CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2011-2830
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2830/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/08b630e66e042af3fe80015509b3238c2679ea40
|
08b630e66e042af3fe80015509b3238c2679ea40
|
PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <[email protected]> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderMenuList::adjustInnerStyle()
{
RenderStyle* innerStyle = m_innerBlock->style();
innerStyle->setBoxFlex(1);
innerStyle->setPaddingLeft(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingLeft(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingRight(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingRight(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingTop(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingTop(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingBottom(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingBottom(style()), Fixed));
if (document()->page()->chrome()->selectItemWritingDirectionIsNatural()) {
innerStyle->setTextAlign(LEFT);
TextDirection direction = (m_buttonText && m_buttonText->text()->defaultWritingDirection() == WTF::Unicode::RightToLeft) ? RTL : LTR;
innerStyle->setDirection(direction);
} else if (m_optionStyle && document()->page()->chrome()->selectItemAlignmentFollowsMenuWritingDirection()) {
if ((m_optionStyle->direction() != innerStyle->direction() || m_optionStyle->unicodeBidi() != innerStyle->unicodeBidi()))
m_innerBlock->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
innerStyle->setTextAlign(style()->isLeftToRightDirection() ? LEFT : RIGHT);
innerStyle->setDirection(m_optionStyle->direction());
innerStyle->setUnicodeBidi(m_optionStyle->unicodeBidi());
}
}
|
void RenderMenuList::adjustInnerStyle()
{
RenderStyle* innerStyle = m_innerBlock->style();
innerStyle->setBoxFlex(1);
innerStyle->setPaddingLeft(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingLeft(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingRight(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingRight(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingTop(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingTop(style()), Fixed));
innerStyle->setPaddingBottom(Length(theme()->popupInternalPaddingBottom(style()), Fixed));
if (document()->page()->chrome()->selectItemWritingDirectionIsNatural()) {
innerStyle->setTextAlign(LEFT);
TextDirection direction = (m_buttonText && m_buttonText->text()->defaultWritingDirection() == WTF::Unicode::RightToLeft) ? RTL : LTR;
innerStyle->setDirection(direction);
} else if (m_optionStyle && document()->page()->chrome()->selectItemAlignmentFollowsMenuWritingDirection()) {
if ((m_optionStyle->direction() != innerStyle->direction() || m_optionStyle->unicodeBidi() != innerStyle->unicodeBidi()))
m_innerBlock->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
innerStyle->setTextAlign(style()->isLeftToRightDirection() ? LEFT : RIGHT);
innerStyle->setDirection(m_optionStyle->direction());
innerStyle->setUnicodeBidi(m_optionStyle->unicodeBidi());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_lookup_root(server, fhandle, info);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
break;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
|
static int nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_lookup_root(server, fhandle, info);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
break;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_fl_put_owner(fl_owner_t owner)
{
struct nfs4_lockowner *lo = (struct nfs4_lockowner *)owner;
if (lo)
nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner);
}
|
nfsd4_fl_put_owner(fl_owner_t owner)
{
struct nfs4_lockowner *lo = (struct nfs4_lockowner *)owner;
if (lo)
nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperDidReceiveMouseEvent(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
set_pepper_last_mouse_event_target(instance);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperDidReceiveMouseEvent(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
set_pepper_last_mouse_event_target(instance);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1658
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1658/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
GuestViewBase* ExtensionViewGuest::Create(WebContents* owner_web_contents) {
return new ExtensionViewGuest(owner_web_contents);
}
|
GuestViewBase* ExtensionViewGuest::Create(WebContents* owner_web_contents) {
return new ExtensionViewGuest(owner_web_contents);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
EphemeralRange Editor::selectedRange() {
return frame()
.selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.toNormalizedEphemeralRange();
}
|
EphemeralRange Editor::selectedRange() {
return frame()
.selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.toNormalizedEphemeralRange();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5873
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5873/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/m6w6/ext-http/commit/3724cd76a28be1d6049b5537232e97ac
|
3724cd76a28be1d6049b5537232e97ac
|
fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
|
static const char *parse_ip6(struct parse_state *state, const char *ptr)
{
const char *error = NULL, *end = state->ptr, *tmp = memchr(ptr, ']', end - ptr);
TSRMLS_FETCH_FROM_CTX(state->ts);
if (tmp) {
size_t addrlen = tmp - ptr + 1;
char buf[16], *addr = estrndup(ptr + 1, addrlen - 2);
int rv = inet_pton(AF_INET6, addr, buf);
if (rv == 1) {
state->buffer[state->offset] = '[';
state->url.host = &state->buffer[state->offset];
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, buf, state->url.host + 1, state->maxlen - state->offset);
state->offset += strlen(state->url.host);
state->buffer[state->offset++] = ']';
state->buffer[state->offset++] = 0;
ptr = tmp + 1;
} else if (rv == -1) {
error = strerror(errno);
} else {
error = "unexpected '['";
}
efree(addr);
} else {
error = "expected ']'";
}
if (error) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse hostinfo; %s", error);
return NULL;
}
return ptr;
}
|
static const char *parse_ip6(struct parse_state *state, const char *ptr)
{
const char *error = NULL, *end = state->ptr, *tmp = memchr(ptr, ']', end - ptr);
TSRMLS_FETCH_FROM_CTX(state->ts);
if (tmp) {
size_t addrlen = tmp - ptr + 1;
char buf[16], *addr = estrndup(ptr + 1, addrlen - 2);
int rv = inet_pton(AF_INET6, addr, buf);
if (rv == 1) {
state->buffer[state->offset] = '[';
state->url.host = &state->buffer[state->offset];
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, buf, state->url.host + 1, state->maxlen - state->offset);
state->offset += strlen(state->url.host);
state->buffer[state->offset++] = ']';
state->buffer[state->offset++] = 0;
ptr = tmp + 1;
} else if (rv == -1) {
error = strerror(errno);
} else {
error = "unexpected '['";
}
efree(addr);
} else {
error = "expected ']'";
}
if (error) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse hostinfo; %s", error);
return NULL;
}
return ptr;
}
|
C
|
ext-http
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6624/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLDocument::setLinkColor(const AtomicString& value)
{
setBodyAttribute(linkAttr, value);
}
|
void HTMLDocument::setLinkColor(const AtomicString& value)
{
setBodyAttribute(linkAttr, value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5011/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
DevToolsUIBindings::FrontendWebContentsObserver::FrontendWebContentsObserver(
DevToolsUIBindings* devtools_ui_bindings)
: WebContentsObserver(devtools_ui_bindings->web_contents()),
devtools_bindings_(devtools_ui_bindings) {
}
|
DevToolsUIBindings::FrontendWebContentsObserver::FrontendWebContentsObserver(
DevToolsUIBindings* devtools_ui_bindings)
: WebContentsObserver(devtools_ui_bindings->web_contents()),
devtools_bindings_(devtools_ui_bindings) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/55136969558bd7d8b3456cd1447442a5425fd9df
|
55136969558bd7d8b3456cd1447442a5425fd9df
|
Create PaintChunk and begin writing code to build paint chunks.
BUG=537409
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1379883003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352369}
|
bool DisplayItemList::clientCacheIsValid(DisplayItemClient client) const
{
if (skippingCache())
return false;
updateValidlyCachedClientsIfNeeded();
return m_validlyCachedClients.contains(client);
}
|
bool DisplayItemList::clientCacheIsValid(DisplayItemClient client) const
{
if (skippingCache())
return false;
updateValidlyCachedClientsIfNeeded();
return m_validlyCachedClients.contains(client);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
static unsigned long pthreads_thread_id(void)
{
unsigned long ret;
ret = (unsigned long)pthread_self();
return (ret);
}
|
static unsigned long pthreads_thread_id(void)
{
unsigned long ret;
ret = (unsigned long)pthread_self();
return (ret);
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/61b77165a1125a80f105f4382a99d9d7a1eb0cf2
|
61b77165a1125a80f105f4382a99d9d7a1eb0cf2
|
2010-08-12 Dimitri Glazkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ensure that parser doesn't attach children that have been removed by JavaScript event handlers.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43813
This patch re-fixes bug 40742 in a way that keeps allowing HTMLLinkElement
to lazy-attach.
* html/HTMLConstructionSite.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLConstructionSite::attach): Added parent check.
* html/HTMLLinkElement.cpp: Basically undoes changes introduced by r61424.
* html/HTMLLinkElement.h: Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@65281 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLLinkElement::processCallback(Node* node)
|
void HTMLLinkElement::processCallback(Node* node)
{
ASSERT_ARG(node, node && node->hasTagName(linkTag));
static_cast<HTMLLinkElement*>(node)->process();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidGetResourceResponseStart(
const ResourceRequestDetails& details) {
controller_.ssl_manager()->DidStartResourceResponse(details);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidGetResourceResponseStart(details));
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RESOURCE_RESPONSE_STARTED,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<const ResourceRequestDetails>(&details));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidGetResourceResponseStart(
const ResourceRequestDetails& details) {
controller_.ssl_manager()->DidStartResourceResponse(details);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidGetResourceResponseStart(details));
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RESOURCE_RESPONSE_STARTED,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<const ResourceRequestDetails>(&details));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
move_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
CopyMoveJob *job;
CommonJob *common;
GList *fallbacks;
SourceInfo source_info;
TransferInfo transfer_info;
char *dest_fs_id;
char *dest_fs_type;
GList *fallback_files;
job = task_data;
common = &job->common;
dest_fs_id = NULL;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
fallbacks = NULL;
nautilus_progress_info_start (job->common.progress);
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
&dest_fs_id,
-1);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* This moves all files that we can do without copy + delete */
move_files_prepare (job, dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type, &fallbacks);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* The rest we need to do deep copy + delete behind on,
* so scan for size */
fallback_files = get_files_from_fallbacks (fallbacks);
scan_sources (fallback_files,
&source_info,
common,
OP_KIND_MOVE);
g_list_free (fallback_files);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
NULL,
source_info.num_bytes);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
memset (&transfer_info, 0, sizeof (transfer_info));
move_files (job,
fallbacks,
dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type,
&source_info, &transfer_info);
aborted:
g_list_free_full (fallbacks, g_free);
g_free (dest_fs_id);
g_free (dest_fs_type);
}
|
move_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
CopyMoveJob *job;
CommonJob *common;
GList *fallbacks;
SourceInfo source_info;
TransferInfo transfer_info;
char *dest_fs_id;
char *dest_fs_type;
GList *fallback_files;
job = task_data;
common = &job->common;
dest_fs_id = NULL;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
fallbacks = NULL;
nautilus_progress_info_start (job->common.progress);
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
&dest_fs_id,
-1);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* This moves all files that we can do without copy + delete */
move_files_prepare (job, dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type, &fallbacks);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* The rest we need to do deep copy + delete behind on,
* so scan for size */
fallback_files = get_files_from_fallbacks (fallbacks);
scan_sources (fallback_files,
&source_info,
common,
OP_KIND_MOVE);
g_list_free (fallback_files);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
NULL,
source_info.num_bytes);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
memset (&transfer_info, 0, sizeof (transfer_info));
move_files (job,
fallbacks,
dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type,
&source_info, &transfer_info);
aborted:
g_list_free_full (fallbacks, g_free);
g_free (dest_fs_id);
g_free (dest_fs_type);
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool V8TestObjectPython::hasInstance(v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsValue, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate)->hasInstance(&wrapperTypeInfo, jsValue);
}
|
bool V8TestObjectPython::hasInstance(v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsValue, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate)->hasInstance(&wrapperTypeInfo, jsValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0228
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0228/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int lua_ap_set_context_info(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *prefix;
const char *document_root;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
prefix = lua_tostring(L, 2);
luaL_checktype(L, 3, LUA_TSTRING);
document_root = lua_tostring(L, 3);
ap_set_context_info(r, prefix, document_root);
return 0;
}
|
static int lua_ap_set_context_info(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *prefix;
const char *document_root;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
prefix = lua_tostring(L, 2);
luaL_checktype(L, 3, LUA_TSTRING);
document_root = lua_tostring(L, 3);
ap_set_context_info(r, prefix, document_root);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16540/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
|
c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
| null |
pdf14_rcmask_new(gs_memory_t *memory)
{
pdf14_rcmask_t *result;
result = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_rcmask_t, &st_pdf14_rcmask,
"pdf14_maskbuf_new");
if ( result == NULL )
return(NULL);
rc_init_free(result, memory, 1, rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free);
result->mask_buf = NULL;
result->memory = memory;
return(result);
}
|
pdf14_rcmask_new(gs_memory_t *memory)
{
pdf14_rcmask_t *result;
result = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_rcmask_t, &st_pdf14_rcmask,
"pdf14_maskbuf_new");
if ( result == NULL )
return(NULL);
rc_init_free(result, memory, 1, rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free);
result->mask_buf = NULL;
result->memory = memory;
return(result);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
int tracer_init(struct tracer *t, struct trace_array *tr)
{
tracing_reset_online_cpus(&tr->trace_buffer);
return t->init(tr);
}
|
int tracer_init(struct tracer *t, struct trace_array *tr)
{
tracing_reset_online_cpus(&tr->trace_buffer);
return t->init(tr);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6144/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
|
void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnStoreInitialized(const base::TimeTicks& start_time,
int init_attempts_spent,
bool success) {
init_attempts_spent++;
if (success) {
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::LOADED);
ReportInitializationAttemptsSpent(init_attempts_spent);
store_->GetOfflinePages(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnInitialGetOfflinePagesDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time));
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::FAILED_LOADING);
