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Oncor has failed to point to any express waiver of immunity in the DJA that would permit the instant action. It is settled in Texas that for the Legislature to waive immunity against the state and its political subdivisions, a statute or resolution must contain a clear and unambiguous expression of the Legislature's waiver of immunity. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011). The Legislature went on to codify this in the Code Construction Act, providing that “In order to preserve the legislature's interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034. | Party Submissions | 4.885605 | 4.984387 | 5.358263 |
In cases of self-dealing—when directors or managers engage in conduct that usurps corporate opportunities or diverts corporate assets—their subjective motive is irrelevant. | Party Submissions | 12.795937 | 11.569451 | 14.27025 |
According to ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 106, women with high-risk conditions should be followed in labor with continuous FHR monitoring. Mrs. Walker’s pregnancy and labor had several high risk factors, including prematurity, use of Pitocin, and a Category II-III FHR tracing with minimal variability, absent accelerations, and recurrent decelerations. Dr. Castillo fell below the standard of care at or shortly after 09:25, when she failed to apply, or direct to be applied, a fetal scalp electrode (FSE) to assess fetal wellbeing, or lack thereof, as well as fetal oxygenation. This was required because the FHR strip was frequently indeterminate and inadequate for interpretation due to a doppler “signal intermittent,” as documented in the Detail Notes Log by Nurse Beukelman. App. 7, CR 668. | Party Submissions | 10.475237 | 11.827869 | 11.071977 |
Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to the USMCA Protocol by November 27, 2023. | Legal Decisions | 11.87265 | 12.78868 | 13.174138 |
In the Spring of 2020, when the Covid-19 virus spread throughout the State of Texas, appellant Galovelho was operating EG Steak, a dine-in full-service restaurant in Frisco, Texas. On March 13, 2020, due to the imminent threat posed by Covid-19, appellee Governor Greg Abbott declared a state of disaster pursuant to the Texas Disaster Act. Days later, on March 19, Abbott issued executive order GA-08, which in relevant part stated: In accordance with the Guidelines from the President and the CDC, people shall avoid eating or drinking at bars, restaurants, and food courts,. .. provided, however, that the use of drive-thru, pickup, or delivery options is allowed and highly encouraged throughout the limited duration of this executive order. GA-08. During the course of the disaster declaration, Abbott issued a series of additional executive orders that permitted indoor dining in varying percentages of a restaurant’s capacity. None of these or ders required restaurants to close; none prohibited owners from using their property. | Party Submissions | 4.731867 | 5.733704 | 4.960335 |
There's another significant requirement that Bay has failed to conclusively establish and it was also an issue in Briggs: there is no evidence that Bay filed any written agreement as required by the statute under subsection (f). The Briggs court observed: “Moreover, there is no evidence the OCIP Manual, or any other written agreement for that matter, was filed with the insurance carrier for purposes of complying with the requirements of the TWCA. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(f) (requiring the general contractor to file a copy of the agreement to provide workers' compensation coverage with its workers' compensation carrier or, if self-insured, the Workers' Compensation Division); Id. at § 406.123(g) (making the failure to file a copy of the written agreement in accordance with subsection (f) an administrative violation).“ Briggs at 284. | Party Submissions | 6.739456 | 6.243589 | 7.099097 |
West Headnotes (13) [1] Mandamus Acts and proceedings of courts, judges, and judicial officers Mandamus Matters of discretion Mandamus relief is available if the trial court violates a duty imposed by law or clearly abuses its discretion, either in resolving factual issues or in determining legal issues, when there is no other adequate remedy by law. | Party Submissions | 10.363136 | 11.267138 | 12.222853 |
The injured employee obtained a judgment in Alabama. Prior to that judgment, the employer had not pursued an action for reimbursement. The employer received credit in the Alabama judgment for payments it had made to the employee. By its arguments on appeal, the employer conceded that the receipt of the Alabama judgment was the employee's election to recover benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075. The court concluded that the employer's right to recovery under Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.009 was derivative of the employee's. Although § 409.009 did not expressly state that a subclaimant's reimbursement claim was derivative of a claimant's, the court construed the provision as a whole in relation to the entire Texas Workers' Compensation Act and held that, where a claimant was barred from recovering benefits, a subclaimant was similarly barred. | Party Submissions | 5.285808 | 5.591386 | 5.354775 |
Whether attorneys (TREC licensed or nonlicensed) are exempted from REC’s state consumer real estate contract protection allows Attorney usage to violate UPHPA, Bus. & Com. Code 26 – Fraud, 27 – Fraudulent Transfers, Gov. Code Sec 51.903 – Action on Fraudulent Lien on Property, Penal Code 31 – Theft, 32 – ‘Considerations’, and other violations; granting Appellee default ‘Title’ and complete ownership of Appellant’s inherited real estate (surface, mineral), mineral leases, real property developments, and other unlawful gains (personal, financial, business, political, other) are State and Federal Penal Code (State, Federal) offenses (theft, civil rights violations, other), granting Court Orders Cancellations, Change of Venue, Change of Venue Hearings. | Party Submissions | 22.509901 | 18.355015 | 20.90009 |
Separation from Service Benefit is paid, the payment commencement date for the installment form of payment will be the first (1st) anniversary of the payment of the lump sum. | Contract | 11.643551 | 13.923022 | 20.403341 |
Brief of Appellee. On September 13, 2021, Appellant’s Reply Brief was filed. Judgment and Opinion of the court of appeals was issued on June 9, 2022, with Justices Carlyle, Smith and Garcia participating in the decision and Justice Smith authoring the opinion. Husband filed a Motion for Rehearing En Banc, which the court denied on July 27, 2022. The citation for the court of appeals opinion is In re J.Y.O., 2022 WL 2071113 (Tex.App. – Dallas 2022). | Party Submissions | 4.90762 | 4.740978 | 5.059343 |
Sargeant did not clearly explain how it would have occurred in its Memorial, nor was it argued therein in the terms of the present request. | Legal Decisions | 40.387688 | 58.2207 | 64.93644 |
