text
stringlengths 198
621k
| id
stringlengths 47
47
| dump
stringclasses 95
values | url
stringlengths 15
1.73k
| file_path
stringlengths 110
155
| language
stringclasses 1
value | language_score
float64 0.65
1
| token_count
int64 49
160k
| score
float64 2.52
5.03
| int_score
int64 3
5
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A View from Emerging Technology from the arXiv
The Danger Of Green Laser Pointers
Cheap green laser pointers can emit dangerous levels of infrared radiation, according to an investigation carried out by physicists in the US
Twenty years ago, a green laser would set you back $100,000 and occupy a good-sized dining room table. Today, you can buy a green laser pointer the size of a ball point pen for $15.
These devices create coherent green light in a three step process. A standard laser diode first generates near infrared light with a wavelength of 808nm. This is focused onto a neodymium crystal that converts the light into infrared with a wavelength of 1064nm. In the final step, the light passes into a frequency doubling crystal that emits green light at a wavelength of 532nm.
All this can easily be assembled into a cigar-sized package and powered by a couple of AAA batteries.
The result are devices generally advertised to have a power output of 10mW.
Today, Jemellie Galang and pals from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the University of Maryland say they’ve found worrying evidence that the output of some green laser pointers is much higher and more insidious. They describe one $15 green laser pointer that actually emits ten times more infrared than green light.
Galang and co are under no illusion as to the potential consequences of this. “This is a serious hazard, since humans or animals may incur significant eye damage by exposure to invisible light before they become aware of it,” they say.
And the problem appears to be widespread. “We have found that this problem is common in low-cost green laser pointers, though its seriousness varies widely,” they say.
That’s not a good state of affairs. Any ordinary user would be entirely unaware of the problem because infrared light is invisible. However, Galang and buddies describe a simple way for anybody to detect these infrared emissions.
The method is to reflect the the beam off a standard CD which acts as a diffraction grating, and so separates light of different wavelengths. The diffracted light is reflected onto a piece of paper which displays the diffraction pattern. Many webcams are sensitive to infrared light or can be easily modified to detect it. So photographing the paper using such a camera shows the diffraction pattern of the green light and any infrared light produced too.
The team hasten to emphasize the safety procedures that must be used during such an experiment.
They also take apart the green laser pointer in question to identify the cause of the problem. The design ought to include an infrared filter that blocks any infrared light that isn’t converted to green light. However, the culprit they bought not only did not have the filter, it did not have a slot for such a filter. “We thus believe that the absence of the filter in this case was due to a design decision,” they say
So somebody somewhere has removed the filter from the design, presumably to reduce costs. If that isn’t a criminal act, it ought to be.
Ref: arxiv.org/abs/1008.1452: A Green Laser Pointer Hazard
Become an MIT Technology Review Insider for in-depth analysis and unparalleled perspective.Subscribe today | <urn:uuid:cacc7754-6f01-43a1-a2d1-0767adcfa246> | CC-MAIN-2017-51 | https://www.technologyreview.com/s/420214/the-danger-of-green-laser-pointers/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-51/segments/1512948587496.62/warc/CC-MAIN-20171216084601-20171216110601-00582.warc.gz | en | 0.941103 | 683 | 2.90625 | 3 |
Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance
World mass migration began in the early nineteenth century, when advances in transportation technology and industrial revolutions at home enabled increasing numbers of people to set off for other parts of the globe in search of a better life. Two centuries later, there is no distant African, Asian, or Latin American village that is not within reach of some high-wage OECD labor market. This book is the first comprehensive economic assessment of world mass migration taking a long-run historical perspective, including north-north, south-south, and south-north migrations. Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson, both economists and economic historians, consider two centuries of global mobility, assessing its impact on the migrants themselves as well as on the sending and receiving countries. Global Migration and the World Economy covers two great migration waves: the first, from the 1820s to the beginning of World War I, when immigration was largely unrestricted; the second, beginning in 1950, when mass migration continued to grow despite policy restrictions. The book also explores the period between these two global centuries when world migration shrank sharply because of two world wars, immigration quotas, and the Great Depression. The authors assess the economic performance of these world migrations, the policy reactions to deal with them, and the political economy that connected one with the other. The last third of Global Migration and the World Economy focuses on modern experience and shows how contemporary debates about migration performance and policy can be informed by a comprehensive historical perspective.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262582775. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form. | <urn:uuid:d685ea71-4f76-4d57-a593-982aa0feb5ed> | CC-MAIN-2016-36 | https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262582775.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-36/segments/1471982976017.72/warc/CC-MAIN-20160823200936-00126-ip-10-153-172-175.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.911884 | 471 | 3.09375 | 3 |
As a parent, it’s worrying to see your child throw punches and kicks at a sibling, or throw items around the house. Thankfully, there are ways to channel that aggressive energy into something productive, like martial arts training. Believe it or not, such aggressive acts can greatly benefit your child when its tempered through martial arts training and discipline.
Real martial arts training (unlike what’s shown on television or movies) is based on the principle of non-violence. There are a lot of varieties, types and styles, but all of them are based on strict moral teachings.
Read on to learn about more ways how martial arts help the development of your child.
Martial Arts Promote Mental Health
Whether it’s Kung Fu, Karate, Taekwondo, Kickboxing or some other form, improves psychological health by boosting the student’s self-esteem, confidence, self-discipline and concentration.
The training programs are regulated and structured so students develop greater mental and physical stability. Your child will learn how the mind and body work together, thereby giving him/her a better understanding of co-ordination. The child is trained to perform under pressure. It builds self-confidence in your child and prepares him/her to handle any challenging situation that comes their way. Children who are bullied have the most to gain as it grants them a sense of empowerment by teaching them self-defence.
Martial arts can benefit your kid if he/she suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Children afflicted with these disorders suffer from anxiety, fear and poor memory. The physical activity involved in the training strengthens the neural networks in the brain and enables better self-control in your child.
Martial Arts Fight Obesity
Obesity is currently an epidemic. In recent years, almost 13% of kids in Canada aged between 3-19 years are obese due to lack of physical activity. Obese kids are more likely to grow up into obese adults suffering from various health issues like hypertension, high cholesterol, heart disease, diabetes, stress, anxiety and depression. Many schools now don’t offer physical education programs and even if they do, not all kids are athletic. Martial arts are a great alternative, in fact, a much better alternative to PE programs. Martial arts training will make being active fun, engaging and boost their fitness level.
Martial Arts Improve the Social Skills of Your Child
Social skills are very important part of growing up and succeeding in life. If your child is very shy and quiet, or too talkative and boisterous, he/she can highly benefit from martial arts training. These training programs will teach your child to build healthy relationships with the other kids. He/she will also learn better communication skills, teamwork and conflict resolution while having to communicate with the instructor and other peers.
The lessons your child will learn from attending martial arts training will last for the rest of his/her life. There’s no right age for your kid to be enrolled. It depends on your kid’s interest and if you think that it’s the right time to channel his/her energy into something constructive. Before choosing a martial arts academy for your child, ensure that the location has qualified instructors, good training spaces and safety measures in place. | <urn:uuid:be5fe0c1-8e68-4ced-aad3-d5224c3cb6a9> | CC-MAIN-2021-04 | https://legendsmma.net/kid-learn-martial-arts/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-04/segments/1610703520883.15/warc/CC-MAIN-20210120120242-20210120150242-00395.warc.gz | en | 0.949181 | 685 | 3.125 | 3 |
Despite the fears of a very vocal minority of parents, who not only refuse to have their children vaccinated, but see a government conspiracy in the requirements, childhood immunizations are on the rise. For the oldest and well-known vaccinations such as the polio vaccination, immunization rates are above 90%. In fact less than 1% of children, only 0.6% of the children in the United States receive no vaccinations. For the United States as a whole, polio vaccination is at 93%; measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) is at 92%, chicken pox (varicella) is at 91% and the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (whooping cough) is at 96%.
Childhood Vaccination Rates Remain High in the United States
Over 90% of children between the ages of 19 and 35 months receive vaccinations in accordance with CDC guidelines.
MMR Vacination Rates by State
There is a geographic difference in vaccination rates when examined by state. Of the 50 US states plus the District of Columbia, 13 of these had vaccination rates below the stated public health goal of 90%. Nine of these states are in the western half of the country. Montana (85.1%) had the lowest MMR vaccination rate, followed by Utah (85.5%), Nevada (87.0%), Idaho (87.2%), Arizona (87.7%), Alaska (88.4%), New Mexico (88.8%), Colorado (89.3%) and Washington (89.8%). Only two are located in the Northeast - New Jersey (86.1%) and New York (89.3%). In the South, Louisiana (89.5%) has the lowest MMR vaccination rate. In the Southeast, Kentucky (89.5%) is the lowest.
MMR States with under a 90% vaccination rate
13 of the 50 US States have less than 90% of their children vaccinated for measles, mumps and rubella.
Childhood Vaccination Coverage for the Modified Series
While all states had reached at least 85% coverage for the MMR vaccination. The modified vaccine series varies from Nevada (61.3%) to Wisconsin (82.7%). Across the United States, when state residence is not taken into account, 72.7% of children have received the modified vaccine series. The series as defined by the CDC includes ≥4 doses DTP/DT/DTaP vaccine (diphtheria, tetanus toxoids, and pertussis vaccine; diphtheria and tetanus toxoids vaccine; and diphtheria, tetanus toxoids, and acellular pertussis vaccine), ≥3 doses of poliovirus vaccine, ≥1 dose of any measles-containing vaccine, ≥3 doses of HepB, ≥1 dose of varicella vaccine, and ≥4 doses of PCV. Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccine is excluded.
Only 4 states - Florida (81.0%), New Hampshire (81.0%), Michigan (81.3%) and Wisconsin (82.7%) are above 80% childhood vaccination rates for the modified vaccine series.
States Below the Modified Vaccine Series Average of 72.7% Coverage
How does the CDC collect this childhood vaccination data.
The National Immunization Survey (NIS) is based on information collected quarterly through a randomized phone survey. So there could be a bias towards households that have landlines and against those that do not. It is followed by a mail survey to the vaccination providers. For the 2010 NIS, 63.8% of households answered the questions. Vaccination providers returned vaccination records for 71.2% of all children with completed household interviews, for a total of 17,004 children. | <urn:uuid:dc3246fd-e5ff-4089-857b-dc5be7664c3e> | CC-MAIN-2023-06 | https://wizzley.com/childhood-vaccination-rates-remain-high-in-the-united-states/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499758.83/warc/CC-MAIN-20230129180008-20230129210008-00664.warc.gz | en | 0.937843 | 768 | 3.125 | 3 |
Globally, 840 million people are without access to energy. While nine out of ten people have access, it requires extra resources to provide energy for underserved areas. In 2017, only 78% of rural areas had access to electricity compared to 97% of urban areas. Without electricity, one must spend hours fetching water, vaccines cannot be properly stored at clinics, businesses struggle to be competitive, and children cannot do homework at night. Clean energy for cooking is also a safety concern. Since 2012, there have been about four million premature deaths each year due to a lack of access to clean cooking fuels, and three billion people still don’t have access to these fuels. Also, fossil fuel energy accounts for about 60% of total global greenhouse gas emissions. Ensuring universal access to energy is the primary purpose of Sustainable Development Goal 7.
SDG 7 aims to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.
Targets and Indicators
SDG 7 has five specific goals, or targets, measured through various indicators. One of the targets is to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy services by 2030. Another one is to increase the share of renewable energy globally by 2030, measured through the share of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption. Some secondary goals of this SDG include enhancing international teamwork to achieve accessible clean energy research and technology, as well as expanding infrastructure for providing modern and sustainable energy services.
What’s Already Being Done
The global electrification rate increased from 83 percent to 90 percent from 2010 to 2018. While there has been good progress in increasing access to energy worldwide, there is still a great need for accessible energy in rural areas, especially sub-Saharan Africa, where 53 percent of the population lacks access to electricity.
Within the United States, the American Council on Renewable Energy hopes to perform advocacy for the renewable energy sector. They stated renewable energy created 549,911 jobs in 2019, showing that clean energy is economically beneficial, as well as environmentally beneficial. The organization works on publishing research, educating legislators on policies, and doing outreach on renewable energy’s financial benefits.
Applying It: How Everyone Can Help
Large companies and governments bear an essential responsibility in reducing energy use, but you can help too. Add a rug to your bedroom to increase heat, which allows you to turn the thermostat down. Try plugging in appliances and chargers into a power strip. Instead of just hopping in your car to get somewhere, maybe you can ride a bike, walk, take the bus, or even consider carpooling with friends. Reusing products also helps to reduce the industrial use of energy. You can shop for clothes at second-hand stores, drink from a refillable water bottle, and use reusable bags at the grocery store. Though small, these steps can help the world meet SDG 7! | <urn:uuid:8f66383c-0050-48da-b460-a250ebea3f90> | CC-MAIN-2023-40 | https://academy4sc.org/video/sustainable-development-goal-7-affordable-and-clean-energy/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-40/segments/1695233511386.54/warc/CC-MAIN-20231004152134-20231004182134-00479.warc.gz | en | 0.944191 | 596 | 3.609375 | 4 |
Suppose you are Jabir. Once you were going to a nearby shop to pay electricity bill by mobile phone. On the way, you met with a friend named Tanin who, truly speaking, is addicted to mobile phone. Now,
Write a dialogue between you and your friend about the uses and abuses of mobile phone
A dialogue between myself (Jabir) and my friend (Tanin) about the uses and abuses of mobile phone—
Jabir : Hi Tanin, you seem to have got addicted to mobile phone. Raise your head.
Tanin: Oh no, I was enjoying a ghost scene. Yes, Tanin. Really I’m wasting a lot of time on mobile phone nowadays. However, where are you going?
Jabir : To pay electricity bill by mobile phone.
Tanin: Think over, Jabir; how comfortable and easeful mobile phone has made our life.
Jabir : Really it is a miracle. No tension, no wait, no stress, no uncertainty, no misunderstanding. You can do global communication in seconds. Everything is in the grip of your hand.
Tanin: It appears that you are here means you are everywhere.
Jabir : Everything is right, Tanin. But this wonderful machine has also its demerits.
Tanin: Quite right. For example I’m ruining my education by wasting time.
Jabir : You are a simple example, Tanin.
Tanin: What are the other abuses of mobile phone?
Jabir : Criminals run their crime network through mobile; drivers talking over mobile while driving are likely to cause serious accident. Besides, radiation emerged from mobile phone causes serious health hazard.
Tanin: What are health problems mobile phone can create?
Jabir : Excessive use of mobile can cause brain cancer or brain tumor, loss of hearing, heart-risk, genetic damage, increased stress etc.
Tanin: Really a matter of great concern.
Jabir : Yes, Tanin. But there is no unmixed blessing in the world. We have to accept the good side and reject the bad one.
Tanin: Thank you, Jabir. I’ve got very important information from you about mobile phone abuse. It’ll help me get aware.
Jabir : Thank you too. | <urn:uuid:4087f9dc-92d6-40f1-977b-a86cc93a2a9d> | CC-MAIN-2023-40 | https://www.lessonbangla.com/dialogue-between-you-and-your-friend-about-the-uses-and-abuses-of-mobile-phone/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-40/segments/1695233510734.55/warc/CC-MAIN-20231001005750-20231001035750-00330.warc.gz | en | 0.932496 | 496 | 2.515625 | 3 |
Join the Nation's Conversation
To find out more about Facebook commenting please read the Conversation Guidelines and FAQs
Injuries and death from window blind cords send two kids to emergency department each day
Study says childen's injuries and deaths from window blinds have not stalled despite decades of safety concerns. (Dec. 11) AP
While the cords dangling from your window blinds may not seem like a risky item, for small children, they can pose the risk of strangulation or serious injury, according to a new report.
The study published in the journal Pediatrics found that from 1990 through 2015, 17,000 children under six, or almost two children a day, wound up in the emergency department for window blind-related injuries. According to a statement from the Center for Injury Research and Policy at Nationwide Children's Hospital of those injured the majority were released, but the study found that about one child each month died when their neck became entangled in a window blind cord.
Many parents believe that they can keep their children from harm if they watch them carefully, but many blind related injuries happen within minutes, Gary Smith, MD, senior author of the study and director of the Center for Injury Research and Policy at Nationwide Children’s Hospital said in a statement.
“A curious child can quickly get entangled in a window blind cord," Smith said. "This can lead to strangulation within minutes, and the parent may not hear a thing because the child often can’t make a sound while this is happening.”
Data for the study was obtained from National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) and In-Depth Investigation (IDI) databases, which are maintained by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
According to the study, the dangers of blind cords peak for children ages 1 to 4, when a child's mobility increases. Smith said in a statement that it's "unacceptable that children are still dying from window blind cord strangulation."
He said the current voluntary safety standards surrounding blind cords are not enough, and called on parents to swap out blinds for cordless blinds and shades.
"A mandatory federal safety standard should be adopted prohibiting the sale of products with accessible cords," he said.
The study said parents should replace all blinds with cords, or purchase retrofit kits that can address some of the cord hazards.
Parents can also move furniture away from windows so children cannot climb on them to get to window blind cords. | <urn:uuid:a66b154f-159a-434e-809f-b8ad0f001e22> | CC-MAIN-2018-47 | https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/12/11/injuries-and-death-window-blind-cords-send-two-kids-emergency-department-each-day/939705001/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-47/segments/1542039746301.92/warc/CC-MAIN-20181120071442-20181120093442-00147.warc.gz | en | 0.956877 | 503 | 2.640625 | 3 |
Put an end to some students' frustration with homework by giving them a "green light." Assign the first few questions from the homework assignment as a "green light" activity near the end of the class period. When students have completed those questions, look over their responses; give them permission to move on, or help them to get on track with the assignment. You might write "green light" on the page or hand out a green candy or stick a green-dot sticker on the paper. The "green light" gives students a good start on their homework and builds confidence. And it can be fun!
Education World Teacher Feature: Starring Carol Gibson
(Education World, February 28, 2005)
Article by Cara Bafile
Copyright © 2005 Education World | <urn:uuid:abc2183c-e233-4ed9-9c32-2d70fe974f53> | CC-MAIN-2016-26 | http://www.educationworld.com/a_curr/homeworktips/homeworktips002.shtml | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-26/segments/1466783396106.71/warc/CC-MAIN-20160624154956-00152-ip-10-164-35-72.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.946244 | 159 | 2.734375 | 3 |
Kline -- 1937 Alfa Romeo 12C-37
Jeff Kline's powerful
and impressive 1937 Alfa Romeo 12C-37 V12 Grand Prix car won the race for
the later, faster Pre- War cars. This car battled the "Silver Arrows"
of Mercedes-Benz and Auto Union in the climactic era of Pre-War Grand
World War II hit automobile
racing like the asteroid impact that ended the age of the dinosaurs.
This mass extinction stopped the development of many complex and interesting
cars. Nothing like them ever appeared again.
Next: Pre-War Cars -- 2
Back to: Pre-War
Cars -- 1 (2)
Back to: Monterey
Historics 2000 -- Homepage | <urn:uuid:45bbf4ac-33e6-4701-a499-c359d1aee1db> | CC-MAIN-2017-04 | http://www.tamsoldracecarsite.net/PreWar2.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-04/segments/1484560280485.79/warc/CC-MAIN-20170116095120-00210-ip-10-171-10-70.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.842982 | 154 | 2.78125 | 3 |
Landing a spacecraft on the surface of Mars is a Herculean task. Payloads reach hypersonic speeds as they heat up while entering the Martian atmosphere — the reason scientists have referred to it as the “seven minutes of terror.”
Many spacecraft have slowed their descents to Mars using large parachutes. But landing heavier spacecraft on the Red Planet, like those with a human crew, will pose new engineering challenges, according to new research — and a potential solution could involve a harrowing nose dive.
“Unfortunately, parachute systems do not scale well with increasing vehicle mass,” said assistant professor in the Department of Aerospace Engineering at the University of Illinois Zach Putnam in a press release. “The new idea is to eliminate the parachute and use larger rocket engines for descent.”
The paper Putnam co-authored about optimizing the trajectories that Mars landers should take on descent was published in the Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets.
There’s another issue that comes along with larger rockets: more valuable space used up by additional rocket fuel. And that’s space that could be used for scientific instruments or even human passengers.
Luckily, there might be a middle ground: pre-determined trajectories could minimize the need for massive parachutes or giant tanks of additional propellants to fire descent system rockets.
To pull that off, the vehicle would have to dive down, then turn its nose up just at the right time to fly over the Martian surface at a low altitude.
“This enables the vehicle to spend more time flying low where the atmospheric density is higher,” Putnam said. “This increases the drag, reducing the amount of energy that must be removed by the descent engines.”
READ MORE: Developing a Flight Strategy to Land Heavier Vehicles on Mars [University of Illinois]
More on landing on Mars: Breaking: NASA’s InSight Lander Just Landed on Mars | <urn:uuid:e1c3a7a6-79b3-44e1-9a82-cd5765a34d34> | CC-MAIN-2019-30 | https://futurism.com/mars-lander-heavy-payloads | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-30/segments/1563195525414.52/warc/CC-MAIN-20190717221901-20190718003901-00147.warc.gz | en | 0.918664 | 403 | 3.75 | 4 |
Babies tend to move more at certain times of the day as they alternate between alertness and sleep. They are usually most active between 9 p.m. and 1 a.m., right as you’re trying to get to sleep. This surge in activity is due to your changing blood sugar levels.
Are fetuses more active at night?
Now a University of Auckland-led study shows it is entirely normal in late pregnancy for babies to be more active in the evening and bedtime, and that babies’ movements tend to keep getting stronger even as they come to term.
Is it normal for baby to move all day in womb?
However, some babies are more active than others. Ultimately, doctors will look for approximately one active hour a day as the guidelines of a healthy pregnancy. Still, some babies are more active. Activity in the womb is normal, and the overall level will vary even from pregnancy to pregnancy.
Why is my baby more active at night in the womb?
Pregnant women often observe more movements during the night time. One of the common reasons that could explain this pattern is that baby becomes more alert when he/ she is not feeling any activity. While would-be-mothers are more active during the day, baby goes into the sleeping mode.
Do babies move less some days?
“Some days my baby kicks so hard, but then I can go a full day without noticing much movement. … Once your baby’s head is engaged in your pelvis, he or she will be even less mobile. As long as you’re feeling regular movement (don’t forget to count those kicks), it’s less important what type of movement it is.
Who moves early in womb boy or girl?
One study, published in 2001 in the journal Human Fetal and Neonatal Movement Patterns, found that boys may move around more in the womb than girls. The average number of leg movements was much higher in the boys compared to the girls at 20, 34 and 37 weeks, that study found.
What does it look like when a baby kicks inside you?
Others describe first baby kicks to feel like flutters, gas bubbles, tumbling, a light tickle, a painless “zapping” feeling, a light flicking, or a gentle thud or tap. As baby grows, movements will become much more pronounced and you will feel them more frequently.
What does it mean if baby kicks a lot?
Babies who kick a lot in the womb are also more active after birth. Some mothers have more trouble feeling the kicks than others. If the placenta is on the front side of the womb, or if you are overweight, you will feel the kicks less. You can practice feeling for kicks when you check to see if your stomach moves.
Is baby kicking a lot a good sign?
On your end, the kicks and jabs are also good signs that the baby is doing well in there, which is why most prenatal health practitioners recommend tracking your baby’s kicks once a day.
How can you tell if your baby is stressed in the womb?
Heart rate abnormalities that are signs of fetal distress:
Tachycardia (an abnormally fast heart rate) Bradycardia (an abnormally slow heart rate) Variable decelerations (abrupt decreases in heart rate) Late decelerations (late returns to the baseline heart rate after a contraction)
Do babies have quiet days in the womb?
A: It’s normal for babies to have quiet periods in utero, and a temporary dip in activity could just mean that your baby is sleeping or he’s low on energy because you haven’t eaten in a while. However, if you sense an overall slowdown in movement, call your doctor.
Can I sleep on my right side while pregnant?
There’s a lot you may worry about during your pregnancy. Your sleep position doesn’t need to be top of the list. Doctors recommend resting on your side — right or left — to give you and your baby the optimal blood flow.
Who is more active in womb girl or boy?
Conclusion: Despite numerous prior studies derived from small samples failing to reveal significant sex differences in fetal activity, the present study demonstrates that males are about 10% more active than females during the latter two-thirds of pregnancy and are even more so following birth.
What happens if baby movements slow down?
It is not true that babies ‘slow down’ as labor approaches, but they have less space to move in. During your pregnancy you should try to be aware of your baby’s movement patterns. If the movements slow down or change it could be a sign that your baby is unwell and you should contact your midwife immediately.
How long is too long not feeling baby move?
Generally speaking, if you don’t feel at least 10 fetal movements in two hours, call your doctor to make sure that you’re not at risk for stillbirth. If you’re more than 28 weeks pregnant, your doctor may ask you to come in for a non-stress test (NST) to make sure that your baby isn’t in distress.
How can I make my baby move?
8 Tricks for Getting Your Baby to Move in Utero
- Have a snack.
- Do some jumping jacks, then sit down.
- Gently poke or jiggle your baby bump.
- Shine a flashlight on your tummy.
- LEARN MORE: Fetal Movement During Pregnancy and How to Do a Kick Count.
- Lie down.
- Talk to baby.
- Do something that makes you nervous (within reason). | <urn:uuid:3c2500b1-6b12-4605-a16e-96469cedf5ea> | CC-MAIN-2021-31 | https://thenewnormalpodcast.com/kids/what-time-of-day-are-babies-most-active-in-the-womb.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-31/segments/1627046153739.28/warc/CC-MAIN-20210728154442-20210728184442-00569.warc.gz | en | 0.944281 | 1,193 | 2.734375 | 3 |
Affordable and automated mobile-based microscopy
An affordable and automated alternative to conventional microscopes, tailored to effectively support microscopy-based diagnosis in areas with limited access to healthcare services.
Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) affect over 1.5 billion of the world’s poorest population. Microscopic examination is the gold standard for the diagnosis of several NTDs, but reliable diagnosis in rural endemic areas is often limited by lack of trained personnel and adequate equipment. Consequently, NTDs are commonly misdiagnosed and people receive inadequate treatment.
AICOS has been performing research in the field of Mobile Microscopy since 2013, which started with the development a fully automated 3D-printed smartphone microscope, termed μSmartScope. Through the usage of a motorised automated stage fully powered and controlled by a smartphone, the μSmartScope allows autonomous acquisition of microscopic images, with the ultimate goal of decreasing the burden of manual microscopy examination.
The μSmartScope also aims to reduce dependence on experts in microscopy diagnosis available on-site, by allowing straightforward integration with Artificial Intelligence (AI). Particularly, computer vision modules can be easily embedded in the μSmartScope framework to support the diagnosis of target pathologies.
The μSmartScope has already been tested for NTDs like Malaria, Chagas, Cervical Cancer and Microfilaria. It was demonstrated that is possible to distinguish those agents on the acquired images, which clearly illustrates the huge potential of μSmartScope to support microscopy diagnosis in medically-underserved regions.
In addition, an AI-powered version of the μSmartScope is being developed for the automated detection of malaria, with already reported results of 73.9-96.2% sensitivity and 92.6%-99.3% specificity, using a dataset of 566 malaria-infected thin blood smear images. | <urn:uuid:0bdab939-d505-4c73-a036-b993a50ba76f> | CC-MAIN-2019-47 | https://www.aicos.fraunhofer.pt/en/our_work/portfolio/micron.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-47/segments/1573496668539.45/warc/CC-MAIN-20191114205415-20191114233415-00482.warc.gz | en | 0.932221 | 382 | 2.78125 | 3 |
CRISPR – The Game Changer comes to Human
It is exactly an year ago, I came across this term called ‘CRISPR’ and I had no clue that it would be the most vital Game changer then. From then, as every other Life science student, I was really very excited to have an opportunity to work with this technology. Today, though I may not get my hands on to use it, I can witness the magic happening in my lab with this hot player in the town.
Giving hopes to the unimaginable things and to the dream world, finally CRISPR has moved them from mere Science fiction to reality.
The Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) is an adaptive bacterial immune system that allows them to detect viral DNA and destroy them. Everyday bacteria has to deal with a variety of viral infections, and it has only a few minutes to diffuse them before the viral has its hold upon the bacteria. Part of the system is a protein called Cas9, which seek out, cut and eventually degrade the viral DNA. But this system is modified to use it as an Genetic Engineering tool to cut specific sequences in genome of any other organism and not just the viral DNA.
Way back in 2013, when Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier worked on a small project studying about bacteria and flu, they did not have believed that it was a project that could be the greatest breakthrough in the scientific world. Their study on how bacteria fight viral infections led them to CRISPR. From then, Jennifer had been making hopes for this technology as it has no bounds. This came true when the Chinese scientists came out with the ‘Designer babies’. They showed it is possible to genome edit the human embryo to our will. The Philadelphians used CRISPR to remove the DNA from an integrated HIV virus from the human cells.
When many companies have started commercialising the technique and venture capitalists started pouring in more money, and with CRISPR in the hotseat, Jennifer along with her colleagues called for a global pause to cease the use of this technology on human embryo and think about the unintended consequences as well as the intended outcomes of this scientific breakthrough.
The Science has already moved faster than we imagined of. Very recently, week ago, the FDA and National Institute of Health with the Recombinant advisory committee has agreed to test CRISPR’s first ever human clinical trial to combat blood cancers like myeloma, melanoma and sarcoma. This is one huge step forward towards the future of Genome Engineering.
“Genome engineered humans are not with us yet, but it is no longer science fiction”
With America waving its flag green, there are still controversies regarding the use of this technology. The advisory committee made sure the therapy is somatic and not germ line, thus leaving the gene pool undisturbed. The therapy aims in modifying the T-lymphocyte cells taken from the cancer patients and deleting a couple genes PD-1 and a TCR to go undetectable by the cancer cells and offer prolonged fight in destroying them. Troubleshooting at the laboratory with mice models, showed a decrease in the number of cancer cells to a greater extent than imagined of.
I am not writing this article to showlight the CRISPR’s human trial but its dynamism. CRSIPR technology can be used to enhance abilities of an organism including our own species. When I talk about enhancement, I am talking of abilities that were once a fiction(stronger muscles, bones, less cardiac diseases). Genome engineered animals and plants are happening right now. A week ago again the world sees the first CRISPR edited crop. I feel this is the time to think Science since finally this technology is moving towards Human genome engineering.http://www.geneticengg.com/2016/06/24/crispr-the-game-changer-comes-to-human/http://www.geneticengg.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/JADwithCRISPR750.jpghttp://www.geneticengg.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/JADwithCRISPR750-150x150.jpgGenome engineeringCharpentier,CRISPR,Genome enginering,Jennifer doudna,T-cellsIt is exactly an year ago, I came across this term called ‘CRISPR’ and I had no clue that it would be the most vital Game changer then. From then, as every other Life science student, I was really very excited to have an opportunity to work with this...Sudharsan VaratharajanSudharsan Varatharajanv.firstname.lastname@example.orgAdministratorGeneticEngg.com | <urn:uuid:d4ab7f9f-e019-4714-ae86-8a18c11963a4> | CC-MAIN-2018-05 | http://www.geneticengg.com/2016/06/24/crispr-the-game-changer-comes-to-human/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-05/segments/1516084887832.51/warc/CC-MAIN-20180119065719-20180119085719-00176.warc.gz | en | 0.94693 | 1,022 | 2.640625 | 3 |
What Does psychologist Mean?Quite a few therapists settle for overall health insurance. Verify to determine Should your insurance plan is covered. Feel free to debate this when you Call the therapist.
review the psychological development and progress that happen all through daily life. Numerous developmental psychologists focus on small children and adolescents, but they also may well analyze getting old and issues going through more mature Grown ups.
Postsecondary academics instruct students in a wide variety of educational and specialized topics past the highschool amount. They could also perform exploration and publish scholarly papers and books.
Whilst psychologists generally require a doctoral diploma in psychology, a grasp’s degree is adequate for a few positions. Most psychologists also need a license.
This technique might be a very successful way of obtaining very good psychologists within your Neighborhood. A 2nd solution should be to ask trusted friends for members of the family who they would advocate.
Find out more regarding the job outlook for psychologists and find which fields of psychology give the greatest probable for advancement.
Working towards psychologists are also educated to administer and interpret numerous tests and assessments that will help diagnose a issue or notify more about how an individual thinks, feels and behaves.
), or are fully against their Concepts? Are you presently frustrated by your attempts to search out a highly effective treatment method that doesn't demand abstinence or preach the dogma of Nameless Teams/twelve-Move Applications? Have you at any time puzzled if there was a far better technique for dealing with addictions besides regular methods? There exists a way!"
Psychologists should have solid conversation techniques since they expend Substantially in their time Hearing and Talking with people or describing their study.
The things they Do: Psychologists study cognitive, emotional, and social procedures and habits by observing, interpreting, and recording how folks relate to one Psychologue enfant Paris another and to their environments.
A psychologist plus a psychiatrist in many cases are perplexed as possessing the identical indicating. Although the two examine the Mind, thoughts, thoughts and thoughts, There may be a distinct difference between the two fields of review. The first variances amongst the two fields is mainly the instruction necessities, the precise schooling, follow and income. In the event your career is to be a psychologist, you'd get started your instruction having an undergraduate major in psychology. Right after earning either a bachelor of science in psychology or perhaps a bachelor of art in psychology, you would probably then have to go to a graduate plan to generate a masters diploma in addition to a doctorate diploma in psychology.
The popular blog has won many awards, and it’s simple to see why. Brain Blogger is a necessity-stick to resource for anybody planning to sustain with news referring to the review with the Mind and thoughts.
Some psychologists work independently, performing investigation or Operating only with clients or shoppers. Other people operate as part of a Health care group, collaborating with physicians, social workers, and Many others to deal with illness and encourage Over-all wellness.
Ny, Ny 10024 Watch "My non-public observe provides a heat and caring position to build capabilities and enhance individual expansion. Therapy is a guided process of self-discovery, furnishing entry to strengthening techniques making sure that new and more healthy thoughts and behaviors go ahead and take put of outdated harmful types. | <urn:uuid:02222d66-c638-4610-96f2-17beee73a04e> | CC-MAIN-2019-51 | http://codyxruli.mybjjblog.com/what-does-psychologist-mean-9535181 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-51/segments/1575540525598.55/warc/CC-MAIN-20191209225803-20191210013803-00176.warc.gz | en | 0.957772 | 672 | 2.65625 | 3 |
Interest rates have a pretty big affect on the housing market. Obviously the higher that an interest rate is, the more difficult it will be to pay a mortgage. There are other factors at play as well such as inflation. The way that the government fights against inflation is to raise interest rates. Affordability can affect the housing market but not as much as one would think. At the end of the day, the housing market is always going to be in high demand as people need places to live.
- Interest rates are very low right now but they are still above the Feds target rate of 2% over inflation.
- The higher an interest rate, the less affordable a mortgage will be for most borrowers.
- When it comes to affordability, it will affect the housing market but not as much as you’d think as there is always demand.
“The government’s primary tool to battle inflation is raised interest rates, which works by reducing the supply of money in the economy. And while this tactic tends to work at managing inflation, rising interest rates can slow or perhaps even reserve gains in property prices.” | <urn:uuid:d8408651-dbcb-41f0-83a3-d371da5131fa> | CC-MAIN-2023-06 | https://40plusfinance.com/how-do-interest-rates-affect-the-housing-market/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764500215.91/warc/CC-MAIN-20230205032040-20230205062040-00431.warc.gz | en | 0.981113 | 236 | 2.6875 | 3 |
” In research writing, sources are cited for two reasons: to alert readers to the sources of your information and to give credit to the writers from whom you have borrowed words and ideas.”
–Diana Hacker, A Writer’s Reference
UConn students are responsible under the Student Code, Appendix A on Academic Integrity, for acknowledging the research and ideas of others, knowing what plagiarism is, and creating accurate bibliographies or “works cited” lists. Whenever you use the quotes or thoughts of others in your own papers, you must indicate where you found them. Each citation should include enough information so that the reader can easily track down the material.
Where do I begin? For starters, check you syllabus or ask your instructor to see what citation style you may be required to use for your papers. Different disciplines use different styles. For example, APA (American Psychological Association) is typically used in the social sciences, MLA (Modern Language Association) in English and literature, and Turabian in history. The Library has style books and online guides to help.
- Citation Guides & RefWorks
- Publication manual of the American Psychological Association, 6th Ed. Call Number : BF76.7 .P83 2010
- MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th ed. Call Number : LB2369 .G53 2009
- Chicago Manual of Style (Turabian). Call Number : Z253 .U69 2010 )
What is a citation? Citations are what you find in bibliographies. It will provide your reader with the information needed to identify your source. A citation of a book generally includes: author(s), title, publisher, date. A citation of an article generally includes: author(s), article title, magazine title, volume, pages, and date. Citations for web documents and articles from databases also include a URL and the date the information was accessed.
How do I cite? Detailed instructions and examples of how to do citations and bibliographies for papers are found in style manuals. You will also need to learn how to paraphrase and summarize so that you avoid plagiarizing. Often, citing is a two-step process. First you’ll quote, paraphrase, summarize, or refer to information from a particular source and then you’ll direct the reader to the exact title listed in your bibliography.
Example, if you’re writing about bullying and documenting data stated by Whitted and Dupper found on page 167 of an article, your paragraph may read as follows: According to Whitted, thirty percent of students in grades 6 -10 reported bullying.
Whitted, Kathryn S., and David R. Dupper. “Best practices for preventing or reducing bullying in schools.” Children & Schools 27.3 (2005): 167-175.
Whitted, K. S., & Dupper, D. R. (2005). Best practices for preventing or reducing bullying in schools. Children & Schools, 27(3), 167-175.
What do I have to cite? You need to cite anything that you found in outside sources, whether the source is from a printed or online source, or directly from an interview with someone who is providing data for your paper. When in doubt, cite. Cite:
- newspaper articles or magazine articles
- books or book chapters
- web sites and web pages
- statistics and charts
- emails, interviews or speeches
- group projects
What is plagiarism? The most basic definition is copying text and using it without giving credit to the author. Many times, plagiarism issues come up because of lack of experience in researching a topic, writing a paper, and creating bibliographies according to specific styles. The most common cases include:
- copying someone else’s words from print or web sites without citing the sources
- quoting, paraphrasing or summarizing someone incorrectly
- downloading a paper from a “free source”
- cutting and pasting from a variety of sources without citing the sources
- recycling an old paper
Online Citation Tools The following web sites are helpful in creating your citations and formatting your paper. Note that the software behind these interactive tools, do not correct spelling errors or take into account and special circumstances that you may need to cite accurately. Always double check your citations with style books and library handouts.
EasyBib : Creates citations in MLA style.
NoodleBib : Creates citations in MLA, APA, and Chicago styles.
Purdue OWL : Detailed guides to creating citations and formatting papers for MLA and APA formats, among others. | <urn:uuid:0e2c042e-eb25-4fc4-982a-841234c4d7b4> | CC-MAIN-2017-34 | http://lib.dev.uconn.edu/about/get-help/research/citing-sources/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-34/segments/1502886116921.70/warc/CC-MAIN-20170823000718-20170823020718-00152.warc.gz | en | 0.885326 | 959 | 3.625 | 4 |
Microsoft remote desktop is essentially a tool that is used to access a desktop from a remote location. The application is produced by Microsoft and the client comes pre-installed with most recent versions of windows.
The Microsoft remote desktop host protocol comes with most professional and server based operating systems.
uses of Microsoft remote desktop
The term Microsoft remote desktop is a literal description of the tool. The common use of Microsoft remote desktop is to control computers that are in a remote location. This could include:
- Logging in to your home PC, from your workplace
- Controlling a workplace server from your home
- Controlling a server that is hosted in a data center
- Controlling a dedicated CCTV or similar functional PC system that does not have a physical screen attached to it
The typical setup of a remote desktop scenario would be remote desktop protocol enabled on a host computer. The Microsoft remote desktop client would then be used on the client computer to gain access to the remote computer via the RDP Protocol.
Remote Desktop Protocol
The remote desktop protocol is the actual method of controlling a PC remotely. The protocol outlines the way in which the video image is sent via TCP/IP to the client and how the keystrokes and mouse gestures are sent back to the host.
The Microsoft remote desktop protocol operates over port 3389. There are various versions of the remote desktop protocol. Which version you use will depend on the client and the host operating system. They will both agree on the best protocol that they can both use.
- Efficient Intel Celeron N4020 Processor (4M Cache,...
- 11.6” HD (1366 x 768) Slim Display
Keep in mind that newer operating systems (especially server based) will only accept connections from clients that are on a new remote desktop protocol. This can be changed by editing settings on the host. That is beyond the scope of this article.
How to configure remote desktop on the host
Windows XP, Windows 7 and server operating systems from server 2003 onwards all have very similar configuration procedures for enabling Microsoft remote desktop.
Enable Microsoft remote desktop
Enabling Microsoft remote desktop is just the first step. Microsoft remote desktop can be enabled from Control Panel, System, remote settings.
As well as enabling Microsoft remote desktop, you will also have the option of allowing older versions of teh RDP protocol to connect to this host. Lastly, you will be able to select users that have access via remote desktop. Note that the user you are currently logged in as will have access by default.
Password requirements for Microsoft remote desktop
It is important to note that in order to make a computer accessible via Microsoft remote desktop, it has to have a password set.
The second step in enabling Microsoft remote desktop on the host is adding a firewall exception locally.
This can be done via Control Panel, Windows Firewall. Here you will be able to allow Remote desktop connections through the local windows firewall.
The last step in most cases will be to add a rule to your hardware firewall. Whilst you may not think you ahve a hardware firewall, you probably will. Most home routers serve as hardware firewalls.
For Microsoft remote desktop to get past your firewall/router you will need to open TCP port 3389 and direct it to the local IP of the host computer.
You can find the IP address of your computer AND your firewall by opeing a command prompt in windows and typing the following:
This will report back the IP address (thats your PC IP address) and the Default Gateway, which is your routers IP address.
Take a note of the PC IP address, then browse to the default gateway address via your Internet browser. You will then be prompted to log in to your router after which you can find the port forwarding or firewall section and allow the port to your local IP address.
Its worth noting that you should probably assign your PC with a static IP address via the router, so that it doesn’t change.
There is a great website that goes into much more detail about port forwarding here.
At this stage, Microsoft remote desktop should work. However, going forward you will either need a static public IP address, or a dynamic DNS service such as no-ip so that you can always contact your host computer remotely.
How to access the host via remote desktop client
Once everything is set up on the host comptuer, you are ready to access the device form a remote client. On the remote client it should be as simple as locating Microsoft remote desktop. Normally Microsoft remote desktop is located in Start Menu, All Programs, Accessories, Remote Desktop.
If you have an operating system of Windows Vista or newer, you can simply search for “Remote Desktop”.
You will tehn be prompted to enter the computer/Host. This is simply the public IP address of the network where your host computer resides, or the DNS name if you are using a dynamic DNS service.
Click connect and you will be asked for the credentials to connect to your remote computer.
Microsoft remote desktop for other devices
The fun doesn’t stop there. There are also lots of third party remote desktop apps available as well as some written by Microsoft and available on other platforms.
A great example of this is the Microsoft Remote Desktop App for IOS. This app is written by Microsoft, for Apple devices. It enables you to connect to your Microsoft remote desktop host computer from your iPhone and iPad! | <urn:uuid:f863420e-b7d6-461e-937b-2bb276bd775a> | CC-MAIN-2021-21 | https://bloggtech.com/technology/microsoft-remote-desktop/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-21/segments/1620243989766.27/warc/CC-MAIN-20210512162538-20210512192538-00553.warc.gz | en | 0.918786 | 1,119 | 2.84375 | 3 |
May 11, 1998
Margaret Fuller: Performing Civic Equality
Images courtesy of the Margaret Fuller Society Homepage
RELATED WEB SITES
Fuller as Muse of the Women's Rights Movement
Godey's Lady Book: Letters of the Separate Sphere
Quotes from other Nineteenth Century Freethinking Women
A Brief History of the Women's Rights Movement
The French Connection: Romantics and Jacobins
RELATED ELECTRONIC TEXTS
Declaration of Sentiments and Declarations of the Seneca Falls Convention
JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY & CRITICISM ON...
to Kyle Napoli for the design tutorial
I. Methodological Introduction
Margaret Fuller had in mind that the title of her essay "The Great Lawsuit: MAN versus MEN. WOMAN versus WOMEN" (which she would later expand and re-name "Woman in the Nineteenth Century") should prepare the reader to suspend habitual thinking in order to "meet [her] on [her] own ground." To honor Fuller's desire to be met on her own ground (or perhaps, given the turn this paper has taken, her stage), I have worked to reconstruct what her ground/stage might have been, and to understand her ideas/performance in that light. My approach engages feminist performance theory as articulated by Judith Butler and Marjorie Garber, with historical and intertextual context. Butler's examination of the relationship between phenomenology and performance of gender offers a cogent model of the process by which cultural constructs of gender become naturalized without quashing the agency of the historical actors. Garber's examination of transvestitism in narrative as a signal of a society under conceptual stress also works particularly well with Fuller, since her writing activity was very much part of Transcendentalism and the American Renaissance, and responded to historical changes, sectional crisis, slavery, the decline of women's rights, and especially political reform. Viewing Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit" as a act of textual transvestitism became more persuasive as I grappled with her complex and sometimes opaque arguments, and certainly was supported by Edgar Allen Poe's view of her as a gender maverick (he divided humanity into three classes: "men, women and Margaret Fuller" ).
I began this essay with the intention of using feminist and new historicist literary theory, but found it impossible to reconcile the egalitarian and androgynous philosophy of "The Great Lawsuit" with the essentialism of feminist literary theory. For example, Elaine Showalter's "gynocritics" assumes sexual difference in the psychodynamics of creativity, the "problem of a female language," and the assumption of a distinct and progressive "female tradition" of writing. While Monique Wittig stands against essentialism, she argues that nineteenth century feminists universally viewed woman as "unique," and that they ignored the historicity of the construction of that view, not to be rescued until women social scientists worked to prove the intellectual equality of the sexes at the end of the century. While these descriptions may apply to the majority of women's literary production, I would argue that Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit" worked to stimulate thinking on the possibilities of Woman by demonstrating that a woman could perform key cultural "scripts" such as a lawsuit and a jeremiad, that women had furthered Western civilization and were crucial to the realization of its zenith in American political culture, and that femality was not only an androgynous aspect of humanity but was also in fact the agent of genius. Fuller hardly wanted to bolster "separate spheres" ideology by emphasizing women's differences. She saw in the absence of women from the public sphere not only great inequality, but also an American body politic kept artificially immature by utilizing only one half of the "Great Radical Dualism." Fuller's key assertions-- the centrality of self-reliant spiritual regeneration, the sexlessness of the soul, and an un-gendered "femality" -- thus contradict the categories which Showalter, Wittig and other feminists have ascribed to mid-nineteenth century women's literary production.
Thus, my attempt to "meet her on her own ground" led me to a non-essentialist approach that analyzed the way in which she invoked the jeremiad and Revolutionary referents to legitimize her voice, and then deployed that legitimacy to argue for a new conception of Woman and femality. Accordingly, Butler's theory of gender-as-performance seemed particularly fitting: Fuller learned male cultural scripts by receiving a "male" education (eventually gaining the reputation as the best-read person-- man or woman-- in New England), she rehearsed them with men and women alike as she sought to hone her intellectual skills, and when she turned to a gender critique, her mastery allowed her to perform a powerful revision of these forms. Far from simply "imitating," Fuller was performing traditionally male scripts with mastery and innovation. In Butler's essay, it is unclear what aspect of an individual chooses to repeat or alter the gendered "scripts" as they conduct their performance. Ultimately, Butler hopes that we might achieve a state in which gender scripts have no particular cultural meaning. For Fuller, there was no question of the choice of guidance; femality's self-reliant Minerva aspect must translate the inspiration of its Muse aspect into self-reliant action. And on the question of prescription, where Butler apparently desires either uniformity or an absence of signifying meanings, Fuller affirms that a great variety of male and female expressions will demonstrate the fullness of femality unfolding. Fuller's Transcendentalist critique took "Self Reliance" to its logical -- and for many, seemingly Jacobin -- politically feminist conclusion. The question of how to support a revolution of American political culture that focused on the immorality of falling short of a national covenant suggested a revitalizing jeremiad, while she could translate concerns about Jacobinism into a sense of a revitalizing of American Revolutionary ideals in an era very much concerned with the legacy of that Revolution. In claiming the intellectual realm (and its language) as her own, she does textually what she would later work to do politically and socially: she claims the institutions of America for women as well as men by affirming important national ideals.
My methodology is an attempt to hold in tension concerns of both new historical and cultural studies theories (in this case, performance theory). I wanted to contextualize Fuller's project to demonstate how it varied from (and was more interesting than) what many feminists argue was an imitative and relatively unsophisticated period for women's literary production by engaging new historicism. Yet, Fuller was interested in many of the same issues that concern cultural theorists: the naturalization of cultural constructs, historical change, and the power of language. In combining the two approaches, I hope to give performance theory a historically grounded stage and audience on which to operate. To complicate the analytical, ostensibly objective form of the standard essay, I have provided links to other web sites that give further information about the context in which Fuller wrote and acted.
II. The Performance of Civic Equality: Margaret Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit"
In July 1843, Margaret Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men; Woman versus Women" appeared in The Dial, the journal of the Transcendentalists. In "The Great Lawsuit," Fuller argued that America had failed its destined mission to elucidate a "great moral law." Once the truth "all men are created equal" was articulated, it became a divine mandate as well as a law, which Americans violated in their oppressive treatment of women as well as slaves. In "The Great Lawsuit," Fuller argued that Woman's redress to natural law must come from education and unobstructed access to the public sphere of employment and politics. Unlike "separate spheres" theorists like Catherine Beecher, Fuller argued that there were no essential differences between men and women, that promoting self-reliance for both sexes would bring about needed change in public ideas and institutions, and that once what she called "femality" -- possessed by both sexes, and varying by individual -- was unleashed into a democratized public sphere, America might finally mature and bring forth an unprecedented fusion of spirit, nature and civic harmony. America was, she argued, immature, not yet the pride of Man. The solution was to refresh American political culture with its own egalitarian and spiritual founding ideals through androgynous self-reliance, thereby simultaneously remedying the violation of natural law and developing the special genius of America, the "great moral law." The "Great Lawsuit," then, sought the redress of injuries done to Man and Woman by social and political institutions which obstructed their liberty and equality as promised by American political culture.
"The Great Lawsuit" allowed Fuller to perform in text what she could not in reality: a sermon and a quasi-legal "case" in which she prophesied an androgynous civic identity of Transcendentalism and enlightened democracy. By textually "performing" traditionally male forms of civic discourse such as a lawsuit and a jeremiad, and by drawing on a plethora of familiar referents (such as Plato and John Winthrop), Fuller demonstrated her fitness for the male public sphere. Her performance of male discursive forms legitimized her authority, while her pantheon of historical women and her analysis of marriage and celibacy worked to subvert the male-dominated traditions from which those forms emerged. Rendering America a "wilderness" of selfishness, its institutions tyrannous and its citizens children, rather than men and women, she made the realization of women's rights vital to the Puritan errand, the legacy of the American Revolution, and crucial to the formation of American cultural identity.
The title "The Great Lawsuit" was important both for its epistemological and its performative qualities. Her argument contrasted the ideal of equality against social reality, leading the reader to act as an impartial judge and to be transformed by the process of considering both sides of the argument. She later wrote about the title:
[I]t requires some thought to see what it means, and might thus prepare the reader to meet me on my own ground. Besides, it offers a larger scope, and is, in that way, more just to my desire. I meant by that title to indicate the fact that, while it is the destiny of Man, in the course of the ages, to ascertain and fulfill the law of his being, so that his life shall be seen, as a whole, to be that of an angel or messenger, the action of prejudices and passions which attend, in the day, the growth of the individual, is continually obstructing the holy work that is to make the earth a part of heaven. By Man I mean both man and woman; these are the two halves of one thought. I lay no especial stress on the welfare of either. I believe that the development of the one cannot be effected without that of the other. My highest wish is that this truth should be distinctly and rationally apprehended, and the conditions of life and freedom recognized as the same for the daughters and the sons of time; twin exponents of a divine thought.
Her argument was so different from her reader's world view that she sought a mechanism to stimulate their thinking beyond the habitual. Like Plato in the Republic, Fuller understood that her reader reasoned from flawed a priori assumptions-- specifically, "separate spheres" ideology and the "scientific" studies that gave credence to theories of sexual inequality. The confident "attempts of physiologists to bind great laws by the forms which flow from them" ignored that these "forms" were a result of human education, laws and cultural imperatives, rather than "nature." (Interestingly, she would engage a kind of historical empiricism to support her view of Woman's role in history.) These forms were neither indicative of innate natural differences, nor predictive of future possibility, for, she argued: "Presently, [Nature] will make a female Newton, and a male syren." Thus, laws upholding sexual inequality in the public sphere were enacted against nature and therefore required revision. First, however, the reader had to be persuaded to weigh the evidence that the "laws of nature" were in fact cultural constructs, or what performance theorist Judith Butler has called "scripts." Such persuasion was (and is) no mean cognitive accomplishment, for as Butler has argued, the repeated "performance" of cultural scripts (for example, "separate spheres") reifies them until a violation of their precepts (in this case, Woman in the public sphere) seems unnatural or impossible.
This idea of the impossibility of Woman in the public sphere illuminates the importance of Fuller's performance of the authoritative civic rhetoric usually used by men. Fuller noted that advocates for Woman were considered modern-day Jacobins, upending institutional structures that enshrined "natural" gender inequality. Invoking powerful male civic traditions, Fuller could gain the legitimacy necessary to assert that Woman is equal to Man, as well as demonstrating it by her performance in the public sphere. She also could promote gender equality as the reconciliation of American ideals and institutions. Fuller distinguished the ideal of American gender equality from the universal enfranchisement of the French Revolution by condemning the violence and upheaval associated with the radically democratic Jacobins. In America, equal citizenship was not "Jacobin" but the natural maturation of American ideals. The means for a peaceful revolution toward equality would be through a spiritually enlightened, androgynous democracy. That this spiritual revolution would lead to the fuller expression of human equality was key to both her affirmation and challenge to existing political culture. She sought to revitalize American culture by illuminating the yawning gap between its mission and its current realization in American life, in the tradition of the New England jeremiad.
Moving deftly between the courtroom and the pulpit, Fuller thus set up the first element of a jeremiad by identifying how Americans had fallen away from their covenant with God. In Fuller's "Great Lawsuit," that covenant (a legal concept in and of itself) was inextricably bound with the natural law sentiments espoused during the Revolution. Once articulated, the truth that all men were created equal became a law, "irrevocable as that of the Medes in their ancient dominion." America was still a cultural wilderness since this law was violated shamelessly, and the "great moral law" had not been elucidated. The lawsuits of the essay's title were therefore between the ideal and reality of Man and men, Woman and women. Man was entitled to equality and freedom, both of which were usurped by men, the "pygmies" who dwell in the wilderness of selfishness and erroneously claim Man's inheritance, but he was "still kept out of his inheritance, still a pleader, still a pilgrim." Despite all manner of self-reliant men and women who sacrificed temporal rewards to purchase "one seed for the future Eden," the errand remained unfulfilled. For America to complete its errand, legal and other institutions needed to be reconciled with the divine law. Fuller quoted St. Martin, whose public philosophy provided the proper ideology:
The ministry of man implies, that he must be filled from the divine fountains which are being engendered through all eternity, so that, at the mere name of his Master, he may be able to cast all his enemies into the abyss; that he may deliver all parts of nature from the barriers that imprison them; that he may purge the terrestrial atmosphere from the poisons that infect it; that he may preserve the bodies of men from the corrupt influences that surround, and the maladies that afflict them; still more, that he may keep their souls pure from the malignant insinuations which pollute, and the gloomy images that obscure them; that we may restore its serenity to the Word, which false words of men fill with mourning and sadness; that he may satisfy the desires of the angels, who await from him the development of the marvels of nature; that, in fine, his world may be filled with God, as eternity is.
Fuller used this quote to link the Chiliastic imperative of the Puritans with Transcendentalist means of anti-institutionalization, and with these to refresh America's experiment of a nation built on divine and natural law. The mistreatment of Indians, Blacks and Woman overshadowed America's especial genius, yet, she argued, "Only seemingly, and whatever seems to the contrary, this country is as surely destined to elucidate a great moral law, as Europe was to promote the mental culture of man." Liberty and equality inhered in the promise of America, yet America failed to produce equality and liberty in its culture, thus obstructing the realization of its own particular genius. Insofar as Americans could negotiate an institutional re-alignment, human souls would be able to express the will of God, making the United States an Eden ruled by natural law. She continued, "though the national independence be blurred by the servility of individuals," though Americans indulged in appetitive and indolent behavior, "still it is not in vain, that the verbal statement has been made, 'All men are born free and equal.'" Here, Fuller refreshed the Puritan and Revolutionary language of her father and grandfathers, fusing Transcendentalism with civic duty.
The combination of an unfulfilled errand with revolutionary rhetoric makes for a powerful jeremiad, and Fuller's was made more powerful by her revisionary gender performance. Fuller was the driving force behind the philosophy of The Dial and its inaugural editor, and it was the policy of the journal to not publish authors' names. This may have been intended to free the contributors of their fame (or lack thereof), making the expression of ideas more central than authorial reputation, but it also had the effect of rendering the authors sexless. In the "Great Lawsuit," this anonymity compounded her performance of male rhetorical forms, rendering her unclassifiable, a recognized crosser of cultural gender boundaries. Insofar as she defined herself by her head rather than her heart, promoted equal education, and was the most active of the Transcendentalists, Fuller's writing can be seen as the intellectual equivalent of transvestitism. As Marjorie Garber argues, transvestitism in narrative signals category crisis, "a failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable, permitting border crossings from one apparently distinct category to another. What seems like a binary opposition, a clear choice between opposites that define cultural boundaries, is revealed not only to be a construct but also-- more disturbingly-- a construct that no longer works to contain and delimit meaning." Garber notes that such narratives are characteristic of worlds under conceptual stress; certainly, this is consistent with most of the nineteenth century, especially from the vantage point of Transcendentalists. Obvious areas of conceptual stress were the ideals of the Revolution versus the emerging morally complaisant reality, the cultural codification of separate domestic and public spheres, issues of industrialization, urbanization and immigration, republican versus democratic politics, and, perhaps most importantly for women, a period of "backlash"-like reversals of legal and political gains made during the Revolutionary War period when the loyalty of women was critical. This was also the era of the "American Rennaissance," of striving for a characteristic national cultural identity, which Fuller sought to further through her editorship of and writing for The Dial.
During this national identity crisis, Fuller took advantage of "male" intellectual abilities to affirm and transform American political cultural ideas such that Woman's equal citizenship became their logical and necessary development. As Judith Butler has argued, gender is an act to be learned, rehearsed, and then performed-- with the performance rendering social laws explicit. Fuller's performance of civic equality was an explicit re-rendering of social laws: Woman was equal, Woman belonged in the public sphere, and those who blocked Woman's ascent blocked the realization of the City on a Hill and the maturation of Revolutionary ideals. Fuller was Euridice calling for a new Orpheus, to re-make laws according to divine commission. She became Moses-like, although she could only reach the housetop and the church spire, not Pisgah. She invoked Platonic notions of the ideal city to bolster her the importance of the androgynous soul to the ideal city, and again to indict contemporary gender roles with allusions to Plato's cave. In Plato's Republic, ascent from the cave was realized by the soul's awakening through the dialectical process and study of the forms. For Fuller, the watchers in the cave of culture were "incarcerated," to be freed only when the religious self-reliance was established in them. These shadowy wrong ideas and dead institutions stunted the maturation of the polity (compared to a tree by Fuller), which could not "come to flower till its root be freed from the cankering worm, and its whole growth open to air and light." Yet, who might be the gardener, if the existing order stunted the development of both sexes? Men could not be expected to assist in reconciling relations between the sexes, since they were intellectually incapable of conceiving of women as anything other than for man (not Man). Boy-like men desired girl-like women they could dominate, or surrogate mothers to take care of them. Women, meanwhile, were also unable to perceive clearly; Fuller herself warned that she spoke as much from "society" as from the soul, and thus she offered only the next step forward, not a universal vision. Since both sexes had come to view gender inequality as "natural," and because men benefited from the arrangement, change would have to come from women's continuing self-reliant maturation. Rather than being contented with the constricted sphere articulated by an immature "model-woman of bridal like beauty," women needed to become like Emerson's "American Scholar," showing truth amidst appearances and cheering others to reach higher intelligence and accomplishment.
To that end, an education about Woman's role in the development of Western civilization would provide a starting point for women's thoughts and actions, and men's cooperation. "The Idea of woman," she noted, "has not failed to be often and forcibly represented." Her examples of the self reliant (or at least, notable) women varied from the Virgin Mary to Mary Wollstonecraft, from Cassandra to Mother Anne Lee, demonstrating that women have performed many roles in the public sphere. While Eve may have tempted Adam, Mary redeemed womanhood for the Biblical tradition. Some women-- Queen Elizabeth, Semiamis, Catharine of Russia, Aspasia, Sappho and Eloisa are historical figures given attention in male histories. The Egyptians, Greeks and Romans all had goddesses, with the "wisest legislator" of the latter referring to Meditation as a nymph. Greek drama was full of female characters (Cassandra, Iphigenia, Antigone, Macaria), when Sybelline priestesses were the conduits of the highest god who ruled with nine muses, and when Victory wore a female form. Of all the antiquities, however, Sparta was special:
In Sparta, though, in this respect as all others, was expressed in the characters of real life, and the women of Sparta were as much Spartans as the men. The Citoyen, Citoyenne, of France, was here actualized. Was not the calm equality they enjoyed well worth the honors of chivalry? They intelligently shared the ideal life of their nation.
Sparta was the example par excellence, where the ideal became flesh.
Fuller's portrayal of historical women was meant to "rouse an infinite expectation" of what Woman might accomplish, which scripts she might perform, were she not held back. Each woman is simply documented, neither sentimentalized nor held up as a model of virtue for emulation by the reader. Rather, they represent empirical proof of the myriad possibilities of Woman's performance of self. When details are given, they demonstrate how each woman further complicates the notion of Woman. For example, both the English Queen Elizabeth and the Castilian Queen Isabella "expressed the beginning of the new state, while they forwarded its progress." Each exercised considerable influence on Western culture, yet each was distinct with respect to her private life: "One showed that this strength did not unfit a woman for the duties of a wife and mother; the other, that it could enable her to live and die alone." In Fuller's retelling, Isabella, and not Columbus, is the agent behind the colonization of America, since she funded the journey. Thus, America "must pay back its debt to women, without whose aid it would not have been brought into alliance with the civilized world." Elizabeth, on the other hand, profoundly influenced the great poets of her age by the very fact that she was a powerful queen, inspiring Spenser's Britomart and Belphoebe, as well as Shakespeare's strong women characters. Thus, women can be at once Queen and Muse, powerful in act and inspiration.
Fuller then turned her attention to her contemporaries, analyzing the private "women's sphere" according to the same standards as she has the public sphere in Man vs. Men-- its merits for the development of the androgynous soul (and hence, its compliance with divine and natural law). As against the Puritan model of the male-dominated marriage and home as the "little commonwealth," Fuller articulated a model of private life as the environment in which the soul flourishes or withers, and thus determines the health, or the disease, or the body politic. For Winthrop, the obedience of the wife to the authoritarian husband, the "head" of the household, was the proper model of obedience between the governed and the governing. Fuller, conversely, argued that there can be no unity without all elements of that unity able to function as independent units; the wife has a head of her own, and she must be allowed to use it. Of four kinds of equality in marriage (household partnership, mutual idolatry, intellectual companionship and the marriage of kindred souls), the first three lack the quality of soul-nurturing. Of these three, the third (the intellectual companionship) is only an antetype, since it lacks spiritual passion. She illustrated the intellectual companionship with the marriages of Mary Wollstonecraft and of Madam Roland, the latter representing a modern incarnation of Spenser's Britomart, an "antetype of a class to which the coming time will afford a field, the Spartan matron, brought by the culture of a book-furnishing age to intellectual consciousness and expansion." Given that these marriages (and the women in them) are antetypes, and that the fourth and most desirable form of marriage (the marriage of kindred souls) is virtually nonexistent, celibacy provides a better option. Celibacy, which she heralds as the "great fact of our time," could provide the much-needed opportunity for women to develop their own gifts and identities through self-reliance, transforming themselves through self-culture into literate and spiritual "Spartan Matrons" capable of taking their rightful place in the public sphere.
Fuller subsumed women's self-education and reforms in the private and civic institutions within the American Revolutionary tradition, noting that tyrannical bonds-- those which obstruct natural law-- were meant to be dissolved. Fuller viewed middle-class women's new leisure time and literacy as a unique opportunity for Woman's self-culture, and she advocated the books of Madame Roland, Mary Wollstonecraft and George Sand to that end. One can imagine, however, what a "true woman" might think of adding such texts to her bookshelves, alongside the Bible, Shakespeare, and perhaps a didactic romance or two. Fuller vindicated the propriety of these books by arguing that they were the product of women whose rich genius, tender sympathies, high virtue and chastened harmony would have been unnaturally obstructed by overly narrow bonds of feminine propriety, had they chosen to observe those bonds: "Were there as much room in the world for such, as in Spenser's poem for Britomart, they would not run their heads so wildly against its laws." Insofar as they sought to change tyrannical laws, advocates for Woman were the rightful inheritors of the Revolutionary spirit. If they "alarmed the country by pulling down old towers to get materials," it was simply because they were obliged to "build their house from the very foundation" since existing institutions were unnaturally constricting. New institutions must be built for the new self-reliant "Spartan Matrons" so that they might not be "obliged to run their heads against any wall." Far from advocating the downfall of American culture, the vindication of women's rights expressed "an onward tendency. . . an aspiration of soul, of energy of man, seeking clearness and freedom," in accordance with the best of American political culture.
This made the vindication of women's rights central to the revitalization of a distinct American culture, rather than "Jacobin" radicalism. The revitalization of American cultural identity would come from the logical extension of two of its most powerful cultural traditions, democracy and the sense of divine mission, with "femality" inspiring and guiding the harmonizing and maturation of the body politic. While Fuller was wary of the tyrannical nature of any authority, male or otherwise, that precluded self-reliance, femality was the necessary harmonizing accompaniment to universal civic equality. Femality was not limited to women, nor was masculinity limited to men, but each was a quality possessed by individuals of both sexes: "Male and female represent the two sides of the great radical dualism. But, in fact, they are perpetually passing into one another. . . There is no wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman." The quality of masculinity was the useful one of completing and achieving tasks, while femality was the quality shared by "all men of genius." Femality was "electrical in movement, intuitive in function [and] spiritual in tendency." , Femality's dual nature was exemplified in the inspiring Muse and discerning Minerva, the former being lyrical and magnetic, and the latter the intuitive ability to grasp the totality of reality. Its Minerva aspect was akin to Plato's "dialectical personality"-- a man or woman capable of achieving a unified vision by contemplation rather than through their "eyes and senses," thus allowing them to discern the forms rather than just the shadows, making them philosophers capable of good leadership. Femality was from the "soul, and not from society," and was "a harmonizer of the vehement elements." Thus, femality's Muse aspect was similar to the Universal soul which Transcendentalists and Romantics held to be the underlying reality, and self-reliance was its individual Minerva aspect. It was Emerson's self-reliance, the connection of the individual soul to the Transcendentalist Oversoul. As the agent of genius, harmony and the sublime, femality was the answer to fears about the leveling tendencies of universal suffrage.
In fact, since femality represented a transcendent order, removing the barriers to its full expression (through granting civic equality) was necessary to the realization of the City on a Hill. A more open public sphere was necessarily the appropriate response to the divine and natural law that all humans are androgynous souls "appareled in flesh." Fuller engaged spirituality to affirm that "[t]here is but one law for all souls and, if there is to be an interpreter of it, he comes not as man, or son of man, but as Son of God." No human could speak completely and reliably from the soul, so democracy was necessary to prevent tyranny. By combining Transcendentalist self-reliance (the interaction of the Minerva and Muse aspects of Femality) with universal suffrage and civic participation, Americans might democratically clear away the "canker" of oppressive institutions; by aligning human laws with Femality, they would fulfill their the mission of elucidating a great moral law, bringing American culture into bloom. Then, Fuller prophesied, the Divine would "ascend into nature to a height unknown in the history of past ages, and nature, thus instructed, would regulate the spheres not only so as to avoid collision, but to bring forth ravishing harmony."
In presenting femality as the means to enacting the "great moral law" and finally working toward completion of the "errand in the wilderness," Fuller at once performed and advocated for a woman's role in the public sphere that simultaneously affirmed and revitalized American political cultural traditions. Femality was the animating spirit of the Western tradition and once barriers to its expression were removed, it would reach its zenith in reformed American cultural institutions. Since femality had been relegated to the domestic sphere, America was forced to wander without its philosophical half in a public wilderness of selfishness and cultural immaturity. Far from bringing irrationality to the public sphere, femality would invigorate the blood of the body politic with vital change, bringing it into alignment with the Divine and American founding ideals and thereby elucidating the "great moral law." The "Great Lawsuit" would be resolved when those who obstructed the realization of America's destiny (as the tyrannous English had during the Revolution) were defeated by Woman's advocates, the true heirs to the Revolutionary spirit. Yet America need not suffer through another Revolution, if only men would heed the millennialist urgency and moral anxiety stirred by Fuller's jeremiad. By performing her argument for femality and civic androgyny in traditionally male rhetorical roles, Fuller secured legitimacy for her ideas and for herself as an idea-- an intellectually androgynous woman in the public sphere.
Bartlett, Elizabeth. Liberty, Equality, Sorority. New York: Carlson, 1994.
Bercovitch, Sacvan. "Hawthorne's A-Morality of Compromise," in Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, Ed. Ross Murfin. Boston: St. Martins Press, 1991, pp. 344-357.
Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." Performing Feminisms. Ed. Sue-Ellen Case. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990: 270-82.
Cooke, George Willis. An Historical and Biographical Introduction to Accompany The Dial. Vol. 1 of 2. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961.
Dickenson, Donna. Margaret Fuller: Writing a Woman's Life. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Douglas, Ann. "Margaret Fuller and the Disavowal of Fiction." The Feminization of American Culture. New York: Doubleday, 1988: 259-288.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "Self-Reliance." The Norton Anthology of American Literature. 4th Ed. Vol. 1. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994: 1045-1062.
---. "The American Scholar." The Norton Anthology of American Literature. 4th Ed. Vol. 1. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994: 1021-1033.
Fuller, Margaret. "Preface," Woman in the Nineteenth Century. Norton Library Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971.
---. "The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men; Woman versus Women," The Dial: A Magazine For Literature, Philosophy, and Religion, Vol. IV, No. 1, July 1843. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961, pp. 1-47..
Garber, Marjorie. "Foreword: The Marvel of Peru," Lieutenant Nun: Memoir of a Basque Transvestite in the New World. Trans. Michele Stepto and Gabriel Stepto. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996.
James, Laurie. Men, Women, and Margaret Fuller. New York: Golden Heritage Press, 1990. (Frontispiece)
Murfin, Ross. "What is Feminist Criticism?" in Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, Ed. Ross Murfin. Boston: St. Martins Press, 1991, pp. 275-287.
Plato, Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, Rev. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992.
Rose, Anne. Transcendentalism as a Social Movement: 1830-1850. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
Showalter, Elaine. "Toward a Feminist Poetics," The New Feminist Criticism. Elaine Showalter, ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, pp. 125-143.
Spenser, Edmund. "The Faerie Queene." The Norton Anthology of Poetry. 3rd. Ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 110-134.
Winthrop, John. "Journal of John Winthrop." The Norton Anthology of American Literature. 4th Ed. Vol. 1. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994: 181-187.
Wittig, Monique. "One Is Not Born a Woman." The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader. Ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale and David M. Halperin. New York: Routledge, 1993: 103-109. | <urn:uuid:be28287d-7134-482d-aa25-38a6dac5c20d> | CC-MAIN-2018-05 | http://www.reed.edu/english/Courses/English341gs/FinalPaper/Rebecca/rar.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-05/segments/1516084886895.18/warc/CC-MAIN-20180117102533-20180117122533-00659.warc.gz | en | 0.962907 | 7,792 | 2.640625 | 3 |
The Tenets of Taekwondo
The tenets of Taekwondo are the core values that are taught with it alongside the physical aspects of self defense. The tenets are what makes our martial artist good people. Over the next few weeks, we will do a deep dive into each individual tenet, but for now here is the basic idea behind the values taught in our school.
Courtesy: the showing of politeness in one's attitude and behavior toward others.
Integrity: the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles; moral uprightness.
Perseverance: persistence in doing something despite difficulty or delay in achieving success.
Self Control: the ability to control oneself, in particular one's emotions and desires or the expression of them in one's behavior, especially in difficult situations.
Indomitable Spirit: The spirit that can’t be broken or conquered, the strength of spirit that comes from the knowing one’s self.
Patience: the capacity to accept or tolerate delay, trouble, or suffering without getting angry or upset.
Check back in next week for a deeper look into courtesy, why we teach it, how we teach it, examples of it in martial arts, and every day examples of courtesy!
Want to see it for yourself? Come to a Seo's Martial Arts. We have locations is Calhoun, Rome, Summerville, and Albany Georgia. | <urn:uuid:b9b1b025-47d6-49ee-82e2-4aa172b1aba5> | CC-MAIN-2020-40 | https://www.seosmartialarts.com/post/the-tenets-of-taekwondo | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-40/segments/1600402131986.91/warc/CC-MAIN-20201001174918-20201001204918-00670.warc.gz | en | 0.92401 | 288 | 3.171875 | 3 |
"I used to go on long hikes with my husband, but now my legs get tired so quickly, I can't
go any more."
—Susan, 54 years old
"I don't know what's happened to me. I have an awful pain in my right calf after just 10 minutes of walking. It feels like someone put a clamp on my leg."
—Caroline, 60 years old
"When I walk, I get an aching pain—like a charley horse—in my left leg. When I go shopping, the pain gets so bad I can only walk for about five or six minutes before I have to sit down and rest.
I must be getting old."
—Barbara, 65 years old
Do the comments at left sound familiar? How many times have you heard family members or friends complain about leg pain and chalk it off to "old age?"
Peripheral arterial disease, or P.A.D., may be the cause of their leg pain. But, according to a recent survey by the P.A.D. Coalition, an alliance of health organizations, only 28 percent of American women have even heard of this serious condition. This is alarming, since P.A.D. is a common and dangerous disease that affects about nine million Americans, half of whom are women. That's 1 in 20 over age 50 and 1 in 5 over age 70.
To call attention to this little-known threat, the P.A.D. Coalition and WomenHeart, the National Coalition for Women with Heart Disease, developed the educational campaign. The campaign is in support of "Stay in Circulation: Take Steps to Learn About P.A.D.," a nationwide effort sponsored by the NIH's National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute and more than 80 health organizations, vascular health societies, and government agencies.
P.A.D. occurs when fatty deposits clog arteries in the legs, reducing blood flow and causing leg pain when walking. Left untreated, P.A.D. can lead to disability, amputation (losing a foot or leg), and poor quality of life. Having P.A.D. also means an increased risk of heart attack or stroke. Blocked arteries found in people with P.A.D. can be a red flag that other arteries, including those in the heart and brain, may also be blocked. In the short term, having P.A.D. markedly increases your risk for heart attack, stroke, amputation, and death. In the long term, people with P.A.D. have a two- to six-fold increased risk of a heart attack or a stroke.
"Symptoms of P.A.D. should not be mistaken for inevitable consequences of aging," says NHLBI Director Elizabeth G. Nabel, M.D. "Early detection and treatment of P.A.D. are important for staying in circulation and continuing to enjoy life to the fullest."
Heart disease is the No. 1 killer of American women. While many women now know about the risk factors for heart disease—high blood pressure, not exercising, high cholesterol, high blood fats, and high blood sugar—most women are not aware that if you have P.A.D., you are at increased risk for heart disease and stroke. In fact, P.A.D. is caused by the very same conditions and lifestyle behaviors that cause heart disease and stroke.
- P.A.D. occurs when arteries in the legs become clogged with fatty deposits.
- Signs of P.A.D. include:
- Cramps, tiredness, or pain in your leg muscles that occurs when you walk but goes away with rest.
- Foot or toe pain at rest that often disturbs your sleep.Skin wounds or ulcers on your feet or toes that are slow to heal.
To Find Out More
For more information about P.A.D. and to download free education materials, visit:
Risk Factors for P.A.D.
Some conditions and habits raise your chance of developing P.A.D. Your risk increases if you:
- Are over 50.
- Smoke or used to smoke. Those who smoke or have a history of smoking have up to four times greater risk of developing P.A.D.
- Have diabetes. One in every three people over the age of 50 with diabetes is likely to have P.A.D.
- Have high blood pressure. Also called hypertension, high blood pressure raises the risk of developing plaque in the arteries.
- Have high blood cholesterol. Excess cholesterol and fat in the blood contribute to the formation of plaque in the arteries, reducing or blocking blood flow to the heart, brain, or limbs.
- Have a personal history of vascular disease, heart attack, or stroke. If you have heart disease, you have a one in three chance of also having P.A.D.
- Are African American. African Americans are more than twice as likely to have P.A.D. as their white counterparts. | <urn:uuid:299029c1-2663-4f01-a9c7-781579c8a846> | CC-MAIN-2016-36 | https://medlineplus.gov/magazine/issues/summer09/articles/summer09pg20-21.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-36/segments/1471982293195.16/warc/CC-MAIN-20160823195813-00124-ip-10-153-172-175.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.947373 | 1,050 | 2.71875 | 3 |
Originally published March 2019
Advances in technology have led to substantial changes in the prenatal tests physicians can use to screen and diagnose pregnant patients for genetic abnormalities. New tests are being introduced and conventional tests are being improved—and all have unique benefits and limitations. As tests grow more sophisticated, patients need guidance in navigating the complex information so they can make informed choices about the future of their pregnancy.1
For physicians who treat pregnant patients, being aware of the developments in tests and the current standards of practice, communicating effectively with patients and obtaining informed consent, and documenting treatments and discussions can contribute to achieving the best possible outcomes for all involved.
Advances in prenatal tests
The new prenatal tests and the upgraded existing tests come with a variety of advantages and restrictions. For example, some tests are viewed as more accurate than others. Some can be used earlier in the pregnancy than others. Some carry greater risks. Moreover, some are funded by healthcare systems, while others are not.
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), for instance, is a newer screening tool used to detect Down syndrome and other genetic abnormalities. Its benefits include being non-invasive, highly accurate, and available for use “...at a relatively early point during pregnancy.”2 However, NIPT is regarded as a screening test and not a diagnostic test.3
Meeting the standards of prenatal testing
Whether you are an obstetrician, a family physician with a specialty in obstetrics, or a family physician with an interest in or a need to be involved in obstetrics, the courts expect you to provide prenatal care that meets the current standards of practice. That would typically include being knowledgeable of developments in prenatal tests, both screening and diagnostic, and the nature, uses, advantages, restrictions, accuracy, risks, and availability of the tests.
Communicating with patients, obtaining informed consent
Patients need to be given sufficient and accurate information so they can make informed decisions about the future of their pregnancy.2 The information they need will depend on their individual needs and circumstances. Some may decide to forego prenatal tests altogether, knowing that whatever the findings they would continue with the pregnancy. Others may decide to undergo a limited number of tests, while others may seek out all available tests to decide what course of treatment is appropriate for them.
Patients also need complete information about proposed tests or treatments, so when they provide or refuse consent, it is informed.4 Among the information you should consider providing to patients is the tests that are available, their benefits, limitations, accuracy, risks, possible outcomes, time constraints, and reasonably available alternatives. You should also consider giving information on the options available should test results indicate an abnormality. In addition, patients should be made aware of the availability of genetic counselling services.
Failing to provide patients, in a timely fashion, with information and advice about prenatal tests or a referral to another provider can have a potentially life-long impact. For instance, some patients may decide that they would rather end a pregnancy than give birth to a child with a chromosomal abnormality. If a screening or diagnostic prenatal test that may have predicted such a problem is not offered or not offered within a specific time frame and the result is a baby born with an abnormality, the parents may consider legal action alleging that the physician failed to offer testing within sufficient time to consider aborting the pregnancy. In this situation, the courts will look to several legal principles to guide its examination of the physician’s conduct, including whether the care followed the prenatal testing standard of care at the time of the pregnancy.
Speaking with patients about the intricacies of prenatal tests can be challenging because the language surrounding the tests can be unfamiliar and continually evolving. You should try to provide the information as clearly and simply as possible, and avoid jargon. Ensure patients understand the information and have an opportunity to ask questions. It may be helpful to investigate the material some organizations have written specifically for patients, such as that on the SOGC website, www.pregnancyinfo.ca.5
You may also want to consider organizing the material about the tests using structured communication and documentation tools. Some ministries of health have produced documents that can may be helpful in providing structure. For instance, the Ontario Ministry of Health has produced the document: A User Guide to the Ontario Perinatal Record.6
Further, when a test or treatment is beyond your competence or experience, you have a duty to refer patients to a more appropriate provider, for example to an obstetrician or genetic specialist. You may want to manage these referrals closely as time is an important factor. Some tests must be performed within set time frames to give patients the greatest number of options in deciding the future of their pregnancy.
Documenting in the medical record
The details of the informed consent discussion should be documented in the patient’s medical record including the information you provided, questions asked and the answers provided, and the agreed-on plan for prenatal testing.
As well, documentation in the record may form part of your tracking system for prenatal tests. Given the importance of having some tests performed within specific time limits to allow patients more decision options, you may want to record what tests were performed and when, what results were obtained and when, further test options available, and the agreed-on next steps.
The bottom line
With advances in genetic technology, the options for prenatal tests (both for screening and diagnosing) have grown in number and sophistication. To improve testing outcomes for patients and reduce your medical-legal risk, consider the following:
- Be aware of the current developments in testing and the current standards of practice with respect to tests that should be offered to pregnant patients.
- Give patients the information they need, when they need it, to make informed decisions about the future of their pregnancy.
- Document in the medical record all discussions with patients and the treatments agreed on.
- Van den Veyver IB. Recent advances in prenatal genetic screening and testing. F1000Research 2016;5(F1000 Faculty Rev):2591
- Towes M, Caulfield T. Physician liability and non-invasive prenatal testing. J Obstet Gynaecol Can 2014;36(10):907-914
- Carroll JC, Morrison S. Untangling the Helix 2017: Prenatal genetics for primary care providers [Internet]. Proceedings of the 2017 Family Medicine Forum; 9 Nov 2017 [cited 2018 Dec 3]. Montreal, Canada. Available from: www.geneticseducation.ca
- Canadian Medical Protective Association [Internet]. When consent is informed. Ottawa (CA):CMPA;2016 May [cited 2018 Nov 30]. Available from: https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/cmpa-perspective/2015/when-consent-is-informed
- PregnancyInfo.ca [Internet]. Ottawa (CA):Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada;2018 [cited 2018 Dec. 3]. Available from: https://PregnancyInfo.ca/
- Ontario Provincial Council for Maternal and Child Health (PCMCH) and The Better Outcomes Registry and Network (BORN) Ontario Perinatal Record Working Group [Internet]. A User Guide to the Ontario Perinatal Record. 2018 August [cited 2018 Dec. 3]. Available from: http://www.pcmch.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/OPR_UserGuide_2018Update_Final_18-08-22.pdf | <urn:uuid:a74b5e15-af76-428c-bec1-19b47465a0d5> | CC-MAIN-2019-51 | https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/browse-articles/2019/prenatal-tests-for-genetic-screening-and-diagnosing-changes-choices-challenges | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-51/segments/1575540548537.21/warc/CC-MAIN-20191213020114-20191213044114-00256.warc.gz | en | 0.926789 | 1,554 | 2.828125 | 3 |
It's tempting to attribute the unseasonably warm and dry January completely to the Pacific Ocean temperature pattern dubbed "La Nina," long-associated with reduced precipitation in California.
But wait -- La Nina was also present last winter, when more rainfall than usual drenched the Bay Area and the snowfall in the Sierra Nevada was even higher than normal -- as much as 50 feet in places. Now bare spots are evident even at higher elevations.
"This is truly a tale of two 'Ninas,'" said Bill Patzert, PhD, the world renowned climatologist based at Pasadena's Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
Patzert has focused his research on the weather implications of La Nina and its opposite, El Nino, associated with wetter than usual winters for California.
So how can two Ninas have such different outcomes? Patzert believes the wildcard is to be found to the north in another meteorological phenomenon known as the "arctic oscillation," a variation in the strength of what can be imagined as an atmospheric barrier.
When the arctic oscillation is in a weak phase, as last winter, cold, moist air can escape the arctic region and head south. But when the oscillation is in a strong phase, as this winter, Patzert said it tends to reinforce the dry influence of La Nina at U.S. latitudes.
Patzert likened it to a "fence" that shields us from the arctic air.
The impact is dramatic. So far this season, the LA area has received only 3.76 inches of rain, compared to a normal to-date measurement of 5.24 inches, and 12.28 inches by this time last year, according to the National Weather Service.
In December 2010, we received about 10 inches of rain. Last month, LA received only one inch, and not a trace since Dec. 17.
January warm spells are not all that unusual in Southern California. But we're not alone in the warm and dry weather conditions. Apart from the Sierra, snowfall is far below normal in the Rockies of Colorado and the Wasatch Range of Utah.
Temperatures this past week in the ski resort of Park City, Utah, above 7,000 feet in elevation, have soared well into the 40s. Farther east, parents have been taking their children to outdoor playgrounds in Kansas City, Mo. Tennis players have been bringing out their rackets for outdoor matches as far north as Minneapolis. In the southern tier, the dryness has only intensified the ongoing drought in Texas and New Mexico.
But California faces no imminent drought threat, according to Jeffrey Kightlinger, general manager of the Metropolitan Water District. He credits the storage of water from last winter's bountiful runoff, noting that the MWD's largest Southern California reservoir, Diamond Valley Lake near Hemet, is well over 90 percent of capacity.
The MWD is planning for the possibility that this could be California's driest year on record. But even if that proves to be the case, Kightlinger said there is enough stored water to see us through "three tough years in a row" before cutbacks would be unavoidable.
So how much longer will the warm, dry weather continue?
La Nina might remain in place several more months. What complicates long-range forecasting is the fact that the arctic oscillation has a much shorter period, at times flipping in a matter of weeks or not, Patzert said.
Next month, February, usually is our wettest. Patzert advised it's too early to write off this winter. That said, he's sticking with his forecast that the rest of this season will be drier than usual, but added, "I'm going to keep my fingers crossed that I'm wrong." | <urn:uuid:d7036b4a-de97-4c4c-8bf4-39e7382508e4> | CC-MAIN-2015-35 | http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/La-Nina-Has-Arctic-Ally-in-Prolonging-Warm-Weather-137032978.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-35/segments/1440646312602.99/warc/CC-MAIN-20150827033152-00120-ip-10-171-96-226.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.966154 | 782 | 2.625 | 3 |
Artifact PW2-12: Telecommunications during the Korean War
Submitted by : General Ramsey Withers (Ret’d)
PW2-12 Telecommunications during the Korean War: Good communications are vital to the success of any military mission.
Lieutenant Withers arrived in Korea in late June 1952 and was immediately sent to 1 R 22e R to replace a Signal Officer casualty. This photo, which was taken by a member of the brigade public affairs staff, shows Lt. Withers inspecting the “H-Frame” where the lines to all the forward companies, support platoons, the battalion Command Post, A & B Echelons, flanking battalions and brigade headquarters were terminated before being connected to our battalion headquarters switchboard, on the Yong Don position, in December 1952. The H-Frame was the point at which we started “trouble shooting” outages. | <urn:uuid:288428c2-0879-48da-a400-7e594f5958bc> | CC-MAIN-2023-23 | https://friends-amis.org/projects-programs/personal-treasures/artifact-pw2-12-telecommunications-during-the-korean-war/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-23/segments/1685224649518.12/warc/CC-MAIN-20230604061300-20230604091300-00783.warc.gz | en | 0.970169 | 193 | 2.65625 | 3 |
Dr. Mark Haskins
Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine
Dr. Mark Haskins is a professor of pathobiology at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. He and his colleagues conduct research on metabolic diseases caused by deficient enzyme activity. Such diseases have similar manifestations in animals and in children. Among the techniques Dr. Haskins and colleagues are exploring are use of recombinant DNA and gene therapy. Dr. Haskins has a BS in pre-veterinary sciences from Penn State University, a VMD from the University of Pennsylvania, an MS in biomedical engineering from Drexel University and a PHD in pathology from the University of Pennsylvania. He lives in Philadelphia.
Lysosomal storage diseases (LSDs) are very rare genetic diseases that children get. Tay-Sachs and Fabry disease are examples of the nearly 50 LSDs that have been identified. When we add all the LSDs together, the incidence is about one in every 7,000 live births. A number of LSDs aggregate in certain populations, such as some Jewish populations or the Amish. We also find them in certain breeds of animals. At the University of Pennsylvania veterinary school, we now have 10 of these diseases in dogs and cats that form the basis of our research.
Here’s how the disease works: The body is constantly making big molecules or substrates that are taken into the cells and chopped into smaller pieces by enzymes to be used to make products the body needs. Lysosomes are small bags of enzymes that enable cells to reduce the substrate into the smaller pieces. They do this in a sequential way — enzyme 1 cuts off one piece, enzyme 2 cuts off another piece, enzyme 3 and so on. If one of these enzymes doesn’t work because there has been a mutation, the process stops. In such cases, the substrates enter the cells and instead of being broken down and used, it is stored and the lysosomes become enlarged.
Having cells that are packed with large lysosomes can be a problem, depending on the type of cell. One example of where it’s a problem is in the cells in the cornea of the eye. The large lysosomes cause cloudiness in the cornea, hindering the way light is refracted. This causes a child with an LSD to see as if he or she were looking through ground glass. Children or animals with LSDs are also growth retarded. For instance, puppies in our lab that have an LSD known as MPS VII weigh half as much as normal puppies. Children with MPS I tend to be short in stature, have coarse features and enlarged livers and are severely mentally retarded. In the case of other LSDs such as MPS VI, children who have it are not severely mentally retarded but have other afflictions such as bone disease.
One approach to correcting the problems caused by LSDs is to introduce normal enzymes with mannose 6-phosphate on it that can help the cell begin to break down the substrate that has accumulated in its lysosomes. If we can get this healthy enzyme to be secreted outside of the cells affected by LSDs, it can attach to most of them and be trafficked into the cells where it can begin to work normally.
Where do you get the normal enzyme? One way is to make it in cell cultures, but it has to be genetically engineered. The cost is prohibitive — $300,000 to treat one child for one year and that’s just the cost of the enzyme. In addition, it has to be administered intravenously once a week. So a child would have to go to the hospital to get the treatment one day a week for the rest of his or her life.
Another approach would be to give the child a new organ that would make the enzymes. Two examples are bone marrow and liver transplants. This has been done but has limited possibilities.
The most promising approach is gene therapy where you take a gene, put it into the animal and the animal makes the new enzyme. We have had considerable success with gene therapy in our lab. For example, we took a retrovirus that causes cancer in mice and removed portions of it. Then we put into this virus a promoter which happens to be from a gene in a human liver and also put in the dog’s missing gene. Then we made a lot if this in culture and injected it in animals with LSDs. The result was that our vector infected the dogs’ liver cells, causing them to become factories for producing normal dog enzyme. When administered to puppies at birth, the manufacturing capacity for healthy enzymes is much greater since the liver grows by a factor of 40 times by the time they reach adulthood. We have one dog that manufactures 60 times the normal amount of healthy enzymes that he needs every day and is now 11 years old.
Many of our animals treated with this therapy have body weights that are almost normal, corneas that are now clear, and much improved skeletal features. However, we haven’t been able to improve the neck with gene therapy and at present we don’t know why.
The advantages of this therapy are that it requires only one injection early in life, it is long-lasting and it can be used for other diseases as long as making too much healthy enzyme is not a problem. Its disadvantage is you need to treat very early. At the moment, every child in the U.S. is tested for 15 genetic diseases. The LSDs have generally not been tested for because it hasn’t been a policy to test for diseases we can’t treat. We are now in a situation where, even though enzyme therapy treatment is available, we don’t test for LSDs. That’s a problem because in many cases, we don’t know a child has an LSD until he or she is older and begins to lose language skills and toilet training. The result is that many don’t get diagnosed until they’re two or three years old when the ideal time for intravenous gene therapy has already passed.
We cannot say at this point that gene therapy for LSDs is a cure. For example, the enzyme made in the liver and going into the bloodstream does not pass to the brain. That is because of the blood/brain barrier that is designed to prohibit a variety of substances passing into the brain. This is a big consideration for treating LSDs that cause neurological impairment. There is also the possibility that the therapy, when introduced to a child’s DNA, will result in a tumor. Another problem may be that the body may recognize the normal enzyme as “new” and mount an immune response. That said, gene therapy remains one of the most promising treatments for these profoundly debilitating diseases.
In an effort to provide wide-ranging views and perspectives regarding the practice of and issues surrounding agriculture, the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture (PSPA) seeks speakers representing a variety of perspectives. The statements and opinions they present are strictly their own and do not necessarily represent the views of PSPA. | <urn:uuid:a9066133-15ff-4810-b45c-b71cb0120070> | CC-MAIN-2017-34 | http://pspaonline.com/resources/meetings/09-08-11/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-34/segments/1502886109682.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20170821232346-20170822012346-00101.warc.gz | en | 0.96707 | 1,464 | 3.28125 | 3 |
Free Implications of Day Care for Children Essay Sample
|← Children Dealing with Divorce||CSOM →|
Buy Cheap Implications of Day Care for Children Essay
Over the past several decades, the use of non-parental day care has increased which shows social and economic changes in the American society. Of concern are the implications of this day care to the young children which has promoted and supported their development. The effect of out-of-home care for these youngsters has been a subject of discussion on their socialization and the negative or positive aspects of such day care to the children. The paper will discuss the implications of the day care for young children and its aspects. The concerns stem from the fact that separating these infants from their mothers at such an earlier age may cause emotional harm and interrupt the bond with the mother.
Implications of day care for young children
Children's outcomes are influenced by the environment including the family and childcare experiences on their development. The quality of the childcare support environments affects the quality of preschool child care experiences. This is because of the many concerns regarding the attendance of day-care. Questions that arise are whether they have negative or positive effects on the children's development.