if (init_attempts_spent >= kInitializeAttemptsMax) {
FinalizeModelLoad();
return;
}
const base::TimeDelta delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::RetryDbInitialization,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time,
init_attempts_spent),
delay);
}
|
void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnStoreInitialized(const base::TimeTicks& start_time,
int init_attempts_spent,
bool success) {
init_attempts_spent++;
if (success) {
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::LOADED);
ReportInitializationAttemptsSpent(init_attempts_spent);
store_->GetOfflinePages(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnInitialGetOfflinePagesDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time));
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::FAILED_LOADING);
if (init_attempts_spent >= kInitializeAttemptsMax) {
FinalizeModelLoad();
return;
}
const base::TimeDelta delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::RetryDbInitialization,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time,
init_attempts_spent),
delay);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9644/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static void __gcm_hash_assoc_done(struct aead_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_gcm_reqctx(req);
unsigned int remain;
if (!err) {
remain = gcm_remain(req->assoclen);
BUG_ON(!remain);
err = gcm_hash_remain(req, pctx, remain,
gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done);
if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY)
return;
}
__gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done(req, err);
}
|
static void __gcm_hash_assoc_done(struct aead_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_gcm_reqctx(req);
unsigned int remain;
if (!err) {
remain = gcm_remain(req->assoclen);
BUG_ON(!remain);
err = gcm_hash_remain(req, pctx, remain,
gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done);
if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY)
return;
}
__gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done(req, err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7274/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/7ab66cca5bbdf6cb2d69339ef4f513d95e532dbf
|
7ab66cca5bbdf6cb2d69339ef4f513d95e532dbf
|
Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
|
void r_pkcs7_free_attributes (RPKCS7Attributes* attributes) {
ut32 i;
if (attributes) {
for (i = 0; i < attributes->length; ++i) {
r_pkcs7_free_attribute (attributes->elements[i]);
}
R_FREE (attributes->elements);
}
}
|
void r_pkcs7_free_attributes (RPKCS7Attributes* attributes) {
ut32 i;
if (attributes) {
for (i = 0; i < attributes->length; ++i) {
r_pkcs7_free_attribute (attributes->elements[i]);
}
R_FREE (attributes->elements);
}
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2862/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3b76c8c13ea6b228122440f48c61b66d20443dd
|
a3b76c8c13ea6b228122440f48c61b66d20443dd
|
Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::ScopedNSAutoreleasePool pool;
#endif
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
base::AtExitManager exit_manager;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(kVersionSwitchName)) {
printf("%s\n", STRINGIZE(VERSION));
return 0;
}
FilePath debug_log = remoting::GetConfigDir().
Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("debug.log"));
InitLogging(debug_log.value().c_str(),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
logging::LOG_ONLY_TO_FILE,
#else
logging::LOG_ONLY_TO_SYSTEM_DEBUG_LOG,
#endif
logging::DONT_LOCK_LOG_FILE,
logging::APPEND_TO_OLD_LOG_FILE,
logging::DISABLE_DCHECK_FOR_NON_OFFICIAL_RELEASE_BUILDS);
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
gfx::GtkInitFromCommandLine(*cmd_line);
#endif // TOOLKIT_GTK
net::EnableSSLServerSockets();
MessageLoop message_loop(MessageLoop::TYPE_UI);
base::Closure quit_message_loop = base::Bind(&QuitMessageLoop, &message_loop);
scoped_ptr<remoting::ChromotingHostContext> context(
new remoting::ChromotingHostContext(
new remoting::AutoThreadTaskRunner(message_loop.message_loop_proxy(),
quit_message_loop)));
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
remoting::VideoFrameCapturer::EnableXDamage(true);
remoting::AudioCapturerLinux::SetPipeName(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValuePath(kAudioPipeSwitchName));
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX)
if (!context->Start())
return remoting::kHostInitializationFailed;
remoting::HostProcess me2me_host(context.Pass());
me2me_host.StartHostProcess();
message_loop.Run();
return me2me_host.get_exit_code();
}
|
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::ScopedNSAutoreleasePool pool;
#endif
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
base::AtExitManager exit_manager;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(kVersionSwitchName)) {
printf("%s\n", STRINGIZE(VERSION));
return 0;
}
FilePath debug_log = remoting::GetConfigDir().
Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("debug.log"));
InitLogging(debug_log.value().c_str(),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
logging::LOG_ONLY_TO_FILE,
#else
logging::LOG_ONLY_TO_SYSTEM_DEBUG_LOG,
#endif
logging::DONT_LOCK_LOG_FILE,
logging::APPEND_TO_OLD_LOG_FILE,
logging::DISABLE_DCHECK_FOR_NON_OFFICIAL_RELEASE_BUILDS);
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
gfx::GtkInitFromCommandLine(*cmd_line);
#endif // TOOLKIT_GTK
net::EnableSSLServerSockets();
MessageLoop message_loop(MessageLoop::TYPE_UI);
base::Closure quit_message_loop = base::Bind(&QuitMessageLoop, &message_loop);
scoped_ptr<remoting::ChromotingHostContext> context(
new remoting::ChromotingHostContext(
new remoting::AutoThreadTaskRunner(message_loop.message_loop_proxy(),
quit_message_loop)));
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
remoting::VideoFrameCapturer::EnableXDamage(true);
remoting::AudioCapturerLinux::SetPipeName(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValuePath(kAudioPipeSwitchName));
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX)
if (!context->Start())
return remoting::kHostInitializationFailed;
remoting::HostProcess me2me_host(context.Pass());
me2me_host.StartHostProcess();
message_loop.Run();
return me2me_host.get_exit_code();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
rdpsnd_send(STREAM s)
{
channel_send(s, rdpsnd_channel);
}
|
rdpsnd_send(STREAM s)
{
channel_send(s, rdpsnd_channel);
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
Improve handling and testing of reparse points.
BUG=28804
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553080
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37286 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool FileSystemPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name,
TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics,
LowLevelPolicy* policy) {
std::wstring mod_name(name);
if (mod_name.empty()) {
return false;
}
// TODO(cpu) bug 32224: This prefix add is a hack because we don't have the
if (!PreProcessName(mod_name, &mod_name)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (0 != mod_name.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix)) {
mod_name.insert(0, L"\\/?/?\\");
name = mod_name.c_str();
}
EvalResult result = ASK_BROKER;
const unsigned kCallNtCreateFile = 0x1;
const unsigned kCallNtOpenFile = 0x2;
const unsigned kCallNtQueryAttributesFile = 0x4;
const unsigned kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile = 0x8;
const unsigned kCallNtSetInfoRename = 0x10;
DWORD rule_to_add = kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile |
kCallNtQueryAttributesFile |
kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile | kCallNtSetInfoRename;
PolicyRule create(result);
PolicyRule open(result);
PolicyRule query(result);
PolicyRule query_full(result);
PolicyRule rename(result);
switch (semantics) {
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY: {
open.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND);
create.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND);
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY: {
DWORD allowed_flags = FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES |
FILE_READ_EA | SYNCHRONIZE | FILE_EXECUTE |
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE | READ_CONTROL;
DWORD restricted_flags = ~allowed_flags;
open.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND);
create.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND);
rule_to_add &= ~kCallNtSetInfoRename;
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_QUERY: {
rule_to_add &= ~(kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile |
kCallNtSetInfoRename);
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY: {
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtCreateFile) &&
(!create.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, &create))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtOpenFile) &&
(!open.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, &open))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryAttributesFile) &&
(!query.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &query))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile) &&
(!query_full.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)
|| !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG,
&query_full))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtSetInfoRename) &&
(!rename.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, &rename))) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool FileSystemPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name,
TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics,
LowLevelPolicy* policy) {
std::wstring mod_name(name);
if (mod_name.empty()) {
return false;
}
if (!PreProcessName(mod_name, &mod_name)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (0 != mod_name.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix)) {
mod_name.insert(0, L"\\/?/?\\");
name = mod_name.c_str();
}
EvalResult result = ASK_BROKER;
const unsigned kCallNtCreateFile = 0x1;
const unsigned kCallNtOpenFile = 0x2;
const unsigned kCallNtQueryAttributesFile = 0x4;
const unsigned kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile = 0x8;
const unsigned kCallNtSetInfoRename = 0x10;
DWORD rule_to_add = kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile |
kCallNtQueryAttributesFile |
kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile | kCallNtSetInfoRename;
PolicyRule create(result);
PolicyRule open(result);
PolicyRule query(result);
PolicyRule query_full(result);
PolicyRule rename(result);
switch (semantics) {
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY: {
open.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND);
create.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND);
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY: {
DWORD allowed_flags = FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES |
FILE_READ_EA | SYNCHRONIZE | FILE_EXECUTE |
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE | READ_CONTROL;
DWORD restricted_flags = ~allowed_flags;
open.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND);
create.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND);
rule_to_add &= ~kCallNtSetInfoRename;
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_QUERY: {
rule_to_add &= ~(kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile |
kCallNtSetInfoRename);
break;
}
case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY: {
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtCreateFile) &&
(!create.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, &create))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtOpenFile) &&
(!open.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, &open))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryAttributesFile) &&
(!query.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &query))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile) &&
(!query_full.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)
|| !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG,
&query_full))) {
return false;
}
if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtSetInfoRename) &&
(!rename.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) ||
!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, &rename))) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
void ACodec::IdleToLoadedState::stateEntered() {
ALOGV("[%s] Now Idle->Loaded", mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
}
|
void ACodec::IdleToLoadedState::stateEntered() {
ALOGV("[%s] Now Idle->Loaded", mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void br_multicast_query_received(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
int saddr)
{
if (saddr)
mod_timer(&br->multicast_querier_timer,
jiffies + br->multicast_querier_interval);
else if (timer_pending(&br->multicast_querier_timer))
return;
br_multicast_mark_router(br, port);
}
|
static void br_multicast_query_received(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
int saddr)
{
if (saddr)
mod_timer(&br->multicast_querier_timer,
jiffies + br->multicast_querier_interval);
else if (timer_pending(&br->multicast_querier_timer))
return;
br_multicast_mark_router(br, port);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
group_add_rule(struct ofgroup *group, struct rule *rule)
{
rule_collection_add(&group->rules, rule);
}
|
group_add_rule(struct ofgroup *group, struct rule *rule)
{
rule_collection_add(&group->rules, rule);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9731
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9731/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14
|
0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14
|
udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static int udf_build_ustr_exact(struct ustr *dest, dstring *ptr, int exactsize)
{
if ((!dest) || (!ptr) || (!exactsize))
return -1;
memset(dest, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
dest->u_cmpID = ptr[0];
dest->u_len = exactsize - 1;
memcpy(dest->u_name, ptr + 1, exactsize - 1);
return 0;
}
|
static int udf_build_ustr_exact(struct ustr *dest, dstring *ptr, int exactsize)
{
if ((!dest) || (!ptr) || (!exactsize))
return -1;
memset(dest, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
dest->u_cmpID = ptr[0];
dest->u_len = exactsize - 1;
memcpy(dest->u_name, ptr + 1, exactsize - 1);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
bool FrameFetchContext::ShouldBlockFetchByMixedContentCheck(
WebURLRequest::RequestContext request_context,
WebURLRequest::FrameType frame_type,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirect_status,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (IsDetached()) {
return false;
}
return MixedContentChecker::ShouldBlockFetch(GetFrame(), request_context,
frame_type, redirect_status, url,
reporting_policy);
}
|
bool FrameFetchContext::ShouldBlockFetchByMixedContentCheck(
WebURLRequest::RequestContext request_context,
WebURLRequest::FrameType frame_type,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirect_status,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (IsDetached()) {
return false;
}
return MixedContentChecker::ShouldBlockFetch(GetFrame(), request_context,
frame_type, redirect_status, url,
reporting_policy);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int cbc_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct des_sparc64_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
des_sparc64_load_keys(&ctx->decrypt_expkey[0]);
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & DES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
des_sparc64_cbc_decrypt((const u64 *)walk.src.virt.addr,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len, (u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
|
static int cbc_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct des_sparc64_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
des_sparc64_load_keys(&ctx->decrypt_expkey[0]);
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & DES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
des_sparc64_cbc_decrypt((const u64 *)walk.src.virt.addr,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len, (u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ec14f31eca3a51f665432973552ee575635132b3
|
ec14f31eca3a51f665432973552ee575635132b3
|
[EFL] Change the behavior of ewk_view_scale_set.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70078
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Remove center point basis zoom alignment from ewk_view_scale_set to call
Page::setPageScaleFactor without any adjustment.