III. The Parties shall assign exhibit numbers to these documents and upload them to the Box folder by 30 November 2023. | Legal Decisions | 23.710905 | 23.796778 | 35.16769 |
Matt Marsenison’s relationship with Integrity Aviation goes back a long way. Donna Ross testified that what Turbine Engine and Matt Marsenison were to do was to collect money from Victor Farias to turn around and locate airplane engines that were for sale and determine whether or not they were worth the money, then bring them to Marsenison’s facility, refurbish them and lease them back out to commercial airlines. Marsenison was supposed to collect the lease payments from the airlines. (RR Vol. 1, p. 13) There was evidence that at least $800,000.00 was wire transferred from Integrity’s account to Turbine. (RR Vol. 1, p. 29) In discussing the various wire transfers from the account of Integrity Aviation to Turbine Engine, Mr. Marsenison testified that he does not know what happened to that money. (RR Vol. 1, p. 42) In addition, Donna Ross testified that when she and her husband went to Florida to meet with Matt Marsenison, that Victor Farias was in the room when they met, and that Matt knew what Victor was telling them, because they talked about it. Also, on Integrity Aviation’s website, there was a link to Turbine Engines and Matthew Marsenison. (RR Vol. 1, p. 16-17) In addition, Ms. Ross was asked about the relationship between Marsenison and Turbine Engine Center, and her response was: “So he was, on the websites, president and CEO, so one in the same.” This is evidence of alter ego and of contracting with a Texas resident. She additionally testified that Turbine Engines is what they called it. (RR Vol. 1, p. 20) Ms. Ross also testified that without the Respondent, there was no investment. (RR Vol. 1, p. 21) Donna Ross also testified that, “...without Matt and this facility being valid, there was absolutely nothing to invest in.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 13) This is evidence of alter ego, conversion and false representation by Marsenison. | Party Submissions | 7.049183 | 7.074163 | 7.439772 |
The Bordages owners should not be deemed “non-parties” to the Hooks case for purposes of Restatement 29(7). Collateral estoppel should apply. | Party Submissions | 28.15234 | 30.377674 | 37.64207 |
As to fair comment, Barina contends the privilege does not apply to “a comment ... based on a substantially false statement of fact the defendant asserts or conveys as true.” Resp. Br. at 39 (quoting Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 70 (Tex. 2013)). But Barina has failed to identify a single false fact about her in the Program. Barina did, as Petitioners reported, offer to withdraw as Thrash’s guardian if she was paid $500,000, expressing a willingness to leave Thrash in the care of a family Barina believed had exploited him for her own financial gain. CR1:710. Barina did, as Petitioners reported, shut down Thrash’s business and sold many of his assets without notifying him. E.g., CR1:1090:6-8; CR1:1048; CR1:1331:20-1332:15. And Barina did, as Petitioners reported, make enough money working as Thrash’s guardian that she no longer required full-time employment. CR1:629:4-15. Because the Program reports on truthful facts in a court proceeding, its conclusions, even if critical of Barina, are protected by the fair-comment privilege. In fact, it is critical to democracy that documentaries like the Program are allowed to comment on contentious social issues like the guardianship system to facilitate meaningful discussions about societal change. | Party Submissions | 7.48529 | 8.347474 | 7.674886 |
ETMC Athens also points us to a case from our sister court in Dallas, Russell v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism'd). This case is distinguishable from the facts presented herein. In Russell, the Dallas Court had to determine whether a claim of an employee against a nonsubscribing employer is barred by the running of the two-year statute of limitations or whether the savings provision of the responsible third party statute permitted him to pursue his claims. Id. at 631. Russell, the employee, sought to join his employer, Wendy's, to the suit after the statute of limitations had run after a different defendant brought a third-party action against Wendy's. Id. at 632. After analyzing both Keng I and [*11] Keng II, the Russell court determined that the issue before it, "respecting the statute of limitations and the 'saving' clause in § 33.004(e)," was distinct from the issue presented in the Keng cases. Id. at 640. It declined to adopt our reasoning in Keng I because it "is not the issue we address today." Id. at 641. And it ultimately concluded that the Keng decisions "do not preclude application of the 'saving' provision of § 33.004(e)" to the employee's claims against his employer. Id. at 642 . | Party Submissions | 5.295235 | 5.429187 | 5.827951 |
The annual surveys shall be carried out in accordance with Article 2(3) and (4) in the buffer zones to detect the presence of the specified pest, and in the infested zones to monitor its presence there. | Legislation | 13.071856 | 12.374148 | 15.925345 |
As the Walkers acknowledge, the Court of Appeals ruled only on the causation objections and, thus, did not address Dr. Castillo’s objections to the two experts’ lack of qualifications to opine on causation. (Pet. Br. at 39). If this Court chooses to address the qualifications objections, Dr. Castillo offers the following arguments in support of her objections. | Party Submissions | 8.272399 | 8.76633 | 9.646421 |
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made. | Legal Decisions | 26.068045 | 30.948666 | 38.062782 |
First, the vast majority, if not all, of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege (Articles 9(2)(b) and 9(4) of the IBA Rules). | Legal Decisions | 8.399979 | 9.100479 | 9.771777 |
Affirming the trial court’s order dismissing the case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals offers a roadmap for how to treat Dr. Tappan’s report. Noting that the expert’s obstetric, gynecologic, and surgical qualifications were impeccable, the Court nevertheless concluded his qualifications were insufficient to opine about the cause of brain injuries. Id. (“Nowhere [] does [the expert’s] curriculum vitae indicate he has any experience, training or education in the field of neurology or, more specifically, brain injuries.”). | Party Submissions | 7.884583 | 7.628138 | 8.636035 |
The Walkers greatly embellish the court’s opinion, adding reasoning that simply is not there. The court did not rely on Thompson to apply an “elevated” causation standard. Instead, the court merely cited that case for the same general causation principle this Court has long held applies to expert report cases. A simple application of law to facts was all that was needed for the intermediate court to conclude the causation element was missing. The Court should not grant the petition, but if it does, it should affirm. | Party Submissions | 14.287364 | 14.706564 | 15.727484 |