The parents opting for child care should go for high quality settings where children are likely to spend less time watching TV but socializing with adults. Here, children are exposed to activities that stimulate and nurture language as a cognitive development promoting social development. Caregivers should examine the care settings they provide for the children. How they interact with these children, the experiences they offer, the activities they involve them and how they talk to the children and how they correct unkind children has a big impact on how children interact in the future (Todd M. C. 2001).
Advantages of home daycare
Home daycares provide these children the opportunity to learn and play with other children unlike with nannies. The centers have mixed group of children and adults and may help the child to feel comfortable with older kids. Daycare centers can be the next best thing after a parent's home. , with their homey environments and if the child care is in the same neighborhood they will make the child feel more at home. With licensed and trained staff, children have the advantage of benefitting from trained teachers who are specialized about them (Fuqua C. 2010).
Disadvantages of daycares
Although an attractive idea of having daycare for children while at work, there are some disadvantages of leaving such infants at daycare centers. They include;
Sickness. The risk of contacting disease is higher at daycare centers as the children are more exposed to germs than usually at home. The diseases they are exposed to range from colds, flu, lice infection to pinkeye. Small staff. This happens if there is a low teacher to student staff which can prove to be very harmful to the child. Infants need to be watched constantly by adults and thus a small staff means less care to the children. Cost. Daycares are usually very expensive as they charge outrageous amount of money. Some charge high fees for late picking of the infants after the designated time. Stress. Worrying about leaving your child with someone else and whether she is okay can stress one out. This is worsened if the daycare centre is not fully trusted. Lastly but not least is missed days. This happens when the daycares are closed for holidays meaning that another alternative has to be sought to care for the child. Also the fact that sick children will not be brought to daycare center (Wright D. 2010).
Child care has now been an ordinary part of life for children especially in the western countries. Infants are placed as much as more than 10 hours in these child care centers and as expected they in a big way mould the behavior of the child. There are different implications for these youngsters while in these daycares. As discussed above, they are associated with both negative and positive aspects and parents are encouraged to look for he best care centers to take there children.
- Strategy and Corporate Responsibility
- Children Dealing with Divorce
- Holocaust Auschwitz State Museum | <urn:uuid:5883b641-c493-4568-83d1-9e5d775fd58a> | CC-MAIN-2018-30 | https://bestwritingservice.com/essays/Analysis/Implications-of-day-care-for-young-children.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-30/segments/1531676589417.43/warc/CC-MAIN-20180716174032-20180716194032-00384.warc.gz | en | 0.966704 | 850 | 2.65625 | 3 |
The mutation that causes congenital stationary night blindness (CSNB) in dogs has been discovered after years of research by an international team including a team of researchers from the University of Pennsylvania.
CSNB is an autosomal recessive disease, meaning that it occurs on one of 38 pairs of non-sex chromosomes, and that symptoms will only occur if a copy of the mutation is inherited from both parents. If a dog inherits the mutation from only one parent, they are a carrier, meaning that they will not display the disease but they can still pass it on to their own offspring if they reproduce with another carrier. Those with the disease have reduced vision in low light but normal vision during the day.
The study, which you can find here, was conducted by a team from the University of Pennsylvania in collaboration with researchers from the University of Bern, Cornell University, Chubu University, and the Mie University Graduate School of Medicine. The study included 23 dogs, 12 of which had CSNB and 11 of which did not. The dogs were all closely related, allowing the researchers to notice more small-scale differences in their DNA due to the dogs' genetic similarity. Using a type of analysis that compares single points (basepairs) along the dog's genome, the researchers were able to narrow down the location of the mutation to within a 4-million basepair range. They then conducted a genome-wide analysis and compared it against an international dataset of over 250 dogs to hone in on any mutation that was present in CSNB-positive dogs and carriers, but not in unaffected dogs.
The results were promising: a single basepair deletion mutation was found in the LRIT3 gene that caused the protein to be misshaped. The LRIT3 protein is responsible for positioning another type of protein within specialized cells called ON bipolar cells which relay signals from photoreceptors to the brain. This particular mutation appears to only affect the ON bipolar cells that are associated with rods- the type of photoreceptor that is responsible for vision in low lighting.
In its normal form, LRIT3 ensures that a molecular channel protein, TRPM1, is properly localized at the tip of a cell type adjacent to the retina’s light-sensing photoreceptor cells. This secondary layer of retinal neurons, called ON bipolar cells, relay signals from the photoreceptors on their path to the brain. The mutation appears to specifically affect those ON bipolar cells that are associated with rod cells–those that allow vision in low light.
This discovery has big implications for canine health. Knowing the mutation that causes a condition means that it can be detected through genetic testing. Breeders can get their dogs checked for the mutation to determine which dogs are clear to breed. Over time, CSNB can be reduced or eliminated from breeding stocks, which in turn will reduce the prevalence of CSNB in the dog population. Genetic testing also allows people to check their dogs for the disease, which otherwise may go unnoticed or misdiagnosed, in order to provide better care.
There is hope for dogs that are already suffering from CSNB as well; the research team is already working to design a gene therapy that could completely cure the disease.
You can read more about their discovery in this article from Scienmag. | <urn:uuid:22ea5388-28a5-4ff5-9ebe-7dafb7fe67b2> | CC-MAIN-2021-31 | https://www.whatsyourmuttdna.com/news/cause-of-night-blindness/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-31/segments/1627046154356.39/warc/CC-MAIN-20210802172339-20210802202339-00102.warc.gz | en | 0.968055 | 671 | 3.390625 | 3 |
The Crimson Rosella is native to eastern and south-eastern Australia and has been introduced to New Zealand and Norfolk Island. It is commonly found in, but not restricted to, mountain forests and gardens. The Yellow and Adelaide Rosellas are now regarded as subspecies. The greenish ones, sometimes with crimson blotches, are juveniles. Crimson Rosellas’ calls are chatters or bell-like “tinks”.
Their nests are deep hollows with no lining except wood pulp from the hollow. They lay 5 to 8 white eggs. The female looks after the young for the first 6 days, then the male joins in. They eat mainly seeds and can be heard in tree-tops cracking open gumnuts, but eat some insects too.
Size: 32 - 37 cm
Photo: Mark Trinham. Illustration: Mark Trinham. | <urn:uuid:709588a3-60a7-42d4-928d-a94e69b1ba1b> | CC-MAIN-2020-05 | https://scnaturesearch.com.au/fauna/Crimson%20Rosella | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-05/segments/1579250594209.12/warc/CC-MAIN-20200119035851-20200119063851-00285.warc.gz | en | 0.961921 | 178 | 2.828125 | 3 |
|Student Learning Outcomes -|
- Upon completion students shouuld be able to utilize a variety of exercise modes and techniques to improve muscular strength, endurance, flexibility, and cardio-respiratory endurance.
- Upon completion students should be able to identify weight management principles, basic physiology of exercise, and benefits of regular exercise.
|Description - |
|This course teaches and provides practice specific techniques and conditioning for the sport of softball. This includes drills, weight and flexibility training, and cardio-respiratory development.|
|Course Objectives - |
|The student will be able to: |
- Assess and improve muscle strength and muscle endurance used for the sport of softball.
- Design and practice a program of effective muscle-training exercises.
- Define and assess flexibility and describe the benefits of increased flexibility for the sport of softball.
- Demonstrate softball specific strength exercises and routines
- Practice specific aerobic and anaerobic training
- Demonstrate and assess sport techniques for softball
|Special Facilities and/or Equipment - |
|softball specific equipment |
|Course Content (Body of knowledge) - |
- Assess and improve muscle strength and endurance
- Practice a program of progressive overloading with an understanding of repetitions and sets.
- Physical testing to determine the measure for repetition maximums.
- Demonstrate the ability to select the weight and exercise for targeting each major muscle group.
- Perform and understand the importance of multiple joint exercise.
- Design a program of effect muscle training exercise for the sport of softball.
- Design a program for circuit training exercises that are sport specific.
- Perform proper free weight lifting techniques
- Explain the advantages and disadvantages of free weights vs. weight machines.
- Define and assess flexibility and describe the benefits of increased flexibility for softball specific training.
- Explain the following factors and their influence on flexibility: muscle temperature, physical activity, age and disease.
- Assess flexibility at four joint sites.
- Demonstrate softball specific flexibility exercises and routines.
- Practice softball specific stretching routines.
- Demonstrate PNF stretching exercises.
- Practice softball specific aerobic and anaerobic training.
- Measure and assess individual cardiorespiratory endurance.
- Practice proper warm-up for aerobic and anaerobic exercise.
- Demonstrate and assess sport technique for competitive softball training.
- Analyze softball tapes for successful techniques.
- Practice sport techniques that develop skills for competitive softball.
|Methods of Evaluation - |
|Softball specific pre and post test for individual strength, flexibility, and endurance. |
|Representative Text(s) - |
|None required |
|Disciplines - |
|Physical Education or Coaching |
|Method of Instruction - |
|Discussion, Cooperative learning exercises, demonstrations. |
|Lab Content - |
|Types and/or Examples of Required Reading, Writing and Outside of Class Assignments - |
|Optional reading and writing assignments as recommended by instructor. | | <urn:uuid:5c18a405-f07e-48cf-bcd1-e0620229e5b3> | CC-MAIN-2016-07 | http://www.foothill.edu/schedule/outlines.php?act=1&rec_id=5964 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-07/segments/1454701161946.96/warc/CC-MAIN-20160205193921-00128-ip-10-236-182-209.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.869824 | 642 | 3.46875 | 3 |
One of the twenty six most widely translated authors in the world, Robert Louis Stevenson was a Scottish novelist, poet, essayist, but most widely celebrated as an adventure writer. Best known for his novels Treasure Island (1883) and Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886), Stevenson wrote a number of lesser known short stories, inspired by his worldly travels, as well as children's poems in his collection, A Child's Garden of Verses (1905).
Stevenson relocated extensively to climates he hoped would improve his poor health, traveling from Scotland to France, then upstate New York. In 1888, he chartered a yacht in San Francisco and sailed the South Pacific with his family for three years. His health improved considerably during his extensive adventures in the Hawaiian Islands, Tahiti, the Samoan Islands and New Zealand. He sailed on a voyage with a tyrant chief, openly chastised a Hawaiian minister named Dr. Hyde for berating a clergyman who ran a leprosy colony. In short, Stevenson's adventures in the South Pacific offered inspiring characters and settings for his later, best regarded work.
Though Stevenson was popular, he was condemned during the rise of modern literature and World War One by writers like Virginia Woolf. Considered a second class writer, on par with children's literature and horror genres writers, he was excluded from literature taught in schools. Later, he regained respect and literary acclaim by the likes of Joseph Conrad, whom Stevenson influenced with his South Seas fiction.
A little known fact about Stevenson was his accomplishment as a musical composer. He wrote over 123 original musical compositions for the instruments he played: flageolet, flute, clarinet, violin, guitar, mandolin, and piano. His musical scores included his poetry arranged as melodies, and in 1968 his composition for chamber orchestra was arranged by Robert Hughes and toured throughout the Pacific Northwest.
A Lodging for the Night (1877), was Stevenson's first published fiction, when he was 27. Treasure Island (1883), his first major success, was a tale of piracy and buried treasure, set on the seas Stevenson knew and loved. Kidnapped (1886), an historical novel set in 18th century Scotland, depicted the "Appin Murder." Also in 1886, Stevenson published Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, a dual personality novella that spawned movies and similar themed work exploring the subconscious mind. One of the finest examples of Gothic Literature | <urn:uuid:57d167b4-e557-4a23-a5c8-a6bec6eebdd3> | CC-MAIN-2020-29 | https://americanliterature.com/author/robert-louis-stevenson | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-29/segments/1593655895944.36/warc/CC-MAIN-20200707204918-20200707234918-00444.warc.gz | en | 0.980201 | 508 | 3.265625 | 3 |
Longer, hotter summers, more heat waves, more floods, water supply stresses, worsening air quality, more crop damage, an uptick in asthma and respiratory ills — this is a taste of what Hampton Roads and the rest of the Southeast can expect as the region bears the brunt of rapid climate change, according to a new report.
And, the report states, all those impacts are in addition to a big hike in sea level and more intense hurricanes that climate scientists have warned for years could devastate the mid-Atlantic.
"I think people should be really concerned, especially in the coastal areas," climate expert Chip Konrad said in a recent phone interview.
Konrad is a principal author of "Climate of the Southeast United States: Variability, Change, Impacts and Vulnerability," a 358-page report that compiles existing research and climate models — a collaboration among three Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessment centers funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He is also director of the Southeast Regional Climate Center and an associate professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Among the report's projections:
• A hike in sea level by 1 to 5 feet by the end of the century, with increased coastal flooding and tidal surges;
• Average annual temperatures warming by as much as 9 degrees fahrenheit through the rest of the century;
• Fewer cold days, with the freeze-free season extended by as much as a month by mid-century;
• More days with temperatures exceeding 95 degrees, and a doubling or tripling in the number of heat waves;
• More crop damage from heat stress and drought; and
• Declining air quality, and an increase in pollen counts.
"The basic finding," said climate expert Keith Ingram "is that climate variability is already affecting the Southeastern U.S. and a changing climate is projected to increasingly affect the region in the next 20 years and beyond."
Ingram is director of the Southeast Climate Consortium with the department of agricultural and biological engineering at the University of Florida.
Sign up for a free TidewaterBiz news email here.
Scientists have increasingly sounded alarms over the various impacts of climate change for years. While a changing climate is part of the planet's normal cycle, many scientists today believe the rapid escalation of that change — in particular warmer temperatures and rising seas — is largely due to dumping carbon dioxide into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels. They are trying to get a handle on what changes to expect from one region to the next.
"When we look at these general circulation models, we see a different range of scenarios," Konrad said.
The interior of the region is expected to warm the most, for instance, while the report says coastal temperatures could be moderated by factors such as sea winds.
And not all changes associated with climate change are necessarily bad, Konrad said. But they could come with trade-offs.
Residents might welcome fewer snow and ice events, for instance, but there are many crops that need a certain amount of chilling hours in winter. And lower heating bills could be offset by an increase in air-conditioning costs.
Areas that get more precipitation can also expect more flooding, which would impact water quality and wetlands.
Konrad said air quality would suffer with higher temperatures and more sunny days, which control the amount of ozone in the atmosphere. General circulation models project more days with a stagnant atmosphere, so pollutants can build up in populated areas with no ventilation to disperse it.
The report didn't specifically address the impact on wildlife, but a report earlier in the year from the National Wildlife Federation noted that climate change is "the single biggest threat to wildlife in this century."
According to "Wildlife in a Warming World: Confronting the Climate Crisis," the biggest economic hit in Virginia could be on its $50 billion agriculture industry, which is not only heavily dependent on weather but on pollinators — e.g., butterflies and bees — that are highly sensitive to changes in climate.
Temperature increases are already having an impact, the NWF report said, from the Shenandoah salamander and brook trout in higher elevations to shellfish in the Chesapeake Bay.
Konrad said their report is geared toward many audiences, from residents to industry to policymakers.
"So they can be more on the radar, and can be adapting and thinking about the future," Konrad said. "I think there's something in there for everybody."
Dietrich can be reached by phone at 757-247-7892. | <urn:uuid:bc959125-03ac-4b08-b6a0-92f1d852f38d> | CC-MAIN-2015-27 | http://articles.dailypress.com/2013-11-25/news/dp-nws-climate-stress-southeast-20131125_1_climate-change-climate-scientists-climate-variability | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-27/segments/1435375097204.8/warc/CC-MAIN-20150627031817-00157-ip-10-179-60-89.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.954971 | 936 | 3.171875 | 3 |
Podcast: Play in new window
BOB HIRSHON (host):
Relics from Earth’s birth. I’m Bob Hirshon and this is Science Update.
Scientists have discovered material in rock deposits that’s nearly unchanged since the formation of our planet, four-and-a-half billion years ago. In the journal Science, University of Quebec geochemist Hanika Rizo says that their mere existence is re-writing the book on Earth’s distant past.
HANIKA RIZO (University of Quebec at Montreal, formerly at the Carnegie Institution for Science):
It is difficult to understand knowing that very early we had this giant impact that formed the moon, and this giant impact we thought for a very long time should have erased everything that was formed before in the Earth.
Now they realize that that moon-forming collision must have been with a much smaller object. The chemical composition of the rock also reveals evidence that the early Earth was rocked by between five and fifteen other collisions that helped shape the core we see today. I’m Bob Hirshon, for AAAS, the science society. | <urn:uuid:2f90ed3b-5478-4c6a-b4d8-7bf913f18179> | CC-MAIN-2023-14 | https://www.scienceupdate.com/2016/05/rock/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-14/segments/1679296949958.54/warc/CC-MAIN-20230401094611-20230401124611-00374.warc.gz | en | 0.958323 | 246 | 3.234375 | 3 |
John Henry real?
As a freed slave following the Civil War, Henry became an icon because of his strength and determination. His strong work ethic was not only an example to African-Americans, but also to every workingman.
Henry was among the thousands of "steel-drivin' men" who built the railroads. They used large hammers and steel stakes to pound holes into rock. The holes were filled with explosives that would blast through rough terrain and mountainsides to make way for new railroad tracks. The work was hard and slow.
When the first steam drills were introduced to railroad work, the role of the steel-drivin' men was challenged. "People were fixated with the drill," says Scott Nelson, a history professor at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Va. "In the South, mountains stood in the way of railroads and prevented access to the West. But when the steam drill was introduced, its newness was gripping and interesting."
But the drill would be used to replace the men who had been doing the job. Companies felt that the drill would be faster and cheaper. When the railroad company Henry worked for proposed using the steam drill to replace the steel-drivin' men, Henry challenged the drill. He was sure he could beat it. And he did.
Although Henry has been claimed by several states, some historians think he may have competed against the drill at the Great Bend Tunnel in Talcott, W.Va., in 1872. John "Bill" Dillon, a historian who lives in Talcott, says the purpose of the competition was to see who could get through the mountain the fastest.
"The drill drove one nine-foot hole, but John Henry drove two seven-foot holes," he says. "Well, [compare] 14 feet to nine feet, and you know who was faster."
According to the tale, Henry died with a hammer in his hand moments after winning the contest. It's an image that was turned into a number offolk songs in the years that followed the event.
The popularity of Henry's folklore grew in the 1900s. To date, there are more than 400 recordings of the John Henry story, making it one of the most popular American folk songs. Mr. Nelson has more than 80 versions on his MP3 player. One of his favorite versions is by Leadbelly, an influential blues singer and guitarist during the 1930s and '40s.
But other recording artists - such as Woody Guthrie, Johnny Cash, and Burl Ives - have also recorded a version of the John Henry story.
Nelson says that the popularity of the songs grew at public schools during the 1950s and '60s. "It's easy to sing," he says, "and 'John Henry' was a perfect song for teaching music in the classroom."
The message of the John Henry story is that people can accomplish anything they set their mind to. That's why his story has been retold in dozens of movies and books. There's even a John Henry museum and a July festival, "John Henry Days," in Hinton, W.Va., near Mr. Dillon's hometown.
So, is the story of John Henry true? Nelson and Dillon believe parts of it are.
"Was he born with a hammer in his hand?" Dillon says. "No. But I believe he beat that drill. And I believe he died after he won. I stick with those facts."
Nelson's book, "Steel-Drivin' Man: John Henry and the Untold Story of an American Legend," will be published this fall. He thinks that the John Henry story can continue to inspire people today.
Tall tales are larger than life
Do you think you could rope a tornado or jump over a mountaintop in a single leap? You could if you were a character in a tall tale. Tall tales are stories in which the characters and their actions and adventures are exaggerated and entertaining.
Many American tall tales grew out of specific regions of the country. Pecos Bill and his rattlesnake whip, for example, were to cowboys in the West what Paul Bunyan and his giant blue ox were to lumberjacks in the Midwest. And in the South, John Henry was the quintessential "workingman's man" on the railroad.
"Tall tales make the impossible possible," says Scott Nelson. "They represent the Superman character that defines the best a man can do. They're the Marvel Comics' characters of today - like Captain America or Spiderman."
Indeed, tall tales have been a popular form of entertainment for hundreds of years, and they may change a little each time they're told.
comments powered by Disqus
- Recalling a Film From the Liberation of the Camps
- Skull Fossil Offers New Clues on Human Journey From Africa
- Are crude conspiracies right? Research shows nations really do go to war over oil
- Famed SC civil rights protesters have convictions erased
- A Fight About Taxing The Wealthy, A Century Before President Obama
- Claire Strom to Step Down as Editor of Agricultural History
- Joan Peters’s legacy assessed by one of her fiercest critics, Norman Finkelstein
- West Point historian says if his cadets can understand the history of war, so can Congress
- Australian historian Alan Atkinson wins $100,000 literary prize
- From his perch in Saudi Arabia, Princeton’s Mark Cohen says Jews and Muslims should remember they used to get along | <urn:uuid:70b92ce5-e67a-4b4f-b446-cf198d6da369> | CC-MAIN-2015-06 | http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/22314 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-06/segments/1422115927113.72/warc/CC-MAIN-20150124161207-00126-ip-10-180-212-252.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.982839 | 1,142 | 3.578125 | 4 |
Preeclampsia leads to increased risk of morbidity and mortality for both mother and fetus. Most previous studies have largely neglected mechanical compression of the left renal vein by the gravid uterus as a potential mechanism. In this study, we first used a murine model to investigate the pathophysiology of left renal vein constriction. The results indicate that prolonged renal vein stenosis after 14 days can cause renal necrosis and an increase in blood pressure (BP) of roughly 30 mmHg. The second part of this study aimed to automate a diagnostic tool, known as the supine pressor test (SPT), to enable pregnant women to assess their preeclampsia development risk. A positive SPT has been previously defined as an increase of at least 20 mmHg in diastolic BP when switching between left lateral recumbent and supine positions. The results from this study established a baseline BP increase between the two body positions in nonpregnant women and demonstrated the feasibility of an autonomous SPT in pregnant women. Our results demonstrate that there is a baseline increase in BP of roughly 10–14 mmHg and that pregnant women can autonomously perform the SPT. Overall, this work in both rodents and humans suggests that (1) stenosis of the left renal vein in mice leads to elevation in BP and acute renal failure, (2) nonpregnant women experience a baseline increase in BP when they shift from left lateral recumbent to supine position, and (3) the SPT can be automated and used autonomously.
Preeclampsia, a condition associated with hypertension during pregnancy, affects between 5 and 8% of pregnant women worldwide and leads to upward of 70,000 deaths from related complications [1–3]. This condition typically presents after 20 weeks gestation and can cause multi-organ failure in the expecting mother, leading to premature birth and thereby increasing risk of morbidity and mortality to both the fetus and the expecting mother . Preeclampsia is diagnosed by (1) the presence of a systolic blood pressure (BP) greater than or equal to 140 mmHg or diastolic BP greater than or equal to 90 mmHg and (2) another symptom such as thrombocytopenia, renal insufficiency, or proteinuria . This condition is also more likely to occur in subsequent pregnancies if a woman had preterm preeclampsia in a previous pregnancy [4,5].
Although maternal vascular endothelial factors, proinflammatory cytokines, and abnormal trophoblast invasion in the placenta are all thought to contribute to preeclampsia formation [3,6], another possible mechanism contributing to the development of preeclampsia is the compression of the left renal vein by the gravid uterus . This mechanical compression leads to left renal venous outflow obstruction and acute activation of the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system followed by chronic ischemia-mediated hypertension . The release of pro-inflammatory cytokines associated with renal ischemia may contribute to the multiorgan system dysfunction . The venous outflow obstruction from compression of the left renal vein can cause increased intraparenchymal renal pressure, which can then cause persistent arterial hypertension as described in the 1930s by Irvine Page in a phenomenon known as Page kidney . The left renal vein is of particular interest because studies have shown that this vessel is dilated in women with preeclampsia and that it is especially vulnerable to compression by the gravid uterus where it crosses the aorta [8,9]. Additionally, this vein is subject to anatomic variability between patients . Connections from the left renal vein to other branches can vary [10,11], and flow through collateral veins can be beneficial under certain hemodynamic circumstances . However, these connections are not adequate in all women , and blood pressure elevation in pregnant patients may be due to the acute renal venous outflow obstruction in women with inadequate ipsilateral collateral veins. This outflow obstruction can cause increased intrarenal pressure that may lead to acute changes in vasoactive compounds. Animal models can be useful to study varying degrees of left renal vein constriction as it is difficult to fully examine the effects of venous constriction in humans. Recent preeclampsia mouse models, however, focus on placental ischemia and neglect renal vein compression issues .
In order to predict preeclampsia before it develops, a method known as the supine pressor test (SPT), or roll-over test, was developed by N.F. Gant in the 1970s. This test was shown to predict a pregnant women's risk of developing preeclampsia with a 93% positive predictive value . A positive SPT is defined as an increase in diastolic BP of at least 20 mmHg when shifting from the left lateral recumbent position to the supine position. However, the specificity of the SPT was variable, possibly due to the inconsistent methodology between clinics. Key variables of the methodology include arm position and duration of time spent in supine position. The SPT also fell out of favor due to its poor sensitivity, likely due to its performance between 28 and 32 weeks gestation, which is a timeframe that does not accommodate the variable venous anatomy that pregnant women exhibit .
In this study, we aimed to begin automating the SPT in order to improve execution with the ultimate goal of optimizing specificity and providing a tool that would allow serial assessments in the second half of pregnancy. This tool could potentially direct pregnant women identified as being at risk for developing preeclampsia to seek further clinical care. Patients could also work to rest in a therapeutic position (i.e., on their side) in order to mitigate some of the effects of renal vein compression and potentially prevent preeclampsia from developing. A fully automated SPT could include a wearable BP cuff with a position sensor that could guide users to position themselves correctly. While physicians promote regular check-ups for pregnant women ranging from monthly to weekly depending on gestational age, medicine in rural areas both domestically and globally is often limited by resources that prevent access to quality care. As such, this type of cost-effective, robust, and straightforward diagnostic tool could be useful for pregnant women to track their risk for developing preeclampsia, both in resource-limited areas and developed regions. The purpose of this study was (1) to further elucidate potential mechanisms of preeclampsia by investigating the effects of renal vein stenosis in a murine model of Page kidney and (2) to determine the feasibility and utility of an automated tool with a simplified procedure that allows pregnant women to accurately conduct a SPT. The results suggest an autonomous SPT may have utility for this population without the need for expensive equipment or frequent clinical visits.
2.1 Animal Study
2.1.1 Surgical Procedure.
Female C57BL/6J mice were used for this 2-week study and were divided between two groups (Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, ME). The first group was subject to a partial left renal vein stenosis to mimic aspects of Page kidney (n = 6), while the second group underwent a sham surgery (n = 7). Briefly, all mice were anesthetized using 3% isoflurane delivered in 0.5 L/min medical grade air before they were switched to 1.5–2% isoflurane throughout the surgery. The abdominal cavity was exposed via laparotomy, and the left kidney and renal vein were isolated. In the stenosed group, a 30-gauge needle was aligned parallel to the left renal vein and a silk 6-0 suture was tied around both the needle and the vein as done previously . The needle was then removed to create a stenosis. In the control group, a sham procedure was performed where the suture was loosely tied around the renal vein without constriction (Fig. 1). Buprenorphine (0.03 mg/mL) was administered before the first incision to minimize pain and discomfort. Antibiotic ointment was applied after the surgery (Neosporin, Johnson & Johnson, Skillman, NJ). All procedures were approved by the Purdue Animal Care and Use Committee.
All mice were imaged using high-frequency ultrasound imaging (Vevo3100 Imaging System, FUJIFILM VisualSonics, Inc., Toronto, ON, Canada) with a 32–55 MHz range 256-element array transducer (MX550D, 40 MHz center-frequency). Imaging was performed the day before their surgeries as well as on postsurgical days 3, 11, and 14. Animals anesthetized with isoflurane were imaged in the supine position on a heated stage after a depilatory cream was applied to remove abdominal hair (Nair, Church & Dwight Co., Inc. Ewing, NJ). Long-axis images of the left renal vein were collected using two-dimensional B-mode as well as color Doppler (Supplementary Fig. 2 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection) and pulsed wave (PW) Doppler along the vein. PW Doppler images were analyzed for all animals at baseline and postsurgical day 14 to identify changes in flow and velocity. The PW Doppler images were analyzed using both the vevolab software (FUJIFILM VisualSonics) and a custom matlab code for determining blood flow velocity waveforms.
2.1.3 Blood Pressure.
A noninvasive tail cuff system (Supplementary Fig. 1 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection) was used to acquire blood pressures of conscious mice at baseline and postsurgical days 3, 11, and 14 (2 Channel CODA System, Kent Scientific Corp., Torrington, CT). Between 20 and 40 BP readings per mouse were collected during each time point. Readings were plotted to identify regions of stable measurements after mice became comfortable in the restraining tubes.
2.1.4 Euthanasia and Dissection.
Animals were euthanized via isoflurane overdose inhalation, and the kidneys were removed on day 14 of the study. Isoflurane overdose was followed by cardiac puncture to collect blood. Then both the left and right kidneys were removed and placed in 1× phosphate-buffered saline for up to 72 h before being transferred to 4% paraformaldehyde for all animals.
Tissues were processed for standard histology. Paraffin-embedded coronal sections of each kidney were analyzed using hematoxylin and eosin (H&E) staining, with focus on glomerular structure. Images were acquired at 40× magnification and analyzed by a veterinary pathologist certified by the American College of Veterinary Pathologists.
2.2 Nonpregnant Human Pilot Study
2.2.1 Screening Subjects.
A nonpregnant cohort (n = 50) was recruited to help refine the functionality of the automated SPT in terms of measurement stability and comfort prior to testing in pregnant women. Nonpregnant women were asked to participate in this study to establish a baseline increase in blood pressure when shifting from the left lateral recumbent position to the supine position (Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)) and to determine how long it takes for BP readings to stabilize after a period of light exercise. Subjects were provided a questionnaire to screen for exclusion criteria including previous cardiovascular (CV) conditions such as hypertension or history of sudden cardiac death in immediate family members (Supplementary Table 5 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). Total measurement duration per participant was roughly 30–40 min. All study procedures were approved by the Purdue University Institutional Review Board.
Blood pressure measurements were acquired using a noninvasive ambulatory BP cuff (OnTrak 90227 Ambulatory BP Monitor, SpaceLabs, Seattle, WA). Subjects were given a set of one-page instructions, which detailed the study procedure and how to use the automated cuff. The study was divided into two phases. The first phase included 20 subjects and was used to verify the validity of the procedure itself by gathering survey feedback and identifying issues (Supplementary Table 6 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). This phase of the study asked subjects to first take three BP measurements while seated with their legs uncrossed and their back supported to establish a baseline BP . Subjects then performed light exercise by walking up and down three flights of stairs before immediately lying down in the left lateral recumbent position (Fig. 2(a)). Five serial BP measurements were taken in this position before the subject rotated to the supine position (Fig. 2(b)) where five more BP measurements were acquired by the cuff. Each measurement was acquired in roughly 90 s, with at least 30 s of reperfusion time between measurements. Once the study procedure was complete, subjects were asked to complete a short, anonymous survey with questions about their experience (Supplementary Table 6, which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). Based on the data from the first 20 subjects, phase two of the study was slightly modified to control for the effects of arm positioning and to assess body position angle in the left lateral recumbent position. In addition to the steps in the first phase, the participants were asked to take additional serial BP measurements in the left lateral recumbent position with varying arm positions. For the first five measurements, subjects rested their right arm across their chest (Fig. 2(c)). Subjects then placed their right arm on their right side for the last five measurements (Fig. 2(a)). Body angle measurements (Fig. 2(d)) were also acquired five times in the left lateral recumbent position concurrent with BP measurements by placing a smartphone against the subject's abdomen and using a mobile application to acquire position information (SomnoPose, Proximal Box Software, Eagan, MN). Subjects were also asked to complete a survey with Likert scale-type questions and short free response questions evaluating their experience (Supplementary Table 6 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection).
2.3 Pregnant Women Study
2.3.1 Screening Subjects.
Pregnant volunteers (n = 25) at or past 20 weeks gestation were recruited from the antenatal clinic at Indiana University (IU) Health University Hospital in Indianapolis, IN. Prior to starting study procedures, all subjects were asked to self-report previous history of chronic hypertension and chronic kidney disease as these were exclusion criteria (Supplementary Table 7, which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). Study procedures were performed after subjects met eligibility criteria and once their verbal consent was obtained. All procedures were approved by the governing Institutional Review Board.
Pregnant women were provided a booklet of printed instructions that was created based on feedback from the initial nonpregnant women study (Supplementary Fig. 3, which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). These women were also provided with an automated ambulatory BP cuff (OnTrak 90227, SpaceLabs) and were asked to follow the directions to perform the SPT autonomously using the instructions to the best of their abilities. Research team members recorded data and clarified questions about the procedure as needed. The procedure was similar to the one conducted with nonpregnant women but excluded the exercise component. BP measurements were acquired three times in a seated position, five times in a left lateral recumbent position (Fig. 2(a)), and five times in a supine position (Fig. 2(b)). In the left lateral recumbent orientation, women placed their right arms along the side of their bodies as depicted in Fig. 2(a). Body angle measurements were also obtained in the same manner as in the nonpregnant women study (Fig. 2(d)). While the procedure requested that these women lie in the supine position with their legs extended, many of the study participants laid in this position with their knees bent and feet planted as they felt more comfortable this way. After the study, participants were asked to complete a survey about their experience (Supplementary Table 8, which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection).
For the animal study, significant differences among time points and groups were determined using a one-way repeated measure ANOVA with Tukey or Dunnett's post hoc tests (Minitab v18, State College, PA; GraphPad Prism v8, San Diego, CA). For the PW Doppler data, the number of samples in each group varied since it was not always possible to detect flow due to image artifacts. Thus, a mixed-model analysis was used to analyze differences instead of an ANOVA. For both human studies, subjects' BP measurements were averaged for both body positions and compared between positions. A one-way ANOVA with Tukey's post hoc analysis and two-sample t-tests were both used to determine differences between groups. Statistical significance for all comparisons was considered at p < 0.05. For both animal and human data, assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were tested using Bartlett's test and Ryan-Joiner test. Groups were homogenous (p > 0.05), and all but one group followed a normal distribution (systolic blood pressures of pregnant women taken in the supine position).
3.1 Animal Study
3.1.1 Blood Pressure Increases After Renal Vein Stenosis.
All female mice in this study were between 8 and 15 weeks of age to ensure sexual maturity and weighed 21.6 ± 2.1 g. An average stenosis of 53 ± 26% was created after the 30-gauge needle was removed as measured from long-axis, B-mode ultrasound images. Day 14 systolic BPs for the stenosed group were significantly different from baseline BP measurements (p < 0.05). At the end of the study, the average BPs of all animals in the stenosed group increased by 33.3 ± 25.0 mmHg for systolic BP and by 32.7 ± 26.9 mmHg for diastolic BP (Fig. 3(b)). For the control group, BPs fluctuated and were within 20 mmHg of the baseline measurements for both day 14 systolic and diastolic BP (Fig. 3(b)).
3.1.2 Peak Renal Vein Blood Velocity Increases After Stenosis.
Both peak and mean velocities of the left renal vein measured near the inferior vena cava were lower at day 14 compared to baseline measurements in mice with the stenosis. These velocities measured at the same region in mice from the sham group showed an increasing trend over two weeks.
3.1.3 Renal Vein Stenosis Leads to Renal Necrosis.
The left kidney of the experimental group was necrotic (Fig. 3(a)) compared to the right kidney in the same group as well as to both kidneys in the sham group. Renal necrosis was characterized by increased cellular eosinophilia as well as pyknotic or absent nuclei of renal tubular epithelial cells, glomeruli, and interstitial vessels. More specifically, capillary lumina of affected glomeruli were obscured by swollen endothelial cells and lacked erythrocytes (Fig. 4). Proteinaceous material was often present in the Bowman's space in affected glomeruli suggesting dysfunctional glomerular filtration. Interstitial hemorrhage and thrombosis of a few medium-sized arteries were also apparent in some specimens. The right kidneys in the experimental group and both kidneys in the sham group had typical healthy glomeruli (Fig. 4).
3.2 Nonpregnant Human Pilot Study
3.2.1 Blood Pressure Increased When Subjects Shifted From Left Lateral to Supine Position.
The mean age of the 50 participants in this study was 22.8 ± 3.8 years. Most participants were in the healthy body mass index (BMI) range of 18.5–24.9 kg/m2 (68%; 22.32 ± 3.41 kg/m2). Blood pressure measurements stabilized after roughly 5 min, which corresponded to two BP readings (Fig. 5(a)). As such, the first two measurements taken in the left lateral recumbent position were excluded from the average measurement (Fig. 6(a)) in order to account for only stable postexercise measurements. In nonpregnant women, BPs increased by an average of 10.6 ± 5.7 mmHg and by 10.4 ± 6.0 mmHg for systolic and diastolic BPs, respectively, when shifting from left lateral recumbent to supine position (Fig. 6(a)). BPs increased significantly when shifting between left lateral recumbent and supine positions (p < 0.001). Nonpregnant women naturally rested at an average angle of 78.5 ± 9.0 deg in the left lateral recumbent position (Fig. 2(d)).
3.2.2 User Feedback Suggests General Ease of Use.
Subjects were asked to complete a survey at the conclusion of the study assessing factors such as their comfort and user-friendliness of the instructions and device. Most of the subjects agreed that the instructions they were given were easy to follow (64%), while 32% disagreed. Regarding comfort during the actual procedure, 66% of subjects indicated that it was comfortable for them to acquire BP measurements on their left side, and 60% of subjects said the same for acquiring BPs on their backs (Supplementary Table 1 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection).
3.3 Pregnant Women Study
3.3.1 Blood Pressure Increases Between Left Lateral and Supine Positions in Pregnant Women.
The mean age of the women in this portion of the study was 31.5 ± 4.7 years. The mean gestational age was 29.7 ± 6.6 weeks with 2.4 ± 2.3 gravidity and 1.2 ± 2.1 parity. When averaging all five measurements taken in both body positions, pregnant subjects experienced an average increase of 14.0 ± 4.0 mmHg in systolic BP and 12.5 ± 4.8 mmHg in diastolic BP while shifting from left lateral recumbent position to supine position (Fig. 6(b)). In the left lateral recumbent position, women naturally rested at an angle of 72.6 ± 6.3 deg measured from the bed to their back. The change in systolic and diastolic BPs between positions was 3.4 mmHg and 2.1 mmHg greater, respectively, in pregnant women than in nonpregnant women, but only the systolic BP increase between positions was significantly different between pregnant and nonpregnant women (p < 0.05).
3.3.2 Lateral Position Is More Comfortable Than Supine.
Almost all 25 pregnant women (88%) agreed that the instructions were easy to follow. Additionally, most subjects (92%) agreed that the BP device was comfortable for them to wear throughout the procedure. Pregnant women in the study generally agreed that it was comfortable to take BP on their left side (96%), while only 52% of these women agreed that it was comfortable for them to take BP measurements on their back (Supplementary Table 2 which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection). These women were also asked in which position they tended to sleep and rest, and all women responded that they sleep on their side.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Overall, these data suggest that an autonomous SPT is feasible for pregnant women at risk for preeclampsia. The results of our nonpregnant and pregnant women studies both suggest that the autonomous SPT procedure will be feasible for pregnant women to perform throughout their pregnancy, either autonomously or with minimal assistance. The results also suggest that a baseline increase in BP between positions in nonpregnant women will need to be considered in further development of an automated version of the SPT. From the animal study, severe stenosis of the left renal vein for a period of two weeks led to severe damage to the left kidney as well as to increased BP. Studying the effect of varying degrees of renal vein constriction on intrarenal pressure and vasoactive compounds is warranted.
Blood pressures in animals increased overall in both groups but to varying degrees. Given that Poiseuille's law approximates that pressure difference in flow through a pipe is related to radius to the fourth power, then we can expect that venous outflow obstruction could have a substantial effect on intrarenal pressure. In other words, a small reduction in diameter can have a large effect on pressure as well as on the health and viability of upstream tissue. In a previous rodent study, the left renal vein was ligated leading to increased flow through collateral vessels; mortality, though, increased when important collateral vessels were not preserved . The overall BP change in the stenosed group was about 10 mmHg higher in both systolic and diastolic BP than in sham controls. Hypertension is expected as a result of Page kidney, which previous work has linked to preeclampsia [1,18]. The slight increase in the sham group by day 14 may be due to general stress from the procedure or from typical variation in tail-cuff BP measurements. Although the tail-cuff system used to obtain murine BP measurements can produce noisy data, previous validation studies comparing tail-cuff measurements to radio telemetry suggest that general trends in data are reliable and accurate . Variations in BP among animals in the same procedural group may also have been due to the degree of stenosis they experienced. Even though the same size of needle was used when creating each stenosis, there was variation in baseline vessel diameter among animals, likely due to the differences in ages and body mass. Still, there was no strong correlation found when age was plotted against percent stenosis. While factors such as age and percent stenosis could be considered in future iterations of this model, mice in the stenosed group did indeed experience necrotic tubules. Tubular injuries are in line with results seen in similar renal obstruction procedures [20,21] and in cases of Page kidney . The mice in this study also exhibited other physiologic and histologic changes that result from renal congestion and are also similar to those of Page kidney. Animals in the stenosed group experienced increased eosinophilia, which has also been reported in cases of Page kidney . Additionally, renal obstruction leads to decreased perfusion to blood vessels in the kidney . This decrease may explain the observed necrosis, but clinically, renal injury is more common than renal necrosis. Overall, these murine data suggest that animals with severe renal vein stenosis sustain substantial kidney injury and develop hypertension.
In the human pilot study, subjects shifting from the left lateral recumbent position to the supine position experienced an increase in BP similar to previous studies [23,24], albeit to different degrees likely based on cuff position relative to the heart. We controlled for this factor in the clinical study with pregnant women based on literature and the results from phase two of this pilot study, which demonstrated that, although not statistically significant, arm position can vary the BP in the left lateral recumbent position (Fig. 6(c)). Moreover, the difference in BP taken between the lateral recumbent and supine positions was at least 10 mmHg for both systolic and diastolic BP in both pregnant and nonpregnant women. This change is important because the difference between stages 1 and 2 hypertension is only 10 mmHg . While clinical BP measurements are typically acquired in a seated position, our data suggest that it may be worthwhile to consider body position as a variable when acquiring BP, especially when diagnosing hypertension. American Heart Association (AHA) guidelines indicate that home-based ambulatory BP monitoring can be used to acquire accurate BP measurements outside of the clinic , but our data indicate that it may also be useful to ensure consistent body positioning when acquiring measurements. We also assessed the amount of time it took BP to stabilize after light exercise. BP stabilized after roughly 5 min in most subjects. This is notable because a fully automated SPT will need to incorporate a signal detection feature to ensure that stable BP measurements are being collected in the lateral recumbent position prior to shifting into the supine position in order to optimize test sensitivity.
Another factor to consider with automating the SPT is whether an increase in diastolic BP is still the best metric to use to determine a positive SPT. The initial work that led to the development of the SPT in the 1970s focused on diastolic BP as it was considered the best predictor of CV health , perhaps due to decreased effects of pressure distortion in this phase . However, since the development of the SPT, more recent studies have shown that systolic BP may actually be a better predictor of CV status than diastolic BP . Additionally, because each subject experienced different degrees of change when shifting between positions, the positive SPT criteria could potentially be adjusted based on baseline increase data for better prediction value. Further longitudinal studies will be needed to explore these possibilities and optimize diagnosis criteria.
The pregnant subjects in this study were asked to follow a set of instructions with both text and visual aids provided to them. The research team clarified questions and helped as needed, but for the most part, the pregnant women were able to follow directions autonomously, indicating that they would be able to perform the SPT without the help of a clinician. Differences in BP between positions for pregnant women were increased as compared to differences in nonpregnant women, which could indicate that the gravid uterus does have some effect on BP in supine position as demonstrated in Ref. . In this portion of the study, most women naturally laid their arm across their side when they were in the left lateral recumbent position as depicted in Fig. 2(a). When they did not naturally lie in this position, we asked them to adjust to it in order to keep cuff position consistent. Some women needed assistance sitting up from the supine position after they were done with the procedure, especially if they were past 30 weeks' gestation. As such, pregnant women in their third trimester may need additional assistance in order to perform this procedure. It is also important to note that disturbed venous flow has been implicated with kidney and liver failure in patients with preeclampsia, as well as with dysfunction in venous return when pregnant patients are supine [9,29]. The position in which pregnant women rest has been studied since this can influence venous blood flow. Previous work noted that patients resting in the supine position experienced an elevation of renal pressure in their lower limbs but that this elevation was reduced when the patients were on their side .
Other studies have also asked pregnant women to acquire their own BPs by following a set of instructions. A previous study screened for preeclampsia in the first trimester of pregnancy by having patients record their own BPs at stations (not ambulatory cuffs) and compare these measurements to ones acquired by clinicians . The results helped lead to the current understanding that ambulatory BP monitoring should be considered the reference standard, as per updated 2019 American Heart Association guidelines . These ambulatory BP devices take measurements based on an automated approach that is thought to reduce the white coat effect and human errors associated with the traditional in-office BP acquisition methods requiring sphygmomanometers . This previous work, combined with the results of this study, suggests that home-based BP monitoring for pregnant populations could be beneficial to overall maternal health.
A workflow diagramming how the automated supine pressor test could work is presented in Supplementary Fig. 4, which is available in the Supplemental Materials on the ASME Digital Collection. This tool has the potential to allow pregnant women to conduct the SPT throughout their pregnancies with a home-monitoring strategy that eliminates the need for frequent clinic visits. The automated test will need to integrate an automatic blood pressure cuff and Bluetooth inertial measurement unit (IMU) position sensor through the interface of an application to guide the patient through the supine pressor test. A smartphone app can help guide patients through self-administering the supine pressor test using the wearable sensors, including an automated blood pressure cuff and a nine-axis IMU sensor capable of communicating angular and positional data throughout the duration of the SPT. These data could be transmitted to a secure, cloud-based server from which the app could both upload and retrieve information. The data from the IMU can be processed through an extended Kalman filter in real-time to provide greater accuracy in guiding the patient to a desired orientation . Throughout the duration of the SPT, the app can communicate to the patient whether or not she is in the correct position. If the patient happens to orient herself out of the specified range of acceptable values, the app sends out an alert that will help her return to the desired posture. Through this integrated system, women can guide themselves through the steps of a SPT without having a clinician present. This automated tool can also serve as more than just a diagnostic tool, especially since it has the potential to become a management device that helps ensure that pregnant women are resting in the lateral recumbent position when sleeping. Such a tool could mitigate the effects of left renal vein compression from the gravid uterus and help prevent renal outflow obstruction and resulting renal compartment syndrome.
Additional considerations include the end users of these devices and the locations where it would be most useful. Pregnant women in developed countries as well as in low- and middle- income countries could benefit from an automated SPT. In developed regions, if the SPT is employed early in the pregnancy, a positive test could allow for closer longitudinal surveillance of both mother and fetus. If positive, therapeutic resting positions (i.e., left lateral recumbent) could be recommended before proceeding to more aggressive clinical intervention. In lower resource settings, an automated SPT could serve as monitoring tool between clinical visits, which are not as frequent. This would be particularly beneficial in areas of Africa where up to 10% of pregnancies are affected by preeclampsia, compared to the global average of 2–8% . Sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia have especially high maternal mortality rates, with as many as 90% of global maternal deaths occurring in these areas . In some of these regions, pregnant women are only advised to see their physicians a few times throughout their pregnancies, and transportation expenses are often a barrier to receiving reliable healthcare. An automated SPT tool could be potentially useful in these areas to monitor preeclampsia progression without frequent travel to a clinic. Some regions of Kenya have community health-care workers who can be trained to help administer the automated SPT in rural areas where pregnant women do not have the resources to regularly get their BP checked throughout their pregnancy. There are, however, certain limitations to be considered before implementation. Currently, many automated systems are battery-operated, and these batteries need to be replaced frequently. People in resource-limited areas may not have access to a large supply of batteries or to reliable electrical outlets for charging. It is also important to consider that a positive SPT would indicate that preeclampsia may develop, but effective comprehensive treatments for this condition are still needed. Identifying high-risk pregnant women, though, may lead to increased surveillance and a better opportunity to develop preventative strategies. An educational campaign about safe sleeping practices during pregnancy, for example, may still be beneficial by encouraging pregnant women to sleep on their sides as the best resting position .
These studies are not without their limitations. First, the mouse model does not mimic all of the physiologic changes associated with preeclampsia in humans. Further efforts are needed to create animal models that better reproduce the human condition where renal changes could be investigated. Additionally, neither varying gestational ages nor longitudinal data were included during the pregnant human studies. Future work with a larger human study will be needed to follow subjects throughout pregnancy and to determine the efficacy of an automated SPT.
In conclusion, this study helps to lay the groundwork for an automated SPT that pregnant women could use for monitoring, early detection, and eventually, prediction of preeclampsia. Our studies indicated that women would largely be able to perform this test autonomously given descriptive visual instructions and that there is a significant baseline increase in BP when shifting from the left lateral recumbent position to the supine position of 10–15 mmHg. Additionally, we investigated the pathophysiology of left renal vein stenosis using an animal model, which confirms a relationship between renal vein obstruction and hypertension. The results demonstrated that stenosis in the vein can lead to kidney injury and increased BP. While further work will be needed to evaluate the efficacy of an automated SPT, our hope is to eventually develop and distribute a combined device and data system that can be implemented in a wide range of settings, eventually improving both maternal and fetal health worldwide.
SpaceLabs Healthcare Inc. provided the ambulatory BP cuffs and monitors for this study, but they were not involved in the data analysis or paper preparation. Both Gurneet Sangha and Kirk Foster also provided invaluable insights for this study. This publication was made possible in part, by support from a Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Global Grand Challenges Grant (OPP1182739; Funder ID: 10.13039/100000865), the Purdue Women's Global Health Institute, and the Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute (Funder ID: 10.13039/100006975). The Indiana CTSI is funded in part by Award No. UL1TR002529 from the National Institutes of Health, National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, Clinical and Translational Sciences Award. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. | <urn:uuid:723a9c5e-6721-497d-b127-2aa3aa3188dd> | CC-MAIN-2023-06 | https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/medicaldiagnostics/article/2/4/041009/1065737/Toward-Automation-of-the-Supine-Pressor-Test-for | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764500215.91/warc/CC-MAIN-20230205032040-20230205062040-00859.warc.gz | en | 0.956026 | 7,993 | 2.625 | 3 |
Information security practices are influenced by the geography of operations, the culture from that area, and the industry in general. The trust found within a community, as highlighted by Bruce Schneier in Liars & Outliers, allows the wheels of society to move forward. Said wheels also myopically continue as researched by Steven Pinker. To provide a bit of elaboration on these three points, let me elaborate briefly:
- Geography of Operations – This trust though is based on, in part, on proximity. Individuals are more trusting to those within the same community (however you define this works out to the same result).
- Culture from that area – “Trust non-kin is calibrated by the society we live in. If we live in a polite society where trust is generally returned, we’re at ease trusting first. If we live in a violent society…we don’t trust easily and require further evidence…” – Pg 37
- Industry – Familiarity also engenders trust within an industry, i.e, a doctor working with another doctor automatically introduces a level of confidence and trust in the communication and mutual activities.
Ultimately, Culture is King. It is the culture that defines an organization’s DNA and differentiates them in the market space. The experience one encounters with the Culture of a Google vs. Microsoft environment is palatable. One or the other is not right or wrong, but the Culture is different nonetheless. The challenge is that the Culture MUST change in a world where these principles are violated.
History and biology have proven that when an aggressive culture that doesn’t need to trust as it is the aggressor is introduced into a culture that doesn’t share that culture – the Aggressor always wins. This is highlighted across numerous examples of entire societies being destroyed / absorbed in Guns, Germs, and Steel. A biology example would be the Chinese fish that had invaded the ecosystem in the Great Lakes, and is destroying the current biology.
Ultimately, all systems are connected – regardless of the geography, culture, or industry. Therefore the concepts and methodologies of organizing go to market strategies; deployment of new technology, and simply sustaining competitive operations requires a reframing of the trust model. In essence, the culture of the organization where technology is introduced must be adapted to fit the more aggressive, violent, and hostile landscapes in the world.
Strategically speaking enterprises may operate locally, but must be governed with a global perspective. Such can and must include the geopolitical risks globally, the global value of the intellectual property, and be adaptive to the degrees of risk that is introduced at any given time.
Technologically the deployed systems must be considered and ensured that the trust equated into the system controls is configured aggressively. An example – the classic firewall rule strictness and ‘Deny All’ must prevail, yet in some cases I have seen this not to be true. Be mindful of the connectedness of these systems in the global community.
The impact of culture on an organization’s decision to survive competitively starts with trust – in the systems, the people, the process, and the market. | <urn:uuid:1eb2751c-ea4e-48c7-8f05-491b9384141b> | CC-MAIN-2019-35 | https://pcidss.wordpress.com/2012/12/31/cios-must-address-the-culture-of-trust-gap/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-35/segments/1566027314353.10/warc/CC-MAIN-20190818231019-20190819013019-00207.warc.gz | en | 0.94094 | 648 | 2.546875 | 3 |
- Dementia Slideshow Pictures
- Take the ADHD Quiz
- Brain Foods Slideshow
- Patient Comments: Spinal Cord Injury - Causes
- Patient Comments: Spinal Cord Injury - Symptoms
- Find a local Doctor in your town
- Spinal Cord Injury Facts
- What is the spinal cord injury?
- What are the causes of spinal cord injury?
- What are the symptoms of spinal cord injury?
- How is a spinal cord injury diagnosed?
- How is a spinal cord injury treated?
- What is the outlook for patients with spinal cord injury?
- Is there a cure for spinal cord injury?
- Where can I get more information on spinal cord injury?
- NIH spinal cord injury: treatments and rehabilitation
- What Is a Spinal Cord Injury?
- How Does the Spinal Cord Work?
- What Happens When the Spinal Cord Is Injured?
- What Are the Immediate Treatments for Spinal Cord Injury?
- How Does a Spinal Cord Injury Affect the Rest of the Body?
- How Does Rehabilitation Help People Recover From Spinal Cord Injuries?
- How Is Research Helping Spinal Cord Injury Patients?
- The Future of Spinal Cord Research
NIH spinal cord injury: treatments and rehabilitation
A Short History of the Treatment of Spinal Cord Injury
Accounts of spinal cord injuries and their treatment date back to ancient times, even though there was little chance of recovery from such a devastating injury. The earliest is found in an Egyptian papyrus roll manuscript written in approximately 1700 B.C. that describes two spinal cord injuries involving fracture or dislocation of the neck vertebrae accompanied by paralysis.* The description of each was "an ailment not to be treated."
Centuries later in Greece, treatment for spinal cord injuries had changed little. According to the Greek physician Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) there were no treatment options for spinal cord injuries that resulted in paralysis; unfortunately, those patients were destined to die. But Hippocrates did use rudimentary forms of traction to treat spinal fractures without paralysis. The Hippocratic Ladder was a device that required the patient to be bound, tied to the rungs upside-down, and shaken vigorously to reduce spinal curvature. Another invention, the Hippocratic Board, allowed the doctor to apply traction to the immobilized patient's back using either his hands and feet or a wheel and axle arrangement.
Hindu, Arab, and Chinese physicians also developed basic forms of traction to correct spinal deformities. These same principles of traction are still applied today.
In about 200 A.D., the Roman physician Galen introduced the concept of the central nervous system when he proposed that the spinal cord was an extension of the brain that carried sensation to the limbs and back. By the seventh century A.D., Paulus of Aegina was recommending surgery for spinal column fracture to remove the bone fragments that he was convinced caused paralysis.
In his influential anatomy textbook published in 1543, the Renaissance physician and teacher Vesalius described and illustrated the spinal cord in all its parts. The illustrations in his books, based on direct observation and dissection of the spine, gave physicians a way to understand the basic structure of the spine and spinal cord and what could happen when it was injured. The words we use today to identify segments of the spine - cervical, thoracic, lumbar, sacral, and coccygeal - come directly from Vesalius.
With the widespread use of antiseptics and sterilization in surgical procedures in the late nineteenth century, spinal surgery could finally be done with a much lower risk of infection. The use of X-rays, beginning in the 1920s, gave surgeons a way to precisely locate the injury and also made diagnosis and prediction of outcome more accurate. By the middle of the twentieth century, a standard method of treating spinal cord injuries was established - reposition the spine, fix it in place, and rehabilitate disabilities with exercise. In the 1990s, the discovery that the steroid drug methylprednisolone could reduce damage to nerve cells if given early enough after injury gave doctors an additional treatment option. | <urn:uuid:ca7acbe2-7ca1-402d-9723-75eb0eb022e9> | CC-MAIN-2017-26 | http://www.medicinenet.com/spinal_cord_injury_treatments_and_rehabilitation/page6.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-26/segments/1498128319575.19/warc/CC-MAIN-20170622135404-20170622155404-00144.warc.gz | en | 0.946188 | 858 | 3.015625 | 3 |
According to quantum mechanics, small magnetic objects called nanomagnets can exist in two distinct states (i.e. north pole up and north pole down). They can switch their state through a phenomenon called quantum tunneling.
When the nanomagnet switches its poles, the abrupt change in its magnetization can be observed with low-temperature magnetometry techniques used in del Barco’s lab. The switch is called quantum tunneling because it looks like a funnel cloud tunneling from one pole to another.
A new paper in Nature shows that two almost independent halves of a new magnetic molecule can tunnel, or switch poles, at once under certain conditions. In the process, they appear to cancel out quantum tunneling.
Research from ancient sediment cores indicates that a warming climate could make the world’s arctic tundra far more susceptible to fires than previously thought. The findings are important given the potential for tundra fires to release organic carbon – which could add significantly to the amount of greenhouse gases already blamed for global warming.
Montana State University post-doctoral researcher Philip Higuera is the lead author on the paper, which summarizes a portion of a four-year study funded by the National Science Foundation.
Butterflies and moths are well known for their striking metamorphosis from crawling caterpillars to winged adults. In light of this radical change, not just in body form, but also in lifestyle, diet and dependence on particular sensory cues, it would seem unlikely that learned associations or memories formed at the larval or caterpillar stage could be accessible to the adult moth or butterfly.
Now, scientists at Georgetown University have discovered that a moth can indeed remember what it learned as a caterpillar.
Just picture the scene: you’re at a cocktail party, talking to someone you would like to get to know better but the background noise is making it hard to concentrate. Luckily, humans are very gifted at listening to someone speaking while many other people are talking loudly at the same time. This so-called cocktail-party-phenomenon is based on the ability of the human auditory system to decompose the acoustic world into discrete objects of perception.
It was originally believed that the major acoustic cue used by the auditory system to solve this task was directional information of the sound source, but even though localisation of different sound sources with two ears improves the performance, it can be achieved monaurally, for example in telephone conversations, where no directional information is available.
Many children with autism have elevated blood levels of serotonin – a chemical with strong links to mood and anxiety. But what relevance this “hyperserotonemia” has for autism has remained a mystery.
New research by Vanderbilt University Medical Center investigators provides a physical basis for this phenomenon, which may have profound implications for the origin of some autism-associated deficits.
In an advance online publication in the Journal of Clinical Investigation, Ana Carneiro, Ph.D., and colleagues report that a well-known protein found in blood platelets, integrin beta3, physically associates with and regulates the serotonin transporter (SERT), a protein that controls serotonin availability.
Are smart people drawn to the arts or does arts training make people smarter? Or neither?
According to research led by Dr. Michael S. Gazzaniga of the University of California at Santa Barbara, children motivated in the arts develop attention skills and strategies for memory retrieval that also apply to other subject areas.
“A life-affirming dimension is opening up in neuroscience,” said Dr. Gazzaniga, “to discover how the performance and appreciation of the arts enlarge cognitive capacities will be a long step forward in learning how better to learn and more enjoyably and productively to live. The consortium’s new findings and conceptual advances have clarified what now needs to be done.” | <urn:uuid:b4c9478b-62a1-418f-8155-daa66f307e2f> | CC-MAIN-2014-23 | http://www.science20.com/news_articles?page=1991 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2014-23/segments/1406510256757.9/warc/CC-MAIN-20140728011736-00443-ip-10-146-231-18.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.939464 | 795 | 3.234375 | 3 |
Courtesy: National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Thousands gather on the Mall in 1987 to rally for Soviet Jewry.
“We are not silent today.”
The day we were not silent was 25 years ago: Dec. 6, 1987. The person who told us not to be silent was Elie Wiesel, and the cause to which we gave voice was the cause of a generation: the Soviet Jewry Movement.
During the Washington summit between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan, 250,000 people came to protest on the Mall.
In showing up, the Jewish community and others for the cause showed what it means to take charge of the fate of people who lived across the globe. It was our way of telling our brothers and sisters, you are never alone.
When you are silenced, we will scream. When you are vulnerable, we will make you strong.
The march was a peak moment in a 40-year struggle to liberate 1.5 million Jews from the clutches of the former Soviet Union. It was a turning point in the movement, but it was much more than that.
Reminiscing about the march helps us reflect on the transformation that happened to us at that time. We tried to liberate Jews across the world and found ourselves in the process. Many young leaders of the movement were inspired to work for non-profits with a human rights orientation or work on behalf of the Jewish community as committed professionals or volunteers.
That was me. It changed my life. For the first time, I understood that my voice counted. It did not count alone, but it counted as part of a community and an extended family that were able to shake the world.
Alan Dershowitz once said that he identified strongly with the Soviet Jewry movement because he felt he could have been a Soviet Jew. Any one of us with Eastern European parents or grandparents knows exactly what Dershowitz meant. We fought to free Soviet Jews from behind the Iron Curtain because it was a humanitarian cause but also because we identified almost too closely with their plight. Their lack of their freedoms reminded us too much of the pain of the Holocaust only a generation earlier. If we were not loud enough then, we were going to overcompensate now.
Looking back a quarter of a century later, the lessons of the movement still stay with me. Every genuine struggle is hard and is only won incrementally. There was nothing inevitable about the success of the movement to free Soviet Jews. It was not a given that we would ever realize the goals of the movement. Washington Jews played a leading role in driving the movement and situating protestors at the seat of political power. We learned to leverage where we live and work to achieve higher ends. Sometimes the movement was waylaid by politics, splinter organizations that fought with each other and an intense battle of the egos but ultimately, we knew that we had to put all of that aside. We had one vision we all had to realize. And we did.
Soviet Jews left the former Soviet Union in droves and now live in Israel, Germany, the United States and everywhere else. They lived to see children and grandchildren born into freedoms they did not have. We succeeded. But we also lost some energy along the way. The movement and the march that were defining moments in the lives of many in the Jewish community life is largely the stuff of nostalgia today. There are still many human rights conflicts to fight, but many seem a little more tired, a little more jaded. The rally on the Mall protesting genocide in Darfur had a tenth of the participants protesting a crime of epic proportions.
During the heyday of the struggle, we co-opted a biblical verse from the Exodus story: “Let My People Go.” It was the banner headline of my generation. One of the leaders of the Soviet Jewry movement understood that to engage Soviet Jews in their own struggle, they had to feel an affiliation with Judaism that had been culturally and spiritually erased by communism. He changed the slogan to “Let My People Know,” which inspired the clandestine study of Hebrew and Jewish values across Russia.
Perhaps it is that slogan which must inform today’s generation. With the creation of a Jewish homeland and a strong network of Jewish organizational life in the Diaspora, we have ensured that Jews will always have a refuge and a place to go. What we have yet to do is fulfill the other slogan, “Let My People Know.”
We have more organizations than we did 25 years ago but perhaps less Jewish education. Jewish life must be more than organizations. It must be about knowledge and meaning and causes. A cause found me and helped make me who I am. And now I – and we – have to seek out new causes because the world is still broken, and because the voice of individuals still matters.
Stuart Kurlander is the president of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington | <urn:uuid:4bebbf3e-6bc5-48a2-8ff6-2a0fcd96f05f> | CC-MAIN-2015-40 | http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2012/12/06/let-my-people-know/16856?wprss=rss_guest-voices | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-40/segments/1443736673439.5/warc/CC-MAIN-20151001215753-00111-ip-10-137-6-227.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.980947 | 1,014 | 2.6875 | 3 |
La administración nacional de la seguridad del tráfico en las carreteras (autopistas)
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation, is the federal agency responsible for establishing and monitoring safety criteria for child safety seats and vehicles. In addition, NHTSA develops educational materials and trainings, provides money for research and safety and enforcement programs, conducts research, and conducts compliance testing on products. The NHTSA website, www.nhtsa.gov, provides a wealth of information on child passenger safety.
Visitors to the website can search for recalls, information on types of child safety seats, best practice recommendations, ease of use findings, and locations of child safety seat inspection stations, just to name a few.
NHTSA has also developed a website for parents that covers a wide range of subjects related to children in and around vehicles. Parents Central: From Car Seats to Car Keys: Keeping Kids Safe can be found by clicking www.safercar.gov/parents/index.htm. | <urn:uuid:aeecae3c-b534-404c-86b5-ef4443ba45ef> | CC-MAIN-2016-50 | http://www.preventinjury.org/En-Espanol-(1)/Seguridad-del-nino-pasajero/Acerca-de-los-asientos-de-seguridad-para-ninos/La-administracion-nacional-de-la-seguridad-del-tra | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-50/segments/1480698541692.55/warc/CC-MAIN-20161202170901-00276-ip-10-31-129-80.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.877319 | 222 | 2.53125 | 3 |
Turkish translation of “the pluperfect”
See all translations
the pluperfect noun
/ˌpluːˈpɜːfɪkt/ ( also the past perfect)
› the form of the verb that is used to show that an action had already finished when another action happened. In English, the pluperfect is made with 'had' and a past participle.
had + geçmiş zaman ortacı' ile oluşan fiil kipi; geçmişte bitmiş zaman kipi
Verb forms, tenses and types of verbs | <urn:uuid:c319d8fa-5e40-4c9c-a52c-3711c7191fa4> | CC-MAIN-2015-14 | http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/turkish/the-pluperfect | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-14/segments/1427131300578.50/warc/CC-MAIN-20150323172140-00220-ip-10-168-14-71.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.852963 | 139 | 3.078125 | 3 |
It is possible to classify all known matter into natural substances and artificial substances according to its origin. The term “substance” means that they are substances with a fixed and defined chemical composition. Substances are made up of atoms or molecules , and cannot be separated using physical separation methods (they are not mixtures). Natural … Read more20 Examples of Natural and Artificial Substances
Federal student loan consolidation can help you manage multiple monthly payments to multiple servicers. If, like the vast majority of college graduates, you acquired student loan debt through federal student aid, you likely have more than one loan, which means more than one bill. Trying to juggle all of them can quickly get confusing and … Read moreShould I Consolidate My Federal Student Loans?
According to data compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 16.6% of all U.S. higher education students (about 3.3 million) in fall 2018 were enrolled in institutions offering exclusively distance education courses. More than 35% were enrolled in hybrid institutions that combine distance education and in-person instruction, a class that includes some of … Read more16 Online Degree Programs From Top Universities
This theoretical framework offers a more complete historical perspective and a better context for understanding the present. History is a very active social science, in previous articles we have talked about its ability to self-analyze and rewrite itself. Research, perspective, new data and readings are crucial in the construction of historical becoming. Elements such as … Read moreWhat is Critical Race Theory?
What is Social Phenomena? The social phenomena are all behaviors or trends that occur within a society, which can be performed by some or all the members and having a concrete effect or consequence. For example: immigration, art, the devaluation of a currency, fashion. These phenomena occur when a change occurs in some sphere or … Read moreExamples of Social Phenomena
In chemistry, a mixture is a set of two or more substances that come together without changing chemically. For this reason, it is possible to separate the various components of the mixtures by relatively common physical procedures, such as filtration or distillation . For example: sea water, coffee with sugar, beer, milk. In nature there are … Read more20 Examples of Mixtures
When speaking of compounds, allusion is generally made to chemical compounds , that is, to substances that are made up of two or more chemical elements that are combined in a certain way and proportion. For example: methylene blue, ferric chloride, water, methane . The physicochemical properties of the compounds are not the same as … Read more19 Examples of Compound
Objects that occur in this state of matter are known as solids . Together with the other two ( liquid and gaseous ), they make up the three classically recognized possible states. For example: diamond, iron, sand, silicon. Some incorporate a fourth state, the plasmatic state , only feasible under extremely high temperatures and pressures, … Read more19 Examples of Solids
The values are the principles by which a person, a group or society is governed. Values are abstract concepts, but they manifest themselves in qualities and attitudes that people develop. For example: self-control, compassion, openness, integrity. In a society there are differences in values between different groups, according to social classes, ideological orientations, religion and … Read moreCore Personal Values List and Examples
The Connecting Words also known as connectors are words or expressions that would note a relationship between two sentences . For example: but, and, although, also. Depending on the type of connector, a different meaning is given to the connection that is established. It is important to know the function of each connector to use … Read more100 Examples of Connecting Words | <urn:uuid:6b9589dd-5fba-4a81-9d6a-07bb62939661> | CC-MAIN-2022-49 | https://babythesis.com/category/blog/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-49/segments/1669446710712.51/warc/CC-MAIN-20221129232448-20221130022448-00614.warc.gz | en | 0.942696 | 773 | 2.75 | 3 |
The Industrial Age
What: J.P. Was an famous American financier and banker.
Where: he lived in the city of Philadelphia.
When: He lived from 1837- 1913.
Why: He was good at his job and enjoyed it and the profit.
Thomas A. Edison
What: He invented many things, he even improved the lightbulb.
When:He started inventing in 1876.
Where: He worked in an invention factory, or on his couch where he could think.
Why: He invented thing because he had many ideas and things he wanted to try.
What: It was a strike that lead to bombing.
When: Tuesday may 2, 1886
Where: The riot was at the Haymarket square.
Why: The riot was caused by people who wanted change in there job.
What: the expansion was the railroads expanding west.
When: 1869 may they met up in Utah.
Where: they met up at there meeting place in Utah.
Why: The U.S wanted to expand to connect the two sides of the content. | <urn:uuid:0b464bd7-eeed-4a76-9961-1462a34d9609> | CC-MAIN-2018-39 | https://www.smore.com/1rcn | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-39/segments/1537267157574.27/warc/CC-MAIN-20180921225800-20180922010200-00535.warc.gz | en | 0.971315 | 231 | 2.59375 | 3 |
Learn more about how E. coli bacteria translate sensory signals into movement in the iBiology video lecture entitled, "Marvels of Bacterial Behavior - Molecular Machinery."Edit Summary
Membrane-bound receptor proteins detect the presence of nutrients (A), triggering the release of a signal molecule (B), that reacts with proteins associated with the bacterium's flagellum (C), causing a change in its direction of rotation (D), which propels the organism towards increasing concentrations of nutrients. Artist: Emily Harrington. Copyright: All rights reserved. See gallery for details.
"CheY is the chemotactic response regulator, which transduces signals from the receptors to flagellar motors." (Greenfield 2009: 2)
"[R]ecent in vitro data suggest that different densities of receptors have different kinase and methylation rates, suggesting that the chemotaxis network may adjust its kinase activity based on the local concentration of receptors." (Greenfield 2009: 8) | <urn:uuid:b6c17fa4-4356-4d4a-9b1d-2bf59b7cdfca> | CC-MAIN-2019-35 | https://asknature.org/strategy/receptors-guide-bacterial-navigation/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-35/segments/1566027313747.38/warc/CC-MAIN-20190818083417-20190818105417-00347.warc.gz | en | 0.878247 | 204 | 2.828125 | 3 |
AfriGeneas Military Research Forum
Obit: Truman Gibson, Who Fought Army Segregation
Truman Gibson, Who Fought Army Segregation, Is Dead at 93
His death was announced by Unity Funeral Parlors of Chicago.
Mr. Gibson, a Chicago lawyer, worked within the federal government to end segregation in the armed forces. He often operated out of public view at a time when other black figures like A. Philip Randolph, the president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and Walter White, the N.A.A.C.P. leader, were highly visible in civil rights struggles.
Mr. Gibson was chief adviser on racial affairs to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson from 1943 to 1945. He sought to persuade the Army to use black troops in combat and investigated complaints from black soldiers facing indignities and sometimes violence during their stateside training.
"It was complete, absolute segregation," Mr. Gibson told The Columbus Dispatch, in Ohio, in 2002. "The training facilities were in the South. The attitude was that Southern officers understood 'those people.' White bus drivers in military towns were deputized and armed. That was their approach to handling Southern black soldiers. I tried to put out fires. We were dealing with the killing of black troops. I visited most of the camps and most of the nations where there were black troops."
Mr. Gibson sought to enhance opportunities for black soldiers to become officers, at one point conferring with Jackie Robinson, already a well-known athlete and soon to break baseball's color barrier, when he was experiencing problems in obtaining a commission while an enlisted man at Fort Riley, Kan.
In December 1946, Mr. Gibson was named to President Harry S. Truman's nine-member civilian commission studying the future of universal military training; he was the panel's only black member. In May 1947, when it issued its report, the commission urged an end to segregation in the military. Fourteen months later, Truman issued an executive order that led to desegregation of the armed forces. | <urn:uuid:da383b0b-94bb-4273-bb8b-873bc7b79e1f> | CC-MAIN-2014-42 | http://www.afrigeneas.com/forum-military/index.cgi/md/read/id/2559/sbj/obit-truman-gibson-who-fought-army-segregation/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2014-42/segments/1414637899702.24/warc/CC-MAIN-20141030025819-00196-ip-10-16-133-185.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.97486 | 422 | 2.828125 | 3 |
Blue Ridge Geologic Province
Explore This Article
The Union County. The Appalachian Trail has its southern origin in the Blue Ridge Mountains; the trail's official starting point is Springer Mountain, near the southern tip of Fannin County. Some of Georgia's most-visited state parks are found in the Blue Ridge, including Amicalola Falls, Black Rock Mountain, Tallulah Gorge, Unicoi, and Vogel.
The Blue Ridge province is bounded on the northwest by the Great Smoky fault, across which lies the Valley and Ridge province, and on the southeast by the Brevard fault zone, across which lies the inner section of the Piedmont province. The Blue Ridge province is primarily a physiographic designation, and for this reason, many of the rocks making up the western Blue Ridge resemble the oldest rocks of the Valley and Ridge, whereas some rocks of the eastern Blue Ridge resemble those of the Piedmont. Separating the western from the eastern Blue Ridge are the Hayesville and Allatoona faults.
The western Blue Ridge is dominated by low- to high-grade metamorphosed sedimentary rocks of late Precambrian to early Paleozoic eras. These rocks were deposited in troughs and basins that formed Marble Belt, a long, narrow strip of metamorphosed sedimentary rocks flanked by Great Smoky Group rocks and characterized by rich marble deposits. The Murphy Marble Belt is thought to be between 400 and 500 million years old.
The eastern Blue Ridge consists of a variety of igneous and high-grade metamorphic rocks, including numerous granite bodies. The metamorphic rocks were originally part of the Precambrian basement, as were the volcanic and sedimentary rocks laid down as the proto-Atlantic Ocean began to close during the early Paleozoic era. Gold, which formed as the hot rocks interacted
A thick section of quartzite, the metamorphic equivalent of quartz sandstone, partially rings the large Tallulah dome and forms the high, steep bluffs of Tallulah Gorge in northeast Georgia. Migmatites, rocks with both metamorphic and igneous characteristics, make up other eastern Blue Ridge rocks and reveal the very high temperatures reached by these rocks during mountain building.
The Blue Ridge is an assembly of several stacked thrust sheets, each with its distinctive rock types and structural style. A thrust sheet in the continental crust is a large slice of rock that has been pushed up and over other rocks along a break in the crust known as a thrust fault. Thrust faults form in response to compression during mountain building, and once formed, they provide the break along which thrust sheets move. Along with "fold," or the bending of rocks, the movement White County, is made of this granite, which is about 375 million years old.
The major thrust sheets of the Blue Ridge in Georgia are, from southeast to northwest, the Chattahoochee thrust sheet, the Dahlonega gold belt, the Hayesville-Soque River thrust sheet, and the western Blue Ridge. The Chattahoochee thrust sheet, which contains the Tallulah dome, rests against and partially atop the Dahlonega gold belt running along the Chattahoochee fault. The Hayesville-Soque River thrust sheet sits against and partially atop both the Dahlonega gold belt and the western Blue Ridge along both the Hayesville fault and its probable equivalent, the Soque River fault. To the southwest the Dahlonega gold belt rests against the western Blue Ridge along the Allatoona fault.
The proto-Atlantic Ocean finally closed at the end of the Paleozoic era, at which time the southeastern part of what is now North America collided with what is now northwest Africa. This great collision pushed the entire Blue Ridge province farther onto the continent by 150 kilometers or more, bulldozing the Paleozoic sedimentary rocks to the northwest into what is now the Valley and Ridge province.
Erosion of the Blue Ridge for millions of years has exposed rocks that were once buried deep inside the Appalachian Mountains. In some places, erosion has breached the thrust faults and partially exposed the rocks underneath. The most noteworthy example of such a breach is Brasstown Bald, which is made of Great Smoky rocks but is surrounded by rocks of the once-overlying Hayesville-Soque River thrust sheet.
Media Gallery: Blue Ridge Geologic Province | <urn:uuid:dd99be85-4d13-498a-8465-fbd95076d57f> | CC-MAIN-2015-14 | http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/science-medicine/blue-ridge-geologic-province | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-14/segments/1427131300313.14/warc/CC-MAIN-20150323172140-00144-ip-10-168-14-71.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.951943 | 887 | 3.71875 | 4 |
April 10, 2013
Shingles Vaccine Is Associated With Reduction In Both Postherpetic Neuralgia And Herpes Zoster
Shingles vaccine is associated with reduction in both postherpetic neuralgia and herpes zoster, but uptake in the US is low
A vaccine to prevent shingles may reduce by half the occurrence of this painful skin and nerve infection in older people (aged over 65 years) and may also reduce the rate of a painful complication of shingles, post-herpetic neuralgia, but has a very low uptake (only 4%) in older adults in the United States, according to a study by UK and US researchers published in this week's PLOS Medicine.The researchers, led by Sinéad Langan from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, reached these conclusions by examining the records of 766,330 Medicare beneficiaries* aged 65 years or more between 2007 and 2009.
They found that shingles vaccine uptake was extremely low–only 3.9% of participants were vaccinated–but was particularly low among black people (0.3%) and among people with a low income (0.6%).
Over the study period, almost 13,000 participants developed shingles and the vaccine reduced the rate of shingles by 48% (that is, approximately half as many vaccinated individuals developed shingles as those who were not vaccinated). However, the vaccine was less effective in older adults with impaired immune systems. The authors also found that vaccine effectiveness against post-herpetic neuralgia was 59%.
The authors say: "Herpes zoster vaccination was associated with a significant reduction in incident herpes zoster and [post-herpetic neuralgia] in routine clinical use."
They continue: "Despite strong evidence supporting its effectiveness, clinical use remains disappointingly low with particularly low vaccination rates in particular patient groups."
The authors add: " The findings are relevant beyond US medical practice, being of major importance to the many countries, including the UK, that are actively considering introducing the zoster vaccine into routine practice in the near future."
On the Net: | <urn:uuid:d8663d68-2018-4df2-ad2c-0d69dd011aa0> | CC-MAIN-2016-44 | http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/1112820301/shingles-vaccine-is-associated-with-reduction-in-both-postherpetic-neuralgia-and-herpes-zoster/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-44/segments/1476988719079.39/warc/CC-MAIN-20161020183839-00015-ip-10-171-6-4.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.966907 | 441 | 2.640625 | 3 |
The Scottish Colourists were a group of painters from Scotland whose work was not very highly regarded when it was first exhibited in the 1920s and 1930s, but which in the late 20th Century came to have a formative influence on contemporary Scottish art.
The Scottish Colourists combined their training in France and the work of French Impressionists and Fauvists, such as Monet, Matisse and Cezanne, with the painting traditions of Scotland.
The leading figure of this movement was John Duncan Fergusson, who visited Paris regularly from the 1890s on and then lived there from 1907 until 1914. Other Scottish Colourists were Francis Cadell, Samuel Peploe and Leslie Hunter. They "absorbed and reworked the strong and vibrant colours of contemporary French painting into a distinctive Scottish idiom during the 1920s and 1930s".
The Scottish Colourists continued the work of their predecessors, the Glasgow Boys. Although their style was confident and vibrant, their subject matter was rather timid compared to their French counterparts as it merely consisted of island landscapes, Edinburgh interiors and fashionable models. The Scottish colourists were internationally known during their lifetimes but their work fell out of favor by World War II, until they were discovered in the 1980s and subsequently seen to have played an influential role on the development of Scottish art. | <urn:uuid:8596b2da-8898-4a3a-96db-4b67e4594864> | CC-MAIN-2017-17 | http://art.docuwat.ch/videos/art-of-britain/the-colourists | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-17/segments/1492917118831.16/warc/CC-MAIN-20170423031158-00181-ip-10-145-167-34.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.989753 | 273 | 3.234375 | 3 |
One man’s death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.
If I look at the masses, I will never act. If I look at the individual, I will.
The phenomenon of people being more inclined to help individuals in need, particularly people with a face we can see and a story to tell, than to help large masses of people is called the identifiable victim effect.
To learn more about this effect, check out Dan Ariely’s course on Behavioural Economics on Coursera for free.
Till next time, dream economics. | <urn:uuid:017a594f-67f8-4376-97bb-7040e04ee73e> | CC-MAIN-2018-17 | http://econoception.org/2013/04/what-does-mother-teresa-and-joseph-stiglitz-have-in-common/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-17/segments/1524125945272.41/warc/CC-MAIN-20180421164646-20180421184646-00302.warc.gz | en | 0.928928 | 121 | 2.8125 | 3 |
The Law of War in Space
Printed in the Air Force Law Review;
Obtained March 13 2001
II THE MILITARY ASCENT TO SPACE
A. Origins and Evolution of Space Militarization
- Missiles and Rockets
- Nuclear Devices
B. Present and Potential Technologies Available for Space Combat
- Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons
- Kinetic Energy and Hypervelocity Weapons
- Laser Weapons
- Particle Beam Weapons
- Explosive Proximity Weapons
- 'Soft Kill' Weapons
III. THE LAW OF WAR
A. Jus in Bello vs. Jus ad Bellum
B. Customary Principles within the Law of War
- Military Necessity
C. Treaty Law
- Hague Conventions of 1899 (I-IV) and 1907 (I-XIV)
- Geneva Conventions of 1949 (I-IV) and Protocols of 1977 (I-II)
- Additional Conventions Adopted Since 1972 Affecting the Jus in Bello
- Jus Ad Bellum Under the United Nations Charter
IV. Space Warfare Under the Corpus Juris Spatialis
A. Customary Law
B. Treaty Law
- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)--1967
- Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue and Return Agreement)--1968
- Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention)--1972
- Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention)--1975
- Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement)--1979
V. SPACE WARFARE UNDER RELATED TREATIES AND OTHER AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES
VI. THE LAW OF WAR IN OUTER SPACE
- Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)--1963
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty-1972
- Antarctic Treaty-1959, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-1982
B. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
- Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space-1963
- Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space-1986
- Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space--1992
C. International Telecommunication Union
A. Bases on Which the Law of War Applies to Outer Space
a. Parallels to Sea Warfare
b. Previous Application of the Law of War to Aerial Warfare
Outer Space Treaty
B. Problems of Legal Definition and the Use of Force in Space
- Militarization of Space
- Weaponization of Space
- Use of Force in Space
C. National Policy, Military Space Doctrine, and Law of War Manuals
D. Information Warfare
E. Other Selected Issues
- Military Interaction With Intergovernmental Agencies and "Dual Use" Assets
- The Status of Astronauts as Both "Envoys of Mankind" and Combatants
- Return of Astronauts Engaged in Combatant Activities
- Innocent Passage through Airspace for Destinations to and Return from Space
LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 295 ITEMS
Air Force Judge Advocate General School
The Air Force Law Review
48 A.F.L. Rev. 1
LENGTH: 62360 words
ARTICLE: Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space
Major Robert A. Ramey*
* Major Ramey (B.A., Wheaton College; J.D., Seattle University; LL.M., McGill
University) is an instructor, International and Operations Law Division, The Air
Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is a member of the
Bar in the state of Washington.
... ... Because these customary principles are codified in the Outer Space
Treaty, and the treaty has been ratified by all States currently active in
space, customary international law seems less important in ascertaining
principles applicable to future space warfare. ... For example, should
Colombia, Iran, Indonesia, or Yugoslavia acquire the means of space launch in
the coming years, all four being non-parties to the Outer Space Treaty, any
restrictions on such States' space activity that do not come from obligations
imposed by other space treaties will occur largely by operation of customary
international law. ... Further, as with the Outer Spon
Agreement requires that all activities on the moon be carried out in accord with
"international law," and that States bear "international responsibility for
national activity" on the moon. ...
The lawful bearing of arms-under a strict code of military justice and within
a corpus of humanitarian law-has been accepted as a practical necessity. [n1]
John Keegan (1993)
Some may reasonably wonder, for purposes of analysis under the international
law of war, whether there is any meaningful distinction between warfare
prosecuted within airspace and warfare prosecuted within outer space. In boh
cases, the military assets above the earth's surface may support the combat
occurring below, or may engage targets in the same combat environment. Given
this, some may view armed conflict from and within outer space as simply a
subset of air warfare. Others may see armed conflict in outer space as superior
to air warfare-that is, air warfare as a subset of space warfare. Still others
may view space conflict as a new category of combat that is sui generis. We can
state the question more simply as follows: is the "aerospace" environment
fundamentally one field of combat operations or two?
This article suggests that for purposes of analysis under the law of war,
space combat will be sui generis-fundamentally different from combat in
terrestrial airspace. [n2] This approach raises at least three
implications for the analysis undertaken herein. First, space combat
will not be analyzed as simply an extension of air combat; the two are
fundamentally different types of combat suggesting different doctrinal tenets of
power. While the military use of space has traditionally been viewed as a medium
from which to support terrestrial warfare, including air warfare, space as a
medium of warfare itself raises entirely different legal and operational
issues. [n3] Thus, freed from a strict air warfare paradigm, the effort
to establish limits on space combat in its own right can draw principles of
armed conflict from those applicable to land and sea warfare, as well as from
those governing air warfare.
Second, one of the key differences of space warfare, at least for the near
future, will be the spatial separation of human combatants from their weaponry.
Whether kinetic energy or space-based laser weapons in low-earth orbit, or
jamming satellites used to corrupt telecommunications signals in geosynchronous
orbit, the warrior is distant from his instruments of war by between 100 and
22,500 miles. When seeking to apply the current laws of war, it appears
this phenomenon will require new ways of thinking about a legal regime that has
as its purpose the amelioration of human suffering. Beyond simply targeting
other combatants, terrestrial infrastructure, or weapons systems, space warfare
as it is now most widely conceived contemplates the destruction of unmanned
military assets in the air or space environment. [n4] Given these
factors, it seems that the minimization of human suffering, the chief goal of
the laws of war, is already achieved to some extent for space as compared with
the other combat environments. From this observation follows the conclusion that
with respect to space warfare as it is currently conceived, the law of war will
be more applicable to regulation of means and methods of war, than to the
protection of human life. [n5]
Third, the first implication notwithstanding, the legal analysis of issues
unique to space combat, such as the legality of new means and methods of space
warfare, cannot rely solely on analogy with legal relationships governing other
combat environments. This is due in part to the relative infancy of space
warfare and to the recency of its technology. To a certain extent, the
international regulation of space combat will evolve only subsequent to State
action making such combat an imminent possibility. [n6] Because the law
governs actual social relations and not theoretical abstractions, and because
there have been no reported or anticipated cases of actual space combat,
conclusions about legal restrictions on such combat must begin tentatively. This
is not to abandon hope of outlining contours of the legal regulation of space
combat under existing international norms; certain points do clearly emerge from
the analysis. It is simply to acknowledge realistically the limitations of such
an inquiry at this time. States faced a similar dilemma in the days
leading up to World War I with aerial combat. At that time, one could hardly
establish firm legal principles in the absence of State practice. [n7] As
was the case in the 1910s with respect to air warfare, a great deal of original
reflection on the implications of space combat is needed today.
This article will examine the intersection of two subsets of public
international law as they bear on space warfare: the law of war and the law of
outer space. The analysis will focus on the relevant legal issues from the
perspective of the United States, currently the most active spacefaring nation
on Earth. Because the American vision for space war is the most "developmentally
mature," [n8] it is a virtual certainty that U.S. practice will dominate
the development of international law limiting the means, methods, and extent of
the use of force in space.
Part II presents a historical review of the development of military activity
in space. It discusses reactions by the international community to new weapons
such as V-2 rockets, cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
nuclear devices. It also examines the history of U.S. military satellite
development. This part also presents aspects of existing and foreseeable
technology for armed conflict within and from outer space.
Parts III-V consider international law applicable to space warfare. Part III
analyzes international law pertaining to armed conflict and distinguishes
between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum. Further, Part III outlines the
key principles derived from treaties and customary international law and
clarifies that "law of war," "law of armed conflict," and "humanitarian law" are
phrases that have come to be largely synonymous with each other. Part IV
examines the five multilateral space treaties comprising the corpus juris
spatialis, and highlights key passages of relevance to space warfare. Part V
considers related authorities such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Antarctic Treaty, and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as three United Nations General
Assembly (U.N.G.A.) Resolutions. Though not regulating outer space activity per
se, the treaties are relevant either because of inherent parallels they have to
the regulation of outer space, or because they contain specific provisions
limiting space activities.
Part VI applies the legal regime governing international armed conflicts to
space warfare. Here, the article examines the bases on which the law of war
applies to outer space. In doing so, the article suggests that the process by
which the law of war was applied to the last new combat medium, air, serves as a
model for the likely development of the international regulation of space
warfare. Part VI discusses problems of definition within the corpus juris
spatialis that challenge any effort to apply the law of war to space combat. It
further outlines U.S. national and military space policy and highlights the role
that State law of war manuals might play in the future development of
restrictions on space warfare. Part VI then briefly considers information
warfare, a phenomenon heavily reliant on space assets and one of growing concern
to the U.S. military.
Part VI also addresses special problems arising from, among other things, the
prospect of applying the law of war to space warfare. This Part will analyze the
significant problem posed by space assets dedicated to uses of both a civilian
and military nature. It will also examine the status of assets owned both by
belligerent and neutral States, as well as assets owned by opposing
belligerents. It will further consider legal problems raised by the military
status of astronaut combatants in light of the status conferred on all
astronauts under current space law, as well as the question of whether
astronauts found in foreign territory must be returned to opposing belligerents
in time of war. [n9] Part VI concludes by examining whether
proposed rights of innocent passage through foreign airspace for the purpose of
accessing outer space will factor in the future regulation of means and methods
of space warfare.
II. THE MILITARY ASCENT TO SPACE
We will engage terrestrial targets someday-ships, airplanes, land
targets-from space. We will engage targets in space, from space. . . . [The]
missions are already assigned, and we've written the concepts of operations. [n3]
General Joseph W. Ashy, USAF (1996)
In most respects, the history of mankind's ascent to space is a history of
the militarization [n11] of outer space. A review of this history, along
with a basic familiarization of current and potential implements of
space warfare, provides the requisite context from which the analysis herein can
proceed to legal considerations related to the weaponization of space. Among
other things, an understanding of technical space developments provides insight
into the way international legal norms have developed. As discussed more fully
in Part III, while the means by which States may lawfully attack each other's
assets and personnel within space remains partially proscribed, the law has
condoned the non-aggressive military use of space for decades.
A. Origins and Evolution of Space Militarization
1. Missiles and Rockets
Space warfare, as any other use of outer space, requires access to the
space environment. That access requires the use of missiles and rockets, later
termed "boosters" in view of their utility as launch vehicles for spacecraft. As
for most other segments of space technology, rockets [n12] were first
developed for use by military forces. Matte notes the likelihood that "as early
as 3000 B.C. the Chinese had developed rockets for, among other things, use in
warfare." [n13] It would be almost 5000 years however before rockets
became a major instrument of warfare.
It was German ingenuity that first applied rocket technology to
largescale military combat use. [n14] At the Peenemunde experimental
site on the Baltic coast, Germany constructed the famous V-2 ("Vergeltungswaffe
Zwei") rocket. [n15] Making its first flight in October of 1942,
[n16] the rocket stood over 13 1/2 meters high, weighed 15,300 kg, had a
range of 322 km, [n17] and was propelled by an engine producing more
than 800,000 horsepower. [n18] The rocket used a turbo fuel pump
generating pressure at 300 pounds per square inch while pumping 50 gallons
(189.5 liters) of fuel per second. [n19] For guidance and control, the
most difficult technical feat, the rocket relied on gyros that only partially
compensated for wind and other destabilizing factors in flight. Nonetheless, the
V-2 represented a fearsome weapon to which there was no known defense. It also
ushered in one of the most significant revolutions in military weaponry. [n20]
Following the war, under "Operation Paperclip" the leading German rocket
scientists were captured for further work in the U.S. With their expertise, the
U.S. began reconstructing the essence of V-2 technology for the development of
more advanced rockets. This work, together with experience gained from the 1930s
and 1940s studies and experiments at the California Institute of Technology
under Dr. Theodore Von Karman, contributed to Project MX-774-later to become the
Atlas missile, a research and development effort aimed at creating a
5,000 mile range intercontinental ballistic missile. [n21] General Henry
Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps just prior to its establishment as the
U.S. Air Force in 1947, predicted that such a weapon "is ideally suited to
deliver atomic explosives, because effective defense against it would prove
extremely difficult." [n22] Little did General Arnold know that such
defenses would continue to prove extremely difficult through 2000 and beyond. [n23]
In the U.S., missile research and development competed directly for precious
funding with long range bombers. "As with satellite proposals, initial postwar
interest in long-range guided missiles soon succumbed to an Air Force policy
that relied on strategic bombers carrying air-breathing missiles." [n24]
Nonetheless, missile advocates kept sufficient interest engaged to fund
development of the Redstone, Jupiter, and Juno missile programs at the U.S.
