CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4363d1ca65494cb7b271625e1ff6541a9f593c9
|
c4363d1ca65494cb7b271625e1ff6541a9f593c9
|
ozone: evdev: Add a couple more trace events
Add trace event inside each read notification for evdev.
BUG=none
TEST=chrome://tracing in link_freon
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1110693003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#327110}
|
void TouchEventConverterEvdev::UpdateTrackingId(int slot, int tracking_id) {
InProgressTouchEvdev* event = &events_[slot];
if (event->tracking_id == tracking_id)
return;
event->tracking_id = tracking_id;
event->touching = (tracking_id >= 0);
event->altered = true;
if (tracking_id >= 0)
event->cancelled = false;
}
|
void TouchEventConverterEvdev::UpdateTrackingId(int slot, int tracking_id) {
InProgressTouchEvdev* event = &events_[slot];
if (event->tracking_id == tracking_id)
return;
event->tracking_id = tracking_id;
event->touching = (tracking_id >= 0);
event->altered = true;
if (tracking_id >= 0)
event->cancelled = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11144/
|
CWE-754
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
|
73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_export)
{
X509 * cert;
zval * zcert, *zout;
zend_bool notext = 1;
BIO * bio_out;
zend_resource *certresource;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz/|b", &zcert, &zout, ¬ext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!notext) {
X509_print(bio_out, cert);
}
if (PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, cert)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
zval_dtor(zout);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &bio_buf);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zout, bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (certresource == NULL && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_export)
{
X509 * cert;
zval * zcert, *zout;
zend_bool notext = 1;
BIO * bio_out;
zend_resource *certresource;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz/|b", &zcert, &zout, ¬ext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!notext) {
X509_print(bio_out, cert);
}
if (PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, cert)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
zval_dtor(zout);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &bio_buf);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zout, bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (certresource == NULL && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5096/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/abd159cce48f3e34f08e4751c568e09677d5ec9c?w=1
|
abd159cce48f3e34f08e4751c568e09677d5ec9c?w=1
|
Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
|
PHP_FUNCTION(realpath)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
char resolved_path_buff[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (VCWD_REALPATH(filename, resolved_path_buff)) {
if (php_check_open_basedir(resolved_path_buff TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifdef ZTS
if (VCWD_ACCESS(resolved_path_buff, F_OK)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETURN_STRING(resolved_path_buff, 1);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(realpath)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
char resolved_path_buff[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (VCWD_REALPATH(filename, resolved_path_buff)) {
if (php_check_open_basedir(resolved_path_buff TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifdef ZTS
if (VCWD_ACCESS(resolved_path_buff, F_OK)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETURN_STRING(resolved_path_buff, 1);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
const String& HTMLInputElement::suggestedValue() const
{
return m_suggestedValue;
}
|
const String& HTMLInputElement::suggestedValue() const
{
return m_suggestedValue;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5139
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5139/
| null |
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=80bd7b41b30af6ee96f519e629463583318de3b0
|
80bd7b41b30af6ee96f519e629463583318de3b0
| null |
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
}
#endif
c->valid = 1;
}
|
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
c->valid = 1;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
const char * util_acl_to_str(const sc_acl_entry_t *e)
{
static char line[80], buf[20];
unsigned int acl;
if (e == NULL)
return "N/A";
line[0] = 0;
while (e != NULL) {
acl = e->method;
switch (acl) {
case SC_AC_UNKNOWN:
return "N/A";
case SC_AC_NEVER:
return "NEVR";
case SC_AC_NONE:
return "NONE";
case SC_AC_CHV:
strcpy(buf, "CHV");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_TERM:
strcpy(buf, "TERM");
break;
case SC_AC_PRO:
strcpy(buf, "PROT");
break;
case SC_AC_AUT:
strcpy(buf, "AUTH");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 4, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SEN:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.Env. ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SCB:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.ControlByte ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "Ox%X", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_IDA:
strcpy(buf, "PKCS#15 AuthID ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
default:
strcpy(buf, "????");
break;
}
strncat(line, buf, sizeof line);
strncat(line, " ", sizeof line);
e = e->next;
}
line[(sizeof line)-1] = '\0'; /* make sure it's NUL terminated */
line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; /* get rid of trailing space */
return line;
}
|
const char * util_acl_to_str(const sc_acl_entry_t *e)
{
static char line[80], buf[20];
unsigned int acl;
if (e == NULL)
return "N/A";
line[0] = 0;
while (e != NULL) {
acl = e->method;
switch (acl) {
case SC_AC_UNKNOWN:
return "N/A";
case SC_AC_NEVER:
return "NEVR";
case SC_AC_NONE:
return "NONE";
case SC_AC_CHV:
strcpy(buf, "CHV");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_TERM:
strcpy(buf, "TERM");
break;
case SC_AC_PRO:
strcpy(buf, "PROT");
break;
case SC_AC_AUT:
strcpy(buf, "AUTH");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 4, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SEN:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.Env. ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SCB:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.ControlByte ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "Ox%X", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_IDA:
strcpy(buf, "PKCS#15 AuthID ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
default:
strcpy(buf, "????");
break;
}
strcat(line, buf);
strcat(line, " ");
e = e->next;
}
line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; /* get rid of trailing space */
return line;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 1 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace() {
}
|
GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace() {
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18839/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/netdata/netdata/commit/92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca
|
92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca
|
fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
|
inline int web_client_api_request_v1(RRDHOST *host, struct web_client *w, char *url) {
static int initialized = 0;
int i;
if(unlikely(initialized == 0)) {
initialized = 1;
for(i = 0; api_commands[i].command ; i++)
api_commands[i].hash = simple_hash(api_commands[i].command);
}
char *tok = mystrsep(&url, "/?&");
if(tok && *tok) {
debug(D_WEB_CLIENT, "%llu: Searching for API v1 command '%s'.", w->id, tok);
uint32_t hash = simple_hash(tok);
for(i = 0; api_commands[i].command ;i++) {
if(unlikely(hash == api_commands[i].hash && !strcmp(tok, api_commands[i].command))) {
if(unlikely(api_commands[i].acl != WEB_CLIENT_ACL_NOCHECK) && !(w->acl & api_commands[i].acl))
return web_client_permission_denied(w);
return api_commands[i].callback(host, w, url);
}
}
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
buffer_strcat(w->response.data, "Unsupported v1 API command: ");
buffer_strcat_htmlescape(w->response.data, tok);
return 404;
}
else {
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
buffer_sprintf(w->response.data, "Which API v1 command?");
return 400;
}
}
|
inline int web_client_api_request_v1(RRDHOST *host, struct web_client *w, char *url) {
static int initialized = 0;
int i;
if(unlikely(initialized == 0)) {
initialized = 1;
for(i = 0; api_commands[i].command ; i++)
api_commands[i].hash = simple_hash(api_commands[i].command);
}
char *tok = mystrsep(&url, "/?&");
if(tok && *tok) {
debug(D_WEB_CLIENT, "%llu: Searching for API v1 command '%s'.", w->id, tok);
uint32_t hash = simple_hash(tok);
for(i = 0; api_commands[i].command ;i++) {
if(unlikely(hash == api_commands[i].hash && !strcmp(tok, api_commands[i].command))) {
if(unlikely(api_commands[i].acl != WEB_CLIENT_ACL_NOCHECK) && !(w->acl & api_commands[i].acl))
return web_client_permission_denied(w);
return api_commands[i].callback(host, w, url);
}
}
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
buffer_strcat(w->response.data, "Unsupported v1 API command: ");
buffer_strcat_htmlescape(w->response.data, tok);
return 404;
}
else {
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
buffer_sprintf(w->response.data, "Which API v1 command?");
return 400;
}
}
|
C
|
netdata
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
void ShelfWidget::Initialize() {
OnSessionStateChanged(Shell::Get()->session_controller()->GetSessionState());
}
|
void ShelfWidget::Initialize() {
OnSessionStateChanged(Shell::Get()->session_controller()->GetSessionState());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1640/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
void ExpandableContainerView::DetailsView::AddDetail(
const base::string16& detail) {
layout_->StartRowWithPadding(0, 0,
0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
views::Label* detail_label =
new views::Label(PrepareForDisplay(detail, false));
detail_label->SetMultiLine(true);
detail_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
layout_->AddView(detail_label);
}
|
void ExpandableContainerView::DetailsView::AddDetail(
const base::string16& detail) {
layout_->StartRowWithPadding(0, 0,
0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
views::Label* detail_label =
new views::Label(PrepareForDisplay(detail, false));
detail_label->SetMultiLine(true);
detail_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
layout_->AddView(detail_label);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0920/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BookmarkEventRouter::~BookmarkEventRouter() {
if (model_) {
model_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
|
BookmarkEventRouter::~BookmarkEventRouter() {
if (model_) {
model_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
GooString *JBIG2Stream::getPSFilter(int psLevel, char *indent) {
return NULL;
}
|
GooString *JBIG2Stream::getPSFilter(int psLevel, char *indent) {
return NULL;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
bool AppCacheDatabase::DeleteNamespacesForCache(int64_t cache_id) {
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] = "DELETE FROM Namespaces WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
return statement.Run();
}
|
bool AppCacheDatabase::DeleteNamespacesForCache(int64_t cache_id) {
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] = "DELETE FROM Namespaces WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
return statement.Run();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(chown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
{
return sys_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, filename, user, group, 0);
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(chown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
{
return sys_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, filename, user, group, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
C++ readability change for cindylau.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2090008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AppendMatchingCookiesToList(
net::CookieStore* cookie_store, const std::string& store_id,
const GURL& url, const DictionaryValue* details,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* match_list) {
net::CookieMonster::CookieList all_cookies = GetCookieListFromStore(
cookie_store, url);
net::CookieMonster::CookieList::const_iterator it;
for (it = all_cookies.begin(); it != all_cookies.end(); ++it) {
GURL cookie_domain_url = GetURLFromCookiePair(*it);
if (!extension->HasHostPermission(cookie_domain_url))
continue;
extension_cookies_helpers::MatchFilter filter(details);
if (filter.MatchesCookie(*it))
match_list->Append(CreateCookieValue(*it, store_id));
}
}
|
void AppendMatchingCookiesToList(
net::CookieStore* cookie_store, const std::string& store_id,
const GURL& url, const DictionaryValue* details,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* match_list) {
net::CookieMonster::CookieList all_cookies = GetCookieListFromStore(
cookie_store, url);
net::CookieMonster::CookieList::const_iterator it;
for (it = all_cookies.begin(); it != all_cookies.end(); ++it) {
GURL cookie_domain_url = GetURLFromCookiePair(*it);
if (!extension->HasHostPermission(cookie_domain_url))
continue;
extension_cookies_helpers::MatchFilter filter(details);
if (filter.MatchesCookie(*it))
match_list->Append(CreateCookieValue(*it, store_id));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8785/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/602f4a2e14b41703b5f431de3154cd46a5750a2d
|
602f4a2e14b41703b5f431de3154cd46a5750a2d
|
Fixed CVE-2018-8785
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
static void zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* src, size_t count)
{
UINT32 front;
if (count <= 0)
return;
if (count > zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
const size_t residue = count - zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
count = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
src += residue;
zgfx->HistoryIndex = (zgfx->HistoryIndex + residue) % zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
}
if (zgfx->HistoryIndex + count <= zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, count);
if ((zgfx->HistoryIndex += count) == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
}
else
{
front = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize - zgfx->HistoryIndex;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, front);
CopyMemory(zgfx->HistoryBuffer, &src[front], count - front);
zgfx->HistoryIndex = count - front;
}
}
|
static void zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* src, size_t count)
{
UINT32 front;
if (count <= 0)
return;
if (count > zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
const size_t residue = count - zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
count = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
src += residue;
zgfx->HistoryIndex = (zgfx->HistoryIndex + residue) % zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
}
if (zgfx->HistoryIndex + count <= zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, count);
if ((zgfx->HistoryIndex += count) == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
}
else
{
front = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize - zgfx->HistoryIndex;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, front);
CopyMemory(zgfx->HistoryBuffer, &src[front], count - front);
zgfx->HistoryIndex = count - front;
}
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::ActivateSyncTree() {
if (pending_tree_) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "PendingTree:waiting", pending_tree_.get());
DCHECK(pending_tree_duration_timer_);
pending_tree_duration_timer_.reset();
pending_tree_->ProcessUIResourceRequestQueue();
if (pending_tree_->needs_full_tree_sync()) {
TreeSynchronizer::SynchronizeTrees(pending_tree_.get(),
active_tree_.get());
}
if (active_tree_->property_trees()->changed) {
if (pending_tree_->property_trees()->sequence_number ==
active_tree_->property_trees()->sequence_number)
active_tree_->property_trees()->PushChangeTrackingTo(
pending_tree_->property_trees());
else
active_tree_->MoveChangeTrackingToLayers();
}
active_tree_->property_trees()->PushOpacityIfNeeded(