* ewk/ewk_view.cpp:
(ewk_view_scale_set):
* ewk/ewk_view.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@103288 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void _ewk_view_on_mouse_move(void* data, Evas* eventType, Evas_Object* callback, void* eventInfo)
{
Evas_Event_Mouse_Move* moveEvent = static_cast<Evas_Event_Mouse_Move*>(eventInfo);
Ewk_View_Smart_Data* smartData = static_cast<Ewk_View_Smart_Data*>(data);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN(smartData->api);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN(smartData->api->mouse_move);
smartData->api->mouse_move(smartData, moveEvent);
}
|
static void _ewk_view_on_mouse_move(void* data, Evas* eventType, Evas_Object* callback, void* eventInfo)
{
Evas_Event_Mouse_Move* moveEvent = static_cast<Evas_Event_Mouse_Move*>(eventInfo);
Ewk_View_Smart_Data* smartData = static_cast<Ewk_View_Smart_Data*>(data);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN(smartData->api);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN(smartData->api->mouse_move);
smartData->api->mouse_move(smartData, moveEvent);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
Add a setDebugDirtyRegion() feature to the client.
Calling remoting.clientSession.setDebugDirtyRegion(true) enables
rendering of each frame's dirty region with an purple, translucent
overlay.
Currently the dirty region is re-rendered immediately for each frame,
with no linger nor fade-out behaviour.
BUG=427659
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/932013002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#317496}
|
void ChromotingInstance::HandleVideoControl(const base::DictionaryValue& data) {
protocol::VideoControl video_control;
bool pause_video = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("pause", &pause_video)) {
video_control.set_enable(!pause_video);
}
bool lossless_encode = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("losslessEncode", &lossless_encode)) {
video_control.set_lossless_encode(lossless_encode);
}
bool lossless_color = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("losslessColor", &lossless_color)) {
video_control.set_lossless_color(lossless_color);
}
if (!IsConnected()) {
return;
}
client_->host_stub()->ControlVideo(video_control);
}
|
void ChromotingInstance::HandleVideoControl(const base::DictionaryValue& data) {
protocol::VideoControl video_control;
bool pause_video = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("pause", &pause_video)) {
video_control.set_enable(!pause_video);
}
bool lossless_encode = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("losslessEncode", &lossless_encode)) {
video_control.set_lossless_encode(lossless_encode);
}
bool lossless_color = false;
if (data.GetBoolean("losslessColor", &lossless_color)) {
video_control.set_lossless_color(lossless_color);
}
if (!IsConnected()) {
return;
}
client_->host_stub()->ControlVideo(video_control);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
static bool isVideoSizeSupported(
int32_t width, int32_t height,
const Vector<Size>& supportedSizes) {
ALOGV("isVideoSizeSupported");
for (size_t i = 0; i < supportedSizes.size(); ++i) {
if (width == supportedSizes[i].width &&
height == supportedSizes[i].height) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
static bool isVideoSizeSupported(
int32_t width, int32_t height,
const Vector<Size>& supportedSizes) {
ALOGV("isVideoSizeSupported");
for (size_t i = 0; i < supportedSizes.size(); ++i) {
if (width == supportedSizes[i].width &&
height == supportedSizes[i].height) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CanCommitOrigin(
const url::Origin& origin,
const GURL& url) {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableWebSecurity)) {
return true;
}
if (origin.scheme() == url::kFileScheme) {
WebPreferences prefs = render_view_host_->GetWebkitPreferences();
if (prefs.allow_universal_access_from_file_urls)
return true;
}
if (origin.unique())
return true;
if (url.IsStandard() &&
!origin.IsSamePhysicalOriginWith(url::Origin::Create(url)))
return false;
GURL origin_url = origin.GetPhysicalOrigin().GetURL();
return CanCommitURL(origin_url);
}
|
bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CanCommitOrigin(
const url::Origin& origin,
const GURL& url) {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableWebSecurity)) {
return true;
}
if (origin.scheme() == url::kFileScheme) {
WebPreferences prefs = render_view_host_->GetWebkitPreferences();
if (prefs.allow_universal_access_from_file_urls)
return true;
}
if (origin.unique())
return true;
if (url.IsStandard() &&
!origin.IsSamePhysicalOriginWith(url::Origin::Create(url)))
return false;
GURL origin_url = origin.GetPhysicalOrigin().GetURL();
return CanCommitURL(origin_url);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0925
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0925/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ExtensionTabUtil::IsCrashURL(const GURL& url) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
}
|
bool ExtensionTabUtil::IsCrashURL(const GURL& url) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void netif_free_tx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
kvfree(dev->_tx);
}
|
static void netif_free_tx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
kvfree(dev->_tx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void SaveWifiNetwork(const WifiNetwork* network) {}
|
virtual void SaveWifiNetwork(const WifiNetwork* network) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
NaClSubprocess* subprocess,
const Manifest* manifest,
bool should_report_uma,
ErrorInfo* error_info,
pp::CompletionCallback init_done_cb,
pp::CompletionCallback crash_cb) {
ServiceRuntime* new_service_runtime =
new ServiceRuntime(this, manifest, should_report_uma, init_done_cb,
crash_cb);
subprocess->set_service_runtime(new_service_runtime);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(new_service_runtime)));
if (NULL == new_service_runtime) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SEL_LDR_INIT,
"sel_ldr init failure " + subprocess->description());
return false;
}
bool service_runtime_started =
new_service_runtime->Start(wrapper, error_info, manifest_base_url());
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime_started=%d)\n",
service_runtime_started));
if (!service_runtime_started) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
NaClSubprocess* subprocess,
const Manifest* manifest,
bool should_report_uma,
ErrorInfo* error_info,
pp::CompletionCallback init_done_cb,
pp::CompletionCallback crash_cb) {
ServiceRuntime* new_service_runtime =
new ServiceRuntime(this, manifest, should_report_uma, init_done_cb,
crash_cb);
subprocess->set_service_runtime(new_service_runtime);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(new_service_runtime)));
if (NULL == new_service_runtime) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SEL_LDR_INIT,
"sel_ldr init failure " + subprocess->description());
return false;
}
bool service_runtime_started =
new_service_runtime->Start(wrapper,
error_info,
manifest_base_url());
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime_started=%d)\n",
service_runtime_started));
if (!service_runtime_started) {
return false;
}
const PPB_NaCl_Private* ppb_nacl = GetNaclInterface();
if (ppb_nacl->StartPpapiProxy(pp_instance())) {
using_ipc_proxy_ = true;
CHECK(init_done_cb.pp_completion_callback().func != NULL);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon, started ipc proxy.\n"));
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, init_done_cb, PP_OK);
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-8087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8087/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
|
static int append_radio_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, int id,
struct hwsim_new_radio_params *param)
{
int ret;
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID, id);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (param->channels) {
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS, param->channels);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->reg_alpha2) {
ret = nla_put(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2, 2,
param->reg_alpha2);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->regd) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hwsim_world_regdom_custom); i++) {
if (hwsim_world_regdom_custom[i] != param->regd)
continue;
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG, i);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
break;
}
}
if (param->reg_strict) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_STRICT_REG);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->p2p_device) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_SUPPORT_P2P_DEVICE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->use_chanctx) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_USE_CHANCTX);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->hwname) {
ret = nla_put(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME,
strlen(param->hwname), param->hwname);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int append_radio_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, int id,
struct hwsim_new_radio_params *param)
{
int ret;
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID, id);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (param->channels) {
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS, param->channels);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->reg_alpha2) {
ret = nla_put(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2, 2,
param->reg_alpha2);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->regd) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hwsim_world_regdom_custom); i++) {
if (hwsim_world_regdom_custom[i] != param->regd)
continue;
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG, i);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
break;
}
}
if (param->reg_strict) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_REG_STRICT_REG);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->p2p_device) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_SUPPORT_P2P_DEVICE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->use_chanctx) {
ret = nla_put_flag(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_USE_CHANCTX);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (param->hwname) {
ret = nla_put(skb, HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME,
strlen(param->hwname), param->hwname);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14934
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14934/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/enferex/pdfresurrect/commit/0c4120fffa3dffe97b95c486a120eded82afe8a6
|
0c4120fffa3dffe97b95c486a120eded82afe8a6
|
Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
|
void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = safe_calloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
|
void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = malloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
|
C
|
pdfresurrect
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2902
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2902/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Layer::OnScrollOffsetAnimated(const gfx::Vector2dF& scroll_offset) {
}
|
void Layer::OnScrollOffsetAnimated(const gfx::Vector2dF& scroll_offset) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2881/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
[chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
CCLayerTreeHost::CCLayerTreeHost(CCLayerTreeHostClient* client, PassRefPtr<LayerChromium> rootLayer, const CCSettings& settings)
: m_compositorIdentifier(-1)
, m_animating(false)
, m_client(client)
, m_frameNumber(0)
, m_rootLayer(rootLayer)
, m_settings(settings)
, m_visible(true)
{
CCMainThread::initialize();
ASSERT(CCProxy::isMainThread());
}
|
CCLayerTreeHost::CCLayerTreeHost(CCLayerTreeHostClient* client, PassRefPtr<LayerChromium> rootLayer, const CCSettings& settings)
: m_compositorIdentifier(-1)
, m_animating(false)
, m_client(client)
, m_frameNumber(0)
, m_rootLayer(rootLayer)
, m_settings(settings)
, m_visible(true)
{
CCMainThread::initialize();
ASSERT(CCProxy::isMainThread());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e
|
4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05
| null |
static void pdf_run_q(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gsave(ctx, pr);
}
|
static void pdf_run_q(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gsave(ctx, pr);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigationController::RestoreFromState(
const std::vector<TabNavigation>& navigations,
int selected_navigation) {
DCHECK(entry_count() == 0 && !pending_entry());
DCHECK(selected_navigation >= 0 &&
selected_navigation < static_cast<int>(navigations.size()));
needs_reload_ = true;
CreateNavigationEntriesFromTabNavigations(navigations, &entries_);
FinishRestore(selected_navigation);
}
|
void NavigationController::RestoreFromState(
const std::vector<TabNavigation>& navigations,
int selected_navigation) {
DCHECK(entry_count() == 0 && !pending_entry());
DCHECK(selected_navigation >= 0 &&
selected_navigation < static_cast<int>(navigations.size()));
needs_reload_ = true;
CreateNavigationEntriesFromTabNavigations(navigations, &entries_);
FinishRestore(selected_navigation);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10671
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10671/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/blueness/sthttpd/commit/c0dc63a49d8605649f1d8e4a96c9b468b0bff660
|
c0dc63a49d8605649f1d8e4a96c9b468b0bff660
|
Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
|
hostname_map( char* hostname )
{
int len, n;
static char* list[] = { SERVER_NAME_LIST };
len = strlen( hostname );
for ( n = sizeof(list) / sizeof(*list) - 1; n >= 0; --n )
if ( strncasecmp( hostname, list[n], len ) == 0 )
if ( list[n][len] == '/' ) /* check in case of a substring match */
return &list[n][len + 1];
return (char*) 0;
}
|
hostname_map( char* hostname )
{
int len, n;
static char* list[] = { SERVER_NAME_LIST };
len = strlen( hostname );
for ( n = sizeof(list) / sizeof(*list) - 1; n >= 0; --n )
if ( strncasecmp( hostname, list[n], len ) == 0 )
if ( list[n][len] == '/' ) /* check in case of a substring match */
return &list[n][len + 1];
return (char*) 0;
}
|
C
|
sthttpd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14222/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
|
9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
|
avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_seek_fragment(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, int64_t timestamp)
{
MOVContext *mov = s->priv_data;
MOVStreamContext *sc = st->priv_data;
int i, j;
if (!mov->fragment_index_complete)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < mov->fragment_index_count; i++) {
if (mov->fragment_index_data[i]->track_id == st->id || !sc->has_sidx) {
MOVFragmentIndex *index = mov->fragment_index_data[i];
for (j = index->item_count - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
if (index->items[j].time <= timestamp) {
if (index->items[j].headers_read)
return 0;
return mov_switch_root(s, index->items[j].moof_offset);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int mov_seek_fragment(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, int64_t timestamp)
{
MOVContext *mov = s->priv_data;
MOVStreamContext *sc = st->priv_data;
int i, j;
if (!mov->fragment_index_complete)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < mov->fragment_index_count; i++) {
if (mov->fragment_index_data[i]->track_id == st->id || !sc->has_sidx) {
MOVFragmentIndex *index = mov->fragment_index_data[i];
for (j = index->item_count - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
if (index->items[j].time <= timestamp) {
if (index->items[j].headers_read)
return 0;
return mov_switch_root(s, index->items[j].moof_offset);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20961
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20961/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
f_midi_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)
{
struct f_midi *midi = ep->driver_data;
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = midi->func.config->cdev;
int status = req->status;
switch (status) {
case 0: /* normal completion */
if (ep == midi->out_ep) {
/* We received stuff. req is queued again, below */
f_midi_handle_out_data(ep, req);
} else if (ep == midi->in_ep) {
/* Our transmit completed. See if there's more to go.