Army's Redstone Arsenal. [n25] In addition to various sounding rocket
[n26] and cruise missile programs, [n27] and the Thor
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), improvements to the
original V-2 design soon led to the first operational U.S. Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-the Atlas. [n28] Within a few years, the U.S.
fielded the even larger and more sophisticated Titan missile, [n29]
evolved versions of which are still widely in use today both as ICBMs and
commercial space boosters. [n30]
Following World War II, the Soviet Union captured its share of German
scientists as well. Using the V-2 as its point of departure, the U.S.S.R. did
more than simply build copies of the weapon, it put the rocket back into
production within the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. [n31]
Unlike the U.S., the Soviet Union did not have a huge fleet of long-range
bombers, thus the prospect of ICBM development did not have the same
bureaucratic obstacles from a competing weapons platform. What it did have were
relatively primitive atomic weapons that were bulky and required tremendous lift
to propel them across an intercontinental range. They proceeded to create just
such heavy-lift launch vehicles. [n32] The first Soviet ICBM, bearing
the designation "SS-6," was launched in August 1957, a full fifteen months
before the first Atlas launch. It was an SS-6 that carried the world's first
artificial satellite, Sputnik I, into orbit on October 4, 1957. [n33]
2. Nuclear Devices
Following the advent of rocketry, creating a weapon of ultimate destructive
capability was just a matter of time for the leading scientific minds. The
conventional explosives used by the V-2 rockets simply mimicked the effects
attainable by means of air-dropped bombs. These contained the equivalent of one
ton of TNT. By contrast, the earliest nuclear weapons contained the equivalent
of 20,000 tons (20 kilotons). [n34] Later versions would deliver the
equivalent of 15,000,000 tons (15 megatons) of TNT and more. [n35]
Putting the matter plainly, U.S. President Truman would write in his
personal diary, "we 'think' we have found a way to cause a disintegration of the
These early devices weighed five tons and required a rocket of several
hundred tons to carry one weapon to Moscow-too heavy to be practically
effective. [n37] However, with the advance of the ICBM came the advance
of the nuclear device. It soon became small enough to launch inside the
nose-cone of a rocket. [n38] Thus, the lightening speed of the rocket
was mated to the overwhelming power of the nuclear weapon. And given its
desirability for military advantage, it also proliferated.
Between 1945 and 1992, the United States went on to manufacture a total of
70,000 nuclear weapons, some 10,500 of which are still in service. The Soviet
Union produced 55,000, of which 15,000 are currently active. Britain reportedly
made 834 nuclear warheads, France 1,110 and China 600. According to various
reports of unknown reliability, Israel may have made 200, India twenty, Pakistan
between four and seven. South Africa admitted it had produced six devices before
giving up its programme; North Korea may have one or two. [n39]
It was not until 1957 that the first nuclear detonations occurred in space.
[n40] Not only did this development become a catalyst for passage of a
treaty limiting nuclear weapons testing (Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty), [n41] but it brought a plea from the Soviet Union that such
tests not endanger the safety of Soviet cosmonauts. The U.S. responded to the
Soviet concern with the assurance "that no activities were contemplated which
could have harmful effects upon the Soviet spacemen." [n42] Following
passage of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, such detonations in
space were no longer lawful and simple verification measures made them easily
In many ways, the evolution of satellite technology follows the evolution of
missile technology. Without the latter, the former had no way of reaching outer
space. Thus, the early battles for funding of satellite technology in the DOD
and in Congress often pitted satellite and missile research against conventional
weaponry. [n44] Once funding for ICBMs came through however, it was soon
realized that rockets more powerful than an ICBM might succeed in launching
Though early scientists speculated on the possibility of artificial
satellites in earth orbit, Project Rand, under the Douglas aircraft company,
[n46] demonstrated the feasibility of such a feat in its report of May
2, 1946. Report number SM-11827, "Preliminary Design of an Experimental
World-Circling Spaceship," not only provided 236 pages and eight appendices of
detailed technical theory, but it spawned numerous subsequent reports on the
feasibility of satellite design, launch, and reentry. In simple terms, the
report declared that "if a vehicle can be accelerated to a speed of about 17,000
m.p.h. and aimed properly, it will revolve on a great circle path above the
Earth's atmosphere as a new satellite. The centrifugal force will just
balance the pull of gravity." [n47] The report subsequently predicted
that "the achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame
the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the
world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb." [n48]
The earliest military satellite program focused on a reconnaissance mission.
In time, the mission for reconnaissance satellites in the U.S. would be shared
between the military and the intelligence establishment. Systems such as the
venerable Corona series were launched in early 1959 amid great secrecy and were
controlled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. [n49] Though the
focus of public U.S. military space activity remained in the Department of
Defense, it was determined that reconnaissance missions from space could not be
Indeed, the Corona program was so sensitive that it was given the code-name
"Discoverer" to establish a cover. The launches were said to contain "a
scientific project that conducted biomedical research and other experiments in
space." [n50] As Corona began collecting Soviet imagery during the
Eisenhower administration, the DOD established the Office of Missile and
Satellite Systems with oversight for all national reconnaissance activities,
later to become the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). President Eisenhower's
successor, perpetuated these basic organizational changes, including
safeguarding the very existence of the NRO as a State secret. [n51]
Indeed, under the Kennedy administration "the U.S. government no
longer acknowledged that satellites were used for reconnaissance-a policy that
remained in effect until 1978." [n52]
Despite its continuing protection of national security matters, the NRO has
recently revealed some of its methods and assets, including a $ 1.5 billion
state-of-the-art Lacrosse imaging satellite. [n53] The fifteen ton,
school bus-sized satellite was developed in 1986 to track the movement of Warsaw
Pact weaponry. Producing images to resolutions of 1 meter, the system uses radar
technology to obtain images through clouds, foliage, or darkness. [n54]
As of 1997, the NRO maintained two Lacrosse satellites on-orbit with two more
planned. In addition to these, the NRO maintains the HK-11 ("Keyhole")
satellite system which, using optical sensors, is reported to produce
resolutions of six to twelve inches (15 to 30 cm). [n55]
Reconnaissance was not the only military mission for early satellites. Almost
simultaneously with WS-117L, and indeed as an outgrowth of it, the U.S. military
was developing a missile warning system to monitor the launch of Soviet ICBMs.
The first such program, MIDAS ("missile detection and alarm system"), was
troubled with false alarms and overall system unreliability virtually from its
operational beginning in 1960. [n56] Despite some successful test
detections, the system was replaced in the early 1970s by geosynchronous
satellites of the Defense Support Program (DSP) which proved to be
"highly successful," offering the President notice of a missile attack within
moments of launch. [n57] Using an advanced infrared telescope mounted to
the spacecraft's front end, the DSP telescope remained focused on earth ready to
generate an electronic signal upon detection of a missile launch. Its use
continues today. [n58]
Beyond these, other significant satellite systems were developed to carry
military communications, [n59] to provide weather intelligence,
[n60] and to aid navigation. Though assets supporting all
three missions are indispensable to combat operations, the U.S. space-based
navigation system has now become perhaps the best-known of all military space
assets outside military circles. Developed in the 1970s, and declared fully
operational on July 17, 1995, [n61] the Global Positioning System (GPS)
relies on twenty-four operational satellites (with an additional three spares in
orbit) in medium-earth orbits in six orbital planes. [n62] The basic
concept is simple though ingenious:
[The constellation of satellites flies] in twelve-hour orbits at an altitude of
12,543 miles. Each of them carries an atomic clock for precise determination of
time, while ground-based tracking permits each one to know its position with
similar accuracy. A ground receiver then accepts signals from the spacecraft in
view, learning their positions as well as the exact times when the signals were
transmitted. The receiver has its own internal clock, which is not very
accurate, but the data from space allows it to synchronize this clock with those
of the satellites. The receiver then calculates the length of time each signal
has been in transit, traveling at the speed of light. This translates into an
accurate determination of distance to each satellite. Through triangulation, the
receiver then determines its own location. [n63]
The system showed its great value during the 1991 Persian Gulf War by
providing for combatants answers to the age-old questions "where am I" and
"where am I going," to an accuracy of less than thirty feet. [n64] It
was also used to guide munitions launched from air, sea, and
land-based weapons to their targets providing three-dimensional position and
velocity data. This constantly-improving targeting capability will likely be a
significant law of war contribution made by GPS. As discussed more fully in the
next chapter, the ability to target accurately implies the legal duty to do so.
The better GPS accuracy becomes, the higher the burden it will place on its
users to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate targets, and to minimize
collateral damage. Thus, it will no doubt "change the face of future warfare."
[n65] Operating on only sixteen satellites in the 1991 war, [n66]
the system nonetheless proved itself highly useful and will be indispensable
to space missions for future conflicts well into the twenty-first century. [n67]
B. Present and Potential Technologies Available for Space Combat
To date, there has not been a single reported case of force used in outer
space by one nation against another. [n68] Nonetheless, given the
increasing global reliance on space systems, and increasing militarization of
space, its weaponization and evolution into a distinct theater of military
operations seems likely. Though technologies applicable for space combat will
include a wide variety of military instrumentalities, the development
of space weapons is the most obvious choice. Such weapons can be grouped
according to a variety of criteria. [n69] They can be grouped by
missions intended such as "anti-satellite" and "missile defense," or by method
of pursuit such as "boost phase intercept" and "direct ascent." [n70]
Depending on its characteristics, a space weapon could fit within several
different categories at once. One of the most logical means of identification
focuses on the weapon's means of destruction as its distinguishing feature. Most
probable future space weaponry can be described using this method of
identification, including those representative samples discussed in the six
1. Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons
Perhaps the quintessential electromagnetic and radiation weapon is the
nuclear bomb. Recognizing this, the first anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system
made operational by the U.S. involved a nuclear detonation in space. [n71]
Though the history and basic functioning of nuclear weapons have been noted
previously, it is appropriate to consider briefly their effect as a weapon when
detonated in outer space. Given the near-vacuum conditions of space, the range
of a nuclear blast in terms of spreading radiation and heat is greatly
diminished. In the absence of atmosphere, radioactive fallout cannot occur.
[n72] Further, the shock waves, violent winds, and intense heat
generated by a nuclear blast within the atmosphere do not occur in
space. [n73] As a result, the collateral damage from the effects of heat
and blast is fairly easy to confine. [n74] Though the local effects in
space from such a detonation can be very destructive, the most significant
military effect of nuclear blasts in space relates to the creation of an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) in near-earth space where the outer space vacuum
contacts the atmosphere. [n75]
An EMP is created when "a cascade of gamma rays from any nuclear explosion in
space collides with the upper atmosphere." [n76] As these gamma rays
race nearly instantaneously downward toward the top of earth's atmosphere,
resultant charge imbalances create an electrical current that peaks 100 times
faster than lightning, and is largely unrelated to the size of the detonation
for any yield over a few hundred kilotons. [n77] Similar to a lightning
strike, the EMP lasts only for a millionth of a second but holds potential for
devastation of sensitive circuitry. Unshielded electronics within several
hundred miles of the epicenter may be disabled as every unshielded element in
its path acts as a conductor. The higher the burst, the larger the area affected
in the air and land beneath. A burst at a height of 300 miles (483 km) would
affect the entire continental U.S. [n78] "Poorly protected satellites
and solar power systems in orbit are particularly vulnerable, because risk radii
extend hundreds (sometimes thousands) of miles farther in space than in
absorbent air." [n79]
In addition to the effects of an EMP, "beta particles and gamma rays
respectively cause intensive and extensive alterations in the ionosphere."
[n80] These weaken both radio and radar waves. This can result in high
frequency blackouts over broad areas, followed by periods of impaired radio and
radar performance. [n81] Thus, the disruptive capabilities of a nuclear
blast in space hold distinct military advantages. [n82] Nonetheless, in
addition to legal hurdles, Peebles notes that when first considered for its
strategic value, the stationing of a nuclear weapon in space "made no
technical or military sense" for at least four reasons, at least some of which
are applicable today:
First, an orbiting weapon required elaborate spacecraft systems, such as
retro-rockets to deorbit it, others to guide it, and still others to arm it.
Second, all of these integrated systems would have to perform reliably while on
orbit for many months if not years, or the bomb became useless. . . . Third, if
used in retaliation, such weapons could not be delivered at a moments [sic]
notice, but would have to wait at least an orbit or two until the Earth turned
beneath it and the intended target [came] into view. Finally, and perhaps most
tellingly, if such a weapon were used for a first strike and a partial
malfunction occurred as the nuclear bomb moved along its orbit, it might just as
easily fall on Buenos Aires as on Washington D.C., or, worse yet, on Moscow. [n83]
For these and other reasons, and despite the unquestioned devastating effects
for any nation relying on sophisticated electronic infrastructure, a
nuclear-triggered EMP attack on the U.S. is deemed unlikely. The Chairman of
President Clinton's recent Commission on Critical Infrastructure labeled it "the
most remote part of the threat spectrum." [n84]
Non-nuclear electromagnetic weapons have also been proposed. A study for the
U.S. Air Force analyzing the future of air and space power recently reported
that "the technology of high RF [radio frequency] power and large antennas is
about to greatly expand." [n85] The report concludes that when combined,
these innovations will allow for the projection of extremely high power
densities, including electromagnetic radiation, over extremely long distances to
land, air, and space-based targets. [n86] As an example, the report
suggests that such a weapon in the geosynchronous orbit could create a six mile
footprint on a battlefield which would "blank out" all radar receivers and would
damage all unprotected communication sets within that area. The tremendous power
envisioned would also allow injection of signals into even heavily shielded
communications networks, allowing for "information warfare to be waged at
2. Kinetic Energy and Hypervelocity Weapons
Kinetic energy weapons, of which hypervelocity weapons are a subtype, are
historically the most common forms of space weaponry. As suggested above, given
the tremendous speeds at which objects travel in orbit, on the order of 4.7
miles per second in low-earth orbit, just about anything properly aimed could
become a weapon even without the use of an explosive warhead. This is true
because such an object's speed, including those of very small masses, gives it
tremendous kinetic energy for impact. [n88] One U.S. kinetic energy
weapon, originally tested as a missile interceptor, could equally serve as an
ASAT. Known as the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), the weapon, once boosted
into space, unfurls a 4.5 meter radial "net" that is wrapped tightly behind the
nose sensor. The net increases the lethal radius of the homing and kill vehicle.
Successful testing in 1983 and 1984 showed the weapon capable of homing in and
destroying a dummy warhead in space using a long-wavelength infrared sensor. [n89]
A program currently under development in the U.S. is simply called the "KE
ASAT" (kinetic energy ASAT). The system envisions using a large Mylar "shroud"
to impact the target object. [n90] Though it will disable its target
object by force of impact as will many other kinetic energy ASATs, this system
is unique in that the shroud is intended to minimize the creation of a large
quantity of resulting space debris normally associated with kinetic energy
weapon impacts. [n91]
The railgun is another type of kinetic energy weapon that accelerates a
projectile toward selected targets at hypervelocity speeds. Because the railgun
will use electromagnetic forces to accelerate its projectiles, it is an
"electromagnetic" weapon of sorts. However, it is distinct from the
electromagnetic weaponry discussed above in that the final method of destruction
is a kinetic impact rather than an electromagnetic force itself. Testing in the
U.S. has resulted in the electromagnetic acceleration of tantalum discs to
speeds of eleven kilometers per second. [n92] Though not yet developed
as a weapon, such railguns could be stationed in outer space.
An additional space-based kinetic energy weapon has been proposed but
not yet developed. Though not an ASAT, the weapon has been conceived for use
against terrestrial targets. It would capitalize on the tremendous speed of long
rods made of depleted uranium orbiting in space. Remotely commanded to reenter
the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds, the rods could be precision-guided to
targets in the air or on the surface of the earth. Their special shape and
materials would allow for survival on reentry into the atmosphere with little
prospect for collateral damage on impact. The ability to call down such objects
from space at hypervelocity speeds would allow them to penetrate hundreds of
feet into the earth. Strategically, it would also offer the attacker the
"ultimate stealth" and maximum surprise. [n93]
A final example in the kinetic energy category is the Gun Launch to Space
(GLTS) project. The project envisions a large artillery-type structure capable
of launching projectiles hundreds of miles. The most notable example of
rudimentary technology on which the GLTS might be based is the Iraqi "supergun,"
employing a barrel 172 feet long and capable of propelling 114 pound projectiles
to distances of 465 miles. [n94] Although principally conceived as a
system for boosting operational payloads to orbit, the GLTS project has numerous
potential applications, including service as an ASAT. [n95]
3. Laser Weapons
"Laser" is an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of
Radiation and is a device that produces a narrow beam of radiation by means of a
physical emission. The light constituting the laser beam can be produced by a
variety of chemical means. Key components of such a weapon include both the
laser itself and the beam control subsystems which aim the beam. Once created,
the beam used in the proposed weapon's laser is so concentrated that it can be
projected for extremely long distances with very little loss of energy. Study on
laser weapons, including those capable of disabling satellites, began in the
early 1960s, [n96] and received increased attention as part of the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite tremendous technical problems, mostly
still unresolved, lasers could radically change warfare if ever fielded. [n97]
At present, the U.S. is developing space, air, and ground-based
lasers for possible use as weapons against enemy missiles and satellites. One of
the two principal U.S. ground-based lasers is the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical
Laser (MIRACL). [n98] As the name suggests, the laser beam is generated
by chemical reactions, produced by deuterium fluoride, resulting in a focused
beam that is fourteen cm square. [n99] It is the largest laser
developed in the U.S., undergoing numerous tests since 1985 when it destroyed a
stationary ICBM on the ground. In the late 1980s, the Congress prohibited DOD
from using the laser against space objects. [n100] The prohibition
expired in 1995, however, and Congress failed to renew the ban. On Oct. 17,
1997, the MIRACL "illuminated" a satellite in orbit constituting the first-ever
U.S. use of a laser against a satellite. [n101] Though it did not
destroy the object, the move was widely seen as a potential first step toward
development of a laser ASAT capability. [n102] No further tests against
space objects are scheduled.
The airborne laser (ABL) program under development calls for a much
smaller laser system housed within a modified 747 aircraft. The weapon was
conceived as a defense against missile threats but if the program continues to
prove as successful as its latest tests (tracking ballistic missiles, overcoming
atmospheric distortion), U.S. Air Force officials are weighing expanding its
role to reconnaissance, cruise missile defense, and suppression of enemy air
defenses. [n103] The laser, still under development, will use an
oxygen-iodine combustion process to produce the intense light. The first
airborne test firing of the laser against a missile is scheduled for 2002. [n104]
Although the ABL has not been envisioned for an ASAT role, its
anticipated 250 mile range would make it capable of reaching missiles and
satellites in low orbits.
Space-based laser systems (SBLs) that target other space objects have the
dual advantage of being less vulnerable to attack and avoiding the distorting
effects of earth's atmosphere. The laser currently envisioned for the SBL system
uses a hydrogen fluoride chemical reaction to create its light beam. Unlike the
MIRACL and ABL systems, it must be developed to operate in the low pressure
environment of space. The prototype Alpha laser was successfully tested in 1991
under conditions simulating the space environment. Results from the test showed
that megawatt power levels similar to the MIRACL but optimized for space can be
built and operated. [n105] However, as with all three laser weapons
programs several technical challenge remain for SBLs, including keeping the
satellites loaded with a sufficient quantity of chemicals necessary to fuel the
laser. [n106] Current estimates call for space-based laser testing to
begin sometime between 2005 and 2008. [n107]
4. Particle Beam Weapons
The first proposed use of particle beam weapons for satellite defense
occurred in 1965. [n108] Even more technically challenging than lasers,
both particle beam and laser weapons constitute "directed energy" weapons-that
is, weapons which destroy their targets by delivering energy at or
near the speed of light (approximately Mach 1,000,000). This would be a
considerable advantage during time-urgent military engagements. [n109]
In theory, a particle beam weapon could mimic the effects achieved by an
electron accelerator by transferring energy to its target at nearly the speed of
light. In so doing, it would transfer thermal energy similar to the action of a
lightning bolt. [n110] Unlike the short attack of a nuclear (or other)
blast-triggered EMP, a particle beam weapon could keep its destructive beam
focused on the target for longer periods of time.
Particle beam weapons differ from lasers in several respects. The former do
not heat the surface of their targets as lasers do. Thus, the particle beam
weapon does not weaken the structure of its target, but eats through the skin
and damages its internal mechanisms. [n111] Because it does not rely on
light energy, the particle beam weapon would not be affected by cloud cover or a
reflective coating as would a laser. However, despite their theoretical
advantages, such weapons are exceedingly difficult to produce because of the
high-energy current and repetition rates required. [n112]
5. Explosive Proximity Weapons
The category of space weapons characterized by an explosion in proximity to
its target is perhaps the most self-evident form of space weaponry. This type of
weapon simply steers close to its target and blows it up by detonation in the
target's vicinity. The best example is the Soviet ASAT system, first tested in
the late 1960s and fielded in the 1970s. [n113] The explosive kill
vehicle is rocket launched to coincide with the period during which the earth's
rotation will put the weapon into the same orbital plane as the target
satellite. Once the ASAT achieves orbit, ground controllers maneuver the object
for one to two revolutions of the earth until it is close enough to the
target for its own guidance system to activate. "When in range an
explosive charge aboard the interceptor is detonated, sending a cloud of
shrapnel at high speed to destroy the target." [n114] Repeated testing
has shown the system to be marginally effective. [n115] Recent reports
of Russian work on an EMP ASAT may prove more effective. [n116]
Though not yet developed, "space mines" are another type of proximity weapon
that tracks down its target and detonates on impact or other trigger event.
Commentators suggest that the detonators for such mines could be activated by
command from earth, which could be triggered by, for example, reaction to heat
or mechanical action. [n117] Although similar to kinetic energy
weapons, the space mine's method of destruction is not the force of impact but
6. 'Soft Kill' Weapons
A final category includes those weapons designed to disable their space-based
targets, usually satellites, rather than destroy them. Though never fielded, at
least three types of systems in this category have been considered, all of which
rely on rendezvous with the target satellite. [n118] First, weapons
that spray paint onto the optics, solar arrays, or radiators of the target would
disrupt power supplies or mission execution. Second, a target satellite could be
nudged or tipped out of its current orbit in order to exhaust its control fuel.
Third, electronic jamming could disrupt a satellite's proper functioning or shut
it down altogether. In each case, unless detected before the "attack," disabling
missions such as these could be undertaken covertly and the true source never be
detected or proven. Because the results of these "soft kills" often mimic
routine failures, detection would prove difficult. [n119]
III. THE LAW OF WAR [n120]
[The law of armed conflict] is no longer a body of law designed to ensure a
fair fight between two opponents; . . . Today, the law of armed conflict is
designed primarily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary destruction.
This being so, belligerents are held to the standards to which they are capable
of rising. [n121]
The law of armed conflict has been shaped with a recognition of the concept of
"military necessity." Hence "necessity" cannot be claimed as a defense to
violations of absolute prohibitions included in the law of armed conflict, for
example, killing of prisoners of war. More importantly, various military
doctrines, such as accuracy of targeting, concentration of effort, maximization
of military advantage, conservation of resources, avoidance of excessive
collateral damage, and economy of force are not only fully consistent with
compliance with the law of armed conflict but reinforce its observance. [n149]
Discrimination, [n150] as the term suggests, stresses diligence in
"the selection of methods, of weaponry and of targets . . . it includes the idea
of the immunity of non-combatants and those hors de combat, that is, the sick,
wounded, and shipwrecked, but it is not only about that: it can also refer to
geographical and other limitations." [n151] This description
incorporates several concepts, one of the most significant being the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In general, the law of war
prohibits attack of any person deemed a "non-combatant." This means that the
lawfulness of the use of force against individuals under the jus in bello
presupposes attack of those qualifying as combatants. Recognized at least since
the nineteenth century, [n152] the law of war establishes the category
"combatants" in order to specify those who may be attacked, but also to create a
measure of protection for those so categorized. [n153] The 1907
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land stated the general criteria for recognizing combatants: (a)
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (c) carry arms openly; and (d)
conduct operations in accord with the laws and customs of war. [n154]
The care required by the principle of discrimination to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants rests on an even more fundamental principle:
military objective. [n155] This principle requires that a belligerent's
armed attacks be limited to targets that are military in nature and the
destruction of which advances the attacker's tactical, operational, or strategic
position. Such targets would certainly include combatants in action, as well as
inanimate objects deemed necessary for the opponent's prosecution of the
conflict. Thus, Article 48 of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provides the clearest statement of the customary principle, and assumes in its
"basic rule" concerning the general protection of civilians populations that
belligerents will recognize military objectives. "In order to ensure respect for
and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." [n156] Subsequently, Protocol I defines "military
objective" (relating to objects versus noncombatants) as being "limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage." [n157]
The obligation created by the principle of distinction attends both the
attacker and the defender. [n158] Further, because the principle
requires attackers to exercise due care in the selection, engagement, and
destruction of targets, it imposes a duty commensurate with the belligerent's
ability to discriminate. Given the lack of precision afforded by gravity-driven
projectiles dropped from hot air balloons, the outright prohibitions on such
methods of war in 1899 and 1907 make sense in light of the principle of
discrimination. [n159] However, the increasing capability of modern
weaponry not only provides increased tactical options, but potentially increased
obligation as well. To the extent that a laser-guided bomb can be used to
effectuate an attack that properly distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate
targets, but a conventional gravity bomb cannot, the attacker may be obligated
to either forego the attack or use the less common, more costly precision
munition. [n160] Of course, relevant to this targeting and weaponeering
analysis would be the attacker's overall campaign plan. The possibility
certainly exists that use of precision munitions early in a campaign
might produce less overall value under the proportionality analysis than had the
use been reserved for a later target in the campaign.
The customary rule of proportionality, more difficult to articulate than
necessity or discrimination, requires that the use of military force be
proportional to the legitimate military objective in view. This represents more
than simply the principle of war advocating only such force as is necessary to
attain the objective; it actually requires a balancing of anticipated military
advantage against anticipated damage caused. [n161] It essentially
prohibits the use of military force that creates collateral damage to civilians
or property, not otherwise legitimate targets, that is disproportionate to the
military value of the objective. [n162] As Roberts and Guelff point
out, this doctrine can refer to two different situations: first, the
proportionality of a belligerent response to a grievance (in this sense
proportionality provides a link between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello); and
second, "proportionality in relation to the adversary's military actions or to
the anticipated military value of one's own actions, including proportionality
in reprisals." [n163]
In the former sense of proportionality posed by Roberts and Guelff,
the massive coalition military operation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War would have
been disproportionate to an unlawful border incursion and then an immediate
retreat by the Iraqis. Though unlawful, such incursion could be remedied with
far less force. In the latter sense of proportionality, in response to the
opponent's military actions, the destruction of a hydroelectric dam in order to
eliminate a sniper perched on top would constitute an attack disproportionate to
the legitimate objective of eliminating the threat posed by the sniper. Though
the dam may be its own legitimate objective under certain circumstances, it is
not made legitimate simply as a means of achieving the destruction of a far less
Because of the difficulty of applying the principle of proportionality to
specific contexts in modern warfare, scholars and practitioners have devised
tests to assist those engaging in target selection and military operations
planning. One useful formulation for aerial combat has been advanced by Colonel
Gomez of the Spanish Air Force: "an aerial attack expected to cause civilian
casualties would be acceptable should it have the same degree of approval as a
similar action taking place over a part of the country's own territory under
enemy occupation, in which case the civilian casualties would be compatriots."
[n164] This formulation essentially asks the military planner to put
himself in the position of the enemy. Such an approach could be modified to
apply the principle of proportionality to space warfare. Gomez aptly attributes
the difficulty in applying the principle of proportionality to the subjectivity
involved in the application, and thus terms the principle the "Achilles heel of
the law of war." [n165]
Finally, the concept of humanity incorporates several concepts, including
that which is still called "chivalry." [n166] In practice, this
principle may not pose the urgency it once did in limiting armed
conflict because of the way the other principles have matured taking it into
account. This is particularly true of necessity and proportionality, as Colonel
Schmitt observes: "to the extent suffering is useless it is militarily
unnecessary and, because it offers no direct and concrete military advantage,
Nonetheless, the principle of humanity accounts for several efforts at
outlawing means and methods of warfare deemed to cause unnecessary suffering.
International law does not restrict belligerents from wounding or killing
opposing forces so that they will not fight back. It follows from this that once
a combatant is rendered hors de combat ("out of combat"), he is no longer a
legitimate target for further attack. Thus, while it is legitimate to wound a
combatant so as to render him hors de combat, means and methods of warfare
having the effect of exacerbating wounds that would render a combatant hors de
combat, are deemed "unnecessary." The principle has been applied over the
centuries to weapons from antiquity, and those developed more recently that have
been addressed through treaty instruments. These include poisoned weapons, [n168]
barbed weapons, small-caliber incendiary or explosive bullets, [n169]
expanding bullets, [n170] glass and other nondetectable
fragments, [n171] and most recently, blinding lasers. [n172]
In theory, prohibition of all of these weapons limits space war to the
extent that any of them might be delivered against human beings from or within
As the principle of military necessity must be balanced by humanitarian
concerns, some legal commentators note that humanitarian concerns must be
balanced against legitimate military needs as well. The jus in bello principles
presuppose that their application occurs in the midst of armed conflict-that is
"in bello"-and that in some cases States will accurately assert a legal right to
militarily subdue the other. [n173] This forces the law to assume a
pragmatic posture with respect to the goal that warfare remain humane. Thus,
Professor Green rightly observes,
since the law of armed conflict rests upon a judicious balance between military
operational needs and humanitarianism, and since the purpose of the
Geneva Law is the preservation of humanitarianism accompanied by respect for
civilians and the long-term interests of the parties to the conflict by reducing
the possibility of sentiments of revanchisme, application of humanitarian
principles does not override the needs of practical realism. Idealism and a
belief in humanitarianism must not result in an automatic rejection of military
needs or careless accusations of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
However, the assessment of military needs must always be made in good faith. [n174]
This is not to say that military necessity ever provides an authorization to
act (as the following example might incorrectly suggest: "the employment of
military force was authorized because doing so was militarily necessary"), but
simply to say that each of the customary law of war principles represent an
important limitation on means and methods of warfare while simultaneously
recognizing that warfare nonetheless persists in human experience. This fact
affects the content that the law invests into the term "humanity." This fact
further pragmatically presupposes that unless the law somehow accommodates
itself to such realities as the continued existence of war, States will ignore
it. One can recognize the existence of such accommodation by observing the
simple fact that unfettered humanitarianism does not characterize the law of
war. If it did, then not only would such "law" never have achieved the force of
law in the first place, [n175] but the jus in bello would prohibit all
means and methods of war for the simple reason that any one of them are apt to
produce suffering to some extent. Pure humanitarianism would prohibit all
suffering of any kind, as the law of war plainly does not. [n176] The
principles therefore require constant balancing and readjustment. Each
acts as a limit on permissible military activity so that no one principle
obliterates the other. [n177]
C. TREATY LAW
Without doubt, the easiest means of determining international law is by
reference to the explicit will of States as expressed in treaties. Though of
minimal value for ascertaining specific principles applicable to space warfare,
the relevant treaties do provide the general foundation from which a space law
of war will emerge. And, the four general principles of the law of war outlined
above, reinforced within this treaty law, will apply to armed conflict in any
combat environment. [n178]
A discussion of relevant treaty law restraining armed conflict would not be
complete without reference to several historical antecedents. The diplomatic
conferences producing the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and their progeny,
followed several modest attempts to codify the jus in bello. One such attempt,
reflected in the Lieber Code of 1863, so called for its author, Columbia
University professor Francis Lieber, governed the prosecution of war for the
Union Army during the American Civil War. Promulgated by President Lincoln as
General Order Number 100, the Lieber Code's 157 articles set forth standards for
the prosecution of the war and treatment of Confederate troops. [n179]
Though developed in the United States, the Lieber Code became widely
read as expressing an emerging international law relating to restrictions
imposed on combatants in armed conflict, [n180] and it "strongly
influenced the further codification of the laws of war and the adoption of
similar regulations by other States." [n181] Thus, in addition to
influencing the codification of subsequent treaty law, it became the model for
other countries, including Prussia in 1870, [n182] the Netherlands in
1871, France in 1877, Serbia in 1879, Spain in 1882, Portugal in 1890, and Italy
in 1896. [n183]
Eventually, the Geneva Convention of 1864, [n184] the Petersburg
Declaration of 1868, [n185] Protocol and Declaration of the Brussels
Conference of 1874, [n186] and the 1880 Oxford Manual of the Laws and
Customs of War [n187] took modest steps toward limiting the means and
methods of warfare as well as ameliorating the suffering they cause. In each
case, the restrictions on means and methods of war, as well as on treatment of
combatants and noncombatants, provided the foundation for the international
treaty norms still in force today.
1. Hague Conventions of 1899 (I-IV) and 1907 (I-XIV)
The conventions adopted in 1899 and 1907 at the Hague provide, to this day,
the backbone of international regulation governing the means and methods of
warfare. These eighteen treaties attempted to fulfil four main purposes: first,
they sought to identify those who may lawfully participate in war, and define
the duties and rights of those individuals; second, they sought to regulate
means and methods by which States could lawfully conduct warfare; third, they
sought to describe the conditions and manner under which belligerents could
bombard or besiege; and fourth, they sought to regulate truces,
capitulations and armistices, and the military government of occupied
Because the laws of war were among the earliest parts of international law to
be codified, [n189] it may seem that the original principles would
contribute little to the regulation of space combat. This is true only in part.
Though the Hague Conventions had nothing explicit to say about aerial warfare,
for example, several specific restrictions have been applied by extension. It is
no surprise that the Conventions contemplate the means and methods of warfare
then in existence. However, although nothing in the 1907 texts is directed
toward space operations, articulation of the jus in bello for space warfare will
require examination of the Hague Conventions-an examination analogous to that
undertaken for aerial warfare. Just as principles from the Conventions have been
stretched to limit means and methods of air war, a slightly broader reading of
the primary texts could establish the emergence of a generalized jus in bello
Significant provisions for airpower, and thus possibly for spacepower, are
the restrictions on bombardment contained within the fourth Convention
regulating land warfare, [n190] and the ninth Convention regulating
bombardment by naval forces. [n191] As with most of the documents
adopted by the 1907 conference, the Convention on land warfare was drafted using
terms and concepts from its 1899 predecessor. [n192] Both conferences
sought to limit the permissible scope of artillery fire and the "bombardment"
resulting therefrom. Although the ninth Convention only limited bombardment by
"naval forces," [n193] its second Article provided a list of authorized
targets, including "military works, military or naval establishments, depots of
arms or war materiel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs
of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor . . . ." [n194]
Because these targets were specifically excluded from the
Convention's prohibitions on bombardment, including its application to
"naval forces," it appears that the Convention recognizes that these targets
could be attacked by any forces-naval, terrestrial, aerial, or even space.
A second feature of significance, from the ninth Convention, relates to its
Article 2 and the concept of unavoidable collateral damage. After requisite
precautions have been taken by the attacker, including ascertaining the status
of the target, issuance of a summons followed by a reasonable time of waiting,
and failure by the local authorities to destroy the targets themselves, the
attacker is absolved of responsibility for "unavoidable damage." [n195]
Significantly, this places a burden to minimize collateral damage not only on
the attacker, but on the defender as well. Although reflected in subsequent
international instruments, this aspect of the law of war is increasingly
forgotten. In 1907 it was simply "realized that collateral civilian casualties
were regarded as the cost of war to a nation rather than the responsibility of
the attacker." [n196] This general principle will apply equally to
space warfare. Thus, belligerents employing military space assets that
constitute legitimate targets will be obliged to separate them from other
space objects not supporting the armed conflict.
In contrast to the ninth Convention on naval forces, the prohibition on
bombardment in the regulations annexed to the fourth Convention did not limit
itself to land forces. Reflecting the principle previously articulated in the
second 1899 convention, the fourth convention's general prohibition reads: "The
attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." [n197] Although the
drafters of the Convention did not likely envision space warfare, this provision
raises three potential issues related to limitations on space warfare. First,
the specified targets require at a minimum that they be "defended" before making
them subject to attack. This was an early way of restating the principle of
military necessity. That is, unless a potential target was considered
significant enough to defend, it was not deemed significant enough to attack as
a legitimate objective.
A second issue raised by the bombardment prohibition relates to its scope.
Applicable to bombardment "by whatever means," the prohibition against attack of
undefended land targets restricts all bombardment of such targets, however or
wherever originated. Unless properly defended, the enumerated targets
were not to be engaged by land or sea forces. Given the expansive terms used by
the drafters, the prohibition could be interpreted to apply by extension to air
and space forces. [n198]
Finally, the prohibition implicitly recognizes that under proper conditions
certain targets are lawful. Thus, under the terms of the convention, one could
not state that towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may never be lawful
targets. There were cases envisioned in which even towns filled with civilians
could be bombarded. Significantly however, the Convention did not state that a
potential target was legitimate simply because it was defended, only that
undefended targets were off limits. As a result, even a defended target may
still have been protected if it did not otherwise qualify as a legitimate
military objective. Just because a town full of civilians possessed armed
protection, it was not thereby rendered a legitimate target unless it sustained
an industrial or other function contributing to the prosecution of the conflict.
Chapter One of the regulations to the fourth Convention raises further
distinctions that would prove important to all subsequent law of war rules.
[n199] It defined the conditions under which one qualified as a
"belligerent" and thus protection as a "prisoner of war" if taken during the
course of hostilities. As listed previously, the regulations establish four
criteria defining a belligerent [n200] which designation could apply
not only to those in armies, but to militia members and those of volunteer corps
as well. Chapter One further specifies that the category "belligerents" may
include either combatants or non-combatants. [n201] As the term
suggests, combatants refer to those participating directly in the hostilities.
As a rule, members of a State's armed forces are combatants, with the two basic
exceptions being religious and medical personnel. These two categories of
military members, though members of the armed forces and otherwise entitled to
protection as "belligerents" or "prisoners of war," are non-combatants because
they may not participate directly in the use of force.
Even more basic than the distinction between "combatants" and
"non-combatants" was that between "combatants" and "civilians." [n202]
Civilians were viewed as a special class of "non-combatants" (unable to take
part in the hostilities), who were not "belligerents" (susceptible to
capture and incarceration as prisoners of war) either. Neither they nor their
property could be targeted directly as long as they retained their status as
"civilians." However, a final important category, "unlawful combatants" applies
to those non-combatants and civilians who are unauthorized to engage in
hostilities, but do so nonetheless. These individuals lose the protection they
would otherwise enjoy under the laws of war. As the 1977 Protocol (I) to the
Geneva Convention recognizes, unlawful combatants do not lose all humanitarian
protections, [n203] but they are not accorded "prisoner of war" status
if captured, and they face lawful penal consequences by the foreign belligerent
State for their unlawful participation in the conflict. [n204]
One additional category recognized by the Hague regulations merits
attention-spies. This class of participants to the conflict would include one
who, "acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, . . . obtains or endeavors to
obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the
intention of communicating it to the hostile party." [n205] This does
not include soldiers who have penetrated the hostile force's zone of operations
for the purpose of obtaining information. [n206] As applied to space
warfare, this might mean that a combatant who enters an opposing spacecraft
cannot be considered a spy as long as his vessel bears its prescribed
distinctive markings, and the astronaut wears his military uniform. Because of
potentially damaging, serious effects that spies can have on a belligerent,
spies enjoy the least protection under international law and are the
most vulnerable if captured. Spies are not deemed prisoners of war and, subject
to various minimal due process protections, may be tried by hostile belligerents
for espionage. [n207] In the near future however, spying is unlikely to
become a significant issue for space warfare unless current trends toward
unmanned missions change course. For ground operations in support of space
warfare however, the traditional norms governing spying will apply. Thus, the
lawful disposition of a spy having infiltrated a satellite control center will
be no different than that for a spy operating elsewhere.
2. Geneva Conventions of 1949 (I-IV) and Protocols of 1977 (I-II)
The 1949 Geneva Conventions serve primarily as protection for individuals
suffering as a result of armed conflict. Those employing the term "humanitarian
law" as the preferred reference for the law of war, often seem to have the
Geneva Conventions principally in view. This follows from the simple observation
that the 1949 Conventions highlight the international interest in ensuring that
warfare respects the human person to the maximum possible extent. [n208]
During World War II, following numerous violations of the laws of war,
[n209] the world expressed great doubt that the laws of war would
ever truly protect either combatants or civilians. [n210] This sense
was expressed by Winston Churchill after the war: "The only direct measure of
defence on a great scale was to possess the power to inflict simultaneously upon
the enemy as much damage as he himself could inflict." [n211] This is
to say that the laws of war were no "defense" against the indiscriminate use of
force. Thus, to the extent that Churchill spoke for the general temper of his
time, compliance with the laws of war was simply viewed as incidental to the
prosecution of the war. If an international rule were adhered to, it was not for
respect of the "law," but because doing so afforded some military advantage.
Out of this pessimistic environment emerged the diplomatic conference in
Geneva, charged with limiting the harsh effects of war. Primarily concerned
as they are with amelioration of the suffering of war victims, the four
Geneva Conventions are only tangentially related to regulating the means and
methods of war. They represent, as has been said, "Geneva Law" related to
victims, and not "Hague Law" related to means and methods of warfare.
Nonetheless, several provisions do limit means and methods, specifically
Article 19 of the Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field specifies that "Fixed
establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may in no
circumstances be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected by
the Parties to the conflict." [n212] Under Article 22, this protection
for medical facilities applies even if the unit's personnel are armed, the unit
is protected by a fence or armed sentries, small arms and ammunition taken from
the wounded and sick remain in the unit, the unit's services include veterinary
care, or the unit extends care to civilian wounded or sick. [n213]
These provisions clearly remove medical facilities from the list of permissible
targets that belligerents may lawfully destroy. The fact that the prohibition
contemplates "no circumstances" under which such targets may be attacked,
signifies the comprehensive nature of the protection and forbids attack from any
combat environment, including space.
A similar provision can be found in Article 18 of the Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: "Civilian
hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and
maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at
all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict." [n214]
Though this provision would also apply to space attacks, using the same
absolute ("no circumstances") language of convention (I), Article 18 goes a step
further by requiring belligerents to clearly mark civilian hospitals so that
they are "clearly visible to the enemy land, air, and naval forces in order to
obviate the possibility of any hostile action." [n215]
In addition to protection of medical facilities on the ground, Geneva Law
protects medical ships under the Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea. Thus, Article 22 provides that such ships, "built or equipped by the
Powers specially and solely with a view to assisting the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, to treating them and to transporting them, may in no circumstances
be attacked. . . ." [n216] Article 23 clarifies that such protection
extends to such support establishments ashore that may be protected under
Convention (I), [n217] and Article 28 protects the sick-bays aboard a
warship, even where fighting occurs on board the ship. [n218] These
provisions further restrict the potential methods of space warfare as all
protected facilities could in theory be attacked from space. [n219]
Motivated by continuing international conflicts, and particularly the
revitalized interest in the law of war following the Vietnam War,
nongovernmental organizations began arguing for a diplomatic conference to
update the law of war. This followed moves immediately after WWII by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) attempting to restrict aerial
bombardment. This emphasis on the need to update the law of war continued
through the 1950s and 1960s. Following two significant U.N.G.A. Resolutions,
[n220] a diplomatic conference was convened in 1974 to draft new
The first of the two Protocols adopted by the conference pertained to
international armed conflicts and is, to the extent that any law of war treaties
will be relevant, more important for regulation of means and methods of space
warfare. Protocol II limits itself to the regulation of armed force in
"non-international armed conflicts," relates to the protection of victims of
"internal" or "civil" wars, and governs the protection of the victims of such
conflicts. [n221] Substantively, the provisions of Protocol II, which
are significantly fewer and "far less restrictive" [n222] than those of
Protocol I, supplement the provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions-the latter requiring that minimal protections be accorded the
victims of armed conflicts "not of an international character." [n223]
Traditionally, the customary law of war applied to non-international conflicts
only if the government of a country in which the insurrection occurred, or some
third State, chose to recognize the legal status of the insurgent
group. [n224] Because Protocol II, Article 1(2), excludes application
of its terms for "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature. . ." [n225] and such exclusions in the Geneva Conventions have
been the basis for governments routinely denying the application of common
Article 3, [n226] it is doubtful that Protocol II will have much impact
on the amelioration of human suffering caused by non-international armed
Potentially more important for the regulation of means and method of space
warfare are the provisions of Protocol I. Though formally a protocol to the
Geneva Conventions, Protocol I includes regulation of military activity
previously governed by "Hague Law." Despite the innovations worked by Protocol
I's positions on insurgents and reprisals, [n227] the United States
found its greatest difficulty with the general thrust of provisions
relating directly the conduct of military operations--Articles 48 to 58. [n228]
Those articles define, among other things, the basic rule of
distinction, [n229] the meaning of "attack," [n230] the
meaning of "civilians" and "civilian population," [n231] the rule
protecting civilian populations, [n232] the rule protecting civilian
objects, [n233] the rule protecting cultural objects and places of
worship, [n234] the rule protecting objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, [n235] the rule protecting the
natural environment, [n236] the rule protecting works and installations
containing dangerous forces, [n237] the rule establishing necessary
precautions to be taken in the event of attack, [n238] and the rule
establishing precautions to be taken against the effects of attack. [n239]
As may now be obvious, all of these provisions affect the conduct of
space warfare insofar as each limits potential targets and restricts options
otherwise available to military space forces.
Perhaps the biggest concern raised by these provisions was the attempt to
return warfare to restricted means and methods of warfare "that [have] not been
seen in this century." [n240] Specifically, the cumulative effect of
these provisions worked to "shift the responsibility for the protection of the
civilian population away from the host nation (which has custody over its
civilian population, and which traditionally has borne the principal
responsibility for the safety of the civilian population) almost exclusively
onto the attacker." [n241] Two problems with this attempt at
burden-shifting arise. The first concerns the threat to State sovereignty in
cases amounting to self-defense. As the statement of France indicated in the
ICRC commentary to Article 48, had there been a separate vote on Article 48,
"France would have abstained inasmuch as it considered the article to have
'direct implications as regards a State's organization and conduct of defense
against an invader." [n242]
A second concern raised by the formulations of Protocol I is its apparent
failure to acknowledge that attacks are often taken as a reply to previous
aggression. [n243] In this regard, Allied strategic air operations over
Nazi Germany and the multinational march into North Korea in 1950 would have
been rendered militarily impotent had the restrictions of Protocol I applied.
The conduct of military operations against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War
provides an additional example.
For these and other reasons as well, the Protocol attempts to restrict means
and methods of warfare, including aerial warfare, to an extent not acceptable to
a number of nations, without whose support the law of war can not properly
function. [n244] Given the denunciations by France and the United
States, the Protocol did not serve to limit warfare in either the 1991 Gulf War,
or the 1999 NATO air war against Yugoslavia, except to the extent it was viewed
as declaratory, in part, of customary law. Given the strongly-held conviction of
these two major airpower States, it is difficult to see Protocol I serving as a
meaningful formal limitation on aerial warfare, and thus space warfare, for the
foreseeable future. It will however, continue to raise political issues for the
U.S. as it engages in coalition warfare with allies having ratified the
3. Additional Conventions Adopted Since 1972 Affecting the Jus in Bello
Since the close of the diplomatic conference which adopted the Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions, additional conferences have adopted six principal
treaties (in some cases designated protocols to other treaties) affecting the
jus in bello. These include, in chronological order, treaties on Biological
Weapons, [n245] Environmental Modification, [n246]
Conventional Weapons, [n247] Chemical Weapons, [n248] Blinding
Lasers, [n249] and Anti-Personnel Mines. [n250] Of these, the
most likely to effect potential means and methods of space warfare is the
Environmental Modification Treaty.
This Treaty does not restrict the use of environmental modification
techniques for "peaceful purposes," [n251] but does proscribe the
"military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party." [n252] The Treaty is of
particular importance to space warfare in that "environmental modification
techniques" are defined to include "any technique for changing -- through the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes -- the dynamics, composition or
structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and
atmosphere, or of outer space." [n253]
The Treaty's provisions make clear that its purpose is not so much
environmental protection, as a restriction against States making or attempting
changes to environmental processes as an instrument of warfare. The means of
warfare prohibited by the Treaty need not adversely affect the
environment itself because the prohibitions of Article I apply only to the use
of the environment as a weapon. [n254] Further, though not incorporated
into the convention itself, the Parties attached a series of "Understandings" to
the Treaty, which, as part of the negotiating record, clarify terms used in the
text. The "Understanding Relating to Article II" includes a non-exhaustive list
of illustrative phenomena that could be caused by environmental modification
techniques. In addition to earthquakes, tsunamis, changes in weather patterns,
climate patterns, and ocean currents, these include changes in the state of the
ozone layer and changes in the state of the ionosphere. [n255] Although
all of these effects could be attempted from space, the latter two seem the most
likely possibilities. However, the restrictions established by this Treaty do
not seem applicable to any major weapons programs publicly reported to be now in
development. So long as space weapons do not change the outer space environment
"through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes," the treaty is not
likely to serve as a bar to the deployment or use of space weapons. [n256]
In addition to the Environmental Modification Treaty, the four protocols to
the Conventional Weapons Treaty limit the combat use of non-detectable
fragments; mines, booby-traps, and other devices; incendiary weapons; and
anti-optic lasers. The restriction on "mines, booby-traps, and other devices"
will not apply to space warfare as its terms apply only to those devices "on
land." [n257] Though of possible significance, the protocol restricting
use of incendiary devices seems unlikely to affect the development of means and
methods of space warfare unless States Parties develop such weapons to be
delivered from space. The protocol limiting use of blinding lasers will possibly
become relevant as the U.S. could employ such devices in space. [n258]
There is increasing interest in the use of lasers in combat, even those which
[*59] may cause incidental eye injury. [n259] However, rather than
applying these four rather specific provisions to space warfare, the more likely
course will entail development of further protocols to this Convention effecting
specific limits on conventional space weaponry.
4. Jus Ad Bellum Under the United Nations Charter
The Charter of the United Nations governs the very legitimacy of States' use
of force in the first place. As such, it is not formally part of the law of war
but rather forms part of the jus ad bellum. Nonetheless, because the Charter
governs the lawful use of force, its provisions are necessarily related to
considerations of how that force is used under the jus in bello. [n260]
The Charter is "two-faced," serving both as the constitutional document for
the United Nations organization itself, as well as providing substantive
principles of international law. [n261] The substantive provisions are
intended to advance the goals articulated in the Preamble of the Charter,
including among others, the creation of conditions for the maintenance of
international peace and security. [n262] This objective rests on the
proscription of the aggressive use of force, which finds expression in two
portions of the Charter, paragraph 2(4) and Chapter 7. [n263]
In this respect, the principal contribution of the U.N. Charter to the use of
military force is its authoritative articulation of the jus ad bellum. [n264]
The oft-cited provision of paragraph 2(4) enunciates the well-established
international legal principle [n265] prohibiting the use of force: "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
[n266] Balancing this general proscription is the exception for
"self-defense" found in Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. . . ."
[n267] Article 51 goes on to require member States to notify the
Security Council of any actions taken pursuant to this right of self-defense.
Of the many legal issues these two provisions raise, two of the most obvious
affect the use of force in outer space. First, what is the meaning of "threat or
use of force" in relation to outer space as contained in Article 2(4)? And
second, what is the meaning of "if an armed attack occurs" in Article 51? These
issues have been widely discussed in the scholarly literature and will be only
briefly addressed here.
Under Article 2(4), States may neither use force in the course of
their international relations, nor threaten it. Though widely ignored in State
practice, the Charter makes no distinction between the illegality of using force
and of threatening it. Ordinarily, the use of force follows a threat of it. In
such cases, the use of force gets all the legal analysis, and the threat, if
noticed at all, does not attract separate consideration as an independent
violation. [n268] In cases where the use of force does not accompany a
threat, the threat is not generally considered sufficient reason to take action.
Indeed, not only has the mere threat of force seldom led a State to protest the
matter under Article 2(4), but "state practice reveals a relatively high degree
of tolerance towards mere threats of force." [n269] Nonetheless, the
Charter's proscription remains. Given the fact that space warfare will require
new application of existing legal regimes, if not new regimes altogether, new
means and methods of using force will also give rise to new means of making
threats, including those from space.
Significantly, the Charter's focus on force rather than war reflects a
contemplated decision to outlaw all manner of armed conflict. Force is a broader
category than war. Thus the Charter prohibits all cases of armed force whether
or not the parties recognize a formal state of war between them. How States make
this formal recognition also varies from situation to situation and can be
difficult to ascertain. It ultimately depends upon either the issuance of a
declaration or ultimatum, or the occurrence of an "act of war." And yet even
what might constitute an act of war does not always initiate war. As professor
Green puts it, "whether the armed conflict amounts to a war in the
international legal sense of the term depends upon the reactions of the victim
of the attack and also, to some extent, upon the attitude of non-parties to the
Even more difficult historically than defining a state of war, has been the
attempt to determine what "force" the Charter prohibits given the many sources
of pressure nations may use in their relations with each other. It is now widely
agreed that such force does not include political or economic force, as well as
most forms of non-military physical force. [n271] Included in the
prohibition however, not only are cases of direct military force but indirect
force as well. Thus, the use of irregular forces, mercenaries, or the arming or
training of indigenous rebel forces against their own government would
constitute cases of indirect aggression prohibited by the Charter. [n272]
Regarding the latter however, the International Court of Justice clarified
in the Nicaragua v. United States judgment that not all forms of aid violate the
rule of Article 2(4), noting for example that the supply of funds to a rebel
force does not constitute "force." [n273] The potential implications of
this distinction for space support are far reaching as it will allow spacefaring
States to argue that the provision of information to insurgents, a principal
benefit of space assets, [n274] is more akin to the provision of money
than of arms.
Perhaps the biggest question with respect to the self-defense principle
embodied in Article 51 relates to the meaning of the phrase "if an armed attack
occurs." This seems to preclude the right to defend with arms, until an actual
armed attack has triggered the right. Thus, the phrase appears to rule out
"anticipatory" self-defense. [n275] As with the application of Article
2(4), nothing in Article 51 restricts the inherent right of self-defense,
[n276] to the use of force within earth's atmosphere. Although the
delegates to the diplomatic conference adopting the Charter in 1945 did not
likely have in mind the application of force from outer space, we have
subsequently learned that its rudimentary possibility was then under review by
the United States and Soviet Union. Nonetheless, as with the application of
numerous international instruments to new situations and technological
realities, there is no reason to exclude the terms of Articles 2(4) and 51 from
application in outer space. As discussed in the next chapter, the most
significant treaty on outer space specifically references the U.N. Charter.
One consequence of the right of self-defense is that the law does not
absolutely prohibit war; defensive wars that are undertaken pursuant to Article
51 are not illegal. [n277] However, recognizing the abstract rule is
relatively simple, applying it to a specific conflict is not.
Nonetheless, international law must assess the relative legal positions of
competing belligerents in order to sort out what relations exists between the
parties to the conflict, and to third party States. For example, although
parties to a conflict increasingly ignore the distinction between "war" and
other forms of armed conflict, [n278] the law does recognize that a
formal state of war [n279] will entail certain consequences that mere
armed conflict will not. [n280]
Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt, USAF (1998)
Scholars have advanced numerous reasons for maintaining an international law
of armed conflict. [n122] At first glance, the creation of rules for
war-apparently the ultimate breakdown in order-seems ironic at best. [n123]
And [*29] yet although war is a breakdown with respect to peaceful
dispute resolution, it becomes the ultimate breakdown only if allowed by its
participants. War need not lead to anarchy or violent chaos, even though it
necessarily entails injury, killing, and death. [n124] Numerous
historical examples of military discipline displayed in combat show that the
participants in war can recognize order or, at the very least, a chain of
It is tautological to assert that effective warfare requires application of
efficient, ordered methods. Indeed when that form of order represented by the
law of war breaks down, the military effects can be disastrous. Colonel Charles
Dunlap quotes Richard Overy on the effects of Germany's disregard for the laws
of war in its conflict against the Soviets on the Eastern front.
[Such] criminalization of warfare produced a growing indiscipline and
demoralization among German forces themselves. The German army shot fifteen
thousand of their own number, the equivalence [sic] of a whole division . . . .
Desertion or refusal to obey orders increased as the war went on, and the law of
the jungle seeped into the military structure itself. [n125]
Many factors contributed to the Nazi defeat, but the German way of war
on the Eastern front failed at least in part because it became "disorderly."
Thus, advocacy for an efficient, effective military force can itself become an
argument for the laws of war, which will have the effect of reinforcing military
Whatever the reasons, warfare has attended the human race since the beginning
of recorded history. In reflecting on the phenomenon, theorists and scholars
have described the nature of warfare in a variety of ways. Some see it as the
logical and brutal extension of politics; [n127] others view warfare as
principally about deception and avoidance of the enemy's physical strengths. [n128]
However one conceives warfare, all agree that armed combat is an
event in which the battlefield reality is much worse that its mere description
might suggest. [n129] Because of this, the principled warrior
is the last to desire war; when given the discretion, he reserves it as a last
resort. Nonetheless, warfare has been a permanent fixture of the human race. As
one source puts it, "according to estimates based on the period from 3600 B.C.
until 1960, mankind has known only 292 years of universal peace, and in the
remaining 5268 years has faced 14,513 armed conflicts taking 1240 million human
lives." [n130] These statistics highlight the fact that for the sake of
preserving human life and international public order, one must accept,
however cynically, [n131] both the importance and relevance of the laws
A. Jus in Bello vs. Jus ad Bellum
When speaking of the various international norms limiting the prosecution of
war, scholars have historically distinguished between the jus in bello, or, the
laws regulating the conduct of States once armed conflict between them has
begun, [n132] and the jus ad bellum consisting of the law governing
resort to armed conflict. The former law applies to conflicts that the
belligerents themselves may not regard as "wars." [n133] The latter law
is of relatively recent origin and is expressed most authoritatively
in Article 2(4), and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. [n134]
Based on this distinction, Michael Walzer points out that the truly lawful war
must satisfy requirements under both legal regimes: "War is always judged twice,
first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with
reference to the means they adopt." [n135] This two-part analysis leads
another publicist to distinguish between a war's "just cause and [its] just
Some authors conceive a conceptual framework in which the law of war concerns
itself principally with the jus in bello. Thus, Kalshoven writes "the laws of
war, or jus in bello, are those rules and principles of international law which
. . . govern the conduct of war." [n137] This is both the majority view
and the better view. By contrast, others prefer to speak of the law of war as
comprising both aspects. "The term 'laws of war' can have different meanings and
refers to both the rules governing resort to armed conflict (ius ad bellum) and
the rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict (ius in bello)." [n138]
Because the term jus ad bellum more properly coincides with
phrases such as "the right of self-defense" and "resort to the use of force," it
should therefore be distinguished from "laws of war." Equating the jus in bello
with the phrase "laws of war" is not only a matter of historical convention, [n139]
but of logical application of law to war. Simply put, the jus
ad bellum is to be regarded as separate from the law of war because of the
"cardinal principle that jus in bello applies in cases of armed conflict
whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception under jus ad
B. Customary Principles within the Law of War
Given the misery left by warfare through the centuries, warring nations have
developed customary practices seeking to ameliorate its devastating effects. As
the customs of war have evolved into the customs and laws of war, the dominant
objective underlying the law as it relates to military force has remained
constant and can be summed up in one word: restraint. [n141] This was
perhaps best summarized for the fist time in an international instrument by
Article 22 of the Second Convention adopted by the 1899 Hague Peace Conference:
"The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited." [n142] As discussed below, the dominant concepts distilled
from the vast body of customary international law amount to very few; military
necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and humanity. [n143]
These principles, recognized in subsequent treaty law, limit the means and
methods available to belligerents for conducting armed conflicts, and thus each
demands restraint of the belligerent State. [n144] Because there are no
treaties establishing specific jus in bello principles for space combat, these
customary principles provide the most authoritative source, subject to the
specific principles of space law discussed in Chapters Four and Five, on which
the analysis of a jus in bello for space must proceed.
1. Military Necessity
Military necessity expresses the idea that for an attack to be lawful
belligerents must be able to show the connection between the attack, and the
suppression of the enemy's military capability. De Mulinen points out that
military necessity pertains to those measures: "(a) not forbidden by the law of
war; and (b) required to secure the overpowering of the enemy." [n145]
Implied in the restriction this principle imposes is the requirement that
attackers have identified the prospective target in advance of attack as one
that is militarily legitimate. Put otherwise, the attacker must be convinced
that attacking the target will contribute to the victory of his military
undertaking. As the quote at the head of this chapter suggests, the more capable
a belligerent is in properly identifying these militarily necessary targets, the
more responsibility it has in doing so.
Taken to its logical extreme, the principle of necessity could be used to
justify the very sorts of activity the laws of war prohibit. [n146] Any
argument taking the principle to this extreme commits two legal
errors. First, it fundamentally misinterprets the principle by failing to
recognize the sovereign freedom States have in the absence of legal
prohibition. [n147] Legally speaking, a State does not need concepts
like military necessity to justify its behavior in war provided such behavior is
otherwise compliant with applicable jus in bello restrictions. As Schmitt
emphasizes, "military necessity operates within this paradigm to prohibit acts
that are not militarily necessary; it is a principle of limitation, not
authorization. In its legal sense, military necessity justifies nothing." [n148]
Second, as with all of the customary principles underlying the
law of war, but especially military necessity, the concept must be balanced
against the others. The U.S. Air Force stresses this point in its manual on
the law of war:
IV. Space Warfare Under the Corpus Juris Spatialis
Even in the vast expanse of space it can be expected, further, that the host
of participants who will in the future seek to enjoy the many different
potential uses of this great resource will in countless ways, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, interfere with each other. [n281]
States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States
Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary,
shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State party to the
Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its
nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. [n327]
At the outset, one observes that Article IX, like most space law provisions,
makes no distinction between military and civilian activities. Thus, ordinarily
the requirements of Article IX apply fully to military operations in space. [n328]
One possible limitation for space warfare is suggested by the language
prohibiting "harmful contamination" of outer space, the moon, and celestial
bodies. Significantly, the provision applies only to "studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies" and to the "exploration of
them." [n329] Thus, while "studies" and "exploration" would likely
apply to the testing and development of space weaponry, the restriction does not
seem logically applicable to the actual conduct of warfare. Unless by some
tenuous definition "warfare" could be brought within the modifying terms
"studies" and "exploration," it appears that State activities in
support of warfare, whether within space or in support of earth-based
hostilities, are not prohibited from causing "harmful contamination" under
Article IX. [n330] It also bears noting that activities triggering the
prohibition on harmful contamination, namely "studies" and "exploration," would
also have to avoid "adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter." [n331]
A potentially more significant point from Article IX relates to a State's
duty to engage in "international consultations" prior to engaging in activities
which the State "has reason to believe . . . would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space, . . ." It is not difficult to conceive scenarios in
which the use of armed force in space would potentially cause "harmful
interference" with other States Parties in their peaceful exploration and use of
space. Assuming the hostile act were lawfully directed at an asset in conformity
with the jus ad bellum, this requirement would not require consultation with the
opposing belligerent State as it would not be engaged in the "peaceful
exploration and use of outer space." However, it would require consultations
with any third party (neutral) State owning space assets that might foreseeably
be interfered with "harmfully." To the extent that a hostile act in space,
whether lawful or not, could harmfully interfere with a third party State's
asset, Article IX appears to require that the State must be consulted. Further,
unlike other space treaties and U.N. resolutions that leave the timing of such
consultations unclear, Article IX specifies that it must occur "before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment." This could create a
disincentive to carrying out an act of armed conflict as prior consultations
with a third party State could, by public dissemination or otherwise, constitute
a de facto notification to the opposing belligerent State of the anticipated
attack. Nonetheless, the Article IX does not stand in the way of carrying
through with such hostile acts once "consultations" have occurred, even if the
third-party State objects to the anticipated activity or experiment. As a
practical matter, though the Treaty requires it, one wonders whether
the international community even takes this consultation provision seriously
given that so far as is publicly known, no such consultation has ever been
undertaken since the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. [n330]
With respect to military forces in space, the most significant provision from
the Outer Space Treaty appears in Article IV, which directly addresses the
militarization of outer space:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes
shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for
peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
Among the myriad issues raised by this section, a perennial debate has
centered on the meaning of "peaceful purposes," the ambiguous term operating as
one of several limitations on State uses of outer space. Because of the
centrality of the phrase to questions of military uses of space, a historical
sense of its use in international parlance is necessary. When first used by the
U.S. in 1957, the "peaceful and scientific purposes" of outer space activities
soon became the official goal of the United Nations. By vote of 56 to 9 (15
abstentions), the U.N. adopted Resolution 1148 (XII) on November 14, 1957, which
advocated an inspection system to ensure the peaceful uses of space. "This was a
landmark document not only because it represented the first General Assembly
resolution on outer space but also because it introduced the phrase 'exclusively
for peaceful purposes' in an authoritative U.N. text." [n334]
Of course, simply using the term without definition does not fix its meaning.
Professor Vlasic reports that although the first wide-ranging debate on the
peaceful uses of outer space at the 13th session of the U.N.G.A. in 1958 saw
virtually all participants using the term "peaceful" as an antonym for
"military," the resolutions this session produced did not attempt "to interpret
or clarify the term 'peaceful' so commonly used in the context of
contemporary space activities." [n335] Significantly, although U.S.
President Eisenhower proposed by letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin in 1958 that
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. use outer space "only for peaceful purposes" and not for
"testing of missiles designed for military purposes," [n336] the
proposal was never consummated by agreement.
As discussed above, while the world community was debating the meaning of
terms such as "peaceful purposes," the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were secretly
developing satellite systems with clear military capabilities. Thus in the
period from late 1958 to 1959, the U.S. adopted the view that "'peaceful' in
relation to outer space activities was interpreted . . . to mean
'non-aggressive' rather than non-military. . . . By contrast, the Soviet Union
publicly took the view, despite its own military uses of space, that 'peaceful'
meant 'non-military' and that in consequence all military activities in outer
space were 'non-peaceful' and possibly illegal." [n337] This background
forms the context for use of the phrase in the Outer Space Treaty. Though the
Soviet Union and a number of other States consistently maintained the view that
"peaceful" means "non-military," the majority of the international community has
failed to agree. Consequently, the view "which today has gained general
acceptance, is that non-aggressive military uses are peaceful. Thus, 'peaceful'
has come to mean general space activity that is beneficial to and in the
interests of all countries." [n338] This is essentially the view
maintained by the U.S., which stresses that all States possess the inherent
right to defend against foreign aggression in outer space, as well as within
earth's atmosphere. [n339] Despite the long debate over the term
"peaceful" as used in the Outer Space Treaty, its meaning has been well-settled
through the practice of States and certainly includes military activities. [n340]
When assessing the meaning of a term in one treaty, it is instructive
to examine its meaning as used in other treaties as well. Other than the
"peaceful purposes" language contained in the Antarctic Treaty, discussed
below, [n341] the phrase appears more recently in the treaty governing
the International Space Station (ISS). Consistent with the Outer Space Treaty,
Article 1(1) of the ISS Agreement requires that uses of the ISS be reserved for
peaceful purposes. [n342] Interestingly, the ISS Agreement
seems to recognize the divergent interpretations of the phrase "peaceful
purposes." Article 9, paragraph 3(b) provides that "the Partner providing an
element shall determine whether a contemplated use of that element is for
peaceful purposes." [n343] In so agreeing, the Partners reasonably
concede that the likelihood of disagreement over the meaning of the term
justifies a provision stipulating who should determine its meaning. In this
case, each Partner decides for itself whether its proposed use constitutes a
This comes as no surprise. Absent cases referred to the International Court
of Justice, international obligations have often been subject to unilateral
interpretation. Using the ISS Agreement as a reference, it appears safe to
assert that unless an interpretation is so tenuous as to amount to bad faith,
the decision regarding a proper interpretation of "peaceful purposes" under the
Outer Space Treaty continues to rest with the party proposing the action.
Legally speaking, because "peaceful purposes" in the Outer Space Treaty is not
specifically defined it therefore may not mean the same thing as the identical
phrase in the ISS Agreement. Further, the self-interpretation provision of the
ISS Agreement applies only to the handful of States Parties to the ISS
Agreement, which are but a fraction of those States who are parties to the Outer
Space Treaty. Nonetheless, the meaning of a phrase in an international
instrument becomes most clear in light of action by its States Parties. With the
exception of China, the States most active in space are all members of the ISS
Agreement. How these States behave under their "peaceful purposes" obligations
in the ISS agreement will continue to illuminate the meaning of the phrase
A further point from Article IV regards the location to which the "peaceful
purposes" restriction applies. The second paragraph limits use of "celestial
bodies," including the moon, to peaceful purposes. This raises the question
whether the "peaceful purposes" limitation, whatever its meaning, applies away
from celestial bodies. Christol points out that though the Treaty uses "outer
space," "moon," and "celestial bodies" at numerous points and in various
combinations throughout the substantive articles, the omission of "outer
space" in Article IV, paragraph 2 was "clearly intentional." [n344]
While the term "outer space" as used in the Outer Space Treaty includes the moon
and "celestial bodies," [n345] the latter terms do not include within
them the meaning conveyed by "outer space." Christol articulates the negotiating
history of the Treaty and points out that though several States within COPUOS
objected to the omission of "outer space" from Article IV, paragraph 2,
given the clear implication that this would permit non-peaceful purposes for
outer space, the view of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. that the term "peaceful purposes"
should apply only to the moon and celestial bodies won the day. [n346]
As such, the restriction does not formally apply to space activities away from
celestial bodies. [n347]
Nonetheless, though Article IV, paragraph 2 does not prohibit the
non-peaceful use of outer space away from celestial bodies, such uses are
nonetheless implicitly prohibited by other provisions. For example, at least to
the extent that "non-peaceful" means the aggressive use of force, such uses are
prohibited by the U.N. Charter's provision to the contrary. [n348]
Because the Outer Space Treaty restricts State activities in space to those "in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations," [n349] an aggressive use of force forbidden on earth is
equally forbidden in space. Further, some States such as the U.S. have made the
"peaceful" uses of outer space a tenet of national policy. Thus, the 1958
National Aeronautics and Space Act maintains that "activities in space should be
devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." [n350]
This was reiterated recently in the President's National Space Policy wherein
the White House declared "The United States is committed to the exploration and
use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
all humanity." [n351]
A further point under Article IV relates to the legal permissibility
of satellite interceptors or anti-satellite (ASATs) satellites. ASATs deviate
from the non-aggressive character of virtually all other satellites, and in so
doing may appear to violate the non-aggressive mandate required of all space
activities under the "peaceful purposes" restriction. However, regardless of
their putative "destabilizing" character for international peace and security,
[n352] the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the
transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space, including
ASATs. The prohibition on orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons, [n353] strongly suggests the distinction between those
weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destructive power, including those
directed at satellites. Though Article IV(1) could easily be modified to effect
the de-weaponization of space, [n354] conventional weapons are not
A final point from the Outer Space Treaty relates to the prohibition on the
establishment of "military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing
of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial
bodies." Though this clause does not include the "moon" as does the one
immediately preceding it, it is clear that the Outer Space Treaty uses
"celestial bodies" as a phrase which includes the moon. Thus the first sentence
of Article IV(2) speaks of the moon "and other celestial bodies." (emphasis
added) As a result, Article IV can reasonably be read to prohibit both the
creation of permanent military structures on the moon or other celestial bodies,
as well as the testing of weapons there. Though non-nuclear weapons testing is
not prohibited in outer space, [n356] it cannot occur on celestial
bodies. Such prohibition could well have been in response to published reports
of the U.S. moon base program. In a January 21, 1958 speech about a planned
military outpost on the far side of the moon, Brigadier General Homer A. Boushey
The moon provides a retaliation base of unequaled advantage. If we had a base on
the moon, the Soviets must launch an overwhelming nuclear attack toward the
moon from Russia two to two-and-one-half days prior to attacking the continental
U.S.--and such launchings could not escape detection--or Russia could attack the
continental U.S. first, only and inevitably to receive, from the moon--some 48
hours later--sure and massive destruction. [n357]
Whatever its strategic value, such a proposal today would be clearly prohibited
by the Outer Space Treaty.
2. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue and Return Agreement)--1968
Adopted in time for the imminent manned moon launchings of the United States,
the so-called "Rescue and Return Agreement" [n358] sought to clarify
the duties of States relating to astronauts and objects launched into
space. [n359] Though it appears that space warfare in the foreseeable
future will rely primarily on unmanned space activities, the Agreement's
provisions on objects as well as those on astronauts will be relevant as a
limitation on means and methods of space warfare. The Agreement is essentially
an expansion of Article V of the Outer Space Treaty which required States
Parties to regard astronauts as "envoys of mankind" entitled to "all possible
assistance." Divided into provisions dealing with the return of Astronauts
(Articles 1-4) and the return of space objects (Article 5), the treaty had been
adopted by ratification, accession, or succession by eighty-four States as of
1997, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R. [n360]
Regarding astronauts, the Agreement requires a State Party to make two
notifications. It must either notify the launching authority or make a public
announcement, and notify the U.N. Secretary General [n361] under three
conditions: when it receives information or discovers that the personnel of a
spacecraft have (1) suffered accident; (2) experienced conditions of distress;
or (3) made an emergency or intended landing on territory under its
jurisdiction, on the high seas, or on any other place not under any State's
jurisdiction. [n362] Further, the Agreement requires the provision of
"rescue" and "all necessary assistance" by States Parties in cases where
astronauts land in their territory by reason of "accident, distress, emergency,
or unintended landing." [n363] This assistance is equally
mandatory for landings on the high seas or other places not under the
jurisdiction of any States, but only for those Contracting States "in a position
to do so . . . if necessary." [n364]
With respect to "space objects," a term undefined by this or any other
space treaty, [n365] the Agreement requires that notification be made
to the launching authority following discovery of any space object within the
territory of a contracting party, on the high seas, or any other place not under
the jurisdiction of any State. [n366] The treaty further requires that
upon furnishing "identifying data," States Parties "shall" return space objects
found beyond the territorial limits of the launching state. [n367]
However, while this provision would certainly require the return of space
weaponry or satellites having landed back on earth, it does not specify when
such return must take place or in exactly what condition. Presumably, the treaty
requires return within a reasonable time, though that could perhaps occur after
a thorough inspection and analysis of the space object by the State possessing
it. Because the treaty makes no distinction between civil and military
astronauts or launchings, its terms apply equally to astronauts and space
objects used for both purposes.
A significant issue arose in 1978 pertaining to the reentry of a
nuclear-powered ocean reconnaissance satellite owned and operated by the Soviet
Union--Cosmos 954. [n368] On January 24, 1978 the satellite crashed in
Canada's Northwest Territories. According to the diplomatic exchanges following
the incident, the U.S. offered assistance "within 15 minutes." [n369]
After some delay, Canada accepted the U.S. offer of assistance but
declined the Soviet offer. [n370] Instrumental in the exchanges was the
language of Article 5(2). Though it required Canada to "take such steps as it
finds practicable to recover the object or component parts," the treaty allowed
for Soviet assistance only "if requested." [n371] Because Canada never
made the request, the Soviet Union had no right to search for its property on
Canadian soil (and thus protect it from discovery by the West).
Though intended as a clarification of the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and
Return Agreement raises as many questions as it answers. One commonly raised
question pertains the possibility that an astronaut landing in the territory of
another State Party may wish to request political asylum. Though Article 4 does
not seem to allow for this possibility, ("shall be safely and promptly
returned"), [n372] other principles of international law contained in
the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights do. Though a few
States took the position that the treaty did not extinguish the right to request
asylum in connection with an unintended landing from space, [n373] most
States, including the U.S., rejected this position and maintained that the
treaty created a specific exception to the asylum rules. [n374]
Other questions raised by ambiguities in the Agreement include the following:
"How should rescue expenses be treated? Is the launching state obligated to
reimburse the rescuing state? What if a rescue attempt is bungled--will the
rescuing state be liable, or does some sort of Good Samaritan principle apply?
Should there be such a principle, since rescue is mandatory?" [n375]
Though the treaty requires rescues for astronauts, it does not specify who pays
for the rescue operation or in what proportion, unlike the case respecting
searches for space objects under Article 5, and the subsequent Liability
Convention. [n376] The answers to each of these questions could affect
the evolution of space warfare as States make wartime decisions in
light of possible liability. The potentially significant issue of whether the
Rescue and Return Agreement mandates return of astronauts in time of war is
discussed in Part VI. [n377]
3. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (Liability Convention)--1972
The longest of the space treaties at 28 articles, the Liability Convention
takes as its goal an elaboration of "effective international rules and
procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to
ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention of
a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage."
[n378] As with the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability
Convention undertook an expansion of the Outer Space Treaty, in this case
Article VII, which made a launching State "internationally liable for damage to
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons" for
damage caused by its space objects. [n379] With a few exceptions, the
Liability Convention is likely to have only a tangential relationship to the
regulation of space warfare.
The Convention sets up a two-tiered structure of liability. For damage caused
by a space object on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft in flight, the
launching State [n380] is "absolutely liable." [n381]
Otherwise, the Convention provides fault-based liability "in the event
of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a space
object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space
object by a space object of another launching State . . ." [n382] As
with all other space treaties, the Liability Convention makes no distinction
between civilian and military space objects which could form the basis of a
claim. Thus, not only military operations short of armed conflict, but space
operations during war itself could form the basis of monetary claims under the
Convention, provided the space object [n383] of the launching State
caused "damage." Because the Convention defines the term broadly, to include
"loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of
international intergovernmental organizations," [n384] just about any
damage directly caused by the space object will be compensable.
Other provisions establish the principle of joint and several liability;
[n385] apportionment of liability for joint launchings; [n386]
conditions under which a launching State may be exonerated from absolute
liability; [n387] exclusions of liability; [n388] priority of
presenting claims between a State on behalf of itself or national, territorial
States on behalf of non-nationals, and State of residency of victims; [n389]
a one-year statute of limitations from the date of occurrence,
identification of the launching state, or acquisition of facts by the injured
State putting it on notice of the damage; [n390] and the availability
of domestic remedies. [n391] Following this, the Convention provides
seven articles on the establishment, compositions, and procedure of a "claims
commission" for the adjudication of claims made under the convention. [n392]
Though widely hailed as creating an equitable procedure for the resolution
of liability claims, one of the Convention's "most publicized" defects was the
failure to require that Claims Commission decisions would automatically bind
Whether the Liability Convention has succeeded in achieving its goals remains
to be seen. Though the Convention has specified a liability regime, it has never
been used and thus cannot be judged "effective." The Cosmos 954 incident would
have provided the first case study. However though it paid $ 3,000,000 of the
Canadian $ 6,000,000 claim, the Soviet Union refused to engage in legal
argumentation over the Convention's terms. Though the Convention does establish
the international standard for compensation, and fixes the level of liability
based on the spatial area in which the damage occurred, it is unlikely to affect
a State's decision to use of force in space, or the selection of means and
4. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
The Registration Convention establishes a mandatory system of registration
for space objects launched into orbit and beyond. [n394] With reference
to the Convention's preamble, one commentator cites two essential functions
served by an international registration requirement: "(1) a well-ordered,
complete and informative register would minimize the likelihood and even the
suspicion of weapons of mass destruction being furtively put into orbit; (2)
it is not possible to identify a spacecraft that has caused damage without an
international system of registration." [n395] Though the conclusion
stated in the first point above seems overly optimistic, especially given the
late reporting allowed under the Registration Convention, the second appears to
be beyond question.
As with the previous two treaties discussed, the Registration Convention also
clarifies a provision from the Outer Space Treaty. When establishing the
principle that a launching State maintains jurisdiction and control in
space over its launched objects, the Outer Space Treaty makes reference to the
"registry" of States Parties. [n396] Only in the 1975 Registration
Convention did space law formally specify the requirement that States maintain a
registry, [n397] and the nature of its contents.
After defining "launching state," "space object," and "State of registry,"
[n398] the Convention provides that each State will maintain an
"appropriate registry" that contains an entry for all space objects "launched
into earth orbit or beyond." [n399] The Convention allows each State to
determine the specific contents of its registry and the conditions under which
it is maintained, [n400] however certain information must be provided
for the registry kept by the United Nations Secretary General. Thus, the "heart"
of the Convention, Article IV, specifies that launching States must provide the
(a) name of launching State or States;
(b) an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number; [n401]
(c) date and territory or location of launch;
(d) basic orbital parameters, including:
(i) nodal period, [n402]
(ii) inclination, [n403]
(iii) apogee, [n404]
(iv) perigee; [n405]
(e) general function of the space object. [n406]
With respect to military launches, the Convention allows registry
notifications to be sufficiently ambiguous so as to mask the true nature of the
mission. The following two provisions of Article IV make this especially so:
First, the fact that the information need only be provided "as soon as
practicable," which launching States may and do interpret as weeks or months
following the launch; [n407] and second, the fact that only the
"general function" of the space object need be disclosed -- a phrase
interpreted, again, by the launching State. The room for ambiguity afforded by
the Convention allows States to protect the identity of their military
satellites, which perform an entirely legitimate function under the law. [n408]
Writing euphemistically, Professor Diederiks-Verschoor observes
that "the underlying reason for the reluctance [to provide specific information
on reconnaissance satellites] is that States do not trust each
other." [n409] She opines that a State's disclosure of spy satellite
data to "the fullest possible" extent, with due regard to its national security
interests, will perhaps allow registration to "overcome the suspicion barrier."
[n410] The problem with this understandably hopeful analysis, is that
it overlooks the central point of a spy satellite--acquisition of information
without the subject State's knowledge. Once its existence and characteristics
are published, its effectiveness as a instrument for spying diminishes. What
Diederiks-Verschoor and other authors seem to be suggesting with this type of
analysis is that space reconnaissance activities should simply be outlawed.
Though that is a question beyond the scope of this review, it suffices to say
that such activities have been recognized as lawful for decades and likely will
for the foreseeable future. [n411]
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other
Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement)--1979
Of the five multilateral treaties devoted entirely to space, the Moon
Agreement [n412] is the most recent and enjoys the least support.
[n413] Additionally, the Agreement sheds little light on the
international legal regime restricting space warfare beyond that contained in
previous treaties. As a result, the Agreement is marginally relevant for
international space law in general, and the military uses of space in
particular. Nonetheless, the Agreement does contain provisions that could impact
space warfare as persuasive authority for the creation of future international
legal obligations on non-parties.
The Agreement reiterates for the moon many of the principles found in the
Outer Space Treaty including the notions of "province of all mankind," [n414]
exploration and use carried out for the "benefit and interests
of all countries," [n415] the fact that the moon is "not subject to
national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means," [n416] and retention by
States Parties of "jurisdiction and control" over their personnel and space
vehicles. [n417] Further, as with the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon
Agreement requires that all activities on the moon be carried out in accord with
"international law," [n418] and that States bear "international
responsibility for national activity" on the moon. [n419] Finally, both
treaties specify that all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles
"shall be open" to the other States Parties. [n420]
The Agreement applies not only to the moon, but to "other celestial bodies
within the solar system, other than the earth." [n421] Though
"celestial bodies" is nowhere defined in any of the space conventions, it would
presumably include all planets, asteroids, and comets found within earth's solar
system. This is suggested by the Agreement's exclusion from its scope of any
"extraterrestrial materials which reach the surface of the earth by natural
means." [n422] Significantly, the Agreement authorizes removal from the
moon of "samples" of "mineral and other substances." [n423] Though
debate continues on the permissibility and propriety of harvesting lunar
resources, there is no moratorium on doing so given the lack of support for the
Moon Agreement. [n424]
Regarding military activity, the Agreement forbids the placement of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, on the moon itself, in
orbit around the moon, or on trajectories to and around the moon, and on other
celestial bodies. [n425] Further, the Agreement's military provisions
do not prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space in general, only weapons
of mass destruction. The Agreement's language pertaining to military usage does
however largely mirror Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Requiring that the
use of the moon be "exclusively for peaceful purposes," the Moon Agreement
continues "any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of
hostile act on the moon is prohibited." [n426] Given the fact that
the Agreement already specified that activity on the moon must occur pursuant to
international law, and the provision on the "threat or use of force" simply
parrots the language of Article 2(4) under the U.N. Charter, one wonders why
this language was necessary. The reference to "any other hostile act or threat
of hostile act" was new in 1979, suggesting that under the Moon Agreement a
"peaceful" use will be a non-hostile use.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the Agreement of an enduring
character is its articulation of the "common heritage of mankind" concept.
Article 11 begins: "The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage
of mankind." [n427] Though articulated within the U.N. in the 1960s,
[n428] the common heritage of mankind (hereinafter CHM) principle found
its first expression of a legally binding character in the Moon Agreement.
Though not equivalent to the "province of mankind" language found in the Outer
Space Treaty, [n429] the CHM principle bears some
similarities. According to Jasentuliyana, the CHM theory has a specific meaning
when applied to the Moon Agreement and identifies five characteristics for
territory designated as such: (1) it is not subject to State appropriation; (2)
it is jointly managed by all States; (3) all States should equitably share in
the benefits reaped from the exploitation of the resources of the areas; (4) the
areas must be dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes; and (5) the CHM should
be conserved for future generations. [n430]
Throughout its history, the CHM principle in international law has
proven controversial. For the developing States, the concept as applied to
space is an important protection against the "first-come-first-served" approach
taken by the spacefaring States. For those States active in space, particularly
Western States desirous of stimulating private investment, the concept is a
threat to the economical exploitation of space resources. The attempt to
institute a legal regime based on an (undefined) "equitable sharing" of the
moon's natural resources creates uncertainty, which, in turn, stifles commercial
interest. This problem is particularly acute given the Agreement's specification
that the proposed international regime to govern exploitation of the moon's
resources [n431] is to be established "as such exploitation is about to
become feasible." [n432] Uncertainty over the terms of an international
regime was largely responsible for the U.S. decision not to sign the Moon
Agreement. [n433] Ultimately, the conclusion reaches by Reynolds &
Merges appears plausible: "absent adoption by the major space powers,
the Moon treaty is unlikely to play a major role in the future." [n434]
M.S. McDougal, H.D. Laswell & I.A. Vlasic (1963)
With the exception of environmental protection, no major category of
international law is of more recent origin than that devoted to outer space.
[n282] Given its recent origin, and the fact that it is predominantly
driven by technological advances in the exploration and use of space, space law
is a discipline in transition--additional norms continue to emerge as space
technology advances. 'Space law' is defined as that comprising "all
international and national legal rules and principles which govern the
exploration and use of outer space by States, international organizations,
private persons and companies." [n283] Significantly, this broad
definition reflects the rise of national legislation governing outer space
activity, as well as of non-State actors in the increasingly commercialized and
privatized space industry.
Despite its relative recency, literally "thousands of articles, studies, and
books have been published on the subject of space law." [n284] Indeed,
several of these appeared before 1957, the year human activity within outer
space began. [n285] Thus, while it is a recent phenomenon,
space law today is a firmly established discipline resting essentially on five
multilateral treaties. As used here, these five treaties comprise the "corpus
juris spatialis" while "space law" includes prescriptive norms from other
treaties as well, including those discussed in Chapter Five. Before analyzing
the textual bases of space law it is important to note its several distinctive
features. These are important to the application of existing space law to armed
conflict in space.
One notable feature in the continuing development of international space law
is its use, by analogy, of norms drawn from other branches of international law.
Because this feature of space law is explained more fully below, only a brief
reference to it will be made here. [n286] The progressive development
of space law has not emerged in a legal vacuum. "There is, in certain respects,
a catena of notions which justifies a comparison between the concepts applicable
to outer space with those of other environments." [n287] Specifically,
in establishing an early framework for space activities, "lawmakers were able to
borrow from existing principles of international law, including analogies from
international maritime law, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Partial Test Ban
Treaty." [n288] From use of these analogies space law is able to draw
specific conclusions. For example, one commentator cites the legal propriety of
spying from space as having emerged by reference to the law of the sea. "Since
outer space is beyond State sovereignty, as are the high seas, and as espionage
from (or over) the latter is generally accepted as being a legal activity, it
has been concluded that espionage from outer space is also legal." [n289]
Others have accurately speculated on this basis that military spacecraft
will be allowed to enter the territory of other States only upon special
authorization, just as is the case with military aircraft. [n290] As it
has for over forty years, the principle of analogy will continue to play an
important role in the evolution of space law.
Another important feature of space law derives from the permissive nature of
public international law in general. [n291] A specific example
illustrates the point. Because space law prohibits only the stationing of
weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, States may orbit
weapons of lesser destructive capability for the simple reason that no
specific prohibition exists. [n292] In addition, States are free to
make full use of military reconnaissance satellites given the absence of
international prohibitions on such activity.
A third feature of international space law also flows from the general nature
of public international law as well. International space law regulates the
conduct of States. As distinguished from "Astrolaw," [n293] space law
is limited to "the regulation of those activities by States in outer space which
are, by nature, essentially international." [n294] This remains true
despite the rise of both public and private efforts at commercialization of
space. While international agreements will increasingly recognize the presence
of private interests in space, the dominant actors, with respect to
international legal rights and obligations, will continue to be States.
A. Customary Law
To the extent customary law exists for space law at all, it binds all States
whether their consent be express or implied by silence in the face of emerging
legal norms. [n296] Yet what little customary law for space there is
has been derived from the activity of very few States. [n297]
Because of this, and because of the increasing role of treaties both in
international law in general and space law in particular, "customary law is of
far lesser importance and its significance for outer space activities has, in
many respects, not been secured." [n298] This is perhaps yet another
function of the youth of space law relative to more established branches of
international law--there simply has not been sufficient time and widespread
uniformity for customary law to crystallize.
This consideration of customary space law raises two issues regarding the
necessary preconditions for its creation. These merit some discussion here
because the formation of limits to means and methods of space warfare will
likely emerge via customary international law. [n299] First, the time
needed for a custom to evolve into law may be very short, leading some to
minimize the importance of widespread State practice. Although space research
and development had gone on for over a decade, it was not until the launch of
Sputnik I in 1957 that international agreement emerged on basic principles that
should govern outer space activity. With respect to the principle of freedom of
use and exploration of space, that agreement came almost immediately following
the launch of Sputnik I. Because the agreement was largely based on
the practice of only two States, [n300] Professor Cheng went so far as
to suggest the emergence of "instant" customary law. [n301]
However, while it is no longer true that a rule of customary law may be
established only after decades of uniform practice by States, at a minimum
customary law requires the existence of a custom if only to retain a semantic
integrity for the term "customary law." More substantively, international law
still requires that customary law involve the passage of some time. Thus,
writing after the appearance of Professor Cheng's 1965 article, the
International Court of Justice enunciated in a 1969 case that, though the time
element may be short, it is nonetheless "indispensable" to the formation of
customary law. [n302] Later still, in the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) case,
the Court implicitly rejected the notion of instant customary law by employing
the following reasoning:
The mere fact States declare their recognition of certain rules is not
sufficient for the court to consider these as being part of customary
international law. . . . Bound as it is by Article 38 of the Statute . . . the
Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio iuris of
States is confirmed by practice. [n303]
By extension, this means there can be no customary law without confirmation of
the rule in State practice. As the Court observed, such confirmation cannot come
simply by means of declaration, devoid of State practice in space and time. The
fact that customary law cannot crystallize without the passage of time
underscores the preeminent place that treaties will play, at least for the
foreseeable future, in the articulation of space law.
A second issue related to customary space law pertains to the status of
States "specially affected" by an emerging norm under consideration.
International law requires that for the norm to crystallize into customary law,
its status as law must enjoy, at minimum, the acquiescence, if not the outright
consent, of States specially affected by the norm in question. Again, the
International Court of Justice addressed this requirement in its North Sea
Continental Shelf judgments,
with respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of
international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any
considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation
in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States
whose interests were specially affected. [n304] (emphasis added)
Although not adopted universally as a condition sine qua non for the
crystallization of customary norms, the idea was emerging even before the 1969
North Sea Continental Shelf judgments that specially affected States
must act consistent with an emerging custom for it to become law. Thus
assuming here that we are confronted with the creation of new international law
by custom, what matters is not so much the number of states participating in its
creation and the length of the period within which that change takes place, as
the relative importance, in any particular sphere, of states inaugurating the
Today, although a mere paper protest would not appear to obstruct the formation
of customary law, an interested State's continuous and resolute actual practice
to the contrary would. In this way, a persistent objector, if "specially
affected" by the norm under development, could frustrate the crystallization of
such norm. [n306] And, difficult as it may be to ascertain State
practice for such analyses, the North Sea cases showed that this process of
discovery requires examination of factual circumstances in great detail.
The number of States actively engaged in space activities is steadily
growing. However, for now the total number likely to be deemed "specially
affected" remains small, perhaps six to ten. [n307] This
interest makes these spacefaring States important bellwethers for the
development of customary law related to space warfare. To the extent these
States persistently object to a would-be space norm, it cannot become
customary law. [n308]
Though custom does not appear to be of great importance presently, the
consensus has developed that a few principles of customary international law
apply to space activities. These include the "essential principles of the Outer
Space Treaty which have been accepted by all States active in outer space by
practice and with opinio juris after ratification, and where no evidence of
dissenting practice on the part of non-ratifying States is available."
[n309] Specifically, these principles include the freedom of
exploration and use of outer space by all States, and the prohibition on
national appropriation of outer space. [n310]
Because these customary principles are codified in the Outer Space Treaty, [n311]
and the treaty has been ratified by all States currently active
in space, customary international law seems less important in ascertaining
principles applicable to future space warfare. Customary law pertaining to outer
space activities is for the most part a subset of treaty law. [n312]
However, the body of customary law pertaining to space will assume
much greater importance as non-parties to the relevant space treaties become
active in space activities. For example, should Colombia, Iran, Indonesia, or
Yugoslavia acquire the means of space launch in the coming years, all four being
non-parties to the Outer Space Treaty, any restrictions on such States' space
activity that do not come from obligations imposed by other space treaties
[n313] will occur largely by operation of customary
international law. Should any of these States later ratify the Treaty, the
binding effect of that customary law reflected in the Treaty would become far
B. Treaty Law
In terms of certainty and specificity, treaties form the core of modern
international law. This is especially true of space law in general and the
corpus juris spatialis in particular, neither of which, as discussed above, has
existed long enough to provide consensus on any but the most basic principles of
customary law. Though in some cases restatements of customary international
law, [n314] outer space treaties have largely created new law. Of the
treaties discussed below, agreement came as a direct result of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter COPUOS).
[n315] Comprising the corpus juris spatialis, these treaties deal
specifically and directly with the legal regime governing outer space.
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)--1967
It is difficult to overstate the preeminent place in space law enjoyed by the
first international treaty governing outer space, commonly known as the Outer
Space Treaty. [n316] Drawn principally from three previous United
Nations General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) Resolutions, [n317] the Outer
Space Treaty is termed everything from "an ideological charter for the space
age" [n318] to the "Magna Carta of outer space law." [n319] Of
the five multilateral treaties dealing specifically with outer space activities,
it is the most important "by far." [n320] As a result, it is the legal
source of first resort for the analysis of any space law topic.