pending_tree_->property_trees());
TreeSynchronizer::PushLayerProperties(pending_tree(), active_tree());
pending_tree_->PushPropertiesTo(active_tree_.get());
if (!pending_tree_->LayerListIsEmpty())
pending_tree_->property_trees()->ResetAllChangeTracking();
DCHECK(!recycle_tree_);
pending_tree_.swap(recycle_tree_);
ActivateAnimations();
Mutate(CurrentBeginFrameArgs().frame_time);
} else {
active_tree_->ProcessUIResourceRequestQueue();
}
UpdateViewportContainerSizes();
active_tree_->DidBecomeActive();
client_->RenewTreePriority();
if (!active_tree_->picture_layers().empty())
DidModifyTilePriorities();
tile_manager_.DidActivateSyncTree();
client_->OnCanDrawStateChanged(CanDraw());
client_->DidActivateSyncTree();
if (!tree_activation_callback_.is_null())
tree_activation_callback_.Run();
std::unique_ptr<PendingPageScaleAnimation> pending_page_scale_animation =
active_tree_->TakePendingPageScaleAnimation();
if (pending_page_scale_animation) {
StartPageScaleAnimation(pending_page_scale_animation->target_offset,
pending_page_scale_animation->use_anchor,
pending_page_scale_animation->scale,
pending_page_scale_animation->duration);
}
UpdateRootLayerStateForSynchronousInputHandler();
}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::ActivateSyncTree() {
if (pending_tree_) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "PendingTree:waiting", pending_tree_.get());
DCHECK(pending_tree_duration_timer_);
pending_tree_duration_timer_.reset();
pending_tree_->ProcessUIResourceRequestQueue();
if (pending_tree_->needs_full_tree_sync()) {
TreeSynchronizer::SynchronizeTrees(pending_tree_.get(),
active_tree_.get());
}
if (active_tree_->property_trees()->changed) {
if (pending_tree_->property_trees()->sequence_number ==
active_tree_->property_trees()->sequence_number)
active_tree_->property_trees()->PushChangeTrackingTo(
pending_tree_->property_trees());
else
active_tree_->MoveChangeTrackingToLayers();
}
active_tree_->property_trees()->PushOpacityIfNeeded(
pending_tree_->property_trees());
TreeSynchronizer::PushLayerProperties(pending_tree(), active_tree());
pending_tree_->PushPropertiesTo(active_tree_.get());
if (!pending_tree_->LayerListIsEmpty())
pending_tree_->property_trees()->ResetAllChangeTracking();
DCHECK(!recycle_tree_);
pending_tree_.swap(recycle_tree_);
ActivateAnimations();
Mutate(CurrentBeginFrameArgs().frame_time);
} else {
active_tree_->ProcessUIResourceRequestQueue();
}
UpdateViewportContainerSizes();
active_tree_->DidBecomeActive();
client_->RenewTreePriority();
if (!active_tree_->picture_layers().empty())
DidModifyTilePriorities();
tile_manager_.DidActivateSyncTree();
client_->OnCanDrawStateChanged(CanDraw());
client_->DidActivateSyncTree();
if (!tree_activation_callback_.is_null())
tree_activation_callback_.Run();
std::unique_ptr<PendingPageScaleAnimation> pending_page_scale_animation =
active_tree_->TakePendingPageScaleAnimation();
if (pending_page_scale_animation) {
StartPageScaleAnimation(pending_page_scale_animation->target_offset,
pending_page_scale_animation->use_anchor,
pending_page_scale_animation->scale,
pending_page_scale_animation->duration);
}
UpdateRootLayerStateForSynchronousInputHandler();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12981/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
SWFShape_hideLine(SWFShape shape)
{
ShapeRecord record;
if ( shape->isEnded )
return;
if ( shape->isMorph )
return;
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->line = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_LINESTYLEFLAG;
}
|
SWFShape_hideLine(SWFShape shape)
{
ShapeRecord record;
if ( shape->isEnded )
return;
if ( shape->isMorph )
return;
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->line = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_LINESTYLEFLAG;
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8099/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]>
|
GIT_INLINE(bool) is_file_or_link(const int filemode)
{
return (filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB ||
filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB_EXECUTABLE ||
filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_LINK);
}
|
GIT_INLINE(bool) is_file_or_link(const int filemode)
{
return (filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB ||
filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB_EXECUTABLE ||
filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_LINK);
}
|
C
|
libgit2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1613
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::UpdateLifecycleState(
mojom::LifecycleState state) {
switch (state) {
case mojom::LifecycleState::kFrozen: {
if (GetState() == LifecycleUnitState::PENDING_DISCARD) {
freeze_timeout_timer_->Stop();
FinishDiscard(discard_reason_);
} else {
SetState(LifecycleUnitState::FROZEN,
StateChangeReason::RENDERER_INITIATED);
}
break;
}
case mojom::LifecycleState::kRunning: {
SetState(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
StateChangeReason::RENDERER_INITIATED);
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
}
|
void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::UpdateLifecycleState(
mojom::LifecycleState state) {
switch (state) {
case mojom::LifecycleState::kFrozen: {
if (GetState() == LifecycleUnitState::PENDING_DISCARD) {
freeze_timeout_timer_->Stop();
FinishDiscard(discard_reason_);
} else {
SetState(LifecycleUnitState::FROZEN,
StateChangeReason::RENDERER_INITIATED);
}
break;
}
case mojom::LifecycleState::kRunning: {
SetState(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
StateChangeReason::RENDERER_INITIATED);
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1798/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2c118bfab8bc6b8bb213abfc35201e441693d55
|
a2c118bfab8bc6b8bb213abfc35201e441693d55
|
KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_ioapic_clear_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq_source_id)
{
int i;
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
__clear_bit(irq_source_id, &ioapic->irq_states[i]);
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
}
|
void kvm_ioapic_clear_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq_source_id)
{
int i;
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
__clear_bit(irq_source_id, &ioapic->irq_states[i]);
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9491/
|
CWE-190
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2b4667baa5a2badbdfec1794156ee17d4afef37c
|
2b4667baa5a2badbdfec1794156ee17d4afef37c
|
Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
|
AMediaCodec* AMediaCodec_createDecoderByType(const char *mime_type) {
return createAMediaCodec(mime_type, true, false);
}
|
AMediaCodec* AMediaCodec_createDecoderByType(const char *mime_type) {
return createAMediaCodec(mime_type, true, false);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0028
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0028/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Efros <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
noinline struct pt_regs * __cpuinit __attribute__((weak)) idle_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
memset(regs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
return regs;
}
|
noinline struct pt_regs * __cpuinit __attribute__((weak)) idle_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
memset(regs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
return regs;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
Dactyloscoper::Record(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, "1");
}
|
void V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
Dactyloscoper::Record(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, "1");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9644/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
void crypto_drop_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
if (!spawn->alg)
return;
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_del(&spawn->list);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
}
|
void crypto_drop_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
if (!spawn->alg)
return;
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_del(&spawn->list);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4130/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
|
53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
| null |
int red_channel_waits_for_migrate_data(RedChannel *channel)
{
RedChannelClient *rcc;
if (!red_channel_is_connected(channel)) {
return FALSE;
}
if (channel->clients_num > 1) {
return FALSE;
}
spice_assert(channel->clients_num == 1);
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(ring_get_head(&channel->clients), RedChannelClient, channel_link);
return red_channel_client_waits_for_migrate_data(rcc);
}
|
int red_channel_waits_for_migrate_data(RedChannel *channel)
{
RedChannelClient *rcc;
if (!red_channel_is_connected(channel)) {
return FALSE;
}
if (channel->clients_num > 1) {
return FALSE;
}
spice_assert(channel->clients_num == 1);
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(ring_get_head(&channel->clients), RedChannelClient, channel_link);
return red_channel_client_waits_for_migrate_data(rcc);
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5153
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5153/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20a9e39a925dd0fb183acb61bb7b87f29abea83f
|
20a9e39a925dd0fb183acb61bb7b87f29abea83f
|
Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
[email protected]
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
|
void TracingControllerImpl::DisconnectFromService() {
coordinator_ = nullptr;
}
|
void TracingControllerImpl::DisconnectFromService() {
coordinator_ = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18339/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
[scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
|
void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnIdlePeriodStarted() {
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
any_thread().in_idle_period = true;
UpdatePolicyLocked(UpdateType::kMayEarlyOutIfPolicyUnchanged);
}
|
void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnIdlePeriodStarted() {
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
any_thread().in_idle_period = true;
UpdatePolicyLocked(UpdateType::kMayEarlyOutIfPolicyUnchanged);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static u32 tun_get_msglevel(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
return tun->debug;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
|
static u32 tun_get_msglevel(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
return tun->debug;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9425/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
|
2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
| null |
ZEND_API zval *zend_ts_hash_str_find(TsHashTable *ht, const char *key, size_t len)
{
zval *retval;
begin_read(ht);
retval = zend_hash_str_find(TS_HASH(ht), key, len);
end_read(ht);
return retval;
}
|
ZEND_API zval *zend_ts_hash_str_find(TsHashTable *ht, const char *key, size_t len)
{
zval *retval;
begin_read(ht);
retval = zend_hash_str_find(TS_HASH(ht), key, len);
end_read(ht);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits(void)
{
return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT;
}
|
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits(void)
{
return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
system_call_script(thread_master_t *m, int (*func) (thread_t *), void * arg, unsigned long timer, notify_script_t* script)
{
pid_t pid;
/* Daemonization to not degrade our scheduling timer */
if (log_file_name)
flush_log_file();
pid = local_fork();
if (pid < 0) {
/* fork error */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed fork process");
return -1;
}
if (pid) {
/* parent process */
thread_add_child(m, func, arg, pid, timer);
return 0;
}
/* Child process */
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
skip_mem_dump();
#endif
system_call(script);
exit(0); /* Script errors aren't server errors */
}
|
system_call_script(thread_master_t *m, int (*func) (thread_t *), void * arg, unsigned long timer, notify_script_t* script)
{
pid_t pid;
/* Daemonization to not degrade our scheduling timer */
if (log_file_name)
flush_log_file();
pid = local_fork();
if (pid < 0) {
/* fork error */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed fork process");
return -1;
}
if (pid) {
/* parent process */
thread_add_child(m, func, arg, pid, timer);
return 0;
}
/* Child process */
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
skip_mem_dump();
#endif
system_call(script);
exit(0); /* Script errors aren't server errors */
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd;hp=7f82c01523505052615492f8e220f4348ba46995
|
71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd
| null |
add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, tree[current].many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
|
add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2859
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2859/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionService::ProcessExtensionSyncData(
const ExtensionSyncData& extension_sync_data,
SyncBundle& bundle) {
const std::string& id = extension_sync_data.id();
if (extension_sync_data.uninstalled()) {
std::string error;
if (!UninstallExtensionHelper(this, id)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not uninstall extension " << id
<< " for sync";
}
return;
}
if (extension_sync_data.enabled()) {
EnableExtension(id);
} else {
DisableExtension(id);
}
SetIsIncognitoEnabled(id, extension_sync_data.incognito_enabled());
const Extension* extension = GetInstalledExtension(id);
if (extension) {
int result = extension->version()->CompareTo(extension_sync_data.version());
if (result < 0) {
bundle.pending_sync_data[extension_sync_data.id()] = extension_sync_data;
CheckForUpdatesSoon();
}
} else {
const bool kInstallSilently = true;
if (!pending_extension_manager()->AddFromSync(
id,
extension_sync_data.update_url(),
bundle.filter,
kInstallSilently)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not add pending extension for " << id;
}
bundle.pending_sync_data[extension_sync_data.id()] = extension_sync_data;
CheckForUpdatesSoon();
}
}
|
void ExtensionService::ProcessExtensionSyncData(
const ExtensionSyncData& extension_sync_data,
SyncBundle& bundle) {
const std::string& id = extension_sync_data.id();
if (extension_sync_data.uninstalled()) {
std::string error;
if (!UninstallExtensionHelper(this, id)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not uninstall extension " << id
<< " for sync";
}
return;
}
if (extension_sync_data.enabled()) {
EnableExtension(id);
} else {
DisableExtension(id);
}
SetIsIncognitoEnabled(id, extension_sync_data.incognito_enabled());
const Extension* extension = GetInstalledExtension(id);
if (extension) {
int result = extension->version()->CompareTo(extension_sync_data.version());
if (result < 0) {
bundle.pending_sync_data[extension_sync_data.id()] = extension_sync_data;
CheckForUpdatesSoon();
}
} else {
const bool kInstallSilently = true;
if (!pending_extension_manager()->AddFromSync(
id,
extension_sync_data.update_url(),
bundle.filter,
kInstallSilently)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not add pending extension for " << id;
}
bundle.pending_sync_data[extension_sync_data.id()] = extension_sync_data;
CheckForUpdatesSoon();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7283
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7283/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c88547a8119e3b581318ab65e9b72f27f23e641d
|
c88547a8119e3b581318ab65e9b72f27f23e641d
|
xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
xfs_da3_root_split(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk1,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk2)
{
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_da_intnode *oldroot;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
struct xfs_da_args *args;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
struct xfs_inode *dp;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
struct xfs_mount *mp;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf *leaf;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
int level;
int error;
int size;
trace_xfs_da_root_split(state->args);
/*
* Copy the existing (incorrect) block from the root node position
* to a free space somewhere.