For vectors, it is the effectiveness of the method to capture a positive vector when it is present in the survey area. For soil, it is the effectiveness of selecting a soil sample containing the pest when the pest is present in the survey area. | Legislation | 15.050626 | 13.385333 | 16.19529 |
Also, on January 14, 2021, MVP advised the trial court that the Oklahoma court had denied McCarthy’s motion to dismiss. McCarthy and RLB each filed a response to MVP’s plea in abatement, contending that the forum-selection clause is voidable under section 272.001, they had voided the forum-selection clause, and principles of comity did not require abatement of the Texas case. | Party Submissions | 8.614538 | 9.173281 | 11.114591 |
Furthermore, waiver requires proof of the actual intent to relinquish the right or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right. Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n., 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008). Neither was demonstrated by Petitioner. All of the cases cited by Petitioner to support their claim that silence or inaction demonstrated waiver are inapplicable, because none dealt with an optional acceleration clause, or even a waiver that is alleged to occur before maturity of the obligation. Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996)(right of refusal on stock sale); Vinewood Cap., LLC v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP, 735 F.Supp.2d 503, 518-19 (N.D. Texas)(breach of fiduciary duty claim); Trelltex, Inc. v. Intecx, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)(underpayments of commissions); Williams v. Moores, 5 S.W.3d 334, 336-37 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied)(inheritance of real property). | Party Submissions | 4.996403 | 5.288396 | 5.264844 |
After reviewing the “litany of allegedly deficient conduct” by Dr. Castillo and Baptist, the Court concluded that the experts failed to satisfy the decades-old criteria of explaining how and why any of the alleged breaches caused H.W.’s injury. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5; see Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (expert report failing to link an alleged breach to conclusion that injury would have been avoided is conclusory and insufficient). The cases are hardly analogous. | Party Submissions | 11.856218 | 11.790588 | 13.588789 |
I have read, understand and agree to abide by the terms of this Agreement, the Plan and the most recently executed Associate Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement that I entered into with the Company (the “Associate Agreement”). By checking the box labeled “I Agree,” or by otherwise electronically indicating my acceptance of this Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that the grant of the RSUs pursuant to this Agreement is consideration for my entering into and complying with the Associate Agreement. I understand this Agreement, the Plan and the Associate Agreement in all respects and the terms and conditions of the RSUs granted to me. | Contract | 4.596859 | 4.001458 | 5.077756 |
Each Party shall abide by the maritime delimitation line as defined in Article 1 and shall not claim or exercise any sovereign rights or coastal State jurisdiction in maritime areas beyond this line .349 264. The Tribunal concludes that the only part of the Loop Hole which constitutes Norwegian territory for the purposes of the BIT is the 10.81% of the continental shelf which lies on the Norwegian side of the 2010 demarcation line. It is therefore necessary to consider where North Star’s four vessels harvested snow crab. | Legal Decisions | 12.283556 | 13.186903 | 11.889351 |
Moreover, the timing, purpose, and effect of a lis pendens are significantly different than an abstract of judgment. A lis pendens is filed during litigation to constructively provide “notice to the world” that a particular property is the subject of litigation. In re Collins, 172 S.W.3d 287, 292-93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding). A lis pendens may be filed “during the pendency of an action involving (1) title to real property, (2) the establishment of an interest in real property, or (3) the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property”—because the general public has the right to know that a property is the subject of litigation before transacting business related to the property. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.007(a)). | Party Submissions | 3.928494 | 4.032112 | 4.093088 |
The appellate court brushed aside Dr. Monga’s complaint that the expert was unqualified to offer an opinion about ultrasound interpretation and use, holding that the expert demonstrated he was familiar with the continuum of the standard of care for managing pregnancies. The expert was therefore “qualified to render an opinion as to whether Dr. Monga breached the standard of care in failing to order the type of procedure that he has extensive experience performing.” Id. at *8. | Party Submissions | 9.492544 | 9.426973 | 10.609455 |
Respondents argue Alpesh did not engage in self-dealing when he used his position as President of CKC Partners to enrich himself at CKC’s expense. Resp. 17-19. These arguments are based on an erroneous definition of self-dealing. | Party Submissions | 9.674428 | 10.793419 | 11.213713 |
Synopsis Background: User of online platform, which allowed users to buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued currencies, brought putative class action against platform operator, alleging that operator failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from users' accounts. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, William H. Alsup, J., 2022 WL 1062049, denied operator's motion to compel arbitration based on operator's user agreement. Operator filed interlocutory appeal and moved to stay district court proceedings pending resolution of arbitrability issue on appeal. The District Court denied motion to stay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2022 WL 3095991, denied motion to stay. Certiorari was granted. | Party Submissions | 4.692795 | 4.901111 | 5.197686 |