Other than establishing what can only be called the "constitution" of outer
space, [n321] the Outer Space Treaty specifies that "Outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means." [n322] Of the many activities this provision clearly
prohibits, it has generated some debate relating to its scope. For example,
commentators are divided over its application to private, non-governmental
claims of ownership over celestial bodies. [n323] Increasing
private investment in space makes this a live issue that military users of
space must understand.
In addition to its "no sovereignty" provision, the Treaty established a few
innovations in international law. One significant innovation pertains to the
provision of Article VI requiring that States bear "international responsibility
for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are carried
on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities." [n324]
This departure from the general rule of international law, namely, that States
bear responsibility only for State activity, makes the contracting State liable
for the offenses (or any other activity) of its citizens or private
organizations with respect to space activity. [n325] This provision
marks the first time that such an extension of State liability had occurred in a
legally binding document. [n326] Although this provision appears
unlikely to affect significantly the ability of States to wage space warfare
given the State-controlled nature of military forces, it could impact the
research and development of weapons systems. For example, to the extent that a
military space contractor pursues testing of space weaponry in outer space, the
host State will bear "international responsibility" for the activity.
Further, the novel principle of State responsibility for "national
activities in outer space" could render the home State liable for the
unauthorized hostile space activities of its citizens, even if carried out from
a foreign country. Despite the great difficulty in regulating such activity,
this could mean that the U.S., for example, would bear responsibility to the
Chinese, should a U.S. citizen manage to destroy a Chinese satellite in space,
even if construction, launch, and control of the attacking object or method of
destruction occurred entirely outside the U.S., and without its authorization.
An additional provision could be applied to space combat in a variety of
respects. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides in part:
V. SPACE WARFARE UNDER RELATED TREATIES AND OTHER AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES
No one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning will be of the
mastery of space. [n435]
each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall
give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal
from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Certainly, in case of war with the other Party or any other State, the Parties'
"supreme interests" would be jeopardized, allowing for withdrawal. Whether
the proliferation of ICBMs to States hostile to the U.S. jeopardizes
its supreme interests is now under intense debate. [n461]
Last year, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed a bill that
enshrined into U.S. national security policy the fielding of a national missile
defense system. [n462] On July 23, 1999, President Clinton signed the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999 which commits the United States to fielding
a national missile defense system "as soon as is technically feasible."
[n463] The move represents a dramatic move in the U.S. quest for
missile defense - a quest formally begun by President Reagan in 1983 with the
announcement of preliminary research into a "peace shield" to guard against
foreign missile threats. [n464] Despite criticism, after decades of
failures missile defense technology has reached "an historic phase in its
favor." [n465] Pressure to renegotiate or withdraw from the
Treaty will continue to mount, in part because such renegotiation or withdrawal
will be absolutely necessary if the U.S. is to field a national missile defense
system, while remaining compliant with its international legal obligations.
3. Antarctic Treaty-1959, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Those looking for analogous legal regimes to that contemplated for outer
space, often cite the regimes established for the continent of Antarctica and
for the high seas. Of the two, the high seas receive particular attention. Not
too long ago, the high seas seemed as vast to explorers as outer space does
today. But in addition to their vastness, the freedom of movement thereon
mirrors the freedom of movement reserved in law for outer space. Thus, one
commentator notes the "maritime antecedents" of the freedoms of outer space. [n466]
With respect to the status of the high seas, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the most comprehensive treaty ever created,
largely mirrors customary international law. [n467] Among its other
numerous categories, it establishes the legal status for the high seas-the vast
majority of the world's oceans which are free of any territorial claims or
superior rights or interests by any one State. As with the legal status for
outer space, the LOS Convention articulated the "freedom" of all States to
traverse the high seas unimpeded. [n468] Thus, under international law
the high seas constitute an area that is res communis omnium-territory free for
equal use by all States.
By contrast, Antarctica constitutes territory that could be likened
to terra nullius. [n469] Previous to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, several
States laid claim to portions of Antarctica. [n470] This meant that for
a period of time, those portions were no longer terra nullius. However, the
Treaty's Parties, including all States that previously made territorial claims,
froze all of those claims. The Parties also contracted that no new claims to
sovereignty over any portion of Antarctica would be permitted-a situation
strikingly similar to that established for the whole of outer space by Article 2
of the Outer Space Treaty.
Especially significant is the dissimilarity between the terms "peaceful
purposes" as used in the Outer Space Treaty and that in the Antarctic Treaty. As
used in the latter treaty, the phrase "peaceful purposes" specifically operates
to create a demilitarized zone. Thus, Article 1 specifies that "Antarctica shall
be used for peaceful purposes. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and
fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers as well as the testing of
any type of weapons." [n471] (emphasis added) Not only does this
sweeping language rule out the possibility of "any" activity of a "military
nature," but it clarifies the meaning of peaceful purposes as used in the
Treaty. [n472] For the Antarctic Treaty, peaceful purposes functionally
excludes virtually any military activity. Thus, by law, Antarctica has become
not only demilitarized, but weapons-free. Not so for outer space. Though the
Outer Space Treaty does specifically restrict military activity in Article IV,
it conspicuously omits the broad language modifying the phrase "peaceful
purposes" as contained in the Antarctic Treaty. This use of the phrase in the
Antarctic Treaty was undoubtedly evident to the drafters of the Outer Space
Treaty, and provides further, albeit indirect, evidence that "peaceful purposes"
under the Outer Space Treaty cannot simply mean non-military. [n473]
Whether these two treaty regimes provide helpful analogies to outer space
depends on the space activity contemplated. When applying the issue to military
space combat, the high seas, though perhaps not necessarily the legal
regime governing the high seas, appears a much better analogy than the territory
of Antarctica. For example, while space affords tremendous tactical and
strategic military advantage, Antarctica does not. [n474] Further,
although Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits claims of national
appropriation and sovereignty in space, the Outer Space Treaty also implies the
legitimacy of weapons in space, [n475] a possibility the Antarctic
Treaty forecloses [n476] for Antarctica, but the LOS Convention for the
high seas does not. [n477]
B. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
The U.N. Charter invites the General Assembly to make "recommendations" on
issues within its competence. [n478] Further, the seminal Article 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice articulates the three
formal sources of international law, none of which include U.N. resolutions: (1)
treaties; (2) international custom; and (3) general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. [n479] From this basis, the consensus
has emerged that U.N.G.A. resolutions do not in and of themselves bind States.
[n480] Nonetheless, the space resolutions have proven significant to
the formation of space law. Indeed, as becomes evident below, such resolutions
not only predated the subsequent space treaties, but have for a variety of
reasons become the vehicle of choice for expressing international
opinion on various space-related topics. [n481]
1. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space-1963
The space resolution adopted in late 1963 by the United Nations General
Assembly is of interest today largely for tracing the negotiating history of the
Outer Space Treaty. Certainly a diplomatic breakthrough when it emerged from the
bilateral U.S./Soviet negotiations, the "Declaration of Legal Principles"
[n482] found itself incorporated almost entirely into the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. [n483] In many regards, it was the "first significant
step in the development of space law." [n484]
The importance of the Resolution can be seen by the use of two terms in its
title, "Declaration" and "Legal Principles." Because of the lengthy negotiating
and drafting history predating the resolution, and its unanimous support, it
practically amounted to a treaty when adopted. Though not binding on any State,
[n485] the Resolution does not read like a traditional resolution.
Rather, it declares and announces legal principles instead of merely
recommending a course of action. The considerable authority of its
pronouncements were cemented in law just four years later with adoption of the
Outer Space Treaty.
2. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space-1986
In contrast to the "Declaration of Legal Principles" of 1963, the 1986
Resolution on remote sensing activities addresses a specific form of outer
space activity. The Resolution defines remote sensing as follows in Principle I:
"the sensing of the Earth's surface from space by making use of the properties
of electromagnetic waves emitted, reflected or diffracted by the sensed objects,
for the purpose of improving natural resources management, land use and
protection of the environment." [n486] Given the absence of any
governing treaty, [n487] the Remote Sensing Resolution is the most
authoritative international document to provide not only a general
definition, but also the basic parameters of permissible State activity. Passed
unanimously by the General Assembly, the Resolution was the culmination of
previous efforts from 1968 through 1985. [n488] Although related to the
activity of military reconnaissance satellites, the Remote Sensing Resolution
aims rather at formulating norms for civilian and commercial users. [n490]
Nonetheless, the biggest users of civil and commercial remote sensing data
are the military and intelligence agencies. [n490] Thus, the Resolution
could become relevant to space warfare to the extent that a belligerent uses
commercially available data in support of its military operations. [n491]
Of the fifteen principles contained in the Resolution, the most
important include the fourth, twelfth, and thirteenth. Principle IV specifically
links remote sensing activities to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, and
encourages that remote sensing activities occur "on the basis of respect for the
principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their
own wealth and natural resources." [n492] Widely viewed as a provision
in favor of developing nations, this Principle further protects the "legitimate
rights and interests of the sensed State." [n493] The practical effect
of these protections are unclear as the Resolution does not define several key
terms, such as "legitimate."
Central to the Resolution's system of principles is the distinction between
"primary data," [n494] "processed data," [n495] and "analysed
[sic] information." [n496] While the first two categories should be
made available to a "sensed State," the latter need not. Thus, Principle XII
specifies that as soon as primary and processed data are produced, the sensed
State will have access to such data on "a non-discriminatory basis and on
reasonable cost terms." [n497] While perhaps appearing to be a victory
for the interests of sensed States, many of which are in the process of
development and have no indigenous remote sensing capability, this "access"
provision amounts to a victory for the liberty of the few States most active in
space. [n498] Principle XII does not call on sensing States to offer
prior notification to sensed States of its activities, and it certainly does not
require prior permission for remote sensing from space-two issues
creating lively debate as the State delegations negotiated the Resolution's
Finally, Principle XIII exhorts sensing States, upon request, to "enter into
consultations with a State whose territory is sensed in order to make available
opportunities for participation and enhance the mutual benefits to be derived
therefrom." [n499] Here the Principle assumes that the sensing is
already occurring ("is sensed") before the consultations are to begin. Further,
consultations is an unspecified term that appears not to bind States to much of
anything in actual practice. [n500] Still, the provision is of some
value as it encourages sensing States to reveal their activity to the sensed
State. In cases where the sensed State would not otherwise know of the remote
sensing activity over its territory, this appears to be a logical prerequisite
for the sensed State to take advantage of access to the data encouraged under
As Professor Christol notes, though unanimity on the resolution was in some
cases grudging, there have been no formal departures from the terms of the
Resolution. [n501] As is generally true for U.N. resolutions, the
longer they are used as the international standard, the stronger their authority
3. Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space--1992
Beginning around the time of the 1978 crash of the Soviet Cosmos 954
satellite in Canada's Northwest Territories, [n502] COPUOS began
working on an international technical framework for the regulation of nuclear
power sources in space. Despite earlier resolutions touching on nuclear power,
[n503] the project came to full fruition on December 14, 1992 with
adoption by the U.N.G.A. of the "Principles Relating to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space." [n504] Because the NPS Resolution deals with
the politically sensitive subject of nuclear power, its adoption is significant;
this is particularly so given the specificity of its terms. To the extent that
State practice consistent with the Resolution creates customary international
law, the framework set forth could significantly affect space warfare-at least
as to those nuclear power sources used in space warfare fitting within the scope
of the Resolution. [n505]
The NPS Resolution provides in the Preamble that its terms apply to
"nuclear power sources in outer space devoted to the generation of electric
power on board space objects for non-propulsive purposes." [n506]
Thus, any application to space weaponry that the Resolution may have relates
only to those means of warfare using a nuclear power source to sustain
electrical systems for the object. [n507] Following this initial
qualification, the Resolution's eleven Principles contain guidelines and
criteria for safe use (Principle 3), safety assessments (Principle 4), and
notification of re-entry (Principle 5). The Resolution also makes reference to
the Outer Space Treaty in its assertions regarding State responsibility
(Principle 8), and to the Liability Convention regarding State liability and
compensation (Principle 9).
The heart of the Resolution is to be found in Principle 3. In establishing
conditions for the safe use of nuclear power in space, it exhorts States to use
an NPS only for missions "which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources
in a reasonable way." [n508] Thus, without defining "reasonable," the
Resolution attempts to limit State use of an NPS while recognizing that for
certain missions, such power sources are appropriate. Indeed the Resolution
continues by establishing the three cases in which nuclear reactors may be used:
(1) on interplanetary missions; (2) in "sufficiently high orbits"; [n509]
and (3) in low-earth orbits if they are stored in sufficiently high orbits
after the operational part of their mission. [n510] Further,
Principle 3 specifies that nuclear reactors for space missions must only use
enriched uranium 235 as fuel, [n511] and that design and construction
of the nuclear reactor "shall ensure that it cannot become critical before
reaching the operating orbit during all possible events." [n512]
Significantly, Principle 5 states what may well be a rule of customary
international law: "Any State launching a space object with nuclear power
sources on board shall in a timely fashion inform States concerned in the event
this space object is malfunctioning with a risk of re-entry of radioactive
materials to the earth." [n513] This general statement would certainly
affect space combat as to cases in which malfunctioning weapons, containing
nuclear power sources, appear likely to reenter earth's atmosphere and impact on
foreign soil. The existence of an ongoing state of hostilities would render the
duty to warn less certain as between the belligerents, though it would probably
apply to dangerous, radioactive space objects likely to impact neutral States,
even if pursuant to accidents occurring in military operations.
According to an unofficial report, States appear to be following the
recommendations contained in the NPS Resolution. [n514] As an example,
the Russian report to the U.N. Secretary General of its anticipated
launch of the Mars 96 satellite powered by plutonium-238 is cited. [n515]
When the satellite malfunctioned and reentered the atmosphere, the Russians
made notification of that event as well, in accord with Principle 5. Similarly,
the U.S. notified the Secretary General of its launch of the Cassini space
probe, containing about 35 kg of plutonium-238 dioxide. [n516] These
instances of "compliance" are important. To the extent that spacefaring States
behave in accord with the U.N. Resolution as though doing so represents a legal
norm, the behavior will slowly come to be a legal norm in the form of customary
international law-if it isn't already.
C. International Telecommunication Union
The growth of the telecommunications industry predates the space age.
Nonetheless, since the advent of satellite telecommunications the industry's
rate of growth has increased tremendously. The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), through its Radio Regulations Board (RRB) coordinates the
international use of the radio spectrum. [n517] As a limited natural
resource, the spectrum will support only a finite number of users among the
radio frequencies before signal interference begins to occur. As a result, a
coordinated global effort to deconflict use of the spectrum becomes the sine qua
non of the world-wide telecommunications capability. The RRB is the forum for
such coordination and its radio regulations specify with great detail the
international standards for coordinating use of radio frequencies.
As suggested above, the U.S. military maintains its own military satellite
telecommunications network. [n518] However, because of the potential
for interference, it must pay careful attention to the regulations issued by the
ITU in order to avoid harmful signal interference. Although not applicable to
the military or other national security functions, [n519] the ITU
regulations govern the majority of telecommunications systems in
space. During military operations, and especially during armed conflict, the
military must operate its telecommunication networks, or lease the capability
from civilian providers, so as to avoid radio interference. This obligation
comes not as the result of legal mandate, but military necessity. Because armed
forces heavily rely on telecommunications for efficient command and control,
[n520] including commercially operated telecommunications systems,
[n521] their use of the radio spectrum must be done taking into account
other users with the potential for harmful interference. Failing to do so risks
losing the critical ability to communicate. Armed conflict creates numerous
unforeseen challenges for military forces; these have been termed the "friction"
of war. [n522] Interference-free communications provides one of the
best lubricants against that friction, and therefore becomes an indispensable
component in the successful prosecution of war.
President John F. Kennedy (1961)
In addition to the treaties and customary law dealing specifically with outer
space, a few other treaties not previously discussed contain provisions relevant
to the prospect of warfare in space. Also, several U.N.G.A. resolutions have, in
some cases quite specifically, revealed the opinion of States on permissible
activities in space. These sources are the focus of this chapter, which, though
not formally part of the corpus juris spatialis, play a significant role in
explicating the full range of international norms relevant to space warfare.
1. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under
Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)--1963
Adopted before any of the "space" treaties, the "Limited Test Ban Treaty"
[n436] nonetheless provided the first treaty provision governing the
use of outer space. Despite being the subject of numerous U.N.G.A. resolutions
renouncing the use or testing of nuclear weapons, until the Treaty entered force
in late 1963 any of the nuclear weapons-capable States were legally free to
detonate their warheads anywhere they wished. [n437] The Treaty forbids
nuclear weapon test explosion[s], or any other nuclear explosion[s] . . .
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other
environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside
the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such
explosion is conducted. [n438]
The Treaty went on to express hope that the parties would conclude a
comprehensive treaty permanently banning all nuclear test explosions, "including
all such explosions underground." [n439]
While of great military significance the Treaty was essentially aimed at the
prevention of global nuclear contamination. [n440] Thus, although
having the effect of an arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty can
"be viewed primarily as an environmental agreement rather than a military one."
[n441] This primary aim of the drafters comes into perspective when one
considers the scope of nuclear testing that had gone on previously. [n442]
Between them, the United States and Soviet Union conducted 212 nuclear
explosions from 1945 to 1958. With the exception of eighteen detonations, all
occurred in the atmosphere. [n443]
The Treaty establishes three significant implications for space warfare.
First, while the treaty prohibits all nuclear detonations in space, even those
that may have value for peaceful military or scientific purposes, it does not
regulate detonations of a non-nuclear nature such as those pertaining
to conventional, biological, chemical, or high energy laser weapons. [n444]
Second, because the treaty outlaws "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or
any other nuclear explosion" (emphasis added), it may prohibit the use of
nuclear fission as a means of space propulsion. [n445] To the extent
nuclear power sources operate by means other than "explosion," the Treaty does
not prohibit their use. Finally, the Treaty also prohibits the use of nuclear
explosions for non-testing purposes as well. Thus, although, for example, the
creation of an electromagnetic pulse in space by means of a nuclear detonation
may present strategic military advantage, particularly in an anti-satellite
role, such activity is forbidden by the treaty. [n446]
2. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty-1972
The ABM Treaty severely limits the deployment, testing, and use of missile
systems designed to intercept incoming strategic ballistic missiles. [n447]
At the time of its adoption in 1972, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. believed
that the best way to avert the possibility of a nuclear exchange, as well as to
curb the urge to continue a nuclear arms buildup, was to render each side
defenseless to a nuclear attack. The two States agreed that just as the actual
ability to defend with an ABM system would create strategic instability, even
the perception that the other has the ability would be destabilizing. [n448]
Thus, with one exception, the two sides agreed to outlaw the testing,
development, deployment, and use of ABM systems. [n449] The exception
allows each side to maintain one ABM system either around its
national capital, or at an ICBM site. [n450] Although the Preamble to
the treaty cites a desire to decrease "the risk of outbreak of war involving
nuclear weapons," [n451] the Treaty applies to defenses guarding
against conventional weaponry carried by ballistic missiles as well.
The two primary provisions impacting space activity come from Articles V and
XII. Article V(1) provides that "each party undertakes not to develop, test, or
deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based." [n452] Though there were no space-based ABM systems
in existence in 1972 when the Treaty was adopted, the space program of each
Party was highly advanced and each could foresee the use of space-based ABM
systems. [n453] Article XII is perhaps even more significant to the
long-term use of space by military systems beyond the more narrow question of
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction,
assembly, conversion or overhaul practices. [n454]
Paragraph 1 is significant in numerous respects, not least of which is the
codification of the "open skies" principle. With this provision, not only was
the legality of space-based surveillance via satellite formally acknowledged,
but such satellites "became an essential component of the international
arms-control regime." [n455] The legality of military
surveillance activity from space was established in international law previous
to the ABM Treaty, however the Treaty certainly gave formal sanction to the
practice by the two leading spacefaring States.
The requirement under Article XII(2) that the Parties not interfere with the
"national technical means" of the other Party can be viewed in part as a
specification of the "peaceful purposes" limitation of the Outer Space Treaty.
That is, any proposed destruction of a Party's national technical means,
including surveillance satellites, [n456] by the other, except pursuant
to self-defense or U.N. Security Council resolution on the use of force,
[n457] would certainly constitute an "interference" with that system as
well as a violation of the "peaceful purposes" mandate. In this way, the ABM
Treaty acts as a partial limitation on the uses of anti-satellite capability
maintained either by the U.S. or Russia.
Those following debates on missile defense in the United States will
immediately recognize that the ABM Treaty has been widely criticized.
[n458] The Secretary of Defense recently announced that if
Russia [n459] fails to agree to modifications to the Treaty to allow
for a minimal missile defense system, the U.S. reserves the right to withdraw
from the Treaty altogether. Significantly, the treaty provides that
VI. THE LAW OF WAR IN OUTER SPACE
[The humanitarian law of armed conflict] applies to all forms of warfare and
to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of
the future. [n523]
DOD is moving into the information age and toward a totally integrated
battlespace, where communications and intelligence space systems are no longer
viewed as solely supporting capabilities to the warfighter, but as instruments
of combat. The space force structure represents a major component of the
information infrastructure and will become increasingly important in deterring
conflict and conducting future military operations. Space forces provide the
sole means to access otherwise denied areas of foreign countries without
violating their sovereignty. [n611] (emphasis added)
A second reason for examining information warfare relates to the
scholarly commentary suggesting means of applying established legal categories
to this new way of waging war. As with information warfare, space warfare will
require legal analyses that either convincingly demonstrate how current
international law will regulate anticipated space operations, or conclude that
international law is currently insufficient to the task. The increasing
appearance of innovative analyses applying traditional legal categories to
developing information warfare tactics could contribute greatly to the
clarification of the jus in bello for space. [n612]
E. Other Selected Issues
After considering the general application of the law of war to military
space activities, several problems related to space warfare remain. The
following are simply representative of many others that have been raised (and
will be raised) as the prospect of space warfare moves from theory into the
fielding of forces.
1. Military Interaction With Intergovernmental Agencies and "Dual Use" Assets
Because space warfare will be very hardware-intensive, [n613] the
status of the assets used in combat will become all-important. In isolating the
legal status of a space system to be used in combat, the answers to two
preliminary questions can assist in clarifying an otherwise complicated
analysis. First, who owns the asset? And second, is the asset used solely for
military purposes, or both civilian and military purposes? [n614]
When ownership of a space asset is shared among several States, the
use of the asset becomes subject to the international agreement creating the
joint ownership. The complexity of the analysis increases in part because there
are more decision-makers with a voice in the decision as to how the asset will
be used. When it comes to the use of a space asset in an armed conflict, the
status of the owner largely determines the status of the asset. For example, the
telecommunication network known as INTELSAT [n615] is jointly owned by
over one hundred sovereign States. Each of these States has a weighted vote in
determining the future of the organization and the uses to which its assets are
Similarly, the former International Mobile Satellite Organization (INMARSAT,
previously the International Maritime Satellite Organization) was an
intergovernmental body owning a network of satellites supporting mobile
telecommunications. Now privatized, INMARSAT had been used in support of several
previous armed conflicts though its use among coalition forces during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991 was the most widely publicized. This might not have been
significant but for the "peaceful purposes" objective mandated by the INMARSAT
Convention. [n616] Unlike the term in the Outer Space Treaty, Moon
Agreement, and other selected international instruments, the term in the
INMARSAT convention has been widely interpreted outside the U.S. to mean those
purposes unrelated to armed conflict. [n617] Attempting a position that
was "overly careful and conservative," States making up the former INMARSAT
organization, which included NATO, former Warsaw Pact, and developing nations,
took the view that while "peaceful purposes" as used in the Convention did not
exclude "military uses" per se, it did exclude uses in armed conflict even if
conducted in self-defense. [n618] As reported by INMARSAT's
General Counsel during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when INMARSAT notified the
U.S. of its concerns related to use of the Organization's assets in furtherance
of armed conflict, the State Department responded by assuring INMARSAT "that
appropriate steps have been taken to avoid recurrence of such publicity."
[n619] Without so stating, the distinct impression left by this and
other commentators [n620] is that uses of the network during armed
conflicts were inconsistent with the Convention's terms.
Because privately-owned global mobile personal telecommunications systems
(such as the former Iridium system, as well as ICO, Teledesic, Odyssey, and
SkyBridge networks) are rapidly proliferating, it is doubtful military forces
will need to rely heavily on intergovernmental organizations such as INTELSAT
for communication support in future conflicts. Despite numerous new legal issues
they are creating, commercial satellite systems are increasingly servicing
military communications needs. [n621] However, to the extent military
forces continue to use intergovernmental assets, an equally difficult question
relates to the status of those owner States that are not party to the armed
conflict. As occurred with "neutral" [n622] INMARSAT States in
Operation Desert Storm, use of the system by belligerent States meant
that neutral (co-owner) States risked loss of their rights as neutral States
under the law of war, at least as to their investment in the INMARSAT system if
it had been lawfully targeted by enemy forces.
Reference to a specific law of war analogy may prove helpful in the analysis
of the use and targeting of assets jointly owned by belligerents and neutrals
alike. Under the law of war, an otherwise inviolable object or person, such as a
church or non-combatant, may become a legitimate target for attack if used for
military ends. Thus, the storage of weapons or the housing of soldiers in a
church, or engagement in active combat by a non-combatant, renders both subject
to attack. Similarly, an object owned by a neutral, which would be otherwise
inviolable as neutral property, becomes properly subject to attack if used by a
co-owner for belligerent purposes. With one exception, this analogy would seem
to apply to the vast majority of space assets co-owned by intergovernmental
organizations, particularly telecommunications satellites.
A possible limitation of this analogy arises with reference to Hague
Conventions V and XIII respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and
persons in case of war on land and sea, respectively. [n623] Although
the titles suggest that each Treaty's scope is specifically limited to warfare
on land or sea, such apparent limitations have not hindered application of jus
in bello principles from the Hague Conventions to aerial warfare. [n624]
Similarly, the provisions of both Treaties could logically be applied to
space warfare. Article 8 of Convention V allows that neutral States need not
"forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or
telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to
companies or private individuals." [n625] Nonetheless, while the
neutral State need not restrict the use of its assets to only non-belligerent
States for "telegraph or telephone cables," Article 9 requires that any
allowance by the neutral State for belligerent use be "impartially applied by it
to both belligerents." [n626] Thus, in keeping with customary
principles of State neutrality, the Treaty forbids a neutral to give
preferential treatment to one belligerent if it allows access to any. By clear
inference, this means that to the extent the neutral State does give preference,
the preferential access to the asset for one belligerent renders the
"neutral's" property non-neutral, and thus subject to attack.
An additional issue arises under Hague Convention V's "general participation
clause." Article 20 provides that "the provisions of the present Convention do
not apply except between contracting Powers, and then only if all the
belligerents are parties to the Convention." [n627] Because, for
example, the United Kingdom is not a party to the Convention, Article 20
operated to render its specific provisions inapplicable to the Persian Gulf War
conflict. [n628] Nonetheless, when drafted, Hague Convention V, as well
as Hague Convention XIII, were viewed as declaratory of customary international
law. Thus, without asserting that the Hague conventions on neutrality do in fact
amount to restatements of customary law, Roberts and Guelff accurately point out
that "to the extent that [ ] Convention [V] may be considered customary
international law, it would be binding on all States and its 'general
participation clause' . . . would cease to be relevant. In hostilities since
1907, including both world wars, the Convention was frequently referred to by
both neutrals and belligerents." [n629] Among other things, this simply
illustrates that the law is unspecific on this point. How the Hague Conventions
on neutrality or the principles of customary international law would restrict
targeting of jointly-owned satellites in space warfare is as yet unclear. While
this problem of "neutral" ownership of implements of war is not unique to
space assets, it is an issue widely applicable to space assets given widespread
intergovernmental cooperation in space, and is thus likely to become a concern
in space warfare.
A second major problem related to the status of space assets in combat is the
use to which they are put. In many cases, implements of space warfare can be
converted fairly easily to valuable non-military uses. [n630] For
example, remote sensing satellites are functionally equivalent to military
reconnaissance satellites. While the former do not require the same precision,
the process of acquiring earth-based data is roughly the same.
[n631] Even more closely related are the uses put to weather and
telecommunications satellites. The military may use such a satellite to support
the prosecution of its wartime objectives while the same satellite is being used
simultaneously for non-military purposes. [n632] This raises the
question whether such an asset may be lawfully targeted by an opposing
The general rule provided by the law of war allows destruction of targets
that are military objectives when doing so is not disproportionate to the
military objective sought by the destruction. On this basis, major
infrastructure targets were lawfully destroyed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War
that provided, for example, electricity both to the civilian populations and to
the command and control functions of the Iraqi military. [n634] A
similar rationale applies equally to dual-use satellites. To the
extent a satellite is used for the support of a military purpose, be it
communications, weather, early warning of missile launch, or reconnaissance, it
becomes a military objective and is lawfully subject to attack. This of course
assumes that the space asset is actually used for such military purpose and is
not merely targeted for having the potential to be so used. [n635]
2. The Status of Astronauts as Both "Envoys of Mankind" and Combatants
The trend for the past few decades suggests that military manned space
missions will not carry the significance of unmanned missions in the near term.
Nonetheless, there will undoubtedly be some role for military astronauts in
space combat. This raises a few obvious questions in light of language used by
the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue and Return Agreement. In his account of
the reception he received following the Apollo 11 manned mission to the surface
of the moon, command module pilot Michael Collins made the following
Travelling around the world several months after the flight, I was continually
impressed by the fact that no matter where we were, the reaction was the same
and, to me, unexpected. Never did I hear, 'Well, you Americans finally did it.'
Always it was 'we,' we human beings drawn together for one fleeting moment
watching two of us walk that alien surface. [n636]
This reception correlates with the status astronauts bear under international
law: "envoys of mankind." [n637] The lofty phrase reserved for
astronauts appears to suggest that they are given the legal status of
diplomats. [n638] However, a significant tension will arise as military
astronauts move from activities that are scientific in nature, to those that are
warlike. Interestingly, the language immediately preceding the "envoys" phrase
from the Outer Space Treaty states the permissibility of military personnel in
space for scientific or other peaceful purposes. [n639] This
juxtaposition suggests, along with the fact that the term "astronaut" applies to
all humans in space [n640] and that the term envoy makes no distinction
between military and civilian astronauts, that the term envoy as used in the
Outer Space Treaty certainly applies to military personnel in space. However,
the Outer Space Treaty does not countenance armed conflict in space.
Under the law of war there is no reason the term combatant could not apply to
military personnel in space just as it does to individuals on land, sea, and air
if authorized to engage in armed conflict. [n641] Formally speaking, in
order to be accorded all legal protections under the jus in bello as
belligerents, it seems that such combatant astronauts would be required to
adhere to the requirements set forth under Article 1 of the annexed regulations
to Hague Convention (IV), namely, (a) commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
(c) carry arms openly; and (d) conduct operations in accord with the laws and
customs of war. [n642] Under such conditions, the legal tension between
a person being accorded a quasi-diplomatic status, as well as being
given the right to use force might appear to be acute. Because the term
"combatant" is fairly well established under the law of war, full resolution of
this potential tension requires placement of the term envoy in its proper
context within the Outer Space Treaty.
The term as used requires an interpretation that is consistent with relevant
assumptions made elsewhere in the Treaty and with its object and purpose.
Indeed, this is a requirement imposed on the interpretation of any treaty.
[n643] The same treaty that designates astronauts as envoys also
presupposes that States will abide by their obligation to limit national
activity to peaceful purposes. A necessary precondition for any astronaut
claiming combatant status will be some violation of the "peaceful purposes"
injunction. That being the case, it is implausible to assert that any astronaut
qualifying as a combatant, whether acting in an aggressive, non-peaceful role,
or a defensive, peaceful role, will be accorded the diplomatic status due an
envoy. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that those accorded
diplomatic immunity may not engage in armed hostilities. [n644] From
this, two commentators have helpfully pointed out that "[a] military astronaut
[who] participates in hostile acts does not exercise diplomatic functions."
[n645] It would simply be incongruous for one person to simultaneously
constitute a combatant and an "envoy of mankind." [n646] The practical
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty then becomes this: States Parties
"shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind" only when engaged in
"peaceful" activities, as the Outer Space Treaty assumes them to. When such
conditions do not exist, it makes no logical or textual sense for astronauts to
be regarded as "envoys" by opposing belligerent States.
3. Return of Astronauts Engaged in Combatant Activities
At least two treaties within the corpus juris spatialis require the prompt
return of astronauts. In the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing
on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas, the Outer Space
Treaty requires that astronauts be "safely and promptly returned to the State
of registry of their space vehicle." [n647] The Rescue and Return
Agreement makes the duty even more expansive, applying even to cases of
unintended landing. Article 4 uses language suggesting that the duty to return
If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the personnel
of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party
or have been found on the high seas or in any other place not under the
jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and promptly returned to
representatives of the launching authority. [n648]
These provisions precipitate the question: "must combatant astronauts be
returned in time of war?"
The answer is plainly "no" for reasons similar to those justifying the
conclusion that astronauts engaged in armed conflict will not be accorded
diplomatic immunity. In both cases, the terms of the Rescue and Return Agreement
assume that the space activities of astronauts, even if military in nature, will
be scientific and non-aggressive--that is, peaceful. Once the outbreak of armed
hostilities occurs in space, at least one of the States involved will have
violated the peaceful purposes limitation. Whatever else the
astronaut-combatants may be at that point, they most certainly will be prisoners
of war if captured by virtue of accident, distress, emergency or unintended
landing. The opposing belligerent will owe no greater duty to return the
prisoner of war from space than it would the prisoner of war from the land, sea,
4. Innocent Passage through Airspace for Destinations to and Return from
Beyond the question of where airspace ends and outer space begins, lies a
problem many States face related to space access. States such as the U.S.,
with great land masses bounded by vast expanses of the oceans, have a
certain degree of independence in the launch and recovery of their space
objects. Because many States are entirely landlocked, or possess territory too
small to launch objects into space using only their own airspace or that over
the high seas, a question arises as to the possibility of incorporating into
space law another feature from the law of the sea--innocent passage. In this
case, several commentators have been proposing that for some States to truly
enjoy the free exploration and use of outer space guaranteed by the Outer
Space Treaty, they must be accorded a right of innocent passage through the
national airspace of other States. Some have gone even further to suggest that
such a right exists in customary international law. [n649]
As suggested previously, such a right does not exist in the law and is not
likely to emerge in the near future given traditional State interests in
territorial sovereignty. [n650] However, even if it did, it would not
serve the ends of belligerent States in the midst of armed conflict during which
passage would not be innocent. For passage to be "innocent" under the Law of the
Sea Convention, it cannot be "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State." [n651] It is self-evident that foreign military
activity in support of armed conflict in the territory of the host State
(whether territorial seas or superjacent national airspace), absent explicit
permission, will be prejudicial to the peace of that State. States may always
attempt to secure prior permission before entering the national airspace of
another State. This could certainly occur during an armed conflict. However, as
long as the law of the sea remains the controlling analogy, any future
recognition of rights to innocent passage into foreign national
airspace for space objects, will not apply to belligerents during armed
International Court of Justice (1996)
A review of current scholarship analyzing the application of the law of war
to outer space warfare yields little information. While many authors have
written on space militarization and weaponization, and some on space warfare,
almost none have undertaken an analysis of space warfare in the context of the
law of war. [n524] Indeed, it would seem that popular culture in the
form of science fiction movies has taken a greater interest in the subject than
have legal scholars and practitioners. [n525] For at least two reasons,
this must change. First, use of the space environment in warfare is
not just a matter of speculative planning for future conflicts, it has already
occurred. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo made clear, space
assets were decisive in battle planning and execution. Second, failure to
analyze one's legal obligations raises the very real specter of violating
obligations that do in fact exist. Given that the U.S. contemplates armed
conflict within the space environment, it must not proceed oblivious to norms
establishing permissible and impermissible means and methods of warfare. For
example, the increasing use of high-technology wargames using space combat
scenarios is uncovering knotty legal issues. [n526] It is also giving
added urgency to questions that become increasingly "real world" such as the
following: "does intentional interference with a U.S.-owned satellite orbiting
600 mi. above the Earth constitute an act of war?" [n527]
Given the numerous previous uses of space assets for combat support,
the evolution from passive, defensive support systems to active, offensive,
weaponized systems seems only a matter of time. Professor Spires provides the
following instructive review of space assets used in combat:
As early as the Vietnam conflict, weather and communications satellites
furnished useful data and imagery to commanders in Southeast Asia and linked
them with Washington, D.C. More recently, satellite communications had proven
important in the British Falkland Islands campaign and in Urgent Fury, the
Grenada invasion of 1983. In 1986, during Operation Eldorado Canyon, space
systems provided a vital communications link and supplied important mission
planning data to aircrews that bombed targets in Libya. In 1988, Operation
Earnest Will witnessed the first use of GPS test satellites to support ships and
helicopters during mine sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. During
Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, DSCS satellites provided long-haul
communications links and DMSP supplied important weather data.
These operations, however, involved only portions of the military space
community for a relatively brief period of time, and the contribution of space
systems was not widely understood or appreciated. Desert Storm, by contrast,
involved the full arsenal of military space systems. Nearly sixty military and
civilian satellites influenced the course of the war. [n528]
To these military uses can be added the extensive use of space assets in the
1999 Operation Allied Force campaign in Yugoslavia. [n529] What this
review demonstrates is that the military use of space for combat
continues toward more robust, integrated systems. The increasing reliance on
space assets strongly suggests that the space environment will eventually become
a distinct theater of military operations. [n530]
A. Bases on Which the Law of War Applies to Outer Space
To those familiar with international law, it may seem strange to undertake a
separate discussion of the bases on which the law of war applies to outer
space conflicts. As a general proposition of international law, a State's legal
obligations are not conditioned geographically unless otherwise specifically
noted or unless the circumstances of the obligation make such conditions
obvious. As a result, it may appear self-evident that the law of war will apply,
to the extent it has relevance, to future space conflicts. [n531] But
this is not necessarily accurate for the simple reason that the
specific legal norms governing space warfare, with very few exceptions,
[n532] have yet to emerge. Thus, to provide the basis for further
development, the conclusion that the principles of the law of war apply to outer
space should prevail only on the basis of reasoned legal argumentation. At least
three methods of argument, discussed below, appear to sustain the conclusion
that the existing law of war does apply to space warfare: argumentation by
analogy, argumentation based on specific reference to the terms of the Outer
Space Treaty, and argumentation based on the Martens' clause.
As discussed earlier, development of the corpus juris spatialis has occurred
in part by use of legal analogies. [n533] Analogy has been used in two
senses. First, the environment to be regulated-outer space-is compared to other
environments, such as the high seas and Antarctica. On this basis, the
international community has developed the legal regime governing outer space
after drawing from legal norms governing these other environments. Second, the
use of analogy occurs after a legal norm within the corpus juris spatialis has
already been established. In this sense a principle of law is interpreted by
means of analogy with a specific principle from another legal regime. This could
be termed argumentation by micro-analogy, while the other constitutes
argumentation by macro-analogy.
Both types of argumentation will be useful with respect to developing a jus
in bello for space. On the macro-level, the jus in bello governing means and
methods of combat on land, sea, or air, provides potential similarities to means
and methods of space combat made possible by the existing and proposed
technologies discussed in Chapter Two. The closer the factual similarity, the
more likely it is that the existing norm will undergird the developing legal
regime for space. Similarly, given the relative youth of space law,
argumentation by micro-analogy is just about the only means of interpreting the
general corpus juris spatialis to fit specific legal issues relating to the
military use of outer space. Though use of analogies in any sense can be
misleading if it amounts to misrepresentation of the existing norm used as the
analogy, it will undoubtedly guide the quest for articulating the current jus in
[*125] bello for space, as well as the development of the many further norms
likely to emerge in the context of State practice. [n534]
a. Parallels to Sea Warfare
Given the general jurisdictional parallels and legal analogies drawn between
outer space and the high seas, [n535] a similar comparative approach is
natural in attempting to establish the status of outer space in conditions of
armed conflict. The sovereign rights of all States on the high seas are equal.
So too in outer space. Once armed conflict has begun however, with the exception
of avoiding the territory and property of neutral States, [n536] the
legal status of the place in which combat occurs becomes less important. Thus,
if State A launches an "armed attack" against State B, the latter may respond in
self-defense either in State A's territory, State B's territory, the high seas,
international airspace, or outer space. As a result, though space law has made
significant use of analogies from the law of the sea, a unique analogy between
warfare in space and warfare on the high seas appears inapposite, at least as
distinguished from analogies with international airspace and the territory of
b. Previous Application of the Law of War to Aerial Warfare
In addition to the use of analogies drawn by the corpus juris spatialis from
the law of the sea, it is likely that the jus in bello for space will draw on
the developmental patterns characterizing evolution of the jus in bello for
aerial warfare. [n537] When the Hague conferences met in 1907, aviation
was a fledgling industry. There were profound uncertainties about how
or even if aviation could be effectively used in war. Thus, the 1907 Conventions
do not specifically address limits on aerial warfare. [n538] As
aeronautical technology developed, the international community never adopted a
binding legal regime restricting means and methods of aerial warfare. Though
the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare are thought to reflect customary law in
some respects, not a single nation ever ratified this agreement. What does exist
by way of restriction, exists in piecemeal form through an array of instruments
comprising the laws of war. This evolutionary, piecemeal approach to
restrictions on aerial warfare is likely to characterize the evolutionary growth
of international restrictions on space warfare as well.
Military roles and missions for space assets in the U.S. have developed along
lines similar to those of airpower during the beginning of this century.
[n539] In both cases, intelligence-gathering and support operations
came first, followed by each respective medium used as a means of
transportation. Finally, offensive and defensive combat roles followed. As
USSPACECOM plans for offensive and defensive combat capabilities in space, the
comparison with airpower appears complete. Of course, the possibility always
exists that space combat will be outlawed by international agreement. However,
"the odds are poor. . . . Deep-seated [human] traits create tremendous
temptations for aggressors to take all, unless probable costs of such action
exceed anticipated gains." [n540]
As a result of the parallel development of air and space military missions,
and of the piecemeal recognition of international limits on means and methods
for prosecuting aerial war, it is reasonable to predict that the jus in bello
for outer space will evolve as did the jus in bello for airspace: incrementally,
by analogy to former means and methods of warfare, and in the absence of a
comprehensive treaty-based system of prohibitions.
2. Outer Space Treaty
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty provides perhaps the clearest
indication that the international law of war will apply to space warfare:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international co-operation and understanding. [n541]
Two significant observations arise from this provision. First, Article III
applies the restrictions of all international law to outer space activities ("in
accordance with"). As products of "international law," this surely includes both
the jus ad bellum, made obvious by Article III's specific reference to the U.N.
Charter, and the jus in bello. This observation provides the strongest evidence
that as far as its principles will apply to future technologies, the law of war
has been incorporated into military space operations by virtue of the Outer
A second observation relates to the requirement that a State's exploration
and use of outer space be "in the interest of maintaining international peace
and security." This well-worn phrase in international law comes directly from,
among others, the U.N. Charter. [n542] As historically used, the phrase
assumes that military force will be available to the international community to
ensure international order. [n543] As international law has limited the
means and methods States may use in employing military force in combat, those
limits form a part of the context in which the maintenance of international
peace and security, including the use of force in space, must occur.
3. Martens' Clause
A final observation regarding the application of the laws of war to military
space operations relates to what became known at the Hague diplomatic
conferences as the "Martens' Clause." This clause, so named for the Russian
delegate proposing its inclusion, was inserted into the preamble of the 1899
Second Convention and the 1907 Fourth Convention. The clause was intended to
supplement the prohibitory rules adopted at both conferences. The clause appears
in several law of war documents, and reads as follows in its 1907 iteration:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high
contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. [n544]
The clause reminds States Parties that explicit prohibitions within the
Treaty do not supercede general, implicit prohibitions operating in the
background by way of "principles of the law of nations." [n545] In this
way, the clause covers not only customary international law but also
incorporates all rules and principles of the general law of nations. [n546]
As a result, it does more than simply claim that customary international
law fills in the gaps left by conventional law.
The further influence of the clause can be seen by its inclusion into
successive law of war documents throughout the twentieth century. Thus, versions
of the principle quoted above have appeared in each of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, [n547] the 1977 Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions
governing international armed conflicts, [n548] and the 1980 Convention
on Conventional Weapons. [n549] This widespread incorporation of the
principle, adopted by the vast majority of States, strongly suggests that the
Martens' Clause itself may have become a principle of customary international
The continuing vitality of the doctrine expressed in the Martens' Clause will
be particularly important for space warfare, often thought to be the most
technologically innovative form of warfare. Because the doctrine is
phrased "dynamically," [n551] implicitly anticipating the need to
regulate means and methods of warfare developed through technological advances,
it will always operate to limit the lawful prosecution of space warfare. No
matter what new means or methods are developed, they will remain subject to "the
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." [n552]
B. Problems of Legal Definition and the Use of Force in Space
As is the case with domestic law, international law depends for its coherence
and consistency on clear definitions of key terms. The quest to further develop
a jus in bello for space will be plagued with the conspicuous absence of
authoritative definitions of several significant terms and concepts. In addition
to the difficulty of applying existing law, this situation holds important
lessons for the future drafting of space treaties, including the importance of
avoiding terms and phrases open to more than one reasonable interpretation.
[n553] Though the lack of definition or use of ambiguous terms often
reflects the presence of irreconcilable difference among the drafters, such
devices can work to utterly frustrate the aims of the treaties in which they
appear. It certainly will complicate the emergence of a distinct jus in bello
1. Militarization of Space
The militarization of outer space does not necessarily entail its
weaponization. [n554] Many of the legal issues arising from the
militarization of space do so in part because of the absence of clear
definitions for terms used in the relevant space treaties. For example, aside
from peaceful purposes [n555] and outer space, [n556]
the law lacks basic authoritative definitions of other terms including
space object, and space debris. As noted previously, the Liability Convention
defines "space object," but its general circularity leaves the definition
unhelpful. [n557] Functionally, the "space object" as used in
international parlance includes "space debris." As it is generally conceived, a
space object includes any artifact, manned or unmanned, that is launched into
orbit. This includes objects that have ceased to function and have become
debris. The lack of legal definition for these basic terms makes the already
difficult task of applying two distinct branches of international law to space
combat that much more difficult.
2. Weaponization of Space
Beyond terms relevant to the militarization of space are those related to the
more controversial prospect of space weaponization. Not only has the U.S.
historically eschewed the prospect of fielding space weapons, but even as their
use has recently attracted renewed attention, some officers within the military
publicly advocate a space sanctuary policy -- that is, no weapons in space.
[n558] Many others, including the current Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Air Force, view the ultimate weaponization of space as "inevitable."
[n559] Whatever policy the U.S. adopts, one must immediately confront
the question "what constitutes a weapon?" As one example, the meaning of nuclear
weapon as used in the Outer Space Treaty may become less and less evident in
future decades witnessing an evolution of space weaponry. [n560] While
some hearing the term nuclear weapon may immediately equate it with
thermonuclear devices designed for detonation under controlled circumstances, it
is certainly correct to observe that "nuclear energy may be used in different
ways and may be a potential weapon even if not so designed." [n561] As
a result, in the absence of clear definition, one could argue that following its
malfunction, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, for example, became a "nuclear
Further complicating any legal analysis of the permissible scope of the
weaponization of space one confronts a further definitional vacuum. Despite the
heavy militarization of space, the basic term "space weapon" lacks definition in
international law. As a result, the concept it represents, which broadly
speaking includes any implements of warfare in space, is difficult to isolate
for purposes of analysis. And, without this foundational definition, one cannot
define phrases on which it logically relies, such as nuclear weapon and weapon
of mass destruction. The difficulty arises in that any comprehensive definition
of space weapon will include space systems equally used for non-military,
non-destructive, and non-aggressive purposes. Though space weapons may seem to
include only a discrete class of armaments with easily definable
characteristics, a closer examination "reveals a less obvious and more inclusive
set of systems." [n562]
One proposed definition illustrates this challenge:
A space weapon is a device stationed in outer space (including the moon and
other celestial bodies) or in the earth environment designed to destroy, damage,
or otherwise interfere with the normal functioning of an object or being in
outer space, or a device stationed in outer space designed to destroy, damage,
or otherwise interfere with the normal functioning of an object or
being in the earth environment. Any other device with the inherent capability to
be used as defined above will be considered as a space weapon. [n563]
Of particular interest is the second sentence. While it acknowledges that
space objects not designed as weapons may become weapons if they can "be used"
as such, it arguably leaves the definition so broad as to include just about any
object at all.
Objects in orbit travel at roughly 17,000 miles per hour. This fact alone
gives them the "inherent capability" to destroy or interfere with an object or
being in space or in the earth environment. This is equally true of functioning
satellites, dead satellites, and space debris. Similarly, under this definition
commercial telecommunications satellites are space weapons as they have the
inherent capability to interfere with the normal functioning of other
telecommunications satellites. Indeed a rifle, a hunting knife, or even any
sharp object on earth possesses the capability to destroy and/or interfere with
a ground station, making impossible the normal functioning of the satellite it
supports. These observations are not intended to suggest "space weaponry" should
not be defined. They are simply intended to illustrate the difficulty of
creating a definition that will distinguish space weapons from the larger
categories weapons, space objects, or even objects.
Put another way, should the developing law of war ever proceed to restrict
the use of existing or potential space weapons, the definition of space weapons
will have to confront the difficult problem of what to do about "non-dedicated
systems"--that is, those space systems not designed as weapons. [n564]
It will also have to elucidate whether the restriction applies to the
weapon's subcomponents as well. [n565] A consensus among States on such
a definition will facilitate application of the law of war to armed conflict in
In the meantime, consideration of technologies useful for space combat will
proceed under the principle that State action is permitted in the absence of
clear legal prohibition. [n566] Though regularly denounced by a large
segment of the international community as destabilizing for the use and
exploration of outer space, [n567] in principle none of the potential
means and methods of space warfare discussed previously in Chapter Two, with the
exception of nuclear weapons, violate international law. [n568] Of
course, the use to which these weapons are put could render them
unlawful for a specific objective if, for example, their use rendered them
disproportionate (or indiscriminate or inhumane) under the law of war as judged
against the military objective in view. But this is an inherent possibility for
any weapon, which, by itself, does not render the weapon unlawful.
3. Use of Force in Space
Beyond definitional limitations, a thorough articulation of legal standards
applicable to space warfare should account for the ways most likely to trigger
jus ad bellum restrictions on the resort to the use of armed force. One
commentator has observed that space law, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
Outer Space Treaty, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Moon Agreement, was
developed to "permit, indeed to endorse, the arms race, including the
militarization of space." [n569] Though speaking with a sense of irony
and regret, this scholar's comments raise the twin questions of the law's
tolerance of one State's infliction of intentional damage on another's assets,
and of the capture of foreign space assets. Though the U.N. Charter forbids the
"threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations," [n570] the meaning of this prohibition remains
hotly contested. The prevailing view is that this provision is an absolute bar
to the use of force with the sole exceptions being self-defense and
authorization by the Security Council. The other view, greatly bolstered by the
recent NATO air war in Kosovo, asserts that the prohibition pertains only to the
use of force for purposes inconsistent with the Charter such as the subjugation
of another State, or annexation of its territory. [n571] A State's
interpretation of the general prohibition on the use of force will obviously
greatly impact its decision whether or not to use it. For example, if
a State finds in the Charter no prohibition on individual or collective
"humanitarian intervention," it will expand to the uses of force it deems lawful
in any of the combat environments, including space. [n572]
Beyond general principles under the jus ad bellum, one can find reference to
the intentional use of force within space law itself. A careful reading of the
Liability Convention discloses that the corpus juris spatialis implicitly
recognizes that under certain circumstances the intentional destruction of
space objects might occur. [n573] As previously discussed, the
Liability Convention subjects States Parties to absolute liability for damage
caused by its space objects on the earth's surface, or to aircraft in flight,
[n574] and to liability based on fault for damage by its space object
to the space object of another State "being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth." [n575] However, Article VI provides exoneration from
absolute liability in cases where either the claimant State, or the natural or
juridical persons it represents, caused the damage wholly or partially by gross
negligence, or an act or omission done with intent to cause damage. [n576]
A proper understanding of the phrase "intent to cause damage" provides
insight into the Convention's foresight as to the possibility of uses of force
against space objects.
Under Article VI, the scope of the exoneration applies only as to "absolute
liability" under Article II, and therefore exoneration from liability for damage
by space objects done on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.
Given the purpose of space objects, that is, launch into space, this provision
for exoneration would certainly include intentional acts taken against space
objects while in space that later cause damage on the earth or in the air.
Obviously, the exoneration for intentional damage caused by a claimant State
presupposes the possibility that such intentional damage will occur. Thus,
despite the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty prescribing the "peaceful" use
and exploration of space, the Liability Convention recognizes the distinct
possibility that States may engage in intentional damage to space objects.
While this does not imply the Convention's sanction for such events, [n577]
it does suggest that the international community realistically
expected that a claimant State might take action amounting to the intentional
damaging of a space object. [n578]
Legally speaking, the capture of a foreign space object is related to the
question of intentional uses of force. Under the Outer Space Treaty a State
Party to the Treaty "on whose registry an object launched into outer space is
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object." [n579]
At face value, this means that a satellite, for example, registered by State X
belongs to State X for purposes of jurisdiction and control. Nonetheless, when
State X uses its satellite to intentionally and wrongfully disable State Y's
satellite, assuming that doing so amounts to an "armed attack" under the U.N.
Charter, State Y may in self defense disable State X's satellite. [n580]
In such circumstances, State X has violated one of the conditions assumed
to exist by the Outer Space Treaty--the peaceful use of outer space. Having
properly acted in self-defense, may State Y capture State X's aggressor
satellite for intelligence or other purposes? It certainly seems that the law of
war authorizes belligerents not only to kill opposing belligerents but to
destroy their weaponry. If State Y can lawfully destroy State X's satellite, it
can certainly capture it, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
notwithstanding. Put otherwise, the only way a State may be assured the
protection of its space assets, is to ensure that its activities remain
compliant with international law, including space law and the jus ad bellum.
C. National Policy, Military Space Doctrine, and Law of War Manuals
A review of the U.S. space policies at the Presidential and DOD levels
reveals that the leadership invariably reserves a place for national security
and military activity within its space policy statements. In fact, current U.S.
national space policy directs the DOD to assume certain space missions that,
when implemented, will have the effect of preparing the U.S. for armed conflict
in space. As a result, U.S. space policy precipitates the need for an
examination of the laws of war. Increasingly, prominent observers are calling
for full implementation of U.S. military space policy which would result in a
robust combat capability. [n581] Taking the argument a step further,
others argue for a fourth military department devoted to space. [n582]
Nonetheless, as one military commentator observes, "although the idea
of space warfare is becoming prominent in Air Force thinking, little effort has
been made to flesh out what it means." [n583] It also appears that
little thought has been given to the question "how will the law of war limit a
State's ability to prosecute warfare in space?"
In establishing the current national space policy in 1996, President Clinton
reiterated the requirement to use space for "peaceful purposes." [n584]
Consistent with the forty-year U.S. interpretation of the term, it does not
exclude military activity such as intelligence-gathering or even armed defense:
"'Peaceful purposes' allow defense and intelligence-related activities in
pursuit of national security and other goals." [n585] More recently,
the President's National Security Strategy states that "our policy is to promote
development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that
protects our vital national security interests." [n586]
The U.S. National Space Policy directs U.S. space activity under several
substantive areas comprising "Civil Space Guidelines," "National Security
Space Guidelines," "Commercial Space Guidelines," and "Intersector Guidelines."
The DOD is directed, inter alia, to "maintain the capability to execute the
mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force
application." [n587] These four mission areas form the backbone of the
DOD's military space activity, as executed by its unified command for space,
With respect to the law of war, the DOD explicitly states that it is U.S.
defense policy to ensure that "the law of war obligations of the United States
are observed and enforced by the DOD Components." [n588] Further, the
heads of DOD Components are directed to ensure that "the members of their
Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such
conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of
war during all other operations." [n589] At a minimum, these provisions
mean that to the extent the law of war applies to space combat at all, and the
U.S. develops the means for conducting space combat, the law of war
will apply to U.S. forces in such combat.
As the titles to USSPACECOM's four major mission areas suggest, the first
two, "space support" and "force enhancement," ensure that space assets
facilitate the operations of combat forces on land, sea, and air. These missions
are evolving rapidly and are leading to the "operationalization" of U.S. space
forces. [n590] The latter two missions, "space control," and "force
application," are more controversial as they suggest the weaponization of
space, and are most closely related to combat in a future theater of military
The notion of military "space control" strikes many observers as antithetical
to the fundamental tenet of the Outer Space Treaty: that outer space is an
environment free for use and exploration by all States. However, the current
U.S. policy does not purport to establish areas of exclusive control by U.S.
forces, but simply attempts to negate threats to U.S. assets. U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense, John J. Hamre, recently explained that the space control
mission is defensive in nature: "We fully believe that 'negation' in
space--preventing the bad guys from using space against us--is fully authorized
under international law, but we do want to take steps and actions that don't
create instability in the world." [n591]
The U.S. space control policy is based on a five-pronged approach which
includes: "(1) assured access to space and operation once there; (2)
surveillance of the space environment and space-based objects; (3) protection of
spacecraft, ground stations and data links; (4) prevention of damage and
interference to U.S. space infrastructure; and (5) negation of hostile space
systems that place U.S. and allied assets at risk." [n592] This
translates to the following definition of space control, as articulated in
USSPACECOM's long-range plan: "Control of Space is the ability to ensure
un-interrupted access to space for U.S. forces and our allies, freedom of
operations within the space medium and an ability to deny others the use of
space, if required." [n593] Translated into legal terms,
attempts to "ensure un-interrupted access to space" and to maintain "an ability
to deny others the use of space," [n594] are simply expressions in the
military space context of the right to self-defense in response to hostile
action. As these policy goals are gradually implemented through practice they
will require clarification as to the means and methods used.
Space force application contemplates the use of armed force originating from
outer space. While the U.S. maintains limited space control options, it has no
acknowledged space force application capabilities--this is to say it has no
operational space-based weaponry. [n595] The USSPACECOM Long Range Plan
does not elaborate on this mission in nearly the detail it does for space
control. According to General Richard B. Meyers, then-Commander, USSPACECOM,
this is due in part to the fact that there is no national policy to weaponize
space. While the President has assigned USSPACECOM the space force application
mission, "there's been no national action on this. . . . Our focus now is
looking at the concepts [of operation] and some of the basic technologies that
would enable us to do that someday--if we're tasked by the national command
authority to go do that. . . . Today there is relative harmony in space."
[n596] If the U.S. ever does proceed to the fielding of space force
application options, it will most likely focus on missile defense.
Given the evolution of its national military doctrine, the U.S. may soon be
positioned to begin a preliminary incorporation of combat space operations into
its law of war manuals. The obvious starting point would be its manual on air
warfare. [n597] Not only would this course of action reflect the
military's institutional acceptance of the law of war for space warfare, but it
would allow the U.S. to encourage the progressive development of that law.
Military manuals serve not only as evidence of State opinio juris, but can also
serve a limited lawmaking role as well.
Because international law notoriously lacks its own enforcement system, national
implementation is often a critical factor in successful international lawmaking.
. . . Certainly, both the absence of a manual or the use of manuals whose
content does not include the relevant norms would strongly suggest that those
norms have not been adopted. [n598]
In addition, given sufficient uniformity, principles of law articulated in
law of war manuals could be viewed as "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," and thus a formal source of international law as
articulated by the Statute of the International Court of Justice. [n599]
The role of law of war manuals in making international law could be
especially helpful for space warfare at its advent. A consensus among the
leading States regarding acceptable limits on space warfare, as reflected in
their law of war manuals, could prove as authoritative as a treaty. Meanwhile,
incorporating existing norms for space warfare into a law of war manual, as well
as defining the U.S. understanding of means and methods of space combat that are
compliant with the law, would likely influence other States to adopt and act on
them as well.
D. Information Warfare
As the technological information revolution that has characterized late
twentieth and early twenty-first century life finds increasing military
applications, military strategists are recognizing in new ways the age-old
importance of information as a component of warfare. [n600] Though it
is a subject raising difficult legal questions well beyond the scope of this
article, information warfare merits attention given its natural connection with
space telecommunications systems. Because of heavy U.S. reliance on technology
for its military effectiveness, potential threats to the information
infrastructure will significantly affect combat readiness. [n601] This
fact led a recent Air Force study examining future concepts, capabilities, and
technologies to conclude that "influence increasingly will be exerted by
information more than by bombs." [n602]
In conceptualizing its categories of activity, the U.S. military
distinguishes between information operations, those actions taken to affect an
adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own
information and information systems, [n603] and information warfare,
which are information operations conducted during time of crises or
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or
adversaries. [n604] Because the narrower concept of information warfare
applies during time of armed conflicts, it will be the more relevant of the two
concepts as analyzed in the context of space warfare.
Examination of emerging principles of information warfare will benefit the
analysis of space warfare under the law of war in two respects. First, because
the tactics of information warfare rely heavily on space assets, information
warfare can be loosely conceived as being a component of space warfare.
[n605] Whether classified as an active or passive manipulation of
information, a State's information operations in war certainly qualify as a
"means" or "method" of warfare. In this respect, information warfare is subject
to regulation under the jus in bello. To the extent information operations
involve the use of force in an armed conflict, such operations must be
necessary, [n606] proportional, [n607] discriminate,
[n608] and humane. [n609] They must also comply with
applicable conventional restrictions imposed under the Hague and Geneva
In his 1998 Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Secretary of
Defense William S. Cohen highlighted this relationship between military space
assets, and the acquisition and manipulation of information for strategic
If there was ever a threat to our national security [in space], the best--the
only--way to solve the problem is to take weapons into space. [n652]
Suppose an observer of the Wright brothers' [sic] memorable first flight at
Kitty Hawk had been given the assignment of foretelling what aviation would be
like seventy or so years later. Had he envisaged the wide-bodied jet or the
supersonic transport he would have been absolutely correct. He would also have
been laughed to scorn by his contemporaries at the time. Had he merely enlarged
the Wright brothers' [sic] frail biplane into some bigger, stronger thing with
umpteen engines and several sets of wings, chances are he would have been
considered a true visionary even though his projected creation might be more
akin to a flying bird-cage.
J.W. MACVEY, SPACE WEAPONS SPACE WAR 80 (1979). See also D. LANGFORD, WAR IN
2080: THE FUTURE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (1979) [hereinafter LANGFORD].
n10 W.B. Scott, USSC Prepares for Future Combat Missions in Space, 145:5 AV.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 5, 1996, at 51. General Ashy served as the Commander,
United States Space Command [hereinafter USSPACECOM], Air Force Space Command,
and the North American Aerospace Defense Command from September 1994 to August
Providing another in a series of observations on the military
"operationalization" of outer space, General Ashy later predicted that "the
relatively high percentage of space force capabilities devoted to a supporting
role will change to a 'supported' role. In other words, future military
operations will be supported not only from space (as in the first stages of
airplane use), but also within and to space." J.W. Ashy, Space Operations and
Organization: Some Thoughts About the Future, 146:16 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr.
16, 1997, at 56.
n11 The term "militarization," as applied to outer space, should not be
confused with "weaponization." Though there are no authoritative international
definitions of either term, the former refers to "the use of outer space by a
significant number of military spacecraft." I.A. Vlasic, Space Law and the
Military Applications of Space Technology, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
386 n.6 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1995) [hereinafter Vlasic, Space Law and
Military Applications]. Such activity may be non-aggressive and scientific in
nature, or aggressive and hostile. It may or may not involve the use of weapons,
though the contrasting term weaponization is meant to suggest that by itself,
the term militarization as applied to space does not necessarily include the
presence of weapons. The term weaponization "refers to the placing in outer
space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made targets in
outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment." Id. Though not necessarily
so, the term implies the maintenance and use of such weapons by military forces.
Thus, though conceptually distinct, weaponization should generally be conceived
as a form of militarization.
n12 Rockets can be distinguished from missiles essentially in that the latter
possess superior navigational technology, making them more accurate for striking
targets. Otherwise, the following definition of rocket could apply to both: "A
vehicle that can operate outside Earth's atmosphere, because it carries its own
oxidizer, as well as fuel." JOHN M. COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES: THE NEXT 50
YEARS 159-60 (1989) [hereinafter COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES].
n13 N.M. MATTE, SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1984)
[hereinafter MATTE, SPACE ACTIVITIES]. Matte further observes that "military use
has given the greatest impetus to modern rocket technology." Id. Durch and
Wilkening trace the rocket's history as follows:
The military rocket is a device whose pedigree is obscure. Though many credit
the Chinese with their first use in the thirteenth century, there is some
indication that the formulae for the propellants used in those rockets may have
come to China from Europe. On the other hand, the Mongol expansion of the middle
thirteenth century may have transported Chinese technology westward. That same
expansion brought rocketry to India, where it was encountered by the British as
early as 1750. Indian war rockets were used primarily to spook cavalry (in
effect, as early jamming devices), and at that they were apparently effective.
W.J. Durch & D.A. Wilkening, Steps Into Space, in NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE
MILITARY USE OF SPACE 17 (W.J. Durch, ed., 1984) [hereinafter Durch &
n14 David Spires points out that following World War I, Germany was
interested in bombardment rockets for its army that was "sorely constrained by
the Versailles Treaty." SPIRES, supra note 3, at 5. Although the Treaty of
Versailles effectively disarmed Germany by forbidding the development of heavy
artillery and poison gas, it did not constrain all potential weapons such as the
rocket. In 1919, few thought of it as practical weapon of war. Durch &
Wilkening, supra note 13 at 17. Following the Nazi rise to power in the early
1930s the Treaty was repudiated outright. However, the research into military
rocketry continued as the merits of the potential weaponry became clearer.
n15 In popular parlance, the "V" stood for "vengeance" and the "2"
represented the second rocket-type fielded by the German army. The first model,
the much smaller V-1, was produced by the German Luftwaffe as an aerodynamic
pulse-jet "cruise" missile. Although the big rocket was known to technical
specialists as the A-4, V-2 is the more common designation that is familiar to
most observers of the German rocket program (the "Wehrmacht" program). The V-2's
three predecessor models began in 1933 with the A-1 and ended in 1936 with the
A-3. German scientist von Braun would later describe the A-1 as taking 1 1/2
years to build and 1/2 second to blow up. T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, COUNTDOWN: A
HISTORY OF SPACE FLIGHT 15 (1997) [hereinafter HEPPENHEIMER].
n16 Id. at 4
n17 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 5.
n18 HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 22.
n19 Id. at 23. For this purpose, the German scientists used modified
firefighter's pumps which also required simple construction, fast action, very
high flow rate, and constant delivery pressure.
n20 Indeed, Wernher von Braun termed its capture by the U.S. "one of the
greatest technical prizes in history." W. VON BRAUN & F. ORDWAY III, HISTORY OF
ROCKETRY AND SPACE TRAVEL 117 (3rd ed., 1975) [hereinafter VON BRAUN & ORDWAY].
n21 I M.J. MUOLO, SPACE HANDBOOK: A WAR FIGHTER'S GUIDE TO SPACE 3 (1993) at
3 [hereinafter MUOLO]. Although the U.S. cancelled the project in 1947, it was
reinstated in 1951 and has "changed little in over 40 years. . . . Significant
advances in its capability and adaptability are reasons the Atlas has become the
'DC-3' of space launch vehicles." Id. at 126-27.
n22 Quoted in SPIRES, supra note 3, at 10.
n23 For a discussion of missile defense and the legal regime regulating it,
see infra notes 447-463 and accompanying text.
n24 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 17. Until the early 1950s, the early missile
advocates were forced into a form of circular reasoning:
missiles seemed too challenging technologically, but no funds could be spent on
solving the technological dilemmas; so the problems would go unresolved and the
missile would remain 'impossible.' To questions about the logic of budgeting for
missile programs, the answer always seemed to be the dogmatic response: 'the
time is not right' for an expanded program.
Id. at 21.
n25 At least four factors account for the change in attitude by the U.S.:
first, news that the Soviets had successfully detonated an atomic bomb in August
1949; second, communism's triumph in China; third, reports of Soviet advances in
missile technology; and fourth, the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Id.
at 22, 23.
n26 Examples include the WAC Corporal, Aerobee, and Viking. Of these, the WAC
Corporal became "the first man-made object to enter extra-terrestrial space"
having been launched as a second stage from a V-2 to a height of 250 miles. Id.
(quoting F. Malina's paper "Origins and First Decade of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory" at 60).
n27 Early cruise missiles included the Snark, the first intercontinental
cruise missile, and the Navaho. The latter traveled to its target under "ramjet"
power, achieving speeds in excess of Mach 3. Ramjet technology utilizes a
process of "ram" compression at supersonic speeds in order to avoid the need for
jet turbines. The U.S. has used ramjet technology since the 1940s for its Navaho
missiles. SPIRES, supra note 3, at 21. In addition, the U.S. has used the
technology since 1959 for its A-11 and A-12 (later SR-71) reconnaissance
aircraft. W.E. Burrows, The Oxcart Cometh, And Goeth at Mach 3.2, 13:6 AIR &
SPACE, Feb./Mar. 1999, at 68.
In the years following WWII, the threat of nuclear exchange made the small,
slow cruise missiles ineffective as an intercontinental delivery system as
compared to ballistic missiles.
The ICBM's can travel thousands of miles along arcs that take them hundreds of
miles out into space; their trajectories, once determined during the interval
that the motors are in operation, are thence affected only by gravitational
forces and by air resistance during their exit from and re-entry into the
VON BRAUN & ORDWAY, supra note 20, at 121. Cruise missiles could not compete
with this capability for intercontinental application.
n28 The Atlas contained significant performance enhancements that allowed for
it to leave earth's atmosphere and then send an independent warhead back to
earth. These included housing its liquid fuel within the rocket's skin, and
making the warhead separable from the rocket so the latter could avoid the
design features requiring survivability upon reentry.
n29 The Titan was originally conceived as a backup program to the Atlas. The
two programs were developed simultaneously in order to save time in countering
the increasing perception of Soviet missile superiority. In 1953, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Trevor Gardner, became
the champion of ICBM development in the U.S. having "made it his mission in
public life to convince the government that the nation must pursue a crash
program to develop an operational Air Force ICBM or face nuclear disaster."
SPIRES, supra note 3, at 31. Gardner's technological evangelism proved so
successful, that by the fall of 1955, President Eisenhower designated the Atlas
ICBM the "highest national priority" weapons system. Id. at 35. Management for
the crash missile program fell to Gardner protege Brigadier General Bernard
Schriever, a man who "used his intelligence, patience, and superb negotiating
skills with military, government and private industry leaders to become an
effective advocate for missile and space systems causes." Id. at 33.
n30 The complete family of Titan missiles includes several versions: I
(1959); II (1962); Gemini (1965); IIIA (1964); IIIB (1966); IIIC (1965); IIID
(1971); IIIE (1974); 34B (1975); 34D (1982); IISLV (1988); III (1989); IV
(1989). P. CLARK, JANE'S SPACE DIRECTORY, 1997-1998 277 (13th ed., 1997)
[hereinafter JANE'S]. In addition to the Atlas and Titan missiles, the
Department of Defense uses a variety of other missile systems, principally as
spacelifters rather than weapons systems, including the SCOUT, Pegasus, Delta,
and Space Transportation System ("Space Shuttle"). MUOLO, supra note 21, at
121-34. Additional missiles developed since World War II for weapons use include
the Polaris and Poseidon (both sea-launched), Pershing, and the Minuteman.
n31 HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 60. Though the U.S. got to Germany first,
the Soviets were first to Peenemunde. By the time the Soviets got there, most of
the documents and personnel had been removed by the Germans. Nonetheless, there
was enough left for the Soviets to use productively, including middle and
lower-level staffers familiar with the V-2 rocket research and development.
Though the codename "Operation Paperclip" for the U.S. roundup of German
scientists, documents, and hardware was revealed after the war, as was the
British "Operation Backtrack," the Soviet codename was never made public. M.
STOIKO, SOVIET ROCKETRY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 71 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
n32 The implications from this early Soviet resolve were enormous. As von
Braun later observed, "the decision [to proceed with the ICBM before the U.S.]
not only gave [the Soviets] a significant edge in ballistic missile technology
for years, but was also a great factor in their leadership in space
exploration." VON BRAUN & ORDWAY, supra note 27, at 140.
n33 The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1, was launched atop a Juno 1 on Jan.
31, 1958. See id. at 160.
n34 LANGFORD, supra note 9, at 45. The first large-production nuclear weapon
utilized a chain-reaction process known as fission, by which the mass of a
uranium or plutonium atom is converted to energy. Langford notes that as between
uranium and plutonium, the latter is easier to use for fission weaponry. Id. at
47. The nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945 ("Little Boy") was a
uranium bomb that was remotely detonated at a height of 570 meters over the
city. "Detonation height determined how large an area would be damaged. . . . A
bomb detonated too high would expend its energy blasting thin air; a bomb
detonated too low would expend its energy excavating a crater. It was better to
be low than high." R. RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 631 (1986)
[hereinafter RHODES]. On Aug. 9, 1945, a plutonium bomb ("Fat Man") was dropped
on Nagasaki with an estimated 22 kiloton yield.
n35 LANGFORD, supra note 34, at 49. It bears noting that nuclear weapons are
those characterized by the unique interaction of particles within an element's
nucleus. Whereas the fission chain-reaction begins with the acquisition of a
stray neutron particle which then spreads from nucleus to nucleus, the fusion
reaction requires the fusing of two nuclei. Because of the natural magnetic
repulsion of hydrogen nuclei, the two must be forcibly fused to begin the fusion
reaction. This is accomplished by heating the nuclei to such a degree that their
resulting speed yields collisions of sufficient force to achieve the fusion.
Thus the term "thermonuclear" weapons. The triggering element used to generate
the tremendous heat needed for fusion is a fission reaction. Once the fusion
begins, it creates its own chain-reaction. By surrounding the entire explosive
core with U-238, scientists discovered that the neutrons lost in the fusion
reaction could be used to fuel a second fission reaction. Thus, the nuclear
weapons most widely stockpiled make use of a fission-fusion-fission process. Id.
at 49. The first thermonuclear device, carrying an explosive force of 10
megatons of TNT was detonated at the Eniwetok atoll in 1952 (also spelled
Enewetak). In 1954, a 15 megaton device was detonated at the Bikini atoll. Id.
n36 RHODES, supra note 34, at 690
n37 HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 47. By contrast, the V-2 weighed a mere
n38 One Minuteman III ICBM is armed with the equivalent of 84
first-generation nuclear weapons. Rhodes, supra note 36, at photograph 106
n39 D. SHUKMAN, TOMORROW'S WAR: THE THREAT OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS 25
(1996) [hereinafter SHUKMAN].
n40 A tass news agency announcement of Aug. 27, 1957 which reported the
successful test of the Soviet ICBM also included reference to "a series of
explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons . . . set off at
great altitudes." M.S. McDOUGAL, ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 389 n.7
(1963) [hereinafter McDOUGAL, ET AL.]. Between Aug. 27, 1957 and Sept. 7, 1958,
the U.S. exploded three atomic bombs over the South Atlantic at a reported
altitude of between 200 and 300 miles. During the summer of 1962 in the Pacific
at similar altitudes, the U.S. exploded weapons "in the hydrogen bomb range."
Id. In a Nov. 3, 1958 report to the U.S. President, three possible military uses
of a high-altitude nuclear detonation were identified: "The high energy
radiation including particles from the explosion produces effects on space; the
whirling high energy electrons generate radio noise; and the delayed radiation
from the fission products can affect radio transmission." P.B. STARES, THE
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: U.S. POLICY, 1945-1984 108 (1985) [hereinafter STARES,
THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE].
n41 See infra notes 436-446 and accompanying text.
n42 McDOUGAL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 45. The Soviet note and U.S. reply
are reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1962, at 22.
n43 The U.S. "Vela Hotel" series of satellites were launched in 1963 and 1964
to scan above the horizon and detect nuclear tests in space. They were, in the
view of one military space historian, "one of the most successful Air Force
space projects." CURTIS PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER: THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM 41 (1997) [hereinafter PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER].
n44 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 35. In time, "the relationship between
satellites and missiles had become better understood as rockets with sufficient
thrust soon would be able to launch the heavier satellites. . . ."
n45 HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 90.
n46 Project Rand later became the Rand Corporation, a federally funded
research and development corporation serving as the primary technical consultant
to the U.S. Air Force.
n47 RAND CORPORATION, PRELIMINARY DESIGN OF AN EXPERIMENTAL WORLD-CIRCLING
SPACESHIP (1998) (from the abstact; Report Number SM-11827, May 2, 1946).
n48 Id. at 2.
n49 Launched as a stop-gap measure for strategic reconnaissance between the
termination of U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and the WS-117L system,
the Corona system remained operational from its first flight on Feb. 28, 1959
through June 1972. The Air Force was nominally deemed a joint venture partner of
the Corona program, which required mid-air recovery of film imagery taken by the
orbiting camera. For a thorough account of the recently-declassified Corona
program, see CURTIS PEEBLES, THE CORONA PROJECT: AMERICA'S FIRST SPY
SATELLITES (1997) [hereinafter PEEBLES, THE CORONA PROJECT]. The WS-117L
program, standing for "Weapon System 117L," led to development of the first
military satellite, the Advanced Reconnaissance System. The system used an
electro-optical television-type imaging system for its reconnaissance
capability. The Air Force established the requirement for such a system on Nov.
27, 1954, followed by a formal General Operational Requirement in March 1955
which called for a system providing an image resolution of no larger than 20
feet. SPIRES, supra note 3, at 36-37
n50 PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at 13.
n51 The National Reconnaissance Office was considered so secret
that even in classified documents outside the special security controls
established for satellite photos and data, the words 'National Reconnaissance
Office' and 'National Reconnaissance Program' were not to be used. Instead, the
phrase 'Matters under the purview of DOD TS 5105.23' would be given. (This was
the directive which established the NRO.) It would be thirty-two years before
the initials 'NRO' were spoken in public by a U.S. government official.
PEEBLES, THE CORONA PROJECT, supra note 49, at 96.
n52 PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at 14.
n53 Upon release of videotape depicting the satellite, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY declared that it used "the most advanced technology employed by
any U.S. military or civilian unmanned spacecraft." C. Couvalt, Secret Relay,
Lacrosse NRO Spacecraft Revealed, 148:12 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 23, 1997,
n54 Id. With its solar array and still-secret radar antenna, the satellite is
actually much larger than a bus.
n55 Id. at 28. For obvious reasons, the capability of military technology
exceeds that which is commercially available. This continues to challenge
military research and development however with ever-increasing improvements to
commercial remote sensing capability. In April 1999, the Space Imaging
Corporation aspired to exceed Russia's Spin-2 capability of two meters. The
Ikonos 1 satellite boasted digital black and white images to resolutions of one
meter. M. Mecham, Commercial Imaging to Enter 1-Meter Era, 150:17 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 26, 1999, at 84. After launch on Apr. 27, 1999, the
satellite was lost when an electrical malfunction prevented the satellite from
separating from its booster. Athena/Ikonos Loss Caused by Open Circuit, 150:24
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 14, 1999, at 82; C. Covault, Reviews Advance As New
Satellite Fails, 150:21 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 24, 1999, at 61. The
subsequent launch of a successor satellite on Sept. 3, 1999 now makes one meter
resolution from space available to any purchaser.
n56 MIDAS was originally designated "Subsystem G" in the WS-117L program
before becoming its own separate system. PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43,
at 33. Previously, there were U.S. systems used to track space objects, however
none were focused on the distinctive heat signature left by an ICBM or IRBM.
n57 Id. at 38. In 1991, DSP satellites alerted coalition forces to the launch
of Iraqi Scud missiles-the first use of U.S. missile warning satellites in
combat. Id. at 39.
n58 Currently in development is the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) which
will incorporate the current DSP system. The SBIRS will include much more than
an early warning capability. Its operational requirements call for four mission
areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
characterization. Federation of American Scientists, Space Based Infrared
System, Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/warning/sbir.htm (last visited June 28,
2000) (on file with the Air Force Law Review). The program originally entailed
development of four satellites in GEO and two more in highly elliptical orbits
(SBIRS-High), and a constellation of 24 additional satellites in low-earth orbit
(SBIRS-Low). The U.S. Air Force recently cancelled a demonstrator project for
the SBIRS-Low program citing costs and delays in the SBIRS-High program, which
is now scheduled for launch in 2004. Launch of the SBIRS-Low system is set for
2006. R. Wall, USAF Cancels SBIRS-Low Satellite Demonstrations, 150:6 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Feb. 8, 1999, at 66; R. Wall, Pentagon Delays SBIRS Launch, 150:3
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 18, 1999, at 26.
n59 Though the early emphasis for military satellites was on scientific
exploration and reconnaissance, interest in a space-based telecommunications
network for the military began at least as early as Arthur C. Clarke's 1945
proposal to position three satellites in equidistant geosynchronous orbit
(22,500 miles) for near-global communications coverage. Because Clarke first
proposed use of the GEO for communications satellites, it is also sometime
referred to as the Clarke orbit. G.H. REYNOLDS & R.P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 15 (2nd ed., 1997) [hereinafter REYNOLDS & MERGES].
The first communications satellite, Project Score, was launched on Dec. 18, 1958
and carried a tape-recorded Christmas message from President Eisenhower.
PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at 44. A subsequent effort, dubbed
Project West Ford, relied upon the release of 400 million copper dipoles of 0.7
inch length at an altitude of 2000 miles. The "needles" were to form a 25 to 30
mile wide ring around the earth off of which communications signals could be
reflected. After a successful test, the military terminated the program in the
face of vigorous scientific and environmental protests. Id. at 45. See also
DELBERT R. TERRILL, JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW
63-66 (1999). Other systems were used in the 1960s until the Interim Defense
Communications Satellite Program (IDCSP), later renamed the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) became operational in 1967. These were followed by
second and third generation satellites (DSCS II and DSCS III) providing
strategic communications from fixed military installations. These systems have
been updated by the MILSTAR system, "a totally secure, jam free system; its
terminals can be carried in a suitcase and set up in two and one-half minutes."
Donald J. Kutyna, Indispensable: Space Systems in the Persian Gulf War, in THE
U.S. AIR FORCE IN SPACE 1945 TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 103, 117 (R. Cargill
Hall & Jacob Neufeld, eds., 1995). For mobile (tactical) communications, the DOD
has used systems such as the Lincoln Experimental Satellite (LES), the Tactical
Communications Satellite (TACSAT I), and the Navy's Fleet Satellite
Communications System (FLTSATCOM). PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at
47-50. For a discussion of the legal issues raised by military use of the former
International Mobile Satellite Organization's INMARSAT system, see infra Part
VI, @ E.1. The growth of military dependence on commercial communications
systems will only increase the legal and operational issues during times of
armed conflict. By 1999, approximately 60% of U.S. military satellite
communications traveled over commercial systems. W.B. Scott, Space Chief Warns
of Threats to U.S. Commercial Satellites, 150:15 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 12,
1999, at 51 [hereinafter Scott, Threats to U.S. Satellites].
n60 NASA's Tiros I satellite, launched on Apr. 1, 1960, created a revolution
in weather forecasting. However, it could not satisfy military needs for
coverage, readout locations, or timeliness. Scott, Threats to U.S. Satellites,
supra note 59 at 52. DOD developed a series of satellites in the 1960s placed in
450 mile polar orbits that became the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP). During the Vietnam war, cloud cover imagery from DMSP satellites became
the basis of target selection and mission planning. Id. at 53. The program's
existence was not publicly revealed until 1973. The DMSP has undergone numerous
upgrades since its inception, to include sensors detecting temperature,
atmospheric moisture, soil moisture, sea state, and ice cover. The DMSP has
supported all major U.S. military operations since the Vietnam War. Id. at 55.
n61 Id. at 59.
n62 Id. at 57. See also Air Force News Service, U.S. Discontinues Selective
Availability of GPS to Public, May 2, 2000 (on file with author).
n63 HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 348-49.
n64 W.J. BOYNE, BEYOND THE WILD BLUE: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE 274
(1998). Because the U.S. made use of the system available to commercial and
civil users shortly after the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the
Soviet Union in 1983, it opened a possible security risk from a military point
of view. One nightmare scenario for security analysts is the specter of a "poor
man's cruise missile" in the hands of hostile States or terrorists - that is, an
old weapon suddenly made extremely accurate by use of GPS. SHUKMAN, supra note
39, at 166. As a result, the U.S. initially degraded the accuracy of the primary
signal, establishing the difference between a "coarse acquisition code" and the
encrypted "precise code," to protect the military advantage the system offers
its military and that of its allies. Recent developments associated with the
U.S. military's Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) put the required military
position accuracy of the system at 3 meters. With growing reliance on the system
by foreign and domestic non-military users as well, the potential liability to
the U.S. has increased proportionately. B.D. Nordwall, World Pressure Grows for
Regional GPS Augmentations, 147:22 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 1, 1997, at 66.
As of May 1, 2000, President Clinton directed that the DOD provide the
undegraded signal for public use. In discontinuing "selective availability," the
President stated that future threats could be dealt with by applying selective
availability on a regional basis as needed. Air Force News Service, U.S.
Discontinues Selective Availability of GPS to Public, May 2, 2000 (on file with
author). For a thorough analysis of potential U.S. liability both under domestic
and international law, see Jeffrey A. Rockwell, Liability of the United States
Arising Out of the Civilian Use of the Global Positioning System (1996)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University) (on file with author, and the
Nahum Gelber Law Library, McGill University).
n65 SHUKMAN, supra note 39, at 163 (from a classified Pentagon assessment of
the performance of GPS in the Gulf War).
n66 Id. at 163.
n67 In Operation Allied Force, the NATO allies made heavy use of GPS for
navigation and precision-guided targeting. C. Covault, Recon, GPS Operations
Critical to NATO Strikes, 150:17 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 26, 1999, at 35.
However, heavy military reliance on GPS is a double-edged sword because the
system is still extremely vulnerable to jamming. Interference by electronic
jamming, or even destruction of part of the system by anti-satellite weaponry,
might cripple a military force having abandoned its skills in other forms of
navigation. SHUKMAN, supra note 39, at 164-65.
n68 Vlasic, Space Law and Military Applications, supra note 11, at 397, 398.
n69 For a discussion of the problem of defining "space weapon," see notes
558-565 and accompanying text.
n70 An example of the latter is the U.S. ASAT Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle
(ALMV). First tested against a functioning satellite on Sept. 13, 1985, the ASAT
"kill vehicle" was launched aboard a missile from an F-15 for ascent to the
target satellite and destruction by impact. "The warhead, or Miniature Vehicle
(MV), is an extremely complex and sophisticated device consisting of eight
cryogenically cooled infrared telescopes, a laser gyro, and sixty-four small
computer-controlled rockets used for final course adjustments before colliding
with the target. All this is packed into a 12-by-13 inch casing. After being
guided to and released near the target, the Miniature Vehicle homes in on the
heat emitted by the satellite and rams into it with sufficient force to destroy
it." PAUL B. STARES, SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 99 (1987) [hereinafter STARES,
SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY]. See also C. Covault, Antisatellite Weapon Design
Advances, 112:24 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 16, 1980, at 243. In terms of
destructive classification, the ALMV is a kinetic energy weapon.
n71 Though the previous SAINT ("satellite interceptor") system had been
developed, it was never fielded. The latter system, known simply as Program 437,
utilized a nuclear warhead launched atop a Thor IRBM from Johnson Island in the
South Pacific. With a yield of 1 megaton, the warhead had a kill radius of 5
miles. The U.S. declared the system fully operational on June 10, 1964, and it
remained in service or available for speedy redeployment until it was terminated
on Apr. 1, 1975. See PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at 62-65.
n72 COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 28.
n73 In a vacuum, winds do not blow and shock waves cannot develop where no
medium such as air, water, or earth resists compression. As for heat, the
fireballs normally associated with nuclear blasts in the air do not occur above
65 miles (approximately 100 km). Id. at 29.
n74 By contrast, collateral damage from initial nuclear radiation "regardless
of type, is indiscriminate, . . . [and] would be difficult to predict and
expensive to control." Id. at 31.
n75 Such an event was portrayed in the James Bond Hollywood production
n76 COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 29.
n77 Id. at 31.
n78 Id. at 30.
n80 Id. The ionosphere exists from 30 to 500 miles (approximately 48 to 805
km) above the earth's surface. Id. at 9.
n81 During a detonation at 48 miles (77 km) altitude on Aug. 1, 1958 over
Johnson Island, the U.S. observed the degradation of high frequency radio
traffic throughout a region several thousand miles in diameter for a period of
approximately six hours. Id. at 29.
n82 Indeed the Soviet Union used an array of 64 nuclear tipped anti-ballistic
missiles around Moscow as a small-area missile defense system. Code named
"Galosh," the system undoubtedly could be converted into an ASAT system. STARES,
SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 70, at 96.
n83 PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER, supra note 43, at 59.
n84 J.C. Anselmo, U.S. Seen More Vulnerable to Electromagnetic Attack, 147:4
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 28, 1997, at 67.
n85 Ivan Bekey, Force Projection from Space, in (unnumbered Space
Applications Volume) NEW WORLD VISTAS: AIR AND SPACE POWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
at 83, 84 (1995) [hereinafter Bekey].
n87 Id. at 85. With respect to information warfare, the report gives a number
of examples: network viruses, disinformation, memory erasures, and false
signals. For a brief discussion of information warfare and its relation to
space combat, see infra Part VI, @ D.
n88 For example, a 4,000 pound automobile would have to travel almost 270
miles per hour to equal the kinetic energy of a one-pound projectile traveling
at 4.7 miles per second. DAVID E. LUPTON, ON SPACE WARFARE: A SPACE POWER
DOCTRINE 22 (1988).
n89 B. Jasani, Space Weapons and International Security-An Overview, in
SPACE WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 22 (B. Jasani, ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Jasani, Space Weapons].
n90 Federation of American Scientists, Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite,
Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/keasat.htm (last visited June 29,
2000) (on file with the Air Force Law Review).
n93 Bekey, supra note 86, at 83.
n94 M. Potter, Gun Launch to Space: International Policy and Legal
Considerations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 305 (1992).
n95 Id. at 306.
n96 STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, supra note 40, at 111.
n97 During the height of research on the Strategic Defense Initiative many
scientists openly questioned that a missile defense project involving
space-based lasers could ever work. The Union of Concerned Scientists declared
that an effective defense of the U.S. against a Soviet missile defense was
unattainable. A report from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
claimed the likelihood that such a system could protect the U.S. from Soviet
missile attack "so remote that it should not serve as the basis for public
expectations or national policy." L.B. TAYLOR, JR., SPACE: BATTLEGROUND OF THE
FUTURE? 24 (rev. ed., 1988) (quoting Edward Edelson, Space Weapons: The Science
Behind the Big Debate, POPULAR SCIENCE (July 1994)) [hereinafter TAYLOR]. Partly
because of the tremendous technical difficulties, the program began to refocus
on earth-based lasers.
n98 The other ground-based program is a free-electron laser designed to
reflect its high-energy beam off orbiting space mirrors for redirection back to
n99 Federation of American Scientists, Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser,
Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/miracl.htm (last visited June 29,
2000) (on file with the Air Force Law Review). The beam is created via chemical
Just downstream from the combustor, deuterium and helium are injected into the
exhaust. Deuterium combines with the excited fluorine to give excited deuterium
fluoride molecules, while the helium stabilizes the reaction and controls the
temperature. The laser's resonator mirrors are wrapped around the excited
exhaust gas and optical energy is extracted. The cavity is actively cooled and
can be run until the fuel supply is exhausted. The laser's output power can be
varied over a wide range by altering the fuel flow rates and mixture.
n100 Sami Fournier, U.S. Text-Fires 'MIRACL' at Satellite Reigniting ASAT
Weapons Debate, (Oct. 1997) Arms Control Association,
http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/oct97/miracloct.htm (on file with the Air Force
Law Review) [hereinafter Fournier].
n101 M.A. Dornheim, Laser Engages Satellite, With Questionable Results,
147:17 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 27, 1997, at 27. The test was not intended to
destroy the satellite but merely examine what various MIRACL power levels could
do to the target satellite's sensors. An official reported that the anticipated
data gathering from the satellite was unsuccessful.
n102 Following the test, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement
saying that the laser "may become a step toward creating an anti satellite
potential." Fournier, supra note 100. Even before the test, several U.S.
lawmakers sent President Clinton a letter stating "we are deeply troubled that a
test of a ground based laser system with such obvious ASAT warfare capabilities
would proceed ahead of any debate or deliberate policy development." Id.
n103 D.A. Fulghum, Airborne Laser Aimed At New Defense Roles, 149:14 AV. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 5, 1998, at 111; D.A. Fulghum, Airborne Laser Tested,
Weighed for New Missions, 147:17 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 27, 1997, at 26.
The ABL program manager, Colonel Michael Booen, stated that "this [laser's
success] is going to break the door down for directed energy weapons." Id.
n104 W. Matthews, Laser Faces 'Challenges,' Report Says, A.F. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1998, at 24.
n105 Federation of American Scientists, Space Based Laser, Federation of
American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl.htm (last
visited June 29, 2000) (on file with the Air Force Law Review).
n106 J.R. Asker, Washington Outlook, 150:21 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 24,
1999, at 27.
n107 M.A. Dornheim, Pentagon Mulls Space Laser Test, 148:12 AV. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 23, 1998, at 32.
n108 STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, supra note 40, at 111.
n109 Another theorized advantage of directed energy (DE) weapons will be the
range of employment options offered. These could fill the gap between diplomacy
and bombs by allowing for an escalating scale of destructive from minor
disruption to the target to total destruction. See W.B. Scott, 'Beam' Weapons
Edging Into Arsenal, 151:1 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH. July 5, 1999, at 53.
n110 TAYLOR, supra note 97, at 33. Because of its great speed and capacity
for repeat firing, Taylor suggests that particle beams "would do to the
ballistic missile virtually what the machine gun did to the infantry charge."
Id. at 34.
n111 Id. at 33.
n112 Id. at 35.
n113 Some conceive this ASAT as a kinetic energy weapon. "The Soviet ASAT
system could be categorized as a rocket-propelled KEW [kinetic energy weapon]."