*/
args = state->args;
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error)
return error;
dp = args->dp;
tp = args->trans;
mp = state->mp;
error = xfs_da_get_buf(tp, dp, blkno, -1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return error;
node = bp->b_addr;
oldroot = blk1->bp->b_addr;
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC)) {
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, oldroot);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(oldroot);
size = (int)((char *)&btree[nodehdr.count] - (char *)oldroot);
level = nodehdr.level;
/*
* we are about to copy oldroot to bp, so set up the type
* of bp while we know exactly what it will be.
*/
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, bp, XFS_BLFT_DA_NODE_BUF);
} else {
struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr leafhdr;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf_entry *ents;
leaf = (xfs_dir2_leaf_t *)oldroot;
dp->d_ops->leaf_hdr_from_disk(&leafhdr, leaf);
ents = dp->d_ops->leaf_ents_p(leaf);
ASSERT(leafhdr.magic == XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC ||
leafhdr.magic == XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC);
size = (int)((char *)&ents[leafhdr.count] - (char *)leaf);
level = 0;
/*
* we are about to copy oldroot to bp, so set up the type
* of bp while we know exactly what it will be.
*/
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, bp, XFS_BLFT_DIR_LEAFN_BUF);
}
/*
* we can copy most of the information in the node from one block to
* another, but for CRC enabled headers we have to make sure that the
* block specific identifiers are kept intact. We update the buffer
* directly for this.
*/
memcpy(node, oldroot, size);
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC)) {
struct xfs_da3_intnode *node3 = (struct xfs_da3_intnode *)node;
node3->hdr.info.blkno = cpu_to_be64(bp->b_bn);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, bp, 0, size - 1);
bp->b_ops = blk1->bp->b_ops;
xfs_trans_buf_copy_type(bp, blk1->bp);
blk1->bp = bp;
blk1->blkno = blkno;
/*
* Set up the new root node.
*/
error = xfs_da3_node_create(args,
(args->whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) ? mp->m_dirleafblk : 0,
level + 1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return error;
node = bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
btree[0].hashval = cpu_to_be32(blk1->hashval);
btree[0].before = cpu_to_be32(blk1->blkno);
btree[1].hashval = cpu_to_be32(blk2->hashval);
btree[1].before = cpu_to_be32(blk2->blkno);
nodehdr.count = 2;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_to_disk(node, &nodehdr);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC)) {
ASSERT(blk1->blkno >= mp->m_dirleafblk &&
blk1->blkno < mp->m_dirfreeblk);
ASSERT(blk2->blkno >= mp->m_dirleafblk &&
blk2->blkno < mp->m_dirfreeblk);
}
#endif
/* Header is already logged by xfs_da_node_create */
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(node, btree, sizeof(xfs_da_node_entry_t) * 2));
return 0;
}
|
xfs_da3_root_split(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk1,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk2)
{
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_da_intnode *oldroot;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
struct xfs_da_args *args;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
struct xfs_inode *dp;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
struct xfs_mount *mp;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf *leaf;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
int level;
int error;
int size;
trace_xfs_da_root_split(state->args);
/*
* Copy the existing (incorrect) block from the root node position
* to a free space somewhere.
*/
args = state->args;
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error)
return error;
dp = args->dp;
tp = args->trans;
mp = state->mp;
error = xfs_da_get_buf(tp, dp, blkno, -1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return error;
node = bp->b_addr;
oldroot = blk1->bp->b_addr;
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC)) {
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, oldroot);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(oldroot);
size = (int)((char *)&btree[nodehdr.count] - (char *)oldroot);
level = nodehdr.level;
/*
* we are about to copy oldroot to bp, so set up the type
* of bp while we know exactly what it will be.
*/
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, bp, XFS_BLFT_DA_NODE_BUF);
} else {
struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr leafhdr;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf_entry *ents;
leaf = (xfs_dir2_leaf_t *)oldroot;
dp->d_ops->leaf_hdr_from_disk(&leafhdr, leaf);
ents = dp->d_ops->leaf_ents_p(leaf);
ASSERT(leafhdr.magic == XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC ||
leafhdr.magic == XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC);
size = (int)((char *)&ents[leafhdr.count] - (char *)leaf);
level = 0;
/*
* we are about to copy oldroot to bp, so set up the type
* of bp while we know exactly what it will be.
*/
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, bp, XFS_BLFT_DIR_LEAFN_BUF);
}
/*
* we can copy most of the information in the node from one block to
* another, but for CRC enabled headers we have to make sure that the
* block specific identifiers are kept intact. We update the buffer
* directly for this.
*/
memcpy(node, oldroot, size);
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC)) {
struct xfs_da3_intnode *node3 = (struct xfs_da3_intnode *)node;
node3->hdr.info.blkno = cpu_to_be64(bp->b_bn);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, bp, 0, size - 1);
bp->b_ops = blk1->bp->b_ops;
xfs_trans_buf_copy_type(bp, blk1->bp);
blk1->bp = bp;
blk1->blkno = blkno;
/*
* Set up the new root node.
*/
error = xfs_da3_node_create(args,
(args->whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) ? mp->m_dirleafblk : 0,
level + 1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return error;
node = bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
btree[0].hashval = cpu_to_be32(blk1->hashval);
btree[0].before = cpu_to_be32(blk1->blkno);
btree[1].hashval = cpu_to_be32(blk2->hashval);
btree[1].before = cpu_to_be32(blk2->blkno);
nodehdr.count = 2;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_to_disk(node, &nodehdr);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC) ||
oldroot->hdr.info.magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC)) {
ASSERT(blk1->blkno >= mp->m_dirleafblk &&
blk1->blkno < mp->m_dirfreeblk);
ASSERT(blk2->blkno >= mp->m_dirleafblk &&
blk2->blkno < mp->m_dirfreeblk);
}
#endif
/* Header is already logged by xfs_da_node_create */
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(node, btree, sizeof(xfs_da_node_entry_t) * 2));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1805/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static void iov_fault_in_pages_read(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
|
static void iov_fault_in_pages_read(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
{
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
while (len > 0) {
unsigned long this_len;
this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
fault_in_pages_readable(iov->iov_base, this_len);
len -= this_len;
iov++;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowGpuLaunchRetryOnIOThread() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const base::android::ApplicationState app_state =
base::android::ApplicationStatusListener::GetState();
return base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_UNKNOWN == app_state ||
base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_RUNNING_ACTIVITIES == app_state ||
base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_PAUSED_ACTIVITIES == app_state;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowGpuLaunchRetryOnIOThread() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const base::android::ApplicationState app_state =
base::android::ApplicationStatusListener::GetState();
return base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_UNKNOWN == app_state ||
base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_RUNNING_ACTIVITIES == app_state ||
base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_PAUSED_ACTIVITIES == app_state;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static int wait_for_concurrent_writes(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
static ino_t last_ino;
static dev_t last_dev;
int err = 0;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 1
|| (last_ino == inode->i_ino && last_dev == inode->i_sb->s_dev)) {
dprintk("nfsd: write defer %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
msleep(10);
dprintk("nfsd: write resume %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
}
if (inode->i_state & I_DIRTY) {
dprintk("nfsd: write sync %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
err = vfs_fsync(file, 0);
}
last_ino = inode->i_ino;
last_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
return err;
}
|
static int wait_for_concurrent_writes(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
static ino_t last_ino;
static dev_t last_dev;
int err = 0;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 1
|| (last_ino == inode->i_ino && last_dev == inode->i_sb->s_dev)) {
dprintk("nfsd: write defer %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
msleep(10);
dprintk("nfsd: write resume %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
}
if (inode->i_state & I_DIRTY) {
dprintk("nfsd: write sync %d\n", task_pid_nr(current));
err = vfs_fsync(file, 0);
}
last_ino = inode->i_ino;
last_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6942/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
|
29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
| null |
Round_Super( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_F26Dot6 distance,
FT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
FT_F26Dot6 val;
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = ADD_LONG( distance,
exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation ) &
-exc->period;
val += exc->phase;
if ( val < 0 )
val = exc->phase;
}
else
{
val = NEG_LONG( SUB_LONG( exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation,
distance ) &
-exc->period );
val -= exc->phase;
if ( val > 0 )
val = -exc->phase;
}
return val;
}
|
Round_Super( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_F26Dot6 distance,
FT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
FT_F26Dot6 val;
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = ADD_LONG( distance,
exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation ) &
-exc->period;
val += exc->phase;
if ( val < 0 )
val = exc->phase;
}
else
{
val = NEG_LONG( SUB_LONG( exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation,
distance ) &
-exc->period );
val -= exc->phase;
if ( val > 0 )
val = -exc->phase;
}
return val;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c58d6ae09d0c916b6003238de09e34f14cce758f
|
c58d6ae09d0c916b6003238de09e34f14cce758f
|
Introduce a method to build the tree from a CompactHTMLToken
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107082
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
No new tests because covered by existing fast/parser tests.