The Trial Court sustained Midland’s objection/motion to strike the hearsay-upon-hearsay portion of the Ramboll Report; the evidence was properly stricken from the record by the Trial Court and should not considered by this Court. (CR 385–86.)2 In contrast, in Midland’s Brief in Support of its Plea to the Jurisdiction, Midland submitted the affidavit of Carl Craigo, the City’s Director of Utilities. Such affidavit affirmatively established that Midland owns and operates a domestic wastewater treatment plant, and it never permitted the alleged disposers to discharge into Midland’s sewer collection system after looking to the only location where such permissions exist – Midland’s pretreatment records. (CR 54.) After Midland’s evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction, the burden shifted to Weatherford to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and Weatherford failed to do so. Instead, Weatherford continues to lean on inadmissible evidence— properly excluded by the Trial Court—in a desperate attempt to tie Midland to the disposal of the Contaminants. The stricken hearsay was the only “evidence” Weatherford offered that could even remotely tie Midland to the disposal, and such failure to affirmatively connect Midland to the disposal is fatal to Weatherford’s SWDA claim. | Party Submissions | 8.205871 | 8.323936 | 9.157521 |
These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 13.390581 | 13.452183 | 14.155488 |
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and RENDERED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding appellee H A O a one hundred percent separate property interest in the marital residence and RENDER judgment awarding the marital residence to appellee H A O and appellant L M O as tenants in common with each owning an undivided one-half interest in the marital residence as their separate property. | Party Submissions | 3.623368 | 4.464078 | 4.091454 |
If the district court does not have jurisdiction under the Tax Code to determine the validity and scope of the 2019 agreement, the court does under the UDJA. This is what the First Court of Appeals held in MHCB (USA), 249 S.W.3d at 86 (This suit “is, at its core, a suit to determine the meaning of section 1.111(e). A suit seeking an interpretation of a governmental unit’s or administrative agency’s statutory authority, and the related determination of whether that unit or agency is acting outside of that authority, is not a suit against the State (as long as money damages are not sought) and is thus not precluded by immunity from suit.”). Oncor seeks some of this same type of relief under its alternative claim under the UDJA. Oncor specifically pled for determinations of “the meaning of the relevant Tax Code provisions” and “the scope, validity, and effect of” the 2019 agreement. See CR.31. Respondents do not mention, much less refute, this holding in MHCB (USA). See Respondents’ Brief at 36-43. No court has yet overruled that case. | Party Submissions | 8.333644 | 8.822885 | 9.462098 |
There is no dispute that the Texas constitution’s takings provision is different from the United States Constitution’s provision. The Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” while the Texas counterpart provides: “[n]o person’ s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). | Party Submissions | 3.016273 | 3.086695 | 3.207348 |
The TCCA sets the standard of care in premises liability cases, but duties arise from common law. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622-23. As this Court articulated in Shumake, courts apply several factors and common law principles to determine a premise owner’s duties. See id. (citing Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 286–87). This Court should grant this petition and address whether a City has a duty to enforce its mandatory safety rules where the magnitude of the risk to patrons reached the level of an unreasonable risk of harm, the risk was apparent to the property owner, and the risk arose in circumstances where the property owner had readily available opportunities to reduce it. | Party Submissions | 9.588535 | 9.866046 | 10.218265 |
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 447. In the present case, it is common ground that there is no agreement of the kind envisaged by the first sentence, so that it is the second sentence of Article 42(1) which is applicable. It is also common ground that the Tribunal must apply the BIT which, as a treaty, must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the international law of treaties. While the VCLT is not in force between Latvia and Norway, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 are generally regarded as declaratory of customary international law and will therefore be applied as such. | Legal Decisions | 3.718021 | 4.06807 | 3.604931 |
Documents including communications and e-mails exchanged between Mr Obradović or his advisors and representatives, Mr Rand or his advisors or representatives, the Ahola Family Trust, the directors of Coropi, and/or the directors of Kalemegdan during the time period between 23 March and 12 August 2012, concerning Coropi's purported acquisition of a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan. | Legal Decisions | 12.017107 | 11.859818 | 13.124641 |
Court then explained that this Court has held that whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment is an issue that regards compensability, citing Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. | Party Submissions | 13.407804 | 17.06698 | 18.73859 |
Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court reverse the judgement of the court of appeals, and remand this case to the trial court for additional proceedings. | Party Submissions | 5.351603 | 5.708413 | 6.89403 |
B. POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION AND CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS While Tyler's statutory arguments are most persuasive, we also agree with its practical arguments regarding the potential for confusion and conflicting judgments *845 if the underlying suit were tried first. In Luby's, we recognized that a judgment in the negligence suit before the Commission's compensability determination would “inject needless uncertainty and confusion” due to the potential for conflicting rulings and a waste of resources. Luby's, 979 S.W.2d at 816–17. 21 Here, the carrier is not a party to the Harris County suit, and not necessarily bound by its decision. | Party Submissions | 10.017513 | 10.157742 | 10.793095 |
Bellpas can make no representations about “the 335” and is left to provide another artistic rendering of the Affected Territory to meet its need of the moment. | Party Submissions | 109.06043 | 109.38501 | 130.54855 |
Building on Bustamante’ s holding, Windrum v. Karah confirmed that while some negligent conduct may be “too attenuated” to be the proximate cause of a patient ’ s injury, a negligent act must only be a “substantial factor” in causing the ultimate harm ; it need not be the “immediate cause.” 581 S.W.3d 761, 778 (Tex. 2019) (“Never have we adopted an “immediate cause” standard as the court of appeals did here.”). Negligence is a “substantial factor” when there is a “direct link” in the causal chain of a patient’s injury. Id. at 781. | Party Submissions | 6.721464 | 7.169124 | 7.298445 |
McCarthy and Subcontractor waive all rights and claims against each other and against the Owner, all subcontractors and others as required in the Contract Documents for damages to the extent reimbursed by Builder's Risk except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance and responsibility for the cost of deductibles, which Subcontractor will pay when responsible for such damage. | Party Submissions | 12.356667 | 11.296619 | 13.117127 |