Jasani, Space Weapons, supra note 89, at 19. However, as its title suggest, a
kinetic energy weapon derives its value as a weapon not from an explosive
capacity, if any, but its kinetic energy. The design of the Soviet System relies
heavily on its explosive charge; the ASAT need not even physically impact its
n114 STARES, SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 70, at 87. The average
wait before launch can occur in order to attack a specific satellite is six
hours. Id. at 88.
n115 Id. at 86.
n116 Reportedly, the Russians resumed ASAT testing in April of 1999 with a
design that will utilize an EMP. As reported, the Pentagon considers this a
"serious development" given that satellites are the "Achilles' heel of the U.S.
military's high-technology force used for sending orders to forces around the
world as well as communicating with troops and organizing logistics." B. Gertz &
R. Scarborough, Russian ASAT, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at 9.
n117 A.A. Kokoshin, et al., Measures for Counteracting Space Strike Weapons,
in SPACE WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 92 (B. Jasani, ed., 1987).
n118 See Bekey, supra note 86, at 87.
n120 This article uses the phrases "law of war," "law of armed conflict," and
"humanitarian law" as being essentially synonymous. Historically, "law of war"
has been used, although "law of armed conflict" is more accurate given that such
law applies in cases of conflict not amounting to war. "Law of war" will
generally be used in order to highlight the connection between the relevant
treaty regimes, rooted in the first five decades of the twentieth century, and
current State practice. Some scholars articulate distinctions among the three
phrases noting for example that humanitarian law is that subset of the law of
war that concerns itself specifically with the reduction of human suffering.
However, because the reduction of suffering is ultimately the goal of all
restrictions on the means and methods of warfare, such distinctions seem overly
technical. Others, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), prefer the
term "international humanitarian law" which it describes as the synthesis of
"Hague Law," governing means and methods of warfare, and "Geneva Law," governing
the protection of the victims of war. See The Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 1, at 27 [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons]. This definitional framework is ultimately helpful as it
attempts to contain the full range of law governing the use of force in combat
to a single category of international law. However, use of terms like
"humanitarian" when applied to limits on war's means and methods risks merely
equating the law of war with human rights law. On the dangers associated with
doing so, see infra notes 176 and 220. On the connection between human rights
law and the law of war, see Howard Levie, Violations of Human Rights in Time of
War As War Crimes, in 70 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, LEVIE ON THE LAW OF WAR 373
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green, eds., 1998); Rene Provost, Reciprocity in
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 1994 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 383 (1995).
n121 Schmitt, Bellum Americanum, supra note 6, at 412.
n122 Reasons commonly include: diminishing suffering, diminishing the moral
depravation of the soldiers, lessening the dangers that threaten the survival of
our civilization, lessening the dangers that threaten the survival of mankind,
favorably impacting the peacetime creation of doctrines and weapons, and
furthering the cause of disarmament to the extent specific weapons are
prohibited. B.V.A. Roling, The Significance of the Laws of War, in CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON U.N. LAW AND ON THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 133 (A. Cassese, ed., 1975). To these six might be added a seventh and
eighth - increased chances for the restoration of peace following armed
hostilities, and, somewhat paradoxically, increased military efficiency by
requiring the focused application of force.
n123 For some, "ironic" is the gentle way of putting it. Some authors express
outright cynicism that the project of regulating warfare can ever succeed.
Others provide examples leading to a measured skepticism over various aspects of
the law of war. This skepticism can take the form either that military forces
and their civilian leaders cannot be trusted to follow the law when war begins,
or that the law simply does not regulate consistently. An example of the former
relates to action at the First Hague Peace Conference to phrase principles of
warfare restrictively subject to exceptions, rather than permissively subject to
restrictions. As Hays Parks notes, "this is a manifestation of the fundamental
distrust international lawyers have for things military, and a reluctance to
permit battlefield commanders any latitude in situations that require a judgment
call." W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War 32:1 A.F. L. REV. 1, 14 n.54
(1990) [hereinafter Parks]. Regarding the latter form of skepticism,
Doswald-Beck claims that the law's prohibition of certain forms of bullets
without an unambiguous prohibition of nuclear weapons "creates skepticism
regarding the seriousness of any of the law of war." L. Doswald-Beck,
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars, in 71
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM,
39 at 43 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green, eds., 1998).
n124 Those viewing war as necessarily barbaric, for reasons of strategy or
otherwise, react coolly to the whole notion of rules, or moderation in war.
Thus, British Vice Admiral Sir John Fisher declared at the 1899 Hague Peace
Conference that humanizing war was tantamount to humanizing hell. His suspicion
at the law of war flowed from his view of the very nature of war:
what you call my truculence is all for peace. If you rub it in, both at home and
abroad, that you are ready for instant war with every unit of your strength in
the first line, and intend to be first in, and hit your enemy in the belly, and
kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take any!), and
torture his women and children, then people will keep clear of you.
Parks, supra note 123, at 13 n.50.
n125 Charles Dunlap, A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, 8 A.F. ACAD. J.
LEGAL STUD. 71, 89 (1997-1998) (quoting Richard Overy, WHY THE ALLIES WON 302-05
n126 Such an argument assumes a certain form of warfare that values and
benefits from order. Theoretically, guerilla or terrorist tactics could eschew
the type of "order" discussed here. But even these methods of warfare assume a
certain level of coordination, planning, and thus order.
n127 Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that,
war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains
peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means . . . . The political
object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be
considered in isolation from their purpose.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, 87 (M. Howard, & P. Paret, trans. & eds., 1976)
[hereinafter CLAUSEWITZ]. Elsewhere, Clausewitz describes how ugly those "other
means" really are:
If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it
involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand.
That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent
toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in
war . . . . It would be futile-even wrong-to try and shut one's eyes to what war
really is from sheer distress at its brutality.
Id. at 75-76.
n128 Thus ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu "did not conceive the object of
military action to be the annihilation of the enemy's army, the destruction of
his cities, and the wastage of his countryside. 'Weapons are ominous tools to be
used only when there is no alternative.'" Samuel B. Griffith, Introduction to
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR, 1, 40 (S.B. Griffith, trans., 1963). The dichotomy
between the approaches of Clausewitz and of Sun Tzu led B.H. Liddell Hart to
Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world
wars of this century if the influence of Clausewitz's monumental tome On War,
which moulded European military thought in the era preceding the First World
War, had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu's exposition
on 'The Art of War.'
B.H. Liddell Hart, Forward to SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR v (S.B. Griffith, trans.,
n129 One need only view two recent Hollywood productions, Saving Private Ryan
and The Thin Red Line, to experience the horrors of war beyond the written word.
In both cases, the films vividly portray the existential horrors of warfare
(violent death, mutilation, betrayal, savagery, terror) through realistic
reenactment. Yet even the film medium, powerful as it is, cannot reproduce the
feelings experienced in war either by the combatant or the noncombatant. Beyond
this, Saving Private Ryan, in particular, included reenactment of several
violations of the law of war. In one case toward the end of the film, a young
American soldier is shown killing a German soldier who had his hands in the air
and had surrendered his weapon and intent to resist, thus entitling himself to
protection as a prisoner of war. Though the 1949 Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War had not yet come into existence at
the time of this depiction, the 1907 regulations annexed to the Hague Convention
(IV) on land warfare had. These regulations, which governed military conduct
during WWII, unambiguously required humane treatment for prisoners of war. The
young American is portrayed as being the underdog having impotently witnessed
another German lawfully, though agonizingly, killing an American compatriot just
moments before. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this scene is the
unfortunate effect it likely has on most American audiences. Rather than
producing feelings of distaste at having witnessed a war crime, the screenplay
appears designed to elicit a sense of euphoria that the younger, weaker American
finally got the enemy. To the extent that the popular media manipulates public
opinion in ways such as this, respect for the law of war is not engendered, but
diminished. This is not to disparage this particular movie. The Secretary of
Defense rightly honored director Steven Spielberg on Aug. 11, 1999 at a ceremony
during which the Secretary awarded him the DOD Distinguished Civilian Public
Service Award for successfully honoring the memory of a past generation that
made the ultimate sacrifice in a just cause. The example is simply intended to
highlight dangers that may exist for the law of war in the popular mind coming
out of even magnificent works such as Saving Private Ryan.
n130 E.J. Osmanczyk, War, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1018 (2nd ed., 1990). Horrible as it is, Malanczuk
notes that war has not always been perceived as it is today.
It is hard to realize that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries most
people (except for a few pacifists) regarded war in much the same way as they
regarded a hard winter - uncomfortable, certainly, but part of the settled order
of things, and providing excellent opportunities for exhilarating sport; even
the wounded soldier did not regard war as wrong, any more than the skier with a
broken leg regards skiing as wrong.
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (7th
ed., 1997) [hereinafter MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW].
n131 Despite some vigorous dissent, the law of war has influenced the conduct
of armed forces in many ways. As examples to the contrary, consider Cicero's
oft-quoted maxim inter arma silent leges (lit. "in war the law is silent"), and
professor Fenwick's pessimistic candor, "it is futile to attempt to revive [the
laws of war] . . . . Let's face the facts. War has got beyond the control of law
. . . . The sooner every man, woman and child old enough to think realizes that
he will be a party to the next war, the better." C.G. Fenwick, 43 PROC. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 110 (1949) (transcript of oral response to W. Downey, Jr.,
Revision of the Rules of Warfare). Roberts and Guelff cite several international
norms that have been observed principally because of the law of war including,
humane treatment of prisoners, a state's entitlement to neutral status,
illegitimacy of certain targets, and that persons not active in the conflict
should be spared from the consequences of the fighting to the extent possible.
Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Introduction to DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 1,
14 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., 1989) [hereinafter Roberts & Guelff].
n132 Because the law of war is a matter of public international law, and
regulates the conduct of States relative to each other, it does not ordinarily
regulate purely internal, civil wars. Nonetheless, certain regional agreements
relate to internal conflicts. Further, Roberts and Guelff note that,
customary international law provided that the laws of war might become
applicable to a non-international conflict through the doctrine of 'recognition
of belligerency' . . . [by which] the government of a state in which an
insurrection existed could recognize the belligerency of the insurgent faction,
and the laws of war would thereby become applicable.
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 12. The authors further note that the
doctrine of recognition of belligerency has fallen into decline, and that the
surer basis for application of certain fundamental humanitarian provisions in
non-international conflicts is Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Id. at 13. Finally, while the 1977 Geneva Protocol II is intended
to expand the provisions of Common Article 3, it too applies only during the
existence of an "armed conflict."
n133 "Today humanitarian law is applicable in any international armed
conflict, even if the parties to that conflict have not declared war and do not
recognize that they are in a formal state of war." Christopher Greenwood,
Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICT 1, 10 (Dieter Fleck, ed., 1995). As Greenwood uses the term,
"international humanitarian law" is synonymous with the older phrase "law of
war" (with the exception of the law of neutrality), the former including all
rules designed to regulate the treatment of the individual-civilian or military,
wounded or active-as well as rules governing the means and methods of warfare.
Id. at 9.
n134 See infra, Part III, @ C.4.
n135 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (2d. ed., 1977).
n136 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 246
(1995). Though Franck frames the distinction in moral categories (i.e. "just"),
the context makes clear he is asserting that the early development of
international legal norms mirrored those of the "just war" tradition-an ethical
as well as a legal theory of warfare. Franck claims that this tradition held
sway in Western societies as both a legal and ethical theory until the 1648
Peace of Westphalia ushered in an international order based on "a balance of
power among sovereign nations [rather than] the ideal of a unified empire under
God and right reason. This Westphalian system remained in place until the
outbreak of war in 1914. Positivism largely banished notions of just war from
the realm of law to the outer marches of moral philosophy." Id. at 252.
n137 Fritz Kalshoven, Laws of War, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 316 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n138 MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 306.
n139 Arguably, prior to 1928 and execution of the Treaty of Paris
(Kellogg-Briand Pact) which purported to outlaw warfare as a legitimate means of
dispute resolution, there was no such thing as a jus ad bellum. While there were
ethical principles relating to conditions for a "just war" and for self-defense,
nothing approached the level of international law. Even the Treaty of
Versailles, which took initial steps toward conditioning the use of force (e.g.
Article 16 which made acts of war against any member of the League of Nations
acts of war against all members), did not explicitly ban war itself. Treaty of
Versailles, art. 16, (1919 Supp.) 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 2.
n140 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 1.
n141 This is subject to the clarification that while the law of war as a body
of legal principles does work to limit the means and methods of warfare, those
principles recognize that in the world of fact (versus legal principle) acts of
combat exist and may even appear to be allowed by reference to the relevant
legal principle. Some may view this reference to legal principles as
authorization, as for example in this reference to the principle of military
necessity: "I did X, an otherwise prohibited act, because it was militarily
necessary." For a discussion of military necessity, see infra, Part III, @ B.1.
But to view the law of war as authorizing or enabling behavior, misses a
fundamental principle of international law. Professor Schmitt, author of the
foregoing military necessity example, puts it best: "To exist as a principle of
law, military necessity must have independent legal valence. That can, by
definition, only occur when it is characterized as a limitation, for, as a
general rule, all that is not prohibited in international law is permitted."
Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Law on the Battlefield 8 A.F. ACAD. J. L. STUD.
255, 257 (1997-1998) (reviewing A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD (1996))
[hereinafter Schmitt, Book Review]. This analysis applies to all principles and
tenets of the law of war-thus all are restrictions on behavior. As for the
general proposition in international law that all that is not forbidden is
permitted, the International Court of Justice recently quoted from two previous
cases, as it recounted the position of several States leading up to its advisory
opinion on the threat or use of Nuclear Weapons. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 120 (referencing the Steamship Lotus and Nicaragua
cases). In the Steamship Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (P.C.I.J.) stated that "restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot . . . be presumed" and that international law leaves to States "a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules." P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19. Then more recently, the
International Court of Justice stated that "in international law there are no
rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by
treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign state can be
limited." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 4,
135. Though the latter language specifically addressed armaments, it rests on
the rationale from the Steamship Lotus case-unless prohibited, an action is
n142 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, (1907 Supp.) 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 129.
n143 These four principles are generally viewed as summarizing the customary
law of war, though this enumeration is not accepted universally. Thus, Hays
Parks describes the concept of proportionality as subordinate to, and an
expression of, discrimination. He argues that discrimination is attended today
with some confusion "because of the attempted injection of the concept of
proportionality into the law of war." Parks, supra note 123, at 5 n.18. By
contrast, Professor Schmitt subordinates distinction to proportionality, and
recognizes chivalry as a forth distinct customary principle. See Michael N.
Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International
Armed Conflict 22:1 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 52 (1997) [hereinafter Schmitt, Green
War]. Whatever the formulation however, each approach includes the relevant
prescriptive norms as developed in customary law, while giving special emphasis
to some but not others.
n144 As the subsequent analysis shows, the law demands such restraint whether
the operation in question is offensive or defensive in nature.
n145 FREDERIC DE MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES 82-83
(Int'l Committee of the Red Cross 1987) [hereinafter DE MULINEN]. Perhaps
subpart (b) of this formulation is the more important as subpart (a), simply
invoking that which is not forbidden by the law of war, could apply to any
principle of the law of war and says nothing unique about the restrictions
imposed by military necessity.
n146 Such was the case in nineteenth century Germany as expressed through the
doctrine of Kriegsraison. This concept, an interpretation of the traditional
notion of military necessity, asserted that military necessity "could justify
any measures - even in violation of the laws of war - when the necessities of
the situation purportedly justified it." Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, The Conduct
of Armed Conflict and Air Operations P1-3(a)(1) (Nov. 19, 1976) (reissue
pending as AFPAM 51-710) [hereinafter AFP 110-31]. Abuse of the principle
continued into the twentieth century as Carnahan notes: "The modern denigration
of military necessity goes back at least to the Nuremberg trials after World War
II, where some defendants argued that military necessity justified their
atrocities against civilian populations." He continues that "military necessity
is widely regarded today as an insidious doctrine invoked to justify almost any
outrage. As a result, the principle has not been allowed to play the creative
role that it is capable of playing." Bruce M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the
Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 230 (1998) [hereinafter Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the
Laws of War].
n147 For a discussion addressing this error, see supra note 141.
n148 Schmitt, Green War, supra note 143, at 54.
n149 AFP 110-31, supra note 146, at P1-6(b).
n150 Also termed "distinction."
n151 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 5.
n152 Professor Green, quoting from a treatise dating to 1802, states that "it
is only with the writers of the nineteenth century that either a clear
definition or the rights of soldiers or the first usage of the term 'combatants'
is found." LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 101 (1993)
n153 Thus, the law protects those combatants who are captured, wounded, sick,
or shipwrecked. The combatant category also does not include every member of the
military force, for example chaplains and medical personnel.
n154 Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, (1908 Supp.) 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (entered
into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) Annex]. Those
military members who should ordinarily fit this category but do not for failure
to comply with one of its terms, such as soldiers not wearing a uniform or
concealing their weapons, become "unlawful combatants" and risk loss of
protections afforded to lawful combatants.
n155 Admiral Robertson notes the fundamental character of the principle of
discrimination, and thus of military objective, by reference to the
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons. There the
court opined that military objective is one of the two "cardinal principles" of
the law of armed conflict (the other being the prohibition on the use of weapons
causing unnecessary suffering to combatants). H.B. Robertson, The Principle of
the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict, 8 A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD.
35 (1997-1998) (citing ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 120,
at 28) [hereinafter Robertson].
n156 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
n157 Id., art. 52(2). Though not adopted universally as a treaty rule,
Admiral Robertson notes that Protocol I's provisions on military objective from
Articles 48 and 52 are widely incorporated into military manuals and are
"recognized as a norm of customary international law." Robertson, supra note
155, at 44.
n158 For further discussion of this point, see infra note 196.
n159 See Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439; Declaration (IV, 1) To
Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives
from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
n160 Schmitt's observation bears repeating.
[The law of armed conflict] is no longer a body of law designed to ensure a fair
fight between two opponents . . . . Today, the law of armed conflict is designed
primarily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary destruction. This being
so, belligerents are held to the standards to which they are capable of rising.
Schmitt, Bellum Americanum, supra note 6, at 412. Schmitt's implication is that
technological advancement comes at some cost with respect to the law of war; the
more effectively weapons can avoid unnecessary destruction, the less ability
belligerents legally have in allowing for the possibility of such destruction.
n161 In this way, proportionality differs from the principle "economy of
force." Schmitt, Green War, supra note 143, at 55 n.267.
n162 This principle not only governs the use of force during the ongoing
operations of armed conflict, but during an act of self-defense under Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations as well. See infra note 262. Thus, it is a
"rule well established in customary international law" that in exercising its
right to self-defense, a State may only use "measures which are proportional to
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it." Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 94. The U.S. took the position that
the lawfulness of an act of self-defense depends in part on the necessity and
the proportionality of the measures taken. Id. at 103.
n163 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 5. The concept of reprisals has
proven controversial in international law. In 1977, Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions sought to eliminate a form of reprisal taken against civilians or
the civilian population. Professor Green explains that reprisals are "otherwise
illegal measures taken in response to prior illegal measures of the adverse
party and which are intended to cause the adverse party to cease its illegal
activities and comply with the law. They are not measures taken simply by way of
retaliation." GREEN, supra note 152, at 331, 332. Abraham Sofaer points out that
the U.S. decision not to ratify the Geneva Protocol I came, in part, because it
narrowed the right of reprisal. He further states that this factor was of
concern to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that it "would hamper the ability
of the United States to respond to an enemy's intentional disregard of the
limitations established in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or Protocol I."
Abraham Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785
(1988). Interestingly, Parks attributes the failure of the diplomatic
conference to produce fundamental agreement among the delegations to the
"cultural and philosophical differences that were substantially greater than
they had been [at the Hague in 1907 and Geneva in 1949]." He further points out
that many delegations were led by international lawyers lacking subject-matter
expertise; "no delegation had a military officer of the stature of a Mahan,
Fisher, or Rodgers." Parks, supra note 123, at 76.
n164 F.J.S. Gomez, The Law of Air Warfare 323 INT. REV. RED CROSS 347, 354
(1998) [hereinafter Gomez].
n166 In some formulations, chivalry receives attention as a separate
customary principle. As it has developed in the law of war, chivalry
distinguishes between acts of deception that undermine the goodwill of the
enemy, and those that do not. Thus, acts of perfidy are always prohibited. As
enumerated in Article 37 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, these
prohibited acts include feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or
of a surrender, feigning an incapacitation by wounds or sickness, feigning
civilian or non-combatant status (such as marking of combat aircraft with the
international symbols affording protection as medical aircraft), and feigning
protected status by the use of signs, emblems, or uniforms of the United Nations
or of neutral States. By contrast, the law does not prohibit "ruses," such as
the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation, which
deceive the opponent yet do not betray his confidence in measures requiring his
goodwill and which are intended to ameliorate the effects of war. Protocol I,
supra note 156, art. 37.
n167 Schmitt, Bellum Americanum, supra note 6, at 409.
n168 As Carnahan notes, "the ban on poisoned weapons is one of the oldest
continuing prohibitions in the law of war." Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary
Suffering, The Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 705, 714 (1996) [hereinafter Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering]. It predates
any attempts at codification by centuries.
n169 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grams Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, (1907 Supplement) 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95.
n170 These munitions have soft or hollow points so as to flatten on impact.
Also called "dum-dum" bullets after the munitions factory near Calcutta India
where first developed, they are outlawed for over 30 States Parties to a Hague
Declaration of 1899. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets,
July 29, 1899, (1907 supp.) 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 155. The declaration explicitly
applied to bullets "which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is
pierced with incisions." Id. Though not a party to the Declaration, the United
States has acknowledged that it will abide by the terms of the agreement.
Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, supra note 168, at 720.
n171 Protocol [to the Convention on Conventional Weapons] on Non-Detectable
Fragments (Protocol I), Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 (entered into force Dec.
2, 1983). This Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits
the use of "any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments
which in the human body escape detection by X-rays." Id.
n172 Protocol [to the Convention on Conventional Weapons] on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996) (entered into force
July 30, 1998) [hereinafter Protocol on Blinding Lasers]. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) takes the prohibition of Protocol IV a step
further in its 1995 pamphlet Blinding Weapons, and declares all "blinding as a
method of warfare" to be a violation of international humanitarian law.
Carnahan, distinguishing the ICRC's denunciation of poison gas in 1925, notes
that this "striking policy departure" marks the first time in history that the
ICRC has "publicly denounced a specific method of warfare as a violation of
international law." Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, supra note 168, at 705.
Carnahan concludes that by declaring the
undefined concept of 'blinding as a method of warfare' unlawful and making
exaggerated claims for the destructiveness of lasers, the ICRC has helped to lay
the basis for false war crime charges against any soldier captured with a
portable laser. The ICRC may have compromised its own ability to prevent abuse
of prisoners of war subjected to such charges.
Id. at 731. Although itself bordering on exaggeration, at least one important
reminder can be taken from this conclusion-a very possible consequence of
crusading against a means of warfare in the interest of soldiers may make the
very soldiers in view more vulnerable. A final observation regarding this
protocol lasers relates to its prospective nature vis-a-vis the weapons at
issue. This is one of the only attempts in the law of war to prohibit the use of
a weapons system before it has been deployed in combat, or even fielded for
training purposes prior to combat.
n173 For example, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, States have
the "inherent right" to use armed force in self-defense. See discussion infra
notes 262 and 267. This raises two fundamental issues. First, because the right
is inherent, and has been recognized by customary international law long prior
to the appearance of the United Nations Charter, the right existed before the
law prohibited warfare as an instrument of national policy. This right has been
widely recognized at least since the Caroline incident of 1837. See D.J. HARRIS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 894 (5th ed., 1998) [hereinafter
HARRIS]. Second, because the United Nations Charter speaks of this prerogative
toward self defense as a "right," it appears to be an explicit authorization to
act in certain circumstances. Taken as an authorization, and coupled with the
jus in bello, the reasonable implication of this understanding of Article 51 is
that States not only have the right to self defense, but have the right to use
armed force in self defense, and have the right to attack militarily necessary
targets in proportionate, "humane" ways as long as such attacks are otherwise
predicated on compliance with the jus ad bellum. Though this understanding
borders on repudiation of the principle articulated in the Steamship Lotus case,
that is, States may act as they please unless prohibited by law, by suggesting
that with respect to self defense the law plays an authorizing rather than
merely prohibitive role, it is better seen as merely a limited exception to the
Lotus rule rather than a direct challenge to it. For a discussion of the
Steamship Lotus case, see supra note 141.
n174 GREEN, supra note 152, at 333.
n175 Given the development of international law in this century, it is highly
doubtful States would ever completely restrict themselves from resort to the use
of force under any circumstances - the ultimate extension of pure humanity.
n176 It is for this reason that there is some danger of confusion in
referring to the law of armed conflict as humanitarian law. To the extent that
the latter title evokes images of human rights law, the term humanitarian, and
the legal content it suggests, could be transposed improperly from the one
subset of public international law to the other. This would fail to accord the
term its rightful and more limited place as it functions within the law of armed
conflict. Put simply, humanitarian as used in human rights law does not
necessarily mean "humanitarian" as used in the law of armed conflict. This does
not mean the two bodies of law are strictly distinct. See, e.g., Levie and
Provost cites at supra note 120. It also does not at all mean that humanity in
the law of war is a narrow principle of customary international law. As Schmitt
observes, as applied to protection of the environment in armed conflict,
humanity assumes an extra-anthropocentric quality. In this way it can be seen as
a broader concept than "humanitarian" as used in human rights law, and includes
prohibition of "activities that are not so much inhumane as inhuman. They are
acts we intuitively recognize as inherently wrongful regardless of the context
in which they occur. In a sense, they are violative of the 'dictates of public
conscience.'" Schmitt, Green War, supra note 143, at 61.
n177 Schmitt articulates a sequential analysis in determining whether a
military course of conduct comports with the law.
1. Means: Do the methods or means selected to execute the attack violate the
principles of distinction, humanity, or any specific prohibition of the law of
armed conflict? 2. Target: Is the target a military objective? If so, is attack
on this type of target specifically forbidden? If not, is the destruction of the
target militarily necessary? 3. Result: Does the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated outweigh the collateral damage and incidental injury
likely to result?
Schmitt, Book Review, supra note 141, at 276 n.24. This approach helpfully
clarifies that each principle acts as a filter to weed out impermissible
military acts while at the same time recognizing that these principles are not
authorizations to act, but limitations on acts which might otherwise be lawful.
n178 It should be remembered that the two basic treaty regimes represented by
the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions, do not purport to be the
exhaustive sources for law of war restrictions. Though they are, to a large
extent, codifications of customary law, customary international law remains as a
viable source not only for circumstances unaddressed in the treaty law, but to
govern the conduct of non-parties to the treaties.
n179 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Order No. 100, Apr. 23, 1863, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler
& Jiri Toman, eds., 1988) [hereinafter Schindler & Toman].
n180 Fritz Munch, War, Laws of, History, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n181 Schindler & Toman, supra note 179, at 3 (introductory note).
n182 Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War, supra note 146, at 215.
n183 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 7.
n184 Conditions for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, Schindler & Toman, supra note 179, at 279.
This convention has been superceded by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
n185 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, (1907 Supp.) 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95. This
declaration is the first agreement among States prohibiting the use of specific
weaponry in time of war. The provisions of the declaration were later
incorporated into the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations.
n186 Final Protocol and Project of an International Declaration Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War, Aug. 27, 1874, Schindler & Toman, supra note 179,
at 25. The provisions of the protocol, and the international declaration have
been incorporated into the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and Regulations.
n187 The Laws of War on Land, Sept. 9, 1880, Schindler & Toman, supra note
179, at 35 (originally published by the Institute of International Law). Again,
the influences of the Oxford Manual on the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and
Regulations are clear.
n188 P.J. Cameron, The Limitations on Methods and Means of Warfare, 1984
AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 252 (1985).
n189 Schindler & Toman, supra note 179, at vii (from the Introduction).
n190 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, (1908 Supp.) 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910)
[hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)].
n191 Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War,
Oct. 18, 1907, (1908 Supp.) 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 146 (entered into force Jan. 26,
1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IX)].
n192 Though still in force today, the fourth convention of 1907 lost the
support of eighteen States which were parties to the 1899 second convention.
These eighteen States or their successors (e.g. Yugoslavia) remain formally
bound by the 1899 convention.
n193 Id. at art. 1.
n194 Id. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this list is its inclusion of
industrial targets with military value. For the first time, this was explicitly
recognized by an international instrument. Nonetheless, the entire list was
regarded by the head of the U.S. delegation as simply declaratory of customary
international law. Parks, supra note 123, at 18.
n195 Hague Convention (IX) Annex, supra note 154, at art. 2.
n196 Parks, supra note 123, at 18. Parks further concludes that the rule of
Article 2, was declaratory of customary law. Thus, however provocative such a
claim may sound today, its roots go back to the codified foundations of the law
of war, and beyond. This point about the legal obligations of the defender is a
theme Parks sustains throughout his monumental, book-length article. The piece
provides an excellent scholarly argument, citing to the provisions of both Hague
and Geneva law, for the proposition that defenders bear as heavy an obligation
to ameliorate the possibility and effects of collateral damage from air warfare
as do attackers.
n197 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 154, at art. 25.
n198 Though the drafters of the convention could not have specifically
foreseen the technological revolution in military affairs that would come later
in this century, the absolute terms "whatever means" would seem to include means
of bombardment from unanticipated new combat environments such as outer space.
As for targeting from the air, the Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held
that the Convention IV rules relating to bombardment specifically applied to air
warfare. GREEN, supra note 152, at 173 (citing Coenca Bros. v. Germany, 7 M.A.T.
n199 As with most provisions of the fourth 1907 convention, this one came
substantially from the second 1899 convention. See Schindler & Toman, supra note
179, at 75.
n200 See Hague Convention (IV) Annex, supra note 154 and accompanying text.
n201 Id. at art. 3.
n202 Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 65, 66 (Dieter Fleck, ed., 1995).
n203 Article 75(1) of Protocol (I) specifies that
persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit
from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol [i.e.
prisoners of war; refugees and stateless persons] shall be treated humanely in
all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this
Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, color, sex, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
Protocol I, supra note 156, at art. 75(1).
n204 The category "unlawful combatants" does not include those combatants who
use means and methods of armed conflict that are violative of the jus in bello.
These offenders may be war criminals, and they may be prosecuted under
international law or the domestic law of the opposing belligerent, but they are
not what has traditionally been known as unlawful combatants. Further, contrary
to the impression left by some in the television and print media following the
abduction of three U.S. soldiers in Macedonia during Operation Allied Force,
prisoners of war may be tried under certain conditions. However, as Article 99
of the third 1949 Geneva Convention specifies, this cannot be for any "act which
is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in
force at the time the said act was committed." Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
n205 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 154, at art. 29.
n206 Id. at 54.
n207 For a relatively recently formulation of the principle, see Protocol I,
supra note 156, at art. 46.
n208 Of course, the rules embodied in Hague Law are equally humanitarian and
equally concerned with protection of the person. However, because Geneva Law
explicitly provides for the sick, wounded, shipwrecked, and prisoners it is more
often thought of as the fullest expression of humanitarian law.
n209 Two examples include the saturation bombing of civilian populations
centers, and certain indiscriminate naval bombardments. Roberts & Guelff, supra
note 131, at 93.
n210 Hays Parks suggests that international lawyers of that era even doubted
the applicability of the law of war to modern warfare, and particularly to
aerial bombardment. Parks, supra note 123, at 50.
n211 Id. (quoting M. GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: THE PROPHET OF TRUTH,
1922-1939 573 (1976)).
n212 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, 6 U.S.T. 3114
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention I].
n213 Id. at art. 22. Because the convention by its title purports to protect
"armed forces in the field," the inclusion of the last circumstance seems
particularly odd. Not only are civilians non-combatants, they are
non-belligerents. Positing that a protected facility does not lose its
protection merely by virtue of the presence of a wounded civilian, seems to
state the obvious.
n214 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 18, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
n215 Id. The reference to "land, air, and naval forces" appears intended to
highlight that the prohibition applies to all combat environments.
n216 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 22, 6 U.S.T.
3316, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
n217 Id. at art. 23.
n218 Id. at art. 28.
n219 Indeed, protected persons are also potentially subject to attacks from
space. Thus, to the extent that the Geneva Conventions protect individuals from
attack, they restrict space warfare. One example pertains to the prohibitions on
taking reprisals against prisoners of war. See Geneva Convention III, supra note
204, at art. 13. Similarly, belligerents may not take reprisals against
civilians. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 214, at art. 33.
n220 These Resolutions not only further empowered the ICRC to justify the
need for a diplomatic conference, but represented the early disposition of the
majority of States to the conference on several subjects that would later become
controversial. The first resolution, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts, invited the U.N. Secretary-General, in conjunction with the ICRC, to
study steps for better application of existing humanitarian conventions and to
study the need for additional conventions. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts, Dec. 19, 1968, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18,
at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969). The General Assembly adopted the Resolution by a
unanimous vote of 111 to none. More importantly, this Resolution affirmed three
principles, stated in a prior ICRC Resolution
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited; (b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian population as such; (c) That distinction must be made at all times
between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.
Id. As displayed by the vote, these principles were not controversial and indeed
were taken as a restatement of customary international law. The larger issue
raised by the Resolution was the use of human rights language to describe what
were historically law of war restrictions. Although the identification of human
rights with humanitarian law has become increasingly prevalent in the scholarly
literature following publication of documents such as Resolution 2444, it
remains to be seen whether this is good for the law of war. While human rights
law has traditionally been rooted in philosophy and politics, the law of war is
rooted in military exigency. As a consensus grows for centralized punishment of
violations within both bodies of law, as envisaged by the International Criminal
Court, one sincerely hopes that the unseemly politicization often characterizing
State rhetoric regarding human rights concerns does not infect the quest for a
robust, enforced law of war. If the latter succumbs to petty world politics, it
may be largely due to the blurring of the humanitarian law of war, aimed at the
focused restricting of suffering during armed conflict, with human rights law,
aimed at far broader issues and concerns.
Following Resolution 2444 by two years, the U.N.G.A. adopted Resolution 2675
by a vote of 109 votes to none, with 18 States abstaining or absent. Basic
Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, Dec.
9, 1970, G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Resolution 2675]. In two cases, the eight provisions
of Resolution 2675 restated the substance of provisions already stated in
Resolution 2444. Otherwise, Resolution 2675 exhorted States to respect civilian
populations and property by exempting them from attack, and reemphasizes the
human rights rationale for such protections. In some cases the provisions
restated concepts existing in the Geneva Conventions, and in all cases, the
Resolution "restates rules of international law." Schindler & Toman, supra note
179, at 267. Interestingly, regarding civilian property, the Resolution states
that "dwellings and other installations that are used only by civilian
populations should not be the object of military operations." Resolution 2675,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 77. Implicitly, this affirms that unless
such property is used exclusively by civilians ("only by"), it may be subject to
attack if not otherwise protected on some other ground.
n221 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
n222 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 448.
n223 Geneva Convention I, supra note 212, at art. 3; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 216, at art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 204, at art. 3;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 214, at art. 3.
n224 Robert & Guelff, supra note 131, at 447.
n225 Protocol II, supra note 221, at art. 1(2).
n226 Robert & Guelff, supra note 131, at 448.
n227 Protocol I, supra note 156, at art. 1(4). Addressing the "General
Principles and Scope of Application" of the entire Protocol, Article 1(4)
the situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the [United Nations General
Assembly] Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
Id. This means that insurgents opposing "colonial domination and alien
occupation and . . . racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination" were to be accorded the full protections of the jus in
bello, including limits on the state's means and methods of subduing the
insurgents militarily. Id. (emphasis added) This provision alone proved too
difficult politically for some States to accept. (States not having ratified the
Protocol as of 1999 include: Afghanistan, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Fiji,
France, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kiribati,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, and the U.S.)
Another provision difficult to accept for some States, including the U.S.,
related to the concept of reprisals. Articles 51(6), 52(1), and 54(4), prohibit
reprisals under any circumstances against the civilian population, against
civilian objects, and against objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, respectively. Id. at art. 51(6), 52(1), 54(4). Parks claims
that the first two provisions were not a codification of customary law, but a
reversal of it. See Parks, supra note 123, at 94. He further states that flawed
legal analysis of the doctrine of reprisals often results from confusion of the
concept with others such as retaliation, revenge, or legitimate acts of
self-defense. Id. Customarily, civilian individuals and property could be
threatened and attacked as a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil, and
to promote respect for the law of war. Though reprisals are politically
sensitive because they entail commission of an otherwise illegal act in order to
suppress other illegal acts, they have proven effective historically in
deterring violations of the jus in bello. Id. at 95. Parks cites as an example
the threat by President Franklin Roosevelt to use chemical weapons as
sufficient warning to deter German use of such weapons. Id.
n228 Parks, supra note 123, at 112.
n229 Protocol I, supra note 156, at art. 48.
n230 Id. at art. 49.
n231 Id. at art. 50.
n232 Id. at art. 51.
n233 Id. at art. 52.
n234 Id. at art. 53.
n235 Id. at art. 54.
n236 Id. at art. 55.
n237 Id. at art. 56.
n238 Id. at art. 57.
n239 Id. at art. 58.
n240 Parks, supra note 123, at 112.
n241 Id. Just as significant an issue as is the burden shifting, is the legal
effect of violations by the defender vis-a-vis the attacker. A common view of
Protocol I, Article 58, which requires that "the parties" (including both
attacker and defender) take precautions against the effects of attacks "to the
maximum extent feasible," is that violation by the defender in its obligations
toward its own civilians does not absolve the attacker of its obligations when
considering attacks that put such civilians at risk. Protocol I, supra note 156,
at art. 58. This appears to conflict with the position taken by the U.S. Air
Force law of war manual: "[a] party to a conflict which places its own citizens
in positions of danger by failing to carry out the separation of military
activities from civilian activities necessarily accepts, under international
law, the results of otherwise lawful attacks upon the valid military objectives
in their territory." AFP 110-31, supra note 146, at P5-4b. For an interesting
resolution of this apparent conflict, see Schmitt, Book Review, supra note 141,
at 267. Key to the resolution is the clause "otherwise lawful attacks."
Ultimately, the best view conceives violations by the defender to take
precautions as "merely a factor in mitigation should the attacker violate its
own." Id. It should also be noted that although AFP 110-31 presents a view from
the United States Air Force, the document's preamble specifies that it "does not
promulgate official U.S. Government policy."
n242 Parks, supra note 123, at 112 n.351. Parks notes further that the French
position was not isolated, but representative. Id.
n244 For additional perspectives, see G.H. Aldrich, Prospects for United
States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991); Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Civilians Under the
Draft Geneva Protocol: A Preliminary Inquiry, 18 A.F. L. REV. 32 (Winter 1976).
n245 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 (entered into force 26 March 1975).
n246 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 (entered into
force 5 October 1978) [hereinafter Environmental Modification Treaty].
n247 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 (entered into force Dec.
2, 1983) [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Treaty]. The treaty contained
protocols on (1) fragments not detectable by X-rays; (2) mines, booby traps, and
other devices; and (3) incendiary weapons. All three protocols went into force
with the treaty in 1983. A fourth Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons went into
force on July 30, 1998. See Protocol on Blinding Lasers, supra note 172.
n248 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 21, 103d Cong. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993)
(entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).
n249 Protocol on Blinding Lasers, supra note 172.
n250 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1507 (1997) (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999).
n251 Environmental Modification Treaty, supra note 246, at art. III(1).
n252 Id. at art. I(1).
n253 Id. at art. II (emphasis added).
n254 Schmitt, Green War, supra note 143, at 82.
n255 Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. GAOR,
31st Sess., Supp. No. 27, at 91, 92, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976).
n256 Given its narrow scope, the Treaty "affects only a very narrow band of
possible operations." Schmitt, Green War, supra note 143, at 85.
n257 Protocol II (as amended), Environmental Modification Treaty, supra note
246, at art. 1, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996) (amended May 3, 1996) (entered into force
Dec. 3, 1998).
n258 A recent controversy raises the question whether such weapons have ever
been used against U.S. military personnel. An Apr. 4, 1997 incident suggested
the possible Russian use of such a weapon against a Naval aviator. The aviator
reported severe eye pain and headaches after seeing a distinct dot of red
light emanating from the Russian ship Kapitan Man in U.S. waters. Despite
Russian denials, and a subsequent search of the ship by U.S. authorities which
discovered no laser, suspicions have continued given the several day delay in
executing the search and medical reports showing the aviator's injury consistent
with a laser attack. Associated Press, Navy Officer Blames Russian Laser, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at 1; B. Gertz, Clinton Won't Back Navy Officer After
Laser Attack, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at 1.
n259 Interestingly, the Protocol on Blinding Lasers implicitly recognizes
that lasers are not prohibited as a weapon system so long as they are not
"specifically designed" to cause blindness. Protocol on Blinding Lasers, supra
note 172, at art. 1. Article 2 states: "In the employment of laser systems, the
High Contracting Parties shall take all feasible precautions to avoid the
incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall
include training of their armed forces and other practical measures." Id. at
art. 2. This restriction presupposes that laser systems might in fact be used
("in the employment"), and that they might be used by military forces whose use
will necessitate training for proper use so as to avoid functioning as a
blinding weapon. Among others, the U.S. military is studying the use of an
"Anti-Personnel Beam Weapon" that would likely cause slight skin or eye
irritation by carrying an electrical charge through a lazed stream of ionized
air. D. Mulholland, Laser Device May Provide U.S. Military NonLethal Option,
DEFENSE NEWS, June 14, 1999, at 6.
n260 But note that the law of war applies whether a use of force is lawful or
not. See supra note 140, and accompanying text.
n261 A third function of the Charter is to provide the constitutive features
of the International Court of Justice, established under Article 92 of the
Charter, by means of the Statute of the International Court of Justice appended
to the Charter and consisting of seventy separate articles. STAT. OF THE INT'L
CT. OF J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945)
[hereinafter STAT. OF THE ICJ].
n262 U.N. CHARTER (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter U.N.
CHARTER]. Article 1, paragraph 1, states the first purpose of the United
Nations: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace . . ." The Charter states this principle against the backdrop of its
preamble which decries the "untold sorrow" of the world wars of the twentieth
century and calls war a "scourge." Id.
n263 Chapter 7, containing articles 39 through 51, applies to "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."
n264 While a thorough exposition of the jus ad bellum is beyond the scope of
this article, some understanding of the field, and of its principal source,
could work to eliminate confusion in legal analysis. For example, one might
misidentify an issue as requiring analysis under the jus in bello which actually
requires analysis under the jus ad bellum. Such confusion could lead to errant
legal conclusions under the law of war.
n265 Malanczuk goes even further: "The prevailing view is that the Charter
has enacted a comprehensive rule on the prohibition of the use of force, which
has become recognized as jus cogens . . ." MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 311. The International Law Commission
agrees: "the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force
in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law
having the character of ius cogens." HARRIS, supra note 173, at 835 (quoting
International Law Commission, Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1966 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMISSION 247-48). This is the view of the United
States as well, as quoted from its pleadings at the International Court of
Justice in the Nicaragua case. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4. Taken from Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the concept of jus cogens constitutes "peremptory norm[s] of
general international law," which become the most basic ordering concepts in
international law. They are principles from which no treaty may derogate. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In this way,
jus cogens is the international legal norm that norms all other norms. Examples
that are widely acknowledged by scholars include the rules against genocide and
n266 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 262, at art. 2(4).
n267 Id. at art. 51.
n268 Several reasons may account for this. Chiefly, the negative effects of a
threat are thought to pale in comparison to the effects of actual force. And, as
Sadurska notes, there may actually be occasions in which the threat of force
"far from precipitating fighting, may be an effective mechanism for dissuading
international actors from using violence." R. Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 239, 247 (1988). In this way, the threat may actually work as a
substitute for the use of force.
n269 A. Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 118 (B. Simma, et al., eds., 1994) [hereinafter Randelzhofer].
n270 GREEN, supra note 152, at 70.
n271 Randelzhofer, supra note 269, at 112, 113. The author points out that
while these forms of coercion may not constitute "force" under Article 2(4),
their use may violate the general principle of non-intervention.
n272 Id. at 113, 114.
n273 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4,
n274 See discussion of information warfare, infra Part VI, @ D.
n275 Such forms of self-defense occur when a State uses armed force to repel
an "imminent" attack before it actually occurs.
n276 In its lengthy review of customary international law related to the use
of force in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice stated that
the right of self-defense referenced in the Charter at Article 51, as an
"inherent right," is firmly rooted in customary international law. This explicit
provision in the Charter therefore provides parallel authority for the
assertion of the right.
n277 In addition to wars of a defensive character, the U.N. Charter also
authorizes armed force pursuant to authority by the Security Council. "Should
the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER, supra note 262, at art. 42. Presumably, the enumeration
of "air, sea or land forces" is meant to suggest that the Security Council may
use any form of force it deems necessary, these three being the exhaustive means
then in existence in 1945. On this interpretation, the list is not exclusive,
but indicative of the scope of Security Council authority. Though not
specifically mentioned, the use of space forces would be a legitimate exercise
of authority as well.
n278 In addition to the fact that Article 2(4) applies to conflicts not
formally constituting wars, Professor Harris points out an additional reason for
this--the terms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols apply to
"all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict." Harris, supra note
173, at 860 n.3.
n279 The laws of war have evolved with State practice regarding initiation of
hostilities. De Mulinen points out that historically an armed conflict commenced
with a previous warning either in the form of a declaration of war or an
ultimatum containing a conditional state of war. See DE MULINEN, supra note 145,
at 30. Subsequently, as such declarations and warnings fell out of use, the laws
of war continued to apply to conflicts short of war. Thus, the common Article 2
to each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies the provisions of each
convention to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties. . . ." Geneva
Convention I, supra note 212, at art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 216,
at art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 204, at art. 2; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 214, at art. 2. The Conventions do not specify what constitutes
an armed conflict, thus De Mulinen appears correct in asserting that "no minimum
of intensity of violence or fighting, no minimum of military organization and no
minimum of control of territory is required." DE MULINEN, supra note 145, at 31.
Any armed violence between the representatives of one State and those of another
will trigger application of the laws of war, whether the conflict amounts to
"war" or not.
n280 Of the legal effects created by a formal state of war, perhaps the most
interesting for purposes of the law of war is the termination of certain
categories of treaties between the belligerent States. See J. Delbruck, War,
Effect on Treaties, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 310
(Bernhardt, ed., 1982). Delbruck notes that the effect of war on treaty
obligation is nowhere specifically enumerated. The older consensus was that war
terminated all treaty relations and obligations as between the belligerents. The
newer approach in international law takes a more flexible approach, preferring
to preserve international order and to see war as simply suspending the
execution of certain treaties. Thus Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing as a judge
on the Court of Appeals of New York anticipated the current trend,
"international law today does not [in cases of war] preserve treaties or annul
them regardless of the effects produced. It deals with such problems
pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of war exact. It
establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules." Id. (quoting
from Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 241 (1920)). Delbruck continues, "war may
now be illegal, but it has not thereby become a phenomenon outside the realm of
law." Id. at 311. In this way, the law prefers to give effect to treaties to the
maximum extent possible. Those treaties that must be suspended during war
include multilateral treaties with which the belligerents are unable to comply
due to the impact of the war. Those that will be terminated include political
treaties that depend for their existence and proper functioning on normal
political and social relations between the belligerents -- relations that are
terminated by war. Significantly, though the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that the severance of diplomatic relations between the parties
to a treaty does not normally affect the legal relations between them as
established by the treaty, the Convention does not specify how war effects the
operation of treaties. Vienna Convention, supra note 265, at art. 63.
n281 McDOUGAL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 514.
n282 Space law is "a newcomer to the family of legal disciplines." I UNITED
STATES SPACE LAW: NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 17, Release 98-2 (1998).
That space law rightfully takes its place as a major branch of international law
is now beyond question. Jennings notes seventeen categories of international
law: (1) the position of States in international law, (2) the law relating to
international peace and security, (3) the law relating to economic development,
(4) State responsibility, (5) succession of States and governments, (6)
diplomatic and consular law, (7) the law of treaties, (8) unilateral acts, (9)
the law relating to international watercourses, (10) the law of the sea, (11)
the law of the air, (12) the law of outer space, (13) the law relating to the
environment, (14) the law relating to international organizations, (15)
international law relating to individuals (including nationality, extradition,
right of asylum and human rights), (16) the law relating to armed conflicts, and
(17) international criminal law. See R.Y. Jennings, International Law, in 11
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n283 P. Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of International Law, 1994 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 147 (1995) [hereinafter Malanczuk, Space Law].
n284 V. Kopal, Evolution of the Doctrine of Space Law, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 17 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992).
n285 Although the U.S. had placed a man-made object in outer space prior to
this, 1957 is considered the watershed year in which the "Space Age" is most
often said to have begun. On October 4 of that year, the Soviet Union launched
Sputnik I, the world's first man-made satellite. See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note
15, at 122.
n286 See infra, Part VI, @ A.1.
n287 MATTE, SPACE ACTIVITIES, supra note 13, at 175, 176.
n288 N. Jasentuliyana, The Lawmaking Process in the United Nations, in
SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 41 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992).
n289 B.M. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 29, 30 (1986)
n290 See McDOUGAL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 729.
n291 See supra note 141.
n292 Of course, prohibitions could come from a variety of sources other than
space treaties. Customary international law could also supply the requisite
prohibition on State action. In the case cited however, as will be argued
further below, no such prohibitions exist.
n293 As one source puts it, "Astrolaw contemplates the practice of law in
outer space. . . . The direct subjects of Space Law are sovereign nations; the
direct subjects of Astrolaw are natural and legal persons in space. . . .
Astrolaw focuses not upon space as a legal regime, but upon space as a place."
G.S. ROBINSON & H.M. WHITE, JR., ENVOYS OF MANKIND: A DECLARATION OF FIRST
PRINCIPLES FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF SPACE SOCIETIES 147 (1986) [hereinafter
ROBINSON & WHITE]. Others refer to Astrolaw as a necessary supplement to the
space law treaty system, and as a "common law of outer space." D. O'Donnell &
N.C. Goldman, Astro Law as Lex Communis Spatialis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 322 (1998).
n294 C.J. Cheng, New Sources of International Space Law, in THE USE OF AIR
AND OUTER SPACE COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 209 (C.J. Cheng, ed., 1998). Cheng
further notes that although different titles for this body of law such as
"Aerospace Law," "International Law of Outer Space," "International Space Law,"
"Space Law," and "The Law of Outer Space," "provide notional concepts about the
scope of international space law . . . in its inception, this new branch of law
was defined as a corpus of rules which govern the space activity of States."
Id. at 208 n.1, 209 (emphasis added).
n295 Though this is true generally as a basic tenet of international law, it
is especially true of space law which makes States internationally responsible
for all national activity, whether public or private. See infra note 324 and
n296 In classical international legal theory, customary international law
serves as a formal source of law. Thus, Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice charges the Court with resolving disputes in
accord with international law by applying, inter alia, "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." STAT. OF THE ICJ, supra note
261, at art. 38.
n297 The two factors generally regarded as necessary for the crystallization
of an emerging norm into customary law are the practice of States and general
opinion that the norm under consideration bears the force of law. Thus Malanczuk
when inferring rules of customary law from the conduct of States, it is
necessary to examine not only what States do, but also why they do it. . . .
State practice alone does not suffice; it must be shown that it is accompanied
by the conviction that it reflects a legal obligation. . . . The technical name
given to this psychological element is opinio iuris sive necessitatis (opinio
iuris for short). It is usually defined as a conviction felt by States that a
certain form of conduct is required by international law.
MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 44. The
author continues by pointing out the difficulty of ascertaining a state's opinio
juris and the modern tendency to "infer opinio iuris indirectly from the actual
behavior of States." Id.
n298 Malanczuk, Space Law, supra note 283, at 159. But see opinion of
Professor Diederiks-Verschoor, "customary law is already playing a significant
role in space law, and . . . States have evidently found it necessary, if not
expedient, to abide by its rules." I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION
TO SPACE LAW 12 (1993) [hereinafter DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR].
n299 As suggested in Part VI, @ A.1.b., infra, the development of a jus in
bello for space will likely track the method by which the jus in bello for
aerial combat evolved. In the latter case, after over seventy years of aerial
combat, the international community has yet to witness a treaty dedicated to
means and methods of aerial warfare. The incremental, customary development of
an aerial jus in bello will likely be the pattern for space warfare.
n300 Although a minority view, some scholars denied the existence of any
customary law for outer space in the early days of space flight. Thus, as late
as 1961, Professor Cooper wrote
it is quite impossible to apply international legal principles in a satisfactory
manner in any geographic area whose legal status is unknown. Today the legal
status of outer space is as vague and uncertain as was the legal status of the
high seas in the centuries before Grotius, in the Mare Liberum, focused
attention on the need of the world to accept the doctrine of the freedom of the
seas. . . . No general customary international law exists covering the legal
status of outer space.
J.C. Cooper, The Rule of Law in Outer Space, 47 AM. BAR ASS'N J. 23 (1961)
(quoted in MATTE, SPACE ACTIVITIES, supra note 13, at 83).
n301 B. Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant'
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965) [hereinafter Cheng,
'Instant' Customary Law]. In his fascinating article, Professor Cheng challenged
the orthodox view of customary law. Placing greater stress on the requirement
that States express acceptance of a general practice (opinio juris), Cheng
continued by noting that
it may be permissible to go further and say that the role of usage in the
establishment of rules of international customary law is purely evidentiary: it
provides evidence on the one hand of the contents of the rule in question and on
the other hand of the opinio juris of the States concerned. Not only is it
unnecessary that the usage should be prolonged, but there need also be no usage
at all in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the opinio juris of the
States concerned can be clearly established. Consequently, international
customary law has in reality only one constitutive element, the opinio juris.
Where there is opinio juris, there is a rule of international customary law.
Id. at 36. Though this attenuated view of customary law is widely disputed,
Cheng's watershed 1965 article largely framed the debate. Indeed, no less a
distinguished scholar than R. Bernhardt regards the notion of instant custom a
distinct possibility under exceptional cases (though not under "traditional
concepts") in which such instant law is useful or necessary "at least if a new
rule is accepted without exception and the conduct of States conforms to it
and no measures contrary to the rule are taken." Malanczuk, Space Law, supra
note 283, at 160-61. See R. Bernhardt, Customary Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 64-65 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982). Perceptively,
Malanczuk notes that the exceptional cases about which Bernhardt allows under
the rubric "customary law" are nothing of the sort. "There may indeed be a need
for this, but then it is not custom but some other (new) source of international
law." MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 46.
n302 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 43 [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases].
Specifically, the Court stated that "an indispensable requirement would be that
within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have
been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked." Id. This cautionary approach requires that to the extent the time
element is shortened, State agreement on the emerging norm must increase. Yet,
nowhere does the Court allow that the requirement for the passage of time may be
dispensed with, even in cases of perfect unanimity.
n303 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4,
n304 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 302, at 42.
n305 H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 1950 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 376, 394. The author went on to point out, by way of example, the special
importance of maritime powers such as the U.S. and U.K. for matters pertaining
to the seas. To this perspective can be added the view of Virally, writing on
the eve of the North Sea decisions: "firm opposition of a number of states,
especially if they constitute an appreciable section of the international
community or comprehend one or more of the great powers, may no doubt obstruct
the formation of a general customary rule." M. Virally, The Sources of
International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (M. Sorensen, ed.,
1986) (emphasis added).
n306 J.I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and The Development of
Customary International Law, 1985 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1986) [hereinafter
Charney]. In those cases involving persistent objectors not "specially
affected," international law allows that although the customary norm under
development may fully ripen into customary international law, the objecting
State is not bound. Thus held the International Court of Justice in both the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and Asylum cases. In the former, the Court stated "in
any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway
inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian
coast." Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131. In the Asylum case,
the Court stated that "even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed
between certain Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru
which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary,
repudiated it." Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru) I.C.J. 266, 277-78. "In both
[cases], the Court had previously found that the substantive rule of law did not
exist in the first place. The Court then went on to allow that even if the rule
were international law, the objecting States in these cases would not legally be
obligated to abide by the rule." Charney, id. at 9. Accord I RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, @ 102 cmt. d (1987) (stating, "in
principle a dissenting state which indicates its dissent from a practice while
the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule of law
even after it matures.") This is not to say that a State must express its
affirmative consent in order to be bound by customary law, just that its
objection can work to remove its obligation to comply with the subsequent
customary norm that crystallized over its objection.
n307 Among this number would certainly include the United States, Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Japan.
n308 This examination of interested State practice appears to be the method
employed consistently by the International Court of Justice in its examination
of customary law, and comports with the opinion expressed by numerous scholars
today. Thus, in the Nicaragua case, the Court undertook to establish the
customary legal basis for the principle of nonintervention as it analyzed the
dispute between the United States and Nicaragua. In so doing, the Court pointed
out that although the U.S. expressed its opinion that U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 2131 was not a formulation of law but only a statement of political
intention, the U.S. later accepted resolution 2625 which purported to declare
law on the same point as resolution 2131. Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 107. The Court's exercise in resolving the
apparent U.S. reservation to the principle of nonintervention is instructive,
and makes the most sense when viewed as an attempt to show that the U.S. was not
a persistent objector to the principle. In this light, the Court has employed a
method logically flowing from its prior assertion as to the required acceptance
of "specially affected" States in the formation of customary international law.
Given this disposition of the court, and apparently of international law in
general, the emerging practice of the United States with respect to the
recognition (or nonrecognition) of restrictions on space warfare, becomes most
n309 Malanczuk, Space Law, supra note 283, at 159.
n310 See id.
n311 See infra, Part IV, @ B.1.
n312 This is subject to the observation that debate now exists as the to
status of potential customary norms not otherwise addressed by treaty law. These
include the notion that international law recognizes a right of space objects,
headed either to or from outer space, to freely transit the sovereign airspace
of other States. Although some have pointed to the lack of objection by certain
States in the case of occasional violations of its airspace by space objects as
evidence that the "norm" has crystallized, this view is highly suspect. At a
minimum these anecdotal occasions assume that the violated state was aware of
the intrusion--unlikely in most cases usually cited. Thus Malanczuk observes
the contention can hardly be sustained that the practice of space powers to
launch their space objects into outer space after 1957 by crossing the air
space under the sovereignty of other countries developed into custom by the
acquiescence of those States. The countries affected simply often lacked the
technological capacities to find out.
MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 43. Beyond
this, even if a State knew about the violation, isolated instances of an
intrusion followed by a mere failure to protest is hardly sufficient to
establish a customary norm binding the entire international community. More than
this would be necessary to evince the requisite opinio juris. Thus Professor
There is no a [sic] right of (instant?) customary international law that space
objects can 'freely' transit through foreign airspace. The fact that in practice
so far no objections have been raised against transit through a State's airspace
by a foreign space object, is not an argument to refer to a customary right of
transit, as too few States have considered to be confronted with such transit
(and none have been), and no opinio juris with respect to such practice has been
pronounced as yet.
H.A. WASSENBERGH, PRINCIPLES OF OUTER SPACE LAW IN HINDSIGHT 36 (1991). By
contrast, the widespread recognition of the principle of freedom of space,
though it came rather quickly following the Soviet launch of Sputnik I, was
accompanied not only by the lack of objection in the face of orbital
overflights, but affirmative acquiescence by most States in the form of United
Nations resolutions. An additional customary norm pertains to the right of
space surveillance. In this instance a much stronger case can be made that
international law contains a customary norm to freely observe other States. As
Professor Diederiks-Verschoor notes "it is important to bear in mind that there
is as yet no statutory obligation on States, in U.N. Resolutions or elsewhere,
to ask for prior consent . . ." DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 298, at 11.
Given this, and given the general international legal principle that in the
absence of prohibition States are free to act as they please, it is perhaps
better to see the right of space surveillance not so much as requiring specific
authorization by an explicit customary norm but as the natural prerogative of a
State flowing from its sovereignty and from the principle that space is free.
n313 For example, as of 1993, Colombia and Indonesia had not ratified any of
the multilateral space treaties; Iran had ratified the Rescue & Return
Agreement, and Liability Convention; and Yugoslavia had ratified the Rescue &
Return Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention. Resolution
of the difficult question of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's uncertain
status within international law and its succession to treaties ratified by the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is to some extent ongoing as of this
writing (July 2000). For discussion of the international legal implication of
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, see HARRIS, supra note 173, at 120-31.
n314 For example, in addition to the two principles cited above, namely, the
freedom of space for use and exploration, and the prohibition on national
appropriation of space or celestial bodies, a third customary principle provides
for the rescue of astronauts in distress. Regarding the first two cited
principles, see supra note 310 and accompanying text.
n315 Established by resolution of the U.N.G.A. in 1958, COPUOS has served as
a central forum for international negotiations toward the development of space
law. Although made up of only 61 members, less than one-third of the United
Nations membership, and unable to adopt rules and regulations binding on State
parties (unlike the International Civil Aviation Organization for example),
COPUOS has nonetheless played a remarkably effective role in the early
development of space law. Of the five treaties now in force under the corpus
juris spatialis, all five originated within COPUOS. With only one exception in
1982, COPUOS has acted on the basis of consensus. "In other words, every
member of the Committee . . . was given a veto." Cheng, 'Instant' Customary Law,
supra note 301, at 27. As might be expected, this makes the negotiation and
drafting process "detailed, laborious, and time-consuming." N. Jasentuliyana,
The Lawmaking Process in the United Nations, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE
34 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992). This principle of action-by-consensus also
increases the commitment to the legal regimes created as well.
This is not to suggest that COPUOS is the only international body concerned
with space law. The scope of COPUOS' mandate in the progressive development of
space law excludes consideration of military uses, which the major space powers
relegate to "fora dealing with disarmament and arms control issues." Malanczuk,
Space Law, supra note 283, at 150. The most notable such forum is the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament. As of 2000, there were sixty-one member States of
COPUOS (unchanged from 1995): Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sudan,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, and Yugoslavia. COPUOS, Membership of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/602 1 (1995).
n316 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space
n317 Namely, Resolution 1772, Jan. 3, 1962, International Co-operation in the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; Resolution 1962 (XVIII), Dec. 13, 1963,
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, and Resolution 1963 (XVIII), Dec. 13, 1963,
International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. For a discussion
of the second, and most important of these resolutions, see infra notes 482-485
and accompanying text.
n318 ROBINSON & WHITE, supra note 293, at 181.
n319 N. Jasentuliyana, The Role of Developing Countries in the Formation of
Space Law, XX:II ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 95, 97 (1995) [hereinafter Jasentuliyana,
n320 I.A. Vlasic, A Survey of the Space Law Treaties and Principles Developed
Through the United Nations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 324 (1996).
n321 "[The Outer Space Treaty] represents de facto and de jure the
constitution of outer space." I.A. Vlasic, Some Thoughts on Negotiating and
Drafting Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Relating to Outer Space, in IV
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN OUTER SPACE: TOWARDS A NEW ORDER OF SURVIVAL
203, 212 (M.N. Matte, ed., 1991) [hereinafter Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting
Agreements Relating to Outer Space]. Subsequent multilateral space law treaties
serve primarily as commentaries and clarifications of the Outer Space Treaty.
n322 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. II.
n323 Private entrepreneurs are now declaring their intent to make claims of
ownership over asteroids. See, e.g., P. Landesman, Starship Private Enterprise,
THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 1998, at 178. As a matter of law, the possibility of
private appropriation has been widely rejected as an implicit violation of the
Outer Space Treaty's "no-sovereignty-in-outer-space" provision. However, growing
privatization of space activities, recognition of the economic benefits of
commercialization, differentiation of space resources from ocean resources, and
hesitation among venture capitalists to invest short of security interests
backed by ownership may lead to a gradual change in practice and law. The
positions of Wassenberg and Gorove that private appropriation does not violate
the Outer Space Treaty, while a minority view today, may became the majority
view in the twenty-first century. See H. Wassenbergh, Responsibility and
Liability for Non-Governmental Activities in Outer Space, in ECSL SUMMER COURSE
ON SPACE LAW AND POLICY: BASIC MATERIALS 197 (1994); S. Gorove, Interpreting
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 351 (1969).
Indeed, "some scholars writing in the wake of the Outer Space Treaty's
ratification took the position that Article 2's no-sovereignty provisions bar
any property rights in outer space resources. That position has lost its
popularity over time, however, and is no longer held by many scholars." REYNOLDS
& MERGES, supra note 59, at 82. As an example, some business interests have
begun planning to construct space resorts. "The Space Transportation
Association, an industry lobbying group, recently created a division devoted to
promoting space tourism, which it sees as a viable way to spur economic
development beyond earth." T. Beardsley, The Way to Go in Space, 280:2
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Feb. 1999, at 81. See also W.B. Scott, Studies Claim
Space Tourism Feasible, 146:14 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 7, 1997, at 58.
n324 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VI.
n325 As State responsibility for national space activity has been a
cornerstone of the corpus juris spatialis since 1967, it may well be a principle
of customary international law binding non-contracting States as well.
n326 The idea appeared previously in Principle 5 of U.N.G.A. Resolution 1962
(XVIII). However, this Resolution did not legally bind any State. See discussion
infra note 482.
n327 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IX.
n328 The entire body of international space law as it applies to space
warfare is subject to the limitations effected by a state of war between
belligerents. The difficult question of how an armed conflict terminates or
modifies obligations otherwise binding on belligerents in peacetime cannot be
avoided with respect to space warfare. For an example, see supra note 280 and
n329 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IX.
n330 Though Article IX also requires States to "conduct all their activities
in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the Treaty," this vague exhortation could just as likely apply
to the activities of States on earth as well. Outer Space Treaty, supra note
316, at art. IX. Certainly as a general proposition the intentional creation
of harmful contamination would run counter to various principles of
international law. However, as is often the case with armed conflict, the law
recognizes that as a matter of brute reality, certain activities illegitimate in
peace will be tolerated in war. Thus, in analyzing space warfare, the corpus
juris spatialis cannot be read in isolation from the law of war. In the context
of armed conflict, Article IX seems to create no greater duty for States with
respect to the space environment than that which exists for the terrestrial
environment. But see Professor Vlasic, "although these provisions apparently are
not aimed at hostile uses of outer space, they could nonetheless be invoked
against military activities not otherwise banned by the Treaty." Vlasic, Space
Law and Military Applications, supra note 11, at 397.
n331 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IX.
n332 B. REIJNEN, THE UNITED NATIONS SPACE TREATIES ANALYSED 130-31 (1992)
n333 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IV.
n334 I.A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 37, 39 (B. Jasani, ed., 1991) [hereinafter
Vlasic, Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space].
n336 Id. (quoting text of letter as contained in McDOUGAL, ET AL., supra note
40, at 395).
n337 Id. at 40.
n338 C.Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 22 (1982)
[hereinafter CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE]. In addition to
the textual problems associated with equating the terms peaceful and
non-military, (indeed Article IV itself contemplates the military use of space
for scientific research) the interpretation suffers from a practical difficulty.
Just about any use of space can support a military purpose. Thus, even if a
satellite were developed, tested, launched, and controlled by a "civilian" organ
of State government, the information it provided could be useful for military
purposes. Weather, navigation, communications, and remote sensing are just a few
applications of space capabilities of great use to military forces. To say that
the Outer Space Treaty forbids this activity seems highly dubious. Yet this is
the logical extension of the claim that all uses of space must scrupulously
avoid any military uses and thereby remain peaceful.
n339 See id. at 29.
n340 Indeed the term includes the prospect of space weapons as well.
If one chooses to ignore the controversy concerning the 'true' meaning of
'peaceful' in the Outer Space Treaty, it is safe to conclude that the Treaty
permits the deployment in outer space of anti-satellite weapons, directed energy
weapons, or any other kind of weapon, as long as these weapons are not in
conflict with the prohibitions of Article IV [such as weapons of mass
destruction in orbit] of the Outer Space Treaty, or some other international
Vlasic, Space Law and Military Applications, supra note 11, at 397. As a
linguistic matter, though the true meaning of peaceful can just as accurately
mean "non-aggressive," (in part evidenced by the fact that Article IV forbids
military bases, installations, fortifications, and maneuvers--a meaningless
partial demilitarization if "peaceful" simply means "non-military") the relevant
issue is this: what does the term allow and what does it prohibit under the law?
On this, the corpus juris spatialis is clear.
n341 See infra notes 469, 471 and accompanying text. Though none go so far as
the Antarctic Treaty in divorcing "military" activities from "peaceful
purposes," other treaties specifically suggest that "peaceful," as used therein,
means non-military. Thus,
an examination of agreements which use the term 'peaceful'--namely, the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the Antarctic Treaty; the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Their Destruction; and the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of the Environmental
Modification Techniques--shows that in all these treaties the term 'peaceful' is
used in contradistinction to 'military.'
Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting Agreements Relating to Outer Space, supra note
321, at 215. Assuming for the sake of argument that this interpretation is
accepted for each treaty cited, the exercise simply demonstrates that when the
drafters of a treaty intend for "peaceful" to mean non-military, they so state.
In the absence of doing so, one cannot simply assume it. For example, Article 88
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea specifies that "the high
seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). Given the history of State practice on the
high seas, no one assumed that this article turned the high seas into a
demilitarized zone. This provision "most certainly cannot be interpreted to mean
that military uses of the high seas are prohibited. Both customary law and the
uniform practice of States, before 1982 and after, are crystal clear on this
point." Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting Agreements Relating to Outer Space,
supra note 321, at 215. Unless the treaty specifies that "peaceful" means
non-military, or its negotiating history makes it obvious, it cannot be assumed.
n342 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States
of the European Space Agency, The Government of Japan, The Government of the
Russian Federation, and The Government of the United States of America
Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998,
art. 1(1), IV UNITED STATES SPACE LAW: NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 98-1
(S. Gorove, ed., 1998) [hereinafter ISS Agreement].
n343 Id. at art. 9 P3(b).
n344 CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338, at
n345 Christol quotes the principal U.S. negotiator of the treaty, Ambassador
Arthur Goldberg, for this proposition: "'obviously whatever the definition of
outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies are in outer space.'" Id. at
n346 Id. at 24.
n347 Professor Vlasic provides one insight as to why the U.S. preferred to
restrict the application of "peaceful purposes" to the moon and celestial
bodies: "According to [a] former Legal Advisor in the U.S. Department of State,
the "language of Article IV was carefully chosen to ensure that general
principle of 'peaceful uses' would not interfere with the testing" of weapons
such as nuclear ballistic missiles." Vlasic, Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, supra note 334, at 42. Of course, on the widely-accepted view that
peaceful means non-aggressive, such testing would not have been a problem.
Indeed, on this understanding, the actual use of weapons in space can be
peaceful if compliant with the jus ad bellum. Thus, Professor Christol's
pragmatic recognition that
it is a fact that [Article 4(2)] says that the moon and celestial bodies full
stop shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; and by that I take it to
mean that this inhibition or restriction does not apply to outer space today.
Though I do realize that there are many who make arguments which sometimes are a
little overreaching, and whereas my sympathies go with them, my legal training
tells me that we had better not read it that way . . .
C. Christol, Discussion, in M. COHEN & M.E. GOUIN, LAWYERS AND THE NUCLEAR
DEBATE 233 (1988).
n348 See supra notes 266-274 and accompanying text.
n349 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. III.
n350 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. @ 2451(a) (1994).
n351 The White House, National Science and Technology Council, National
Space Policy, Sept. 19, 1996 (from the Introduction). The policy statement
articulates the long-held U.S. position on the meaning of peaceful purposes by
stating that "'Peaceful purposes' allow defense and intelligence-related
activities in pursuit of national security and other goals." Id. P3.
n352 "In the case of weapons systems, there is a much broader feeling [beyond
that for military support systems] that they are destabilizing and should be
banned." P. Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, in SPACE
LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143, 150 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992). Further, in a
fascinating recent article, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce DeBlois argued that for
reasons of national policy, the U.S. should resist the urge to weaponize space
with ASATs. He boldly proclaims the U.S. National Space Policy "weak and
ambiguous" with "no clear vision" and no one "in charge," and that for space
matters "few people would argue" that the U.S. is "fumbling around in an ad hoc
manner." DeBlois, supra note 3, at 52. Yet even this advocate of the "space
sanctuary" school recognizes that "except for [weapons of mass destruction] and
[anti-ballistic missile systems for the U.S. and Russia], no international
prohibition on space weapons exists." Id. at 46.
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully consider the policy merits of
weaponizing space. However, the debate that Lieutenant Colonel DeBlois invites
is sure to yield a flood of comment, much of which will no doubt take issue with
his central premise that space weapons are ultimately destabilizing. With
respect to ASATs in the context of the cold war, Stares helpfully summarizes the
opposing positions, portions of which still carry some currency in the post-cold
[The pro-ASAT school] starts from the belief that space is just another military
arena where satellites will have to adapt to new threats with new
countermeasures in the same way that their counterparts on earth have adapted. .
. . [Proponents believe the U.S. can] deny the Soviets the use of their space
assets in wartime while simultaneously preserving the security of U.S. space
systems. Moreover, they argue that any attempt to constrain the development of
antisatellite systems is illogical and unfeasible; illogical because there are
no such limitations on weapons capable of attacking, say, high-flying
reconnaissance aircraft or early warning radars, and unfeasible because of the
unavoidable presence of the residual antisatellite systems . . . . The second
school . . . starts from the belief that the United States is more dependent on
the service of military satellites than the Soviet Union is and therefore has
more to lose in the event of hostilities in space. The proponents of this view
remain highly skeptical of the United States' ability to defend its vital
space assets in the face of unconstrained antisatellite development by the
Soviet Union. In addition to stimulating an expensive and in the end fruitless
competition, they believe an ASAT arms race could seriously erode superpower
stability during a severe crisis. Specifically, the knowledge that the other
side had a highly effective ASAT weapon system capable of crippling one's own
vital early warning and strategic communication satellites could become an
overwhelming incentive to strike first in a major superpower crisis.
STARES, SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 70, at 5.
n353 Because the Outer Space Treaty does not define nuclear weapon its
prohibition has stimulated debate over newer technologies such as the X-ray
laser which is powered by a nuclear explosion. Whether a nuclear-powered laser
is a nuclear weapon will mean the difference between its lawful orbiting of
earth or not. P. Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, in
SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 147 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992). Given its
destructive power, the military significance of such a laser will be tremendous.
For example, the intense X-rays emitted as a result of the initial nuclear blast
lead some to speculate that one X-ray laser no larger than a packing crate would
be able to destroy the entire Russian ICBM arsenal if they were launched at one
time in a massive attack. TAYLOR, supra note 97, at 36. In addition to the
possibility that such weapons may be nuclear weapons under the Outer Space
Treaty, their immense destructive capability may otherwise render them weapons
of mass destruction.
n354 Professor Stojak points out that though it is unlikely to happen, the
change could occur without a new treaty were Article IV(1) modified to read:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in outer space [instead of
"in orbit around the earth"] any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on the moon or on
celestial bodies, or station weapons [instead of "such weapons"] in outer
space in any other manner.
M.L. Stojak, Recent Developments in Space Law, in ARMS CONTROL AND THE RULE OF
LAW: A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE 62 (J.M. Beier & S.
Mataija, eds., 1998) [hereinafter Stojak].
n355 The exception to this applies only to the U.S. and Russia under the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which prohibits interference with "national
technical means" of arms control verification. See infra Part V, @ A.2. With
respect to the ban on orbiting of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction,
it has been widely observed that the proscription does not extend to partial
To be 'in orbit,' an object must circumnavigate the planet at least one full
time. When, on Nov. 3, 1967, U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that
the U.S.S.R. had been testing a Fractional Orbiting Bombing System (FOBS), that
could become operational in 1968, he hastened to add that as such an object,
while entering outer space, does not completely circle the globe, it, like an
intercontinental ballistic missile, was not in violation of the 1967 treaty.
HURWITZ, supra note 289, at 111.
n356 For discussion of the prohibition on nuclear weapons tests in space, see
infra notes 436-438 and accompanying text.
n357 W.E. Burrows, The Military in Space: Securing the High Ground, in
SPACE: DISCOVERY AND EXPLORATION 142 (M.J. Collins & S.K. Kraemer, eds., 1993)
(quoting speech by Brigadier General Homer A. Boushey).
n358 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, 19
U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968) [hereinafter
Rescue & Return Agreement]. Although widely used, the shorthand "astronaut
agreement" is unfortunate because it masks the treaty's application to return of
objects as well as astronauts. A better shorthand reference would be the "rescue
and return agreement." CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra
note 338, at 152.
n359 Though never defined, it seems best to think of a space object as
something distinct from astronauts. However, when international law finally
settles on a definition of space object it may include astronauts. See infra
n360 Other than the Moon Agreement, the U.S. and Russia are parties to four
of the five multilateral treaties under the corpus juris spatialis. For
discussion of the Moon Agreement, see infra, Part IV, @ B.5.
n361 Though the treaty does not specify whether the notifications to the
launching authority and the U.N. Secretary General are conjunctive or
disjunctive, the language of Article 2 requiring similar notifications is
n362 Rescue & Return Agreement, supra note 358, at art. 1.
n363 Id. at art. 2. Article 2 further specifies that if assistance by the
launching authority would "effect a prompt rescue or would contribute
substantially to the effectiveness of search and rescue operations" it shall
cooperate with the State Party in whose territory the astronaut has landed.
Id. This raises two observations. First, if the conditions for cooperation are
satisfied, the launching authority must assist. Second, because Article 6
defines launch authority, in part, as "the State responsible for launching," it
could constitute a State other than the astronaut's home state. For example,
when the U.S. launches Canadian, French, or Spanish astronauts on its Space
Shuttle, if the occupants were to land in the territory of another contracting
party by reason of "accident, distress, emergency, or unintended landing," the
U.S. as "launching authority" could be required under Article 2 to assist in any
recovery efforts. Id. Such efforts would then be "subject to the direction and
control of the Contracting Party, which shall act in close and continuing
consultation with the launching authority." Id. With respect to the treaty, its
provisions, including the duty to rescue and assist, formally apply only to
States Parties. However, by analogy with Maritime Law, it seems likely that this
duty to assist astronauts in distress is rooted in customary international law.
The duty to assist mariners on the sea has long been established both by treaty
(e.g. 1910 Brussels Treaty) and custom, and likely applies equally to
n364 Id. at art. 3.
n365 The Liability Convention, does define space object as including the
"component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof." Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, art. 1(d), 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered
into force Sept. 1, 1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention]. However in using
the very term to be defined within the definition itself, the definition is so
hopelessly circular that it amounts to no definition at all.
n366 Rescue & Return Agreement, supra note 358, at art. 5(1).
n367 Id. at art. 5(3).
n368 The satellite was designed for ocean reconnaissance and was powered by a
"nuclear reactor working on uranium enriched with isotope of uranium-235."
SPACE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS 295 (I. Vlasic, ed., 1997)
(containing Statement of Claim by Canada, Jan. 23, 1979). The Cosmos 954 crash
was the first instance "in the history of space exploration where a claim was
made by one sovereign state against another on account of damage caused by a
falling space object." B. Schwartz & M.L. Berlin, After the Fall: An Analysis of
Canadian Legal Claims for Damage Caused by Cosmos 954, 27 McGILL L.J. 676
(1982). The satellite contained over 50 kg of enriched uranium, suggesting it
was not designed for reentry in 1978 but only after a long orbital lifetime.
n369 President Carter notified Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and actually
repeated an offer made prior to the satellite's reentry. A.F. Cohen, Cosmos 954
and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 10:1 YALE J. INT'L L. 78, 80
(1984). Not only does this suggest that the U.S. had tracked the satellite to
its reentry point, but that the U.S. earnestly wanted an analysis of the Soviet
spy satellite. Cohen reports that prior to the reentry, the Soviet Union
secretly provided the U.S. with information about the satellite's reactor,
though this information was only formally provided to Canada months after the
crash. See id. at 179.
n370 Indeed, though the Soviet Union expressed no interest in the return of
the object and therefore claimed it had no obligation to provide identifying
data under Article 5(3) (required prior to return of the object), it expressed
regret that its specialists did not participate in the search and removal of the
object. CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338, at
179. Because no State has ever requested return of a space object from another,
Article 5 has never been tested in practice.
n371 Rescue & Return Agreement, supra note 358, at art. 5(2).
n372 Id. at art. 4.
n373 Austria, supported by France, wished to continue to offer asylum in
keeping with its "traditional policies toward aliens." CHRISTOL, MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338, at 175.
n374 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 204. These States plausibly
asserted that requests for asylum under conditions of the unintended landings
specified in the treaty could be coerced, "particularly when the requestor is
the victim of a recent space accident and may not be in full possession of his
or her faculties." Id.
n375 Id. Also, though its terms suggest application to living astronauts, the
treaty does not answer whether a duty exists to return the remains of expired
n376 Liability Convention, supra note 365.
n377 See infra, Part VI, @ E.3.
n378 Liability Convention, supra note 365 (from the Preamble).
n379 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VII. Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty also provided the drafters of the Liability Convention some
guidance in its assertion that States Parties "shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . ." Id. at art. VI.
Foster notes that the Outer Space Treaty left several left several questions
(a) what flight instrumentalities are covered by the term 'object?';
(b) what is meant by the phrase 'internationally liable?';
(c) what regime will govern the liability of States engaged in a joint venture-
-will they be jointly and severally liable or only severally liable?;
(d) what is encompassed by the term 'damage?';
(e) how is an international organization to be responsible under the Treaty when
it cannot become a party to, or even accept the obligations contained in the
(f) what mechanisms will be used to settle disputes arising when damage is caused?
W.F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, 1972 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 143 n.3 [hereinafter Foster]. Of
these, with the exception of the first, all have been clarified to some
meaningful degree by the Liability Convention.
n380 Defined more expansively than "launching authority" under the Rescue &
Return Agreement, "launching state" under the Liability Convention includes (1)
the State who launches a space object; (2) the State who procures the launch of
a space object; and (3) the State from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched. Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. I(c).
n381 Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. 2. This significant
provision was the first time that an international agreement provided for
attaching absolute liability to State actors.
n382 Id. at art. 3.
n383 As stated previously, the Liability Convention's definition of "objects"
attempts, but fails to define the term. Though it would appear to include
non-operational space debris, it leaves several unresolved issues. For example,
it is unclear whether a space object is simply an object designed for travel in
outer space. Foster notes that all of the draft definitions of "space object" in
the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee "contained the criterion of being designed for
movement in outer space." Foster, supra note 379, at 145. On this approach,
sounding rockets that fail to leave earth's atmosphere and scientific equipment
permanently left on the moon are not space objects. By contrast, a satellite in
transit by rail that rolls off its platform causing damage would logically
subject the State of origin to absolute liability. Though the Liability
Convention attaches liability to "launching States" it does not specify that to
be compensable the damage must occur during or after a launch. Further, because
the Liability Convention definition of "space object" includes "component parts
of a space object," it is unclear whether, for example, cargo and crew of a
space object also qualify themselves as "space objects." They might if Christol
is correct that "component parts' is to be construed in a broad sense to include
such property on board as would be conducive to the successful operation of the
space object." CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note
338, at 109. Because the Convention does not explicitly define the term "space
object," these hypothetical scenarios raise potential future disputes over what
types of objects can create liability.
n384 Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. I(a).
n385 Id. at art. IV.
n386 Id. at art. V.
n387 Id. at art. VI.
n388 Id. at art. VII.
n389 Id. at art. VIII.
n390 Id. at art. X.
n391 Id. at art. XI.
n392 Id. at art. XIV--art. XX.
n393 CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338, at
n394 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15,
1979) [hereinafter Registration Convention].
n395 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 298, at 41.
n396 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VIII.
n397 Arguably, the Outer Space Treaty implicitly required the maintenance of
a registry simply because use of the term in the Treaty assumes that States
maintain them. Yet, the matter was not stated as a requirement until 1975.
n398 Registration Convention, supra note 394, at art. I. The first two
phrases are given definitions identical to those found in the Liability
n399 Id. at art. II(1). This suggests that space objects, or other objects,
launched into sub-orbital trajectories need not be registered. Technically, this
would include objects failing to complete a single circumnavigation of the
globe, as for example objects following a 180 or 270 degree arc, short of the
complete 360 degree path required of orbital flights.
n400 Id. at art. II(3).
n401 Essentially, this information has been made optional in view of Article
V which suggests that space objects may or may not carry identifying markings:
"Whenever a space object launched into earth orbit or beyond is marked with the
designator or registration number referred to in Article IV, paragraph 1(b), . .
." The obvious but unstated assumption flowing from "whenever" is that in some
cases the object might be marked, in some cases it might not, at the option of
the launching state.
n402 Also termed "orbital period." "The time it takes a spacecraft or other
object to circumnavigate Earth, . . . High altitude circuits take longer to
complete than low ones. Elliptical and circular orbits have equal periods, if
the average of apogee and perigee altitudes is the same." COLLINS, MILITARY
SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 156.
n403 Also termed "orbital inclination."
The angle of a flight path in space relative to the equator of Earth, . . .
Equatorial paths are 0 [degree] for flights headed east, 180 [degrees] for those
headed west. Polar paths are 90 [degrees]. All other paths overfly equal parts
of the northern and southern hemispheres (from 50 [degrees] N latitude to 50
[degrees] S, for example).
n404 "The maximum altitude attained by a spacecraft in elliptical orbit
around Earth, its moon, or another planet." Id. at 146.
n405 "The minimum altitude attained by a spacecraft in elliptical orbit
around Earth, its moon, or another planet. Spacecraft in [low-earth orbit]
attain maximum velocity at that point where Earth's gravitational pull is
strongest." Id. at 157.
n406 Registration Convention, supra note 394, at art. IV(1).
n407 In some cases, what is practicable may require delay for up to a year or
more. During the prosecution of an international armed conflict, it would hardly
be practicable for a belligerent to transmit the launch of its space objects to
an opposing belligerent through the United Nations. Notification to the opposing
belligerent is the practical result of such notifications made during the armed
conflict, given the fact that "there shall be full and open access to the
information in this [United Nations] Register." Id. at art. III(2). On this
interpretation of Article IV(1), a belligerent could avoid the difficult
conclusion that the Registration Convention does not apply during armed
conflicts--the belligerent could simply and reasonably apply the Convention's
own terms in the context of armed conflict. This interpretative approach to the
Registration Convention is available to belligerents in any conflict, not merely
those involving space combat. Thus, during Vietnam, the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
and the 1999 war in the former Yugoslavia, belligerents could legitimately delay
notification to the U.N. Secretary General under Article IV until doing so
provided no tactical advantage to the enemy. Once the military threat posed by
earlier notification is passed, the notification became practicable for the
State of registry.
n408 Indeed, protection of the "national technical means" (including space
reconnaissance capabilities) under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., is the sine qua non of an effective verification
structure. To the extent the ABM Treaty should survive in its current form, the
U.S. and Russia must protect the secrecy of their space reconnaissance assets.
The Registration Convention allows them to do this. For a discussion of the ABM
Treaty, see infra, Part V, @ A.2.
n409 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 298, at 42.
n411 In addition to reconnaissance satellites, the vague reporting
requirements could easily obscure the true nature of attack satellites as well.
n412 Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N.
Doc. A/34/664 (1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon
n413 As of 2000, nine States had ratified the treaty, few of which are active
in space and none of which are major space actors. Among others, these include
Australia, Mexico, and Pakistan. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General (July 21, 2000), available at
(copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). France signed but has
not ratified the treaty. Id.
n414 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 4(1); accord Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 316, at art. I.
n415 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 4(1); accord Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 316, at art. I.
n416 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 11(2); accord Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 316, at art. II.
n417 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 12(1); accord Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VIII (using term "object" versus "vehicles,
equipment, facilities, stations, and installations").
n418 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 2; accord Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 316, at art. III.
n419 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 14(1); accord Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VI.
n420 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 15(1); accord Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 316, at art. XII. The Moon Agreement adds a fifth category,
facilities, to the list of items open to States Parties.
n421 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 1(1).
n422 Id. at art. 1(3).
n423 Id. at art. 6(2). Unfortunately, the treaty does not define "sample."
Thus it is not clear from the treaty's terms either what sized object
constitutes a sample (1 cm? .5 m? 10 m? 100 m?) or how many samples may be
removed. Article 6(2) goes on to state that "States Parties may in the course of
scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the moon in
quantities appropriate for the support of their missions." Id. While this comes
close to providing guidance on a permissible amount, the fact that minerals and
substances may "also" be used in this way suggests that it is in addition to the
taking and retaining of samples. Thus, there is no clear answer.
n424 The Apollo 11 moon landing in 1969 is regarded as providing the first
major impetus toward negotiating a specific treaty governing moon activities.
The negotiators were motivated in part by "an awareness that tangible Moon rocks
were being returned to Earth, the possibility that mineral and other substances,
as well as intangible resources, might be exploited, and speculation that it
might be possible to establish human habitations on the Moon." CHRISTOL, MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338, at 246. The provision allowing
for limited exploitation of the moon's resources came at the expense of
proposals by some developing countries to outlaw the exploitation of natural
resources in space except under the auspices of an international regime.
n425 Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 3(3). The prohibition on
orbiting weapons of mass destruction around the moon was thought to close a gap
left by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. The latter outlawed the orbiting
of weapons of mass destruction around the earth, and the installation or
stationing of such weapons on celestial bodies or in outer space. Though the
prohibition on stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space could be
read to foreclose the lawfulness of orbiting, for example, a nuclear weapon
around the moon, the Outer Space Treaty did not specifically forbid orbiting of
the moon by nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The Moon Agreement
n426 Id. at art. 3(2).
n427 Id. at art. 11.
n428 As applied to outer space, the concept first arose in July 1967 at the
behest of the Ambassador of Argentina, Aldo Armando Cocca, in discussions held
with the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee.
A few months later, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo,
applied the principle to the law of the sea when he stated that the seabed was
the 'common heritage of mankind.' The concept was formalized first in the 1979
Moon Agreement, and subsequently in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
Jasentuliyana, Developing Countries, supra note 319, at 106. Prior to this, the
CHM concept appeared in a 1970 U.N.G.A. resolution declaring principles
governing the seabed and subsoil beneath it.
n429 During negotiations over the Moon Agreement, the Argentinean delegation
submitted a working paper in which it proposed that the merit in "replacing the
vague expression 'province of mankind' by the more meaningful expression 'common
heritage of mankind' is that in doing so one has specified the commencement of
an action, replacing an abstract statement by a means of operating, within a
specified legal framework." Jasentuliyana, Developing Countries, supra note 319,
at 107-08. Perhaps Diederiks-Verschoor puts the distinction best:
The 'province of mankind' must be identified as a general political principle
with certain moral overtones, meant to govern rights and duties in outer
space. Its legal substance, according to Article I [of the Outer Space Treaty]
is international cooperation and use of outer space without discrimination of
any States, and the duty to take into account the interests of other States. The
scope of the term 'common heritage' is much more restricted in legal terms,
covering only the exploitation of the moon's natural resources.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 298, at 45. As usual, Professor Christol gets to
the heart of the matter:
[despite commonalities] it is evident that the two principles carry separate and
distinct characteristics. The province of mankind principle is linked to the res
communis principle which allows for the exploration, use, exploitation, and
voluntary sharing of common resources. On the other hand, the Common Heritage of
Mankind principle, as contained in the Moon Agreement, may be characterized as a
"res communis plus" principle in the sense that successful explorers, users, and
exploiters of the moon and its natural resources will be obligated to conform to
the decisions of the international legal regime identified in Article 11 of that
agreement . . . . The province of mankind principle does not contemplate the
formation of an international inter-governmental body or that there be an
obligatory sharing of the tangible acquisitions of Moon and celestial body
C.Q. Christol, Important Concepts for the International Law of Outer Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 73, 80 (1998).
n430 Jasentuliyana, Developing Countries, supra note 319, at 106-07. For more
detailed analyses, see G.M. Danilenko, The Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind in International Law, XIII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 247 (1988); N.
Jasentuliyana, The U.N. Space Treaties and the Common Heritage Principle, 2
SPACE POL'Y 296 (1986); A. Cocca, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Doctrine and
Principle of Space Law--An Overview, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH
COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 17 (1986); N.M. Matte, Limited Aerospace
Natural Resources and their Regulation, VII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 379 (1982);
K.B. Walsh, Controversial Issues Under Article XI of the Moon Treaty, VI ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 489 (1981); and S.M. Williams, The Common Heritage of Mankind and
the Moon Agreement--Economic Implications and Institutional Arrangements, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 87 (1981).
n431 The Agreement calls for an international regime that contains four
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources; (c) The expansion of
opportunities in the use of those resources; and (d) an equitable sharing by all
States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the
interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those
countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration.
Moon Agreement, supra note 412, at art. 11(7).
n432 Id. at art. 11(5).
n433 Indeed, friction between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did not help the
prospects for ratification. Although the other leading global space power, and
presumably capable of developing the means to exploit the moon's natural
resources, the U.S.S.R. generally sided with the interests of the developing
States. Both were against incorporation of the CHM principal, however, the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. could not agree on whether exploitation could begin before
establishment of the international regime called for in Article 11--the U.S.
position--or not, the Soviet position. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 298,
at 46. For further information on the debates within the U.S. Senate and State
Department, see M.L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law: Moon Treaty, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 421-26 (1980). Though
the State Department supported the Agreement, a large number of space interest
groups mounted a tremendous protest to the implications of the CHM principle.
What is most surprising is that despite the strong objection to the CHM
principle coming from the U.S., "the U.S. delegation in COPUOS was the main
architect [of the concept]." D. Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the
Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of International Space Law,
19 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 231 (1981). See also C. Christol, Current
Developments: The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985).
n434 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 116.
n435 J.F. Kennedy, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN
F. KENNEDY, 1961, 405 (1962).
n436 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Underwater, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into
Force Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty]. As the title
suggests, the Treaty effected a "limited" ban on nuclear testing that did not
restrict detonations under ground. Important as its restrictions on space
activities are, some scholars refer to it as a sixth space treaty. See, e.g.,
REIJNEN, supra note 332, at ix.
n437 The only limitation of course being those locations where the detonation
would constitute an illegal use of force under the jus ad bellum, or means and
method of warfare against foreign property or persons in violation of the jus in
bello. Because France and China never signed the treaty, they would in theory
still be free to initiate detonations in the atmosphere, under water, or in
outer space. Such activity would have to overcome the strong argument that doing
so violates customary international law, including that related to environmental
protection. France continued to test on the high seas until 1973. Though
Australia sought a declaration from the International Court of Justice that such
testing violated international law, the Court determined the issue moot when
France declared it would carry out no further such testing in the South Pacific.
See Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J.
n438 Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 436, at art. I(1) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, the drafters sidestepped the issue of where space begins by
simply forbidding detonations within the atmosphere and "beyond its limits,
including outer space." Id.
n439 Id. The U.S. signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was
rejected by the Senate in October of 1999.
n440 Of course, negotiators were not oblivious to the clear military
implications as well. Jankowitsch writes, "In 1962, the international community
was jolted and the situation changed dramatically when the first nuclear weapon
was tested in outer space. Suddenly, the extension of the arms race into outer
space posed a real and present threat to international peace and security, . .
." Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed., 1992).
n441 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 54.
n442 Although one of his highest priorities as President, Dwight D.
Eisenhower declared the failure of his administration to secure a nuclear test
ban "the greatest disappointment of any administration--of any decade--of any
time and of any party." P.H. Nitze & S.D. Drell, This Treaty Must Be Ratified,
WASH. POST, June 21, 1999, at 19.
n443 See N.M. Matte, The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (10 October 1963) and the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space IX ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 391, 397(1984). The Soviets did not
begin their testing until Aug. 29, 1949.
n444 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 59.
n445 Id. at 61. The authors note that the United States abandoned its
experimentation on the ORION nuclear propulsion system after ratification of the
treaty. Such system used small atomic bombs as fuel. A similar process is
thought to fuel the X-ray laser developed as part of the Strategic Defense
Initiative. See supra note 353. The U.S. Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment opined in 1985 that existing international law prohibits "the testing
or deployment in space of nuclear space mines or ASATs that would require a
nuclear detonation as a power source." U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, 1985, at
21. The basis of this conclusion is likely not the Outer Space Treaty's ban on
the orbiting or stationing of nuclear weapons in space, the definition of which
is reasonably open to interpretation, but the Limited Test Ban Treaty's ban on
nuclear detonations in space.
n446 Because electromagnetic pulses are not dissipated in space, a single
two-megaton bomb exploded at 50 km or higher above the earth could affect the
circuits of nearly all satellites up to the geostationary orbit. REYNOLDS &
MERGES, supra note 59, at 59. While military satellites are shielded against
such threats, commercial satellites usually are not. Of course, the treaty does
not prohibit all explosions in space, only those generated by a nuclear blase.
n447 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972)
[hereinafter ABM Treaty].
n448 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 96.
n449 ABM Treaty, supra note 447, at art. I, II. As would become significant
in 1983, the ABM Treaty did not prohibit research into ABM systems.
n450 Id. at art. III, as amended. The treaty originally allowed two ABM
systems having a radius of 150 km or less. This was reduced to one, by Protocol
of 1974. See Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645 (entered into force May 24, 1976). The Protocol
specified that the U.S. would not deploy an ABM system in the area centered on
its capital, while the Soviet Union would not deploy a system in the deployment
area of its ICBM silo launchers. Id. at art. I. While the U.S. explored the
development of a system as authorized by the Treaty, it never fielded one. By
contrast, the Soviet Union did field one around Moscow. In addition, the U.S.
suspected at least one other site maintained by the Soviets that was not
authorized under the Treaty. As Shukman notes, "Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to
admit, after years of denials, that one large radar, built near Krasnoyarsk in
Siberia, was in breach of the agreement." SHUKMAN, supra note 39, at 57.
n451 ABM Treaty, supra note 447 (from the Preamble).
n452 Id. at art. V(1).
n453 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 97.
n454 ABM Treaty, supra note 447, at art. XII.
n455 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 97.
n456 The term 'national technical means' (NTM) includes
a variety of technical information-gathering methods for monitoring both
military activities and armaments subject to verification. NTM consists, most
importantly, of satellites, ships, aircraft and ground-based radar stations, as
well as other technical devices. . . . Of course, neither side entirely relies
only on its technical means of verification; many additional methods for
collecting intelligence are also used to complement the information obtained by
I.A. Vlasic, Verifying Compliance With Arms Control Agreements: Whatever
Happened to 'ISMA'?, in ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN OUTER SPACE 191 (N.M.
Matte, ed., 1985).
n457 The possibility of a Security Council use of force authorization is
practically zero as both Parties to the Treaty maintain a veto over any such
Security Council resolutions.
n458 Recently published criticisms are numerous: C. Krauthammer, The ABM
Trap, WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, at 27 [hereinafter Krauthammer]; R.K. Bennett,
Needed: Missile Defense, READER'S DIGEST, July 1999, at 117; J. Hackett, Urgent
Need to Exit ABM Treaty, WASH. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at 19; Editorial, Where's
the Treaty?, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1999, at 22; J. Skrlec, ABM Pact Outdated,
Kissinger Tells Panel: Rogue States Pose Threat, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 1999, at
These sources show that in addition to the growing chorus of criticism from
the U.S. public and Congress, critics include those having negotiated the treaty
itself, including Henry Kissinger and John Rhinelander. Critics point to the
threat to U.S. cities of missile attacks by nations such as North Korea, Iran,
and Pakistan. Even those skeptical of the technical feasibility of ABM systems
are witnessing some recent system successes, after numerous failures. A
successful June 10, 1999 test firing of the Army's Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense system (THAAD), showed, according to program manager Brigadier General
Richard Davis, that the U.S. now has "the guidance control, accuracy and the
processing that allows us to hit a bullet with a bullet." P. Shenon, After Six
Failures, Test Of Antimissile System Succeeds, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at 1;
See also THAAD Seeker Views Hera Target Before Hit-to-Kill Intercept, 150:26 AV.
WK. & SPACE TECH., June 28, 1999, at 42; World News Roundup, 150:24 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH, June 14, 1999, at 56. The system scored a second successful test on
Aug. 2, 1999. M.A. Dornheim, Tough Tests for THAAD Are Several Years Off, 151:7
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH, Aug. 16, 1999, at 70. The second success prompted the DOD
to consider an expedited fielding of the theater system; moving it from 2007 to
2006. R. Wall, Missile Defense Changes Emerge, 151:9 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH, Aug.
20, 1999, at 30; See also R. Wall, THAAD At Crossroads After Intercept, 151:6
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH, Aug. 9, 1999, at 29. The technical implications of these
theater ABM successes are still unclear. This uncertainty is especially acute
given a recent national missile defense test failure off the coast of
California. See Elaine Sciolino, Antimissile System Fails Over Pacific, Pentagon
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2000, at 1. However, as with early critics of ICBM
or satellite technology who predicted such innovations were not feasible, the
drive to accomplish each was simply a matter of scientific and fiscal willpower.
It is likely that the quest for a technically feasible national missile defense
system will follow a similar course. The strategic implications are more
apparent. Among other benefits, a single THAAD missile battery could defend
Taiwan while three batteries could defend the entire island of Japan. J.
Hackett, What the THAAD Hit Means, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at 18. As
currently proposed, a national missile system could protect most of the U.S.
against a limited missile strike.
n459 Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Russia became the
successor State to the former U.S.S.R.'s rights and obligations under the
n460 ABM Treaty, supra note 447, at art. XV(2). Recent signs show that
withdrawal by the U.S. may not be necessary. After repeatedly objecting to
U.S. requests for a renegotiation of the Treaty so as to allow for a national
missile defense, Russia decided to discuss the matter under President Yeltsin.
J. Gerstenzang, Clinton, Yeltsin OK New Look at Arms Treaties, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 1999, at 1. Whether the process begun by these negotiations will result in
meaningful progress remains to be seen. As of this writing, the U.S. had
proposed a draft treaty that would allow a defensive system consisting of, in
part, 100 missiles and launchers, as well as sophisticated new radars. Steven
Lee Myers & Jane Perlez, Documents Detail U.S. Plan to Alter '72 Missile Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at 1. However, not only has the proposal met with
great sceptism by the Russians, but several key national security experts have
begun questioning the entire renegotiating strategy. Paul Mann, Tide Surges
Against Clinton's NMD Plan, 152:25 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 26, 2000, at 31.
n461 For example, the U.S. recently discovered that the North Korean ICBM
program maintains a 3-stage rocket capability. Its Taepo-Dong missile travels at
7 to 8 km per second, faster than the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense
ABM system could counter. Krauthammer, supra note 458.
n462 E. Becker, House Approves Star Wars Defense System, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1999, at 1.
n463 M.A. Dornheim, National Missile Defense Focused on June Review, 151:7
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH, Aug. 16, 1999, at 66.
n464 Characteristically, Reagan communicated his disagreement with the
assumptions made by the ABM Treaty in simple, populist terms. His views,
articulated almost seventeen years ago, typify the current widespread
disaffection with the treaty:
I've become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable
of rising above dealing with other nations and human being by threatening their
existence. . . . If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve
major arms reductions, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear
balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of
retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human
condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? . . . I
clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain
problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed
as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these
considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our
country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to
the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. . . . My fellow Americans, tonight we're
launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human
history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it.
As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.
R. Reagan, Peace and National Security, Address to the Nation (Mar. 23, 1983),
in WEAPONS IN SPACE 351-53 (A. Long, et al., eds., 1986). Well before the
President's "Strategic Defense Initiative" speech, derisively termed "star wars"
by members of the news media, ABM research had been underway. "As early as the
1950s, Pentagon planners first suggested fielding anti-missile missiles."
SHUKMAN, supra note 39, at 55.
n465 P. Mann, Historic Turn Eyed in Missile Defense, 151:1 AV. WK. & SPACE
TECH, July 5, 1999, at 30. Specific improvements noted include radar capability
and data processing, optical systems, lasers and sensors, and miniaturization of
crucial missile defense components such as rocket thrusters. Id.
n466 H. DeSaussure, The Freedoms of Outer Space and Their Maritime
Antecedents, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 1 (N. Jasentuliyana, ed.,
n467 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994; U.S. has signed but not ratified)
[hereinafter LOS Convention].
n468 Article 87 states that "the high seas are open to all States, whether
coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law.
It comprises, inter alia, . . . (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of
overflight." Id. at art. 87. Indeed the principal Outer Space Treaty negotiator
for the U.S. stated that the analogy of the high seas was a guiding theme during
the drafting of Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty establishing the freedom of
outer space. CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 338,
at 41. From this, Christol concludes that the negotiators of the Outer Space
Treaty were "aware of the res communis concepts applying to the ocean and were
employing this analogy as they contemplated the legal rules to be applied in the
exploration and use, including exploitation, of the space environment." Id. at
n469 That is, territory belonging to none. Regarding the principle of terra
nullius and the example of Antarctica, see MALANCZUK, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 149.
n471 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force
June 23, 1961) [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty].
n472 Though the Treaty does permit the presence of military personnel,
Article 1 ensures that the activity of such personnel will not be "of a military
nature." Id. at art. 1.
n473 Although the Antarctic Treaty "has often been invoked as the most
authoritative aid for the interpretation of the term 'peaceful' found in various
outer space official texts," the phrase cannot be divorced from the immediate
context in which it is subsequently used. Vlasic, Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, supra note 334, at 41. As noted previously, understanding of the
term evolved from its early use in 1957 as applied to space activity through its
final expression in the Outer Space Treaty. See supra, notes 334-343 and
though it is sometimes offered as a model for space, Antarctica has never
offered military advantages that exceed the costs it imposes. . . . The
arguments for many military uses of space, however, are cast in just such
cost-effectiveness terms, making Antarctica, in that sense, not the analog but
the inverse of space.
W. Durch, Introduction to Durch & Wilkening, supra note 13, at 7.
n475 By explicitly prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction in Article 4, the Outer Space Treaty implies that
States remain free to orbit non-nuclear weapons that are not weapons of mass
n476 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 471, at art. 1. The military inefficiency
of Antarctica likely accounts for the wide adherence to this provision of the
n477 Interestingly, the LOS Convention claims at Article 88 that the "high
seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." LOS Convention, supra note 467,
at art. 88. As Professor Vlasic notes however, this
most certainly does not mean 'non-military,' given the well-known fact that the
high seas are navigated by naval vessels of many nations and used for tests of
nuclear missiles as well as for naval maneuvers. Hence, it is difficult to find
the rationale for the inclusion of the reference to 'peaceful purposes' under
the heading 'high seas.'
Vlasic, Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 334, at 41. If
the term "peaceful" as used in the LOS Convention were given the meaning
ascribed to the similar term in the Outer Space Treaty by the majority of
States, that is non-aggressive, the comparison of outer space with the high seas
for purpose of military use becomes all the more apt. While the high seas have
been the location of military activity for centuries, outer space is becoming
increasingly so. That both environments must be used for non-aggressive
(peaceful) purposes does not impugn the current military uses, so long as they
remain compliant with the jus ad bellum.
n478 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 262, at art. 10.
n479 STAT. OF THE ICJ, supra note 261, at art. 38.
n480 A standard text on international law includes helpful commentary on
General Assembly resolutions are not as such legally binding upon member or
non-member States in the manner of legislation enacted by national parliaments.
In terms of the sources listed in Article 38(1) [of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice], although some writers have argued that General
Assembly resolutions might be seen as informal treaties or as indicating general
principles of law, the most common view . . . is that they contribute in some
way to the formation of custom. It is generally agreed by writers that General
Assembly resolutions may serve as a convenient statement of a custom already
established by state practice of the accepted kind (diplomatic notes, etc.), or
may at once or gradually cause States to march in step in their practice so as
to create one . . . General Assembly resolutions may also contribute to custom
more directly as a form of 'collective' State practice. They are the collective
equivalent of unilateral general statements or, in the context of a particular
dispute, '150 diplomatic protests.'
Harris, supra note 173, at 61. Following the adoption of Resolution 1721, the
U.S. delegate stated that "when a General Assembly resolution proclaimed
principles of international law - as resolution 1721 (XVI) had done - and was
adopted unanimously, it represented the law as generally accepted in the
international community." Cheng, 'Instant' Customary Law, supra note 301, at 35.
Key to this broad assertion is the word "represented." That is, the Resolution
did not become customary law, it simply served as the vehicle by which the
international community expressed unanimous agreement that the resolution's
substance was reflective of the law. The U.S. delegate's statement is broad in
that it purported to give the U.N. principles the status of customary
international law before any custom had developed. For the criticism of this
assumption, see supra notes 301-303 and accompanying text. The assumption aside
however, the statement recognizes that formally speaking, the U.N. Resolution
does not bind any State, whether expressing legal principles and adopted
unanimously or not. As a 1975 U.S. Department of State pronouncement asserted:
as a broad statement of U.S. policy in this regard, I think it is fair to state
that General Assembly resolutions are regarded as recommendations to Member
States of the United Nations. To the extent, which is exceptional, that such
resolutions are meant to be declaratory of international law, are adopted with
the support of all members, and are observed by the practice of states, such
resolutions are evidence of customary international law on a particular subject
Harris, supra note 173, at 62 (emphasis added). For further discussion of the
legal significance of U.N.G.A. resolutions, see infra note 485.
n481 This is likely a result of the increasingly fractious nature of
international negotiation over space issues since the 1979 Moon Agreement. The
international governing organization called for by the Moon Agreement enshrined
the interests of developing States not seen before in treaty law. To many of the
more developed States, this progress came at the expense of their own economic
and security interests. Thus, the absence of any new space treaties since 1979
is likely the result of failures in negotiation, as well as a genuine reticence
by the more developed States against undertaking treaty obligations with which
the State has little intention of complying or even incentive for entering.
n482 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Dec. 13, 1963, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII),
U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964). It should
be noted that though several of the U.N. Resolutions addressing outer space
issues use the term "principles" in the title, these are not used in the same
sense as the term appears in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. As articulated by the U.N.G.A., "principles" related to the
use of outer space, remote sensing, or nuclear power sources in space are worthy
precepts toward which States should aim in their use of outer space, but they
are not "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." STAT. OF
THE ICJ, supra note 261, at art. 38 P1.c.
n483 In lockstep fashion, the Outer Space Treaty adopted the Resolution's
nine provisions practically word for word. Thus, Principle 1 became Article I,
sentence 1 of the Outer Space Treaty. Principle 2 calling for the free
exploration and use of space in accord with international law became Article I,
sentence 2. Principle 3 became Article II. Principle 4 on the applicability of
international law to outer space became Article III. Principle 5, setting
forth the novel requirement that States bear international responsibility for
national activities in space became Article VI. Principle 6 became Article IX.
Principle 7 became Article VIII. Principle 8 became Article VII. Principle 9
became Article V.
n484 Jasentuliyana, Developing Countries, supra note 319, at 97.
n485 Though the Soviet Union wanted the substance of the Resolution
incorporated into a legally binding instrument, it did not claim that the
vehicle used, the U.N. resolution, achieved that end. The fact that a General
Assembly Resolution assumes for itself the term "Declaration" does highlight the
importance of the document. It does not however render the resolution "legally
more binding than any other recommendation." Cheng, 'Instant' Customary Law,
supra note 301, at 31. As the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs has noted
in a Memorandum on "Use of the Terms 'Declaration and Recommendation'"
3. In United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn
instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting
importance are being enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human Rights. A
recommendation is less formal. 4. Apart from the distinction just indicated,
there is probably no difference between a 'recommendation' or a 'declaration' in
United Nations practice as far as strict legal principle is concerned. . . .
However, in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a 'declaration,'
it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong
expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it.
Consequently, in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice, a declaration may be custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon States.
Id. Use of the word "may" in the last quoted sentence, means that the
'declaration,' by itself, cannot bind States. Nonetheless, some scholars speak
in terms suggesting that Resolution 1962 is itself law. Thus, Judge Lachs,
former Chairman of COPUOS concluded that "it is difficult to regard the 1963
Declaration as a mere recommendation: it was an instrument which has been
accepted as law." M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN
CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 138 (1972).
n486 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, Dec. 3,
1986, GA Res. 41/65 (XLII), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 95th Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/41/65 (1987) [hereinafter Remote Sensing Resolution].
n487 Though not specifically geared toward remote sensing, several provisions
of the Outer Space Treaty could apply to remote sensing. These include Article I
(equal use of space by all States), Article III (activities conducted in accord
with international law in the interest of maintaining international peace and
security), Article VI (States bear international responsibility for national
activities), and Article XI (duty to inform U.N. Secretary General of space
activities of member States to the greatest extent feasible).
n488 C.Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 73 (1991)
[hereinafter CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW]. After outlining the five general categories
of compromise leading to agreement, Christol points out that the principle of
"open skies" won the day. Id. at 76. He notes that in the end, even States
initially hesitant to agree on freedom of surveillance from space "consulted
self interest" and developed an expectation that the benefits to be gained by
access to sensed data would outweigh any lost sovereignty to be suffered. Id. at
n489 Although the Resolution made no exception for military activities, this
civil/commercial orientation can be seen from the Resolution's specific
definition of "remote sensing" which aims at "improving natural resources
management, land use and protection of the environment." Remote Sensing
Resolution, supra note 486, at Principle (princ.) I(a). Major civil and
commercial applications for remote sensing data include: water resource
management (surface water inventory, flood control mapping, irrigation demand
estimation, water circulation, lake eutrophication survey, ground water
location); forestry and rangeland management (forest inventory, clearcut
assessment, habitat assessment, fire fuel potential); fish and wildlife
management (habitat inventory, wetlands location, vegetation classification,
snow pack mapping, salt exposure); land resource management (corridor analysis,
facility siting, land cover inventory, flood plain delineation, solid waste
management, lake shore management); environmental management (water quality
assessment, coastal zone management, wetlands mapping, resource inventory,
dredge and fill permits); agriculture (crop inventory, crop yield prediction,
assessment of flood damage, disease monitoring); and geological mapping
(lineament mapping, mineral surveys, powerplant siting, radioactive waste
storage). U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and the
Private Sector, Mar. 1984, at 57. Some of these could easily be converted to
military reconnaissance and surveillance purposes for locating targets, tracking
fleet movements, identifying supply and transport facilities, monitoring air
activities, and warning of enemy preparation or attack.
n490 A number of civil satellite systems produce data that is
commercially-available to both private and public entities: KFA-1000 (Russia, 6
m resolution, 120 km swath); Radarsat (Canada, 8-30 m resolution, 55-550 km
swath); ADEOS (Japan, 8-16 m resolution, 80 km swath); SPOT (France, 10-27 m
resolution, 60-81 km swath); Landsat 6 (U.S., 15-120 m resolution, 185 km
swath); JERS-1 (Japan, 18 m resolution, 100 km swath); CBERS (Brazil, 20 m
resolution, 120 km swath); ERS-1 (European Space Agency, 15-30 m resolution, 80
km swath); RS-1 (India, 36-72 m resolution); MOS-1 (Japan, 50 m resolution). B.
PRESTON, PLOUGHSHARES AND POWER: THE MILITARY USE OF CIVIL SPACE 29 (1994)
[hereinafter PRESTON]. An update to include improvements since 1994 would swell
this list as to the total number of systems, as well as technical capabilities.
Today, imagery at 5 m resolution is widely available.
n491 Preston makes clear the military connection to remote sensing:
From a traditional military view of national security, the obvious reason to
worry about sensing from space is the ability of adversaries to exploit
intelligence from remote-sensing information to achieve military advantage on
the battlefield. A broader perspective on national security would include
economic benefit and foreign policy advantage. For example, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff basic national defense doctrine includes psychological or informational
powers in its list of elements of national strategy. Remote sensing from space
affects all of these: battlefield intelligence, economic strength, and
Id. at 25.
n492 Remote Sensing Resolution, supra note 486, at princ. IV.
n494 Id. at princ. I(b). Primary data are defined as "the raw data that are
acquired by remote sensors borne by a space object and that are transmitted or
delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in the form of electromagnetic
signals, by photographic film, magnetic tape or any other means."
n495 Id. at princ. I(c). "The products resulting from the processing of the
primary data, needed to make such data usable."
n496 Id. at princ. I(d). "The information resulting from the interpretation
of processed data, inputs of data and knowledge from other sources."
n497 Id. at princ. XII.
n498 Arguably it is a victory for Article I of the Outer Space Treaty as well
which requires that the use and exploration of outer space remain "free."
n499 Id. at princ. XIII.
n500 Again, as with all U.N. resolutions, language suggesting that States
"shall" take action or "will" refrain therefrom does not require such action or
bind such States. The mandatory, directive language used in the Remote Sensing
Resolution, as with other U.N. resolutions, is always subject to this
clarification. See, e.g., the following phrases from the principles indicated,
Principle II-"shall be carried out;" Principles III and IV-"shall be conducted;"
Principle V and VIII-"shall promote international co-operation;" Principle
VII-"shall make available technical assistance;" Principle IX-"shall inform the
Secretary-General of the United Nations;" Principle X-"shall promote the
protection of the Earth's natural environment;" Principle XI-"shall promote the
protection of mankind from natural disasters;" Principle XII-"shall have
access;" Principle XIII-"shall . . . enter into consultations;" Principle
XIV-"shall bear international responsibility;" and Principle XV-"disputes . . .
shall be resolved through . . ." To the extent that these provisions draw from
the authority of international law, they simply reiterate a State's preexisting
n501 CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 488, at 94. The author goes so far as to
suggest that the Resolution's principles are representative of customary
international law. After considering the fact that, despite the lack of thorough
agreement, there is no overwhelming demand to overturn the principles or even
reduce them to a treaty, Christol concluded in 1988 that
for the moment the debate has been somewhat stilled. Even the best of agreements
can become controversial or even unstuck. Perhaps the best long-term approach is
to retain remote sensing on the agenda of COPUOS so that efforts can be made to
transmit the terms of the Principles into a treaty. In this manner those who
wish to dissent from the Principles can opt out. In considering this approach
they may find that they may have no where to go. As has been abundantly
indicated, they will not find it easy to escape the norms of customary
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
Other commentators writing more recently have agreed. Thus, "this resolution
has come to represent a codification of customary legal principles that are
binding on nations." J.I. Gabrynowicz, Defining Data Availability for Commercial
Remote Sensing Systems: Under United States Federal Law, XXIII ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 93, 95 (1998).
n502 See supra notes 368-370 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
n503 Paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 33/16, dated Nov. 10, 1978,
requested that launching States "inform States concerned in the event that a
space object with nuclear power sources on board is malfunctioning with a risk
of re-entry of radio-active materials to earth." This subsequently became
Principle 5 of the NPS Resolution. Further, paragraph 11 of General Assembly
resolution 42/68, dated Dec. 2, 1987, endorsed "the agreements reached in the
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee [of COPUOS] with respect to the use of
nuclear power sources in outer space." As Terekhov notes, "those agreements were
the recommendations formulated by the technical experts with the view to
ensuring safe use of NPS in outer space, which recommendations had been
subsequently reflected in the NPS [Resolution]." A.D. Terekhov, U.N.G.A.
Resolutions and Outer Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 97, 101 (1998) [hereinafter Terekhov].
n504 Principles Relating to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space,
Dec. 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/68 [hereinafter NPS Resolution].
n505 Because the Outer Space Treaty forbids the orbiting of "objects carrying
nuclear weapons," the Resolution did not address the question of nuclear power
sources in space used for weaponry. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art.
IV. Although a strict exegesis of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty reveals
that what is prohibited by this clause is the orbiting of "objects carrying
nuclear weapons" not "nuclear weapons" themselves, the subsequent clause-"or
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" - appears to foreclose
the possibility of nuclear warheads in space. Id. The obvious exception,
undoubtedly heavy on the minds of Outer Space Treaty drafters during the course
of negotiations, were the case of ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads
to terrestrial targets after transiting outer space for several minutes.
Although such objects would put nuclear weapons or conceivably other weapons of
mass destruction into space, such delivery systems would not constitute a
placement "in orbit" or a "stationing" of such weapons in space, and would not
therefore violate the Outer Space Treaty. For a discussion of the meaning of
placing an object in orbit, see supra note 355. As used in the NPS Resolution,
nuclear reactors in space apply neither to nuclear weapons (except those which
might conceivably use nuclear power for "generation of electric power"), nor to
nuclear power sources used for propulsion. NPS Resolution, supra note 504 (from
the Preamble). Thus, it appears the law would allow the orbiting of nuclear
power sources used for space weaponry. Such is not likely covered by the phrase
"nuclear weapon" as used in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which more properly
refers not to the weapon's method of propulsion, but to the nuclear source of
its destructive power.
n506 NPS Resolution, supra note 504 (from the Preamble).
n507 Though the Resolution does not cover nuclear propulsion, and is not
legally binding in any event, there are other reasons it may not find
widespread use as a prescriptive guide for military spacecraft. Collins notes
that even though nuclear space propulsion has many proponents, it "attracts
little official support and few funds, because it is costly compared with
chemical systems, and powerful opponents (rightly or wrongly) fear it is unsafe.
International political pressure to ban such engines is great." COLLINS,
MILITARY SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 103.
n508 NPS Resolution, supra note 504, at princ. 3.
n509 "Sufficiently high orbits" are those
in which the orbital lifetime is long enough to allow for a sufficient decay of
the fission products to approximate the activity of the actinides. The
sufficiently high orbit must be such that the risks to existing and future outer
space missions and of collision with other space objects are kept to a minimum.
Id. at princ. 3(2)(b).
n510 Id. at princ. 3(2)(a).
n511 Id. at princ. 3(2)(c).
n512 Id. at princ. 3(2)(e).
n513 Id. at princ. 5(1). In the aftermath of the Cosmos 954 incident, the
former Soviet Union disclaimed a duty to warn Canada of the impending crash,
though it did in general recognize a duty to warn. Supra notes 368-370 and
accompanying text, Because its errant calculations revealed the satellite's
debris would either be incinerated on reentry, or land over the Aleutian
Islands, the Soviet Union did notify the U.S. prior to impact. In one of the
diplomatic exchanges, the Soviets maintained that
calculations made on the basis of [Cosmos 954's] last orbits within the
visibility range of our tracking facilities showed that if, because of the
satellite's emergency condition, individual parts of the satellite were not
fully consumed in the atmosphere and reached the earth's surface, they might
fall into the open sea in the region of the Aleutian Islands. In this
connection, the appropriate information was given to the U.S. government.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 181. Because Canada agreed that the Soviets
had a duty to warn, this agreement on the basic norm-that the Soviet Union had a
duty to warn-represents significant State opinio juris on one of the few cases
involving the reentry of a space object carrying radioactive materials. Indeed,
whether customary law or not, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident requires such notifications as contemplated in Principle 5 of the NPS
Resolution. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26,
1986, 1439 U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force Oct. 27, 1986; signed but not
ratified by the U.S.). This treaty, adopted soon after failure of the Soviet
Chernobyl nuclear reactor, applies to "any nuclear reactor wherever located."
Id. at art. 1(2) (emphasis added). Thus, even for reactors located in space, the
treaty mandates notification to other States Parties of accidents "from which a
release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has
resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be
of radiological safety significance for another State." Id. at art. (1)
n514 Terekhov, supra note 503, at 101. Again, these U.N. principles are
recommendations even though the NPS Resolution, as with the previous Remote
Sensing Resolution, makes frequent use of "shall" in its attempt to encourage
State behavior. The distinction between a resolution's use of "shall" and its
use of "should" matters little and does not affect the document's non-binding
character. "The fact that, for example, the [Remote Sensing Resolution]
contain[s] 'shall' and the [Benefits Resolution] uses mostly "should" is not
perceived as an indication that the former makes stronger recommendations than
the latter. In view of the foregoing, it appears that the "shall/should"
controversy has basically lost its relevance at least as far as outer space
declarations are concerned." Id. at 102.
n515 Id. at 101.
n516 See, e.g., Is Cassini Risky? Look to Facts, Not Emotion, 147:13 AV. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 29, 1997, at 66.
n517 J. Wilson, The International Telecommunication Union and the
Geostationary Satellite Orbit: An Overview, XXIII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 249
n518 Supra note 59.
n519 "Members retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio
installations." Constitution and Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22, 1992, art. 48(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-34
(1996) (as amended through 1994), available at
http://www.itu.int/publications/cchtm/cnv.htm. Because the RRB regulations do
not regulate military activity either in peacetime or war, they cannot be
classified as part of the jus in bello. Nonetheless, because they govern the
civil and commercial use of radio spectrum, they become a critical factor in
establishing a military telecommunications capacity in support of armed
conflict. Beyond this, however, Article 48(2) requires "so far as possible" that
military radio installations
observe statutory provisions relative to giving assistance in case of distress
and to the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the
provisions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission
and the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed
by such installations.
Id. at art. 48(2).
n520 Toward the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the DSCS system was
providing 75 percent of all inter and intratheater multichannel trunking. Leased
commercial satellites provided 20 to 25 percent of all satellite communications
used by U.S. forces. See PRESTON, supra note 490, at 131, 132. For a discussion
of the DSCS system, see supra note 59. The Commander in Chief of USSPACECOM
later testified before the U.S. Congress that, "effective command and control of
U.S. and coalition forces simply would have been impossible without military
satellite communication systems. Over ninety percent of the communications to
and from the area of operations were carried over satellite systems." PRESTON,
supra note 490, at 133.
n521 The effects of losing commercial telecommunications services were
dramatically illustrated for participants of the 1999 U.S. "Army-After-Next
Space and Missile Defense" wargame. When the "Blue" forces lost information
superiority as a result of degraded commercial space services, participants
witnessed a "drastic impact on combat capabilities. . . . Regional commanders
found they had to compete with other paying customers for commercial space
services, such as communications. Ideal time slots and capacities were not
always available." P. Proctor, ed., Wargame Wake-Up Call, 150:14 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 5, 1999, at 17.
n522 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 127, at 119.
n523 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 120, P86. In this
important opinion, the Court cites several of the numerous statements advanced
by States for the conclusion that the law of armed conflict applies to nuclear
weapons whether nuclear weapons were in existence at the time the law developed
or not. Two relevant points arise from this discussion. First, as the Court
quotes from the representative statements of States, the following phrases are
used and are assumed by the court to be synonymous: "international humanitarian
law" (New Zealand), "rules applicable to armed conflict" (Russian Federation),
"jus in bello" (United Kingdom), and "law of armed conflict" (United States).
Second, as the noted quotation above makes clear, the court's conclusion that
humanitarian law applies to nuclear weapons is equally applicable to any "past .
. . present and . . . future" forms of warfare and kinds of weapons. This
statement certainly provides the ICJ's answer to the question of whether the law
of war will apply to space warfare.
n524 While the author is aware of one paper presented at a Princeton
symposium in May 1999 by Professor M. Bourbonniere, with one exception he is
aware of no other authors in print on the specific topic under review. That
exception, dating to 1959, presciently outlined several themes related to the
regulation of space warfare from the relative infancy of military space
development in the 1950s. J.G. Verplaetse, The Law of War and Neutrality in
Outer Space, 29 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET 49 (1959). Verplaetse pointed
out that "the unknown cannot be regulated, even less juridically organized." Id.
Somewhat surprisingly, 41 years after the appearance of this article, the
regulation of means and methods of space warfare still appears to be largely
unknown. Verplaetse's prediction about the possibility of armed conflict in
space remains as true today as ever: "Human forecast cannot but accept the
likelihood that outer space will soon be part of the theater of war of
terrestrial belligerents." Id. at 51.
n525 In the 1999 production Star Trek Insurrection, one scene has Chief
Engineer Lieutenant Geordi LaForge commenting on a weapon's explosive impact
with his spaceship: "I thought subspace weapons were outlawed by the Khitomer
Accords?" "They were," comes his crewmate's ominous reply thereby identifying a
violation of the 24th Century law of war. Beyond this specific reference, a
review of the following recent cinematic releases shows the general popularity
of space and science-fiction themes at the box office: Apollo 13, Independence
Day, 2001: A Space Odyssey, Armageddon, Deep Impact, Contact, Lost in Space, My
Favorite Martian, Wing Commander, Battlefield Earth, Titan A.E., Galaxy Quest,
the Star Wars remake, and a total of eight Star Trek movies. The increasing
popularity of these movies may account for the lack of scholarly legal analysis
as commentators find it difficult to take seriously what the popular mind
relegates to the category "science fiction."
n526 Just this year, the Air Force established the first annual wargame
devoted entirely to space. The Air Force hopes the game will, entitled "The Air
Force Space Game," will eventually "become a Title-10 game on a par with annual
events such as Navy 'Global,' 'Army After Next' and Air Force 'Global
Engagement." William B. Scott, Innovation Is Currency of USAF Space Battlelab,
152:14 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 3, 2000, at 52.
n527 Indeed, even beyond wargame scenarios, events prompting such questions
have already occurred. One author has reported electronic interference by a
hostile Middle East power against a U.S. military satellite.
In one recent case the interference continued for weeks. When the U.S.
satellite changed to a different channel, the interference also changed
channels, suggesting a deliberate attempt by a Third World country to jam a U.S.
military communications satellite. The potential of radio interference is
especially significant considering that the United States is dependent on
satellites for 75 percent of its long-distance military communications.
Hackett & Ranger, Proliferating Satellites Drive U.S. ASAT Need, SIGNAL, May
1990, at 156. While cases such as this arguably do not rise to the level of an
"armed attack" justifying the use of armed force in self defense under the U.N.
Charter, they do raise questions about the legitimacy of coercive responses
short of armed conflict, and whether non-aggressive military action could or
should be interpreted as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4). See supra
notes 262, 267, and accompanying text. For an insightful analysis of the
analogous problem of computer network attacks under the jus ad bellum, see M.N.
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law:
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37:3 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885 (1999)
[hereinafter Schmitt]. Beyond this, the 1997 "Army After Next" wargame "jolted
military and civilian leaders by showing that if U.S. satellites are quickly
destroyed in the early stages of a conflict, ground forces can rapidly grind to
a halt." W.B. Scott, Wargames Revival Breaks New Ground, 149:18 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 2, 1998, at 56, 58. To be effective, wargames require clear
rules specifying what players can and cannot do. To the extent space wargaming
continues raising questions to which there are no clear answers, such as
application of the law of war and the jus ad bellum, these scenarios have served
a useful purpose in prompting the development of national policy. However, with
respect to law of war principles, the games often reveal a shortcoming beyond
the control of the U.S. military or government: an inability to ensure that the
development of international law will account for anticipated military
capabilities. On the possible role law of war manuals might play in remedying
this shortcoming, see infra note 598 and accompanying text.
n528 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 244-45.
n529 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes against
Yugoslavia in 1999 (Allied Force) were even more heavily supported by space
assets than the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the Yugoslavian conflict, although the
United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) classified all orbital data on U.S.
military spacecraft during the conflict stating that even the reason for the
classification remained classified (suggesting the critical role space systems
played), several facts were apparent. NATO made heavy use of two National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Lacrosse imaging radar satellites for pre-strike
intelligence and post-strike bomb damage assessment with resolutions of one to
three meters. Offering more precise resolutions, NATO used NRO's three KH-11
satellites for more sensitive optical and infrared imagery. It was also thought
that NATO was using as many as three other of NRO's highly secret smaller
imaging spacecraft. For weather data, NATO used ten spacecraft, including four
USAF DMSP spacecraft flying in 500-mile polar orbits and two European Meteosat
spacecraft in geosynchronous orbits. As in Desert Storm, Allied Force made heavy
use of the twenty-four medium-earth orbit satellites comprising the Global
Positioning System (GPS). These were used for precision strikes guiding both
munitions and aircraft. See C. Covault, Military Space Dominates Air Strikes,
150:13 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 29, 1999, at 31. In addition to the Meteosat
assets, several other non-U.S. space systems also contributed to NATO's effort
including France's Helios 1 military imaging satellite, which provided images of
one to five meter resolutions. See P. Sparaco, French Satellite Details Air
Strike Damages, 150:15 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 12, 1999, at 26.
n530 While recognizing the tremendous qualitative difference between the use
of space in support of combat operations, and the weaponization of space itself,
the author believes it virtually assured that within the near future space will
be widely viewed as its own military theater of operations and thereafter
weaponized. Increasing awareness in the U.S. of the need to protect national
space assets continues to drive the debate closer toward weaponization. Though
space weapons will likely be developed with the principal purpose to defend
satellites, some will undoubtedly be fielded to provide for an offensive
counter-attack. In both cases, the strategic and political implications appear
to be the same. As Colin Gray points out, it "is a distinction without a
difference." C.S. GRAY, AMERICAN MILITARY SPACE POLICY: INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
WEAPON SYSTEMS AND ARMS CONTROL 49 (1982) [hereinafter GRAY]. Gray proceeds to
articulate four strategic reasons why the U.S. should weaponize space. Though
written before the breakup of the Soviet Union, and largely directed toward a
Soviet adversary, the continuing Russian threat coupled with the evolution of
new space powers, could make Gray's points equally compelling today: first, both
the U.S. and Soviet Union (now Russia) use space for military purposes that
would be critically important during war; second, passive defensive techniques,
or survival aids short of weaponization, are not certain to succeed; third, the
Soviet Union likely already has deployed ASATs; and fourth, it is unlikely that
U.S. spacecraft can be protected through deterrence given that the Soviets have
too much to gain by attacking them in war. Id. at 49-51.
Overall, these arguments amount to the following policy judgment: U.S.
self-denial of ASAT capability will not contribute to the survival prospects of
U.S. C3I assets in space-indeed, quite the opposite is true. Such self-denial
could, and most probably would, permit the Soviet Union [or other potential
future space adversary] to gather and relay strategic intelligence fatal to the
validity of the U.S. policy of continuing deterrence.
Id. at 51.
n531 Professor Cheng hints that such is the case in his syllogistic argument
for the proposition that the legal regime for outer space is analogous to the
basis status of the high sees. His major premise, "that international law is
inherently applicable to outer space," would certainly include the law of war.
B. Cheng, Astronauts, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 40
(Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n532 These include restrictions on the orbiting of nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, as
well as the detonation of nuclear weapons in outer space under the Limited Test
n533 See supra notes 466-477 and accompanying text.
n534 As implied throughout this article the jus in bello for space
demonstrates an "already/not yet" character. Legal commentators understandably
seem reluctant to speak of an existing and distinct jus in bello spatialis ("not
yet"), though as has been shown in Parts III-V above, numerous specific
customary and conventional norms operate to limit means and methods of space
warfare that States may lawfully employ ("already").
n535 For example, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea distinguishes
between territorial sea (complete State sovereignty and jurisdiction) and high
seas (no State sovereignty or jurisdiction, except jurisdiction over its
registered vessels). LOS Convention, supra note 467, at art. 2(1), 87(1).
Similarly, in the space above the earth, States recognize the distinction
between national airspace (complete State sovereignty and jurisdiction) and
outer space (no State sovereignty or jurisdiction, except jurisdiction over its
registered objects). Compare Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,
1944, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, with Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 316, at art. II.
n536 "As a general rule, neutral territory is treated as sacred space; it is
inviolable." J. Astley & M.N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations,
42 A.F. L. REV. 119, 140 (1997). The law of neutrality is a part of the law of
war but not of the jus in bello and is largely consistent with the law of the
sea. Thus, the maritime rights and duties of States in peacetime continue to
exist for the most part during armed conflict. See id. at 138.
n537 At the risk of descending into logical abstraction, a further
clarification is necessary. With reference to the macro/micro categories
established above, the form of argumentation here amounts to a
meta-macro-analogy. That is, not only are we in this case comparing one combat
environment to another to conceive a suitable legal framework for war, we are
examining the development of that comparison as it has been used to establish
the newer framework for aerial combat. Thus, the suggestion made here as to the
evolution of norms limiting aerial warfare depends not only on the comparison of
entire legal systems (macro-analogy between aerial combat and land/sea combat)
within international law, but on an analysis of the larger (meta) process by
which the comparison led to the newer legal regime in the first place.
n538 The possible exception being the proscription on discharging projectiles
from balloons. See Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles
and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439.
n539 COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 1 n.2.
n540 Id. at 2.
n541 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. III. In addition, the Outer
Space Treaty references international law as well at Article I. "Outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and
use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and
in accordance with international law." Id.
n542 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 262, at art. 1(1). The phrase appeared
previously in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Covenant of the League of
Nations, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188.
n543 That is, it requires the "activity which is necessary for maintaining
the conditions of peace." R. Wolfrum, Article 1, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 50 (B. Simma, et al., eds., 1994).
n544 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 190 (from the Preamble).
n546 The distinction between customary law and other general principles of
law was later announced as comprising two separate sources of international law.
See STAT. OF THE ICJ, supra note 261, at art. 38.
n547 Geneva Convention I, supra note 212, at art. 63 P4; Geneva Convention
II, supra note 216, at art. 62 P4; Geneva Convention III, supra note 204, at
art. 142 P4; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 214, at art. 158 P4.
n548 Protocol I, supra note 156, at art. 1(2).
n549 Conventional Weapons Treaty, supra note 247 (from the Preamble).
n550 This possibility is strengthened by the claim of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1946 that convention IV is declaratory of
customary international law. Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 44.
n551 H. Strebel, Martens' Clause, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 252 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n552 Protocol I, supra note 156, at art. 1(2).
n553 Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting Agreements Relating to Outer Space,
supra note 321, at 209.
n554 See definitions of "militarization" and "weaponization," supra note 11.
n555 As suggested above, the common view today regards peaceful purposes as
synonymous with non-aggressive. Such operations would include not only peacetime
military activity, but also activity involving the use of force during armed
conflict. What makes an activity aggressive and thus non-peaceful is not the use
or absence of armed force, but the larger purpose to which it is put. An
aggressive act unlawfully initiated by one belligerent, may trigger a lawful,
though overwhelming armed response from another in individual or collective
self-defense. The latter response is not rendered aggressive even though it may
involve a ferocious degree of force, or even what constitutes an act of war. In
this way, even an act of war may have a larger peaceful purpose. To the extent a
use of force is taken in self-defensive, or pursuant to a U.N. Security Council
authorization, and is proportional to the initial aggressive act (that is, to
the initial violation of the jus ad bellum), it complies with international law
and may occur in space just as elsewhere. For a discussion of the requirement
that the jus in bello principle of proportionality applies to acts of
self-defense, see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 103 ("The Parties also agree in holding that whether the response to
the attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and
the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defense.").
n556 Perhaps the most difficult of all space law issues relates to the
delimitation, or boundary, separating a State's territorial airspace and outer
There is no clear answer to the question of where space begins. But equally
clearly, at some point above the earth, there exists an environment completely
different from the one we have here. A sort of customary law has developed . . .
to the effect than any object in orbit is in space, and that seems enough to
satisfy everyone for the time being.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 59, at 12. For an excellent, recent legal analysis
of the air and space boundary question, see Elizabeth Kelly, The Spaceplane: The
Catalyst for Resolution of the Boundary and 'Space Object' Issues in the Law of
Outer Space? (1998) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University) (on file with
author, and the Nahum Gelber Law Library, McGill University).
n557 Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. 1(d).
n558 See DeBlois, supra note 3; ZIEGLER, supra note 3. Joseph Justin points
out that the "space sanctuary" school "is fundamentally opposed to any military
weapons in space." Justin, supra note 3, at 104. Justin goes on to claim that
the space sanctuary perspective "believes space should not be used as a military
instrument of policy" and that the military role in space is to work for
demilitarization. Id. Although this may represent the classic sanctuary
position, DeBlois and Ziegler do not advocate space as a sanctuary free from any
military presence, just free from weapons.
n559 David A. Fulghum, USAF Chief Signals Key Funding Priorities, 153:1 AV.
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 3, 2000, at 56. Expanding the point, General Michael
Ryan asserted that while the weaponization of space is still decades off, "there
is some inevitability that it will occur if just to protect extensive
communications and navigation systems already there. . . . I think there will be
attacks-challenges to our space capability. We will have to protect our assets
in space because we're becoming much more dependent on them. So I see defense as
a primary emphasis." Id.
n560 See supra, note 353 for further discussion of the definition of "nuclear
weapons" as applied to X-ray lasers.
n561 S. Gorove, Space Without Weapons: International Legal Aspects of Weapons
and Harms, in SPACE WITHOUT WEAPONS 29 (N.M. Matte, ed., 1989) [hereinafter
Gorove, Space Without Weapons].
n562 Paul B. Stares, The Problem of Non-Dedicated Space Weapon Systems, in
PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE (B. Jasani, ed., 1991) 147 [hereinafter Stares,
Non-Dedicated Space Weapon Systems].
n563 B. Jasani, Introduction to PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 13 (B. Jasani, ed.,
n564 Stares, Non-Dedicated Space Weapon Systems, supra note 562, at 147.
Stares goes on to suggest 5 criteria that assist in determining the military
capability of non-dedicated systems:
1. Operational readiness. How soon could the non-dedicated system be readied for
use as a space weapon? What does it entail to make it ready? Are trained
personnel available to convert it and use it for this purpose? Are the necessary
support systems, such as target detection and tracking sensors also available?
2. Target coverage. What targets does the non-dedicated system realistically
threaten? How many such attacks can it carry out? 3. Speed of attack. How
quickly can single or multiple attacks using non-dedicated systems be carried
out? Is there any warning associated with their use that might allow defensive
countermeasures to be implemented? 4. Operational confidence. What is the
probability that single and multiple attacks using non-dedicated systems will
succeed in their intended mission? 5. Operational costs. What, if any, are the
military or political costs associated with the use of non-dedicated systems as
Id. at 151. With reference to ASATs, non-dedicated systems are also termed
"residual" ASATs. See STARES, SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 70, at 3.
n565 Professor Gorove, referring to nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction, maintains that "unless specifically covered, subcomponents which in
themselves do not qualify as a weapon, should not be taken to be included in a
ban relating to the weapon." Gorove, Space Without Weapons, supra note 561, at
n566 For a discussion of this general international legal principle, see
supra note 141.
n567 Indeed, the Soviet Union went so far as to present a "Draft Treaty on
the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space" to the
36th Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Aug. 20, 1981. In pertinent part,
the draft treaty would have required
States Parties . . . not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying
weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space
vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop
in the future.
(Article 1(1)). It would have equally required States Parties "not to destroy,
damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of
space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in
strict accordance with Article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty." (Article 3).
GRAY, supra note 530, at 115.
While the treaty would not have prohibited land-based ASATs, it would have
significantly expanded the scope of the partial deweaponization provision of
Article IV, Outer Space Treaty. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IV.
The U.S. dismissed the Soviet draft treaty as a "hypocritical propaganda ploy."
STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, supra note 40, at 230. Following
announcement that the U.S.S.R. would unilaterally refrain from deploying ASATs
"for the entire period during which other countries, including the U.S.A., will
refrain from stationing in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type," the
Soviets presented a second draft treaty that would have prohibited the testing
and deployment of "any space based weapons intended to hit targets on the Earth,
in the atmosphere, or in space." Id. at 231. Over great scientific and
congressional pressure, the Reagan administration rejected this proposal as well
citing the extreme difficulty, if not "impossibility," in verifying an ASAT
treaty. Id. at 233.
n568 After a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Outer Space Treaty
and the Moon Agreement, Professor Christol observed in 1988 that
in the years since 1967 [Outer Space Treaty] and 1979 [Moon Agreement] science
and technology have perfected new generations and families of weapons, including
those employing highly focused energy, such as laser weapons, and those based on
sub-atomic particles, such as particle beam weapons. Pursuant to the general
legal principle that which is not prohibited is permitted, it may be concluded
that the more recent exotic weapons do not fall within the constraints of the
foregoing treaty provisions.
C.Q. Christol, Outer Space: Battle-Ground of the Future?, in SPACE LAW: PAST
PRESENT AND FUTURE 59 (C.Q. Christol, ed., 1991). The Russians have objected to
the orbiting of particle beam weaponry claiming that it constitutes a "weapon of
mass destruction." TAYLOR, supra note 97, at 34. However, given its likely
capacity for great precision, the weapon need not generate "mass" destruction,
though it may be lethal for its intended target. Some authors suggest,
inexplicably, that just about all space weapons constitute weapons of mass
destruction. See, e.g., M.N. Andem, Implementation of Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 During the 21st Century, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 338, 344 (1998).
n569 M.M. Matte, A Treaty for 'Star Peace,' in 2 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
IN OUTER SPACE 190 (N.M. Matte, ed., 1987).
n570 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 262, at art. 2(4).
n571 Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting Agreements Relating to Outer Space,
supra note 321, at 211.
n572 The more restrictive view of Article 2(4) is admittedly difficult to
square with the U.N. Charter's plain language and the historic reticence in the
U.N.G.A. against foreign interventions. Nonetheless, "examination of the
language and the negotiating background of Article 2(4) provides no unequivocal
indication of its intended meaning." Vlasic, Negotiating and Drafting Agreements
Relating to Outer Space, supra note 321, at 211.
n573 HURWITZ, supra note 289, at 148-50.
n574 Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. II.
n575 Id. at art. III.
n576 Id. at art. VI.
n577 In fact, the exoneration from liability shows the very opposite. The
Convention purports to punish States engaging in intentional destructive acts by
eliminating their remedy against the launching State. As Article VI(2)
establishes however, if the damage is caused by activities of the launching
State that are inconsistent with the international law, including the U.N.
Charter and the Outer Space Treaty, there will be no exoneration from absolute
liability "whatever." Id. at art. VI(2). This would mean that an aggressive
military operation by launching State A that causes damage on the earth or in
the air to claimant State B, will result in no exoneration of absolute liability
for State A, even if State B contributed to the damage by acts done with an
intent to cause damage.
n578 After observing that the U.S. ratified the Liability Convention only
"after being advised by the Department of State that the Convention did not
apply to international damage," Hurwitz concludes from this that "the U.S. has
recognized the right to intentionally damage another State's space objects with
impunity (as least as far as the 1972 Convention is concerned)." HURWITZ, supra
note 289, at 149. Whether this overstates the U.S. position or not, it does seem
clear that the Convention exonerates one State from liability only as against
intentional damage caused by the claimant State or the natural or juridical
persons it represents. Liability Convention, supra note 365, at art. VI(1).
Thus, the U.S. Department of State was certainly correct that the Convention
does not "apply" (that is, create liability), as against one State in cases
where the claimant State has at least "partially" caused intentional damage.
n579 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VIII.
n580 U.N. Charter, supra note 262, at art. 51. Given the fact that Article 51
presupposes a previous customary right to self defense ("inherent right"), the
right to respond by State Y may not even require the occurrence of an armed
attack, depending on the nature of the customary right. For further discussion
of article 51, see supra note 173. State Y's act of self defense must also be
proportionate to State X's provocation.
n581 For example, in arguing for an approach to space power that rests in
part on the assertion that "America's future security and prosperity depend on
our constant supremacy in space," United States Senator Smith advocated a shift
of "substantial" national military resources into space. Sen. Bob Smith, The
Challenge of Space Power, 13:1 AIRPOWER J. 32, 33 (1999) [hereinafter Smith]. He
opined that "if we do, we will buy generations of security that all the ships,
tanks, and airplanes in the world will not provide. This would be a real
'peace-dividend' -- it would actually help keep the peace." Id. Subsequently, he
specified that the use of space to secure information superiority does not
constitute space warfare stating that "if we limit our approach to space just to
information superiority, we will not have fully utilized space power." Id. at
34. Calling for a "space-power culture" within the U.S. military, Senator Smith
warned against allowing a "blanket of political correctness and bureaucratic
inertia" from smothering revolutionary ideas. Id. at 35, 36.
n582 Commentators, politicians, academics, and military members have been
calling for such a move for years. For example, in 1970 Robert Salkeld
provocatively claimed that space warfare was a virtual inevitability. "The
concept which naturally suggests itself is the eventual creation and growth of a
fourth major service, a United States Space Force, which might function at
budgetary parity with the Army, Navy and Air Force." R. SALKELD, WAR AND SPACE
189 (1970). Later, another commentator observed that roles and missions debates
for space between the existing services would reach a fevered pitch leading to
an inevitable evolution toward a separate space service.
Military space operations, much like U.S. tactical air combat power, probably
will remain a specialty within several military services that squabble over
respective budgets/prerogatives, until important space missions involve more
than support for armed forces on Earth and powerful spokesmen present
decisionmakers a persuasive case. A Solomon-style decision eventually will be
unavoidable: senior officials must determine whether to deliver the military
space 'baby' intact or divide it. . . . A separate armed service with
centralized control over all military space activities, for example, might avoid
most doctrinal disputes.
COLLINS, MILITARY SPACE FORCES, supra note 12, at 82, 83. In 1999, Senator Smith
suggested the propriety of such a move: "The notion that the Air Force should
have primary responsibility for space is not sacred. . . . If the Air Force
cannot or will not embrace space power . . . we in Congress will have to
establish an entirely new service." Smith, supra note 581, at 37-38.
n583 NEWBERRY, supra note 3, at 6. Major Newberry's point could be applied
equally to the U.S. Army and Navy, and likely to the national security
establishments of all other spacefaring States as well.
n584 National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy P3 (Sept.
19, 1996) http://ast.faa.gov/licensing/regulations/nsp-pdd8.htm (on file with
the Air Force Law Review) [hereinafter National Space Policy].
n586 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House, Office
of the President 1998) at 25.
n587 National Space Policy, supra note 584, at "National Security Space
n588 Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program P4.1
(Dec. 9, 1998)
n589 Id. P5.3.1.
n590 W.B. Scott, 'Milspace' Maturing Into Warfighter Roles, 147:9 AV. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 1, 1997, at 46.
n591 W.B. Scott, U.S. Adopts 'Tactical' Space Control Policy, 150:13 AV. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Mar. 29, 1999, at 35.
n592 United States Space Command, Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM
Vision for 2020 (March 1998) 21 [hereinafter Long Range Plan]. Following release
of the Long Range Plan, DOD issued a space policy which expanded upon themes
raised by USSPACECOM. For example, the DOD policy states: "Purposeful
interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our
sovereign rights. The U.S. may take all appropriate self-defense measures,
including, if directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), the use of
force, to respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights." Department of Defense
Directive 3100.10, Space Policy P4.2.1 (July 9, 1999) [hereinafter DODD
n593 Long Rang Plan, supra note 592, at 11. The DOD definition of "space
control" mirrors the USSPACECOM definition: "Combat and combat support
operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its
allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. . . ."
DODD 3100.10, supra note 592 PE2.1.3.
n595 W.B. Scott, Space Ops Threatened By Launch Failures, 150:20 Av. Wk. &
Space Tech., May 17, 1999, at 25, 26.
n596 Id. at 26.
n597 AFP 110-31, supra note 146.
n598 W.M. Reisman & W.K. Leitzau, Moving International Law from Theory to
Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed
Conflict, in 64 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 8 (H.B.
Robertson, ed., 1991).
n599 STAT. OF THE ICJ, supra note 261, at art. 38(1)c.
n600 General Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of Staff, asserted that
"dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as occupying
the land or controlling the air has been in the past." Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-5, Information Operations, 1 (Aug. 5, 1998) [hereinafter AFDD 2-5].
n601 Such potential threats have not escaped notice by the Department of
Defense. For example, fears about potential unauthorized access have prompted
serious debate over whether the military should withdraw from the Internet
altogether. DOD May Unplug from Internet Due to Security Worries at Century's
End, INSIDE THE ARMY, June 21, 1999, at 1.
n602 AIR FORCE 2025, supra note 7, at 4. The study went on to assert that
"the key to achieving and maintaining lasting superiority that cannot easily be
duplicated by others lies in the integration of information, air, and space."
Id. at 9.
n603 Department of Defense Directive S-3600.1, Information Operations (Dec.
9, 1996) [hereinafter DODD S-3600.1]. The Air Force broadens this definition for
its forces, including space forces, as follows: "Those actions taken to gain,
exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and include both
information-in-warfare and information warfare." AFDD 2-5, supra note 600, at
41. Information-in-warfare is defined as "the Air Force's extensive capabilities
to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on
integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its
information collection/dissemination activities; and its global navigation and
positioning, weather, and communications capabilities." Id.
n604 DODD S-3600.1, supra note 603. As with "information operations," the Air
Force expands this definition as it recognizes the continuing engagement of
defensive information warfare systems even absent crises or armed conflict:
"Information operations conducted to defend one's own information and
information systems, or to attack and affect an adversary's information and
information systems." AFDD 2-5, supra note 600, at 42. Thus, on either
definition, information warfare is a specialized kind of information operations.
Unlike previous definitions, it includes more than just attack of command and
control systems. Id. at vii.
n605 Of course, information warfare and the multi-faceted operations it
entails is not limited to the space environment. However, with the increasing
reliance on space for telecommunications applications, the means of
transmitting, intercepting, and corrupting information will entail use of
n606 For a discussion of the customary principle of military necessity, see
supra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
n607 For a discussion of the customary principle of proportionality, see
supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text.
n608 For a discussion of the customary principle of discrimination, see supra
notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
n609 For a discussion of the customary principle of humanity, see supra notes
166-177 and accompanying text.
n610 For a discussion of the Hague system, see supra Part III, @ C.1. For a
discussion of the Geneva system, see supra Part III, @ C.2.
n611 Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
1998, Chapter 7, p.1. The most recent Annual Report continues this theme,
"military operations rely heavily upon information lines of communication to,
in, through, and from space." Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, 2000, Chapter 8, p.2. The observation from the 1998
Annual Report that space operations provide access to foreign countries "without
violating their sovereignty," requires some clarification as it might apply to
space warfare. It is certainly true that space surveillance and reconnaissance
activities, even if conducted by foreign militaries, do not violate a
sensed-State's sovereignty. This includes all manner of remote sensing and
electronic interception. Yet as space operations evolve into instruments of
combat, actual destruction of an adversary's space assets is likely to be
accompanied by claims that its sovereignty has been violated. The implications
under the jus ad bellum are obvious and the question will increasingly merit
attention, particularly because a State's sovereignty is generally tied to its
territory. The Outer Space Treaty outlaws national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. II. By itself, this does not mean that
States will not have sovereign rights in space. Article II was tested in 1976
when eight equatorial States attempted to claim sovereignty in portions of the
geosynchronous orbit by means of the dubious "Bogota Declaration." Predictably,
such claims were roundly rejected by the international community which, on the
authority of the Outer Space Treaty and common sense, refused to recognize
sovereign rights in portions of outer space itself. The claims of these States
(Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Indonesia), four of
whom had previously ratified the Outer Space Treaty, "has met with technically
constructive as well as legally well-reasoned refutations by a majority of
member states of the U.N. in those international fora where it has been
reiterated." M.N. ANDEM, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE PEACEFUL
EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE 160 (1992).
Beyond assertions of sovereignty over natural resources from space, or
portions of space itself, lies the question of whether the Outer Space Treaty
allows for sovereignty in a space asset itself beyond an assertion of
sovereignty as a property right. The Outer Space Treaty provides that States
retain jurisdiction and control as well as "ownership" over the space objects on
its registry. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. VIII. The ISS
Agreement uses similar language ("ownership," "jurisdiction and control")
without vesting national sovereignty in the asset. ISS Agreement, supra note
342, at art. 5, 6. However, because Article II of the Outer Space Treaty focuses
on national appropriation, only secondarily mentioning sovereignty as one of
several means of effectuating an illegal claim of national appropriation, it
appears that a limitation on State sovereignty over its space assets, if any,
will not come by operation of Article II.
Certainly States have already appropriated objects that they own and control.
In effect, States already maintain a national appropriation over their assets in
space. A possible source limiting a State's sovereignty rights in its space
assets comes from Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty which requires that all
"stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art.
XII. Typically, spaces over which a State exercises its sovereignty may be
closed to foreign entrance. However, although with this provision States Parties
give up a measure of exclusive occupation and privacy in their space objects on
the moon and other celestial bodies, such does not necessarily imply a loss of
sovereignty. As a practical matter, the question of State sovereignty in its
space objects is relatively unimportant for civil and commercial activities
given the "jurisdiction and control" and "ownership" provisions of Article VIII,
Outer Space Treaty. However, the question may become acute as the prospect of
military confrontation in space increases and States engage in hostilities that
may constitute an act of war. For an interesting recent discussion of State
jurisdiction in outer space, see W.P. Heere, Problems of Jurisdiction in Air and
Outer Space XXIV:2 AIR & SPACE L. 70 (April 1999).
n612 See, e.g., R.G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Information
Warfare 45 A.F. L. REV. 173 (1997); S.P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New
Challenges for Public International Law (1996) 37 Harv. INT'L L. J. 272; and
Schmitt, supra note 527.
n613 As the practice of space warfare is currently evolving, for the near
future it will likely entail principally the targeting and destruction of
unmanned assets both within airspace and outer space.
n614 Phrasing the issues in this way is intended to illustrate that the
problem of "dual use" assets can be understood in two different ways. The use of
the asset can be "dual," as for example a remote sensing satellite used both for
agricultural research as well as for evidence of war crimes. In this regard the
NATO use of satellite imagery to establish the creation of mass graves could
have come from civilian, commercially available remote sensing systems. Further
the ownership of the satellite can be dual as between several States directly,
or through participation in intergovernmental organizations such as the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the
former International Mobile Satellite Organization (INMARSAT).
n615 See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization "INTELSAT," Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 (entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973).
n616 Article 3 of the INMARSAT treaty requires that the uses of its assets be
reserved for "peaceful purposes." Convention on the International Maritime
Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, art. 3, 31 U.S.T. 1, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105
(entered into force July 16, 1979).
n617 W.D. von Noorden, INMARSAT Use By Armed Forces: A Question of Treaty
Interpretation, 23:1 J. SPACE L. 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter von Noorden].
n618 Id. As for military uses authorized by the treaty, the member nations of
INMARSAT, as well the INMARSAT staff itself, have concluded that the treaty's
language "permits the use of INMARSAT assets by UN peacekeeping or peacemaking
forces acting under the auspices of the UN Security Council, even if they are
engaged in armed conflict to accomplish their missions." Department of Defense,
Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in
Information Operations (May 1999) at 15.
n619 von Noorden, supra note 617, at 2. The author strongly implies that the
U.S. simply avoided the "peaceful purposes" issue by focusing instead on
n620 See, e.g., R.A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication
Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and 'Peaceful Purposes' 60 J.
AIR L. & COM. 237 (1994).
n621 Once again, military wargames are precipitating discussion of potential
legal issues. In the Army's 1998 "Space Game 2" an issue arose as to the use of
commercial satellites and whether the U.S. could or should attack either the
space or ground segment. The now-familiar question "which of these options
constitute an act of war?" also was raised. W.B. Scott, Wargame Raises New
Space Policy Dilemmas, 148:8 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 23, 1998, at 98.
n622 The following discussion describes neutrality as a specific legal
category within the law of war:
The term 'neutrality' designates the legal status of a State which does not
participate in a war being waged by other States. A precondition, therefore, is
the existence of a war between sovereign States or a civil war in which the
rebels have been recognized as belligerents. . . . In the case of a use of force
which falls short of actual war, the laws of neutrality do not apply. . . .
Neutrality ends when the neutral State enters the war, but not if it uses force
to counter a violation of its neutrality. . . . A neutral State has the right to
demand respect for its independence and above all for its territorial
sovereignty, including its air space. . . . The supreme precept is that the
neutral State may not, by governmental measures, intervene in the conflict to
the advantage of one of the belligerents. Measures that would assist a
belligerent and those that would harm it are alike forbidden. This prohibition
applies even if equal treatment for both parties is contemplated. Equality of
treatment and impartiality are in this respect irrelevant. It is an obligation
imposed on the government of the neutral State, but not on its nationals. . . .
Basically, neutral obligations are only of a political or a military nature.
R.L. Bindschedler, Neutrality, Concept and General Rules, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-13 (Bernhardt, ed., 1982).
n623 See Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 (1908 Supp.) 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 117 [hereinafter Hague Convention (V)]; See Hague Convention (XIII)
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907
(1908 Supp.) 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 202.
n624 As previously suggested, references to "bombardment" where used in the
conventions governing land (IV) and sea (IX) warfare have been widely read to
effect limits on means and methods of prosecuting air war. See, e.g., Parks,
supra note 123.
n625 Hague Convention (V), supra note 623, at art. 8. The specific reference
to early instruments of telecommunications is particularly apt as applied to
space warfare. The principal assets in which the "dual use" problem for neutral
and belligerent co-ownership arises in space warfare will be for
n626 Id. at art. 9.
n627 Id. at art. 20.
n628 Other non-parties to the Convention that were active to some degree in
the 1991 Persian Gulf War include Canada, Italy and Turkey.
n629 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 131, at 61.
n630 In addition to those cited below, perhaps the most obvious example of
dual-use technology pertains to launch vehicles. In the civilian context, launch
vehicles are also termed boosters or simply transportation systems. In the
military context, virtually the same launch vehicles become missiles and
rockets. This dual use potential for the same launch vehicle creates tension
given the rise of commercial use of space. For example, the joint venture
between U.S., Russian, Norwegian, and Ukrainian corporations to launch
commercial satellites from an ocean-going oil rig was suspended in 1998 over
missile technology concerns. The effort, popularly known as Sea Launch, uses a
Russian Zenit rocket to boost the commercial payloads to orbit. The U.S. State
Department, fearful that Boeing was educating Russia on improvements to its
missile design, halted work on the project. The Zenit rocket is a modified
version of the Russian SS-18 ICBM. See J. Mintz, U.S. Suspends Boeing-Ukraine
Rocket Launch, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, at A14. The U.S. has subsequently
allowed work to resume.
n631 The dual-use character of remote sensing satellites benefits military
and civilian organizations in both directions. Thus, military imagery finds
useful civilian application as well. For example, declassification of
photoreconnaisance from the early U.S. Corona satellites has allowed for surface
water studies. Recently-released imagery showed the size of the Soviet Aral Sea
in 1962. By comparison with 1990s imagery, the considerable extent to which the
sea has shrunk due to the diversion of water for irrigation becomes clear.
PEEBLES, THE CORONA PROJECT, supra note 49, at 266. Peebles also notes that
the first NASA Landsat earth resources satellite was launched in 1972 -- a
month after the end of Corona. With the Corona photos, environmental studies
could be extended back another twelve years, helping to separate long-term
changes from normal variations in such areas as movement of sand dunes, loss of
forest areas, and shifts in the courses of tropical rivers.
n632 Christol argues that this dual-use aspect of most space assets
contributed "to the demise of the position that military activities in the
space environment were inherently aggressive. . . . Space objects engaged in
communications, observations of earth from space, weather observation, and
geodesy could be engaged in either a military, a non-military, or both military
and non-military activities." CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, supra note 338, at 28.
n633 A further permutation of the issue arises when several opposing
belligerents simultaneously use the same asset. During Operation Desert Storm,
both the coalition and Iraq were using transponders off the ARABSAT
telecommunication system. F.R. Cleminson, Banning the Stationing of Weapons in
Space Through Arms Control: A Major Step in the Promotion of Strategic Stability
in the 21st Century, in ARMS CONTROL AND THE RULE OF LAW: A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE 39 (J.M Beier & S. Mataija, eds., 1998). Aside from
the issue of neutral State partial ownership of the system, there appears to be
no jus in bello reason why either side could not have attacked the satellite.
Though each side would have had to calculate whether it stood to gain more than
it lost by the attack, this amounts to a question of military tactics and
strategy rather than permissible conduct under the law.
n634 Thus, in its Report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the
Department of Defense discussed the coalition attacks on major utilities, the
Iraqi communications system, and bridges. The Report affirms that
when objects are used concurrently for civilian and military purposes, they are
liable to attack if there is a military advantage to be gained in their attack.
('Military advantage' is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the
full context of a war strategy, in this instance, the execution of the Coalition
war plan for liberation of Kuwait.)
Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
Appendix O on the Role of the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 623 (1992).
n635 If all that were required were a potential military use, any asset could
be targeted. The homes of civilians far from the battlespace could potentially
be used by military forces, but such are not lawful targets unless so used.
Similarly, any satellite with a system of on-orbit propulsion is a potential
kinetic ASAT for another satellite. This, by itself, does not make the
satellite a military objective.
n636 M. COLLINS, LIFTOFF: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ADVENTURE IN SPACE 161
n637 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. V. Though "astronaut" was
originally a U.S. term referring to human beings in space, it can apply equally
to humans in space from other countries, including those that may prefer the
term "cosmonaut." As used here, the two terms are synonymous and use of the
one constitutes reference to both. The phrase "envoys of mankind" comes from the
Outer Space Treaty which declares "States Parties to the Treaty shall regard
astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render them all
possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on
the territory of another State Party or on the high seas." Id.
n638 Commenting on this term, Cocca writes
The term 'envoy' has a precedent in diplomatic law, that of an envoy
extraordinary. An envoy ranks just below an ambassador and always is an agent, a
messenger. The reason for this unique concept lies in the fact that astronauts
have been vested with the legal representation of all mankind in outer space and
celestial bodies. No former representation has ever been as wide and
politically, it goes beyond the most audacious ambition. On the other hand, this
investment was recognized in the General Assembly by unanimity and acclamation.
A.A. Cocca, Prospective Space Law, 26:1 J. OF SPACE L. 51, 54 (1998).
n639 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. IV ("The use of military
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not
n640 At the time of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, virtually all
U.S. astronauts in space from the Mercury and Gemini projects had all been
members of the U.S. military.
n641 It appears to be of little significance that the Outer Space Treaty
requires that astronauts be regarded as envoys of mankind "in outer space." When
read in context, this is not a geographic limitation for the exclusive area in
which astronauts are to be regarded as envoys, but rather a claim that when away
from earth, that is, in outer space, astronauts represent the human race.
n642 Hague Convention (IV) Annex, supra note 154, at art. 1. Although the
requirements to have a distinctive emblem "recognizable at a distance" and to
"carry arms openly" certainly assume new meaning as applied to outer space, such
requirements could be complied with in space just as they are on land, sea, or
in the air. The central point of these requirements is to allow clear
distinction between combatants and civilians, legitimate and illegitimate
military targets. Failure to so identify oneself if done to take advantage of
the enemy's goodwill, amounts to an act of perfidy, one of the most serious law
of war violations as it undermines the entire system and the mutual "confidence"
on which it is based. For a discussion of perfidy under Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, see supra note 166.
n643 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose." Vienna Convention, supra note 265, at art. 31 (emphasis added). Though
the Vienna Convention came into force well after adoption of the Outer Space
Treaty, the U.S. views its provisions as simply codifying preexisting customary
n644 It is for this reason that diplomats stationed in foreign countries are
accorded such wide protections under international law. Not only are their
personal and professional premises, archives and documents, and persons deemed
"inviolable," but they are free from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force June 24, 1964).
n645 M. Bourbonniere, & L. Haeck, Jus in Bello Spatialis, 1999 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SPACE STUDIES INSTITUTE 8 (1999) (conference on space manufacturing). Once a
diplomat takes up arms, he arguably loses his diplomatic protections. See J.S.
Beaumont, Self-Defense as a Justification for Disregarding Diplomatic Immunity,
1991 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 391 (1992).
n646 The Outer Space Treaty itself hints at this by requiring that States
Parties regard astronauts as envoys. This raises the subtle distinction between
an astronaut actually being an envoy, and simply being regarded as one.
n647 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 316, at art. V.
n648 Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 358, at art. IV.
n649 See S. Gorove, Legal and Policy Issues Raised by the Proposed Notion of
'Aerospace Object,' in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 411 (1998); C.Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 339
(1991); M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING 59, 60 (1972). Generally, the arguments rests on anecdotal evidence
of spacecraft entering the national airspace of a foreign State without incident
n650 For additional discussion of the question of innocent passage as a
customary norm of international law, see supra note 312. In addition to the
arguments of Malanczuk and Wassenberg, additional space law commentators have
made the argument cogently, including A.D. Terekhov, Passage of Space Objects
Through Foreign Airspace: International Custom?, 25:1 J. SPACE L. 1 (1997); P.
Haanappel, The Aerospace Plane: Analogies with Other Modes of Transportation, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 341, 342
(1990); B. Cheng, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary
Problem Functionalism Versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, V ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 323, 357 (1980). Indeed, while backing away from its earlier
unequivocal assertions that such a right exists, Russia more recently stated
that "provisions of international customary law with respect to the passage of
aerospace objects after re-entry into Earth's atmosphere are currently in the
process of being elaborated." Questionnaire On Possible Legal Issues with Regard
to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635 (1996).
n651 LOS Convention, supra note 467, at art. 19.
n652 Scott, Space As New Area of Responsibility, supra note 2, at 55. While
General Estes' point appears self-evident, the U.S. is not likely to deploy
weapons for some time. "We don't foresee weaponization in space between now and
the 2020 timeframe." Robert Wall, Space Weapons Fall from USAF Vision, 153:2 AV.
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 20, 2000, at 86 (quoting Secretary of the Air Force, F.
n653 This prospect appears unlikely. Following his discussion of events at
the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, Professor Vlasic plausibly asserts:
It may not be too far-fetched to conclude that the position of certain States
on the issue of space weapons reflects their desire not to be subject to
restrictions, at least not yet, by an international legal instrument, even if
only a U.N.G.A. resolution, condemning in unambiguous terms the development,
testing and deployment of devices, wherever based, designed to attack or
interfere with space assets.
Vlasic, Space Law and Military Technology, supra note 11, at 407.
n654 As stated previously, given the continuing implications of State
sovereignty in international relations, it is important to conceive State
behavior not as authorized by international law, but rather inherently lawful
unless proscribed by international law. See supra note 141. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to speak of activity that is "not prohibited" or "consistent with
n655 Several of the items on these prohibited and not prohibited lists were
taken from a July 1985 working paper entitled "Survey of International Law
Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space" submitted by the government of Canada
to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. Stojak, supra note 354, at 45, 46.
n656 The two publicly-acknowledged exceptions include the U.S. and Russian
ASAT systems. States have historically been reluctant to agree to restrictions
on their use of potential weaponry before it has been developed and fielded. The
notable exception is the recent restriction on blinding lasers. See supra note
General Howell M. Estes, III USAF (1997)
Before examining how the law of war will restrict means and methods of
space warfare, it is necessary to determine whether it applies to military
space operations in the first place. Given the evolution of aerial
warfare--gradual restrictions on means and methods applied from the existing law
of war--and the apparent similarity of certain aspects of the maritime
environment to that of outer space, one can apply the traditional set of norms
known as the law of war to space warfare by employing a process of analogical
reasoning. The conclusion that the existing law of war will apply to space
warfare is further supported by treaty bases in the Outer Space Treaty and the
law of war's Martens' clause.
That said, when it comes to outlining permissible military activity during
the course of space combat, it appears equally clear that the near-total
atmospheric vacuum characterizing outer space is matched by a similar legal
vacuum with respect to the jus in bello for space warfare. Academicians and
practitioners are left to making educated but uncertain guesses based on
analogies with other legal regimes. As with any attempt to predict the
application of current (though insufficient) legal regimes to future phenomena,
it is extremely difficult to articulate with any precision how this application
should occur. The difficulty is largely a function of developing warfare
technologies that continue to outpace the progressive development of
international law. Ideally however, the task should fall to diplomats and
international legislators having the authority to negotiate clarifications to
international law before the relevant issues are unilaterally decided by States
in the context of actual combat. [n653]
The prospect of space warfare requires the formulation of a new
perspective on the law of war. The law of war contains prescriptive norms
derived from a wide variety of sources. With respect to space warfare, the
corpus juris spatialis, in addition to a variety of arms control treaties,
contributes additional restrictions to the existing law of war. Having concluded
that the traditional law of war will apply to space warfare, and employing the
most widely accepted understandings of the terms "peaceful" and "space weapon,"
an examination of relevant legal sources demonstrates that the following
military activities are prohibited at this time:
* Interference with space-based "national technical means" (space based sensors)
for arms control verification as between the U.S. and Russian Federation;
* Placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit
around the earth and on celestial bodies or in orbit around them;
* Testing or other detonation of nuclear weapons in outer space;
* Placement of military bases and conduct of military tests or maneuvers on
celestial bodies and in orbits around them;
* Destruction of targets that are not military objects or militarily necessary,
and are specifically prohibited such as hospitals, churches, and non-combatants;
* Use of space weapons or tactics that are "inhumane," "disproportionate" to the
militarily necessary objective sought, or are incapable of use so as to
"distinguish" between legitimate and illegitimate targets (as the terms are used
under the traditional jus in bello);
* Development, testing, and deployment of space-based or other anti-ballistic
missile systems and components (with a single limited exception);
* Military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques in outer
By contrast, an examination of the same sources discloses that, at a
minimum, the following military activities in outer space are not prohibited:
* The use of military personnel;
* The use of space-based remote sensors in support of combat or other military
* The use of space-based communication, navigation, and meteorological systems
for combat or other military purposes;
* The deployment and non-aggressive use of conventional space weapons; and
* The transiting of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in non-orbital
Despite nearly forty years of research into space weaponry there is no
binding international instrument limiting the use of such weapons. With two
isolated examples, such weapons have not been fielded, contributing to State
reluctance to foreclose further study into effective deterrents. [n656]
However there will come a day when a treaty governing means and methods of
space warfare will be desirable. In addition to the certainty written law brings
to the legal structures governing human conduct, formal agreements most clearly
evince the consent of the governed. Of course, any treaty developments for
space warfare must strike a pragmatic balance between national security,
international legal order, and human rights--a balance for which the jus in
bello has striven for at least 100 years.
To a certain degree, this review of the law of war and its application to
space warfare serves as a call for further analysis of the topic. Though armed
conflicts apparently have not occurred in space to date, the rudimentary means
for engaging in such conflicts now exist. As each armed conflict since Vietnam
makes greater use of space assets, it is undoubtedly only a matter of time
before a future conflict witnesses the application of force both from and within
the space environment. When it does, and in the absence of specific
international norms restricting the use of means of methods of war in space,
State practice will provide the first insights into how the law will be applied.
As this article has argued, the lawful scope of such warfare will be limited
by the customary principles of proportionality, necessity, discrimination,
humanity, and an array of treaty-based norms affecting the targeting of
individuals and objects. To this extent, the existing law of war restricts the
scope of space warfare today. How the law will evolve into the future law of war
will largely depend upon the nature and scope of such warfare, and upon the new
customary principles that may emerge thereby. However, it is doubtful that the
international community will have any greater success in codifying the law
governing space warfare than it has had with respect to aerial warfare.
n1 JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 5 (1993).
n2 Professor Matte argues that "airspace" is a misnomer, and that the proper
term is "air medium." He makes this distinction in arguing against "any kind of
arbitrary demarcation between 'air space' and 'outer space.'" N.M. MATTE,
AEROSPACE LAW: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES 11 n.31 (1982). Professor Matte
further observed that the two environments are "at present governed by two
different legal regimes," id. (emphasis added), but that the more logical
approach is to speak of an aerospace continuum. On this approach, "the rules and
norms of aeronautical law, on the one hand, and of aerospace law, on the other
hand, should be applied according to functional criteria, i.e., the type of
activity being carried out." Id. This contrasts with the "traditional view" of
crafting and applying law to the medium in which the activity is carried out,
either air or space. Though insightfully recognizing the great difficulty of
establishing a non-arbitrary boundary between air space and outer space, this
view, if applied to armed conflict, would identify applicable norms limiting
weaponry and methods of warfare based on a functional approach, rather than on
where the combat occurs. The difficulty with this from a military point of view
lies in the conceptual challenge of creating warfare policy, doctrine, and
operating plans without a clear demarcation of the theater of operations. See,
e.g., W.B. Scott, Pentagon Considers Space As New Area of Responsibility, 146:12
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 24, 1997, at 54 [hereinafter Scott, Space as New
Area of Responsibility].
n3 One author aptly terms the difference "significant." R.D. NEWBERRY,
SPACE DOCTRINE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (1998) [hereinafter NEWBERRY].
The difference is helpfully illustrated by three representative schools of
thought on the relationship between military activity and outer space: (1)
space as a demilitarized sanctuary; (2) space as the high ground; and (3)
space as a theater of operations. J.E. Justin, Space: A Sanctuary, the High
Ground, or a Military Theater?, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF SPACE
(U. Ra'anan & R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1984) 102-09 [hereinafter Justin].
The first view recognizes a minimal role for the military use of space but not
its weaponization. Two thoughtful, moderated accounts representing this view
were recently provided by two USAF officers. One aims at "opening the debate" on
the space sanctuary view. B.M. DeBlois, Space Sanctuary: A Viable National
Strategy 12:4 AIRPOWER J. 41 (Winter 1998) [hereinafter DeBlois]. The other
claims to present the "strongest possible argument for a space sanctuary today."
D.W. ZIEGLER, SAFE HEAVENS: MILITARY STRATEGY AND SPACE SANCTUARY THOUGHT (1998)
[hereinafter ZIEGLER]. The second of the three schools of thought, sees the role
of military activity in space as principally supportive of terrestrial combat
and could include the use of weapons from space. This view stresses the
inseparability of the air and space media, and makes heavy use of the term
"aerospace," a term coined in 1958 by USAF Chief of Staff General Thomas White.
Justin at 107; see also D.N. SPIRES, BEYOND HORIZONS: A HALF CENTURY OF AIR
FORCE SPACE LEADERSHIP 54 (rev'd ed., 1998) [hereinafter SPIRES]. The third view
represents the most complete use of space for military purposes. This view sees
space not merely as another medium in which to augment existing military roles,
but as an emerging combat environment, or military mission, in its own right.
The present author's analysis rests on the conclusion that international law
does not prohibit the use of outer space as a complete military theater of
operations per se. This assumes that any force used as part of military
operations in space is compliant under the jus ad bellum. For a discussion of
the jus ad bellum, see infra notes 132 through 140 and accompanying text.
n4 The unmanned assets used in outer space are obvious-satellites and
missiles. Unmanned assets used within airspace include unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), currently used for surveillance, as well as missiles either headed for
or from space or used entirely within airspace. See generally JEFFREY N.
RENEHAN, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A LETHAL
COMBINATION? 5-13 (1997) (provides helpful discussion of UAVs and remotely
piloted vehicle technologies).
n5 This is to say that as long as space warfare is prosecuted through
unmanned missions against assets wholly within the space environment, that
portion of the law of war traditionally known as "Hague Law" will govern space
warfare more readily than that portion known as "Geneva Law." For a discussion
of "Hague Law," see infra notes 188 through 207 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of "Geneva Law," see infra notes 208 through 219 and accompanying
n6 Professor Schmitt has pointed out that on rare occasions, international
law has sought to outlaw the deleterious effects of certain anticipated
technologies. In this regard he cites the ban on blinding laser weapons, adopted
before such weapons had ever been used in military operations. "Much more
frequently, however, law has proven reactive. Indeed, in the twentieth century,
codification efforts have followed major wars in almost lock-step fashion."
Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First-Century War
and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, in 71 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENIUM 389 (Michael N.
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green, eds., 1998), reprinted in 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051
(1998) [hereinafter Schmitt, Bellum Americanum].
n7 As Geoffrey Best puts it, "there was no international law on aerial
warfare before the turn of our century. The Hague Conferences [1899 and 1907]
gingerly laid a few foundations. . . . but the terms used were soon discovered
to be archaic, and vital questions had been begged." G. BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE
1945 199 (1994). It will be difficult to avoid similar mistakes as States
contemplate moving into uncharted legal territory once again. Any attempt to
depict the future in plausible terms is fraught with many challenges. The
following three challenges, taken from a fascinating Air Force study on future
concepts, capabilities, and technologies in the year 2025, certainly apply to
any attempt to envision a future law of war and the conditions necessitating it:
First, one runs the risk of assuming that because we can do something, we will.
In this case technology drives planning, not the reverse. Second, we
straight-jacket the future with today's assumptions. That is, we focus on an
array of problems and possibilities that are too narrow compared to the array we
actually will encounter. A third problem is the reverse of the previous one.
Here, we are too expansive and imagine far more than we or the world are in fact
capable of accomplishing in the time frame under review.
J.W. Kelly, Executive Summary, in AIR FORCE 2025 6 (1996) [hereinafter AIR FORCE
n8 Schmitt, Bellum Americanum, supra note 6, at 390. Numerous commentators,
including senior military officers, have widely termed Operation Desert Storm
the first space war. See, e.g., R. Saltus, Air Force says it Might Have Won the
War in 2 More Weeks, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1991, at 10; C. Covoult, DESERT STORM
Reinforces Military Space Directions, 134:14 AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 8,
1991, at 42.
n9 Though several interesting studies consider the possibility of warfare
with extra-terrestrial forms of intelligent life, such consideration is far
beyond the scope of this article. Such analyses also exceed the scope of
international law proper. Nonetheless, these works often make useful
observations about future space weaponry and the difficulty of scientific
prediction. For example, one sober, scientifically-respectable work, considering
the technological preconditions for successfully defending against alien attack,
distinguishes this project from that of mere science fiction, and points out the
importance of allowing authors free rein in speculating about future | <urn:uuid:a488d871-5262-4904-abc6-2f9314f5e9c5> | CC-MAIN-2015-22 | http://www.space4peace.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-22/segments/1432207930995.36/warc/CC-MAIN-20150521113210-00065-ip-10-180-206-219.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.911974 | 121,755 | 2.9375 | 3 |
The purpose of this glossary is to provide an accessible dictionary of assessment-related terms for use by a non-technical, lay audience. This audience includes various consumers of assessments and assessment information who have had limited or no formal training regarding measurement and assessment. Examples of such individuals include: K-12 educators, parents of students, media writers, adult test takers, researchers who use assessment instruments or existing assessment results in their work, policy makers at the state and national levels, and higher education administrators in areas such as admissions or institutional research.
The intention of the glossary is to offer definitions for “technical terms” or “specialized jargon” in a way that might be readily understood by those who have not studied in the field or have not developed expertise through work experience in the field. Ease of interpretation and technical correctness were both goals in the development of glossary definitions. Some specialists or experts might provide more complex or “inclusive” definitions for some terms in order to be more exact. However, the approach used in developing this glossary was to err on the side of communicating simply with a lay audience rather than to ensure precision in expression that would be acceptable to specialists in the field when both criteria could not be met.
The terms included in the glossary cover a broad range of concepts and labels used in educational testing in the realms of achievement, aptitude, and psychological assessment. For achievement testing, this includes language associated with programs like NCLB (No Child Left Behind), RTTT (Race To The Top), APP (Advanced Placement Program), and NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress), in addition to K-12 standardized achievement batteries and tests used in various subject-matter areas, like reading comprehension, for example. In the area of aptitude testing, programs like ACT, SAT, PSAT (Preliminary SAT) and other admissions tests would be included, as well as K-12 tests of cognitive abilities. For psychological assessments, instruments and score reports most commonly used in special education are included. | <urn:uuid:3c36a057-ca46-4455-8617-3e9121eadba7> | CC-MAIN-2018-22 | http://www.ncme.org/ncme/NCME/NCME/Resource_Center/Glossary_Folder/Purpose.aspx | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-22/segments/1526794864725.4/warc/CC-MAIN-20180522112148-20180522132148-00433.warc.gz | en | 0.951141 | 417 | 3.703125 | 4 |
According to Norse* mythology, the world will end at Ragnarok, a time of great destruction when the gods will wage a final battle with the giants and other evil forces. Ragnarok has not yet arrived, but the events leading to it have already been set in motion.
Before Ragnarok begins, the world will suffer a terrible winter lasting three years. During this period the sun will grow dim, evil forces will be released, and wars will rage among humans. The trickster Loki will gather the frost giants and sail to Asgard, the home of gods. The wolf Fenrir, the serpent Jormungand, and Hel, the goddess of the dead, will break free and join Loki and other evil characters in a battle against the gods.
On the morning of Ragnarok, the god Heimdall will sound his mighty horn, summoning the gods to battle. During the terrible struggle that follows, all the great gods—including Odin* and
trickster mischievous figure appearing in various forms in the folktales and mythology of many different peoples
* See Names and Places at the end of this volume for further information.
Thor*—will be killed. Loki and the monsters, giants, and other evil beings will also perish. The earth will be set on fire, the sun and moon will be destroyed, the sky will fall, and the world will finally sink beneath the sea and vanish.
Ragnarok will not be the end of everything, however. The World Tree Yggdrasill will survive, and two humans—Lif and Lifthrasir—and some animals will be sheltered among its branches. New land will rise from the oceans, and a fresh green earth will emerge. Lif and Lifthrasir will repopulate the world. Some of the gods—including Balder*—will also return and rebuild Asgard, ushering in a new golden age. Giants and other evil beings will not reappear but will fade as a distant memory. | <urn:uuid:7f856d82-d1e9-4896-a883-141a89d88d5e> | CC-MAIN-2015-27 | http://www.mythencyclopedia.com/Pr-Sa/Ragnarok.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-27/segments/1435375098924.1/warc/CC-MAIN-20150627031818-00286-ip-10-179-60-89.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.908754 | 401 | 2.859375 | 3 |
Skip to comments.SETI and Intelligent Design
Posted on 12/02/2005 8:35:59 AM PST by ckilmer
|SETI and Intelligent Design
By Seth Shostak
posted: 01 December 2005
06:37 am ET
If youre an inveterate tube-o-phile, you may remember the episode of "Cheers" in which Cliff, the postman whos stayed by neither snow, nor rain, nor gloom of night from his appointed rounds of beer, exclaims to Norm that hes found a potato that looks like Richard Nixons head.
This could be an astonishing attempt by taters to express their political views, but Norm is unimpressed. Finding evidence of complexity (the Nixon physiognomy) in a natural setting (the spud), and inferring some deliberate, magical mechanism behind it all, would be a leap from the doubtful to the divine, and in this case, Norm feels, unwarranted.
Cliff, however, would have some sympathizers among the proponents of Intelligent Design (ID), whose efforts to influence school science curricula continue to swill large quantities of newspaper ink. As just about everyone is aware, these folks use similar logic to infer a "designer" behind such biological constructions as DNA or the human eye. The apparent complexity of the product is offered as proof of deliberate blueprinting by an unknown creatorconscious action, presumably from outside the universe itself.
What many readers will not know is that SETI research has been offered up in support of Intelligent Design.
The way this happens is as follows. When ID advocates posit that DNAwhich is a complicated, molecular blueprintis solid evidence for a designer, most scientists are unconvinced. They counter that the structure of this biological building block is the result of self-organization via evolution, and not a proof of deliberate engineering. DNA, the researchers will protest, is no more a consciously constructed system than Jupiters Great Red Spot. Organized complexity, in other words, is not enough to infer design.
But the adherents of Intelligent Design protest the protest. They point to SETI and say, "upon receiving a complex radio signal from space, SETI researchers will claim it as proof that intelligent life resides in the neighborhood of a distant star. Thus, isnt their search completely analogous to our own line of reasoninga clear case of complexity implying intelligence and deliberate design?" And SETI, they would note, enjoys widespread scientific acceptance.
If we as SETI researchers admit this is so, it sounds as if were guilty of promoting a logical double standard. If the ID folks arent allowed to claim intelligent design when pointing to DNA, how can we hope to claim intelligent design on the basis of a complex radio signal? Its true that SETI is well regarded by the scientific community, but is that simply because we dont suggest that the voice behind the microphone could be God?
In fact, the signals actually sought by todays SETI searches are not complex, as the ID advocates assume. Were not looking for intricately coded messages, mathematical series, or even the aliens version of "I Love Lucy." Our instruments are largely insensitive to the modulationor messagethat might be conveyed by an extraterrestrial broadcast. A SETI radio signal of the type we could actually find would be a persistent, narrow-band whistle. Such a simple phenomenon appears to lack just about any degree of structure, although if it originates on a planet, we should see periodic Doppler effects as the world bearing the transmitter rotates and orbits.
And yet we still advertise that, were we to find such a signal, we could reasonably conclude that there was intelligence behind it. It sounds as if this strengthens the argument made by the ID proponents. Our sought-after signal is hardly complex, and yet were still going to say that weve found extraterrestrials. If we can get away with that, why cant they?
Well, its because the credibility of the evidence is not predicated on its complexity. If SETI were to announce that were not alone because it had detected a signal, it would be on the basis of artificiality. An endless, sinusoidal signal a dead simple tone is not complex; its artificial. Such a tone just doesnt seem to be generated by natural astrophysical processes. In addition, and unlike other radio emissions produced by the cosmos, such a signal is devoid of the appendages and inefficiencies nature always seems to add for example, DNAs junk and redundancy.
Consider pulsars stellar objects that flash light and radio waves into space with impressive regularity. Pulsars were briefly tagged with the moniker LGM (Little Green Men) upon their discovery in 1967. Of course, these little men didnt have much to say. Regular pulses dont convey any informationno more than the ticking of a clock. But the real kicker is something else: inefficiency. Pulsars flash over the entire spectrum. No matter where you tune your radio telescope, the pulsar can be heard. Thats bad design, because if the pulses were intended to convey some sort of message, it would be enormously more efficient (in terms of energy costs) to confine the signal to a very narrow band. Even the most efficient natural radio emitters, interstellar clouds of gas known as masers, are profligate. Their steady signals splash over hundreds of times more radio band than the type of transmissions sought by SETI.
Imagine bright reflections of the Sun flashing off Lake Victoria, and seen from great distance. These would be similar to pulsar signals: highly regular (once ever 24 hours), and visible in preferred directions, but occupying a wide chunk of the optical spectrum. Its not a very good hailing-signal or communications device. Lightning bolts are another example. They produce pulses of both light and radio, but the broadcast extends over just about the whole electromagnetic spectrum. That sort of bad engineering is easily recognized and laid at natures door. Nature, for its part, seems unoffended.
