if (mutt_str_strcmp(url.user, ImapUser) == 0)
url.user = NULL;
url_tostring(&url, buf + 11, sizeof(buf) - 11, 0);
mutt_str_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), "\"");
mutt_buffer_init(&token);
mutt_buffer_init(&err);
err.data = errstr;
err.dsize = sizeof(errstr);
if (mutt_parse_rc_line(buf, &token, &err))
mutt_debug(1, "Error adding subscribed mailbox: %s\n", errstr);
FREE(&token.data);
}
|
static void cmd_parse_lsub(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char buf[STRING];
char errstr[STRING];
struct Buffer err, token;
struct Url url;
struct ImapList list;
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_LIST)
{
/* caller will handle response itself */
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
return;
}
if (!ImapCheckSubscribed)
return;
idata->cmdtype = IMAP_CT_LIST;
idata->cmddata = &list;
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
idata->cmddata = NULL;
/* noselect is for a gmail quirk (#3445) */
if (!list.name || list.noselect)
return;
mutt_debug(3, "Subscribing to %s\n", list.name);
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "mailboxes \"", sizeof(buf));
mutt_account_tourl(&idata->conn->account, &url);
/* escape \ and " */
imap_quote_string(errstr, sizeof(errstr), list.name, true);
url.path = errstr + 1;
url.path[strlen(url.path) - 1] = '\0';
if (mutt_str_strcmp(url.user, ImapUser) == 0)
url.user = NULL;
url_tostring(&url, buf + 11, sizeof(buf) - 11, 0);
mutt_str_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), "\"");
mutt_buffer_init(&token);
mutt_buffer_init(&err);
err.data = errstr;
err.dsize = sizeof(errstr);
if (mutt_parse_rc_line(buf, &token, &err))
mutt_debug(1, "Error adding subscribed mailbox: %s\n", errstr);
FREE(&token.data);
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
circle_area(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(circle_ar(circle));
}
|
circle_area(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(circle_ar(circle));
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int lz4_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lz4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->lz4_comp_mem = vmalloc(LZ4_MEM_COMPRESS);
if (!ctx->lz4_comp_mem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
static int lz4_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lz4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->lz4_comp_mem = vmalloc(LZ4_MEM_COMPRESS);
if (!ctx->lz4_comp_mem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4127/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0bfc96cb77224736dfa35c3c555d37b3646ef35e
|
0bfc96cb77224736dfa35c3c555d37b3646ef35e
|
block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void scsi_disk_put(struct scsi_disk *sdkp)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = sdkp->device;
mutex_lock(&sd_ref_mutex);
put_device(&sdkp->dev);
scsi_device_put(sdev);
mutex_unlock(&sd_ref_mutex);
}
|
static void scsi_disk_put(struct scsi_disk *sdkp)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = sdkp->device;
mutex_lock(&sd_ref_mutex);
put_device(&sdkp->dev);
scsi_device_put(sdev);
mutex_unlock(&sd_ref_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13785/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/glennrp/libpng/commit/8a05766cb74af05c04c53e6c9d60c13fc4d59bf2
|
8a05766cb74af05c04c53e6c9d60c13fc4d59bf2
|
[libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
|
png_handle_eXIf(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
unsigned int i;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_eXIf");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
if (length < 2)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "too short");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr == NULL || (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_eXIf) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_EXIF;
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = png_voidcast(png_bytep,
png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, length));
if (info_ptr->eXIf_buf == NULL)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of memory");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
png_byte buf[1];
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 1);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf[i] = buf[0];
if (i == 1 && buf[0] != 'M' && buf[0] != 'I'
&& info_ptr->eXIf_buf[0] != buf[0])
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "incorrect byte-order specifier");
png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = NULL;
return;
}
}
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
png_set_eXIf_1(png_ptr, info_ptr, length, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = NULL;
}
|
png_handle_eXIf(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
unsigned int i;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_eXIf");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
if (length < 2)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "too short");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr == NULL || (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_eXIf) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_EXIF;
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = png_voidcast(png_bytep,
png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, length));
if (info_ptr->eXIf_buf == NULL)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of memory");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
png_byte buf[1];
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 1);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf[i] = buf[0];
if (i == 1 && buf[0] != 'M' && buf[0] != 'I'
&& info_ptr->eXIf_buf[0] != buf[0])
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "incorrect byte-order specifier");
png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = NULL;
return;
}
}
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
png_set_eXIf_1(png_ptr, info_ptr, length, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = NULL;
}
|
C
|
libpng
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.