Finally, Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.), is distinguishable. There, plaintiff claimed her doctor caused a brachial plexus and brain injuries when he tried to deliver a macrosomic baby vaginally and the baby became stuck in the birth canal for nearly half an hour. Id. at *1. Plaintiff served an expert report from an expert in obstetrics and maternal-fetal medicine to discuss Dr. Monga’s improper interpretation and use of an ultrasound and the cause of the baby’s injuries. | Party Submissions | 4.735482 | 5.085254 | 4.998759 |
The majority’s lead case dealt with the value of a disinterested director’s compensation: “The mere fact that a director receives compensation for his services as a board member does not demonstrate demand futility. Connolly and Molinari have failed to allege with factual particularity that the compensation received by the non-employee board members was material to each director or outside of the norm.” Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d at 845–46. This conclusion was sound. Connolly and Molinari were disinterested directors who were entitled to compensation. Without a specific allegation that their compensation was outside the norm, the plaintiff could not establish demand futility. | Party Submissions | 9.564787 | 9.29541 | 9.641818 |
Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital , 462 S.W.3d 496, 505 (Tex. 2015). However, when claims based upon professional or administrative claims should be held to trigger the TMLA is not so clear. | Party Submissions | 9.03568 | 10.57835 | 11.563465 |
Here, Husband testied he bought the marital residence five years before marriage and renanced it twice: 2008 and during the marriage in 2016. Although Wife was listed as grantor and grantee on the 2016 deed, Husband testied she was never an owner and he thought it was “strange” she was listed as agrantor. He did not know how she was listed on the deed, and it caused him concern that there may have been confusion at the title ofce. While Husband expressed reservations about the deed, he never testied that he did not intend to gi Wife an interest in the marital property. | Party Submissions | 9.683109 | 11.016202 | 10.263001 |
An audio recording of the session was made and deposited in the archives of ICSID. The recording was distributed to the Members of the Tribunal and the Parties. | Legal Decisions | 9.273673 | 7.693136 | 11.04318 |
MVP has not identified—and cannot identify—any language in the Subcontract where RLB clearly, specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly agreed to waive its Section 272.001 rights. Instead, MVP relies on Subcontract paragraphs 1.2, 11.1, and 11.2 for its proposition that MCC paragraph 47.7’s waiver provisions were incorporated into the Subcontract. MVP’s Brief at 41-42. But nowhere in any of these paragraphs is waiver, Section 272.001, or MCC paragraph 47.7 even mentioned. Thus, MVP is left to tepidly claim these “flow-down provisions demonstrate the parties’ intent to incorporate paragraph 47.7 into the Subcontract.” Id. The language of these paragraphs shows otherwise. | Party Submissions | 7.076333 | 7.355196 | 7.779904 |
The Commission would underline that the EU, as a Contracting Party to UNCLOS, is under an obligation to respect Article 77(2) of UNCLOS. Similarly, upon its ratification by the Union, UNCLOS forms part of the legal order of the Union pursuant to the provisions of Article 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, such that also the Member States are bound to respect it. | Legal Decisions | 5.542819 | 5.640986 | 5.861637 |
Oncor’s argument necessarily implies that § 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) repeal §1.111(e)(2), at least in part, without so much as mentioning the repeal. Courts will not interpret one statute as repealing another absent a clear intent of the Legislature to do so. Hegar v. Health Care Service Corp., 652 S.W.3d 39, 45-46 (Tex. 2022). Rather, the statutes should be read in harmony with each other. Gordon v. Lake, 356 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex. 1962); Brightbill v. State, 734 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1987, no writ) . | Party Submissions | 5.060825 | 5.501504 | 5.229188 |
Awardee understands that the Company’s Confidential Information includes not only the individual categories of information identified in this Section, but also the compilation and/or aggregation of the Company’s information, which is and has been compiled/aggregated via significant effort and expense and which has value to the Company and to the Company’s employees as used in furtherance of the Company’s business. | Contract | 8.969471 | 8.739056 | 9.243515 |
Under the plain language of the City’s Mandatory Safety Policy, High Hopes should have been denied access to the pool. SCR79. | Party Submissions | 36.65801 | 48.162037 | 57.98769 |
If any time during the term of the Loan, any applicable tax law is changed in such a manner that it increases the Lender’s cost of maintaining the Loan, the Borrower agrees to reimburse the Lender for all such additional costs; provided, however, that if the Borrower is prevented or unable for any reason to reimburse the Lender for such additional costs of maintaining the Loan, then the unpaid principal amount of the Loan, together with interest on the Loan, shall be immediately repaid. | Contract | 4.514316 | 4.167851 | 4.877175 |
An order of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel was previously entered staying all trial court proceedings in the cases listed in Appendix A to the Agreed Motion to Transfer to Pretrial Court and Immediate Stay. That stay is hereby continued in force until further order of the MDL Panel, and the stay is modified to extend to (1) all cases listed in the said Motion or any attachments to said Motion, (2) all cases listed in the Notice of Filing of First Supplement to Appendix A (Related Cases) to Motion to Transfer and Immediate Stay and Motion to Clarify December 8, 2021 Stay Order and (3) all tag-along1 cases that have been or may be filed. | Party Submissions | 8.558678 | 7.604259 | 8.952354 |
There’s a difference between pre -trial and trial. Participation in pre-trial is not participation in trial. There is no evidence that Wilson Plaintiffs participated in, or exercised any control over, the Harpst trial, or had any right to do so, and they had no beneficial interest in the recovery of damages in the Harpst trial. | Party Submissions | 10.081753 | 10.281121 | 11.320716 |
The United States objects to Request No. 2.e for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.330242 | 13.055233 | 14.585659 |