Junk, redundancy, and inefficiency characterize astrophysical signals. It seems they characterize cells and sea lions, too. These biological constructions have lots of superfluous and redundant parts, and are a long way from being optimally built or operated. They also resemble lots of other things that may be either contemporaries or historical precedents.
So thats one point: the signals SETI seeks are really not like other examples drawn from the bestiary of complex astrophysical phenomena. That speaks to their artificiality.
The Importance of Setting
Theres another hallmark of artificiality we consider in SETI, and its context. Where is the signal found? Our searches often concentrate on nearby Sun-like star systems the very type of astronomical locale we believe most likely to harbor Earth-size planets awash in liquid water. Thats where we hope to find a signal. The physics of solar systems is that of hot plasmas (stars), cool hydrocarbon gasses (big planets), and cold rock (small planets). These do not produce, so far as we can either theorize or observe, monochromatic radio signals belched into space with powers of ten billion watts or morethe type of signal we look for in SETI experiments. Its hard to imagine how they would do this, and observations confirm that it just doesnt seem to be their thing.
Context is important, crucially important. Imagine that we should espy a giant, green square in one of these neighboring solar systems. That would surely meet our criteria for artificiality. But a square is not overly complex. Only in the context of finding it in someones solar system does its minimum complexity become indicative of intelligence.
In archaeology, context is the basis of many discoveries that are imputed to the deliberate workings of intelligence. If I find a rock chipped in such a way as to give it a sharp edge, and the discovery is made in a cave, I am seduced into ascribing this to tool use by distant, fetid and furry ancestors. It is the context of the cave that makes this assumption far more likely then an alternative scenario in which I assume that the random grinding and splitting of rock has resulted in this useful geometry.
In short, the champions of Intelligent Design make two mistakes when they claim that the SETI enterprise is logically similar to their own: First, they assume that we are looking for messages, and judging our discovery on the basis of message content, whether understood or not. In fact, were on the lookout for very simple signals. Thats mostly a technical misunderstanding. But their second assumption, derived from the first, that complexity would imply intelligence, is also wrong. We seek artificiality, which is an organized and optimized signal coming from an astronomical environment from which neither it nor anything like it is either expected or observed: Very modest complexity, found out of context. This is clearly nothing like looking at DNAs chemical makeup and deducing the work of a supernatural biochemist.
Straw man, anyone?.
Do you know Seth? If you do, tell him thanks for the great article :-)
The difference is that we can find concrete evidence through SETI, but not through ID.
Morning ping. Even if this isn't worthy of cranking up the ping machine, this should be archived as a means of comparing good vs. bad/bogus science in the context of the ID debate.
"Well you see, Norm, it's like this... A herd of buffalo can only move as fast as
the slowest buffalo and when the herd is hunted, it is the slowest and weakest ones
at the back that are killed first. This natural selection is good for the herd as a
whole, because the general speed and health of the whole group keeps improving by
the regular killing of the weakest members. In much the same way, the human brain
can only operate as fast as the slowest brain cells. Now, as we know, excessive
drinking of alcohol kills brain cells. But naturally, it attacks the slowest and
weakest brain cells first. In this way, regular consumption of beer eliminates
the weaker brain cells, making the brain a faster and more efficient machine. And
that, Norm, is why you always feel smarter after a few beers."
Does anyone know what the radio frequencies from Earth would "look like" if someone was in another star system doing the same, SETI-like experiment?
"All your intelligent design are belong to me"
Sounds like this might be Cliff the Postman pretending to be an actual scientist. By the way SETI did have one important function. It has thoroughly debunked the concept of a big bang beginning by acknowledging that there are many blue shift situations whereas a big bang would require an expanding universe with only red shifts!
ID is just as valid as any conceptual theory and probably fits the current, factual information better than other more traditionally held theories. SETI is probably worried that their funding might be cut if they do not support the politically correct version of reporting.
SETI must be going reeeeeal slow these days. Shostak has a lot of time on his hands to weave strawmans to peddle.
That's before actually tackling questions of ID's validity. He's just a sloppy debater who skates by on an inflated impression of his reputation.
Well, its because the credibility of the evidence is not predicated on its complexity. If SETI were to announce that were not alone because it had detected a signal, it would be on the basis of artificiality.
this is a gob smaker. so the signature of intelligence is its artificiality.
What is truly amazing here is that this guy makes the case for ID!!
He claims that SETI is seeking narrow, organized signals, much in the same way we can discern if an object if fabricated by the unnatural appearance and shape.
Well, life is an organization of chemicals and elements that exist everywhere, but when assembled properly----life.
ID purports that such organization is evidence of design at work rather than random chance.
The radio signals sought by SETI are those organized and not those emanating from random chance.
Well, he is the senior astronomer at SETI, and his cv says his Ph.D is in astronomy from Caltech, so mabe we can give him the benefit of the doubt.
...a big bang would require an expanding universe with only red shifts!
Uhhh, no, it wouldn't require that.
Our of curiousity, what is the "concrete evidence" that points to extraterrestrial intelligence?
This, plus your claim to be An Actual Scientist, is making my B.S. meter twitch. Explain how the Big Bang cancels all proper motion, and renders orbital mechanics invalid.
That's because "intelligent design" has absolutely no scientific basis but SETI does...as the article explains quite well.
It has thoroughly debunked the concept of a big bang beginning by acknowledging that there are many blue shift situations whereas a big bang would require an expanding universe with only red shifts!
The universe is a swirling mixture of multiple vectors thus some objects will move towards each other while others move away in an expanding framework. Thus, red and blue shifts would be observed.
ID is just as valid as any conceptual theory and probably fits the current, factual information better than other more traditionally held theories
Completely wrong. ID can not be supported by experimentation and observation nor can it predict phenomenon. Thus, it utterly fails to be a valid scientific theory.
The difference is that we can find concrete evidence through SETI, but not through ID.
Our of curiousity, what is the "concrete evidence" that points to extraterrestrial intelligence?
there is the kicker.
there is no "concrete evidence"
similiarly atheists will say : show me your concrete evidence for God. (But exclude everything in the natural universe as evidence of a creator.)
While the Big Bang is still an hypothesis, SETI has done nothing to bunk or debunk it. M31 is blue-shifted, but it is relatively nearby and is allowed to blue-shift.
It's like saying, "Show me the forest, but don't use the trees as evidence."
Please reread the article - especially the conclusion. ID claims that naturally occurring complexity must be artificial since it is complex - a circular logic fallacy. SETI is looking for a signal that has a simplicity and efficiency that can not be observed being produced by any natural source. This indicates a possible artificial source. The evidence builds if it can be reproduced or a mechanism could be constructed for reproduction.
I gather that one argument for ID is that the odds of random events leading to the creation of life are so long as to be unsupportable. However, the odds of any series of events leading to any situation are equally long.
Close except that the formation of DNA, cellular systems, or even orbital mechanics and quantum events are not "random."
They follow very detailed, exact laws of the chemical and physical interactions that determine chemical reactions, protein structures, and physical events.
Simple example: salt is not formed and its structure determined by sodium and chloride atoms just randomly bumping into each other and sticking together in a random fashion. The many laws that describe ion dissociation, electron valencies, bond mechanics, etc. determine that one sodium and one chloride bond at a specific angle.
They would see our narrowband carriers. :-)
You should consider brushing up on your Astronomy 101.
On the contrary, apparent complexity leads to the reasonable inference that a designer may be involved in its production.
ID = Agnostic Creativism..
SETI = Gnostic Fantasy..
Evolution = Dialectic Material Psuedo-Science..
I was thinking something similar, but we use so much of the broadcast spectrum and, since the Earth would appear to be a point source, I imagine there would be all kinds of overlap of the different bands and frequencies from all the radio sources, as well as possible attenuation from interstellar media. So my first thought is the spectrum would look fairly broad and incoherent in the radio region and then taper off where the spectrum goes to shorter wavelengths. Would there be specific, narrow band emissions that would not overlap?
While you've pointed out some circumstances that must exist to permit the occurance of certain constructs, I don't believe you have made clear that the existence of those circumstances did not occur through random and unplanned events.
It's good enough. ID and SETI too. Great way to slide into the weekend. I'm hauling out the ping machine ...
Quite so. Well stated :)
I'm not sure I understand your statement. Are you bringing to question that the laws themselves of chemical and physical determinants for reaction and molecular structure occurred through random events? Or, perhaps, that the earliest protein precedents of RNA/DNA resulted from random organic compounds coming together in an "planned" event?
I suppose so -- and I suppose also that they'd be narrowly focused S-band type signals sent from blowtorches like Goldstone, Madrid, and Canberra.
The question is: how likely is it that one could pick up such signals, even from big, powerful sites like those, at a distances on the order of light years?
I'd think it would be hard enough to detect extremely weak signals sent to us on purpose, much less incidental signals directed to (say) some alien version of Pioneer 10.
Leaving aside questions being batted about in this thread, what's your personal opinion of the likelihood of ever seeing such signals, assuming they were sent?
And that, not complexity or a lack of complexity, is the core claim of ID -- that one can distinguish the natural from the artificial or intelligently made. If SETI claims that such a distinction can be made scientifically, then the idea that one could distinguish the natural from the artificial in biology is not unreasonable. Despite what this article claims, both SETI and ID are doing the same thing.
SETI assumes, without any existing evidence, that extraterrestrial intillgence may exist. In order to find evidence of such ET intelligence, they look for evidence of signals which have characteristics that would distinguish the artificial from the natural. ID assumes, without any existing evidence, that a creator of some sort may exist. In order to find evidence of such a creator, they look for evidence of pheonemna or features of life or the universe that would distinguish the created phoneomna from the natural. Both start with no evidence and propose finding the evidence by looking for created features among natural features. So without the whole complexity red herring, the difference is? Either you can differentiate the natural from the intelligently created or you can't. Either both are science or neither is.
Thank you. It's a matter of perspective and a perspective of matter. ;-)
As others have pointed out, there is no possible set of evidence or data which ID cannot fit.
In the spectrum of ID advocates you find people like Michael Denton, who assert that evolution is 100 percent naturalistic and has no deviations from the description given by mainstream biology. You have Behe, who accepts common descent, but believes God has intervened at some points. You have young earth creationists who believe that all variation is simply a matter of juggling existing alleles.
In short, there is no theory or hypothesis behind ID which limits the range of expected phenomena. There is nothing that is even potentially unexpected.
It would be difficult to detect such signals hence the size of the radio telescopes and networks combined with the large amounts of computing assets marshaled by the SETI project.
However, the last article I read stated that close to 1200 signals had been detected that can not be attributed to any known natural source. Which could mean that there are natural sources yet to be discovered or understood to account for these signals....or that there may be a few of those 'alien Pioneer' craft being noisy.
SETI has made a number of advance predictions about the sort of as-yet-undetected signal that would reflect intelligent creation rather than natural origin (e.g. the distinction between a broad-spectrum and a narrow-band signal described in the above article). ID has made a number of after-the-fact assertions about already-known natural phenomena (e.g. the claim that the probability of existing macromolecules forming is unreasonably low, even over an entire planet and billions of years).
The difference is equivalent to that between painting a target on a wall and shooting a bullet through the bulls-eye and shooting a bullet through a wall and painting a bulls-eye around the hole.
I am in the middle of a software test. Sigh. Will answer all posts this evening. :-)
That's a bullseye
That's no fun! You should've done your impression first and then let us guess. Still, I'd say you nailed it.
Also known as the "Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy"....
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works. | <urn:uuid:96ea076e-4d87-46a3-bd66-f98957f903a1> | CC-MAIN-2015-35 | http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1532744/posts?page=26 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-35/segments/1440645298065.68/warc/CC-MAIN-20150827031458-00311-ip-10-171-96-226.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.955867 | 4,384 | 2.734375 | 3 |
Southern Montessori School provides a safe and happy learning environment in which children are able to flourish and build positive, caring and respectful relationships with their friends and teachers. Pastoral care is managed in the classroom as teachers take a holistic approach to education and are interested in the social and emotional wellbeing of all the children in their care, as well as their academic development.
Our positive guidance approach to behaviour fosters well-adjusted and considerate children who are self-disciplined and able to self-regulate. Children learn and build social and emotional skills through modelling and explicit teaching, with group work and class discussions proving opportunities for further development. Children are also taught strategies to help them learn to positively manage any social difficulties they encounter.
Multi-age classrooms allow classmates to know one another well, moving from being supported by peers as a younger child in the class to having increased responsibilities and leadership opportunities when they are older. In our three year Cycles, children also build close and supportive relationships with their teachers. And by involving children in decision making, a sense of ownership and responsibility for the learning environment is fostered. This generates a strong sense of community.
The Keeping Safe: Child Protection Curriculum is taught at all year levels. This program has two main themes:
- we all have the right to be safe
- we can help ourselves to be safe by talking to people we trust
The Australian Curriculum Personal and Social Capabilities, encompassing Self Awareness, Self Management, Social Awareness and Social Management guide our approach to enhancing student wellbeing. The Better Buddies Program leads to the development of strong, supportive relationships between our Reception and Cycle 3 children, and our Year 6 Leadership Program encourages our Primary School leaders to see themselves as valued role models for the younger students. In addition, the What’s the Buzz program offers greater support to students in social and emotional learning. | <urn:uuid:9613c82d-6ea4-4a7f-9472-ce8ebc78bc00> | CC-MAIN-2019-26 | https://www.southernmontessori.sa.edu.au/education/wellbeing/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-26/segments/1560627998100.52/warc/CC-MAIN-20190616102719-20190616124719-00514.warc.gz | en | 0.964036 | 384 | 3.125 | 3 |
Preparation Lab Policies
The Field Museum's preparation labs are home to many fossil specimens in various states of condition. These are important research materials, and knowledge of these fossils and how they are to be handled and prepared is crucial. The labs are staffed by very experienced preparators, well-versed in all aspects of preparation, molding and casting. There are also students and volunteers who work in the labs, but they must demonstrate hand-eye coordination, manual dexterity, consistency and commitment.
The labs use chemicals, materials and equipment that may be hazardous if used improperly. Each lab has a folder which contains the MSDS (Materials Safety Data Sheet) for each chemical and compound used in the lab. Flammable items are stored in a vented Flammables Cabinet. All chemicals are clearly labeled. In addition, all personnel are properly trained in the use of power tools and appropriate safety gear (goggles, gloves, hearing protection, respirator masks with particulate and organic cartridges). Discarded chemical waste is disposed of properly, in accordance with OSHA standards.
All prep lab personnel are assigned their own specific projects. They must follow staff instructions and guidance; and they are responsible for the careful preparation, handling, record-keeping and proper storage and labeling of the specimens. Proper tool maintenance, cleaning of work stations and general lab cleanliness are also undertaken by all lab personnel.
People who want to become prep volunteers should first contact the chief preparator. An interview and a fossil prep test will then be scheduled. If an applicant has passed the prep test, an application will be processed by Human Resources and a background check is run. Once a week for one year is the minimal required commitment to fulfill.
- Science Newsflash
- Follow Our Research
- Conservation Efforts
- Explore Our Collections
- Research Resources
- Science Podcasts | <urn:uuid:f7147399-b5de-4ba2-b36a-822ca35a7e01> | CC-MAIN-2014-15 | http://fieldmuseum.org/explore/department/geology/fossil-prep/policies | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2014-15/segments/1397609532573.41/warc/CC-MAIN-20140416005212-00309-ip-10-147-4-33.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.93417 | 376 | 2.53125 | 3 |
I won’t ever forget watching one of my most struggling students light up when he showed me that he had written a simple story in cuneiform, using the few glyphs that were included in the social studies book. “It's like I’m a time traveler!” he’d said.
And of course, he was right.
One of the most vivid yet everyday ways we can help our students transcend time is to consistently use primary sources as the centerpiece of our social studies curriculum.
Far too many stories and perspectives are whitewashed in an effort to streamline, simplify, or dominate. It is the teacher’s daily challenge to teach students to learn to ask the tough questions, and in doing so, bring light to more truth.
Here are some fun, practical ideas for using primary sources in your social studies classroom:
- Teach it first, Teach it Specifically, and Teach it Often. Learning to analyze primary sources is a tough skill. It requires higher-order thinking. Sometimes it involves reading, sometimes looking at art or an artifact, sometimes listening to music or looking at a photograph or map. Begin the year practicing this skill with various resources and circle back to it frequently. I kept Primary Source Analysis worksheets on-the-ready, printed out in an accessible location all year long. Access them here.
- Use Music. With online music databases and the Library of Congress National Jukebox website, teachers today can access music from a vast swath of human history. You can search by genre, time period, and much more. There is nothing like music to truly immerse your students and engage their brains.
- Don’t worry about what you don’t know. I’ve had 5th graders reading Colombus’ journals. Were they edited? Of Course. I gave students manageable paragraphs that painted a picture. Did they understand every word? Of course not. And that’s okay. I had them draw pictures, after several supported, close readings, of what they DID understand, even if it was just an image or two. Then, discuss as a class or conference in small groups to fill in gaps of understanding.
- Act it Out. I used this strategy often. Break the students into groups and have them study different primary sources from the same event or time period. For instance, concerning the American Revolution- one group could read a snippet of the Declaration of Independencec, one group could look at Emanuel Luetze’s classic “Washington Crossing the Delaware” (and here would be a good opportunity to discuss the difference between when Washington actually crossed the Delaware and when Leutze painted it in 1851!), and another group could read something from the British and/or French at the time. As students act out their understanding of their source, they begin to see the larger picture emerge- that multiple perspectives and agendas exist and must be examined.
So, have at it & have fun!
Write in cuneiform!
Sketch like DaVinci!
Listen to Rhapsody in Blue!
Whatever you do, don’t let your students leave your classroom thinking that history is something they find in a textbook, or that there is only one story to an event. This lesson must be repeated and practiced over and over and over.
What are your favorite ways to enliven social studies instruction? How do you like to make sure your history class is centered on primary sources?
Next Week: Using Primary Sources to Teach Social Justice | <urn:uuid:96e79788-d8bf-42a9-a4f4-5b634aa07b2c> | CC-MAIN-2017-17 | http://blog.biguniverse.com/teach-your-students-cuneiform-and-other-ideas-primary-sources-across-the-curriculum-pt.-3 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-17/segments/1492917123632.58/warc/CC-MAIN-20170423031203-00029-ip-10-145-167-34.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.951199 | 734 | 3.703125 | 4 |
A Tale of Two Cities
A Tale of Two Cities (1859) is a novel by Charles Dickens, set in London and Paris before and during the French Revolution. With well over 200 million copies sold, it ranks among the most famous works in the history of fictional literature.
The novel depicts the plight of the French peasantry demoralized by the French aristocracy in the years leading up to the revolution, the corresponding brutality demonstrated by the revolutionaries toward the former aristocrats in the early years of the revolution, and many unflattering social parallels with life in London during the same time period. It follows the lives of several protagonists through these events. The most notable are Charles Darnay and Sydney Carton. Darnay is a French once-aristocrat who falls victim to the indiscriminate wrath of the revolution despite his virtuous nature, and Carton is a dissipated British barrister who endeavours to redeem his ill-spent life out of his unrequited love for Darnay's wife.
The 45-chapter novel was published in 31 weekly installments in Dickens' new literary periodical titled All the Year Round. From April 1859 to November 1859, Dickens also republished the chapters as eight monthly sections in green covers. Dickens' previous novels had appeared only as monthly installments. The first weekly installment of A Tale of Two Cities ran in the first issue of All the Year Round on 30 April 1859. The last ran thirty weeks later, on 26 November.
- Cricket House Books, December 2012
- Download options:
- EPUB 2 (Adobe DRM)
You can read this item using any of the following Kobo apps and devices: | <urn:uuid:760fb455-b4dc-42ba-82d6-3603876909a7> | CC-MAIN-2016-36 | https://store.kobobooks.com/en-us/book/A-Tale-of-Two-Cities/9fW9Vsk0AkG_r4r4WfDkZQ?MixID=9fW9Vsk0AkG_r4r4WfDkZQ&PageNumber=1 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-36/segments/1471982292697.31/warc/CC-MAIN-20160823195812-00190-ip-10-153-172-175.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.940788 | 340 | 2.890625 | 3 |
"Kung fu" is one of the best forms of physical exercise. It combines development of muscles with self-defensive movements. It gives equal work to the foot, hand, and the whole body. Advantages are that this gymnastics is so amusing besides instructive that persons once having taken a lesson seldom give it up. In other words, persons stick to it without being compelled to do so and what this means is understood by all engaged in the phyical culture work.
There is a new meaning in "Kung fu" which is found in the work of the Chin Woo Athletic Association. It is mental development and moral uplift, based upon the old principle of "Sound Mind in a Sound Body."
~ S.S. Chow, 1919
Jingwu: The school that transformed kung fu
by Brian Kennedy and Elizabeth Guo. | <urn:uuid:31b0cac9-ed8b-4c05-8082-310350482eea> | CC-MAIN-2018-17 | http://daoji.blogspot.com/2010/10/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-17/segments/1524125948285.62/warc/CC-MAIN-20180426144615-20180426164615-00296.warc.gz | en | 0.953955 | 177 | 2.5625 | 3 |
Ancient Religion Islam
Islam is the religion founded by Muhammad and articulated in the Qur’an, a book considered by its adherents to be the verbatim word of the single incomparable God, and the Islamic prophet Muhammad's demonstrations and examples (called the Sunnah, collected through narration of his companions in the volumes of Hadith) for implementing it. The word Islam is a homograph, having multiple meanings, and a triliteral of the word salam, which directly translates as peace. Other meanings include submission, or the total surrender of oneself to God. An adherent of Islam is a Muslim, meaning "one who submits". The word Muslim is the participle of the same verb of which Islam is the infinitive. Muslims regard their religion as the completed and universal version of an original monotheistic faith that was revealed to many peoples before, including to Adam, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other prophets. Islamic tradition holds that previous messages have changed and the revelations were distorted over time.
The first sura in a Qur'anic manuscript by Hattat Aziz EfendiMuslims consider the Qur'an to be the literal word of God; it is the central religious text of Islam. Muslims believe that the verses of the Qur'an were revealed to Muhammad by God through the angel Gabriel on many occasions between 610 and his death on June 8, 632. The Qur'an was reportedly written down by Muhammad's companions (sahabah) while he was alive, although the prime method of transmission was orally. It was compiled in the time of Abu Bakr, the first caliph, and was standardized under the administration of Uthman, the third caliph. From textual evidence Islamic studies scholars find that the Qur'an of today has not changed significantly over the years.
The Qur'an is divided into 114 suras, or chapters, which combined, contain 6,236 ayat, or verses. The chronologically earlier suras, revealed at Mecca, are primarily concerned with ethical and spiritual topics. The later Medinan suras mostly discuss social and moral issues relevant to the Muslim community. The Qur'an is more concerned with moral guidance than legal instruction, and is considered the "sourcebook of Islamic principles and values". Muslim jurists consult the hadith, or the written record of Muhammad's life, to both supplement the Qur'an and assist with its interpretation. The science of Qur'anic commentary and exegesis is known as tafsir.
The Qur'an states that all Muslims must believe in God, his revelations, his angels, his messengers, and in the "Day of Judgment". Also, there are other beliefs that differ between particular sects. The Sunni concept of predestination is called divine decree, while the Shi'a version is called divine justice. Unique to the Shi'a is the doctrine of Imamah, or the political and spiritual leadership of the Imams.
Muslims believe that God revealed his final message to humanity through the Islamic prophet Muhammad via the archangel Gabriel (Jibril). For them, Muhammad was God's final prophet and the Qur'an is the holy book of revelations he received over more than two decades. In Islam, prophets are men selected by God to be his messengers. Muslims believe that prophets are human and not divine, though some are able to perform miracles to prove their claim. Islamic prophets are considered to be the closest to perfection of all humans, and are uniquely the recipients of divine revelation-either directly from God or through angels. The Qur'an mentions the names of numerous figures considered prophets in Islam, including Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, among others. Islamic theology says that all of God's messengers since Adam preached the message of Islam-submission to the will of God. Islam is described in the Qur'an as "the primordial nature upon which God created mankind", and the Qur'an states that the proper name Muslim was given by Abraham.
Religious practices include the Five Pillars of Islam, which are five duties that unite Muslims into a community. The Five Pillars of Islam are five practices essential to Sunni Islam. Shi'a Muslims subscribe to different sets of pillars which substantially overlap with the Five Pillars. They are:
The shahadah, which is the basic creed or tenet of Islam: "'ashadu 'al-la ilaha illa-llahu wa 'ashadu 'anna muhammadan rasulu-llah", or "I testify that there is none worthy of worship except God and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of God." This testament is a foundation for all other beliefs and practices in Islam. Muslims must repeat the shahadah in prayer, and non-Muslims wishing to convert to Islam are required to recite the creed.
Salah, or ritual prayer, which must be performed five times a day. Each salah is done facing towards the Kaaba in Mecca. Salah is intended to focus the mind on God, and is seen as a personal communication with him that expresses gratitude and worship. Salah is compulsory but flexibility in the specifics is allowed depending on circumstances. In many Muslim countries, reminders called Adhan (call to prayer) are broadcast publicly from local mosques at the appropriate times. The prayers are recited in the Arabic language, and consist of verses from the Qur'an.
Zakat, or alms-giving. This is the practice of giving based on accumulated wealth, and is obligatory for all Muslims who can afford it. A fixed portion is spent to help the poor or needy, and also to assist the spread of Islam. The zakat is considered a religious obligation (as opposed to voluntary charity) that the well-off owe to the needy because their wealth is seen as a "trust from God's bounty". The Qur'an and the hadith also suggest a Muslim give even more as an act of voluntary alms-giving (sadaqah).
Sawm, or fasting during the month of Ramadan. Muslims must not eat or drink (among other things) from dawn to dusk during this month, and must be mindful of other sins. The fast is to encourage a feeling of nearness to God, and during it Muslims should express their gratitude for and dependence on him, atone for their past sins, and think of the needy. Sawm is not obligatory for several groups for whom it would constitute an undue burden. For others, flexibility is allowed depending on circumstances, but missed fasts usually must be made up quickly. Some Muslim groups do not fast during Ramadan, and instead have fasts different times of the year.
The Hajj, which is the pilgrimage during the Islamic month of Dhu al-Hijjah in the city of Mecca. Every able-bodied Muslim who can afford it must make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his or her lifetime. When the pilgrim is about ten kilometers from Mecca, he must dress in Ihram clothing, which consists of two white seamless sheets. Rituals of the Hajj include walking seven times around the Kaaba, touching the Black Stone, running seven times between Mount Safa and Mount Marwah, and symbolically stoning the Devil in Mina. The pilgrim, or the hajji, is honored in his or her community, although Islamic teachers say that the Hajj should be an expression of devotion to God instead of a means to gain social standing.
The word Islam is a verbal noun originating from the triliteral root s-l-m, and is derived from the Arabic verb Aslama, which means "to accept, surrender or submit." Thus, Islam means acceptance of and submission to God, and believers must demonstrate this by worshipping him, following his commands, and avoiding polytheism. The word is given a number of meanings in the Qur'an. In some verses (ayat), the quality of Islam as an internal conviction is stressed: "Whomsoever God desires to guide, He expands his breast to Islam." Other verses connect islam and din (usually translated as "religion"): "Today, I have perfected your religion (din) for you; I have completed My blessing upon you; I have approved Islam for your religion." Still others describe Islam as an action of returning to God-more than just a verbal affirmation of faith. Another technical meaning in Islamic thought is as one part of a triad of islam, iman (faith), and ihsan (excellence); where it represents acts of worship (`ibadah) and Islamic law (sharia).
Commonly cited estimates of the Muslim population in 2007 range from 1.3 billion to 1.8 billion. Approximately 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shi'a, with a small minority belonging to other sects. Some 30-40 countries are Muslim-majority, and Arabs account for around 20% of all Muslims worldwide. South Asia and Southeast Asia contain the most populous Muslim countries, with Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh having more than 100 million adherents each. According to U.S. government figures, in 2006 there were 20 million Muslims in China. In the Middle East, the non-Arab countries of Turkey and Iran are the largest Muslim-majority countries; in Africa, Egypt and Nigeria have the most populous Muslim communities. Islam is the second largest religion after Christianity in many European countries
Ramadan and Fasting Tradition:
Fasting during Ramadan, the Muslims holy month, was ordained during the second year of Hijrah. Why not earlier? In Makkah the economic conditions of the Muslims were bad. They were being persecuted. Often days would go by before they had anything to eat. It is easy to skip meals if you don’t have any. Obviously fasting would have been easier under the circumstances. So why not then?
The answer may be that Ramadan is not only about skipping meals. While fasting is an integral and paramount part of it, Ramadan offers a comprehensive program for our spiritual overhaul. The entire program required the peace and security that was offered by Madinah.
Yes, Ramadan is the most important month of the year. It is the month that the believers await with eagerness. At the beginning of Rajab --- two full months before Ramadan --- the Prophet Muhammad, Sall-Allahu alayhi wa sallam, used to supplicate thus: "O Allah! Bless us during Rajab and Sha’ban, and let us reach Ramadan (in good health)."
During Ramadan the believers get busy seeking Allah’s mercy, forgiveness, and protection from Hellfire. This is the month for renewing our commitment and re-establishing our relationship with our Creator. It is the spring season for goodness and virtues when righteousness blossoms throughout the Muslim communities. "If we combine all the blessings of the other eleven months, they would not add up to the blessings of Ramadan," said the great scholar and reformer Shaikh Ahmed Farooqi (Mujaddad Alif Thani). It offers every Muslim an opportunity to strengthen his Iman, purify his heart and soul, and to remove the evil effects of the sins committed by him.
"Anyone who fasts during this month with purity of belief and with expectation of a good reward (from his Creator), will have his previous sins forgiven," said Prophet Muhammad, Sall-Allahu alayhi wa sallam. "Anyone who stands in prayers during its nights with purity of belief and expectation of a reward, will have his previous sins forgiven." As other ahadith tell us, the rewards for good deeds are multiplied manifold during Ramadan.
Islam on Terrorism:
One of the distinctive characteristics of the times we live in is the overwhelming presence of violence in our societies. Whether it is a bomb going off in a market place, or the hijacking of an aircraft where innocent people are held at ransom to achieve political ends, we live in an age, where the manipulation and loss of innocent lives has become commonplace.
Such is the all-pervasive nature of indiscriminate violence, that "terrorism" is considered as one of the prime threats to peace and security in our societies.
The word terrorism came into wide usage only a few decades ago. One of the unfortunate results of this new terminology is that it limits the definition of terrorism to that perpetrated by small groups or individuals. Terrorism, in fact, spans the entire world, and manifests itself in various forms. Its perpetrators do not fit any stereotype. Those who hold human lives cheap, and have the power to expend human lives, appear at different levels in our societies. The frustrated employee who kills his colleagues in cold-blood or the oppressed citizen of an occupied land who vents his anger by blowing up a school bus are terrorists who provoke our anger and revulsion. Ironically however, the politician who uses age-old ethnic animosities between peoples to consolidate his position, the head of state who orders "carpet bombing" of entire cities, the exalted councils that choke millions of civilians to death by wielding the insidious weapon of sanctions, are rarely punished for their crimes against humanity.
It is this narrow definition of terrorism that implicates only individuals and groups, that has caused Muslims to be associated with acts of destruction and terror, and as a result, to become victims of hate violence and terror themselves. Sometimes the religion of Islam is held responsible for the acts of a handful of Muslims, and often for the acts of non-Muslims!
Could it be possible that Islam, whose light ended the Dark Ages in Europe, now propound the advent of an age of terror? Could a faith that has over 1.2 billion followers the world over, and over 7 million in America, actually advocate the killing and maiming of innocent people? Could Islam, whose name itself stands for "peace" and "submission to God", encourage its adherents to work for death and destruction?
For too long, have we relied on popular images in the media and in Hollywood films, for answers to these pertinent questions. It is now time to look at the sources of Islam, and its history to determine whether Islam does indeed advocate violence.
Islam - The Great Unifier:
Far from being a militant dogma, Islam is a way of life that transcends race and ethnicity. The Glorious Qur’an repeatedly reminds us of our common origin:
"O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)."
Thus, it is the universality of its teachings that makes Islam the fastest growing religion in the world. In a world full of conflicts and deep schisms between human beings, a world that is threatened with terrorism, perpetrated by individuals and states, Islam is a beacon of light that offers hope for the future.
References : wikipedia.org, whyislam.org, denvermosque.org
* Eminent Cartoonist RK Laxman
* Why Are Indian Kids So Good at Spelling?
* SP Balasubrahmanyam - Legendary Indian Film Singer
* The Guru for today's world
* Growing Social Networking
* Diwali Celebrations at The White House
* Ancient Religion Islam
* Indian Classical Dance - Our rich heritage
* Incredible India for ancient wonders
* 15th Indian Parliament
* Mother's Day Special
* Bura Na Mano! Holi Hai!!
* Living Positive
* India at a glance in the year 2008
* 75 years of Rich Indian Cricket
* Recession - What is all about it?
* Terrorism in India
* Beautiful Colorado for the Fall Colors
* Homoeopathy - Alternate popular medicine
* Increasing medical tourism industry in India
* Visiting parents from India
* Keeping the Indian Dance Tradition
* Indian kids excelling in prestigious contests
* India's remakable multi-satellite launch
* Outsourcing to India Trends
* Expanding World Cricket with IPL Franchises
* Reducing demand for Gold in India
* Historic Hindu prayer opened Colorado State Senate
* Right time to return to India?
* The Importance of Yoga for Kids
* India Real Estate Investments
* Amazing New Golden Temple in Vellore, Tamilnadu, India
* Response to Welcome by Swami Vivekananda
* The power of Vishnu Shahasra Namam
* How do we align outselves with God in our day to day life? | <urn:uuid:d3883318-bd44-4da8-9358-b3edcda2d998> | CC-MAIN-2017-26 | http://desishades.com/features.php?tab=329 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-26/segments/1498128323807.79/warc/CC-MAIN-20170628222452-20170629002452-00280.warc.gz | en | 0.957904 | 3,439 | 3.953125 | 4 |
When one hears the term power supply, he will just conclude that it must be an electric power source. With the aid of certain forms of equipment, electrical energy along with other types of energy is successfully transferred into an output. The definition and function of this product makes it more closely linked to supplies or gadgets that need electricity.
Electrical power is among the terms essential to power supply. It is the 8DG60349AA that converts electrical power in one form to another. This could include a summary of sources including batteries, chemical fuel cells, solar energy, alternators and generators and other sorts of energy storage systems. Below is actually a detailed description of each of these power supplies.
Linear power supplies – Probably the most popular kinds of linear power supplies is definitely the AC linear power. When transforming the present that comes from an AC to your lower voltage, a transformer is used. For production of direct current or DC from your AC, one utilizes the rectifier. The second produces pulsating current through the existence of a capacitor. The particular voltages produced may depend upon the load contained in the AC supply. This sort of linear power is classified under such category since it functions by using a linear regulator that stabilizes and adjusts the equipment voltage.
Aside from AC linear power, battery power is in fact among the linear types of power supply and is also highly favored as it makes traditional power supplies be a little more portable and reliable. It is comprised of a wide array of cells which are electromechanically connected to one another. Such connection results to the preferred voltage needed by a certain gadget to reach its optimum functions. Lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, and dry cell batteries are popular subcategories of batteries.
Switched-mode power supplies – This really is entirely distinct from the linear form. Additionally, it produces AC or DC power but uses a varied principle. There is absolutely no need to make use of a transformer so that you can rectify the transformation of AC to DC voltages. The voltage which is produced by this method is broken down further into small bits of electronic switches. The switches are enlarged once it comes with an increasing power requirement for a certain system or industry.
Aside from those two main categories to get a power supply, there are other forms utilized in many industries. There are programmable in addition to uninterruptible power supplies. High voltage power supplies will also be portion of the list. These UN375 may be applied in computer systems and welding industries.
An isolation transformer is an electronic device that prevents the appliances from short-circuit and fire hazards. It is really an industrial device, meaning it really is commonly used inside the industrial sector. The main feature of this device is that it supplies the voltage current for the devices. Besides industrial uses, it is also found in a number of other sectors like Hospitals, Telecom, plus it etc. This product is highly in demand as it lowers down the high voltage and mainly preferred to use for sensitive devices. An isolation transformer is generally placed in hospitals since it helps their sensitive devices to have the accurate rate of the power source. Here pubuid some terrific benefits of having this device.
It Gives You Safety Towards The Devices – The key reason for its too much use is it provides safety for the devices. It lowers down the power source and supplies the accurate level of current for the sensitive devices. Additionally, it prevents the unit from electric shocks and short circuits; this will make it the most preferred device among industrial sector.
Minimises The Surges – The primary benefit of alcatel 7750 is it decreases the power surges. It will help within the smooth working from the devices and provides them a long life. You can even install this gadget to perform your electrical cycle smoothly.
It Reduces The Noise – An isolation transformer is usually recognized for its noise reduction policy. This product helps to cut down the noise that develops due to vibration and grounding. It will be the best device that must be installed in the industrial sector because it has many great benefits and will not create noise; hence, fails to disturb your working premises. | <urn:uuid:41500627-bc29-4a0f-9ede-0bf815c719a1> | CC-MAIN-2019-30 | http://bada-world.info/2019/04/18/lucent-5ess-find-answers/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-30/segments/1563195528869.90/warc/CC-MAIN-20190723043719-20190723065719-00220.warc.gz | en | 0.944591 | 839 | 3.3125 | 3 |
Blockchain is often referred to as a harbinger of transparency, but what does that really mean? Transparency is not defined as eliminating privacy and sharing every aspect and minutia of our daily lives, contrary to what entities like Facebook and Instagram would prefer. Rather it’s about making key bits of information public in order to prevent deleterious backroom deals and behind-the-curtain agreements that benefit a few to the detriment of many. The financial crisis of 2008 and the Facebook-Cambridge analytica scandal can both be traced to a lack of transparency. Blockchain technology is heralded for increasing transparency by rendering all transactions occurring on the Blockchain a matter of public record, but transactions are also known as being anonymous. How can the ledger that is the Blockchain be transparent and anonymous at the same time?
The first Blockchain application, Bitcoin, was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto as a way to increase transparency in financial transactions, but not to render privacy obsolete. The Bitcoin Blockchain is transparent in the sense that all transactions are public record, so the amount being exchanged between entities is available for anyone to witness, but the entities involved in the transactions are pseudonymous (not anonymous, as many people assume). The distinction between pseudonymous and anonymous is an important one. True anonymity would connote no way to tie the actual identity of the individual in question to his/her actions. Pseudonymity means that the identity of the transactor is concealed, but not impossible to reveal.
One of the biggest criticisms of Bitcoin as well as other cryptocurrencies has been that by enabling pseudonymity, the technology sets up a magical tech playground for criminals. This notion has been debunked by investigators who have been able to use processes of triangulation to piece together the identity of those conducting illegal activities using cryptocurrency. Even if a criminal were careful to never reveal his or her identity or use any centralized platforms, those he has transacted with may not be so circumspect. The chances are high that one of the individuals or entities with whom the criminal has transacted will use a centralized service in which he/she must provide identification. Coinbase, for example, is a centralized platform in which users must provide ID to link their bank accounts and begin exchanging fiat currency to cryptocurrency. If an investigator subpoenas Coinbase for information on a particular user who is suspected of conducting illegal transactions, Coinbase must comply with the request. As government agencies get more savvy tracking down individuals illegally using cryptocurrencies, the current negative association of cryptocurrency as “dark money” will fade fast from the cultural repertoire.
Though the need for increased transparency in financial transactions may be seemingly obvious post 2008, transparency is still lacking in many other facets of society as well. Take today’s social media environment as an example. The current digital landscape is fraught with data silos and controlled by large, centralized platforms, like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, that hold the keys to the proverbial digital kingdom. In this case, “kingdom” means sovereignty over troves of data, and these centralized entities make billions by offering access to this data for a price. Advertisers will pay handsomely for any information that will enable better targeting to consumers, selling more product, and, ultimately, generating greater ROI. A few vital players miss out on this access and subsequent economic rewards: content creators and users. The solution that my team at Contentos and others are interested in exploring, is using Blockchain technology to endow these participants with more control over the ways their data is exploited.To put it simply, instead of personal data being collected by tech giants and sold to the highest bidders, users could have autonomy to determine whether to make their data available and at what price.
Another aspect of the current media ecosystem suffering a scarcity of transparency is the pricing structures that formulate the relationship between advertisers and content creators. It’s not easy for YouTubers to decipher the percentage of income earned by hosting ads on their channels. Such payouts are determined by algorithms whose inner machinations are hidden from the average user’s eye.
One blogger breaks down YouTube’s ad rate calculations as follows:
“YouTube counts impressions (when a viewer clicks on or watches your ads) and for every 1,000 impression, you’ll get roughly $7.50. The problem is how the impression are counted, as it is really dependent on how engaged your audiences are. If a viewer decides to skip through the ads or use an ad-blocker, then you won’t get paid for the view. Because of that, high views doesn’t necessarily translate to a well-earning video. A video with 10,000 views might only have 3,000 thousand impressions, which roughly translates to only $22.50.”
A given YouTuber’s revenue is incredibly troublesome to calculate because the content creator lacks access to the information held by the platform. This dynamic disempowers the creator while endowing YouTube with all the power (in the form of data). We haven’t seen the equivalent of labor unions fighting YouTube for more fair algorithms, in part because the factors determining income are so ambiguous that it would be difficult to challenge. Our goal in building the Contentos protocol is to ensure more information is available to creators, allowing them to make their own financial and creative decisions in the media ecosystem.
By increasing transparency, whether in the realms of finance or media, we empower people with the information they need to make decisions that benefit themselves and that of the greater community, as opposed to closed-door systems that are constructed to benefit those with access to data, information, and value at the expense of everyone else. Blockchain is the ideal technology to use in injecting greater transparency into systems because of its capabilities for recording every transaction on an immutable ledger while allowing users to retain a level of pseudonymity that does not infringe upon their rights to privacy. | <urn:uuid:b216c135-94dd-45db-81bb-2b1b1a51bec5> | CC-MAIN-2020-24 | https://www.blockchainbeach.com/what-does-transparency-really-mean/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-24/segments/1590348496026.74/warc/CC-MAIN-20200605080742-20200605110742-00062.warc.gz | en | 0.947895 | 1,205 | 3.1875 | 3 |
Separate names with a comma.
Discussion in 'Ducks' started by animalpro24, Jan 2, 2012.
How long do runners lay for until they are done. My girl is a year and a half old and isn't laying.
Healthy runners will lay for years, I have read. They slow down a bit after three or four years, but keep laying.
My duck Neun developed egg yolk peritonitis, and that kept her from laying. Sadlly, it was fatal.
Hmmm. She hasn't lain in about a couple months. Is there something I need to check for, if any thing is wrong with her?
The things that cause birds to lay eggs are called Ova (translated: egg). All females hatch with ova inside them. Chickens have about 1000 ova, and Ducks about 1500. Ova are the most important element of her body's egg-making function, yet, there is no function to make more Ova, so when they've laid 1500 eggs, they will never lay aggain. This is why Red Sexlinks and Khaki campbell 'burn out'; they've been breed to use up most of the Ova in a very short time, and that is why a Runner will lay consistently for 2 yrs, and then lay lower numbers every year, and a Rouen can lay 25 eggs a year consistently for 10 yrs. And that's why egg ducks will lay for a longer time than egg chickens; they can make more eggs.
Is she molting or has the weather changed where you are? My runner girls stopped laying a couple of months ago when the weather was getting cooler. It would be cold one day and then hot again the next and threw them off. I am asuming that once the weather warms back up my girls will pick up again so I would go with weather. | <urn:uuid:52a2edc9-6237-4bab-850b-fafb544c70cd> | CC-MAIN-2017-39 | https://www.backyardchickens.com/threads/how-long-do.615737/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-39/segments/1505818692236.58/warc/CC-MAIN-20170925164022-20170925184022-00627.warc.gz | en | 0.970014 | 388 | 2.53125 | 3 |
Health care workers were placed at risk with scarce mask use or insufficient supply of respirators during H1N1 pandemic during the earliest stages of 2009,claims a study published in the December issue of Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, the journal of the Society of Healthcare Epidemiology of America.
The study, led by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), tracked 63 Southern California health care workers who had contact with six of the first eight laboratory-confirmed 2009 H1N1 cases in the U.S. Because these contacts happened before the 2009 H1N1 outbreak had been widely reported, the cases shed light on how well health care workers protect themselves before a direct epidemiological threat becomes evident.
The investigation found that 9 of the health care workers tracked became infected with the 2009 H1N1 virus, likely from contact with infected patients. Twenty of the 63 health care workers reported that they had worn a mask or respirator at least once when in contact with patients, and no one from that group became infected with 2009 H1N1. Meanwhile, 43 workers reported never using a mask around patients, and all 9 infections occurred in workers from this group.
Overall, mask and respirator use was disappointingly low, the researchers report. Only 19 percent reported using a mask during every patient encounter. Use was especially low among outpatient workers, who also made up the majority of those who became infected with 2009 H1N1.
"The findings highlight the challenge of getting health care personnel to routinely wear Personal Protective Equipment," Jenifer Jaeger, MD, MPH, Associate Pediatrician, Massachusetts General Hospital, said. "The study also suggests that greater attention to infection control and preparedness, particularly among outpatient workers, is needed." | <urn:uuid:f54c57d8-0f4e-43b6-bee7-cf663a562953> | CC-MAIN-2017-47 | http://www.medindia.net/news/Health-Care-Workers-Scarce-Mask-Use-During-2009-H1N1-Outbreak-Revealed-94211-1.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-47/segments/1510934805265.10/warc/CC-MAIN-20171119023719-20171119043719-00593.warc.gz | en | 0.968693 | 357 | 2.53125 | 3 |
If the antecedent of a relative clause is the personal pronoun "you", say, for example, second person singular, should the verb in the relative clause be singular or plural? For example:
Jason, this award is presented to you, who loves debate. (or "... love debate"?)
'You' is a pronoun that is always preceded by a verb conjugated in its plural form, whether singular or plural. Note that in your example, 'Jason' is the antecedent to the pronoun 'you' and not otherwise. An antecedent is a word or phrase which a pronoun refers back to. Keeping aside the above correction, 'loves' is the right conjugation that matches 'you'. We can't say, for instance 'you is'.
|link comment||answered Mar 29 '12 at 21:01 Perpetua New member|
Hero of the day
Person voted on the most questions. | <urn:uuid:16b28ee0-979b-489e-8863-fd4d9638530d> | CC-MAIN-2017-13 | https://www.grammarly.com/answers/questions/4372-relative-clause/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-13/segments/1490218188924.7/warc/CC-MAIN-20170322212948-00346-ip-10-233-31-227.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.891414 | 193 | 2.609375 | 3 |
Something unusual is written in Chapter 8 of the ancient prophetic text of Joshua. As the leader of Israel, Joshua orders an altar of uncut stones be built to worship Yahweh after the great victories at Jericho and Ai. He then proceeded to copy the Torah given by Yahweh to Moses on stones. Why did he do this? What is the significance of the stones?
Throughout the Old Testament this particular Hebrew word for stone spelled Aleph, Beyt, Noon is used as a picture of Messiah to come. In the writings of the prophet Isaiah Chapter 28 verse 16, Adonai Yahweh says:
Behold I lay in Zion for a foundation a stone, a tried stone, a precious corner stone, a sure foundation: he that believeth shall not make haste.
Shall not make haste means will not be disturbed. The implication is clear; Messiah is the bulwark of our faith and can be completely trusted. What can we discover in the Hebrew letters that might give us more understanding?
Aleph is the picture of the strong leader, and is also the number 1 which points to God the Father.
Beyt is the house, the tent, the family dwelling place; and is also the number 2 which identifies God the Son.
Noon is the picture of life or activity and is also the number 50 which points to the Holy Spirit.
Here we see Aleph, a picture of the strong leader providing a family dwelling place where we will enjoy life. Wonderfully, Yahweh has locked for all time in His letters the concept that He has made us family and provided life for us in His son Yeshua, the “rock” of our salvation.
The numbers these letters represent add even more understanding to the mystery.
Here we discover Aleph, or 1, is followed by Beyt, or 2, followed by Noon, or 50. Our “stone” is the work of the Father in the person of the Son by the power of the Holy Spirit!
In Psalm 118:22 we see something very revealing about this precious stone:
"The stone which the builders refused is become the head stone of the corner."
Not only will Messiah be rejected, but He is the head or chief stone. The word head here has to do with the top of a wall. Again, the picture is clear: Messiah is not only the starting place for building our faith, He is the one who caps it or completes it.
The rabbi Paul, writing to the church at Ephesus in Chapter 2 verses 21 and 22, reminds us Yeshua is the chief cornerstone:
"In whom all the building fitly framed together groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord: in whom ye also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit."
When Joshua wrote the words of the Torah on the stones by the altar he was giving us a picture of the Living Word, Yeshua, the rock of our salvation.
But all is not good news; the disciple of Yeshua, named Peter, warns us in his second letter Chapter 2 verse 7 and 8 that:
"Unto you therefore which believe he is precious: but unto them which be disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense, even to them which stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed."
The first place this word for stone is found is in the first book of the ancient text in Genesis Chapter 2 verse 12 where the onyx stone is found just outside of the Garden of Eden. The word onyx is not actually found in the Hebrew, but instead, the word “pale” stone is used. Onyx is used here in a descriptive way because it is a translucent stone or a “pale” stone and allows light to pass through it. It is important to note this stone was found outside the garden and was still available to Adam after the fall when he was denied access to Elohim and the tree of life. From the beginning, Elohim has intended to provide Yeshua Ha-Mashiach, who is called the “light of the world” in the Gospel of John Chapter 8 verse 12, as a precious foundation for those who would trust in Him.
In Revelation 2:17 Yeshua Ha-Mashiach gives His beloved disciple John a very interesting promise:
"To him who overcomes, to him will I give some of the hidden manna and I will give him a white stone, and a new name written on the stone which no one knows but he who receives it.”
The one who overcomes is a reference to all those who have put their faith and trust in the saving work of Messiah. But what is the white stone this believer will be given?
The white stone of John’s revelation is the final place where the word stone is found in relation to the Church, those who have placed their trust in Messiah. Here’s the picture. To start with, the stone is not white. The word translated “white” is from the Greek leukos and its root means “light.” The word “stone” used here refers to a pebble that is well-worn from handling and is used as a ballot or a ticket of admission. The “new” in the new name does not mean new in the sense of having never been seen before, but new in the sense of “fresh.” The preposition “on” used when the new name is “written on the stone” means superimposed. No matter how you look at this stone that is filled with light you can always see the name written on it.
And what is the name written there? The best possibility is the name for LORD in the Old Testament, YHWH, pronounced Yahweh or Yehova. In the pictograph, it reads Yood the hand, Hey behold, Vav the nail, and Hey behold: hand behold nail behold. Whenever that name is found, it is a picture of the finished work of Messiah on the cross. Behold the hand, behold the nail. This is the name that is always fresh and never old. Just as the doubts of Thomas, one of the disciples of Yeshua, were dispelled in the Gospel of John Chapter 20 verse 28 when he saw the nail-scarred hands, we also recognize Yeshua for who He truly is when we understand the work He has done for us.
So the final mystery is this. The one who overcomes, the believer in Yeshua, receives a small polished stone filled with the light of Yahweh and having on it His name testifying to His finished work on the cross. Possession of it guarantees access or admission into the presence of our Heavenly Father from whom we have been separated since the fall of Adam in the garden. Only those who have received Yeshua will understand the name. If you have received Yeshua, the letters on your stone will likely appear scarlet as a further reminder of the bloodshed on your behalf.
|Like this article? Share it using the social sharing links. Subscribe to The Living Word Discovery and get amazing Hebrew Word Studies delivered to you every week!||Get the book and start your own journey into the Hebrew Language!|
|Subscribe!||Get it Now!| | <urn:uuid:8fc0faf4-f267-4b5c-a05f-a1f2077c184b> | CC-MAIN-2020-16 | http://livingwordin3d.com/discovery/2018/02/01/the-mystery-hidden-in-eben-the-overcomers-white-stone/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-16/segments/1585371880945.85/warc/CC-MAIN-20200409220932-20200410011432-00520.warc.gz | en | 0.960634 | 1,545 | 2.6875 | 3 |
Mascenic School District is committed to providing school environments that promote and protect children’s health, wellness and ability to learn by supporting behaviors that include healthy eating and physical activity. “Health” is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Students must stay home if they are sick, someone in their household tested positive for COVID-19, or are awaiting test results. Please call your school's nurse if you are unsure before sending your student to school. Click the "Stay Home When Sick" document for more information.
Close contacts no longer need to quarantine unless they live in the same household as a COVID positive person and./or can not avoid contact to a COVID positive person. The "Self-Observation Guide" will help you understand what to do if you have been identified as a close contact but do not need to quarantine.
Those that are required to quarantine can find more information in the "Self-Quarantine Guide".
Those who are positive for COVID 19 are required to isolate. More information on isolation can be found in the "Self Isolation Guide".
If you have any questions relating to COVID-19 mitigation or protocols, please reach out to your school's nurse to ask questions.
The Mascenic Regional School District COVID Response Protocol link will provide the districts up to date methods for managing COVID-19 for our schools.
On September 7th the Mascenic School Board adopted a definition of suspected case as follows:
A suspected case is defined as a person who meets the clinical AND epidemiological criteria as outlined below:
Acute onset of fever AND cough; or
Acute onset of ANY THREE OR MORE of the following signs or symptoms: fever, cough, general weakness/fatigue, headache, muscle pain/weakness, sore throat, inflammation of the mucus membranes in the nose, difficult or labored breathing, lack or loss of appetite/nausea/vomiting, lack or loss of smell/taste, diarrhea, altered mental status with no other documented source of symptoms (ie. allergies).
Residing or working in a setting with high risk of transmission of the virus: for example, closed residential settings and humanitarian settings, such as camp and camp-like settings for displaced persons, any time within the 14 days before symptom onset; or
Residing in or travel to an area with community transmission anytime within the 14 days before symptom onset. | <urn:uuid:5a2cc12f-09ec-4813-b374-692e555aa208> | CC-MAIN-2022-27 | https://www.mascenic.org/page/resources | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-27/segments/1656103669266.42/warc/CC-MAIN-20220630062154-20220630092154-00528.warc.gz | en | 0.92837 | 527 | 2.515625 | 3 |
Dr. Elena Bodnar was born in Ukraine, so it should come as no surprise that the Chernobyl nuclear accident and images of 9/11 moved her to brainstorm diligently for ways to make events like these more survivable for the human beings unfortunate enough to be involved in them. Yet, many people were still quite surprised when Bodnar presented a hot-pink prototype of a practical gas mask at Harvard University. Nevertheless, Bodnar won an Ig Nobel prize for doing outstanding and seemingly ridiculous research that is in reality extremely useful.
See video below:
More specifically, Bodnar has created something called an emergency bra: a bra that doubles as a face mask to guard against chemical explosions, biological hazards, and other unforeseen deadly situations. The EBra is pretty much like any other bra until the need arises for it to become something more; the cups can be separated, and then all a user needs to do is put their mouth and nose into a cup, extend the bra strap over their head, and then breathe naturally.
What’s more, the bra can also act as two protective face masks, which could not only save the life of the wearer but also the life of a wearer’s loved one. As mentioned, Bodnar won the 2009 Ig Nobel Public Health Prize as a result of her ingenuity: “It takes only 25 seconds for average woman to use this personal protective device. Five seconds to remove, convert and apply your own mask, and 20 seconds to wonder who the lucky man is she is going to save.”
As discussed, Bodnar began her quest with the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in mind:
“If people had had cheap, readily available gas masks in the first hours after the disaster they may have avoided breathing in Iodine-131, which causes radiation sickness. You have to be prepared all the time, at any place, at any moment, and practically every woman wears a bra.”
CNET has reported that a counterpart device for men is also being designed, but it could prove to be more challenging than Bodnar’s product—due to certain required differences in shape and size, of course.
It’s important to note that Bodnar has no issues with acknowledging the humorous aspects of her ideas, her designs, and her products:
“I have no doubt my demonstrations will generate some laughs. However, I also look forward to addressing some serious questions from the British public. I hope audiences at Oxford University, Imperial College and elsewhere will leave thinking about the potential risks they face. I will consider my goals to be accomplished if I make people remember the importance of being prepared for the unexpected.”
Indeed, if a cause is worthwhile and beneficial for all of human kind, why not embrace all aspects of it? Bodnar realizes that her products have the abilities to save unnumbered lives both now and in the future. Whatever puts more of them into the hands of people who might need them is both positive and productive.
Dr. Elena Bodnar, currently the founder and President of the Trauma Risk Management Research Institute in Chicago, is an internationally recognized scientist with over 20 years of experience in clinical research and development of novel diagnostic and therapeutic modalities. She managed the Electrical Trauma Research Program at the University of Chicago, and collaborated with the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency on projects related to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Her areas of scientific expertise are trauma risk management strategies and long term health consequences of radiation exposure and electrical trauma. She has authored numerous scientific publications and book chapters. – https://www.ebbra.com/our-story | <urn:uuid:ab7bf833-4bf2-4b3d-9278-224cd1cb5b5b> | CC-MAIN-2023-06 | https://www.cookiesandcowpies.com/remove-your-bra-its-science/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499891.42/warc/CC-MAIN-20230131222253-20230201012253-00838.warc.gz | en | 0.962888 | 743 | 2.625 | 3 |
Santee Indians. A tribe, probably Siouan, formerly residing on middle Santee River, South Carolina, where Lawson in 1700 found their plantations extending for many miles. One of their villages was called Hickerau. While friendly to the white people, they were at war with the coast tribes. According to Rivers 1Rivers, Hist. S. C., 94, 1874 , they had two villages with 43 warriors in 1715, and were then settled 70 miles north of Charleston. Bartram (Tray., 54, 1791) tells us that in 1715 they sided with the Yamasee against the British, and that they were attacked and reduced by the Creeks, who were allies of the British. It appears from South Carolina colonial documents that the Santee and Congaree were cut off by the “Itwans and Cossabos,” coast tribes in the English interest,’ and the prisoners sold as slaves in the West Indies in 1716. Those that escaped were probably incorporated with the Catawba. Lawson states that their chief was an absolute ruler with power of life and death over his tribe, an instance of despotism very rare among Indians. Their distinguished dead were buried on the tops of mounds, built low or high according to the rank of the deceased, with ridge roofs supported by poles over the graves to shelter them from the weather. On these poles were hung rattles, feathers, and other offerings from the relatives of the deceased. The corpse of an ordinary person was carefully dressed, wrapped in bark, and exposed on a platform for several days, during which time one of his nearest kinsmen, with face blackened in token of grief, stood guard near the spot and, chanted a mournful eulogy of the dead. The ground around the platform was kept carefully swept, and all the dead man’s belongings gun, bow, and feather robes-were placed near by. As soon as the flesh had softened it was stripped from the bones and burned, and the bones themselves were cleaned, the skull being wrapped separately in a cloth woven of opossum hair.
Enter a grandparent's name to get started.
The bones were then put into a box, from which they were taken out annually to be again cleaned and oiled. In this way some families had in their possession the bones of their ancestors for several generations. Places where warriors had been killed were sometimes distinguished by piles of stones or sticks, to which every passing Indian added another.
After the manner of the Cherokee and other Southern tribes the Santee kept corn in storehouses raised on posts and plastered with clay. They made beautiful feather robes and wove cloth and sashes of hair.
For Further Study
The following articles and manuscripts will shed additional light on the Santee as both an ethnological study, and as a people.
- Mooney, Siouan Tribes of the East, 80, 1894.
- Lawson (1700), Hist. Carolina, 34, 1860.
Footnotes: [ + ]
|1.||↩||Rivers, Hist. S. C., 94, 1874| | <urn:uuid:728b451e-3856-496a-b716-13cb5f604c86> | CC-MAIN-2017-22 | https://www.accessgenealogy.com/native/santee-tribe.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-22/segments/1495463608058.57/warc/CC-MAIN-20170525102240-20170525122240-00146.warc.gz | en | 0.986713 | 650 | 4 | 4 |
FALLOWIn Constantine, MI, the Seed Corn Capital of the World, it is the fallow season.
The fields are fallow. Snow drifts and dusts and melts in the fields, and then drifts and dusts some more. Some fields are seeded with winter wheat, resting. Some are soil bound snug by peas, green nitrogen, sprouted and decomposing into humus. Some are stubble. Stubble.
Barns lie quiet. Storage barns at Pioneer hold 950,000 bushels of seed corn, remaining from the three million bushels processed, waiting to be ordered, bagged, shipped and planted.
Villa-Miller’s machinery is stored, dry, enclosed for this season while this seed corn farmer spends the fallow season visiting with in-laws in Costa Rica and checking commodities.
But the other barns sleep. They have been sleeping for decades. They sleep the sleep of death.How long can a field lie fallow yet remain waiting, fertile? It can take five hundred to one thousand years for an inch of soil to form.
Yet in one generation, just since the 1980’s, a family seed corn farm's barn can die. They fall along the roads each season, some caught by wind, by fire, by water. First the roof caves, then the beams lean, and finally the gaping doors close on themselves. A final breath and they are gone.
Seeds die to live. They enter the soil’s darkness, and moist, only there can they be born again.
Is it so with barns, with farming? | <urn:uuid:dff0cda3-9082-4a79-86d3-1c692af5641d> | CC-MAIN-2016-18 | http://storybarn.blogspot.com/2012/01/fallow.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-18/segments/1461860118321.95/warc/CC-MAIN-20160428161518-00063-ip-10-239-7-51.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.934046 | 335 | 2.859375 | 3 |
The savagery of the French Revolution, which declared the Rights of Man but turned to bloody-handed tyranny and repressive terrorism, has long puzzled historians. Among the list of causes, and one rarely remembered, Elizabeth Wilson writes, was the painter Jacques-Louis David. Today, he is best known as one of the great masters of French painting a defining master of an austere neoclassical style that dominated European art for almost a half-century and one of the precursors of modern painting. But for a few terrifying years David was also "the propaganda minister of the French Revolutio a man who could turn an unruly mob, ready to kill for a loaf of bread, into tearful patriots willing to die for the cause."
Wilson's story traces David's life and work, his great ambition and success. That success was mostly nonpolitical until 1785, when one of his monumental and posterish neoclassical paintings, The Oath of the Horatii, in which three brothers swear to fight to the death for their homeland, became linked to patriotic fervor as the Revolution was about to get under way. David went on not only to document the Tennis Court Oath, when the Revolution more or less officially began, but to produce on demand "state funerals and martyr portraits, multimedia pageants with a cast of thousands all designed to keep the revolutionary faith alive, even when bodies were piling up ten deep beside "la guillotine." His most startling picture, and one that links him most clearly to modern painting, is the martyr portrait of Jacobin leader Jean-Paul Marat, dead in his bath after being stabbed by Charlotte Corday.
The guillotine devoured many revolutionary leaders, and, indeed, David had declared he wanted to die with Robespierre, the principal architect of the Terror. But he survived, instead, and soon began fawning upon the young Napoleon. David was a turncoat and a sycophant, but a great painter. "He was born into a world in which painting was for the privileged few," Wilson writes. "His images showed the power of art to electrify even the commonest citizen." | <urn:uuid:9c7b15f4-7402-41c1-a6ff-251969ee8ab3> | CC-MAIN-2022-49 | https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/jacques-louis-david-60191520/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-49/segments/1669446710218.49/warc/CC-MAIN-20221127073607-20221127103607-00222.warc.gz | en | 0.974003 | 442 | 2.890625 | 3 |
‘Technology has made life different, but not necessarily more stressful’, says a recent article in the New York Times, summarising the findings of a study by researchers at the Pew Research Center and Rutgers University. It is often thought that frequent internet and social media use increases stress. Digital unplugging, along with losing weight and quitting smoking, is seen as a healthy thing to do. But, said the article, we needn’t worry so much. Frequent internet and social media users don’t have higher stress levels than less frequent users, and indeed women who frequently use Twitter, email and photo-sharing apps (and who use these media for life-event sharing more than men – who tend to be less self-disclosing online) scored 21% lower on the stress scale than women who did not.
I suggest that, far from being reassuring, these results are very sinister indeed. They indicate that internet technology (or at least something that has happened to humans at the same time as internet technology has been happening to them) has effected a tectonic transformation in the human constitution. The outsourcing, digitalization and trivializing of our relationships should make us stressed. If it doesn’t, something seriously bad has happened. The stress response enables us to react appropriately to threats. Switch it off, and we’re in danger. Only a damaged immune response fails to kick off when there are bacteria around. A tiger confined in a tiny concrete pen has lost a lot of its tigerishness if it doesn’t pace frustratedly up and down, its cortisol levels through the roof.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University. | <urn:uuid:96a9b2e1-b713-44b6-b149-e86a5c1232e2> | CC-MAIN-2021-43 | https://bioethics.georgetown.edu/2015/02/humans-are-un-made-by-social-media/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-43/segments/1634323587623.1/warc/CC-MAIN-20211025030510-20211025060510-00297.warc.gz | en | 0.95779 | 369 | 2.5625 | 3 |
A similar process was under way in the Nile valley. Ever since the voyages of the Portuguese explorers at the close of the fifteenth century, European trade with the East had been carried on almost exclusively by the route around the Cape of Good Hope. But from the outset, there was some interest in shortening the route by digging a canal east of Cairo, where only a low, swampy isthmus separated the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. The Ottoman Turks, who controlled the area, had considered constructing a canal in the sixteenth century, but nothing was accomplished until 1854, when the French entrepreneur Ferdinand de Lesseps signed a contract to begin construction of the canal. The project brought little immediate benefit to Egypt, however, which under the vigorous rule of the Ottoman official Muhammad Ali was attempting to adopt reforms on the European model. The costs of construction imposed a major debt on the Egyptian government and forced a growing level of dependence on foreign financial support. When an army revolt against growing foreign influence broke out in 1881, the British stepped in to protect their investment (they had bought Egypt’s canal company shares in 1875) and set up an informal protectorate that would last untilWorldWar I. The weakening of Turkish rule in the Nile valley had a parallel farther to the west, where autonomous regions had begun to emerge under local viceroys in Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. In 1830, the French, on the pretext of reducing the threat of piracy to European shipping in the Mediterranean, seized the area surrounding Algiers and annexed it into the kingdom of France. By the mid- 1850s, more than 150,000 Europeans had settled in the fertile region adjacent to the coast, while Berber resistance continued in the desert to the south. In 1881, the French imposed a protectorate on neighboring Tunisia. Only Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Ottoman provinces that make up modern-day Libya) remained under Turkish rule until the Italians took them in 1911–1912. | <urn:uuid:af40ff94-28f3-4c32-b0e7-0bf02f891968> | CC-MAIN-2023-14 | https://www.worldhistory.biz/contemporary-history/twentieth-century-world-history/94751-imperialist-shadow-over-the-nile.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-14/segments/1679296943484.34/warc/CC-MAIN-20230320144934-20230320174934-00078.warc.gz | en | 0.964339 | 406 | 3.8125 | 4 |
To Chi or not to Chi?
Monday 21 September 2015
When and how can students consider using the Chi squared test of independence?
This blog post is a result of having received lots of related questions on this topic either online or at workshops. I thought I might just write some thoughts down ina blog post before perhaps making a more formal entry about this on the website. So, the following is just a list of key points for students and teachers to consider about this test.....
It is probably worth noting here that students will need to know how to conclude these tests using both of the following methods.
Using the p-number - as a measure of the probability of independence. If it is lower than significance level (eg 10%, 0.1) then that means that there is a less than 10% chance that the variables are independent so you can conclude that they are not.
Using the calculated chi squared statistic - as a measure of the error between the observed and expected values. If the error is bigger than the critical value (which is related to both the significance level and the degrees of freedom) then we reject the hypothesis that the variables are independent. In exams, the critical value will be given
I have heard some brilliant acronyms for helping students to remember this and I am sure they work well. My preference though is to help students really understand what these statitsics mean. P is a measure of probabilityb of independence, the calculated statistic is a measure of error.
Students may also be expected to demonstrate that they know how to calculate an expected frequency.
Students are expected to conclude their tests using the calculated statistic and comparing it to the critical value. (The second of the methods used above). This is presumably because this method allows students to demonstrate the stages of the calculation where the p-number would not.
When is a test appropriate?
Although not an official rule, it is good guidance for our students that .....
- IF they are looking for a relationship between two numerical data fields they should use a scattergraph.
- IF one or both of the data fields are categorical, they should use a Chi squared test of independence..
What if one of the data fields is numerical?
In this case, students need to put this data in to categories. For example, a student might test to see if GDP is dependent on the hemisphere in which the country is in. In this case students would need to decide on categories for GDP. These might be Low, medium and high. In many cases, this is an arbitrary decision and students should try to justify it. One approach in this case might be to use the first quartile of the results as the 'low' category, the interquartile range as the 'medium' and the upper quartile as the 'high'.
Students should then tally all of their data in to one of these tables. For the example gievn below, the table might look like this.....
This would be a 2 x 3 table ans students would take each country in the survey and put a tally in the appropriate cell. Perhpas the country is in the Northern hemisphere but has a low GDP and so you would put a tally in the top left column. At this stage, it is good to have data on lots of countries so there is a decent total. Otherwise there is a risk that the low frequencies will undrmine the test (see below).
Once students have put the observed frequencies in their contingency table, then they should do a quick test - probably with the GDC - to check the expected frequencies. They must stick to the following rule.
NO EXPECTED FREQUENCIES MUST BE LESS THAN 5
This is said to undermione the test since at some point in the calculation we divide by the expected frequency. If that number is too small then the effect of small variations is disproportionately large.
There after, students are expected to show how they calculate the error for each of the six (in this example) cases. See the example below. It is not a complete example, but just shows the highlights. This test was done to test for a relationship between the gender of a youtuber and the number of subscriptions to their channel.
Yates's Continuity Correction
If students end up with a 2 x 2 contingency table then they are required to use this correction approach. Again, this is related to disproportionate effe t of small variations on smaler numbers (degree freedom just 1).
This is easily done - When we do Observed frequency subtract expected frequency, we then subtract a further 0.5 before squaring. Students are only required to recognise the need and use the correction rather than explain why it is needed. | <urn:uuid:1b07a9f3-fd06-4c25-b50c-b678dcb4efbf> | CC-MAIN-2019-18 | https://www.thinkib.net/mathstudies/blog/19648/to-chi-or-not-to-chi | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-18/segments/1555578529898.48/warc/CC-MAIN-20190420160858-20190420181952-00025.warc.gz | en | 0.947986 | 965 | 3.53125 | 4 |
1802 Directive from James Monroe
An April 16, 1802, directive from James Monroe, then governor of Virginia, reminds Loudoun County court officials to forward to the executive office a copy of the entire court proceedings, including all testimony, concerning any slave "tried and convicted of a crime which affects his life" (i.e., carries the death penalty). In response to the planned 1800 slave uprising known as Gabriel's Conspiracy, the General Assembly passed a series of measures to prevent future rebellions. Among them was the 1801 "Act to empower the Governor to transport slaves condemned when it shall be deemed expedient." Monroe sent this broadside to the county courts to remind court officials to keep him apprised of trials in which slaves were condemned to die. The governor could then choose between having the convicted slaves executed or transported out of the state. | <urn:uuid:47e68dc8-4b3b-40d9-b35b-5346cf113675> | CC-MAIN-2018-39 | https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/media_player?mets_filename=evr6460mets.xml | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-39/segments/1537267155924.5/warc/CC-MAIN-20180919043926-20180919063926-00261.warc.gz | en | 0.965219 | 173 | 2.875 | 3 |
The Energy Department's INCITE program, which stands for the “Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment,” recently put out a report highlighting the ways our supercomputers are catalyzing discoveries and innovations. Above, computing provides an unparalleled ability to model and simulate Type Ia (thermonuclear-powered) supernovas. The ability to do 3D, large-scale simulations of these explosions led to the discovery of an entirely new and unexpected explosion mechanism, termed the gravitationally confined detonation (GCD) model.
Image: courtesy Flash Center for Computational Science, University of Chicago
2 of 7
A supernova explosion from the core collapse of a super-giant star reveals a shock-wave like behavior. This discovery provides a more detailed understanding of how a collapsing star can eject most of its layers and spread elements like iron and oxygen into the surrounding universe.
Image: courtesy Oak Ridge National Laboratoy | David Pugmire
3 of 7
Transportation is 28 percent of US energy consumption. This visualization of the formation and velocity of turbulence at the boundary layer between a vehicle and the medium through which it moves could provide dramatic fuel savings when applied to material design.
Image: courtesy Universidad Politécnica de Madrid | Juan Sillero
4 of 7
This rendering illustrates fields of temperature and pressure in a helicopter combustion chamber. The simulation contained 330 million variable elements and allowed engineers to test the efficiency and stability of different fuels and material combinations.
Image: courtesy Turbomeca and CERFACS | Pierre Wolf
5 of 7
Supercomputers have only recently paved the way for tiny proteins like this ALG3 to be rendered in enough detail to understand their dynamics. A discovery in this area could lead to major advances in creating biofuels, cleaning up waste, and sequestering carbon.
Image: courtesy Oliver Lange
6 of 7
A global particle-in-cell simulation shows core turbulence in a fusion reaction. Sustaining effective fusion reactions, in which the fusion energy produced exceeds the input energy, could pave the way to a clean, safe, and limitless source of energy.
Image: courtesy OakRidge National Laboratory | Scott Klasky
7 of 7
The M8 simulation revealed regions at risk during a magnitude-8 quake by charting peak horizontal ground velocities.
Image: courtesy University of Southern California | Geoffrey Ely | <urn:uuid:2ebe95d8-9f38-45f0-99b6-c1ceed7cbace> | CC-MAIN-2015-48 | http://energy.gov/photos/supercomputers-pictorial-superpowers?page=0%2C6 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-48/segments/1448398464253.80/warc/CC-MAIN-20151124205424-00215-ip-10-71-132-137.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.869734 | 499 | 3.84375 | 4 |
About KTEI's First Nation Student Success Program (FNSSP)
“The First Nation Student Success Program (FNSSP) is a proposal-driven program designed to support First Nation educators on reserve (Kindergarten to Grade 12) in their ongoing efforts to meet their students' needs and improve student and school results. The Program's overall objective is to improve the achievement of First Nation students on reserve by focusing on the priority areas of literacy, numeracy and student retention."
There are three program components that work together to achieve this overall objective. The results of the student learning assessments and other information will help schools identify needs, targets and activities to improve results in the areas of literacy, numeracy and retention. Student learning assessments will also provide data for performance measurement, which will in turn generate reports on results for students, families, communities and INAC. The FNSSP focuses on three components - school success plans, student learning assessments and performance measurement.
If you are a KTEI FNSSP member school or would like to know more about what KTEI's FNSSP current work is about: CLICK HERE
KTEI FNSSP Member Schools
Kenjgewin Teg Educational Institute (KTEI) is the aggregate organization that oversees the project management
and works in collaboration with the following 11 FNSSP participating schools:
1. Constance Lake First Nation – Mamawmatawa Holistic Education Centre
2. Dokis First Nation – Kikendawt Kinomaadii Gamig
3. M’Chigeeng First Nation – Lakeview School
4. Nipissing First Nation – Nbisiing Secondary School
5. Sagamok Anishnawbek – Biidaaban Kinomaagegamik
6. Shawanaga First Nation – Kinomaugewgamik Elementary School
7. Sheshegwaning First Nation – St. Joseph’s Anishnabek School
8. Temagami First Nation – Laura McKenzie Learning Centre
9. United Chiefs and Councils of Mnidoo Mnisiing, Kenjgewin Teg Secondary School
10. Wasauksing First Nation – Wasauksing Kinomaugewgamik
11. Whitefish River First Nation – Shawanosowe School
About Structural Readiness - An Initiative & Component INAC Program of FNSSP
What is structural readiness?
Structural readiness activities focus on increasing and supporting the capacity of First Nation regional management organizations (RMO), like KTEI, to deliver school education services. Structural readiness is entirely optional which means additional funding will be made available to the RMO.
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada is expected to do education reform to the outdated funding formula that current community schools on reserve currently receive. The formula is expected to be updated in 2017 with an overall roll up per student that will include all grants and proposals. This roll up per-student-amount will include the New Paths Funding, FNSSP, Tribal Council Second Level Services and Early Learning proposals that First Nations apply to annually. This will cease to exist and be rolled into one amount per student. This will ensure stable, predictable and equitable funding that will be less onerous then the current process. In addition to the above designated organizations can act to coordinate, deliver and oversee the responsibility for the education systems in the First Nations with schools. Click on the INFOGRAPHIC at the right for more insight into the national, regional and local context of First Nation education - and insight into the types of discussions and planning that First Nation communities will need to consider as part of 'structural readiness' and their First Nation education community choices.
CLICK HERE to print a special issue answering commonly asked questions on Structural Readiness. | <urn:uuid:53f5929a-5b0a-4f64-a5bf-f446bb555ef4> | CC-MAIN-2017-34 | http://www.ktei.net/first-nations-student-success-program.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-34/segments/1502886133449.19/warc/CC-MAIN-20170824101532-20170824121532-00026.warc.gz | en | 0.908537 | 779 | 2.703125 | 3 |
Although the Lakeshore’s name comes from an Indian legend about a mother black bear and her cubs, black bears are rarely seen within the park, though they are becoming more common in Michigan. There are over 50 other species of mammals that can be seen depending on the time of year and watchfulness of the visitor. The lakes and streams have beaver, otter, muskrat, and mink. Many of the small mammals in the park are inconspicuous such as meadow voles, deer mice, weasels, and shrews, but eastern chipmunks are numerous and are not inconspicuous. They frequent the campgrounds, especially on South Manitou Island and can be a nuisance for campers. Fox squirrels and gray squirrels, including the black phase of the gray squirrel, are common. A sighting of a northern flying squirrel should be treasured since they are primarily a nocturnal (active at night) species. Meadow vole runways are exposed as the snow melts and let you know how busy they were during the winter. Long lines of protruded soil tell of an eastern mole who is feeding on earthworms under the ground. Bats are busy little insectivores that are seen flying overhead at dusk while they feed on moths and mosquitos. Among the bats found in the park are the big brown bat, hoary bat, red bat, and silver-haired bat.
Some mammals, such as coyotes and opossums, are fairly recent arrivals to the area. The white-tailed deer were not present in significant numbers until the forests were cleared. Raccoons continue to benefit from man’s activities and are common. If you do not see these animals during your hikes, then watch for their tracks which are commonly seen in sandy or muddy areas. Be sure to enjoy the occasional serenade of a coyote family as you are settling into bed at your campsite. Bobcats are elusive and live in some of the more wild parts of the park and neighboring swamps. Sightings of cougars continue to be reported each year and research efforts are underway to verify that this species has returned to Michigan and the Lakeshore area. | <urn:uuid:6bfb01b4-bd71-4a40-ac56-241b6adb3d04> | CC-MAIN-2015-18 | http://www.nps.gov/slbe/learn/nature/mammals.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-18/segments/1430454443858.51/warc/CC-MAIN-20150501042723-00071-ip-10-235-10-82.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.973409 | 450 | 2.84375 | 3 |
If you or someone you know are experiencing unwanted, distressing or obsessive thoughts surrounding eating habits and/or body image perception, it may be more serious than you think.
It is somewhat normal to have occasional thoughts or feelings about your diet and appearance, however, it is important to take notice of the frequency and severity of these thoughts as it may begin to affect your mental wellbeing and daily life.
If not treated, other illnesses may begin to develop such as depression and anxiety affecting you personally and others around you. Eating disorders can affect anyone of any age, gender or background so if you feel as though these thoughts and feelings are becoming obsessive, it’s important to speak to someone straight away.
Understanding the symptoms, causes and signs of the 5 major disorders may help you to identify whether your experience is a problem. Here’s everything you need to know:
Overview: An extreme, calorie-restricted diet due to a fear of gaining weight. Sufferers view their physical appearance to be significantly different to how they really look; overweight or larger in perspective leading to an underweight BMI. People with this illness are often moderately – extremely malnourished, fatigued and trapped in negative thought patterns affecting their life due to constant, obsessive worries surrounding food intake and body image. However, keep in mind that you do not have to appear with protruding bones to have Anorexia Nervosa as severity can fluctuate. Anorexia Nervosa can affect both men and women of any age or background.
Causes: People with extremely low self-esteem who may idolise or feel pressured to match their appearance to other body images. This may be brought on by a constant association with media channels or pressure from outside environments such as people they know and compare with, occupation (e.g. fashion industry).
Sufferers from depression, anxiety and/or stressful situations in their life are also at high risk in developing the illness. Other psychological factors that trigger may include obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) or other traits of extreme perfectionism, as well as Body Dysmorphia. An imbalance of hormones due to extreme dieting plays a vital part in the brain’s ability to think and function properly. Those with family history of the illness may also be at a greater risk as it often runs down the family line whether genetically or through modeling other’s behaviours such as having a mother who is obsessed about their weight or appearance.
Signs & Symptoms: If you believe yourself or someone you know may be developing Anorexia Nervosa, it is important to get a professional diagnosis to confirm the illness. You can also look for symptoms such as: significant weight loss in a short period of time, excessive exercise, calorie counting, avoiding carbohydrates and fats in diet, evidence of laxative intake, low energy levels, facial differences; skin colour changes & sunken eyes, behavioural changes and talk of low self-esteem/self-worth, a distorted view of body physique. Other personal symptoms that you may feel are changes in libido, hormonal imbalances causing mood swings and menstrual cycle disruptions including cessation of having a menstrual period.
Overview: An inability to control eating habits and low body image perception. Bulimia Nervosa is the medical diagnosis of someone who experiences repetitive binge eating episodes followed by purging their food shortly after in order to avoid further calorie intake by vomiting or consuming laxatives. Purging is caused by a strong obsession of body image satisfaction and feelings of shame and guilt surrounding binge eating episodes. Unlike Anorexia Nervosa, it is uncommon to lose a large amount of weight because your body absorbs calories as soon as it enters your mouth. Around less than 50% of calories are eliminated through vomiting and around 10% from using laxatives therefore it is more likely that a person will either gain weight or maintain weight due to water loss. Similar however, people will also often stick to a strict diet or fast and involve excessive exercise as a part of their routine. People often become secretive and lie about what they have ate. Bulimia can become more severe if not treated and can last up to a lifetime as it is usually unnoticed by others.
Causes: Psychological factors in which affect a person’s ability to control their eating habits may be caused by stressful life situations, low self-esteem, abuse and/or trauma. People may turn to food as a source of comfort in their life however if negative body image is seen to be a major issue, this leads to repetitive purging. It is an unbreakable cycle of feeling unsatisfied or unhappy without food followed by feelings of disgust and shame. Genetics can play a role in the likelihood of developing this illness if is known to be present in family history. Other environmental or cultural influences can also play a part especially seen among women. This may be due to the fact that more women are likely to obsess over weight or body image than men due to pressures from media sources or experiencing constant comparisons to other women. Being bullied by family members or peers for weight as a child can also be a contributing developmental factor.
Signs & Symptoms: Certain behavioural patterns to look out for may include someone being constantly worried or obsessed with their body shape or weight and holding a fear of weight gain. If you are personally affected, you may notice yourself unable to control the amount of bingeing you are doing in one sitting and feeling as if you can’t control what you eat. If you are forcing yourself to purge (forced vomiting, excessive exercising or using laxatives) after bingeing episodes, this is a strong indicator that you should speak with a professional to avoid further damage to you physical and mental health. You may find your diet is unbalanced day to day, some days might entail fasting or restricting calories whilst others involve binging episodes. Hiding evidence of food that has been consumed and being secretive about what you have eaten is also another sign that can impact greatly as this is what causes the illness to often go unnoticed by others and therefore difficult to seek help independently. Other physical signs may start to appear after excessive vomiting including; calluses or red sores on knuckles and hands, damaged teeth/gums caused by stomach acid and swelling in the cheeks due to enlarged glands.
Binge Eating Disorder
Overview: A person suffering with Being Eating Disorder will experience uncontrollable urges to eat large portions of food every couple of hours or less even if they don’t feel hungry, forcing their bodies to feel uncomfortable and fatigued. Food is not purged, ultimately people result with a large amount of weight gain and will develop feelings of emotional shame and guilt around their habits. Although these feelings develop, the illness causes an emotional cycle leading to eating more food in order to cope mentally with their unhappiness. Stress and boredom may also play a vital part in the continuity of these habits. Often these habits are kept a secret from others as they are ashamed and embarrassed, people may also lie about the meals they’ve consumed throughout the day in order to feel as if they can continue eating when around other people; although eating in front of other people can be difficult.
Causes: The exact causes of the illness may differ for each person depending on certain biological, psychological and environmental factors in their life or struggles they may be dealing with. Biological factors may be due to an imbalance of hormones which regulate sugar and hunger cravings. Many factors can contribute to these hormones becoming imbalanced including stress, sleep deprivation, toxins, and other medical conditions. Other chemical imbalances in the brain which regulate addictions may come into play, causing an urge to compulsively eat. Psychological challenges such as depression is an extremely common link with binge eating due to the chemical Dopamine in our brain that is released when we do things that make us feel good; eating. It is a temporary alleviation for depression, however when a person has strong self-loathing feelings of body dissatisfaction and self-esteem they may feel as if there is no end, leading to a vicious cycle. Environmental factors may involve challenges in which a person has previously faced or is currently facing in their life. Traumatic experiences can trigger a person to begin binge eating which may last for long periods of time and may worsen if not treated with professional help. People can also resolve to binge eating to help themselves deal with emotional difficulties caused by social pressure and criticism about their body image or weight.
Signs & Symptoms: You may notice yourself or someone around you developing signs of binge eating. The most common symptoms you may find yourself feeling/doing include: being secretive about food portions/number of meals/types of food, hiding food wrappings or evidence from other people, choosing to eat alone as opposed with other people, eating whilst you are already satisfied or full, experiencing an uncontrollable urge or craving, thinking about food for the majority of your day, feelings of shamefulness and guilt after eating, having a low self esteem and perception of your body image. Signs you may notice from other people around you whom you suspect to be binge eating may include: lazy and fatigued the majority of the time, unhappy or depressed, feeling anxious about their body image, spending large amounts of money on food, rapid weight gain.
Overview: The inability to eat anything that may be considered ‘unhealthy’ or lacking nutritional value. This illness is most commonly adopted by people who are likely to suffer from other syndromes such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). People suffering from Orthorexia have obsessive worries about the ingredients within a meal and will likely remove themselves from situations that involve eating food they have not prepared themselves such as events that serve lunch, dinner at a friend’s house, etc. This starts to affect their state of happiness due to the extent of the concerns. Unlike other eating disorders, the focus of Orthorexia is not generally based around how a person perceives their weight or body image, instead they develop a focus around a healthy diet and become heavily concentrated and obsessed with the quality of food and the health benefits they will gain.
Causes: When significant lifestyle changes are made to better improve a diet due to health concerns, Orthorexia can be developed by taking these concerns to an unhealthy or extreme level. People with obsessive tendencies such as perfectionism or control are at a greater risk of developing symptoms when it comes to any changes in their life or goals they largely focus on. When there is pressure from outsiders such as a career or goal, it can be easier to switch your mentality from a normal to a competitive, obsessive way of thinking about food. It can affect anyone of any age, gender or background who may feel a certain pressure towards a healthy lifestyle or have existing tenancies to avoid failure.
Signs & Symptoms: Some body image worries may be of concern however the most common signs include: avoiding food that someone else has prepared, avoiding substances such as sugar, dairy or carbohydrates, obsessing over ingredients in every meal/packet/etc., high concern with nutritional value, high concerns with the food others are eating, anxious about the food that may be present at an event, etc., idolising others as role models via social media or other platforms. Where healthy eating turns into an Eating Disorder such as Orthorexia is where this healthy eating starts to cause significant psychological distress and impact on the person’s daily functioning.
Overview: The polar opposite to Anorexia Nervosa; sufferers from Muscle Dysmorphia view their physiques to be significantly smaller to how they really look. Worrying thoughts and obsessions surrounding muscle mass percentage and appearance begin to actively take over a person’s mental health as diet and everyday routines are drastically changed. Sufferers will hold fear that if they are not exercising enough or doing the right type of exercise, they will lose muscle mass. Similar with their diet, if they are not consuming enough of the right foods, they worry it may interfere with their ability to gain muscle. There is an extremely low self-esteem factor involved, leading to the mentality that muscle gain will be the only way they will be satisfied with their body image. Muscle Dysmorphia greatly impacts a majority of men in comparison to women due to large amounts of pressure put on from the people around them and stereotypical media platforms.
Causes: Similar to other eating disorders, causes are greatly influenced by a number of biological, psychological and environmental factors. If someone has quite a significant history of dealing with abuse, bullying or other sorts of trauma it can create an obsessive need for approval and satisfaction within themselves, primarily from other people. Underlying issues of low self-esteem can also impact as a means to resolve the issue by ‘improving’ their self appearance rather than dealing with their concerns in a healthier, more long-term sustainable manner. Relationships can also be a major factor; especially men in particular may see themselves as unworthy of love in comparison to other men who appear much ‘larger’ than them. Fearing isolation and being alone will then in turn motivate them to undergo excessive exercise and highly concerned eating habits. Similar to some other eating disorders, symptoms of depression, anxiety or obsessive-compulsive disorder/other perfectionism-type tendencies that pre-exist in a person may place them at a higher risk of developing this illness.
Signs & Symptoms: The main warning signs to look out for include: obsessive worrying about appearance, weight and muscular percentage, constant fear of losing muscle due to lack of exercise or diet, fear of weight loss, excessive exercise needed to maintain or build extra muscle, worrying that other lifestyle commitments may interfere with gym sessions or meals, creating unhealthy routines in order to achieve unrealistic goals, a fear against unhealthy food that doesn’t provide enough quality.
If you feel as though you’d like to get in touch with us or speak about any current concerns involving you or someone you know, we are here to listen.
Ashley Gilmour, our Clinical Psychologist holds extensive experience in dealing with a range of eating disorders with people of all ages and backgrounds. Ashley offers a tailor-made treatment plan suited to your particular needs, concerns and lifestyle to help you achieve your goals.
By visiting your local GP, you can receive an Eating Disorder Management Plan which allows you to claim the Medicare rebate of 40 sessions at Vitality Unleashed Psychology as well as 20 dietician sessions per year.
If you have any questions or need professional help for dealing with eating disorders, contact us at our clinic today on 07 5574 3888 or email us. | <urn:uuid:b2c03c12-035b-4aa5-9778-269fa8274149> | CC-MAIN-2021-31 | https://www.vitalityunleashed.com.au/eating-disorders-the-signs-to-look-out-for/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-31/segments/1627046154408.7/warc/CC-MAIN-20210802234539-20210803024539-00247.warc.gz | en | 0.962654 | 2,968 | 2.890625 | 3 |
If you had asked someone about blockchain a few decades ago, you would have been derided and dismissed as trivial. Blockchains have grown into various varieties depending on their architecture and setup over the last several years.
The material stored on the blockchain's blocks and the activities conducted by the many participants on the blockchain networks can be controlled based on how the blockchain is built and how it is anticipated to execute the desired business function.
Public and private blockchains are the two most prevalent types. Numerous cryptocurrency networks and individual businesses heavily utilize them.
Enterprises are perpetually unsure about public and private blockchain technologies. Here, we'll delve deeper into the features of public and private blockchains and compare them. Once you understand the similarities and differences between them, you can easily choose the one that is most suited to your needs.
As a blockchain solution provider, it is essential to offer both private and public blockchain options to cater to the diverse needs of you. We can recommend the best blockchain solution to ensure the success of your platform launch.
A public blockchain network is one that anyone, at any moment, can join. Public blockchains give all nodes equal access to the blockchain, the ability to create new data blocks, and the ability to validate existing data blocks. In general, there are no limits on participation. Additionally, anyone can access the ledger and participate in the consensus process.
Currently, public blockchains are largely used for bitcoin exchange and mining. On these public blockchains, nodes "mine" for cryptocurrency by solving cryptographic equations to create blocks for the transactions requested on the network. In exchange for their efforts, miner nodes receive a small quantity of bitcoin. The miners essentially operate as new-era bank tellers, facilitating transactions in exchange for a fee (or "mine").
For instance, Ethereum is a public blockchain platform.
Public blockchain firms consistently construct each platform with the utmost security in mind. In reality, businesses and organizations are subjected to cyber hacks daily. It's becoming a significant impediment as time passes.
Additionally, it results in billions of dollars in annual losses.
However, companies can easily avoid hacking difficulties with all the security procedures inherent in a public blockchain. Additionally, they can ensure actual value or improved data quality for every project.
As you may already know, the public blockchain is open to everybody, as its name implies. As a result, you can access these platforms regardless of your location. All you'd need is a computer and a reliable internet connection. As a result, you will always benefit from blockchain technology. Additionally, you can utilize it to do business in a secure atmosphere. Additionally, mining can earn you money.
Everyone is anonymous on a public blockchain. There is no reason to use your true name or identity; everything will remain concealed, and no one will be able to follow you based on that.
Because it is a public domain, this provision is primarily for protecting one's personal property. Many criminals prefer to pay for unlawful acts on the dark web with bitcoin. This is also one of the public blockchain's downsides.
Nodes on a public blockchain are not required to follow any regulations. Thus, there is no end to how one might utilize this platform for their advancement.
Nothing, however, comes close to a completely transparent platform. Essentially, public blockchain companies construct their platforms to be completely transparent to anyone on the ledger.
This means that you can access the ledger at any time. As a result, there is no room for corruption or inconsistency. In any case, everyone is responsible for maintaining the ledger and participating in consensus.
True decentralization is achieved with a public blockchain. This is something that private blockchain networks completely lack. Because everyone has a copy of the ledger, it also has a distributed nature.
Essentially, this sort of blockchain does not have a centralized entity. As a result, nodes are completely responsible for network maintenance. They are updating the ledger using a consensus algorithm to improve fairness.
Additionally, these aspects ensure that the system maintains a decentralized environment.
Typically, any network requires the user to adhere to many rules and regulations. However, this is not the case with public blockchain networks. Because there is no central authority monitoring their every step, all users are empowered.
Additionally, these platforms are accessible to the public, so no corporation can prevent you from downloading the nodes and participating in the consensus.
This is something that private blockchain platforms do not offer. Additionally, if you examine private blockchains, you'll notice that users do not have complete freedom. Our ICO experts can help you enter the crypto space.
When data is stored on the blockchain, it cannot be altered.