* f_midi_transmit eats req, don't queue it again. */
req->length = 0;
f_midi_transmit(midi);
return;
}
break;
/* this endpoint is normally active while we're configured */
case -ECONNABORTED: /* hardware forced ep reset */
case -ECONNRESET: /* request dequeued */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* disconnect from host */
VDBG(cdev, "%s gone (%d), %d/%d\n", ep->name, status,
req->actual, req->length);
if (ep == midi->out_ep) {
f_midi_handle_out_data(ep, req);
/* We don't need to free IN requests because it's handled
* by the midi->in_req_fifo. */
free_ep_req(ep, req);
}
return;
case -EOVERFLOW: /* buffer overrun on read means that
* we didn't provide a big enough buffer.
*/
default:
DBG(cdev, "%s complete --> %d, %d/%d\n", ep->name,
status, req->actual, req->length);
break;
case -EREMOTEIO: /* short read */
break;
}
status = usb_ep_queue(ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
ERROR(cdev, "kill %s: resubmit %d bytes --> %d\n",
ep->name, req->length, status);
usb_ep_set_halt(ep);
/* FIXME recover later ... somehow */
}
}
|
f_midi_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)
{
struct f_midi *midi = ep->driver_data;
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = midi->func.config->cdev;
int status = req->status;
switch (status) {
case 0: /* normal completion */
if (ep == midi->out_ep) {
/* We received stuff. req is queued again, below */
f_midi_handle_out_data(ep, req);
} else if (ep == midi->in_ep) {
/* Our transmit completed. See if there's more to go.
* f_midi_transmit eats req, don't queue it again. */
req->length = 0;
f_midi_transmit(midi);
return;
}
break;
/* this endpoint is normally active while we're configured */
case -ECONNABORTED: /* hardware forced ep reset */
case -ECONNRESET: /* request dequeued */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* disconnect from host */
VDBG(cdev, "%s gone (%d), %d/%d\n", ep->name, status,
req->actual, req->length);
if (ep == midi->out_ep) {
f_midi_handle_out_data(ep, req);
/* We don't need to free IN requests because it's handled
* by the midi->in_req_fifo. */
free_ep_req(ep, req);
}
return;
case -EOVERFLOW: /* buffer overrun on read means that
* we didn't provide a big enough buffer.
*/
default:
DBG(cdev, "%s complete --> %d, %d/%d\n", ep->name,
status, req->actual, req->length);
break;
case -EREMOTEIO: /* short read */
break;
}
status = usb_ep_queue(ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
ERROR(cdev, "kill %s: resubmit %d bytes --> %d\n",
ep->name, req->length, status);
usb_ep_set_halt(ep);
/* FIXME recover later ... somehow */
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
control_init(struct control *control, struct global *global,
const char *file_name, const char *out_name)
/* This wraps file_init(&control::file) and simply returns the result from
* file_init.
*/
{
return file_init(&control->file, global, file_name, out_name, control,
allocate);
}
|
control_init(struct control *control, struct global *global,
const char *file_name, const char *out_name)
/* This wraps file_init(&control::file) and simply returns the result from
* file_init.
*/
{
return file_init(&control->file, global, file_name, out_name, control,
allocate);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2799/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static gboolean webkit_web_view_scroll_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventScroll* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
PlatformWheelEvent wheelEvent(event);
return frame->eventHandler()->handleWheelEvent(wheelEvent);
}
|
static gboolean webkit_web_view_scroll_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventScroll* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
PlatformWheelEvent wheelEvent(event);
return frame->eventHandler()->handleWheelEvent(wheelEvent);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::SupportLabels() const {
return input_type_->IsInteractiveContent();
}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::SupportLabels() const {
return input_type_->IsInteractiveContent();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8374/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
static struct inode *new_simple_dir(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *key,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
BTRFS_I(inode)->root = root;
memcpy(&BTRFS_I(inode)->location, key, sizeof(*key));
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
inode->i_ino = BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_ro_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime;
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime;
BTRFS_I(inode)->i_otime = inode->i_mtime;
return inode;
}
|
static struct inode *new_simple_dir(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *key,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
BTRFS_I(inode)->root = root;
memcpy(&BTRFS_I(inode)->location, key, sizeof(*key));
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
inode->i_ino = BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_ro_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime;
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime;
BTRFS_I(inode)->i_otime = inode->i_mtime;
return inode;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3835/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
unsigned venc_dev::venc_set_message_thread_id(pthread_t tid)
{
async_thread_created = true;
m_tid=tid;
return 0;
}
|
unsigned venc_dev::venc_set_message_thread_id(pthread_t tid)
{
async_thread_created = true;
m_tid=tid;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6035/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
|
bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionTestIncognito(
const std::string& extension_name) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name,
std::string(),
NULL,
kFlagEnableIncognito | kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
|
bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionTestIncognito(
const std::string& extension_name) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name,
std::string(),
NULL,
kFlagEnableIncognito | kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int emulate_ss(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
{
return emulate_exception(ctxt, SS_VECTOR, err, true);
}
|
static int emulate_ss(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
{
return emulate_exception(ctxt, SS_VECTOR, err, true);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9425/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=24125f0f26f3787c006e4a51611ba33ee3b841cb
|
24125f0f26f3787c006e4a51611ba33ee3b841cb
| null |
ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_init(TsHashTable *ht, uint nSize, dtor_func_t pDestructor, zend_bool persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
#ifdef ZTS
ht->mx_reader = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->mx_writer = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->reader = 0;
#endif
return _zend_hash_init(TS_HASH(ht), nSize, pDestructor, persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
|
ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_init(TsHashTable *ht, uint nSize, dtor_func_t pDestructor, zend_bool persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
#ifdef ZTS
ht->mx_reader = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->mx_writer = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->reader = 0;
#endif
return _zend_hash_init(TS_HASH(ht), nSize, pDestructor, persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static void cb(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
++cb_counter;
semaphore_post(semaphore);
}
|
static void cb(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
++cb_counter;
semaphore_post(semaphore);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8740
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8740/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29c63b786ae028d82405421585e91283c8fa0da3
|
29c63b786ae028d82405421585e91283c8fa0da3
|
SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
apr_status_t h2_stream_add_header(h2_stream *stream,
const char *name, size_t nlen,
const char *value, size_t vlen)
{
int error = 0;
ap_assert(stream);
if (stream->has_response) {
return APR_EINVAL;
}
++stream->request_headers_added;
if (name[0] == ':') {
if ((vlen) > stream->session->s->limit_req_line) {
/* pseudo header: approximation of request line size check */
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): pseudo header %s too long",
stream->session->id, stream->id, name);
error = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
}
}
else if ((nlen + 2 + vlen) > stream->session->s->limit_req_fieldsize) {
/* header too long */
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): header %s too long",
stream->session->id, stream->id, name);
error = HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_FIELDS_TOO_LARGE;
}
if (stream->request_headers_added
> stream->session->s->limit_req_fields + 4) {
/* too many header lines, include 4 pseudo headers */
if (stream->request_headers_added
> stream->session->s->limit_req_fields + 4 + 100) {
/* yeah, right */
return APR_ECONNRESET;
}
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): too many header lines",
stream->session->id, stream->id);
error = HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_FIELDS_TOO_LARGE;
}
if (h2_stream_is_scheduled(stream)) {
return add_trailer(stream, name, nlen, value, vlen);
}
else if (error) {
return h2_stream_set_error(stream, error);
}
else {
if (!stream->rtmp) {
stream->rtmp = h2_req_create(stream->id, stream->pool,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (stream->state != H2_STREAM_ST_OPEN) {
return APR_ECONNRESET;
}
return h2_request_add_header(stream->rtmp, stream->pool,
name, nlen, value, vlen);
}
}
|
apr_status_t h2_stream_add_header(h2_stream *stream,
const char *name, size_t nlen,
const char *value, size_t vlen)
{
ap_assert(stream);
if (!stream->has_response) {
if (name[0] == ':') {
if ((vlen) > stream->session->s->limit_req_line) {
/* pseudo header: approximation of request line size check */
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): pseudo header %s too long",
stream->session->id, stream->id, name);
return h2_stream_set_error(stream,
HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE);
}
}
else if ((nlen + 2 + vlen) > stream->session->s->limit_req_fieldsize) {
/* header too long */
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): header %s too long",
stream->session->id, stream->id, name);
return h2_stream_set_error(stream,
HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_FIELDS_TOO_LARGE);
}
if (name[0] != ':') {
++stream->request_headers_added;
if (stream->request_headers_added
> stream->session->s->limit_req_fields) {
/* too many header lines */
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): too many header lines",
stream->session->id, stream->id);
return h2_stream_set_error(stream,
HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_FIELDS_TOO_LARGE);
}
}
}
if (h2_stream_is_scheduled(stream)) {
return add_trailer(stream, name, nlen, value, vlen);
}
else {
if (!stream->rtmp) {
stream->rtmp = h2_req_create(stream->id, stream->pool,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (stream->state != H2_STREAM_ST_OPEN) {
return APR_ECONNRESET;
}
return h2_request_add_header(stream->rtmp, stream->pool,
name, nlen, value, vlen);
}
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 1 |
CVE-2010-4352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4352/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
|
7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
| null |
iter_unrecurse (DBusMessageDataIter *iter)
{
iter->depth -= 1;
_dbus_assert (iter->depth >= 0);
}
|
iter_unrecurse (DBusMessageDataIter *iter)
{
iter->depth -= 1;
_dbus_assert (iter->depth >= 0);
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8812/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3
|
67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3
|
iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static void start_ep_timer(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
if (timer_pending(&ep->timer)) {
PDBG("%s stopped / restarted timer ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
del_timer_sync(&ep->timer);
} else
get_ep(&ep->com);
ep->timer.expires = jiffies + ep_timeout_secs * HZ;
ep->timer.data = (unsigned long)ep;
ep->timer.function = ep_timeout;
add_timer(&ep->timer);
}
|
static void start_ep_timer(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
if (timer_pending(&ep->timer)) {
PDBG("%s stopped / restarted timer ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
del_timer_sync(&ep->timer);
} else
get_ep(&ep->com);
ep->timer.expires = jiffies + ep_timeout_secs * HZ;
ep->timer.data = (unsigned long)ep;
ep->timer.function = ep_timeout;
add_timer(&ep->timer);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
const char* PseudoTypeToString(CSSSelector::PseudoType pseudo_type) {
switch (pseudo_type) {
#define DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(pseudoType) \
case CSSSelector::k##pseudoType: \
return #pseudoType;
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoUnknown)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEmpty)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLastChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLastOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOnlyChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOnlyOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstLine)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstLetter)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthLastChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthLastOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLink)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVisited)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAny)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAnyLink)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAutofill)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHover)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDrag)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFocus)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFocusWithin)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoActive)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoChecked)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEnabled)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullPageMedia)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDefault)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDisabled)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOptional)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPlaceholderShown)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRequired)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoReadOnly)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoReadWrite)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoValid)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoInvalid)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoIndeterminate)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoTarget)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBefore)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAfter)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBackdrop)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLang)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNot)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPlaceholder)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoResizer)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRoot)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScope)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbar)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarCorner)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarThumb)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarTrack)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarTrackPiece)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoWindowInactive)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoCornerPresent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDecrement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoIncrement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHorizontal)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVertical)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoStart)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEnd)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDoubleButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSingleButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNoButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSelection)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLeftPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRightPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullScreen)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullScreenAncestor)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullscreen)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoInRange)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOutOfRange)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoWebKitCustomElement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBlinkInternalElement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFutureCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPastCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoUnresolved)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDefined)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoContent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHost)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHostContext)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoShadow)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSlotted)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSpatialNavigationFocus)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoListBox)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHostHasAppearance)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVideoPersistent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVideoPersistentAncestor)