Participant’s fraud, misappropriation, misconduct or dishonesty in connection with his or her duties; (b) any act or omission which is, or is reasonably likely to be, materially adverse or injurious (financially, reputationally or otherwise) to the Company or any of its affiliates; (c) the Participant’s breach of any material obligations contained the Participant’s employment agreement or offer letter with the Company or any equity award agreement, including, but not limited to, any restrictive covenants or obligations of confidentiality contained therein; (d) conduct by the Participant that is in material competition with the Company or any affiliate of the Company; or (e) conduct by the Participant that breaches Participant’s duty of loyalty to the Company or any affiliate of the Company. | Contract | 3.632157 | 3.408575 | 4.213083 |
Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005); Texas Workers' Compensation Com ‘n v Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 9 (Tex. 1995) (Open court's challenge to “new law” workers' compensation law explaining the quid pro quo of common law remedies in exchange for certain, but limited benefits). | Party Submissions | 9.412881 | 11.73229 | 11.205772 |
Section III of Rafiei’s brief concerns the standards for finding arbitration agreements unconscionable. Brief at 11-14. Given the mature status of the Texas law on unconscionability, it is odd that this section cites only one Texas decision, Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992). | Party Submissions | 6.416513 | 7.419056 | 7.381252 |
The requested document is already submitted as exhibit R-067. Respondent confirms that there are no other documents responsive to this request. | Legal Decisions | 14.843608 | 17.58267 | 20.215126 |
Rather, the Delapenas only contend that the City failed to take an additional step to protect swimmers from the natural perils of swimming at its pool. See Mullens v. Binsky, 130 Ohio App.3d 64, 719 N.E.2d 599, 604 (10th Dist. 1998) (concluding that the risk of drowning at a pool “is an open and obvious condition”); cf. Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (acknowledging that there are “risks inherently associated with open water swimming”). Even if we assume such a duty existed, the record affirmatively negates a finding that the City was consciously indifferent to swimmer safety. | Party Submissions | 6.793251 | 6.981577 | 6.984125 |
This Court has spent considerable energy in recent years emphasizing the role of stare decisis. One example appears in Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 2022). Justice Young’s concurrence in American National is another. Given the overwhelming trend toward compound interest in the twentieth century, and given the work already done in Crider and Lewis, the Court’s recent teachings about stare decisis would sound hollow indeed if a litigant can brush aside generations of Texas law by pointing to a pre-Erie opinion from a federal court. | Party Submissions | 15.521921 | 13.532468 | 16.90668 |
WEM or MEM Wholesale Electricity Market 1. This Award is rendered in a dispute submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ( ICSID or the Centre ) pursuant to the “Agreement Between Argentina and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments ” dated 3 October 1991 ( Argentina-Spain BIT or the BIT or the Treaty) and the “ Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States ”, which entered into force on 14 October 1966 and became binding on Spain on 17 September 1994 and on Argentina on 18 November 1994 (the ICSID Convention). | Legal Decisions | 3.937693 | 4.039494 | 3.945096 |
ICSID arbitration claims.539 While the wording of the waivers includes wide-ranging terms such as “ any rights ” and “ any actions and/or claims,” the Tribunal finds that such wording is not sufficiently unequivocal, clear and specific so as to include international investment law claims. For a waiver to operate at a treaty claim level the waiver must be clear and explicit.540 In this regard, the ILC has explained by reference to the ICJ’s Nauru case that for a waiver to exist “the conduct or statement must be unequivocal.”541 Had the Respondent wished for the Claimant’s shareholders to waive their rights to ICSID arbitration, the Respondent could have included specific language in that respect. | Legal Decisions | 8.567624 | 9.794041 | 8.806723 |
The jurisdictional limits on the justice of the peace courts’ powers in eviction cases serve to prevent other courts from drawing the impermissible inference that abandoning immediate possession in an eviction action equates to abandoning any right of possession or claim of damages in a district court action. (See Pet. Br. 30-31) The court of appeals’ decision transgresses all these legal boundaries, notwithstanding Respondents’ misguided efforts to recast the decision as entirely fact-based. | Party Submissions | 15.386459 | 16.353298 | 15.37103 |
This court further urged the parties to address Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514,518 (Tex. 2007). Morales was a mandatory venue case. The *2 deceased's surviving spouse filed two suits, one in El Paso County and one in Travis County. The issue in Morales was whether a judicial review that had gone through the Division should be filed in the county of the deceased claimant's county of residence under TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.252, or under TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.255 in Travis County. Because the appeal was from an ongoing compensability determination, the court held that the proper venue for the continuation of the appellate process for the workers' compensation case was the county of the deceased's residence at the time of injury. As will be seen further below, Bay's reliance on In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co. Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding), which is also a mandatory venue case, is not applicable to the present case because Mann has not pursued benefits at the Texas Department of Insurance, Workers' Compensation Division (the “Division”). Morales is not on point for any issues in the present case. | Party Submissions | 6.388856 | 6.286807 | 6.568831 |
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to enhance the paid family and medical leave credit, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 3.453514 | 2.937526 | 3.11377 |
Wife’s Retirement Account Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion by valuing and awarding her aCity of Dallas 401(k) because the uncontroverted evidence established that the account did not exist at the time of divorce, and there was insufcient evidence to support the value ofthe retirement account on the date ofdivorce. Husband responds the evidence was legally and factually sufcient to support the trial court’s nding that Wife contributed $64,683.69 to ve ”retirement accounts during the marriage. | Party Submissions | 8.344152 | 9.531439 | 9.446746 |