* html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.cpp:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::constructTreeFromCompactHTMLToken):
* html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.h:
* html/parser/HTMLToken.h:
(AtomicHTMLToken):
(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken::create):
(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken::AtomicHTMLToken):
* xml/parser/MarkupTokenBase.h:
(WebCore::AtomicMarkupTokenBase::AtomicMarkupTokenBase):
(AtomicMarkupTokenBase):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139953 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLDocumentParser::endIfDelayed()
{
if (isDetached())
return;
if (!m_endWasDelayed || shouldDelayEnd())
return;
m_endWasDelayed = false;
prepareToStopParsing();
}
|
void HTMLDocumentParser::endIfDelayed()
{
if (isDetached())
return;
if (!m_endWasDelayed || shouldDelayEnd())
return;
m_endWasDelayed = false;
prepareToStopParsing();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5087/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11601c08e92732d2883af2057c41c17cba890844
|
11601c08e92732d2883af2057c41c17cba890844
|
[IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
|
void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Clear(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->database()->Clear(transaction, object_store_id, callbacks);
}
|
void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Clear(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->database()->Clear(transaction, object_store_id, callbacks);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7815
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7815/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
|
e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
| null |
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
int32_t encoding)
{
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
|
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
int32_t encoding)
{
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::HasValidFrame() const {
return texture_id_in_layer_ != 0 &&
content_view_core_ &&
!texture_size_in_layer_.IsEmpty() &&
texture_size_in_layer_ == content_view_core_->GetBounds().size();
}
|
bool RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::HasValidFrame() const {
return texture_id_in_layer_ != 0 &&
content_view_core_ &&
!texture_size_in_layer_.IsEmpty() &&
texture_size_in_layer_ == content_view_core_->GetBounds().size();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5220/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::EmphasizeURLComponents() {
if (!location_bar_view_)
return;
if (path_fade_animation_)
path_fade_animation_->Stop();
bool text_is_url = model()->CurrentTextIsURL();
GetRenderText()->SetDirectionalityMode(
text_is_url ? gfx::DIRECTIONALITY_AS_URL : gfx::DIRECTIONALITY_FROM_TEXT);
SetStyle(gfx::TEXT_STYLE_STRIKE, false);
base::string16 text = GetText();
bool path_eligible_for_fading = UpdateTextStyle(
text, text_is_url, model()->client()->GetSchemeClassifier());
if (path_fade_animation_ && path_eligible_for_fading && !HasFocus() &&
!model()->user_input_in_progress()) {
url::Component scheme, host;
AutocompleteInput::ParseForEmphasizeComponents(
text, model()->client()->GetSchemeClassifier(), &scheme, &host);
gfx::Range path_bounds(host.end(), text.size());
path_fade_animation_->Start(path_bounds);
}
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::EmphasizeURLComponents() {
if (!location_bar_view_)
return;
if (path_fade_animation_)
path_fade_animation_->Stop();
bool text_is_url = model()->CurrentTextIsURL();
GetRenderText()->SetDirectionalityMode(
text_is_url ? gfx::DIRECTIONALITY_AS_URL : gfx::DIRECTIONALITY_FROM_TEXT);
SetStyle(gfx::TEXT_STYLE_STRIKE, false);
base::string16 text = GetText();
bool path_eligible_for_fading = UpdateTextStyle(
text, text_is_url, model()->client()->GetSchemeClassifier());
if (path_fade_animation_ && path_eligible_for_fading && !HasFocus() &&
!model()->user_input_in_progress()) {
url::Component scheme, host;
AutocompleteInput::ParseForEmphasizeComponents(
text, model()->client()->GetSchemeClassifier(), &scheme, &host);
gfx::Range path_bounds(host.end(), text.size());
path_fade_animation_->Start(path_bounds);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000879/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1105/commits/15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175
|
15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175
|
Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
|
is_nfs4_flags(const char *start, const char *end, int *permset)
{
const char *p = start;
while (p < end) {
switch(*p++) {
case 'f':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT;
break;
case 'd':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT;
break;
case 'i':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
break;
case 'n':
*permset |=
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT;
break;
case 'S':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS;
break;
case 'F':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_FAILED_ACCESS;
break;
case 'I':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_INHERITED;
break;
case '-':
break;
default:
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
|
is_nfs4_flags(const char *start, const char *end, int *permset)
{
const char *p = start;
while (p < end) {
switch(*p++) {
case 'f':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT;
break;
case 'd':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT;
break;
case 'i':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
break;
case 'n':
*permset |=
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT;
break;
case 'S':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS;
break;
case 'F':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_FAILED_ACCESS;
break;
case 'I':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_ENTRY_INHERITED;
break;
case '-':
break;
default:
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::WebkitMouseButtonDown(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (SendErrorIfModalDialogActive(this, reply_message))
return;
RenderViewHost* view;
std::string error;
if (!GetRenderViewFromJSONArgs(args, profile(), &view, &error)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError(error);
return;
}
WebKit::WebMouseEvent mouse_event;
if (!args->GetInteger("x", &mouse_event.x) ||
!args->GetInteger("y", &mouse_event.y)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("(X,Y) coordinates missing or invalid");
return;
}
mouse_event.type = WebKit::WebInputEvent::MouseDown;
mouse_event.button = WebKit::WebMouseEvent::ButtonLeft;
mouse_event.clickCount = 1;
new InputEventAckNotificationObserver(this, reply_message, mouse_event.type,
1);
view->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::WebkitMouseButtonDown(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (SendErrorIfModalDialogActive(this, reply_message))
return;
RenderViewHost* view;
std::string error;
if (!GetRenderViewFromJSONArgs(args, profile(), &view, &error)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError(error);
return;
}
WebKit::WebMouseEvent mouse_event;
if (!args->GetInteger("x", &mouse_event.x) ||
!args->GetInteger("y", &mouse_event.y)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("(X,Y) coordinates missing or invalid");
return;
}
mouse_event.type = WebKit::WebInputEvent::MouseDown;
mouse_event.button = WebKit::WebMouseEvent::ButtonLeft;
mouse_event.clickCount = 1;
new InputEventAckNotificationObserver(this, reply_message, mouse_event.type,
1);
view->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
BackgroundBleedAvoidance RenderBox::determineBackgroundBleedAvoidance(GraphicsContext* context) const
{
if (context->paintingDisabled())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
const RenderStyle* style = this->style();
if (!style->hasBackground() || !style->hasBorder() || !style->hasBorderRadius() || borderImageIsLoadedAndCanBeRendered())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
AffineTransform ctm = context->getCTM();
FloatSize contextScaling(static_cast<float>(ctm.xScale()), static_cast<float>(ctm.yScale()));
if (borderObscuresBackgroundEdge(contextScaling))
return BackgroundBleedShrinkBackground;
return BackgroundBleedUseTransparencyLayer;
}
|
BackgroundBleedAvoidance RenderBox::determineBackgroundBleedAvoidance(GraphicsContext* context) const
{
if (context->paintingDisabled())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
const RenderStyle* style = this->style();
if (!style->hasBackground() || !style->hasBorder() || !style->hasBorderRadius() || borderImageIsLoadedAndCanBeRendered())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
AffineTransform ctm = context->getCTM();
FloatSize contextScaling(static_cast<float>(ctm.xScale()), static_cast<float>(ctm.yScale()));
if (borderObscuresBackgroundEdge(contextScaling))
return BackgroundBleedShrinkBackground;
return BackgroundBleedUseTransparencyLayer;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::IsDrawValid(
const char* function_name, GLuint max_vertex_accessed, GLsizei primcount) {
if (!state_.current_program.get()) {
LOCAL_RENDER_WARNING("Drawing with no current shader program.");
return false;
}
return state_.vertex_attrib_manager
->ValidateBindings(function_name,
this,
feature_info_.get(),
state_.current_program.get(),
max_vertex_accessed,
primcount);
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::IsDrawValid(
const char* function_name, GLuint max_vertex_accessed, GLsizei primcount) {
if (!state_.current_program.get()) {
LOCAL_RENDER_WARNING("Drawing with no current shader program.");
return false;
}
return state_.vertex_attrib_manager
->ValidateBindings(function_name,
this,
feature_info_.get(),
state_.current_program.get(),
max_vertex_accessed,
primcount);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6761/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
void DocumentLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const String& source) {
InstallNewDocument(url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy,
MimeType(), response_.TextEncodingName(),
InstallNewDocumentReason::kJavascriptURL,
kForceSynchronousParsing, NullURL());
if (!source.IsNull()) {
frame_->GetDocument()->SetCompatibilityMode(Document::kNoQuirksMode);
parser_->Append(source);
}
if (parser_)
parser_->Finish();
}
|
void DocumentLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const String& source) {
InstallNewDocument(url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy,
MimeType(), response_.TextEncodingName(),
InstallNewDocumentReason::kJavascriptURL,
kForceSynchronousParsing, NullURL());
if (!source.IsNull()) {
frame_->GetDocument()->SetCompatibilityMode(Document::kNoQuirksMode);
parser_->Append(source);
}
if (parser_)
parser_->Finish();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1743
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
void AwContents::InvokeGeolocationCallback(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jboolean value,
jstring origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (pending_geolocation_prompts_.empty())
return;
GURL callback_origin(base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, origin));
if (callback_origin.GetOrigin() ==
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().first) {
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().second.Run(value);
pending_geolocation_prompts_.pop_front();
if (!pending_geolocation_prompts_.empty()) {
ShowGeolocationPromptHelper(java_ref_,
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().first);
}
}
}
|
void AwContents::InvokeGeolocationCallback(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jboolean value,
jstring origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (pending_geolocation_prompts_.empty())
return;
GURL callback_origin(base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, origin));
if (callback_origin.GetOrigin() ==
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().first) {
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().second.Run(value);
pending_geolocation_prompts_.pop_front();
if (!pending_geolocation_prompts_.empty()) {
ShowGeolocationPromptHelper(java_ref_,
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().first);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Element::~Element()
{
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (document() && document()->renderer()) {
ASSERT(!inNamedFlow());
}
#endif
if (hasRareData()) {
ElementRareData* data = elementRareData();
data->setPseudoElement(BEFORE, 0);
data->setPseudoElement(AFTER, 0);
data->clearShadow();
}
if (isCustomElement() && document() && document()->registry()) {
document()->registry()->customElementWasDestroyed(this);
}
if (hasSyntheticAttrChildNodes())
detachAllAttrNodesFromElement();
if (hasPendingResources()) {
document()->accessSVGExtensions()->removeElementFromPendingResources(this);
ASSERT(!hasPendingResources());
}
}
|
Element::~Element()
{
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (document() && document()->renderer()) {
ASSERT(!inNamedFlow());
}
#endif
if (hasRareData()) {
ElementRareData* data = elementRareData();
data->setPseudoElement(BEFORE, 0);
data->setPseudoElement(AFTER, 0);
data->clearShadow();
}
if (isCustomElement() && document() && document()->registry()) {
document()->registry()->customElementWasDestroyed(this);
}
if (hasSyntheticAttrChildNodes())
detachAllAttrNodesFromElement();
if (hasPendingResources()) {
document()->accessSVGExtensions()->removeElementFromPendingResources(this);
ASSERT(!hasPendingResources());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14170/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2
|
900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2
|
avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int64_t mxf_set_current_edit_unit(MXFContext *mxf, int64_t current_offset)
{
int64_t last_ofs = -1, next_ofs = -1;
MXFIndexTable *t = &mxf->index_tables[0];
/* this is called from the OP1a demuxing logic, which means there
* may be no index tables */
if (mxf->nb_index_tables <= 0)
return -1;
/* find mxf->current_edit_unit so that the next edit unit starts ahead of current_offset */
while (mxf->current_edit_unit >= 0) {
if (mxf_edit_unit_absolute_offset(mxf, t, mxf->current_edit_unit + 1, NULL, &next_ofs, 0) < 0)
return -1;
if (next_ofs <= last_ofs) {
/* large next_ofs didn't change or current_edit_unit wrapped
* around this fixes the infinite loop on zzuf3.mxf */
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"next_ofs didn't change. not deriving packet timestamps\n");
return -1;
}
if (next_ofs > current_offset)
break;
last_ofs = next_ofs;
mxf->current_edit_unit++;
}
/* not checking mxf->current_edit_unit >= t->nb_ptses here since CBR files may lack IndexEntryArrays */
if (mxf->current_edit_unit < 0)
return -1;
return next_ofs;
}
|
static int64_t mxf_set_current_edit_unit(MXFContext *mxf, int64_t current_offset)
{
int64_t last_ofs = -1, next_ofs = -1;
MXFIndexTable *t = &mxf->index_tables[0];
/* this is called from the OP1a demuxing logic, which means there
* may be no index tables */
if (mxf->nb_index_tables <= 0)
return -1;
/* find mxf->current_edit_unit so that the next edit unit starts ahead of current_offset */
while (mxf->current_edit_unit >= 0) {
if (mxf_edit_unit_absolute_offset(mxf, t, mxf->current_edit_unit + 1, NULL, &next_ofs, 0) < 0)
return -1;
if (next_ofs <= last_ofs) {
/* large next_ofs didn't change or current_edit_unit wrapped
* around this fixes the infinite loop on zzuf3.mxf */
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"next_ofs didn't change. not deriving packet timestamps\n");
return -1;
}
if (next_ofs > current_offset)
break;
last_ofs = next_ofs;
mxf->current_edit_unit++;
}
/* not checking mxf->current_edit_unit >= t->nb_ptses here since CBR files may lack IndexEntryArrays */
if (mxf->current_edit_unit < 0)
return -1;
return next_ofs;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8ea5693d5cf304e56174bb6b65412f04209904db
|
8ea5693d5cf304e56174bb6b65412f04209904db
|
Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
|
static bool ExecuteIndent(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
return IndentOutdentCommand::Create(*frame.GetDocument(),
IndentOutdentCommand::kIndent)
->Apply();
}
|
static bool ExecuteIndent(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
return IndentOutdentCommand::Create(*frame.GetDocument(),
IndentOutdentCommand::kIndent)
->Apply();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fbd40ea0180a2d328c5adc61414dc8bab9335ce2
|
fbd40ea0180a2d328c5adc61414dc8bab9335ce2
|
ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
|
static void fib_flush(struct net *net)
{
int flushed = 0;
unsigned int h;
for (h = 0; h < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; h++) {
struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv4.fib_table_hash[h];
struct hlist_node *tmp;
struct fib_table *tb;
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(tb, tmp, head, tb_hlist)
flushed += fib_table_flush(tb);
}
if (flushed)
rt_cache_flush(net);
}
|
static void fib_flush(struct net *net)
{
int flushed = 0;
unsigned int h;
for (h = 0; h < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; h++) {
struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv4.fib_table_hash[h];
struct hlist_node *tmp;
struct fib_table *tb;
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(tb, tmp, head, tb_hlist)
flushed += fib_table_flush(tb);
}
if (flushed)
rt_cache_flush(net);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-5344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5344/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static void loop_reread_partitions(struct loop_device *lo,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
int rc;
/*
* bd_mutex has been held already in release path, so don't
* acquire it if this function is called in such case.