#undef DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
|
const char* PseudoTypeToString(CSSSelector::PseudoType pseudo_type) {
switch (pseudo_type) {
#define DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(pseudoType) \
case CSSSelector::k##pseudoType: \
return #pseudoType;
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoUnknown)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEmpty)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLastChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLastOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOnlyChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOnlyOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstLine)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstLetter)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthLastChild)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNthLastOfType)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLink)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVisited)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAny)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAnyLink)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAutofill)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHover)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDrag)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFocus)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFocusWithin)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoActive)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoChecked)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEnabled)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullPageMedia)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDefault)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDisabled)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOptional)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPlaceholderShown)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRequired)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoReadOnly)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoReadWrite)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoValid)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoInvalid)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoIndeterminate)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoTarget)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBefore)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoAfter)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBackdrop)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLang)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNot)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPlaceholder)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoResizer)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRoot)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScope)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbar)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarCorner)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarThumb)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarTrack)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoScrollbarTrackPiece)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoWindowInactive)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoCornerPresent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDecrement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoIncrement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHorizontal)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVertical)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoStart)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoEnd)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDoubleButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSingleButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoNoButton)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSelection)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoLeftPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoRightPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFirstPage)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullScreen)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullScreenAncestor)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFullscreen)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoInRange)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoOutOfRange)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoWebKitCustomElement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoBlinkInternalElement)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoFutureCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoPastCue)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoUnresolved)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoDefined)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoContent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHost)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHostContext)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoShadow)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSlotted)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoSpatialNavigationFocus)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoListBox)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoHostHasAppearance)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVideoPersistent)
DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING(PseudoVideoPersistentAncestor)
#undef DEFINE_STRING_MAPPING
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tcp_update_scoreboard(struct sock *sk, int fast_rexmit)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, 1, 1);
} else if (tcp_is_fack(tp)) {
int lost = tp->fackets_out - tp->reordering;
if (lost <= 0)
lost = 1;
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, lost, 0);
} else {
int sacked_upto = tp->sacked_out - tp->reordering;
if (sacked_upto >= 0)
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, sacked_upto, 0);
else if (fast_rexmit)
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, 1, 1);
}
tcp_timeout_skbs(sk);
}
|
static void tcp_update_scoreboard(struct sock *sk, int fast_rexmit)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, 1, 1);
} else if (tcp_is_fack(tp)) {
int lost = tp->fackets_out - tp->reordering;
if (lost <= 0)
lost = 1;
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, lost, 0);
} else {
int sacked_upto = tp->sacked_out - tp->reordering;
if (sacked_upto >= 0)
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, sacked_upto, 0);
else if (fast_rexmit)
tcp_mark_head_lost(sk, 1, 1);
}
tcp_timeout_skbs(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int __init lz4hc_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&alg_lz4hc);
}
|
static int __init lz4hc_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&alg_lz4hc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16527/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static void build_feature_ctl(struct mixer_build *state, void *raw_desc,
unsigned int ctl_mask, int control,
struct usb_audio_term *iterm, int unitid,
int readonly_mask)
{
struct uac_feature_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc;
struct usb_feature_control_info *ctl_info;
unsigned int len = 0;
int mapped_name = 0;
int nameid = uac_feature_unit_iFeature(desc);
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;
const struct usbmix_name_map *map;
unsigned int range;
control++; /* change from zero-based to 1-based value */
if (control == UAC_FU_GRAPHIC_EQUALIZER) {
/* FIXME: not supported yet */
return;
}
map = find_map(state, unitid, control);
if (check_ignored_ctl(map))
return;
cval = kzalloc(sizeof(*cval), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cval)
return;
snd_usb_mixer_elem_init_std(&cval->head, state->mixer, unitid);
cval->control = control;
cval->cmask = ctl_mask;
ctl_info = &audio_feature_info[control-1];
if (state->mixer->protocol == UAC_VERSION_1)
cval->val_type = ctl_info->type;
else /* UAC_VERSION_2 */
cval->val_type = ctl_info->type_uac2 >= 0 ?
ctl_info->type_uac2 : ctl_info->type;
if (ctl_mask == 0) {
cval->channels = 1; /* master channel */
cval->master_readonly = readonly_mask;
} else {
int i, c = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
if (ctl_mask & (1 << i))
c++;
cval->channels = c;
cval->ch_readonly = readonly_mask;
}
/*
* If all channels in the mask are marked read-only, make the control
* read-only. snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value() will check the mask again and won't
* issue write commands to read-only channels.
*/
if (cval->channels == readonly_mask)
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl_ro, cval);
else
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl, cval);
if (!kctl) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip, "cannot malloc kcontrol\n");
kfree(cval);
return;
}
kctl->private_free = snd_usb_mixer_elem_free;
len = check_mapped_name(map, kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
mapped_name = len != 0;
if (!len && nameid)
len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state, nameid,
kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
switch (control) {
case UAC_FU_MUTE:
case UAC_FU_VOLUME:
/*
* determine the control name. the rule is:
* - if a name id is given in descriptor, use it.
* - if the connected input can be determined, then use the name
* of terminal type.
* - if the connected output can be determined, use it.
* - otherwise, anonymous name.
*/
if (!len) {
len = get_term_name(state, iterm, kctl->id.name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name), 1);
if (!len)
len = get_term_name(state, &state->oterm,
kctl->id.name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name), 1);
if (!len)
snprintf(kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name),
"Feature %d", unitid);
}
if (!mapped_name)
check_no_speaker_on_headset(kctl, state->mixer->chip->card);
/*
* determine the stream direction:
* if the connected output is USB stream, then it's likely a
* capture stream. otherwise it should be playback (hopefully :)
*/
if (!mapped_name && !(state->oterm.type >> 16)) {
if ((state->oterm.type & 0xff00) == 0x0100)
append_ctl_name(kctl, " Capture");
else
append_ctl_name(kctl, " Playback");
}
append_ctl_name(kctl, control == UAC_FU_MUTE ?
" Switch" : " Volume");
break;
default:
if (!len)
strlcpy(kctl->id.name, audio_feature_info[control-1].name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name));
break;
}
/* get min/max values */
get_min_max_with_quirks(cval, 0, kctl);
if (control == UAC_FU_VOLUME) {
check_mapped_dB(map, cval);
if (cval->dBmin < cval->dBmax || !cval->initialized) {
kctl->tlv.c = snd_usb_mixer_vol_tlv;
kctl->vd[0].access |=
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ |
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
}
snd_usb_mixer_fu_apply_quirk(state->mixer, cval, unitid, kctl);
range = (cval->max - cval->min) / cval->res;
/*
* Are there devices with volume range more than 255? I use a bit more
* to be sure. 384 is a resolution magic number found on Logitech
* devices. It will definitively catch all buggy Logitech devices.
*/
if (range > 384) {
usb_audio_warn(state->chip,
"Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=%u), cval->res is probably wrong.",
range);
usb_audio_warn(state->chip,
"[%d] FU [%s] ch = %d, val = %d/%d/%d",
cval->head.id, kctl->id.name, cval->channels,
cval->min, cval->max, cval->res);
}
usb_audio_dbg(state->chip, "[%d] FU [%s] ch = %d, val = %d/%d/%d\n",
cval->head.id, kctl->id.name, cval->channels,
cval->min, cval->max, cval->res);
snd_usb_mixer_add_control(&cval->head, kctl);
}
|
static void build_feature_ctl(struct mixer_build *state, void *raw_desc,
unsigned int ctl_mask, int control,
struct usb_audio_term *iterm, int unitid,
int readonly_mask)
{
struct uac_feature_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc;
struct usb_feature_control_info *ctl_info;
unsigned int len = 0;
int mapped_name = 0;
int nameid = uac_feature_unit_iFeature(desc);
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;
const struct usbmix_name_map *map;
unsigned int range;
control++; /* change from zero-based to 1-based value */
if (control == UAC_FU_GRAPHIC_EQUALIZER) {
/* FIXME: not supported yet */
return;
}
map = find_map(state, unitid, control);
if (check_ignored_ctl(map))
return;
cval = kzalloc(sizeof(*cval), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cval)
return;
snd_usb_mixer_elem_init_std(&cval->head, state->mixer, unitid);
cval->control = control;
cval->cmask = ctl_mask;
ctl_info = &audio_feature_info[control-1];
if (state->mixer->protocol == UAC_VERSION_1)
cval->val_type = ctl_info->type;
else /* UAC_VERSION_2 */
cval->val_type = ctl_info->type_uac2 >= 0 ?
ctl_info->type_uac2 : ctl_info->type;
if (ctl_mask == 0) {
cval->channels = 1; /* master channel */
cval->master_readonly = readonly_mask;
} else {
int i, c = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
if (ctl_mask & (1 << i))
c++;
cval->channels = c;
cval->ch_readonly = readonly_mask;
}
/*
* If all channels in the mask are marked read-only, make the control
* read-only. snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value() will check the mask again and won't
* issue write commands to read-only channels.
*/
if (cval->channels == readonly_mask)
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl_ro, cval);
else
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl, cval);
if (!kctl) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip, "cannot malloc kcontrol\n");
kfree(cval);
return;
}
kctl->private_free = snd_usb_mixer_elem_free;
len = check_mapped_name(map, kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
mapped_name = len != 0;
if (!len && nameid)
len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state, nameid,
kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
switch (control) {
case UAC_FU_MUTE:
case UAC_FU_VOLUME:
/*
* determine the control name. the rule is:
* - if a name id is given in descriptor, use it.
* - if the connected input can be determined, then use the name
* of terminal type.
* - if the connected output can be determined, use it.
* - otherwise, anonymous name.
*/
if (!len) {
len = get_term_name(state, iterm, kctl->id.name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name), 1);
if (!len)
len = get_term_name(state, &state->oterm,
kctl->id.name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name), 1);
if (!len)
snprintf(kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name),
"Feature %d", unitid);
}
if (!mapped_name)
check_no_speaker_on_headset(kctl, state->mixer->chip->card);
/*
* determine the stream direction:
* if the connected output is USB stream, then it's likely a
* capture stream. otherwise it should be playback (hopefully :)
*/
if (!mapped_name && !(state->oterm.type >> 16)) {
if ((state->oterm.type & 0xff00) == 0x0100)
append_ctl_name(kctl, " Capture");
else
append_ctl_name(kctl, " Playback");
}
append_ctl_name(kctl, control == UAC_FU_MUTE ?