Relator Justice Brian Walker and Real Party in Interest Justice John Devine both filed applications for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary ballot for the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, both choosing to pay the required filing fee of $3,750. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.024(a)(2); Exhibit B, Exhibit C. | Party Submissions | 7.133709 | 8.970489 | 8.769683 |
Unlike the doctor in De La Riva, however, Dr. Tappan specifically addressed his qualifications and experience on the relevant issues. App. 7, CR 663. Because “ [Dr. Tappan] is an expert in managing labor and delivery ” he is qualified to opine “ on the causal relationship between labor and delivery and the complications that stem from labor and delivery, including a newborn ’ s neurological injuries.” Livingston, 279 S.W.3d at 877. | Party Submissions | 12.940216 | 14.401649 | 15.535476 |
West Headnotes (25) [1] Workers' Compensation Exclusiveness Texas Workers' Compensation Act vests the Division of Worker's Compensation at the Texas Department of Insurance with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of whether the claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. | Party Submissions | 5.409254 | 6.709598 | 6.390898 |
In attempting to determine whether the proportionate responsibility statute in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.001 conflicts with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), when an employee files suit against a nonsubscribing employer, that suit is an action to collect benefits and damages under the workers' compensation laws determination. First, under the TWCA, an employee has a statutory burden to prove the employer's negligence. Therefore, under the statute, if the employee is the sole cause of the injury, he cannot recover pursuant to the statute even without the defense of contributory negligence. Consequently, an employee's negligence action against his nonsubscribing employer is brought under the workers' compensation laws of Texas, not only common law. Second, a nonsubscriber is statutorily prohibited from asserting certain common law defenses in a personal injury action brought by an employee. It is by the terms of Texas Workers' Compensation law that an employer is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and fellow servant negligence. | Party Submissions | 5.234085 | 5.239829 | 5.335726 |
YOU MAY CHALLENGE THIS ORDER BY FILING A MOTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER THE DATE THIS ORDER IS SIGNED. SEE TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 145. | Party Submissions | 2.979925 | 3.489919 | 3.357163 |
MVP also ignores that, in the trial court, McCarthy—the only other party to the Subcontract besides RLB—protested MVP’s attempts to enforce the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions against both McCarthy and RLB. R.0361-392, 689-701. MVP’s only legal explanation for how it can essentially jump over its general contractor, who made no attempt to enforce the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions against RLB, is that RLB’s claims are “dependent” on the MCC. MVP’s Brief at 49-52. | Party Submissions | 10.145391 | 9.849895 | 10.331884 |
Moreover, Respondents continue to conflate jurisdiction with the merits of Oncor’s claims. Oncor in this appeal seeks only the opportunity to litigate the merits of its claim. And Oncor does not assert that jurisdiction exists only because unit appraisals are “complex.” See Respondents’ Brief at 29. Rather, Oncor asserts that courts have jurisdiction to determine whether any section 1.111(e) agreement expressly addresses an issue later raised under section 25.25(c). This type of dispute will not likely arise often in simple appraisals of single-jurisdiction properties. But when such a dispute does arise, the mere exercise of jurisdiction over such a dispute does not implicate the policy of “highly favoring” settlements. Merely acknowledging that the district court has jurisdiction to consider claims like Oncor’s (the issue before this Court) does not mean property owners will always prevail on them. | Party Submissions | 10.321883 | 10.213302 | 10.535728 |
The majority’s third case concerned a director who was paid more than $500,000 for her service on the Oracle board of directors. She was challenged for being insufficiently independent from the self-dealing director, not for her own self-dealing. The Delaware Chancery Court held that her receipt of more than $500,000, in addition to other allegations that she was not sufficiently independent, established demand futility. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *18. | Party Submissions | 6.081622 | 6.271765 | 6.217657 |
In most legal malpractice cases, the jury cannot discern for itself 18 Alexander v. Turtur & Associates, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 119-20 (Tex. 2004). | Party Submissions | 6.860459 | 8.321864 | 8.876521 |
To amend the Federal Credit Union Act to modify requirements relating to the regulation and examination of credit union organizations and service providers, to provide the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency with the authority to regulate the provision of services provided to the Government-sponsored enterprises and Federal Home Loan Banks, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.94352 | 4.627774 | 4.947625 |
Because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that Husband obtained his Bank of America 401(k) before the marriage and that he contributed $62,042.77 to that 401(k) during the marriage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling. | Party Submissions | 6.071729 | 6.354008 | 7.363453 |
DÉCIMA SEGUNDA -El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las obligaciones que la Empresa contrae en este Acuerdo, así como de las que a su cargo deriven de los documentos anexos al mismo, dará lugar a la rescisión del Acuerdo. Las faltas y omisiones de la EMPRESA serán sancionadas por las autoridades competentes, con arreglo a las disposiciones legales aplicables. La empresa no solamente se obliga a lo expresamente pactado en este Acuerdo y sus anexos, sino también a las consecuencias que, según su naturaleza son conformes a la buena fe, el uso o la Ley. [Énfasis añadido] 113. Conforme a esta Cláusula, como se explicó en los párrafos 236 y 237 del Memorial de Contestación Subordinada, en caso de cualquier incumplimiento de CALICA con las obligaciones descritas en el Acuerdo de 1986 y sus anexos, así como las derivadas de la buena fe, el uso o la Ley (obligaciones subsecuentes), las dependencias involucradas en el Acuerdo de 1986 podrían desligarse del contenido del mismo y dejarlo sin efecto de manera unilateral. 114. Asimismo, las Cláusulas 11a y 13a establecen que la duración del Acuerdo de 1986 dependería de los permisos, licencias y autorizaciones que fueran necesarias antes de iniciar la ejecución del Proyecto. Al no haber cumplido con la Cláusula 11a, el Acuerdo nunca alcanzó a perfeccionarse y tener una vigencia para las actividades de explotación. | Party Submissions | 5.301056 | 7.549658 | 6.162572 |