*
* If the reread partition isn't from release path, lo_refcnt
* must be at least one and it can only become zero when the
* current holder is released.
*/
if (!atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt))
rc = __blkdev_reread_part(bdev);
else
rc = blkdev_reread_part(bdev);
if (rc)
pr_warn("%s: partition scan of loop%d (%s) failed (rc=%d)\n",
__func__, lo->lo_number, lo->lo_file_name, rc);
}
|
static void loop_reread_partitions(struct loop_device *lo,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
int rc;
/*
* bd_mutex has been held already in release path, so don't
* acquire it if this function is called in such case.
*
* If the reread partition isn't from release path, lo_refcnt
* must be at least one and it can only become zero when the
* current holder is released.
*/
if (!atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt))
rc = __blkdev_reread_part(bdev);
else
rc = blkdev_reread_part(bdev);
if (rc)
pr_warn("%s: partition scan of loop%d (%s) failed (rc=%d)\n",
__func__, lo->lo_number, lo->lo_file_name, rc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static void free_rootdomain(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct root_domain *rd = container_of(rcu, struct root_domain, rcu);
cpupri_cleanup(&rd->cpupri);
cpudl_cleanup(&rd->cpudl);
free_cpumask_var(rd->dlo_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->rto_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->online);
free_cpumask_var(rd->span);
kfree(rd);
}
|
static void free_rootdomain(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct root_domain *rd = container_of(rcu, struct root_domain, rcu);
cpupri_cleanup(&rd->cpupri);
cpudl_cleanup(&rd->cpudl);
free_cpumask_var(rd->dlo_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->rto_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->online);
free_cpumask_var(rd->span);
kfree(rd);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3134
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3134/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309
|
54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309
|
netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(e))
return false;
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
|
static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
return false;
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int addrconf_add_ifaddr(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
{
struct in6_ifreq ireq;
int err;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ireq, arg, sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
rtnl_lock();
err = inet6_addr_add(net, ireq.ifr6_ifindex, &ireq.ifr6_addr, NULL,
ireq.ifr6_prefixlen, IFA_F_PERMANENT,
INFINITY_LIFE_TIME, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME);
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
|
int addrconf_add_ifaddr(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
{
struct in6_ifreq ireq;
int err;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ireq, arg, sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
rtnl_lock();
err = inet6_addr_add(net, ireq.ifr6_ifindex, &ireq.ifr6_addr, NULL,
ireq.ifr6_prefixlen, IFA_F_PERMANENT,
INFINITY_LIFE_TIME, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME);
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10172/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/dbry/WavPack/commit/4bc05fc490b66ef2d45b1de26abf1455b486b0dc
|
4bc05fc490b66ef2d45b1de26abf1455b486b0dc
|
fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
|
static int init_wv_bitstream (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
if (!wpmd->byte_length || (wpmd->byte_length & 1))
return FALSE;
bs_open_read (&wps->wvbits, wpmd->data, (unsigned char *) wpmd->data + wpmd->byte_length);
return TRUE;
}
|
static int init_wv_bitstream (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
if (!wpmd->byte_length || (wpmd->byte_length & 1))
return FALSE;
bs_open_read (&wps->wvbits, wpmd->data, (unsigned char *) wpmd->data + wpmd->byte_length);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
WavPack
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18358/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
|
bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2107/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=68595c0c2886e7942a14f98c17a55a88afb6c292
|
68595c0c2886e7942a14f98c17a55a88afb6c292
| null |
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
{
return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
&aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
}
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
{
return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
&aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit = dt->size;
svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base = dt->address ;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
}
|
static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit = dt->size;
svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base = dt->address ;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
ElementData::ElementData(unsigned arraySize)
: m_isUnique(false)
, m_arraySize(arraySize)
, m_presentationAttributeStyleIsDirty(false)
, m_styleAttributeIsDirty(false)
, m_animatedSVGAttributesAreDirty(false)
{
}
|
ElementData::ElementData(unsigned arraySize)
: m_isUnique(false)
, m_arraySize(arraySize)
, m_presentationAttributeStyleIsDirty(false)
, m_styleAttributeIsDirty(false)
, m_animatedSVGAttributesAreDirty(false)
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
bool InspectorNetworkAgent::FetchResourceContent(Document* document,
const KURL& url,
String* content,
bool* base64_encoded) {
DCHECK(document);
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Resource* cached_resource = document->Fetcher()->CachedResource(url);
if (!cached_resource) {
cached_resource = GetMemoryCache()->ResourceForURL(
url, document->Fetcher()->GetCacheIdentifier());
}
if (cached_resource && InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceContent(
cached_resource, content, base64_encoded))
return true;
for (auto& resource : resources_data_->Resources()) {
if (resource->RequestedURL() == url) {
*content = resource->Content();
*base64_encoded = resource->Base64Encoded();
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
bool InspectorNetworkAgent::FetchResourceContent(Document* document,
const KURL& url,
String* content,
bool* base64_encoded) {
DCHECK(document);
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Resource* cached_resource = document->Fetcher()->CachedResource(url);
if (!cached_resource) {
cached_resource = GetMemoryCache()->ResourceForURL(
url, document->Fetcher()->GetCacheIdentifier());
}
if (cached_resource && InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceContent(
cached_resource, content, base64_encoded))
return true;
for (auto& resource : resources_data_->Resources()) {
if (resource->RequestedURL() == url) {
*content = resource->Content();
*base64_encoded = resource->Base64Encoded();
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0838/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/3ac044334c3ff6a61cb4238ff3ddaf17c7efcf49
|
3ac044334c3ff6a61cb4238ff3ddaf17c7efcf49
|
Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
|
static EAS_RESULT WT_Initialize (S_VOICE_MGR *pVoiceMgr)
{
EAS_INT i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_WT_VOICES; i++)
{
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].artIndex = DEFAULT_ARTICULATION_INDEX;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1State = DEFAULT_EG1_STATE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1Value = DEFAULT_EG1_VALUE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1Increment = DEFAULT_EG1_INCREMENT;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2State = DEFAULT_EG2_STATE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2Value = DEFAULT_EG2_VALUE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2Increment = DEFAULT_EG2_INCREMENT;
/* left and right gain values are needed only if stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].gainLeft = DEFAULT_VOICE_GAIN;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].gainRight = DEFAULT_VOICE_GAIN;
#endif
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].phaseFrac = DEFAULT_PHASE_FRAC;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].phaseAccum = DEFAULT_PHASE_INT;
#ifdef _FILTER_ENABLED
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].filter.z1 = DEFAULT_FILTER_ZERO;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].filter.z2 = DEFAULT_FILTER_ZERO;
#endif
}
return EAS_TRUE;
}
|
static EAS_RESULT WT_Initialize (S_VOICE_MGR *pVoiceMgr)
{
EAS_INT i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_WT_VOICES; i++)
{
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].artIndex = DEFAULT_ARTICULATION_INDEX;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1State = DEFAULT_EG1_STATE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1Value = DEFAULT_EG1_VALUE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg1Increment = DEFAULT_EG1_INCREMENT;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2State = DEFAULT_EG2_STATE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2Value = DEFAULT_EG2_VALUE;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].eg2Increment = DEFAULT_EG2_INCREMENT;
/* left and right gain values are needed only if stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].gainLeft = DEFAULT_VOICE_GAIN;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].gainRight = DEFAULT_VOICE_GAIN;
#endif
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].phaseFrac = DEFAULT_PHASE_FRAC;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].phaseAccum = DEFAULT_PHASE_INT;
#ifdef _FILTER_ENABLED
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].filter.z1 = DEFAULT_FILTER_ZERO;
pVoiceMgr->wtVoices[i].filter.z2 = DEFAULT_FILTER_ZERO;
#endif
}
return EAS_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7539/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=2b0bbc4f8809c972bad134bc1a2570dbb01dea0b
|
2b0bbc4f8809c972bad134bc1a2570dbb01dea0b
| null |
static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
|
static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_IN,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_read(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void callWithScriptStateLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
int result = imp->callWithScriptStateLongMethod(&state);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, result);
}
|
static void callWithScriptStateLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
int result = imp->callWithScriptStateLongMethod(&state);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6038/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
|
void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
uint8_t,
uint16_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] / 255.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_g =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[1]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_b =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[2]) * scale_factor);
*destination = (((source_r & 0xF0) << 8) | ((source_g & 0xF0) << 4) |
(source_b & 0xF0) | (source[3] >> 4));
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
|
void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
uint8_t,
uint16_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] / 255.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_g =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[1]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_b =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[2]) * scale_factor);
*destination = (((source_r & 0xF0) << 8) | ((source_g & 0xF0) << 4) |
(source_b & 0xF0) | (source[3] >> 4));
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
enqueue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
{
bool renorm = !(flags & ENQUEUE_WAKEUP) || (flags & ENQUEUE_MIGRATED);
bool curr = cfs_rq->curr == se;
/*
* If we're the current task, we must renormalise before calling
* update_curr().
*/
if (renorm && curr)
se->vruntime += cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
update_curr(cfs_rq);
/*
* Otherwise, renormalise after, such that we're placed at the current
* moment in time, instead of some random moment in the past. Being
* placed in the past could significantly boost this task to the
* fairness detriment of existing tasks.
*/
if (renorm && !curr)
se->vruntime += cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
/*
* When enqueuing a sched_entity, we must:
* - Update loads to have both entity and cfs_rq synced with now.
* - Add its load to cfs_rq->runnable_avg
* - For group_entity, update its weight to reflect the new share of
* its group cfs_rq
* - Add its new weight to cfs_rq->load.weight
*/
update_load_avg(cfs_rq, se, UPDATE_TG | DO_ATTACH);
update_cfs_group(se);
enqueue_runnable_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
account_entity_enqueue(cfs_rq, se);
if (flags & ENQUEUE_WAKEUP)
place_entity(cfs_rq, se, 0);
check_schedstat_required();
update_stats_enqueue(cfs_rq, se, flags);
check_spread(cfs_rq, se);
if (!curr)
__enqueue_entity(cfs_rq, se);
se->on_rq = 1;
if (cfs_rq->nr_running == 1) {
list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq);
check_enqueue_throttle(cfs_rq);
}
}
|
enqueue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
{
bool renorm = !(flags & ENQUEUE_WAKEUP) || (flags & ENQUEUE_MIGRATED);
bool curr = cfs_rq->curr == se;
/*
* If we're the current task, we must renormalise before calling
* update_curr().