" Switch" : " Volume");
break;
default:
if (!len)
strlcpy(kctl->id.name, audio_feature_info[control-1].name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name));
break;
}
/* get min/max values */
get_min_max_with_quirks(cval, 0, kctl);
if (control == UAC_FU_VOLUME) {
check_mapped_dB(map, cval);
if (cval->dBmin < cval->dBmax || !cval->initialized) {
kctl->tlv.c = snd_usb_mixer_vol_tlv;
kctl->vd[0].access |=
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ |
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
}
snd_usb_mixer_fu_apply_quirk(state->mixer, cval, unitid, kctl);
range = (cval->max - cval->min) / cval->res;
/*
* Are there devices with volume range more than 255? I use a bit more
* to be sure. 384 is a resolution magic number found on Logitech
* devices. It will definitively catch all buggy Logitech devices.
*/
if (range > 384) {
usb_audio_warn(state->chip,
"Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=%u), cval->res is probably wrong.",
range);
usb_audio_warn(state->chip,
"[%d] FU [%s] ch = %d, val = %d/%d/%d",
cval->head.id, kctl->id.name, cval->channels,
cval->min, cval->max, cval->res);
}
usb_audio_dbg(state->chip, "[%d] FU [%s] ch = %d, val = %d/%d/%d\n",
cval->head.id, kctl->id.name, cval->channels,
cval->min, cval->max, cval->res);
snd_usb_mixer_add_control(&cval->head, kctl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OSExchangeDataProviderWin::SetFilenames(
const std::vector<OSExchangeData::FileInfo>& filenames) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < filenames.size(); ++i) {
STGMEDIUM* storage = GetStorageForFileName(filenames[i].path);
DataObjectImpl::StoredDataInfo* info = new DataObjectImpl::StoredDataInfo(
Clipboard::GetCFHDropFormatType().ToFormatEtc(), storage);
data_->contents_.push_back(info);
}
}
|
void OSExchangeDataProviderWin::SetFilenames(
const std::vector<OSExchangeData::FileInfo>& filenames) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < filenames.size(); ++i) {
STGMEDIUM* storage = GetStorageForFileName(filenames[i].path);
DataObjectImpl::StoredDataInfo* info = new DataObjectImpl::StoredDataInfo(
Clipboard::GetCFHDropFormatType().ToFormatEtc(), storage);
data_->contents_.push_back(info);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::paintMaskImages(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutRect& paintRect)
{
bool pushTransparencyLayer = false;
bool compositedMask = hasLayer() && layer()->hasCompositedMask();
bool flattenCompositingLayers = view()->frameView() && view()->frameView()->paintBehavior() & PaintBehaviorFlattenCompositingLayers;
CompositeOperator compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
bool allMaskImagesLoaded = true;
if (!compositedMask || flattenCompositingLayers) {
pushTransparencyLayer = true;
StyleImage* maskBoxImage = style()->maskBoxImage().image();
const FillLayer* maskLayers = style()->maskLayers();
if (maskBoxImage)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskBoxImage->isLoaded();
if (maskLayers)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskLayers->imagesAreLoaded();
paintInfo.context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeDestinationIn);
paintInfo.context->beginTransparencyLayer(1);
compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
}
if (allMaskImagesLoaded) {
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, Color::transparent, style()->maskLayers(), paintRect, BackgroundBleedNone, compositeOp);
paintNinePieceImage(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), style()->maskBoxImage(), compositeOp);
}
if (pushTransparencyLayer)
paintInfo.context->endLayer();
}
|
void RenderBox::paintMaskImages(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutRect& paintRect)
{
bool pushTransparencyLayer = false;
bool compositedMask = hasLayer() && layer()->hasCompositedMask();
bool flattenCompositingLayers = view()->frameView() && view()->frameView()->paintBehavior() & PaintBehaviorFlattenCompositingLayers;
CompositeOperator compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
bool allMaskImagesLoaded = true;
if (!compositedMask || flattenCompositingLayers) {
pushTransparencyLayer = true;
StyleImage* maskBoxImage = style()->maskBoxImage().image();
const FillLayer* maskLayers = style()->maskLayers();
if (maskBoxImage)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskBoxImage->isLoaded();
if (maskLayers)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskLayers->imagesAreLoaded();
paintInfo.context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeDestinationIn);
paintInfo.context->beginTransparencyLayer(1);
compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
}
if (allMaskImagesLoaded) {
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, Color::transparent, style()->maskLayers(), paintRect, BackgroundBleedNone, compositeOp);
paintNinePieceImage(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), style()->maskBoxImage(), compositeOp);
}
if (pushTransparencyLayer)
paintInfo.context->endLayer();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void OverloadedMethodJ1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> string_arg;
string_arg = info[0];
if (!string_arg.Prepare())
return;
impl->overloadedMethodJ(string_arg);
}
|
static void OverloadedMethodJ1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> string_arg;
string_arg = info[0];
if (!string_arg.Prepare())
return;
impl->overloadedMethodJ(string_arg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3842/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
|
int Effect_Release(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
return Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_INIT);
}
|
int Effect_Release(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
return Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_INIT);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoMatrixLoadfCHROMIUM(GLenum matrix_mode,
const volatile GLfloat* matrix) {
DCHECK(matrix_mode == GL_PATH_PROJECTION_CHROMIUM ||
matrix_mode == GL_PATH_MODELVIEW_CHROMIUM);
GLfloat* target_matrix = matrix_mode == GL_PATH_PROJECTION_CHROMIUM
? state_.projection_matrix
: state_.modelview_matrix;
memcpy(target_matrix, const_cast<const GLfloat*>(matrix),
sizeof(GLfloat) * 16);
api()->glMatrixLoadfEXTFn(matrix_mode, target_matrix);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoMatrixLoadfCHROMIUM(GLenum matrix_mode,
const volatile GLfloat* matrix) {
DCHECK(matrix_mode == GL_PATH_PROJECTION_CHROMIUM ||
matrix_mode == GL_PATH_MODELVIEW_CHROMIUM);
GLfloat* target_matrix = matrix_mode == GL_PATH_PROJECTION_CHROMIUM
? state_.projection_matrix
: state_.modelview_matrix;
memcpy(target_matrix, const_cast<const GLfloat*>(matrix),
sizeof(GLfloat) * 16);
api()->glMatrixLoadfEXTFn(matrix_mode, target_matrix);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6769
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6769/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33c5e0a9db05dbd2f7793c23ac23b7aa6a556c05
|
33c5e0a9db05dbd2f7793c23ac23b7aa6a556c05
|
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
|
base::string16 ReplaceEmptyUsername(const base::string16& username) {
if (username.empty())
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PASSWORD_MANAGER_EMPTY_LOGIN);
return username;
}
|
base::string16 ReplaceEmptyUsername(const base::string16& username) {
if (username.empty())
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PASSWORD_MANAGER_EMPTY_LOGIN);
return username;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5940
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5940/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/commit/b8a4ff9775318ca5e679183884a6a63f3da8f863
|
b8a4ff9775318ca5e679183884a6a63f3da8f863
|
replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
|
void wait_for_other(int fd) {
char childstr[BUFLEN + 1];
int newfd = dup(fd);
if (newfd == -1)
errExit("dup");
FILE* stream;
stream = fdopen(newfd, "r");
*childstr = '\0';
if (fgets(childstr, BUFLEN, stream)) {
char *ptr = childstr;
while(*ptr !='\0' && *ptr != '\n')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0')
errExit("fgets");
*ptr = '\0';
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot establish communication with the parent, exiting...\n");
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(childstr, "arg_noroot=0") == 0)
arg_noroot = 0;
fclose(stream);
}
|
void wait_for_other(int fd) {
char childstr[BUFLEN + 1];
int newfd = dup(fd);
if (newfd == -1)
errExit("dup");
FILE* stream;
stream = fdopen(newfd, "r");
*childstr = '\0';
if (fgets(childstr, BUFLEN, stream)) {
char *ptr = childstr;
while(*ptr !='\0' && *ptr != '\n')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0')
errExit("fgets");
*ptr = '\0';
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot establish communication with the parent, exiting...\n");
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(childstr, "arg_noroot=0") == 0)
arg_noroot = 0;
fclose(stream);
}
|
C
|
firejail
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2184
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2184/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be
|
0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int create_standard_audio_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int err;
if (chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x1686, 0x00dd)) /* Zoom R16/24 */
chip->tx_length_quirk = 1;
alts = &iface->altsetting[0];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
err = snd_usb_parse_audio_interface(chip, altsd->bInterfaceNumber);
if (err < 0) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot setup if %d: error %d\n",
altsd->bInterfaceNumber, err);
return err;
}
/* reset the current interface */
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, altsd->bInterfaceNumber, 0);
return 0;
}
|
static int create_standard_audio_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int err;
if (chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x1686, 0x00dd)) /* Zoom R16/24 */
chip->tx_length_quirk = 1;
alts = &iface->altsetting[0];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
err = snd_usb_parse_audio_interface(chip, altsd->bInterfaceNumber);
if (err < 0) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot setup if %d: error %d\n",
altsd->bInterfaceNumber, err);
return err;
}
/* reset the current interface */
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, altsd->bInterfaceNumber, 0);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8117/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/6f737ddfadb596d7d4a993f7ed2141ffd664a81c
|
6f737ddfadb596d7d4a993f7ed2141ffd664a81c
|
- reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
|
file_softmagic(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes,
size_t level, int mode, int text)
{
struct mlist *ml;
int rv, printed_something = 0, need_separator = 0;
for (ml = ms->mlist[0]->next; ml != ms->mlist[0]; ml = ml->next)
if ((rv = match(ms, ml->magic, ml->nmagic, buf, nbytes, 0, mode,
text, 0, level, &printed_something, &need_separator,
NULL)) != 0)
return rv;
return 0;
}
|
file_softmagic(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes,
size_t level, int mode, int text)
{
struct mlist *ml;
int rv, printed_something = 0, need_separator = 0;
for (ml = ms->mlist[0]->next; ml != ms->mlist[0]; ml = ml->next)
if ((rv = match(ms, ml->magic, ml->nmagic, buf, nbytes, 0, mode,
text, 0, level, &printed_something, &need_separator,
NULL)) != 0)
return rv;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/866dc26ad4a98cc835d075b627326e7d7e52ffa1
|
866dc26ad4a98cc835d075b627326e7d7e52ffa1
|
Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
|
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> copy(const BigBuffer& buffer) {
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data = std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]>(new uint8_t[buffer.size()]);
uint8_t* p = data.get();
for (const auto& block : buffer) {
memcpy(p, block.buffer.get(), block.size);
p += block.size;
}
return data;
}
|
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> copy(const BigBuffer& buffer) {
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data = std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]>(new uint8_t[buffer.size()]);
uint8_t* p = data.get();
for (const auto& block : buffer) {
memcpy(p, block.buffer.get(), block.size);
p += block.size;
}
return data;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
resize_hook(SIGNAL_ARG)
{
need_resize_screen = TRUE;
mySignal(SIGWINCH, resize_hook);
SIGNAL_RETURN;
}
|
resize_hook(SIGNAL_ARG)
{
need_resize_screen = TRUE;
mySignal(SIGWINCH, resize_hook);
SIGNAL_RETURN;
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
exsltStrEncodeUriFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int escape_all = 1, str_len = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL, *tmp;
if ((nargs < 2) || (nargs > 3)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs >= 3) {
/* check for UTF-8 if encoding was explicitly given;
we don't support anything else yet */
tmp = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlUTF8Strlen(tmp) != 5 || xmlStrcmp((const xmlChar *)"UTF-8",tmp)) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(tmp);
return;
}
xmlFree(tmp);
}
escape_all = xmlXPathPopBoolean(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
ret = xmlURIEscapeStr(str,(const xmlChar *)(escape_all?"-_.!~*'()":"-_.!~*'();/?:@&=+$,[]"));
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
|
exsltStrEncodeUriFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int escape_all = 1, str_len = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL, *tmp;
if ((nargs < 2) || (nargs > 3)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs >= 3) {
/* check for UTF-8 if encoding was explicitly given;