As opposed to a client-server model, the database is not centralized, and all nodes in the blockchain participate in transaction validation.
As a blockchain development service provider, we empower businesses to explore the digital world by harnessing the potential of public and private blockchain technology.
A network administrator administers a private blockchain, and participants must obtain permission to join the network, making it a permissioned blockchain. A central authority selects who is eligible to be a node in a private blockchain. The central authority does not always grant each node equal rights to execute functions.
The network is controlled by one or more entities, which results in a dependency on third parties for transactions. Only the parties to the transaction will know about it, while others will be unable to access it, i.e., private transactions.
Private blockchains are only partially decentralized due to their restricted public access. Ripple, a business-to-business virtual cryptocurrency exchange network, and Hyperledger, an umbrella project for open-source blockchain applications, are two instances of private blockchains.
Private blockchain solutions are typically more concerned about privacy than public blockchain systems. If you're seeking a solution that can provide your organization with the highest level of anonymity, this is it.
While this may appear a bit extreme, it is the reality. Enterprises are constantly confronted with security and privacy concerns. Additionally, they deal with such sensitive data daily. If even one of them is disclosed, it might suffer a catastrophic loss.
That is why a business must utilize a network capable of securing sensitive information. This is where private blockchains enter the picture.
While public blockchains were the first, they are notorious for their inefficiencies. Why? That is because they are the ones who introduce everyone to the network. As a result, as more individuals attempt to use the features, the platforms cannot support them.
As a result, it accelerates swiftly. On the other hand, private blockchain networks are restricted to few participants. They frequently have specific responsibilities to accomplish. As a result, they have no method of using additional resources and slowing down the platform.
Private blockchains utilize environmentally friendly consensus algorithms to reach an agreement.
Private blockchain solutions are reliable, and they will provide you with the peace of mind you desire. Essentially, each blockchain platform requires you to pay a charge to conduct a transaction. However, the cost might significantly increase on public platforms due to the pressure from nodes seeking transactions.
When there are too many transaction requests, completing them takes time. Additionally, as time passes, the charge climbs significantly. However, this is not the case with private blockchain platforms. Because only a small number of people can request transactions, there are no delays.
Whether you require a private or public blockchain, our team has the expertise to develop a secure, scalable, and efficient blockchain platform. We also provide ongoing support and maintenance to ensure your blockchain remains up-to-date and optimized for your business requirements. Trust us to deliver a reliable blockchain solution that transforms your business idea into a reality.
Whether public or private, both types of blockchains are permissioned. They frequently limit a user's access to a network to a small number of nodes. Additionally, it limits a user's rights on the network's nodes. Other users on the same blockchain are aware of the permissioned blockchain user's identity. Several popular frameworks adhere to the permissioned blockchain development protocol, including Corda, R3, Quorum, B3i, and Hyperledger.
These blockchains have gained popularity as a result of their well-designed governance structures. They are well-organized and assist administrators in maintaining data or updating the network quickly. They are significantly quicker than public blockchain networks.
Consortium/federated blockchains fall within this group when it comes to implementation. External parties are not permitted to participate in these networks. It provides customers with increased scalability, making it an ideal alternative for organizations needing command and control. A public blockchain is completely free, whereas a permissioned blockchain is not.
However, the expense is justified due to the transaction's rapidity and efficiency. Additionally, permissioned blockchains consume little energy, which results in cost savings and benefits the environment.
Due to scalability, computation and energy power, transaction validation speeds, and security, private blockchains look more viable and promising for business adoption than public blockchains. However, a closer examination of private blockchains reveals that they fundamentally contradict the feature that makes blockchain solutions attractive and promising — decentralization.
Each business organization must decide which blockchain type to adopt, public or private, considering their respective company strengths and limitations, aims, and objectives.
Want to find out more about how to proceed with your idea? Contact with our highly experienced hybrid blockchain developer!
Keep CALM & Get In Touch With Our Experts | <urn:uuid:4a4aed72-2224-4a7a-a77c-ae42474d333f> | CC-MAIN-2023-23 | https://www.suffescom.com/blog/public-vs-private-blockchain | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-23/segments/1685224649302.35/warc/CC-MAIN-20230603165228-20230603195228-00709.warc.gz | en | 0.941745 | 1,928 | 2.796875 | 3 |
Creating a clutch out of a book is a fun way to upcycle a damaged book. You will need:
- A book cover
- Spray adhesive
- Glue gun
- Fat quarter of fabric
- A bead
- Ribbon or elastic
Teachers! Did you use this instructable in your classroom?
Add a Teacher Note to share how you incorporated it into your lesson.
Step 1: Creating the Lining
Open the book cover and lay it down flat. Measure the book. Add an inch to each side of the book. Cut the fabric to the appropriate size.
Pin under 1/2" of fabric on each side and iron flat.
Step 2: Creating the Sides
Stand the book on its side with the cover open to about a 45 degree angle.
Trace around the cover then add about a half inch.
Fold a piece of fabric in half. Line the top of the template with the fabric fold and cut. (cut two)
Fold the fabric in half lengthwise and iron down
Step 3: Reinforcing the Spine
Measure the size of the book’s spine. Cut two strips of cardboard the same size.
Glue fabric to one of the strips.
Set both pieces aside to use later.
Step 4: Creating the Catch
Lay the book flat and measure the length. Find and mark the center.
Using a nail, poke through the cover.
Thread a bead with ribbon. Pull the ribbon through the hole. Use hot glue to keep it in place.
On the opposite cover, use another piece of ribbon. Form a loop and glue it to the top center of the cover (interior).
Step 5: Attaching the Sides
Fold the extra half inch of fabric under and iron down.
Using a hot glue gun, glue the tip of the side pieces to the spine of the book.
Next, take the cardboard reinforcement (the one not covered with fabric) and glue it to the spine over the fabric.
Apply hot glue to the 1/2" of fabric you folded and ironed down. Press the fabric along the covers' interior edges.
Step 6: Attaching the Lining
Spray one interior cover with adhesive. Attach the lining.
Spray the interior spine and opposite book cover with adhesive and attach the lining.
Allow the lining to dry.
Using the glue gun, apply hot glue to the underside of the cardboard reinforcement covered with fabric. Place inside the purse on the book’s spine. | <urn:uuid:6c01f3b0-5b54-49b1-a65a-f92e45d82108> | CC-MAIN-2019-39 | https://www.instructables.com/id/Book-Clutch/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-39/segments/1568514576345.90/warc/CC-MAIN-20190923084859-20190923110859-00254.warc.gz | en | 0.886351 | 526 | 2.984375 | 3 |
For about six to 12 hours as the sun dips low on the horizon in the late spring and early summer, an Antarctic ice shelf comes alive. Tiny quakes rattle the ice by the hundreds of thousands—and their existence could help scientists track how glaciers are melting across the frozen continent.
These quakes, documented in a recent study in the Annals of Glaciology, were discovered somewhat by happenstance by a team of researchers working on Antarctica’s McMurdo Ice Shelf in late 2016 and early 2017. As lead study author Douglas MacAyeal of the University of Chicago explained to Earther, the group had traveled to the area to study how meltwater on the surface of ice shelves—the floating fringes of glaciers that have spilled into the sea—can cause the ice to flex and crack, hastening its demise.
“We put out seismometers on the fly even though we hadn’t originally planned to do anything with seismology,” MacAyeal said. “To see if we could hear the ice shelf crack open if a lake we were studying suddenly drained. The answer was, no, we can’t determine when the ice shelf cracked because the ice shelf is cracking all the time.”
The ice, as MacAyeal put it, was “alive with this buzz, or static surge” that cranked up during the coldest part of each day.
To learn more about the weird static feedback, the researchers placed seismometers out in two different spots on the shelf: One in a cold, dry area featuring a thick layer of firn, or compacted snow, and one in a wetter area to the west where all that surface insulation had been stripped away. The firn-free area, MacAyeal explained, was frozen at the surface, but the ice just below was slushy because as sunlight filters in, its heat becomes trapped as it would in a greenhouse.
“We were a little skeptical that we’d see anything,” MacAyeal said.
But instead, the instrument sitting on the slushy side of the ice shelf recorded intense seismic activity, every day from mid-November to early December as the sun dipped low in the sky and temperatures fell. At the drier site, the researchers didn’t see any of this daily quaking.
What the researchers think is happening is that the frozen cap atop the slushy ice is contracting as the temperatures drop, before snapping back under the force of gravity. Whenever this happens, it creates a small icequake. This explanation was supported both by the overlap between the seismicity and temperature, and by models the researchers constructed.
Although they only looked at two spots on a single ice shelf, the scientists speculate that “thermally regulated seismicity may exist on all ice shelves that undergo surface melting and freezing, especially those that have lost their protective, insulating firn layer.” Such icequakes could, they suggest, offer a practical tool for remotely monitoring how melted ice shelves or glaciers have become, an especially relevant topic in a warming world.
Julien Chaput, a new faculty member at University of Texas, El Paso who wasn’t involved with the paper, told Earther that icequakes have been documented in “a variety of different settings” where some sort of environmental trigger exists, whether that’s the daily motion of the tides, ocean swells, or stress due to the flow of glaciers. (“Frost quakes” were even heard in Chicago during the recent polar vortex-induced cold snap.)
“What’s novel about this study is not so much the fact that the icequakes exist... but rather why they exist,” Chaput wrote Earther in an email. He called the paper a “really lovely bit of investigative reporting” for convincingly tying the quakes to daily temperature swings.
“This observation, and in particular the interpretation of it related to thermal bending of a frozen lid over a partially melted slushy layer, is rather novel, and fits in well with other very recent works... in the sense that the very near surface of shelves can be viewed as a coal mine canary, but that unlike the canary, it makes quite a bit of noise before going silent,” Chaput continued.
MacAyeal said his group is now hoping to set up similar seismic monitoring on the Antarctic Peninsula, a region that has experienced some dramatic warming and that has seen several spectacular ice shelf breakups in recent years. He’s excited to see seismology find practical applications in something as relevant as the melting and demise of Antarctic ice.
“It’s very exciting because seismology would be otherwise dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s of plate tectonics,” MacAyeal said. “Cryoseismology is breaking into a new realm of where we can be useful.” | <urn:uuid:aab80239-ef1d-4648-9c0a-93b492a83380> | CC-MAIN-2020-05 | https://earther.gizmodo.com/researchers-discover-antarctic-ice-shelf-alive-with-tin-1833322877 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-05/segments/1579251681625.83/warc/CC-MAIN-20200125222506-20200126012506-00212.warc.gz | en | 0.962885 | 1,039 | 3.796875 | 4 |
ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: The Primate of All England, Metropolitan of the Province of Canterbury, "first among equals" of all Anglican bishops, and the spiritual leader of the Anglican Communion. The See of Canterbury was founded in 597 with the arrival of St. Augustine, who established his first church in the town. The present Archbishop of Canterbury is the Most Rev. and Right Hon. Justin Welby.
ASSISTING BISHOP: A previously consecrated bishop who is appointed by a diocesan bishop with the consent of the standing committee and diocesan council to provide additional episcopal services in the diocese for a specific term.
This is full initiation by water and the Holy Spirit into Christ's Body, the church. God establishes an indissoluble bond with each person in baptism
. God adopts us, making us members of the church and inheritors of the Kingdom of God (BCP, pp. 298, 858). In baptism we are made sharers in the new life of the Holy Spirit and the forgiveness of sins. Baptism is the foundation for all future church participation and ministry.
BISHOP: The third of the three orders of ordained ministry (deacon, priest, bishop). The major functions are to preside over a diocese, consecrate to the episcopate, ordain to the ministry, administer confirmation, and administer ecclesiastical discipline.
BISHOP COADJUTOR: A bishop who is elected to assist the bishop of a diocese and upon the latter's death, retirement, or resignation, succeed the diocesan bishop in office.
BISHOP SUFFRAGAN: A bishop elected to assist the bishop of a diocese but without the right of succession to the office.
BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: The title of the book of worship of the Episcopal Church. The Book of Common Prayer contains doctrine that the church requires to be taught and believed, and a collection of historical documents. It sets forth the standard authorized liturgical texts used in the Episcopal Church. The most recent revision of the Book of Common Prayer was adopted in 1979.
CANON: A law of the church set forth by an ecclesiastical council or convention. This term also refers to a person who is connected to a cathedral, usually a staff priest, or a priest of some other high standing.
DEACON: The first of the three orders of ordained ministry (deacon, priest, bishop). Deacons function in most liturgical and pastoral ministries – not in consecrating the elements – and often assist priests in some way. Its institution is found in Acts 6:1-7.
DIOCESE: The territorial limits of jurisdiction of a diocesan bishop.
EUCHARIST: From the Greek word for "giving of thanks," this refers to the service of Holy Communion or the Lord's Supper as a sacrifice of praise or thanksgiving. The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was ordained by Jesus Christ for the continued remembrance of the sacrifice of his death. It may also be called the Mass, Divine Liturgy, Blessed Sacrament, or Holy Sacrifice.
This governing body carries out the programs and policies of General Convention
between sessions of the General Convention. It may initiate and develop such new works as it deems necessary. It is composed of 38 members: 20 members elected by General Convention (four bishops, four priests or deacons, 12 lay persons), and two members elected by each of the nine provinces.
PRESIDING BISHOP: The chief executive, primate, and spiritual leader of the church and the president of the Executive Council and House of Bishops. He or she is elected by the House of Bishops with confirmation by the House of Deputies for a term of 9 years, and when elected, he/she must resign his/her jurisdiction.
PRIEST: The second of the three orders of ordained ministry (deacon, priest, bishop). The word is a shortened form of “presbyter,” or elder. Priests officiate at any of the sacraments and services of worship other than confirmation, ordination, and consecration.
PROVINCE: A group of dioceses, usually in the same region, whose bishops and delegates meet in synod annually or in those years when the General Convention does not meet. A province is also a term used for a self-governing church body that belongs to the Anglican Communion, such as the Episcopal Church or the Church of England. | <urn:uuid:882f416d-9608-4489-b25d-37a247ff5b7b> | CC-MAIN-2020-05 | https://episcopalchurch.org/posts/publicaffairs/brief-dictionary-terms | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-05/segments/1579251801423.98/warc/CC-MAIN-20200129164403-20200129193403-00485.warc.gz | en | 0.954794 | 936 | 3.1875 | 3 |
“Our worst crime is abandoning the children, neglecting the foundation of life. Many of the things we need can wait. The child cannot. To him we cannot answer ‘Tomorrow’. His name is ‘Today’.”
– Gabriela Mistral
Nothing describes the sorry state of healthcare for newborns in India as succinctly as this quote. It is true that as a developing country we face multiple severe problems but the lack of attention to a problem like this is a grave mistake. While efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality rates over the past 20 years have had a striking impact, stillbirths and newborn deaths have over the same period missed out on the attention they need.
India was home to 700,000 of the one million babies who died within 28 days of birth in South Asia in 2015, according to a Unicef report. It consistently ranked a low sixth in newborn-care services among the eight countries in the south asian region. It lags behind small states like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives.
India has lived through with a 24% share in newborn deaths in the world in 2016, a United Nations report said. The total number of deaths per day is nearly 15,000.
A vast majority of newborn deaths in the world are the direct result of severe infections at birth, which occurs due to the lack of institutional deliveries. Low birth weight, which is caused by preterm birth, is an underlying factor in 60–80% of neonatal deaths. Most of these deaths occur at home, are unrecorded, and remain invisible to all but affected families.
Neonatal mortality is among the most neglected public health issues. A major barrier in reducing the number of neonatal deaths is the fact that only high-level technology and institutional health facility-based care can reduce neonatal mortality, which is forbiddingly expensive.
The average cost of Neonatal Intensive Care Unit facilities per day is Rs 4000. A ventilator, which is mandatory for baby’s survival, costs as high as Rs. 7000 to 10000, per day. Apart from this, there are expenses like medication and drugs, doctor’s fees, hospital admission charges., They add up..
The Indian government is taking laudable action to provide affordable neonatal care with the ‘Newborn Action Plan – 2014’ through government hospitals. However, the effective implementation of these schemes depends on ground level conditions prevalent at these health care centres. The rampant corruption in government hospitals, and a decided lack of trained staff is causing disasters like Gorakhpur tragedy.
Newborn babies have a right to survive and grow into childhood,and to experience life to their full potential. What can ensure that their right is protected? The answer is Baby crowdfunding.
Baby crowdfunding is a way of raising funds for your baby’s neonatal care. Crowdfunding lets you raise the funds by leveraging the strength of your social network. As the entire process is conducted over the internet it offers you the great comfort. Unlike other traditional methods of fundraising like loans and medical insurances, which consume most of your time in tedious paperwork and bureaucratic processes, crowdfunding leaves you with the maximum time. You can spend all of your precious time with your baby who needs it the most.
If you wish to know more about how crowdfunding works, spend a few minutes researching it online.
If you know someone who is in dire need of funds for his baby, suggest baby crowdfunding to them. If you are the one in need, start a fundraiser today! | <urn:uuid:d806b9a0-9b6c-4c2b-b257-6607c4faf8bb> | CC-MAIN-2019-26 | http://zecmastudio.com/baby-crowdfunding-is-the-answer-to-the-plight-of-neonatal-healthcare-in-india/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-26/segments/1560627999066.12/warc/CC-MAIN-20190619224436-20190620010436-00477.warc.gz | en | 0.95991 | 732 | 2.59375 | 3 |
SHIP CLASS: Florida-class
SHIPS-IN-CLASS (2): USS Florida (BB-30); USS Utah (BB-31)
LENGTH: 521.7 feet (159.01 meters)
BEAM: 88.2 feet (26.88 meters)
DRAUGHT: 28.2 feet (8.60 meters)
DISPLACEMENT (SURFACE): 25,400 tons
PROPULSION: 12 x Boilers with 4 x Parsons steam turbines developing 28,000 horsepower to 4 x Shafts.
SPEED (SURFACE): 21 knots (24 miles-per-hour)
RANGE: 5,779 nautical miles (6,650 miles; 10,702 kilometers)
Detailing the development and operational history of the USS Utah (BB-31) Dreadnought Battleship / Training Vessel.
Entry last updated on 9/16/2017.
Authored by Staff Writer. Content ©www.MilitaryFactory.com.
USS Utah (BB-31) was a Dreadnought battleship belonging to the Florida-class revealed in the period prior to World War 1 (1914-1918). The class numbered just two warships - Utah and the lead ship, USS Florida (BB-30) (detailed elsewhere on this site) - but both managed careers serving through World War 1 and into the inter-war years. While USS Florida was given up in the early 1930s to conform with naval treaties of the day, USS Utah continued on in service into World War 2 (1939-1945) where she was ultimately damaged beyond repair during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941).
Dreadnoughts were a new class of fighting ship named after the Royal Navy's HMS Dreadnought. HMS Dreadnought rewrote the book on battleship design when she was introduced in 1906 as she held a uniform, big-gunned primary battery with an impressive secondary battery, was powered by steam propulsion, and proved the perfect blend of speed and armor protection. From her introduction on, any previously-designed warship was therefore recognized as "pre-Dreadnought" while HMS Dreadnought went on to signify a whole new class of warship - known simply as "Dreadnought".
USS Utah was ordered on May 13th, 1908 and laid down by the New York Shipbuilding Corporation on March 9th, 1909. She was commissioned for service on August 31st, 1911.
As built, USS Utah followed the standard laid down by USS Florida (and HMS Dreadnought to some extent). She displaced at 25,400 tons (short) and featured a length of 521.7 feet, a beam of 88.2 feet, and a draught of 28.3 feet. Power came from 12 x boilers feeding 4 x Parsons steam turbines driving 4 x shafts at 28,000 horsepower. Maximum speeds could reach 21 knots in ideal conditions. Armor protection ranged from 11 inches at the belt and 12 inches at each turret face to 11.5" at the conning tower and 1.5" along the decks. Her standard crew numbered 1,001 personnel. A twin mast approach (cage masts) was used and two smoke funnels completed her profile.
The armament suite was led by 10 x 12" (300mm) /45 caliber main guns set in five twin-gunned turrets. Two were located forward with the remaining three aft of the superstructure. The secondary battery was made up of 16 x 5" guns located about the sides of the vessel. 2 x 21" torpedo tubes rounded out her armament fit which was largely consistent for warships of the period.
As with most other USN warships originating from East Coast shipyards, USS Utah completed her shakedown cruise and trials between East Coast and Caribbean waters. She joined the Atlantic Fleet in March of 1912 and undertook gunnery exercises as well as training and a European cruise. She then joined sister USS Florida during the American occupation of Veracruz during the Mexican Revolution which marked her first participation in war.
The United States declared war on the German Empire in April of 1917 and thrust America into the European conflict which would last until late 1918. USS Utah was sent to Irish waters where she was used as convoy force protection against German submarines but saw little action beyond this. The war ended with the Armistice of November 1918.
After a 1921 stop at France, she served as the flagship of the American fleet in Europe until relieved in October of 1922. A goodwill tour of South America followed to which then she was decommissioned in 1925 and modernized through improved armor and anti-torpedo protection, a pole mast replacing one of her original cage masts, and a new propulsion scheme which reduced her twin smoke funnel profile to one funnel. Oil-fired boilers replaced her original coal-fired fit and new engines were added.
With the work completed, she undertook another goodwill tour of South but, because of ongoing naval treaties, she was then forced into conversion as a target ship under the designation of USS Utah (AG-16). She survived this role and took part in various fleet exercises during the latter half of the 1930s while undergoing conversion into a n Anti-Aircraft (AA) training platform. From there she transited into Pacific waters and landed at Pearl for August of 1940. More AA training occurred and the vessel made her way to the California coast just before Christmas. Another period of serving as a target ship befell her until relocation to Pearl once more - she arrived there in early April 1941. Another phase of gunnery training followed as did another West Coast visit and she ultimately settled back in Hawaiian waters before the end.
Pearl Harbor Attack and Fate
USS Utah was present on the morning of the Japanese attack on the Harbor (December 7th, 1941). Her mooring at Ford Island made her a tempting target and she took two Japanese torpedoes as a result. Major flooding took her partially under and a portside list complicated rescues. When she eventually rolled onto her side, dozens were trapped. Subsequent attempts to cut into her hull yielded just four trapped crewmen, the rest perishing in the ship. In all, Utah lost 64 of her crew that day. An attempt to raise and right her was made but the initiative proved fruitless. She was instead decommissioned on September 5th, 1944 and removed from the Naval Register on November 13th of that year. Her hull was left where it laid in harbor waters to act as a tomb and memorial for those lives lost.
USS Utah earned one Battle Star for her service in World War 2.
Where applicable, the appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Russian Ministry of Defense, Chinese Ministry of Defense or British Ministry of Defence visual information does not imply or constitute endorsement of this website (www.MilitaryFactory.com). Images marked with "www.MilitaryFactory.com" or featuring the Military Factory logo are copyrighted works exclusive to this site and not for reuse in any form. | <urn:uuid:fd093f0c-c5f7-4d69-9dd5-2f66c9aa4f2d> | CC-MAIN-2019-09 | https://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=uss-utah-bb31-dreadnought-battleship | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-09/segments/1550247484020.33/warc/CC-MAIN-20190218013525-20190218035525-00455.warc.gz | en | 0.969968 | 1,449 | 2.796875 | 3 |
How Does Secondary Hyperparathyroidism (SHPT) Affect My Kidney Disease Diet?
First, let me explain what SHPT is. Your parathyroid glands are responsible for keeping your bones and calcium levels in your blood at a healthy range. They are located in your neck on the back of your thyroid gland. Most of the time, you don’t even know they are there. They are near your thyroid gland, but work separately and produce PTH (Parathyroid hormone). PTH is responsible for maintaining the correct amount of calcium in the blood and bones, as well as ensuring calcium is absorbed from the digestive system, and finally controlling how much is excreted in the urine. (That is the connection to kidney disease). The amounts of other minerals that are part of bone growth – phosphorus and Vitamin D – are also critically important to the parathyroid. Doctors measure the amount of PTH as an indicator of bone disease.
Secondary Hyperparathyroidism (SHPT) as related to kidney disease is an overproduction of PTH. This is caused by the changes in the kidneys affecting other mineral levels in the blood and causing the body to overproduce PTH. In persons with CKD starting in stage 3, damage to the kidney affects the functioning amount of kidney and cause these changes to possibly occur.
What Causes The Body To Produce More PTH?
While that is a complicated question, I would like to answer it in a way that is easier to understand. Please remember – I am not your doctor!
Initially, your functioning kidney mass is decreased. This happens because of the damage over time to the nephrons in your kidneys. Your doctor may have told you a percentage of your kidneys that are still functioning. Once the amount of your kidneys that are working is decreased beyond a certain level (not exactly clear how much and it varies by individual), 2 things happen.
1. Kidneys are responsible to activate the Vitamin D in our body so it works. With less functional kidney, lower amounts of vitamin D3 are available in the blood stream.
2. Kidneys also excrete the phosphorus in our bodies, and with a lower capacity to produce urine, phosphorus builds up in the blood stream.
Those two events that happen together bring about a decrease in serum (blood level) calcium. A decrease in the amount of calcium, plus a decrease in the amount of Vitamin D3 and an increase in the amount of phosphorus in the blood cause your body to think you need more PTH (because it needs to increase the amount of calcium in your blood stream to a normal level).
What Does Vitamin D Do In Our Body?
PTH works to “normalize” the amount of calcium available in your bloodstream. Calcium is used for many things in your body, and it needs to be available to your cells. So, an increased amount of PTH will cause your bones to be broken down more quickly so that the calcium is available in your bloodstream.
Vitamin D3 happens to be very important in the actions and levels of PTH in our body. You may be aware that our bodies can “make” vitamin D by exposing our skin to sunlight for 10-20 minutes every day. That vitamin D our skin makes has to be transported to the kidney to be changed into the “active” form our body uses. It keeps us from overdosing on Vitamin D with too much sunlight.
Once vitamin D becomes activated, it can work in our bodies. It stimulates some other hormones that tell the parathyroid we have enough PTH. It also decreases PTH indirectly by increasing the amount of calcium we absorb in our “gut” through our intestines. This increases the amount of calcium in our blood stream, and keeps the amount of PTH at a normal level. But once you have a decreased level of vitamin D in your body, it does not work to increase the level of calcium in your blood stream as efficiently (you don’t absorb as much) so your body starts increasing the amount of PTH to accommodate your calcium needs.
How Do Our Bodies Handle Phosphorus?
When the eGFR decreases to less than 60 ml/min, your ability to remove phosphorus from your blood via your kidneys becomes altered. The part of your nephrons that are still working compensate by increasing the removal of phosphorus because your blood levels are increased. This helps to maintain normal phosphorus levels in your blood stream.
Once you progress further in kidney disease, your nephrons eventually become unable to excrete enough phosphorus to compensate, and that is when you start to notice hyperphosphatemia. (elevated blood phosphorus). So, as the amount of phosphorus increases in your blood, PTH is secreted to compensate. Calcium can bind with phosphorus (if they are out of balance) in the blood stream and form particles that then are deposited in organs and blood vessels. As phosphorus levels increase, this risk is higher, so your body reacts by breaking down bones and increasing the calcium levels in the blood stream to even out the levels. This causes the bones to be weakened over time, and calcium particles (those bound with phosphorus) to deposit in areas of the body such as the heart.
What Are The Goals Of Treating A Patient With SHPT?
Overall, the goal is to normalize the levels of the hormones and vitamin D so that the body is not breaking down bone to compensate for increased phosphorus levels. Preventing bone disease, called renal osteodystrophy, is key to the management of the disease. Patients with kidney disease are at a higher risk of cardiovascular disease, and calcium deposited in the heart can cause further problems.
In stage 3, it is very possible that the levels will be normal, but your body is working overtime to compensate and ensure that you are kept in that normal range. National KDOQI guidelines recommend that all patients with a eGFR < 60 ml/min/1.73m2 undergo an evaluation of serum calcium, phosphorus and PTH levels. KDOQI guidelines recommend testing once per year starting with the onset of Stage 3 CKD. PTH should be the key test for patients because of the way the body adjusts to keep calcium, Vitamin D, and phosphorus levels in the normal range by increasing the levels of PTH.
Management And Treatment of PTH and SHPT
KDOQI guidelines have recommended target ranges for PTH and calcium levels in patients with Stage 3 – 5 kidney disease. Based on those target ranges, the first course of action to improve the health of a patient with SHPT and suppress the levels of PTH is thought to be Vitamin D therapy. As vitamin D plays such a role in our absorption of calcium, if a person can take in and absorb appropriate amounts of “active” vitamin D (doesn’t have to be processed by the kidneys), their calcium absorption rate should also improve.
In addition to Vitamin D, dietary therapy includes reduction of high phosphate foods. Foods that are high in phosphate content include dairy products, meats, beans, dark sodas, beer and nuts. Many of these foods are great sources of protein, so it is important to be cautious when eliminating foods. You should focus on removing foods that are high in phosphate yet lower in protein, such as dark colas, cheese, milk, ice cream and beer.
You have to be careful about sources of protein because that can lead to malnutrition which affects outcomes once people start on dialysis. Also, dietary phosphate restriction may not be adequate since most of our food contains phosphates. Many doctors also recommend the use of phosphate binders as well.
Phosphate binding agents are taken with foods, up to 3-4 times per day, and attach to phosphate in the foods we eat causing it to remain in the digestive system and be excreted through stool. They have to be taken with food or they don’t work effectively, yet it is difficult for people to be consistent and remember to take the medications. Sometimes doctors use several different types of binders to achieve success. Some phosphate binders can be found over the counter such as calcium carbonate and aluminum hydroxide. But, you should talk to your doctor about it prior to initiating any additional intake.
What Should I Do About My SHPT?
First of all, discuss what it means with your doctor. Develop that relationship so you can ask. If you cannot, consider finding another doctor who will work with you. If you need to make a longer appointment, you should tell the person booking the appointment that you have a lot of questions and request a longer appointment time. That will keep your physician from feeling rushed.
At this point – if you have CKD Stage 3, it is recommended that you work with a nephrologist. They are experts and will manage your kidney disease very well. You may also want to find a local dietitian or check into a meal plan that meets your nutritional needs. Decreasing the amount of phosphate in your diet, in addition to treatment with an active vitamin D medication can provide a great deal of improvement and reduce your risk of bone and cardiac complications.
Thanks for sticking with me through this entire article. I enjoyed finding out what would help you and steering you in the right direction. If you enjoyed this article, you might enjoy one of my meal plans – Click here now to read more about Stage 3 or Stage 4 kidney meal plans. | <urn:uuid:78740fd6-a566-4a50-8ded-0dbe3fa865e7> | CC-MAIN-2015-11 | http://www.renaldiethq.com/secondary-hyperparathyroidism-shpt-affect-kidney-disease-diet/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-11/segments/1424936462762.87/warc/CC-MAIN-20150226074102-00036-ip-10-28-5-156.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.950301 | 1,948 | 3.109375 | 3 |
X86-64 (AMD64) Application Binary Interface
Every processor's instruction set has an application binary interface or ABI.
- The x86-64 ABI document can be found at x86-64.org's website.
- The x86 and generic ABI documents can be found at SCO's developer page.
- The C++ ABI can be found at Code Sourcery's website.
Linux and many other flavors of Unix use the Executable and Linking Format (ELF) for executables and shared libraries. The current draft is available at SCO's website. | <urn:uuid:5b5686e1-f397-4a9d-971f-6a9dccaadc81> | CC-MAIN-2015-35 | http://www.vikaskumar.org/amd64/abi.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-35/segments/1440644064865.49/warc/CC-MAIN-20150827025424-00066-ip-10-171-96-226.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.82756 | 123 | 2.890625 | 3 |
Murano, the Glass Island
A Travel Guide to Murano, Italy
In English-speaking countries, glass artisans are often performer-pitchmen at craft shows and festivals, where they blow glass baubles for a few dollars or pounds each. But there was a time when the trade of glassblowing--indeed, glassmaking in general--was an elite pursuit dominated by craftsmen in the Venetian Republic, most notably on the island of Murano in the Venetian Lagoon.
"Supplying quality glass products since 1291"
Murano was a commercial port as far back as the 7th Century, and by the 10th Century it had grown into a prosperous trading center with its own coins, police force, and commercial aristocracy. Then, in 1291, the Venetian Republic ordered glassmakers to move their foundries to Murano because the glassworks represented a fire danger in Venice, whose buildings were mostly wooden at the time.
It wasn't long until Murano's glassmakers were the leading citizens on the island. Artisans were granted the right to wear swords and enjoyed immunity from prosecution by the notoriously high-handed Venetian state. By the late 14th Century, the daughters of glassmakers were allowed to marry into Venice's blue-blooded families. (This was roughly equivalent to Archie Bunker's daughter being invited to wed a Cabot or a Peabody.)
Such pampered treatment had one catch: Glassmakers weren't allowed to leave the Republic. If a craftsman got a hankering to set up shop beyond the Lagoon, he risked being assassinated or having his hands cut off by the secret police--although, in practice, most defectors weren't treated so harshly.
What made Murano's glassmakers so special? For one thing, they were the only people in Europe who knew how to make glass mirrors. They also developed or refined technologies such as crystalline glass, enameled glass (smalto), glass with threads of gold (aventurine), multicolored glass (millefiori), milk glass (lattimo), and imitation gemstones made of glass. Their virtual monopoly on quality glass lasted for centuries, until glassmakers in Northern and Central Europe introduced new techniques and fashions around the same time that colonists were emigrating to the New World.
Commerce, art, and kitsch
Murano is still an exporter of traditional products like mirrors and glassware, and its factories produce modern items such as faucet handles, glass lampshades, and electric chandeliers.
At the retail level, there's a growing emphasis on art glass and--most important of all--the souvenir trade.
Visit the ubiquitous glass shops on Murano or in Venice, and you'll find countless paperweights, glass beads and necklaces, knickknacks, and items of glass jewelry. Some are amusing: e.g., colored fish in transparent glass aquariums, or wrapped hard candies of multicolored glass. Others are pretty--glass necklaces and beads, for example. Still others are "hideous," in the words of Jan Morris, who adds:
To be fair, Murano's artisans do produce beautiful works of contemporary art from glass, although some of the designs are by foreign artists. Visit the better galleries and showrooms on Murano, and you'll find works that are technically and aesthetically stunning. Also, don't miss the island's glass museums and leading churches.
To plan your trip to Murano (which is only a few minutes from central Venice by public waterbus), use the navigation table or the "Next page" links at the bottom of each page.
Next page: Murano glass museums
Inset photos copyright © Michel Velders (1),
George Green (2), | <urn:uuid:48a3cd12-b78a-4824-b060-2888f259ae5d> | CC-MAIN-2015-06 | http://europeforvisitors.com/venice/mobile/articles/murano_the_glass_island.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2015-06/segments/1422118108509.48/warc/CC-MAIN-20150124164828-00117-ip-10-180-212-252.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.959001 | 794 | 2.90625 | 3 |
Imagine travelling to the wilderness of Siberia to see a woolly mammoth walking calmly through its natural habitat. Or getting up close to a living, breathing sabre-tooth – crouching behind the bushes as it gets ready to attack its prey. Thanks to developments in cloning and gene-editing technology, the prospect of bringing back extinct animals is looking more likely than ever.
The notion of bringing vanished species back to life is called de-extinction. It is the process of generating an organism that is either an extinct species or resembles an extinct species. But it’s not just about bringing back the dead. De-extinction is about creating populations of healthy, genetically vibrant animals that can be released into the wild where they’ll be able to breed naturally and contribute positively to the environment.
The notion of bringing vanished species back to life has hovered at the boundary between reality and science fiction for decades. It has become even more popular after novelist Michael Crichton unleashed the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park unto the world.
But how does de-extinction work, what are its limits, and should we really bring back long-dead animals? Let’s answer all these questions in this article.
Let’s bring back the mammoth!
Covering a 50 square mile area in Siberia in the Arctic Circle, you’ll find a place called Pleistocene Park. It’s a human-made park where the forests have been replaced with grasslands. It has been done in order to restore the landscape to what it looked like 2 million years ago. It’s currently populated by large mammals like horses and bison to give it that “last Ice Age” feel, But to make it REALLY authentic, they just need one more thing: The Wooly Mammoth!
Around 4,500 years ago, on an island in the Arctic Ocean, the world’s last mammoth died a lonely death. And now they only live on in our imagination. But do they really have to be gone forever?
Humans are not completely responsible for killing off mammoths, but we are responsible for plenty of other extinctions, and that list is quickly growing. These species are extinct, but in many cases, their DNA is still around in places like museum drawers, labs and buried deep in the ground.
Today, scientists think de-extinction might be the answer to saving our planet’s lost biodiversity.
How do you ‘de-extinct’ something?
De-extinction is more complicated than it looks like in movies. For bringing back any dead species, we need its DNA. What’s DNA? DNA is the blueprint of all living beings. DNA holds the instructions for an organism’s assembly, life and reproduction. So if we have some of the DNA of extinct animals, bringing them back is just easy, right? Of course, it’s not that easy. To make an exact copy of anything, you need a complete set of genetic instructions or DNA. Not 50% or 95% of the DNA — a complete 100%.
Imagine a genome as a huge book. If you lose every tenth word, would you still be able to read the whole story? Unfortunately, as soon as something dies, its DNA starts to fall apart. On average, it takes just 521 years for half an animal’s DNA to degrade. Deep freezing has improved DNA preservation of mammoths, but those genetic instructions are still too incomplete.
To re-create anything remotely ancient, scientists are going to have to get crafty. We’ve got to get a little bit of DNA from several well-preserved mammoths. Then let us assemble a whole mammoth genome inside a computer. We can’t just print out a big fuzzy elephant from scratch. But we might be able to edit one! Just like you “cut and paste” on your computer, scientists could snip out certain genes of a closer relative like the Asian elephant — and replace them with whatever genetic material makes a woolly mammoth special. Like resistance to cold, bigger tusks, and the famous fur. Then, this hybrid embryo of an Asian animal and mammoth DNA would be placed inside a living Asian elephant until it is born. Simple, right? Well, it’s a lot harder than it sounds.
For starters, elephant pregnancy lasts more than a year and a half and maybe we shouldn’t gamble with a species that is already endangered. Even if we figure all that out, one mammoth doesn’t bring back a species. Populations with just a few members have low diversity. This makes them easy prey for diseases. Hundreds or thousands of “sort of” mammoths will need to be created to maintain a diverse and healthy population.
Could scientists bring dinosaurs back to life?
Many of us were introduced to the concept of “de-extinction” by the movie “Jurassic Park,” which resurrected the dinosaurs to horrific ends. But people tend to forget that Jurassic Park was pure fantasy.
In reality the only species we can hope to revive now are those that died within the past few tens of thousands of years. Because we can hope to retrieve DNA from intact cells or, at the very least, enough ancient DNA to reconstruct the creature’s genome.
DNA breaks down over time, as explained earlier. The dinosaurs went extinct around 66 million years ago and with so much time having passed it is very unlikely that any dinosaur DNA would remain today. While dinosaur bones can survive for millions of years, dinosaur DNA almost certainly does not.
So, we can never hope to retrieve the full DNA of Tyrannosaurus rex and that leaves creating a dinosaur off the table!
Should we bring extinct species back from the dead?
Jurassic Park may not have got the science of resurrecting extinct species quite right, but nevertheless, it did make one particularly worthy point: As Dr Malcolm says in Jurassic Park, “just because you can, doesn’t mean that you should.”
Sometimes people think about de-extinction like, ‘oh wouldn’t it be cool to have a Dodo or a mammoth back?’. But it’s not just about that species and it being cool to look at. It’s about those species having a role in the ecosystem, which now is not there anymore. Since these animals were around, a lot has changed.
Places like Siberia’s Pleistocene Park are trying to recreate ancient habitats. But when these old species like mammoths arrive at their new home, will the food they once ate even be around? What about the microbes that helped keep them alive? And if mammoths ate up all the grasses, what would happen to other herbivores that now live in the Tundra?
De-extinction will be difficult and expensive. So why do it?
Maybe instead of paying back the planet by bringing back animals that we caused to extinct or just trying to reinvent our favourite ancient animal, we should worry about saving the already existing endangered species. These new genetic tools of creating DNA can help save animals in imminent danger of extinction today.
Species like the one-horned rhino, the snow leopard found in the mountain ranges in Central and South Asia, and the adorable Red Panda are all on the verge of disappearing forever. The same technology that makes de-extinction possible could let us add variety to these species’ DNA. This will create genetic diversity to make their populations bigger and stronger. That way, we won’t be having the same problem 4,000 years from now.
What do you think? Should we bring back the extinct species or let them rest in peace and concentrate on species that are endangered today? Tell us in the comment section below.
As a true introvert, Raza Mehdi shudders at the thought of having to expose very much of himself willingly and with malice-aforethought. Writing online since 2008; fiction, poetry, and articles on science, politics, humour and history. When he is not working, he is either trekking in mountains or sleeping. In his own words, the most apt description of him would be: Biryani on social media, daal chawal in person.
My mentor Raksha Chettri has been my pillar of strength from day one. It is her constant guidance and encouraging words that have helped me become a lifelong learner. A big thanks to her and BYJU'S - The Learning App.
BYJU'S app has helped me understand Maths and Science in a fun way. Now, I study from the app, understand concepts, and then go through my textbooks.
BYJU'S is the bridge that connects my imagination to my reality. The engaging study videos with real-life examples help me understand concepts not only from an exam point of view but as a lesson for life. | <urn:uuid:0d16bbe4-ebae-435a-8306-3708559099b9> | CC-MAIN-2021-04 | https://blog.byjus.com/the-learning-tree/knowledge-vine/bring-back-animals-that-went-extinct/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-04/segments/1610703517559.41/warc/CC-MAIN-20210119011203-20210119041203-00315.warc.gz | en | 0.95053 | 1,858 | 3.890625 | 4 |
Andean textile art is part of a continuing tradition at least 10,000 years old. Fine textiles 8,000 years old are in existance in museums. Weaving is very fundamental to Andean culture People begin weaving and training while still young children. Skills are passed from generation to generation. Each community has distinctive designs and colours.
During the period of the Inca Empire textiles were used like a currency. Taxes were paid with cloth. And it was used to cement treaties and alliances. There were different classes of cloth. The highest class was reserved for royalty and ceremonial use, and had threadcounts above 600 per inch. Quilted armour was lighter, more comfortable, and almost as protective as European armour of the time.
Today, Inca familes in mountain villages raise alpacas, card and hand spin the wool on drop spindles, and dye it with local plants. Using hand looms, the women hand design and weave detailed traditional shawls, ponchos and blankets. Larger items take several months of steady work to complete. | <urn:uuid:e26cba0d-7dd3-4112-a7bf-bb763cf7ab0b> | CC-MAIN-2019-04 | https://www.cherylstradingpost.com/service/inca-traditional-textiles/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-04/segments/1547583657907.79/warc/CC-MAIN-20190116215800-20190117001800-00509.warc.gz | en | 0.973409 | 219 | 3.8125 | 4 |
How Will Someone with Dementia Change?
In the mid to late stages of Dementia, a person’s behaviour and needs may change considerably. This can be distressing both for them and their loved ones, but knowing what to expect can help you prepare you for this moment.
All behaviour is a reaction to something, so try to view any changes in behaviour as a response to a need, rather than being completely random. You may notice the following in your loved one:
- Lack of interest in activities they used to enjoy
- Withdrawal from the world around them
- Social anxiety
- Screaming and shouting
- Repetitive behaviour, or saying the same thing over and over
- Losing or hoarding objects
- Loss of inhibitions
There are a number of explanations for these behaviours. An individual who struggles to recognise familiar people and places may feel withdrawn from their society, or become anxious and worried they are in the wrong place. They may become increasingly nervous about trying new things or leaving the home, as they know they may feel disoriented in a new space.
If they are in pain, they may become restless or frustrated as a result. Shouting or wandering about can also be a response to a basic need, such as wanting to use the toilet or being thirsty. Monitoring when different behaviours occur, and keeping track of possible triggers, can help you get a sense of how best to help your loved one.
What You Can Do
In the instance of a recurring behaviour change, it’s important to rule out underlying health conditions that may be part of the cause, so schedule an appointment with your GP.
As carer, you can build your loved one’s self-esteem and feelings of security by planning a structured day with stimulating activities, including something to occupy their mind and physical exercise.
Making sure your loved one is comfortable can help prevent unexpected behaviour. Try to reduce background noise and clutter than may be confusing, and ensure they have a comfortable, familiar place to sit and sleep.
A sudden outburst in behaviour is a result of genuine pain or distress, so needs to be treated as such. Try asking your loved one how you can help them in a calm, low, voice. Being there to reassure them may be enough to soothe them. It can help to hold their hand or place a hand on their arm to act as a calming presence.
Sometimes, giving yourself space and stepping away from the problem is all that can be done. Giving you and your loved one a breather, and coming back to activities later on, can be enough to reset the behaviour.
Help when you need it
24/7 Live-in care
Our carers have experience with a number of conditions
Reablement / post-surgery
Dementia and Alzheimers
Physical and Disability
Book your care assessment
We will agree a time to come and visit you in your own home. We will take the time to fully understand your care needs, and provide recommendations as to what type of care is required.
Once agreed, we will begin to deliver the care. Whether hourly, live-in, or night care, we will endeavour to deliver the best possible care. | <urn:uuid:b45ff060-cbfa-46ba-a758-a5684a74caa8> | CC-MAIN-2023-50 | https://greenwoodhomecare.co.uk/dementia-and-alzheimers/change/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-50/segments/1700679100739.50/warc/CC-MAIN-20231208081124-20231208111124-00705.warc.gz | en | 0.951695 | 663 | 2.640625 | 3 |
A growing number of Americans consider global warming an important threat that calls for drastic action, and 40% say that a presidential candidate’s position on the issue will strongly influence how they vote, according to a national survey conducted by Yale University, Gallup and the ClearVision Institute.
New Haven, Conn. — A growing number of Americans consider global warming an important threat that calls for drastic action, and 40% say that a presidential candidate’s position on the issue will strongly influence how they vote, according to a national survey conducted by Yale University, Gallup and the ClearVision Institute.
“One of the most surprising findings was the growing sense of urgency,” said Anthony Leiserowitz, director of the Yale Project on Climate Change and the study’s principal investigator. “Nearly half of Americans now believe that global warming is either already having dangerous impacts on people around the world or will in the next 10 years—a 20-percentage-point increase since 2004. These results indicate a sea change in public opinion.”
The survey’s findings include:
- Sixty-two percent of respondents believe that life on earth will continue without major disruptions only if society takes immediate and drastic action to reduce global warming.
- Sixty-eight percent of Americans support a new international treaty requiring the United States to cut its emissions of carbon dioxide 90 percent by the year 2050. Yet, Leiserowitz notes, the United States has yet to sign the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty that would require the United States to cut its emissions 7 percent by the year 2012.
- A surprising 40 percent of respondents say a presidential candidate’s position on global warming will be either extremely important (16 percent) or very important (24 percent) when casting their ballots. “With the presidential primaries and general election near,” Leiserowitz said, “candidates should recognize that global warming has become an important issue for the electorate.”
- Eight-five percent of those polled support requiring automakers to increase the fuel efficiency of cars, trucks and SUVs to 35 miles per gallon, even if it meant a new car would cost up to $500 more; and 82 percent support requiring electric utilities to produce at least 20 percent of their electricity from renewable energy sources, even if it cost the average household an extra $100 a year.
- Majorities of Americans, however, continue to oppose carbon taxes as a way to address global warming — either in the form of gasoline (67 percent against) or electricity taxes (71 percent against). —.
- Finally, 50 percent of respondents say they are personally worried —15 percent say a “great deal”— about global warming. “Many Americans, however, believe that global warming is a very serious threat to other species, people and places far away,” said Leiserowitz, “but not so serious of a threat to themselves, their own families or local communities. Nonetheless, they do strongly support a number of national and international policies to address this problem.”
The survey was conducted July 23-26, 2007, using telephone interviews with 1,011 adults, aged 18-plus. Respondents came from Gallup’s household panel, which was originally recruited through random selection methods. The final sample is consideredto be representative of U.S. adults nationwide, with a margin of error of ±4 percentage points. Survey results are available online: http://environment.yale.edu/news/5305-american-opinions-on-global-warming/.
The Yale Project on Climate Change at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies supports public discourse and engagement with climate-change solutions.
Gallup, Inc., headquartered in Washington, D.C., is one of the world’s leading research companies focusing on studying human nature and behavior. The Gallup Poll has been monitoring U.S. public opinion since 1935, and Gallup now tracks public opinion in over 100 countries worldwide on an ongoing basis.
The ClearVision Institute is a nonprofit organization dedicated to applying entertainment education as a social-change strategy to address climate change through U.S. commercial television. | <urn:uuid:9f3ad216-5834-4d0c-a2a7-06f38cdbaff1> | CC-MAIN-2018-17 | https://www.enn.com/articles/23536 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-17/segments/1524125937074.8/warc/CC-MAIN-20180419223925-20180420003925-00035.warc.gz | en | 0.929203 | 855 | 2.703125 | 3 |
Pregnant and Parenting Teens
Pregnant and parenting teens face enormous challenges in accomplishing their educational goals. Approximately 70 percent of teenage girls who give birth leave school, and, evidence suggests that illegal discrimination is a major contributing factor to this high dropout rate.
Since 1972, when Title IX was enacted, it has been illegal for schools to exclude pregnant and parenting students from school. Despite this fact, many schools fail to help pregnant and parenting teens stay in school, and some actually exclude or punish them.
Girls from around the country tell the same stories: When they got pregnant or had a child, a principal, counselor, or teacher told them they'd have to leave school. In many cases, pregnant and parenting students are told outright that they can't stay in school or must go to an alternative school, which all too often offer substandard educations. Sometimes the discrimination is more subtle. Schools refuse to give excused absences for doctor's appointments, teachers refuse to allow make-up work, or staff members exclude them from school activities based on "morality" codes or make disparaging, discouraging and disapproving comments.
Young people have a right to complete their education regardless of their sex or whether they become pregnant. Teens should not have to choose between completing their education and taking care of themselves and their children.
The ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project works to ensure the rights of pregnant and parenting teens through advocacy, education, and litigation to investigate and end the push-out of pregnant and parenting teens from school.
Know Your Rights Materials:
While the following materials were made by some of our affiliates for state-specific outreach purposes, teens in other states can use these to get a general idea of what their rights are, and can reach out to us for assistance if they need to know more specifically what their rights are in their state.
Palm Card: Your Rights as a Pregnant or Parenting Teen (New York Civil Liberties Union)
Palm Card: The Rights of Pregnant and Parenting Teens in School (ACLU of Minnesota)
Cases and Settlements
The ACLU of Southern California filed and settled a lawsuit on behalf of pregnant and parenting teenagers who were funneled into sub-standard education programs rather than given the opportunity to continue their education at their local high schools. | <urn:uuid:d47bae41-b62a-4e05-b6f0-a289655e8d68> | CC-MAIN-2020-50 | https://www.aclu.org/pregnant-and-parenting-teens | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-50/segments/1606141176256.21/warc/CC-MAIN-20201124111924-20201124141924-00021.warc.gz | en | 0.96916 | 480 | 2.515625 | 3 |
Pulborough shown within West Sussex
|Area||20.98 km2 (8.10 sq mi) |
|Population||4,685 2001 Census|
|- Density||223 /km2 (580 /sq mi)|
|OS grid reference|
|- London||41 miles (66 km) NNE|
|Shire county||West Sussex|
|Sovereign state||United Kingdom|
|Ambulance||South East Coast|
|EU Parliament||South East England|
|UK Parliament||Arundel and South Downs|
Pulborough is a large village and civil parish in the Horsham district of West Sussex, England, with some 5,000 inhabitants. It is located almost centrally within West Sussex and is 50 miles (80 km) south west of London. It is at the junction of the north-south A29 and the east-west (A283) roads.
The village is near the confluence of the River Arun and the River Rother. It looks southwards over the broad flood plain of the tidal Arun to a backdrop of the South Downs. It is on the northern boundary of the newly established South Downs National Park.
The parish covers an area of 2,098 hectares (5,183 acres). In the 2001 census there were 4,685 people living in 1,976 households of whom 2,333 were economically active.
Historically, it was a fording place over the River Arun used by the Romans, who had a mansio across the river at Hardham, one day's march from Chichester on the London road, Stane Street. The Saxons bridged the River Arun here and at nearby Stopham, north of its confluence with the River Rother. It became an important watering and overnight halt for cattle drovers providing easy access to water.
A mile to the north-west in woodland are the earthwork remains of a motte and bailey castle known as Park Mound, dating from the eleventh century.
Transport connections afforded by the River Arun, its navigation, and later by the LBSCR Arun Valley Line brought Pulborough into the industrial age. Good road connections permitted, in the 20th century, the development of manufacturing industry, notably heavy engineering in London Road. This has long since closed down and the site now supports, among other things, a supermarket and a health centre.
Each year, Pulborough hosts the 12 hour Lawn Mower race which runs continuously for 12 hours.
On August Bank Holiday, the Pulborough duck race society hosts its annual duck race, a charity event.
Pulborough is also home to the South Downs Light Railway with its steam and diesel trains running regularly throughout the summer, and a more limited service through the colder months.
Pulborough also boasts one of the fastest growing and most popular Angling Clubs in the South of England which has a number of initiatives to support local youngsters, including angling training as well as offering talks to local clubs, youth and conservation groups on the merits of angling and what anglers do to support, maintain and improve the habitat in conjunction with government departments and other groups.
Earliest records suggest cricket has been played in Pulborough since 1799. Now based at the Recreation Ground, Pulborough Cricket Club boasts numerous Senior and Junior (Colts) teams. Previously a member club of the Sussex Invitation League, Pulborough's 1st and 2nd Elevens were invited to join the Sussex Cricket League ("the county league") from the 2004 season. A 3rd League XI plays in the West Sussex League, home matches being played nearby at Watersfield. Pulborough was a founder member of the North West Sussex Colts Cricket League (now known as the iDentilam League) in 1987, when it became apparent that schools were not providing adequate cricketing opportunities to local youth. Various age-groups (Under 9s, 10s, 12s, 14s and 16s) now provide ample opportunity to develop cricket skills, played in a competitive environment and ultimately secure the long term future of the club. The club also provides a mechanism for younger players to progress into senior cricket, with two non-league senior teams playing matches on Sunday afternoons. In 2006, the Sussex Cricket Board recognised the club's efforts towards youth sport, and awarded it ECB 'Focus Club' status. In 2008, the Club launches a junior girls team, thereby continuing the club's ongoing progressive and ambitious plans.
Other notable events
On 17 July 2000, Pulborough made the headlines when the body of missing girl Sarah Payne was found in a field off the A29 near the village. She had been reporting missing some 15 miles (24 km) away in Littlehampton 16 days earlier. Roy Whiting, a 42-year-old convicted paedophile, was found guilty of her murder on 12 December 2001 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
On 19 April 2003, the body of 31-year-old Brighton music teacher Jane Longhurst, who had been strangled some weeks earlier, was found at Wiggonholt Common. Her best friend's partner Graham Coutts was found guilty of her murder on 4 February 2004 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The murder verdict was reduced to manslaughter on 19 July 2006.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Pulborough.| | <urn:uuid:f5eadb56-0696-4b28-9d5c-28e03d94cfc5> | CC-MAIN-2013-48 | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulborough | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2013-48/segments/1386163066095/warc/CC-MAIN-20131204131746-00038-ip-10-33-133-15.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.958298 | 1,107 | 2.734375 | 3 |
An interactive demonstration of how friction is created, and its effects.
- Friction is the resistive force between two surfaces rubbing against each other.
- Heat and sound can be created by friction.
- Friction is responsible for stopping moving objects.
- Friction plays a part in many daily activities, such as carrying, driving and walking.
Try these tests to experience friction
Rub your hands together fast
Feel the heat?
That's created by friction
Click your fingers
Hear the sound?
It's made because of friction
Gently slide a book along your desk
Why does it stop?
Because of friction
Friction: resistive force between two surfaces rubbing ...
Please log in to view and download the complete transcript. | <urn:uuid:d8439f40-7bde-4e75-86a7-9a7a538785e4> | CC-MAIN-2019-51 | https://www.twig-world.com/film/factpack-experience-friction-1539/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-51/segments/1575540486979.4/warc/CC-MAIN-20191206073120-20191206101120-00329.warc.gz | en | 0.936679 | 156 | 3.78125 | 4 |
No Products in the Cart
This DIGITAL Social Awareness SEL curriculum for 3-5 includes 5 detailed lessons filled with digital, interactive activities that teach older kids about social expectations and social cues, empathy, peer pressure, conflict resolution, and anti-bullying.
Kids will have opportunities to learn, practice, and develop social-emotional skills through a variety of engaging lessons and digital activities.
The program provides teachers and parents with lesson plans, instructions, videos, and activities to support social-emotional learning in digital format. Lessons are one-on-one, small group, or large group compatible.
The DIGITAL social awareness unit has been formatted and modified to be taught digitally in conjunction with the printable version or independent of it. The lessons and activities have been adapted to be used online in digital teaching platforms (Google Slides and PowerPoint) and on devices.
What does this DIGITAL Social Awareness Unit cover?
Lesson 1: Social Expectations & Cues
★Kids will learn to understand what social expectations are and attempt to follow them. They will learn and understand what social cues are and how they are used to communicate messages differently.
Lesson 2: Empathy
★Kids will learn to understand what empathy is and why it is important. They will describe ways of being empathetic (looks, sounds, feels) and ways that are not. They will be encouraged to act in empathetic ways.
Lesson 3: Peer Pressure
★Kids will learn to understand what peer pressure is and share good and bad examples from their knowledge and experience. They will learn strategies of how to avoid and respond to negative peer pressure.
Lesson 4: Conflict Resolution
★Kids will learn to identify ways to solve conflict and demonstrate effort in solving them peacefully. They will describe conflicts they have encountered and what they learned.
Lesson 5: Anti-Bullying
★Kids will learn to understand what bullying is and what it is not. They will learn to describe and demonstrate ways to stand up to and stop bullying behavior. They will be encouraged to actively attempt to stop bullying when they encounter it.
Activities included in the Social Awareness unit:
Look at the PREVIEW and VIDEO for a look at this SEL unit up close and the variety of lessons and activities included!
How to Use DIGITAL SEL:
Comes with READY-FOR-YOU Google Slides & Interactive PowerPoint Lessons:
It can be used with other similar platforms to support 1:1 classrooms in delivering a meaningful social-emotional learning program.
Benefits of using DIGITAL Social-Emotional Resources:
mind+heart digital aligns with the CASEL framework of the 5 core competencies for SEL. It provides educators with an affordable and accessible option that is structured and highly effective in 3-5 classrooms.
♥♥Teach the digital version of this unit with the printable version of the unit. Buy them together in a money-saving bundle (option available in cart).♥♥
Check out the other SEL units for 3-5:
Self-Management & Mindfulness
Growth Mindset & SMART Goal Setting
Friendship & Relationships
Social Awareness: Empathy, Peer Pressure, Conflict Resolution, Bullying
Kindness, Gratitude, & Bucket Filling
Respect, Honesty & Integrity, & Stereotyping
Responsibility, Leadership, & Decision Making
Stay connected with Proud to be Primary
♥Join our email list and get weekly teacher tip emails and access to our FREE resource library.
♥Visit our website at Proud to be Primary for tons of engaging ideas for teaching kids in the classroom!
♥Join our Facebook group and connect with thousands of PROUD primary teachers like yourself.
Please read the description, review the preview file, and read the FAQ in our Help Center carefully before purchasing.
Question not answered? Reach out to support at support@proudtobeprimary.
All digital sales on Proud to be Primary of resources are considered final and non-refundable.
© Copyright Proud to be Primary, Elyse Rycroft. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to copy pages specifically designed for student or teacher use by the original purchaser or licensee. This product is licensed for personal classroom use ONLY unless multiple licenses are purchased. The reproduction, alteration, adaptation, copying, or sale of any part of this product is strictly prohibited. Read the full Terms and Conditions HERE. | <urn:uuid:1fcb92ef-2595-4c61-8bd0-8441a7c3cbcc> | CC-MAIN-2021-31 | https://shop.proudtobeprimary.com/products/social-awareness-digital-grades-3-5 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-31/segments/1627046153899.14/warc/CC-MAIN-20210729234313-20210730024313-00408.warc.gz | en | 0.91128 | 924 | 3.921875 | 4 |
Importance of education in economic development
Education, a strong correlation with economic development
Islamabad, Oct 12: Education is considered to have a strong correlation with social and
economic development. In contemporary times when the focus is on the
'knowledge economy' the role of education becomes all the more
important in the development of human capital.
After all, a society
of literate and skilled citizens has more chances of development at the economic and social levels.
Education can reduce poverty and social injustice by providing the
underprivileged resources and opportunities for upward social mobility
and social inclusion. Yet, until the National Education Policy (NEP)
2009 was unveiled, the budgetary allocation for education in Pakistan
was on the decline.
The lack of political commitment of the
state has resulted in multiple educational systems which are inherently
discriminatory and biased in nature. A large number of students are
unable to attend schools. According to the Education For All Global
Monitoring Report (2007), almost 6.5 million children in Pakistan do
not go to school. Countries like India, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ghana,
Niger, Kenya and Mali are placed in relatively better positions. The
only country that has a worse situation than Pakistan's is Nigeria,
with more than eight million children out of school.
number of students who make it to schools, however, drop out by class
five. According to NEP, about 72 per cent make it to grade five which
means a dropout rate of 28 per cent. This significant figure further
brings down the chunk of the population that makes it to school.
Such a large number of students outside school means that they are
deprived of the opportunity to learn and acquire skills for playing a
meaningful role in society. Social exclusion is a great loss at the
individual and societal levels. Most of these out-of-school children
experience poverty and unemployment and some get involved in criminal
activities as well. Constitutionally, the provision of basic education
to citizens is the state's responsibility. Is the state carrying out
its responsibility? The state needs to analyse the reasons be hind
the number of out-of-school children. They come from poor families and
cannot afford the luxury of education despite their desire for it.
The real issue of educational apartheid comes to the surface only after
joining a school. Enrolling in a school does not ensure the provision
of quality education. There is one question which is central to
quality: what kind of school is it? The answer to this question may
include the state of the building, faculty, management, curriculum,
textbooks, examination system and medium of instruction as well as the
socio-economic background of the children.
The reference to
socio-economic background is crucial as schools - like social classes -
are stratified in terms of social status. So social exclusion is not
only at the access level but also at the quality level. The widening
difference between private and public schools is responsible for the
gaping chasm between resources and opportunities given to the poor and
the rich. Children from elite schools have enhanced chances of
employment and social integration whereas children from public schools,
no matter how bright they are, are disadvantaged in terms of getting
exposure to quality education.
The famous slogan 'education
for all' needs to be revisited. Is it sufficient to enrol every child
in school? The continuance of disparity and exclusion goes on depending
on the quality of the school. Thus the slogan needs to focus on
'quality education for all'. It is the quality aspect which is missing
in disadvantaged schools. Instead of taking some constructive measures
to improve the conditions the state is taking the easy route of
offering private schools as an alternative.
officials publicly give statements that public schools have failed and
the only alternative left is private schools. I do not intend to
underplay the significant role private schools can play in the uplift
of the educational system in Pakistan. My only contention is that they
are there to complement the system and should not be presented as an
alternative to public education.
Education has failed
miserably to reduce poverty gaps, social injustice and oppression. The
education policy suggests that "the educational system of Pakistan is
accused of strengthening the existing inequitable social structure as
very few people from public-sector educational institutions could move
up the ladder of social mobility".
What action plan has been
given in the new education policy to ensure that this won't happen in
the future? Simply referring to a problem does not mean that it has
been taken care of. The education policy should have given a clear and
concrete blueprint to combat social exclusion, inequality and social
injustice. The existing discriminatory educational systems are not only
perpetuating the socio-economic gaps between the haves and have-nots,
they are also responsible for further widening these gaps.
writer is director of the Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences at
the Lahore School of Economics and author of Rethinking Education in
Pakistan. -Shahid Siddiqui
"I AM IRFAN KHAN BELONG TO RAWALAKOT AZAD KASHMIR TODAY I DTUDY YOUR COMMENTS ON EDUCATION ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT I AM APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS A LOT"
Name: MUHAMMAD IRFAN KAHN
City, Country: RAWALPINDI
"your performance is nice keep it up"
City, Country: adis abab,ethiopia
"its a well conducted research.the situation in kenya is not much different although the government has really tried.congratulations!"
Name: kinya zipporah james
City, Country: thika-Kenya
"i liked this article very much and its very interesting too."
Name: rohan chandra
City, Country: delhi,india
"its a very nice article"
City, Country: jorhat,india
"very informative piece, hope to see more mork"
"I really enjoy your research and im saying more grease to your elbow."
Name: Dogara Harris Maude
City, Country:Pambegua Nigeria
"I am success from your written. thank you very much"
Name: Puna Das
City, Country:chabua and india
"i heartedly appreciat your measures in awareness in bringing the attention of all the concerned authorities towards the worst condition of education sector in pakistan.sir i am also angaged scince 15 years to the field of education as teacher from primary level to university level.the thing i have found responsible to the criticle conditions of education in pakistan is the exterime ignorance and deprivation of education sector are the policymakers of our beloved country who conciousely bussy in damaging education and the poor masses of pakistan."
Name: muhammad ismail
"I really need it for my assignment,great and informative piece of work,carry on."
Name: Hurmat Malik
"soooooo goooooooo dear"
City, Country: lahore
"i just enjoy using this wep it helps me to finish my work in no time"
City, Country:south africa
"I am surprised upon reading your essay.We have so much similarities here in the Phils. We encounter the same scenario and problems. I am glad that you post this in the net. I hope many people will read this specially our policy makers. You are extremely correct. It should NOT be EFA(Education For All) It should be QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL. Indeed only true education will help us elevate the quality of life."
Name: cynthia p. rivera
City, Country:Quezon City, Philippines
"The education is increasing and when it is increasing it will decrease"
City, Country:brits,south africa
"Thnk you sooooooooo much sir"
Name: Sohail sameer
City, Country:Islamabad pakistan
"I like your article-It is interesting,but you have not really shown the relationship btn education and economy"
"Child is meant to Learn, Not Earn."
Name: Arslan Hassan
City, Country:Lahore, Pakistan
"Asalam o alaikum, Thanks for this piece of imformation. Iused it in my assignment."
Name: Muhammad Mohsan
City, Country: lahore,pakistan
Post your comments
Playgrounds shortage perturbs students, kids
Islamabad: Shortage of playgrounds in the twin cities of
Rawalpindi and Islamabad irked kids and students in different
The situation forced them to use green areas
and residential streets as playgrounds, creating problems for the residents.
of the students, aged 12-17, can be seen on green belt in different
areas. The civic body has constructed a few parks in different sectors,
but these didn't not fulfil the requirements of all the sectors.
parents of the kids have expressed concern over the lack of playgrounds
and urged concerned authorities concerned to construct more grounds in
the areas especially for kids.
A physical education instructor told
the agency that a child's playground is a place they can retreat to
when they want to relax after a busy day at school and their other
obligations. He said that it gave them a chance to release some energy
and have fun.
"As an adult, you surely know all about the need
to escape from the stresses of everyday life," he added .
that learning through play was an important process and
a fundamental part of a child's development.
that promote different types of play are vital for a child's cognitive,
emotional, physical, and social development, " he
He said playgrounds provide crucial and vital opportunities for children to play.
of CDA when contacted said that the civic body had constructed many
playgrounds in the federal capital for the residents.
healthy activities like different types of games. He assured that the
CDA would construct more playgrounds for students including kids in the
city to provide them safe places for exercise and entertainment. The nation
Post your comments
IBSA awards prizes to outstanding scouts
Islamabad: Participants of a prize distribution ceremony of `Scouts Week' called
for reviving the spirit of scouting among students in federal colleges
to make them useful and active citizens of the country.
colourful function was arranged at Islamabad Model College for Boys
(IMCB), F-8/4 to award prizes to outstanding scouts of Islamabad Boy
Scouts Association (IBSA).
Director General Federal
Directorate of Education (FDE) Shaista Pirzada, who was the chief guest
on the occasion, said the new generation is well informed about
physics, chemistry and other subjects but is drifting away from social
and moral values.
"We have neglected the importance of social
service and confined the students to just their studies. It is the sole
responsibility of the teachers to educate the students about values of
sacrifice, caring and sharing," she said adding that teachers must play
their role in inculcating real human values of love and brotherhood,
and nurture an urge among the students for serving humanity.
said students are the future of a nation and they must be educated
about the historical facts and sacrifices rendered by our forefathers
in achieving an independent country.
Shaista Pirzada directed
all principals of the federal institutes to conduct scouting activities
in their respective institutions. Scouts are well prepared to cope with
any natural calamity and disaster but they lack training of swimming,
she said and announced that these scouts would be given training of
swimming at Sports Complex.
Provincial Secretary IBSA Zahoor
Hussain said the Association is playing a dynamic role in training the
boy scouts and enabling them to cope with any emergency situation
effectively. He thanked different organisations including Anjuman
Hilal-e-Ahmar and Islamabad Traffic Police (ITP) for their support in
training the scouts.
One of the scouts, Ishaque, exhibited his
oratory skills in a speech on `Scouting is Service' and stressed on the
role of scouting in the character building of the students through
inculcating the spirit of patriotism. The collective activities of
scouts of different provinces promote a sense of togetherness and
kinship, and it is time to renew the scouting movement, he said.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the first Chief Scout, who believed in the
positive role of scouting for physical and mental growth and
development of a student's personality.
Post your comments
Headstart students planted 200 saplings
Islamabad: Almost 30 students from Headstart A-level Branch Sunday
started their campaign to plant around 200 trees along the
Margalla Road in Islamabad.
According to a press release
issued here the students belonged to the 'Planting A Better Future' society.
worked along with Capital Authority Development (Environmental
Department), and were graciously welcomed by Mr Altaf a Forest Officer
and Dr Suleman DG Environment.
The club is organised by Maham
Faisal Khan also in her first year of A-level's and Mohammad Ibrahim
Khan. Although, their aim was to plant fruit trees in villages this
project was greatly appreciated, as the club had no funds to put its
intentions into action. They plan to spread awareness of environment
related issues and create recycling revolution.
The need for
such spirit is greatly needed in Pakistan as only 4.8 per cent
approximately of its landmass is forested with 1 per cent of this
depleting every year. The news
Post your comments | <urn:uuid:641f380e-0bfb-4adc-a06b-a0ead479d136> | CC-MAIN-2018-17 | https://www.interface.edu.pk/students/Oct-09/Importance-of-education.asp | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2018-17/segments/1524125944851.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20180421012725-20180421032725-00217.warc.gz | en | 0.929335 | 2,918 | 3.21875 | 3 |
Religious scholars in Rome are arguing over a tiny scrap of papyrus that may indicate some early Christians thought Jesus Christ had a wife.
Speaking this week at a religious studies conference, U.S. professor Karen King of Harvard Divinity School announced that scholars are studying a piece of papyrus that quotes Jesus as saying the words "my wife." King says the papyrus dates from the 4th century, but the age of the ink needs more testing.
The words are written in Coptic, a language of ancient Egyptian Christians, and the context of the words is unclear, as they appear on a scrap only a little larger than a business card.
King says the words do not prove Jesus was married, only that some early Christians may have thought so. Christian tradition has long held that Jesus remained unmarried.
Any new finding about his relationships with women, whether as partners or as disciples, could affect debates about the role of women in the Christian faith.
The artifact is owned by a private collector, leading some skeptics to speculate the owner is courting publicity to increase the value of the object.
Some information for this report was provided by AP, AFP and Reuters. | <urn:uuid:f7151620-d2ba-4c4e-a890-1af4ad98ef72> | CC-MAIN-2017-09 | http://www.voanews.com/a/papyrus_scrap_ignites_jesus_marriage_debate/1511138.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2017-09/segments/1487501171807.25/warc/CC-MAIN-20170219104611-00553-ip-10-171-10-108.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.97456 | 237 | 2.875 | 3 |
Did you know most food waste happens at home? Here are dozens of ways to repurpose food plus save time and money.
What is food waste?
We buy food with the best of intentions, don’t we?
We don’t mean to be wasteful, do we?
But have you thrown out food this week?
Perhaps you bought vegetables because you thought you should be eating more of them. But then didn’t cook them or know how to make them taste good.
Or you bought food intending to eat at home but then ended up going out. Or the ingredients meant for a specific occasion went unused because it never happened.
So the banana ripens before you peel it. The lettuce turns brown before the salad is made. The fish turns before you get to it.
You’re not alone. It’s estimated that we toss about 20 percent of the food we buy.
Food is the largest stream of materials in American trash. Forty four percent of food waste occurs at home.
A food waste challenge at home
Ready to see how much food and money you are throwing away? You can do your own wasted food challenge. For one week, measure how much food your family wastes in a week and record the volume. Track how much you throw away and the reason you didn’t eat it. It could be that you ate out, didn’t know how to cook the food, didn’t feel like cooking, bought too much, didn’t store it properly. Also note the approximate value. If you paid $3.00 for a container of strawberries and threw away a third, you lost a dollar to wasted food.
Let me know your results! 😉
Tips for reducing food waste
- Label items in the fridge, freezer, and pantry. A name and date go a long way to help keep track of food and reduce waste. No need to make your freezer a cold tray bin!
- Store leftovers in clear glass containers so you can see them.
3. When reheating leftovers, be sure they reach 165° F. Reheat sauces, soups and gravies by bringing them to a rolling boil. Cover leftovers to reheat. This retains moisture and ensures that food will heat all the way through
4. The Sell-by date is a suggestion for display in store. There is still reasonable time to use the food so no need to throw out milk on this date!
5. Best-by and Use-by dates are recommendations for best flavor/quality. Beyond this date is rarely a safety concern (see #6). An exception is infant formula and baby food. These dates should be followed.
6. Use Best-by date on foods with a higher Listeriosis risk: deli meats, hot dogs, smoked seafood, raw sprouts, raw milk and soft cheese made with unpasteurized milk.
7. FIFO: first in, first out. Bring older food to front of fridge and cupboards to avoid castaways.
8. Post an “Eat First” sign in your fridge to let everyone know what foods need to go. Use these foods for lunches, snacks, or to repurpose into another meal. Or make Sunday a clean-out-the-fridge meal.
9. Shop your own kitchen first. Ask: “What do I have?” rather than “What do I want?”
10. Cook perishable foods first. The sooner you get to them, the easier it is to serve as snacks and meals through the week, saving time, effort, and money.
11. Check out: Is My Food Safe? and FoodKeeper Free on Itunes.
12. Right size your portions so you’re not cooking too much
13. Purchase with a purpose. Planning a weekly menu makes better use of your groceries.
How to reduce food waste, repurpose dairy
- Keep your milk fresh and cold by storing it in the coldest part of the fridge—the back bottom shelf. Not the door.
- Clean the cheese drawer. Shred or chop a variety of cheeses to use in grilled cheese sandwich. Add jam for a flavor boost. This is not your mother’s grilled cheese!
- Have extra milk on hand? Make Masala Chai to sip hot or cold.
- How long does yogurt last? Kept cold it can last a month. See mold? Toss.
- Plain yogurt can be mixed in dips, dressings, pancakes, muffins, overnight oats, smoothies, soups or sauces.
- Have extra milk you need to use? Make Panna Cotta or yogurt or bake Apricot Pecan Crisps.
- Spread ricotta cheese on toast. Top with sliced kiwifruit or tomato.
- Use cottage cheese in place of cream cheese or ricotta in dips, casseroles, pancakes and desserts. Process in a blender if you want a smoother texture.
How to reduce food waste, repurpose vegetables
- Mix leftover corn with chopped peaches, avocado and feta or black beans and peppers with a squeeze of lime juice.
- Freeze chipotle peppers and dollops of tomato paste on waxed paper, then store airtight.
- Potatoes are best stored in a cool, dark, ventilated place, such as an unheated pantry or closet. Refrigerator is too cold for spuds. Take advantage of the bags many potatoes are sold in. Those dark-colored, perforated plastic bags with small holes cut in the sides allow air movement and are ideal for taters.
- Onions, like potatoes, prefer a cool, dry, ventilated area.
- Leftover avocado? Rub the cut surface with lemon or lime juice; store in airtight container. Smash onto toast with sprinkle of chile flakes and salt.
- Blend fresh herbs with oil; freeze in ice cube trays. Or make pesto.
- Marinate older mushrooms in oil, vinegar and herbs
- Add chopped vegetables to hummus, quesadillas, pizza, tacos, frittatas, and omelets.
- Grate butternut squash, carrot or parsnips in hash browns, breads and muffins.
- Add puréed cooked carrots or squash to mac n cheese or serve over ravioli.
- Collect vegetable odds and ends such as carrot peels, asparagus ends, broccoli stalks, onions, celery roots and leftover green beans in a freezer bag to use for soup. Use the whole cauliflower in Roasted Cauliflower Fettuccine.
- Add limp carrots, peppers or celery or soft fruits such as plums, pears, apples to your slow cooker meals for more flavorful soups, stews and braised meats.
- Pickle juice can be used to pickle onions, cucumbers or zucchini.
- Use the levers on your crisper drawers. An open lever allows moisture and gases to escape for apples, pears, peppers, mushrooms, and ripe mangoes and avocados. Closed lever keeps moisture in for lettuce, spinach, broccoli and strawberries. Compost what you don’t use.
15. Use a salad spinner to keep lettuce, herbs and other greens dry. A rubber ring on the bottom keeps it from scooting across the counter like this Oxo spinner.
How to reduce food waste, repurpose fruit
- Ripe bananas are super sweet additions to smoothies. Peel ripe bananas; freeze in airtight container. Break into chunks before tossing in blender or use ripe bananas to sweeten cooked oatmeal. Add toward the end of cooking.
- Look for a produce sale bin next time you shop. Give a bruised apple a home and save money.
- Use leftover fruit or vegetables to infuse water.
4. Extra fruit on hand? Repurpose it into a sorbet.
5. If you consistently throw away fresh fruits and vegetables, buy frozen or canned. They result in less food waste overall.
6. Salsa is the Little Black Dress for a chicken breast. Use fruits, vegetables, herbs, spices.
7. Freeze juice, chicken broth, coconut milk, and wine in ice cube trays for flavor boosts
8. Extra fruit that’s past its prime? Freeze it for smoothies. Make a sauce to spoon over oatmeal or yogurt. Blend with olive oil and vinegar to make a salad dressing or glaze
9. Store bananas, pineapple, ginger, winter squash, eggplant, and basil at room temperature.
10. Ripen at room temp in a paper bag, then refrigerate avocado, kiwifruit, melon, peach, pear, plum, and mango.
11. Repurpose a less-than-perfect mango into Mango Jalapeno Dressing.
12. Will you use the BOGO special? If not, best to leave it at the store.
How to reduce food waste at home, repurpose grains
- Repurpose leftover pasta into a peanut noodle bowl or scramble with eggs. Float ravioli in chicken broth with spinach and mushrooms.
- Use dry bread (not moldy) to make croutons, breadcrumbs or crostini. Slice into ¼-inch, spray with cooking spray, bake 5 minutes at 350°F. Mix ricotta with peas and mint to spread on those toasted slices.
- Consider the bulk bins when shopping for grains, cereal, nuts, dried fruit. Buy the amount you need to avoid storing foods you may use once in a blue moon. Also reduces packaging.
- Repurpose dry bread into a strata. Plus a good way to use those veggies and cheese.
- Slice olive bread or cranberry walnut bread into thin slices, bake at 350℉ to make crackers.
- Dried tortillas? Make chips. Cut into wedges, sprinkle with salt and chile powder or lime zest. Bake 400℉.
- Cooked rice and grains can be frozen in airtight containers for several months. Don’t forget to label and date.
How to reduce food waste, repurpose protein
- Vacuum-packed ground meat is only packaged once so it uses half the amount of plastic. Vacuum packing makes it last longer.
- Ideal storage for eggs is in the original carton in the center of the fridge. They may be refrigerated 4 to 5 weeks. Once cooked (such as a pie or casserole) or out of their shell, eat within 3-4 days.
- Repurpose leftover meatloaf into paninis or add to egg muffin cups or cornbread.
- Packaged raw meat: should be stored on a tray on the bottom shelf up to 2 days before cooking or freeze for 3-4 months.
- Store packaged raw meat on a tray on bottom shelf. Plan to use refrigerated roasts and steaks within 3 to 4 days and ground beef within 1 to 2 days of purchase.
The number one way to reduce food waste at home?
Shop with a grocery list. You’ll spend less and save time and you’ll never find brown, mushy lettuce in your fridge again. My LiveBest shopping list can help.
My website contains some affiliate links. That means if you click through on a link I may earn income from the seller, not the buyer, you. My intent is to be a resource for you. | <urn:uuid:b80e6ee8-4055-459c-9754-58e920a04a66> | CC-MAIN-2020-29 | https://livebest.info/recipes/reduce-wasted-food/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2020-29/segments/1593655886095.7/warc/CC-MAIN-20200704073244-20200704103244-00352.warc.gz | en | 0.896716 | 2,424 | 2.890625 | 3 |
what type of intermolecular forces must be overcome in converting each of the following from a liquid to a gas?...isaacpelayo
what type of intermolecular forces must be overcome in converting each of the following from a liquid to a gas? a) CO2 b) NH3 C)CHCl3 d) CCl4
- 10 years ago
- Your boss has todl you to evaluate two ovesns for tink-the tinkers, a gourment sanwhich shop. After some questionin of...
- what is the first ten amendements called?
- What's the difference between today's military and knights?
- 7+3x =-5
- Graph and establish orientation for the curve determined by the equations: x = cos(t 2 ) + 1 and y...
- How does the fear of the messenger illustrate the narrator's idea that it is impossible to know another person?
- which is more healthy sweeteners or sugar and why
- What is Pete's monthly take home pay and indicate the amount his check was under or overstated. What is his weekly traveling expenses? | <urn:uuid:375d9003-3659-4f1d-a041-42162632b88d> | CC-MAIN-2021-43 | https://www.sweetstudy.com/content/what-type-intermolecular-forces-must-be-overcome-converting-each-following-liquid-gas | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2021-43/segments/1634323585322.63/warc/CC-MAIN-20211020152307-20211020182307-00569.warc.gz | en | 0.930808 | 236 | 3.046875 | 3 |
As of September 2017, there were approximately 19 million women veterans in the United States, Puerto Rico, and foreign U.S territories. Is the women’s long-term mental health impact of service the same as their male counterparts? Overwhelming studies have shown that it is not and despite the research VA mental health care providers are lagging behind in serving the women veteran population.
Servicewomen continue to deal with a culture of bias, harassment and sometimes assault while serving their country. In addition, active duty women must endure and figure out a way to manage long family separations and combat deployments. These issues are hardly addressed while on active duty. Some women are concerned about seeking care because of a perceived potential impact on their security clearance. After the transition from active duty to veterans, women veterans are significantly more likely to face mental health challenges than veteran men. Veteran Affairs data shows that women veterans are 250% more likely than civilian women to commit suicide.
There is also the issue of women being categorized as “housing insecure” instead of homeless. Housing insecurity is defined as high housing costs in proportion to income, poor housing quality, unstable neighborhoods, overcrowding, or homelessness. The number of women among homeless veterans increased from 7.5% in 2009 to 10% in 2011, while they were just 7% of the total veteran population.
Why does this happen? Many young people join the military before ever having stable permanent housing. The military takes care of all housing needs but it is transitional. After discharge, many of move home, to their parents’ house, or to “couch surfing.” They return oftentimes with no credit, no rental history, and find themselves in increasingly unstable and unsafe places. If they find themselves without a place to live, they use the GI Bill to pay rent and bills rather than to graduate. They become conditioned to housing instability.
This situation is further compounded by the statistic that Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans are more likely to have experienced than other cohorts multiple deployments, have service-related disabilities, higher rates of PTSD, and military sexual trauma. In addition, studies have shown that women service members experience isolation, alienation and sometimes threat in larger scales than their male cohorts.
The VA is undergoing a major reorganization to transform the way it provides services for its veterans nationally. This includes addressing chronic homelessness for returning veterans, but there is still a lot of room for improvement. Veterans have expressed the need to improve transition services for men as well as women whether it be reintegration when they are leaving military service or demobilization after a combat tour. Recommendations for gender-specific transition and demobilization assessments and services have been made by many groups. Although some effort has been made by the Department of Defense (DOD) to address this gap it appears to be inadequate because mental wellness is not improving. Servicewomen have a very different experience of deployment and transition and programs must be tailored to meet women’s specific needs. The VA and DOD must come together and jointly reach a solution that provides a continuum of care that is gender specific with proven lasting improvement in the mental wellness of the women who serve this nation.
If you find yourself struggling with housing insecurity or would like more information about VA services for the homeless, call to 1-877-4AID-VET to connect with VA. | <urn:uuid:ca7cb511-3f0f-44ed-bf56-27bd549ce23b> | CC-MAIN-2019-09 | https://www.hillandponton.com/servicewomen-mental-health-long-term/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2019-09/segments/1550247511573.67/warc/CC-MAIN-20190221233437-20190222015437-00218.warc.gz | en | 0.970906 | 684 | 3.0625 | 3 |
As probably all ESL teachers are aware of, many, if not most of their students have difficulties with pronunciation. Here are fun sentence dictation activities to improve ESL pronunciation.
Students may have a great understanding of grammar and a wide-ranging vocabulary, but if they can’t be understood when speaking, those are moot points.
But it is somewhat difficult for teachers to address every single pronunciation issue that pops up in class.
Add to that, having a strictly pronunciation-oriented class can be seriously boring for the students and you.
Plus, it can be downright embarrassing if teachers single out one student’s pronunciation issues.
Typically, the problem is not so much the pronunciation of words, but how students make the sounds that are combined for pronunciation.
That’s why it’s necessary at times to break words into constituent sounds. We can call these sounds speech sounds or phonetics.
It is of course difficult for teachers to address every single pronunciation issue that pops up in class. With the right TESOL certification, teachers can learn how to offer a creative, insightful, and engaging pronunciation class such as the fun sentence dictation activities.
Beware not to embarrass students by singling out their pronunciation issues.
Today we have a game that can make honing speech sounds more fun, and at the same time target weak areas. It’s called, Fun Sentence Dictation Activity. It’s something I designed many years ago when I realized, as mentioned, much of the underlying problem in pronunciation is not words but individual speech sounds.
But how do you teach sounds to a mixed class of elementary students, university students, or adults? Well, you don’t have to teach it as much as create an awareness of it in your learners’ minds then capitalize on it. And it can be done in a fun way. Read on for instructions on how to take your pronunciation classes to the next level.
Instructions-Fun Sentence Dictation Activities
It is important to be able to represent sounds for students in an unambiguous way; standard English spelling doesn’t usually do the job, so some different representations of sounds may be needed like fun sentence dictation activities. The most common method is the IPA (International Phonetic Alphabet). There are other methods, many of which will be incorporated into the textbooks your students are using. Whatever one you choose, be certain that students understand it, and be certain that you are consistent with the way you apply it. Students will depend on it.
1. Identify Problematic Phonetic Sounds
If you’re teaching pronunciation within a specific culture, you’re likely aware of specific speech sounds that are problematic to the culture. Therefore, you know which sounds to focus on. However, if you have a mixed class, you’ll need to spend a little time interacting with them to be able to identify weak areas.
For example, a diverse group of learners may need some polish in the following contrasting (“vs.”) speech sounds:
- /ae/ vs. /eh/, /uh/, and /ah/
- /ee/ vs. /ih/
- /p/ vs. /f/
- /b/ vs. /v/
- /th/ vs. /t/ and /s/
- /TH/ vs. /d/
These are now your target sounds (TS) and the sounds you incorporate into the activity. Again, the point here is to playfully create an awareness of speech sound shortcomings in the students that will provide an opportunity for you to correct and teach.
2. Create Fun Sentences
They’re called fun sentences because they sound somewhat silly but could be real. Check out a few examples here:
- Have an apple after stamping the sample.
- A fashionably tan man.
- My cousin Sunny is Fanny’s friend.
- Matt’s math class.
- We expect wetter weather.
- Six beef sandwiches.
- Is Kim with Jim?
- This list or these?
- Three trees filled with bees.
- Six sick pigs sitting.
- Fly Friday after five.
- Pick up your pace.
- Perfectly proper photos.
- French fries please.
- Fifteen photos of the finishers.
- A ban on vans.
- The velvet vest is best.
- They’ve left Dave.
- We’ve been breathing better.
Notice how each sentence has captured either one speech sound or a pair of speech sounds. For example: “Have an apple after stamping the sample” emphasizes the /ae/ sound. And, “We expect wetter weather” incorporates “tt” which comes out as /d/ (when located in the middle of a word) vs. /TH/ (weather).
Write or type one sentence on one strip of paper. Depending on your class size, you’ll want to have enough for at least 1, 2, or 3 rounds.
3. Prepare the Class
Have a shoebox with the individual fun sentence strips and pass the box around. Each student will grab 1, 2, or 3 or three strips depending on your plan. Students shouldn’t show each other what their strips say. They’re secrets only to be revealed later in the class. Each student should also have a pen and paper to write on.
4. Let the Dictations Begin
Starting with the first learner, he/she will speak the sentence as clearly as he/she can but in a natural way— natural but clear. That’s the challenge. It shouldn’t be elongated or halting. You can permit one or two repeats, but no more than that. The idea is to challenge both speakers and listeners.
The listeners write what they hear on a note pad. Continue going around the room until you’ve completed the round or rounds. You should be taking note of issues with specific speech sounds and or words to be addressed during the feedback portion. But remember, during feedback time, no names; just address the issues—we don’t want to shame anyone.
5. Wrap Up and Feedback
When everyone finishes speaking their sentences, it’s time for the revelations. Beginning with the first sentence, you will either write on a board or show the strip to the class. Class members then check what they heard.
As they see where they may have gone wrong, they become aware of their need for developing their skills in discerning contrasting speech sounds. In that sense, “Fun Sentences” is also a listening activity. On the other hand, if most of the class wrote the wrong sentence, the speaker can see where he/she needs polish in sound production.
No worries though, there are no grades for this, so they don’t need to worry about showing each other or the teacher what they wrote/heard.
What happens if the person saying the sentence missed the accurate sound but someone else hears/writes the correct sentence?
Spoken: “Set these papers there.”
Written: “Sit this papers there.”
That tells you there’s an issue with the student’s perception of the /eh/ vs. /ih/, and /ee/ vs. /ih/ sounds. This isn’t an uncommon occurrence.
Or, what if the speaker said, “Pickled Pfeffer,” clearly, but the listener writes, “Pickled pepper.” That tells you the listener has an issue with /p/ vs. /f/ sounds.
As the teacher, you’ll have to be alert and judge what passes for clear speech and what passes for weak listening.
You can also turn this into a game as follows:
- Divide the class into two teams: A and B.
- One speaker from team A will say the words clearly to another team A member who will write the sentence down.
- If the sentence is correct, then team A receives points. If incorrect, team B may attempt to steal the points by producing the exact sentence spoken by the team A speaker.
- Alternatively: Create a time limit of say 15-20 seconds to accomplish the sentence.
- Select the game-ending point goal and continue the game until finished.
The fun sentence dictation activity is a fun way to address pronunciation issues from the bottom up. If students can learn to produce clearer speech sounds, their pronunciation will improve significantly. Having this type of activity can help them realize that they need some polish and be more welcoming to phonetic instruction and training from you. And, because it’s a pronunciation activity, it can be used with all levels and ages.
It’s just fun and gets a lot of laughs (depending on the chemistry in your class)!
Give it a shot and tell us how it went. | <urn:uuid:3c37afb0-6a6b-47ca-b139-d51f262dcae4> | CC-MAIN-2023-40 | https://ontesol.com/blog/how-to-teach-english/teaching-pronunciation/esl-pronunciation-101-fun-sentence-dictation-activity/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-40/segments/1695233510983.45/warc/CC-MAIN-20231002064957-20231002094957-00095.warc.gz | en | 0.93455 | 1,889 | 3.765625 | 4 |
Land of opportunity
We honor them now, decades after their selfless acts, the Schindlers, Wallenbergs and Wintons of this world. They were heroes in a dangerous time, risking all to save the lives of others.
Oskar Schindler, a member of the Nazi party, saved 1,200 Jewish employees and family members from Hitler. A flawed man, he was first drawn to them as cheap labor in his Krakow factory. He found his conscience but lost his fortune, protecting them from certain death.
Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat during World War II, might have saved as many as 100,000 from the death camps. Based in Hungary, he provided passports and sanctuary in Swedish properties around Budapest. He disappeared just after the war.
British stockbroker Nicholas Winton abandoned a ski trip to help a friend in Prague in 1938. Stunned by Kristallnacht, Winton started the Czech Kindertransport. He found foster homes abroad for 669 children but remained haunted by the 225 he lost, on the last train out, seized by the Nazis.
The world was blessed then with individuals who selflessly battled evil. But then as now, nations also had to rise to the challenge. And where other nations saw darkness without hope, America saw opportunity to protect the oppressed.
Now, thousands of refugee children have gathered inside our borders, fleeing from unspeakable treatment and ominous death in their lawless hometowns in Central America. And opportunity knocks again, albeit on a smaller scale. As before, there are individual heroes who will fight for them. But that is rarely enough.
As before, this is a national opportunity to honor our Founders and keep faith with American principles. Those are not empty words on the Statue of Liberty. Emma Lazarus defined our national character when she wrote:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
In spite of this American prayer, there will always be fear-mongers among us. There is even a special breed of ignoramus this time, brandishing weapons at protests, demanding that the children be deported. It makes you wonder what kind of men take up arms against helpless children. But this nation has never bowed to their ilk.
Forget everything else. Forget politics and immigration policy. Forget about red states and blue states and legislative impasse. And forget the next election. On the last great day, who will want to answer for bureaucratic dawdling when these children cried out for our help?
These are children who have escaped certain danger, begging for our sword and shield. They properly believe in America as savior and we must protect and nurture them or put our national soul at risk.
Jesus chastised his disciples when they chased away the children who sought his blessing, saying, “Allow little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God.”
Joseph Sabino Mistick, a lawyer, law professor and political analyst, lives in Squirrel Hill (joemistick.com). | <urn:uuid:b7459fa7-9170-43ca-9670-5c8cd09d8200> | CC-MAIN-2016-26 | http://triblive.com/opinion/josephmistick/6455213-74/opportunity-forget-america | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2016-26/segments/1466783399117.38/warc/CC-MAIN-20160624154959-00174-ip-10-164-35-72.ec2.internal.warc.gz | en | 0.958431 | 670 | 2.65625 | 3 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.