*/
if (renorm && curr)
se->vruntime += cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
update_curr(cfs_rq);
/*
* Otherwise, renormalise after, such that we're placed at the current
* moment in time, instead of some random moment in the past. Being
* placed in the past could significantly boost this task to the
* fairness detriment of existing tasks.
*/
if (renorm && !curr)
se->vruntime += cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
/*
* When enqueuing a sched_entity, we must:
* - Update loads to have both entity and cfs_rq synced with now.
* - Add its load to cfs_rq->runnable_avg
* - For group_entity, update its weight to reflect the new share of
* its group cfs_rq
* - Add its new weight to cfs_rq->load.weight
*/
update_load_avg(cfs_rq, se, UPDATE_TG | DO_ATTACH);
update_cfs_group(se);
enqueue_runnable_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
account_entity_enqueue(cfs_rq, se);
if (flags & ENQUEUE_WAKEUP)
place_entity(cfs_rq, se, 0);
check_schedstat_required();
update_stats_enqueue(cfs_rq, se, flags);
check_spread(cfs_rq, se);
if (!curr)
__enqueue_entity(cfs_rq, se);
se->on_rq = 1;
if (cfs_rq->nr_running == 1) {
list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq);
check_enqueue_throttle(cfs_rq);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5327/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
static u32 tcm_loop_get_pr_transport_id_len(
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_node_acl *se_nacl,
struct t10_pr_registration *pr_reg,
int *format_code)
{
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg =
(struct tcm_loop_tpg *)se_tpg->se_tpg_fabric_ptr;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = tl_tpg->tl_hba;
switch (tl_hba->tl_proto_id) {
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS:
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_FCP:
return fc_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_ISCSI:
return iscsi_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown tl_proto_id: 0x%02x, using"
" SAS emulation\n", tl_hba->tl_proto_id);
break;
}
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
}
|
static u32 tcm_loop_get_pr_transport_id_len(
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_node_acl *se_nacl,
struct t10_pr_registration *pr_reg,
int *format_code)
{
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg =
(struct tcm_loop_tpg *)se_tpg->se_tpg_fabric_ptr;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = tl_tpg->tl_hba;
switch (tl_hba->tl_proto_id) {
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS:
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_FCP:
return fc_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_ISCSI:
return iscsi_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown tl_proto_id: 0x%02x, using"
" SAS emulation\n", tl_hba->tl_proto_id);
break;
}
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9994
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9994/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static av_always_inline int webp_get_vlc(GetBitContext *gb, VLC_TYPE (*table)[2])
{
int n, nb_bits;
unsigned int index;
int code;
OPEN_READER(re, gb);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, 8);
index = ff_reverse[index];
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
if (n < 0) {
LAST_SKIP_BITS(re, gb, 8);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
nb_bits = -n;
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, nb_bits);
index = (ff_reverse[index] >> (8 - nb_bits)) + code;
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
}
SKIP_BITS(re, gb, n);
CLOSE_READER(re, gb);
return code;
}
|
static av_always_inline int webp_get_vlc(GetBitContext *gb, VLC_TYPE (*table)[2])
{
int n, nb_bits;
unsigned int index;
int code;
OPEN_READER(re, gb);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, 8);
index = ff_reverse[index];
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
if (n < 0) {
LAST_SKIP_BITS(re, gb, 8);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
nb_bits = -n;
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, nb_bits);
index = (ff_reverse[index] >> (8 - nb_bits)) + code;
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
}
SKIP_BITS(re, gb, n);
CLOSE_READER(re, gb);
return code;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9120/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7
|
9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7
|
staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int ion_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ion_client *client = file->private_data;
pr_debug("%s: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
ion_client_destroy(client);
return 0;
}
|
static int ion_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ion_client *client = file->private_data;
pr_debug("%s: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
ion_client_destroy(client);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5327/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8
|
loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
static int tcm_loop_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
return 0;
}
|
static int tcm_loop_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6712
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6712/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
int iwl_remove_default_wep_key(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
{
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Removing default WEP key: idx=%d\n",
keyconf->keyidx);
memset(&ctx->wep_keys[keyconf->keyidx], 0, sizeof(ctx->wep_keys[0]));
if (iwl_is_rfkill(priv->shrd)) {
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv,
"Not sending REPLY_WEPKEY command due to RFKILL.\n");
/* but keys in device are clear anyway so return success */
return 0;
}
ret = iwl_send_static_wepkey_cmd(priv, ctx, 1);
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Remove default WEP key: idx=%d ret=%d\n",
keyconf->keyidx, ret);
return ret;
}
|
int iwl_remove_default_wep_key(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
{
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Removing default WEP key: idx=%d\n",
keyconf->keyidx);
memset(&ctx->wep_keys[keyconf->keyidx], 0, sizeof(ctx->wep_keys[0]));
if (iwl_is_rfkill(priv->shrd)) {
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv,
"Not sending REPLY_WEPKEY command due to RFKILL.\n");
/* but keys in device are clear anyway so return success */
return 0;
}
ret = iwl_send_static_wepkey_cmd(priv, ctx, 1);
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Remove default WEP key: idx=%d ret=%d\n",
keyconf->keyidx, ret);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::RemoveAccessibilityMode(AccessibilityMode mode) {
SetAccessibilityMode(RemoveAccessibilityModeFrom(accessibility_mode_, mode));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::RemoveAccessibilityMode(AccessibilityMode mode) {
SetAccessibilityMode(RemoveAccessibilityModeFrom(accessibility_mode_, mode));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df
|
1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df
|
userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int dissolve_free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
int rc = 0;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (PageHuge(page) && !page_count(page)) {
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(head);
int nid = page_to_nid(head);
if (h->free_huge_pages - h->resv_huge_pages == 0) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
/*
* Move PageHWPoison flag from head page to the raw error page,
* which makes any subpages rather than the error page reusable.
*/
if (PageHWPoison(head) && page != head) {
SetPageHWPoison(page);
ClearPageHWPoison(head);
}
list_del(&head->lru);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
h->max_huge_pages--;
update_and_free_page(h, head);
}
out:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return rc;
}
|
int dissolve_free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
int rc = 0;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (PageHuge(page) && !page_count(page)) {
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(head);
int nid = page_to_nid(head);
if (h->free_huge_pages - h->resv_huge_pages == 0) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
/*
* Move PageHWPoison flag from head page to the raw error page,
* which makes any subpages rather than the error page reusable.
*/
if (PageHWPoison(head) && page != head) {
SetPageHWPoison(page);
ClearPageHWPoison(head);
}
list_del(&head->lru);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
h->max_huge_pages--;
update_and_free_page(h, head);
}
out:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
base::FilePath GetTemporaryDownloadDirectory() {
std::unique_ptr<base::Environment> env(base::Environment::Create());
return base::nix::GetXDGDirectory(env.get(), "XDG_DATA_HOME", ".local/share");
}
|
base::FilePath GetTemporaryDownloadDirectory() {
std::unique_ptr<base::Environment> env(base::Environment::Create());
return base::nix::GetXDGDirectory(env.get(), "XDG_DATA_HOME", ".local/share");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
void svc_rdma_put_context(struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt, int free_pages)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt = ctxt->xprt;
int i;
if (free_pages)
for (i = 0; i < ctxt->count; i++)
put_page(ctxt->pages[i]);
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
xprt->sc_ctxt_used--;
list_add(&ctxt->list, &xprt->sc_ctxts);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
}
|
void svc_rdma_put_context(struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt, int free_pages)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt = ctxt->xprt;
int i;
if (free_pages)
for (i = 0; i < ctxt->count; i++)
put_page(ctxt->pages[i]);
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
xprt->sc_ctxt_used--;
list_add(&ctxt->list, &xprt->sc_ctxts);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8844
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8844/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d2b9d2a5ad5ef04ff978c9923d19730cb05efd55
|
d2b9d2a5ad5ef04ff978c9923d19730cb05efd55
|
powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
|
static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mcontext __user *sr, int sig)
{
long err;
unsigned int save_r2 = 0;
unsigned long msr;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int i;
#endif
/*
* restore general registers but not including MSR or SOFTE. Also
* take care of keeping r2 (TLS) intact if not a signal
*/
if (!sig)
save_r2 = (unsigned int)regs->gpr[2];
err = restore_general_regs(regs, sr);
regs->trap = 0;
err |= __get_user(msr, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]);
if (!sig)
regs->gpr[2] = (unsigned long) save_r2;
if (err)
return 1;
/* if doing signal return, restore the previous little-endian mode */
if (sig)
regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_LE) | (msr & MSR_LE);
/*
* Do this before updating the thread state in
* current->thread.fpr/vr/evr. That way, if we get preempted
* and another task grabs the FPU/Altivec/SPE, it won't be
* tempted to save the current CPU state into the thread_struct
* and corrupt what we are writing there.
*/
discard_lazy_cpu_state();
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
/*
* Force the process to reload the altivec registers from
* current->thread when it next does altivec instructions
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VEC;
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
/* restore altivec registers from the stack */
if (__copy_from_user(¤t->thread.vr_state, &sr->mc_vregs,
sizeof(sr->mc_vregs)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vr)
memset(¤t->thread.vr_state, 0,
ELF_NVRREG * sizeof(vector128));
/* Always get VRSAVE back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.vrsave, (u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs[32]))
return 1;
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
mtspr(SPRN_VRSAVE, current->thread.vrsave);
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
if (copy_fpr_from_user(current, &sr->mc_fregs))
return 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
/*
* Force the process to reload the VSX registers from
* current->thread when it next does VSX instruction.
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VSX;
if (msr & MSR_VSX) {
/*
* Restore altivec registers from the stack to a local
* buffer, then write this out to the thread_struct
*/
if (copy_vsx_from_user(current, &sr->mc_vsregs))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vsr)
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
current->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
/*
* force the process to reload the FP registers from
* current->thread when it next does FP instructions
*/
regs->msr &= ~(MSR_FP | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1);
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
/* force the process to reload the spe registers from
current->thread when it next does spe instructions */
regs->msr &= ~MSR_SPE;
if (msr & MSR_SPE) {
/* restore spe registers from the stack */
if (__copy_from_user(current->thread.evr, &sr->mc_vregs,
ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_spe)
memset(current->thread.evr, 0, ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32));
/* Always get SPEFSCR back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.spefscr, (u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs + ELF_NEVRREG))
return 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
return 0;
}
|
static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mcontext __user *sr, int sig)
{
long err;
unsigned int save_r2 = 0;
unsigned long msr;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int i;
#endif
/*
* restore general registers but not including MSR or SOFTE. Also
* take care of keeping r2 (TLS) intact if not a signal
*/
if (!sig)
save_r2 = (unsigned int)regs->gpr[2];
err = restore_general_regs(regs, sr);
regs->trap = 0;
err |= __get_user(msr, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]);
if (!sig)
regs->gpr[2] = (unsigned long) save_r2;
if (err)
return 1;
/* if doing signal return, restore the previous little-endian mode */
if (sig)
regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_LE) | (msr & MSR_LE);
/*
* Do this before updating the thread state in
* current->thread.fpr/vr/evr. That way, if we get preempted
* and another task grabs the FPU/Altivec/SPE, it won't be
* tempted to save the current CPU state into the thread_struct
* and corrupt what we are writing there.
*/
discard_lazy_cpu_state();
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
/*
* Force the process to reload the altivec registers from
* current->thread when it next does altivec instructions
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VEC;
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
/* restore altivec registers from the stack */
if (__copy_from_user(¤t->thread.vr_state, &sr->mc_vregs,
sizeof(sr->mc_vregs)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vr)
memset(¤t->thread.vr_state, 0,
ELF_NVRREG * sizeof(vector128));
/* Always get VRSAVE back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.vrsave, (u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs[32]))
return 1;
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
mtspr(SPRN_VRSAVE, current->thread.vrsave);
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
if (copy_fpr_from_user(current, &sr->mc_fregs))
return 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
/*
* Force the process to reload the VSX registers from
* current->thread when it next does VSX instruction.