we don't support anything else yet */
tmp = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlUTF8Strlen(tmp) != 5 || xmlStrcmp((const xmlChar *)"UTF-8",tmp)) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(tmp);
return;
}
xmlFree(tmp);
}
escape_all = xmlXPathPopBoolean(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
ret = xmlURIEscapeStr(str,(const xmlChar *)(escape_all?"-_.!~*'()":"-_.!~*'();/?:@&=+$,[]"));
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8130/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
_tiffReadProc(thandle_t fd, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
/* tmsize_t is 64bit on 64bit systems, but the WinAPI ReadFile takes
* 32bit sizes, so we loop through the data in suitable 32bit sized
* chunks */
uint8* ma;
uint64 mb;
DWORD n;
DWORD o;
tmsize_t p;
ma=(uint8*)buf;
mb=size;
p=0;
while (mb>0)
{
n=0x80000000UL;
if ((uint64)n>mb)
n=(DWORD)mb;
if (!ReadFile(fd,(LPVOID)ma,n,&o,NULL))
return(0);
ma+=o;
mb-=o;
p+=o;
if (o!=n)
break;
}
return(p);
}
|
_tiffReadProc(thandle_t fd, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
/* tmsize_t is 64bit on 64bit systems, but the WinAPI ReadFile takes
* 32bit sizes, so we loop through the data in suitable 32bit sized
* chunks */
uint8* ma;
uint64 mb;
DWORD n;
DWORD o;
tmsize_t p;
ma=(uint8*)buf;
mb=size;
p=0;
while (mb>0)
{
n=0x80000000UL;
if ((uint64)n>mb)
n=(DWORD)mb;
if (!ReadFile(fd,(LPVOID)ma,n,&o,NULL))
return(0);
ma+=o;
mb-=o;
p+=o;
if (o!=n)
break;
}
return(p);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3864
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3864/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/6fe85f7e15203e48df2cc3e8e1c4bc6ad49dc968
|
6fe85f7e15203e48df2cc3e8e1c4bc6ad49dc968
|
MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
|
MPEG4Extractor::MPEG4Extractor(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mMoofOffset(0),
mDataSource(source),
mInitCheck(NO_INIT),
mHasVideo(false),
mHeaderTimescale(0),
mFirstTrack(NULL),
mLastTrack(NULL),
mFileMetaData(new MetaData),
mFirstSINF(NULL),
mIsDrm(false) {
}
|
MPEG4Extractor::MPEG4Extractor(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mMoofOffset(0),
mDataSource(source),
mInitCheck(NO_INIT),
mHasVideo(false),
mHeaderTimescale(0),
mFirstTrack(NULL),
mLastTrack(NULL),
mFileMetaData(new MetaData),
mFirstSINF(NULL),
mIsDrm(false) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
DownloadItemImpl::GetExternalData(const void* key) const {
std::map<const void*, ExternalData*>::const_iterator it =
external_data_map_.find(key);
return (it == external_data_map_.end()) ? NULL : it->second;
}
|
DownloadItemImpl::GetExternalData(const void* key) const {
std::map<const void*, ExternalData*>::const_iterator it =
external_data_map_.find(key);
return (it == external_data_map_.end()) ? NULL : it->second;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5094/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::ScheduleOutputSurfaceAsOverlay(
OverlayProcessor::OutputSurfaceOverlayPlane output_surface_plane) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::ScheduleOutputSurfaceAsOverlay,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), std::move(output_surface_plane));
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::ScheduleOutputSurfaceAsOverlay(
OverlayProcessor::OutputSurfaceOverlayPlane output_surface_plane) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::ScheduleOutputSurfaceAsOverlay,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), std::move(output_surface_plane));
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7501
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7501/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/404ef011c300207cdb1e531670384564aae04bdc
|
404ef011c300207cdb1e531670384564aae04bdc
|
Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
|
static int fsmVerify(const char *path, rpmfi fi)
{
int rc;
int saveerrno = errno;
struct stat dsb;
mode_t mode = rpmfiFMode(fi);
rc = fsmStat(path, 1, &dsb);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
/* HP-UX (and other os'es) don't permit unlink on busy files. */
char *rmpath = rstrscat(NULL, path, "-RPMDELETE", NULL);
rc = fsmRename(path, rmpath);
/* XXX shouldn't we take unlink return code here? */
if (!rc)
(void) fsmUnlink(rmpath);
else
rc = RPMERR_UNLINK_FAILED;
free(rmpath);
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
} else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
rc = fsmStat(path, 0, &dsb);
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) rc = 0;
if (rc) return rc;
errno = saveerrno;
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
char buf[8 * BUFSIZ];
size_t len;
rc = fsmReadLink(path, buf, 8 * BUFSIZ, &len);
errno = saveerrno;
if (rc) return rc;
if (rstreq(rpmfiFLink(fi), buf)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
if (S_ISFIFO(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
} else if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
if ((S_ISCHR(dsb.st_mode) || S_ISBLK(dsb.st_mode)) &&
(dsb.st_rdev == rpmfiFRdev(fi))) return 0;
} else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
if (S_ISSOCK(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
/* XXX shouldn't do this with commit/undo. */
rc = fsmUnlink(path);
if (rc == 0) rc = RPMERR_ENOENT;
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
}
|
static int fsmVerify(const char *path, rpmfi fi)
{
int rc;
int saveerrno = errno;
struct stat dsb;
mode_t mode = rpmfiFMode(fi);
rc = fsmStat(path, 1, &dsb);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
/* HP-UX (and other os'es) don't permit unlink on busy files. */
char *rmpath = rstrscat(NULL, path, "-RPMDELETE", NULL);
rc = fsmRename(path, rmpath);
/* XXX shouldn't we take unlink return code here? */
if (!rc)
(void) fsmUnlink(rmpath);
else
rc = RPMERR_UNLINK_FAILED;
free(rmpath);
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
} else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
rc = fsmStat(path, 0, &dsb);
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) rc = 0;
if (rc) return rc;
errno = saveerrno;
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
char buf[8 * BUFSIZ];
size_t len;
rc = fsmReadLink(path, buf, 8 * BUFSIZ, &len);
errno = saveerrno;
if (rc) return rc;
if (rstreq(rpmfiFLink(fi), buf)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
if (S_ISFIFO(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
} else if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
if ((S_ISCHR(dsb.st_mode) || S_ISBLK(dsb.st_mode)) &&
(dsb.st_rdev == rpmfiFRdev(fi))) return 0;
} else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
if (S_ISSOCK(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
/* XXX shouldn't do this with commit/undo. */
rc = fsmUnlink(path);
if (rc == 0) rc = RPMERR_ENOENT;
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
}
|
C
|
rpm
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2902
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2902/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Layer::RemoveFromParent() {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (parent_)
parent_->RemoveChildOrDependent(this);
}
|
void Layer::RemoveFromParent() {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (parent_)
parent_->RemoveChildOrDependent(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
|
void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
base::AutoReset<bool> in_stop_all_loaders(&in_stop_all_loaders_, true);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->StopLoading();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
DidFinishNavigation();
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
|
void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
base::AutoReset<bool> in_stop_all_loaders(&in_stop_all_loaders_, true);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->StopLoading();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
DidFinishNavigation();
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1790/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
|
b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
| null |
LZWStream::LZWStream(Stream *strA, int predictor, int columns, int colors,
int bits, int earlyA):
FilterStream(strA) {
if (predictor != 1) {
pred = new StreamPredictor(this, predictor, columns, colors, bits);
if (!pred->isOk()) {
delete pred;
pred = NULL;
}
} else {
pred = NULL;
}
early = earlyA;
eof = gFalse;
inputBits = 0;
clearTable();
}
|
LZWStream::LZWStream(Stream *strA, int predictor, int columns, int colors,
int bits, int earlyA):
FilterStream(strA) {
if (predictor != 1) {
pred = new StreamPredictor(this, predictor, columns, colors, bits);
if (!pred->isOk()) {
delete pred;
pred = NULL;
}
} else {
pred = NULL;
}
early = earlyA;
eof = gFalse;
inputBits = 0;
clearTable();
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
MagickExport const char *GetXMLTreeTag(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
return(xml_info->tag);
}
|
MagickExport const char *GetXMLTreeTag(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
return(xml_info->tag);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
|
const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6135/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetNeedsBeginFrame(bool needs_begin_frames) {
if (needs_begin_frames_ == needs_begin_frames)
return;
needs_begin_frames_ = needs_begin_frames;
if (view_)
view_->SetNeedsBeginFrames(needs_begin_frames);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetNeedsBeginFrame(bool needs_begin_frames) {
if (needs_begin_frames_ == needs_begin_frames)
return;
needs_begin_frames_ = needs_begin_frames;
if (view_)
view_->SetNeedsBeginFrames(needs_begin_frames);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8087/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
|
static int hwsim_get_radio_nl(struct sk_buff *msg, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int idx, res = -ENODEV;
if (!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID])
return -EINVAL;
idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID]);
spin_lock_bh(&hwsim_radio_lock);
list_for_each_entry(data, &hwsim_radios, list) {
if (data->idx != idx)
continue;
if (!net_eq(wiphy_net(data->hw->wiphy), genl_info_net(info)))
continue;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
res = mac80211_hwsim_get_radio(skb, data, info->snd_portid,
info->snd_seq, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
nlmsg_free(skb);
goto out_err;
}
genlmsg_reply(skb, info);
break;
}
out_err:
spin_unlock_bh(&hwsim_radio_lock);
return res;
}
|
static int hwsim_get_radio_nl(struct sk_buff *msg, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int idx, res = -ENODEV;
if (!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID])
return -EINVAL;
idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_ID]);
spin_lock_bh(&hwsim_radio_lock);
list_for_each_entry(data, &hwsim_radios, list) {
if (data->idx != idx)
continue;
if (!net_eq(wiphy_net(data->hw->wiphy), genl_info_net(info)))
continue;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
res = mac80211_hwsim_get_radio(skb, data, info->snd_portid,
info->snd_seq, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
nlmsg_free(skb);
goto out_err;
}
genlmsg_reply(skb, info);
break;
}
out_err:
spin_unlock_bh(&hwsim_radio_lock);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7145
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7145/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18f39e7be0121317550d03e267e3ebd4dbfbb3ce
|
18f39e7be0121317550d03e267e3ebd4dbfbb3ce
|
[CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <[email protected]>
|
smb2_echo_callback(struct mid_q_entry *mid)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = mid->callback_data;
struct smb2_echo_rsp *smb2 = (struct smb2_echo_rsp *)mid->resp_buf;
unsigned int credits_received = 1;
if (mid->mid_state == MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED)
credits_received = le16_to_cpu(smb2->hdr.CreditRequest);
DeleteMidQEntry(mid);
add_credits(server, credits_received, CIFS_ECHO_OP);
}
|
smb2_echo_callback(struct mid_q_entry *mid)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = mid->callback_data;
struct smb2_echo_rsp *smb2 = (struct smb2_echo_rsp *)mid->resp_buf;
unsigned int credits_received = 1;
if (mid->mid_state == MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED)
credits_received = le16_to_cpu(smb2->hdr.CreditRequest);
DeleteMidQEntry(mid);
add_credits(server, credits_received, CIFS_ECHO_OP);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6624/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Element* HTMLDocument::activeElement()
{
if (Element* element = treeScope().adjustedFocusedElement())
return element;
return body();
}
|
Element* HTMLDocument::activeElement()
{
if (Element* element = treeScope().adjustedFocusedElement())
return element;
return body();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ClipboardUtil::CFHtmlToHtml(const std::string& cf_html,
std::string* html,
std::string* base_url) {
size_t fragment_start = std::string::npos;
size_t fragment_end = std::string::npos;
ClipboardUtil::CFHtmlExtractMetadata(
cf_html, base_url, NULL, &fragment_start, &fragment_end);
if (html &&
fragment_start != std::string::npos &&
fragment_end != std::string::npos) {
*html = cf_html.substr(fragment_start, fragment_end - fragment_start);
base::TrimWhitespace(*html, base::TRIM_ALL, html);
}
}
|
void ClipboardUtil::CFHtmlToHtml(const std::string& cf_html,
std::string* html,
std::string* base_url) {
size_t fragment_start = std::string::npos;
size_t fragment_end = std::string::npos;
ClipboardUtil::CFHtmlExtractMetadata(
cf_html, base_url, NULL, &fragment_start, &fragment_end);
if (html &&
fragment_start != std::string::npos &&