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VSX;
if (msr & MSR_VSX) {
/*
* Restore altivec registers from the stack to a local
* buffer, then write this out to the thread_struct
*/
if (copy_vsx_from_user(current, &sr->mc_vsregs))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vsr)
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
current->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
/*
* force the process to reload the FP registers from
* current->thread when it next does FP instructions
*/
regs->msr &= ~(MSR_FP | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1);
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
/* force the process to reload the spe registers from
current->thread when it next does spe instructions */
regs->msr &= ~MSR_SPE;
if (msr & MSR_SPE) {
/* restore spe registers from the stack */
if (__copy_from_user(current->thread.evr, &sr->mc_vregs,
ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_spe)
memset(current->thread.evr, 0, ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32));
/* Always get SPEFSCR back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.spefscr, (u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs + ELF_NEVRREG))
return 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateDrawArrays(const char* function_name) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
if (!ValidateRenderingState(function_name)) {
return false;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, function_name, reason);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateDrawArrays(const char* function_name) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
if (!ValidateRenderingState(function_name)) {
return false;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, function_name, reason);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16931
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16931/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
|
parse_list(xmlChar *str) {
xmlChar **buffer;
xmlChar **out = NULL;
int buffer_size = 0;
int len;
if(str == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
len = xmlStrlen(str);
if((str[0] == '\'') && (str[len - 1] == '\'')) {
str[len - 1] = '\0';
str++;
}
/*
* allocate an translation buffer.
*/
buffer_size = 1000;
buffer = (xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(buffer_size * sizeof(xmlChar*));
if (buffer == NULL) {
perror("malloc failed");
return(NULL);
}
out = buffer;
while(*str != '\0') {
if (out - buffer > buffer_size - 10) {
int indx = out - buffer;
xxx_growBufferReentrant();
out = &buffer[indx];
}
(*out++) = str;
while(*str != ',' && *str != '\0') ++str;
if(*str == ',') *(str++) = '\0';
}
(*out) = NULL;
return buffer;
}
|
parse_list(xmlChar *str) {
xmlChar **buffer;
xmlChar **out = NULL;
int buffer_size = 0;
int len;
if(str == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
len = xmlStrlen(str);
if((str[0] == '\'') && (str[len - 1] == '\'')) {
str[len - 1] = '\0';
str++;
}
/*
* allocate an translation buffer.
*/
buffer_size = 1000;
buffer = (xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(buffer_size * sizeof(xmlChar*));
if (buffer == NULL) {
perror("malloc failed");
return(NULL);
}
out = buffer;
while(*str != '\0') {
if (out - buffer > buffer_size - 10) {
int indx = out - buffer;
xxx_growBufferReentrant();
out = &buffer[indx];
}
(*out++) = str;
while(*str != ',' && *str != '\0') ++str;
if(*str == ',') *(str++) = '\0';
}
(*out) = NULL;
return buffer;
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5352/
|
CWE-264
|
https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?h=V_6_9&id=1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d
|
1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d
| null |
channel_free(Channel *c)
{
char *s;
u_int i, n;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
if (channels[i])
n++;
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
s = channel_open_message();
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
if (c->sock != -1)
shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
channel_close_fds(c);
buffer_free(&c->input);
buffer_free(&c->output);
buffer_free(&c->extended);
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
channels[c->self] = NULL;
free(c);
}
|
channel_free(Channel *c)
{
char *s;
u_int i, n;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
if (channels[i])
n++;
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
s = channel_open_message();
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
if (c->sock != -1)
shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
channel_close_fds(c);
buffer_free(&c->input);
buffer_free(&c->output);
buffer_free(&c->extended);
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
channels[c->self] = NULL;
free(c);
}
|
C
|
mindrot
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11376/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/1f37c04f2a762500222dda2459e6a04646feeedf
|
1f37c04f2a762500222dda2459e6a04646feeedf
|
Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
|
static int bin_libs(RCore *r, int mode) {
RList *libs;
RListIter *iter;
char* lib;
int i = 0;
if (!(libs = r_bin_get_libs (r->bin))) {
return false;
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_println ("[Linked libraries]");
}
r_list_foreach (libs, iter, lib) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("CCa entry0 %s\n", lib);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%s\"%s\"", iter->p ? "," : "", lib);
} else {
r_cons_println (lib);
}
i++;
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("]");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
if (i == 1) {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i library\n", i);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i libraries\n", i);
}
}
return true;
}
|
static int bin_libs(RCore *r, int mode) {
RList *libs;
RListIter *iter;
char* lib;
int i = 0;
if (!(libs = r_bin_get_libs (r->bin))) {
return false;
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_println ("[Linked libraries]");
}
r_list_foreach (libs, iter, lib) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("CCa entry0 %s\n", lib);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%s\"%s\"", iter->p ? "," : "", lib);
} else {
r_cons_println (lib);
}
i++;
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("]");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
if (i == 1) {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i library\n", i);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i libraries\n", i);
}
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 sptes[4];
int nr_sptes, i, ret;
gpa_t gpa;
gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
ret = handle_mmio_page_fault_common(vcpu, gpa, true);
if (likely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE))
return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0) ==
EMULATE_DONE;
if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0);
if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY))
return 1;
/* It is the real ept misconfig */
printk(KERN_ERR "EPT: Misconfiguration.\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "EPT: GPA: 0x%llx\n", gpa);
nr_sptes = kvm_mmu_get_spte_hierarchy(vcpu, gpa, sptes);
for (i = PT64_ROOT_LEVEL; i > PT64_ROOT_LEVEL - nr_sptes; --i)
ept_misconfig_inspect_spte(vcpu, sptes[i-1], i);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
return 0;
}
|
static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 sptes[4];
int nr_sptes, i, ret;
gpa_t gpa;
gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
ret = handle_mmio_page_fault_common(vcpu, gpa, true);
if (likely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE))
return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0) ==
EMULATE_DONE;
if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0);
if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY))
return 1;
/* It is the real ept misconfig */
printk(KERN_ERR "EPT: Misconfiguration.\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "EPT: GPA: 0x%llx\n", gpa);
nr_sptes = kvm_mmu_get_spte_hierarchy(vcpu, gpa, sptes);
for (i = PT64_ROOT_LEVEL; i > PT64_ROOT_LEVEL - nr_sptes; --i)
ept_misconfig_inspect_spte(vcpu, sptes[i-1], i);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0038/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268
|
2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268
|
x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int compat_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (optname == SO_ATTACH_FILTER)
return do_set_attach_filter(sock, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
return do_set_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
static int compat_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (optname == SO_ATTACH_FILTER)
return do_set_attach_filter(sock, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
return do_set_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
All: Merge some file writing extension checks
|
int Com_Milliseconds( void ) {
sysEvent_t ev;
do {
ev = Com_GetRealEvent();
if ( ev.evType != SE_NONE ) {
Com_PushEvent( &ev );
}
} while ( ev.evType != SE_NONE );
return ev.evTime;
}
|
int Com_Milliseconds( void ) {
sysEvent_t ev;
do {
ev = Com_GetRealEvent();
if ( ev.evType != SE_NONE ) {
Com_PushEvent( &ev );
}
} while ( ev.evType != SE_NONE );
return ev.evTime;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6060/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd6a5115103b3e6a52ce15858c5ad4956df29300
|
fd6a5115103b3e6a52ce15858c5ad4956df29300
|
Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
|
void AudioNode::Dispose() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
#if DEBUG_AUDIONODE_REFERENCES
fprintf(stderr, "[%16p]: %16p: %2d: AudioNode::dispose %16p\n", context(),
this, Handler().GetNodeType(), handler_.get());
#endif
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker locker(context());
Handler().Dispose();
if (context()->ContextState() == BaseAudioContext::kRunning) {
context()->GetDeferredTaskHandler().AddRenderingOrphanHandler(
std::move(handler_));
}
}
|
void AudioNode::Dispose() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
#if DEBUG_AUDIONODE_REFERENCES
fprintf(stderr, "[%16p]: %16p: %2d: AudioNode::dispose %16p\n", context(),
this, Handler().GetNodeType(), handler_.get());
#endif
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker locker(context());
Handler().Dispose();
if (context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
context()->GetDeferredTaskHandler().AddRenderingOrphanHandler(
std::move(handler_));
} else {
if (context()->ContextState() == BaseAudioContext::kRunning) {
context()->GetDeferredTaskHandler().AddRenderingOrphanHandler(
std::move(handler_));
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1703
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1703/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
UsbListInterfacesFunction::UsbListInterfacesFunction() {
}
|
UsbListInterfacesFunction::UsbListInterfacesFunction() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9202
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9202/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
|
IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_version_int(void)
{
return IW_VERSION_INT;
}
|
IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_version_int(void)
{
return IW_VERSION_INT;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7913/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18
|
8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18
|
[media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static int seek_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id *id)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int i, best_i = -1, best_nr_matches = 0;
unsigned int type_mask = 0;
tuner_dbg("%s called, want type=", __func__);
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
if (!priv->firm) {
tuner_err("Error! firmware not loaded\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (((type & ~SCODE) == 0) && (*id == 0))
*id = V4L2_STD_PAL;
if (type & BASE)
type_mask = BASE_TYPES;
else if (type & SCODE) {
type &= SCODE_TYPES;
type_mask = SCODE_TYPES & ~HAS_IF;
} else if (type & DTV_TYPES)
type_mask = DTV_TYPES;
else if (type & STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES)
type_mask = STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES;
type &= type_mask;
if (!(type & SCODE))
type_mask = ~0;
/* Seek for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
if ((type == (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask)) &&
(*id == priv->firm[i].id))
goto found;
}
/* Seek for generic video standard match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
v4l2_std_id match_mask;
int nr_matches;
if (type != (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask))
continue;
match_mask = *id & priv->firm[i].id;
if (!match_mask)
continue;
if ((*id & match_mask) == *id)
goto found; /* Supports all the requested standards */
nr_matches = hweight64(match_mask);
if (nr_matches > best_nr_matches) {
best_nr_matches = nr_matches;
best_i = i;
}
}
if (best_nr_matches > 0) {
tuner_dbg("Selecting best matching firmware (%d bits) for "
"type=", best_nr_matches);
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx:\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
i = best_i;
goto found;
}
/*FIXME: Would make sense to seek for type "hint" match ? */
i = -ENOENT;
goto ret;
found:
*id = priv->firm[i].id;
ret:
tuner_dbg("%s firmware for type=", (i < 0) ? "Can't find" : "Found");
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
return i;
}
|
static int seek_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id *id)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int i, best_i = -1, best_nr_matches = 0;
unsigned int type_mask = 0;
tuner_dbg("%s called, want type=", __func__);
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
if (!priv->firm) {
tuner_err("Error! firmware not loaded\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (((type & ~SCODE) == 0) && (*id == 0))
*id = V4L2_STD_PAL;
if (type & BASE)
type_mask = BASE_TYPES;
else if (type & SCODE) {
type &= SCODE_TYPES;
type_mask = SCODE_TYPES & ~HAS_IF;
} else if (type & DTV_TYPES)
type_mask = DTV_TYPES;
else if (type & STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES)
type_mask = STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES;
type &= type_mask;
if (!(type & SCODE))
type_mask = ~0;
/* Seek for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
if ((type == (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask)) &&
(*id == priv->firm[i].id))
goto found;
}
/* Seek for generic video standard match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
v4l2_std_id match_mask;
int nr_matches;
if (type != (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask))
continue;
match_mask = *id & priv->firm[i].id;
if (!match_mask)
continue;
if ((*id & match_mask) == *id)
goto found; /* Supports all the requested standards */
nr_matches = hweight64(match_mask);
if (nr_matches > best_nr_matches) {
best_nr_matches = nr_matches;
best_i = i;
}
}
if (best_nr_matches > 0) {
tuner_dbg("Selecting best matching firmware (%d bits) for "
"type=", best_nr_matches);
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx:\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
i = best_i;
goto found;
}
/*FIXME: Would make sense to seek for type "hint" match ? */
i = -ENOENT;
goto ret;
found:
*id = priv->firm[i].id;
ret:
tuner_dbg("%s firmware for type=", (i < 0) ? "Can't find" : "Found");
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
return i;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13225/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
|
concat_left_node_opt_info(OnigEncoding enc, OptNode* to, OptNode* add)
{
int sb_reach, sm_reach;
OptAnc tanc;
concat_opt_anc_info(&tanc, &to->anc, &add->anc, to->len.max, add->len.max);
copy_opt_anc_info(&to->anc, &tanc);
if (add->sb.len > 0 && to->len.max == 0) {
concat_opt_anc_info(&tanc, &to->anc, &add->sb.anc, to->len.max, add->len.max);
copy_opt_anc_info(&add->sb.anc, &tanc);
}
if (add->map.value > 0 && to->len.max == 0) {
if (add->map.mmd.max == 0)
add->map.anc.left |= to->anc.left;
}
sb_reach = to->sb.reach_end;
sm_reach = to->sm.reach_end;
if (add->len.max != 0)
to->sb.reach_end = to->sm.reach_end = 0;
if (add->sb.len > 0) {
if (sb_reach) {
concat_opt_exact(&to->sb, &add->sb, enc);
clear_opt_exact(&add->sb);
}
else if (sm_reach) {
concat_opt_exact(&to->sm, &add->sb, enc);
clear_opt_exact(&add->sb);
}
}
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &add->sb);
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &add->sm);
if (to->spr.len > 0) {
if (add->len.max > 0) {
if (to->spr.len > (int )add->len.max)
to->spr.len = add->len.max;
if (to->spr.mmd.max == 0)
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sb, &to->spr);
else
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &to->spr);
}
}
else if (add->spr.len > 0) {
copy_opt_exact(&to->spr, &add->spr);
}
select_opt_map(&to->map, &add->map);
add_mml(&to->len, &add->len);
}
|
concat_left_node_opt_info(OnigEncoding enc, OptNode* to, OptNode* add)
{
int sb_reach, sm_reach;
OptAnc tanc;
concat_opt_anc_info(&tanc, &to->anc, &add->anc, to->len.max, add->len.max);
copy_opt_anc_info(&to->anc, &tanc);
if (add->sb.len > 0 && to->len.max == 0) {
concat_opt_anc_info(&tanc, &to->anc, &add->sb.anc, to->len.max, add->len.max);
copy_opt_anc_info(&add->sb.anc, &tanc);
}
if (add->map.value > 0 && to->len.max == 0) {
if (add->map.mmd.max == 0)
add->map.anc.left |= to->anc.left;
}
sb_reach = to->sb.reach_end;
sm_reach = to->sm.reach_end;
if (add->len.max != 0)
to->sb.reach_end = to->sm.reach_end = 0;
if (add->sb.len > 0) {
if (sb_reach) {
concat_opt_exact(&to->sb, &add->sb, enc);
clear_opt_exact(&add->sb);
}
else if (sm_reach) {
concat_opt_exact(&to->sm, &add->sb, enc);
clear_opt_exact(&add->sb);
}
}
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &add->sb);
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &add->sm);
if (to->spr.len > 0) {
if (add->len.max > 0) {
if (to->spr.len > (int )add->len.max)
to->spr.len = add->len.max;
if (to->spr.mmd.max == 0)
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sb, &to->spr);
else
select_opt_exact(enc, &to->sm, &to->spr);
}
}
else if (add->spr.len > 0) {
copy_opt_exact(&to->spr, &add->spr);
}
select_opt_map(&to->map, &add->map);
add_mml(&to->len, &add->len);
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Uint8Array*, cppValue, jsValue->IsUint8Array() ? V8Uint8Array::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Uint8Array>::Cast(jsValue)) : 0);
imp->setUint8ArrayAttribute(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
|
static void uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Uint8Array*, cppValue, jsValue->IsUint8Array() ? V8Uint8Array::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Uint8Array>::Cast(jsValue)) : 0);
imp->setUint8ArrayAttribute(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2237/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
static inline int pfkey_init_proc(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
|
static inline int pfkey_init_proc(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9375/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=96d87bdda3919bb16f754b3d3fd1227e1f38f13c
|
96d87bdda3919bb16f754b3d3fd1227e1f38f13c
| null |
static void xhci_mfwrap_update(XHCIState *xhci)
{
const uint32_t bits = USBCMD_RS | USBCMD_EWE;
uint32_t mfindex, left;
int64_t now;
if ((xhci->usbcmd & bits) == bits) {
now = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
mfindex = ((now - xhci->mfindex_start) / 125000) & 0x3fff;
left = 0x4000 - mfindex;
timer_mod(xhci->mfwrap_timer, now + left * 125000);
} else {
timer_del(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
}
}
|
static void xhci_mfwrap_update(XHCIState *xhci)
{
const uint32_t bits = USBCMD_RS | USBCMD_EWE;
uint32_t mfindex, left;
int64_t now;
if ((xhci->usbcmd & bits) == bits) {
now = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
mfindex = ((now - xhci->mfindex_start) / 125000) & 0x3fff;
left = 0x4000 - mfindex;
timer_mod(xhci->mfwrap_timer, now + left * 125000);
} else {
timer_del(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1747
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1747/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
|
void CastCastView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
DCHECK(sender == stop_button_);
cast_config_delegate_->StopCasting();
}
|
void CastCastView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
DCHECK(sender == stop_button_);
StopCast();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-11147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11147/
|
CWE-125
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=e5246580a85f031e1a3b8064edbaa55c1643a451
|
e5246580a85f031e1a3b8064edbaa55c1643a451
| null |
ZEND_INI_MH(phar_ini_cache_list) /* {{{ */
{
PHAR_G(cache_list) = new_value;
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_STARTUP) {
phar_split_cache_list(TSRMLS_C);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_INI_MH(phar_ini_cache_list) /* {{{ */
{
PHAR_G(cache_list) = new_value;
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_STARTUP) {
phar_split_cache_list(TSRMLS_C);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static void sched_dl_do_global(void)
{
u64 new_bw = -1;
struct dl_bw *dl_b;
int cpu;
unsigned long flags;
def_dl_bandwidth.dl_period = global_rt_period();
def_dl_bandwidth.dl_runtime = global_rt_runtime();
if (global_rt_runtime() != RUNTIME_INF)
new_bw = to_ratio(global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
/*
* FIXME: As above...
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
rcu_read_lock_sched();
dl_b = dl_bw_of(cpu);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&dl_b->lock, flags);
dl_b->bw = new_bw;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dl_b->lock, flags);
rcu_read_unlock_sched();
}
}
|
static void sched_dl_do_global(void)
{
u64 new_bw = -1;
struct dl_bw *dl_b;
int cpu;
unsigned long flags;
def_dl_bandwidth.dl_period = global_rt_period();
def_dl_bandwidth.dl_runtime = global_rt_runtime();
if (global_rt_runtime() != RUNTIME_INF)
new_bw = to_ratio(global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
/*
* FIXME: As above...
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
rcu_read_lock_sched();
dl_b = dl_bw_of(cpu);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&dl_b->lock, flags);
dl_b->bw = new_bw;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dl_b->lock, flags);
rcu_read_unlock_sched();
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
static void clone_endio(struct bio *bio)
{
blk_status_t error = bio->bi_status;
struct dm_target_io *tio = container_of(bio, struct dm_target_io, clone);
struct dm_io *io = tio->io;
struct mapped_device *md = tio->io->md;
dm_endio_fn endio = tio->ti->type->end_io;
if (unlikely(error == BLK_STS_TARGET)) {
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME &&
!bio->bi_disk->queue->limits.max_write_same_sectors)
disable_write_same(md);
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES &&
!bio->bi_disk->queue->limits.max_write_zeroes_sectors)
disable_write_zeroes(md);
}
if (endio) {
int r = endio(tio->ti, bio, &error);
switch (r) {
case DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE:
error = BLK_STS_DM_REQUEUE;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case DM_ENDIO_DONE:
break;
case DM_ENDIO_INCOMPLETE:
/* The target will handle the io */
return;
default:
DMWARN("unimplemented target endio return value: %d", r);
BUG();
}
}
free_tio(tio);
dec_pending(io, error);
}
|
static void clone_endio(struct bio *bio)
{
blk_status_t error = bio->bi_status;
struct dm_target_io *tio = container_of(bio, struct dm_target_io, clone);
struct dm_io *io = tio->io;
struct mapped_device *md = tio->io->md;
dm_endio_fn endio = tio->ti->type->end_io;
if (unlikely(error == BLK_STS_TARGET)) {
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME &&
!bio->bi_disk->queue->limits.max_write_same_sectors)
disable_write_same(md);
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES &&
!bio->bi_disk->queue->limits.max_write_zeroes_sectors)
disable_write_zeroes(md);
}
if (endio) {
int r = endio(tio->ti, bio, &error);
switch (r) {
case DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE:
error = BLK_STS_DM_REQUEUE;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case DM_ENDIO_DONE:
break;
case DM_ENDIO_INCOMPLETE:
/* The target will handle the io */
return;
default:
DMWARN("unimplemented target endio return value: %d", r);
BUG();
}
}
free_tio(tio);
dec_pending(io, error);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4097/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/56c6a8a4aadca809e04276eabe5552935c51387f
|
56c6a8a4aadca809e04276eabe5552935c51387f
|
oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
unsigned int oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *mem,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
long points;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, mem, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Shortcut check for a thread sharing p->mm that is OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN
* so the entire heuristic doesn't need to be executed for something
* that cannot be killed.
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->mm->oom_disable_count)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The memory controller may have a limit of 0 bytes, so avoid a divide
* by zero, if necessary.
*/
if (!totalpages)
totalpages = 1;
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + p->mm->nr_ptes;
points += get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
points *= 1000;
points /= totalpages;
task_unlock(p);
/*
* Root processes get 3% bonus, just like the __vm_enough_memory()
* implementation used by LSMs.
*/
if (has_capability_noaudit(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
points -= 30;
/*
* /proc/pid/oom_score_adj ranges from -1000 to +1000 such that it may
* either completely disable oom killing or always prefer a certain
* task.
*/
points += p->signal->oom_score_adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task that may be killed since it's
* possible that no single user task uses more than 0.1% of memory and
* no single admin tasks uses more than 3.0%.
*/
if (points <= 0)
return 1;
return (points < 1000) ? points : 1000;
}
|
unsigned int oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *mem,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
int points;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, mem, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Shortcut check for a thread sharing p->mm that is OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN
* so the entire heuristic doesn't need to be executed for something
* that cannot be killed.
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->mm->oom_disable_count)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The memory controller may have a limit of 0 bytes, so avoid a divide
* by zero, if necessary.
*/
if (!totalpages)
totalpages = 1;
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + p->mm->nr_ptes;
points += get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
points *= 1000;
points /= totalpages;
task_unlock(p);
/*
* Root processes get 3% bonus, just like the __vm_enough_memory()
* implementation used by LSMs.
*/
if (has_capability_noaudit(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
points -= 30;
/*
* /proc/pid/oom_score_adj ranges from -1000 to +1000 such that it may
* either completely disable oom killing or always prefer a certain
* task.
*/
points += p->signal->oom_score_adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task that may be killed since it's
* possible that no single user task uses more than 0.1% of memory and
* no single admin tasks uses more than 3.0%.
*/
if (points <= 0)
return 1;
return (points < 1000) ? points : 1000;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
void idle_task_exit(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->active_mm;
BUG_ON(cpu_online(smp_processor_id()));
if (mm != &init_mm) {
switch_mm_irqs_off(mm, &init_mm, current);
finish_arch_post_lock_switch();
}
mmdrop(mm);
}
|
void idle_task_exit(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->active_mm;
BUG_ON(cpu_online(smp_processor_id()));
if (mm != &init_mm) {
switch_mm_irqs_off(mm, &init_mm, current);
finish_arch_post_lock_switch();
}
mmdrop(mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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