fragment_end != std::string::npos) {
*html = cf_html.substr(fragment_start, fragment_end - fragment_start);
base::TrimWhitespace(*html, base::TRIM_ALL, html);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11645/
|
CWE-200
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b60d50b7567369ad856cebe1efb6cd7dd2284219
|
b60d50b7567369ad856cebe1efb6cd7dd2284219
| null |
lib_file_open_search_with_combine(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile,
gx_io_device *iodev, bool starting_arg_file, char *fmode)
{
stream *s;
const gs_file_path *pfpath = lib_path;
uint pi;
for (pi = 0; pi < r_size(&pfpath->list); ++pi) {
const ref *prdir = pfpath->list.value.refs + pi;
const char *pstr = (const char *)prdir->value.const_bytes;
uint plen = r_size(prdir), blen1 = blen;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
gp_file_name_combine_result r;
/* We need to concatenate and parse the file name here
* if this path has a %device% prefix. */
if (pstr[0] == '%') {
int code;
/* We concatenate directly since gp_file_name_combine_*
* rules are not correct for other devices such as %rom% */
code = gs_parse_file_name(&pname, pstr, plen, mem);
if (code < 0)
continue;
if (blen < max(pname.len, plen) + flen)
return_error(gs_error_limitcheck);
memcpy(buffer, pname.fname, pname.len);
memcpy(buffer+pname.len, fname, flen);
code = pname.iodev->procs.open_file(pname.iodev, buffer, pname.len + flen, fmode,
&s, (gs_memory_t *)mem);
if (code < 0)
continue;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
/* fill in the buffer with the device concatenated */
memcpy(buffer, pstr, plen);
memcpy(buffer+plen, fname, flen);
*pclen = plen + flen;
return 0;
} else {
r = gp_file_name_combine(pstr, plen,
fname, flen, false, buffer, &blen1);
if (r != gp_combine_success)
continue;
if (iodev_os_open_file(iodev, (const char *)buffer, blen1, (const char *)fmode,
&s, (gs_memory_t *)mem) == 0) {
if (starting_arg_file ||
check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_p, buffer, blen1) >= 0) {
*pclen = blen1;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
return 0;
}
sclose(s);
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
|
lib_file_open_search_with_combine(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile,
gx_io_device *iodev, bool starting_arg_file, char *fmode)
{
stream *s;
const gs_file_path *pfpath = lib_path;
uint pi;
for (pi = 0; pi < r_size(&pfpath->list); ++pi) {
const ref *prdir = pfpath->list.value.refs + pi;
const char *pstr = (const char *)prdir->value.const_bytes;
uint plen = r_size(prdir), blen1 = blen;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
gp_file_name_combine_result r;
/* We need to concatenate and parse the file name here
* if this path has a %device% prefix. */
if (pstr[0] == '%') {
int code;
/* We concatenate directly since gp_file_name_combine_*
* rules are not correct for other devices such as %rom% */
code = gs_parse_file_name(&pname, pstr, plen, mem);
if (code < 0)
continue;
if (blen < max(pname.len, plen) + flen)
return_error(gs_error_limitcheck);
memcpy(buffer, pname.fname, pname.len);
memcpy(buffer+pname.len, fname, flen);
code = pname.iodev->procs.open_file(pname.iodev, buffer, pname.len + flen, fmode,
&s, (gs_memory_t *)mem);
if (code < 0)
continue;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
/* fill in the buffer with the device concatenated */
memcpy(buffer, pstr, plen);
memcpy(buffer+plen, fname, flen);
*pclen = plen + flen;
return 0;
} else {
r = gp_file_name_combine(pstr, plen,
fname, flen, false, buffer, &blen1);
if (r != gp_combine_success)
continue;
if (iodev_os_open_file(iodev, (const char *)buffer, blen1, (const char *)fmode,
&s, (gs_memory_t *)mem) == 0) {
if (starting_arg_file ||
check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_p, buffer, blen1) >= 0) {
*pclen = blen1;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
return 0;
}
sclose(s);
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6309
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6309/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=acacbfa7565c78d2273c0b2a2e5e803f44afefeb
|
acacbfa7565c78d2273c0b2a2e5e803f44afefeb
| null |
int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 0);
}
|
int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 0);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18174/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8dca4a41f1ad65043a78c2338d9725f859c8d2c3
|
8dca4a41f1ad65043a78c2338d9725f859c8d2c3
|
pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
|
static void amd_gpio_irq_mask(struct irq_data *d)
{
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
struct gpio_chip *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(INTERRUPT_MASK_OFF);
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
}
|
static void amd_gpio_irq_mask(struct irq_data *d)
{
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
struct gpio_chip *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(INTERRUPT_MASK_OFF);
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16075
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16075/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableIsolatedCodeCache(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetIsolatedCodeCacheEnabled(enable);
}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableIsolatedCodeCache(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetIsolatedCodeCacheEnabled(enable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
void PaintController::SetImagePainted() {
frame_first_paints_.back().image_painted = true;
}
|
void PaintController::SetImagePainted() {
frame_first_paints_.back().image_painted = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7010
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7010/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int sse4_c(void *v, uint8_t * pix1, uint8_t * pix2, int line_size, int h)
{
int s, i;
uint32_t *sq = ff_squareTbl + 256;
s = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
s += sq[pix1[0] - pix2[0]];
s += sq[pix1[1] - pix2[1]];
s += sq[pix1[2] - pix2[2]];
s += sq[pix1[3] - pix2[3]];
pix1 += line_size;
pix2 += line_size;
}
return s;
}
|
static int sse4_c(void *v, uint8_t * pix1, uint8_t * pix2, int line_size, int h)
{
int s, i;
uint32_t *sq = ff_squareTbl + 256;
s = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
s += sq[pix1[0] - pix2[0]];
s += sq[pix1[1] - pix2[1]];
s += sq[pix1[2] - pix2[2]];
s += sq[pix1[3] - pix2[3]];
pix1 += line_size;
pix2 += line_size;
}
return s;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2706470a422dec8f4ae2538e80f0e7e3c4f4f7f6
|
2706470a422dec8f4ae2538e80f0e7e3c4f4f7f6
|
[Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
void PaymentRequest::OnPaymentResponseAvailable(
mojom::PaymentResponsePtr response) {
journey_logger_.SetEventOccurred(
JourneyLogger::EVENT_RECEIVED_INSTRUMENT_DETAILS);
if (response->method_name.empty() || response->stringified_details.empty()) {
RecordFirstAbortReason(
JourneyLogger::ABORT_REASON_INSTRUMENT_DETAILS_ERROR);
delegate_->ShowErrorMessage();
return;
}
client_->OnPaymentResponse(std::move(response));
}
|
void PaymentRequest::OnPaymentResponseAvailable(
mojom::PaymentResponsePtr response) {
journey_logger_.SetEventOccurred(
JourneyLogger::EVENT_RECEIVED_INSTRUMENT_DETAILS);
if (response->method_name.empty() || response->stringified_details.empty()) {
RecordFirstAbortReason(
JourneyLogger::ABORT_REASON_INSTRUMENT_DETAILS_ERROR);
delegate_->ShowErrorMessage();
return;
}
client_->OnPaymentResponse(std::move(response));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5035/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardTransientEntry() {
if (transient_entry_index_ == -1)
return;
entries_.erase(entries_.begin() + transient_entry_index_);
if (last_committed_entry_index_ > transient_entry_index_)
last_committed_entry_index_--;
transient_entry_index_ = -1;
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardTransientEntry() {
if (transient_entry_index_ == -1)
return;
entries_.erase(entries_.begin() + transient_entry_index_);
if (last_committed_entry_index_ > transient_entry_index_)
last_committed_entry_index_--;
transient_entry_index_ = -1;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1302/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fff450abc4e2fb330ba700547a8e6a7b0fb90a6e
|
fff450abc4e2fb330ba700547a8e6a7b0fb90a6e
|
Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
|
void OutOfProcessInstance::ScrollToY(int y) {
pp::VarDictionary position;
position.Set(kType, kJSSetScrollPositionType);
position.Set(kJSPositionY, pp::Var(y / device_scale_));
PostMessage(position);
}
|
void OutOfProcessInstance::ScrollToY(int y) {
pp::VarDictionary position;
position.Set(kType, kJSSetScrollPositionType);
position.Set(kJSPositionY, pp::Var(y / device_scale_));
PostMessage(position);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2fb4f2c9c461551d43fdfa28ef4c960da81a47dd
|
2fb4f2c9c461551d43fdfa28ef4c960da81a47dd
|
Gate support for certain EOTFs/primaries/matrices on color management / hdr flags
Creates a new class VideoColorSpace specifically for encoding color spaces
according to ISO/IEC 23001-8.
Plumb this color space through from parsing to validation.
BUG=687627
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#456518}
|
bool ParseDolbyVisionCodecId(const std::string& codec_id,
VideoCodecProfile* profile,
uint8_t* level_idc) {
if (!IsDolbyVisionAVCCodecId(codec_id) &&
!IsDolbyVisionHEVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
return false;
}
const int kMaxDvCodecIdLength = 5 // FOURCC string
+ 1 // delimiting period
+ 2 // profile id as 2 digit string
+ 1 // delimiting period
+ 2; // level id as 2 digit string.
if (codec_id.size() > kMaxDvCodecIdLength) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": Codec id is too long (" << codec_id << ")";
return false;
}
std::vector<std::string> elem = base::SplitString(
codec_id, ".", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
DCHECK(elem[0] == "dvh1" || elem[0] == "dvhe" || elem[0] == "dva1" ||
elem[0] == "dvav");
if (elem.size() != 3) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid dolby vision codec id " << codec_id;
return false;
}
unsigned profile_id = 0;
if (elem[1].size() != 2 || !base::StringToUint(elem[1], &profile_id) ||
profile_id > 7) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid format or profile_id=" << elem[1];
return false;
}
switch (profile_id) {
case 0:
if (!IsDolbyVisionAVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": codec id is mismatched with profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE0;
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_HEVC_DEMUXING)
case 4:
case 5:
case 7:
if (!IsDolbyVisionHEVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": codec id is mismatched with profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
if (profile_id == 4)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE4;
else if (profile_id == 5)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE5;
else if (profile_id == 7)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE7;
break;
#endif
default:
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": depecrated and not supported profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
unsigned level_id = 0;
if (elem[2].size() != 2 || !base::StringToUint(elem[2], &level_id) ||
level_id > 9 || level_id < 1) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid format level_id=" << elem[2];
return false;
}
*level_idc = level_id;
return true;
}
|
bool ParseDolbyVisionCodecId(const std::string& codec_id,
VideoCodecProfile* profile,
uint8_t* level_idc) {
if (!IsDolbyVisionAVCCodecId(codec_id) &&
!IsDolbyVisionHEVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
return false;
}
const int kMaxDvCodecIdLength = 5 // FOURCC string
+ 1 // delimiting period
+ 2 // profile id as 2 digit string
+ 1 // delimiting period
+ 2; // level id as 2 digit string.
if (codec_id.size() > kMaxDvCodecIdLength) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": Codec id is too long (" << codec_id << ")";
return false;
}
std::vector<std::string> elem = base::SplitString(
codec_id, ".", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
DCHECK(elem[0] == "dvh1" || elem[0] == "dvhe" || elem[0] == "dva1" ||
elem[0] == "dvav");
if (elem.size() != 3) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid dolby vision codec id " << codec_id;
return false;
}
unsigned profile_id = 0;
if (elem[1].size() != 2 || !base::StringToUint(elem[1], &profile_id) ||
profile_id > 7) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid format or profile_id=" << elem[1];
return false;
}
switch (profile_id) {
case 0:
if (!IsDolbyVisionAVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": codec id is mismatched with profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE0;
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_HEVC_DEMUXING)
case 4:
case 5:
case 7:
if (!IsDolbyVisionHEVCCodecId(codec_id)) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": codec id is mismatched with profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
if (profile_id == 4)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE4;
else if (profile_id == 5)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE5;
else if (profile_id == 7)
*profile = DOLBYVISION_PROFILE7;
break;
#endif
default:
DVLOG(4) << __func__
<< ": depecrated and not supported profile_id=" << profile_id;
return false;
}
unsigned level_id = 0;
if (elem[2].size() != 2 || !base::StringToUint(elem[2], &level_id) ||
level_id > 9 || level_id < 1) {
DVLOG(4) << __func__ << ": invalid format level_id=" << elem[2];
return false;
}
*level_idc = level_id;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
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