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the Delapenas failed to allege a valid waiver of immunity under the TTCA. The City also submitted jurisdictional evidence, including copies of the City’s written rules and policies concerning the operation of Buttercup Pool and a document the City referred to as the “Cedar Park Aquatics Safety Plan, ” which is a report authored by a risk management consultant prior to the incident. The City also submitted evidence from the Cedar Park Police Department’s investigation, including reports, diagrams, witness statements, and bodycam video taken by responding officers. | Party Submissions | 9.130194 | 9.90162 | 10.28557 |
Wa s it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Appellant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration when: 1) Appellee introduced legally sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to the conscionability of the delegation and the arbitration agreement, and; 2) the trial court resolved those questions of fact in favor of Appellee? | Party Submissions | 6.317588 | 6.876281 | 6.809543 |
To authorize the Secretary of State to provide additional assistance to Ukraine using assets confiscated from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and other sovereign assets of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.308695 | 8.139388 | 6.175591 |
Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be enforced in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose. | Legal Decisions | 6.291745 | 6.645221 | 6.540481 |
The United States objects to Request No. 3.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a. | Legal Decisions | 9.173362 | 14.129761 | 16.077465 |
Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 230 (Tex. 2010). The last case in this Court’s trilogy was decided in 2010. Deciding the issue now under the newer TCPA statute and Rule 91a would not only reaffirm this framework, but also contribute to the robust dialogue about the fundamental jury right that has rightfully been encouraged recently by several members of the Court. See Nath III, 660 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Devine, J., joined by Busby, J., dissenting to denial of petition for review) (given “the historic importance of the constitutional guarantees of a trial by jury,” this Court should take this opportunity to “clarify our jurisprudence and safeguard this fundamental right”); see also Matter of Troy S. Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. 2022) (Busby, J., concurring, joined by Devine, Young, JJ.) (observing the framers’ use of “sweeping and emphatic language to guarantee it not once, but twice” in the current Texas Constitution). | Party Submissions | 7.674196 | 7.627842 | 7.904408 |
The Walkers filed their Original Petition in December 2020, claiming that Dr. Castillo and Baptist deviated from accepted standards of care in managing H.W.’s delivery. (CR.7-21). As to Baptist, the Walkers further claimed that nurses caring for Mrs. Walker departed from accepted standards of nursing practice. (CR.11-12). | Party Submissions | 11.323956 | 10.317442 | 12.274211 |
In Hall, the defendant published a series of articles about misconduct by compounding pharmacies, which specifically discussed the plaintiff compounding pharmacy and mentioned it was “under investigation.” 579 S.W.3d at 380-81. As in Tatum, the plaintiff argued that the articles’ gist, about fraud at compounding pharmacies, pertained to him specifically. Id. at 377. And as in Tatum, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, noting that the article merely “places the accusations against [the plaintiff] in the context of the greater controversy facing the compounding industry, but that's it.” Id. at 381 (emphasis added). The Court also concluded that no “objectively reasonable reader” could infer that allegations about other companies—or about the industry more generally—implied anything about the plaintiff specifically. Id. at 377-378, 381. As the Court noted, the plaintiff “[did] not cite, nor can we find, any statements in [defendant’s] articles implying [plaintiff] is actually guilty of anything.” Id. at 381. While the report was “not flattering, ... not flattering is not defamatory.” Id. | Party Submissions | 6.165779 | 6.071816 | 6.490126 |
If you are a director, officer or principal shareholder, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) further restricts your ability to sell or otherwise dispose of Shares acquired upon settlement of the Units. | Contract | 4.232152 | 4.879604 | 4.953908 |
It was not. The Court of Appeals instead concluded both that: (1) “[b]ecause Weatherford failed to raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the City’s jurisdictional challenge, we agree with the City that neither its actions nor the allegations in Weatherford’s pleadings subject the City to the. .. SWDA. .. .”; and (2) “[b]ecause the statutory definitions of ‘solid waste facility’ and ‘solid waste’ are fatal to Weatherford’s cost-recovery claim against the City, we hold that the governmental immunity waiver provisions contained in the SWDA do not apply to the City in this case. . .” Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. filed). The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Trial Court’s determination as to lack of jurisdiction. Weatherford’s focus upon the domestic sewage exclusion mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals’ opinion in an attempt to circumvent the actual basis for the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the Trial Court—Weatherford’s failure to overcome Midland’s jurisdictional challenge and the fact that Midland’s sewer system is not a “solid waste facility,” as such term is defined under the SWDA. | Party Submissions | 4.966738 | 5.150587 | 5.431674 |
SuppCR8-9 (emphasis added). In September 2007, the trial court severed the cases as Samson requested, separating the Hooks into their own case and the other Tract 4/14 owners into this Bordages case. SuppCR40-42; 1CR208-210. But 2023 Samson disagrees with 2007 Samson, insisting this case can contradict the companion Hooks case, though they were once united before being rendered asunder. | Party Submissions | 25.209532 | 28.611156 | 32.183125 |
Under the TTCA, “if a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private pro perty, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a). But when a premises defect claim involves a recreational activity, such as swimming, the Recreational Use Statute further limits the premises owner’s liability by imposing a specialized duty to “refrain from gross negligence, or from acting with malicious intent or in bad faith.” See id. §§ 75.001(3)(C) (defining “recreation” to include swimming), 75.002(d) (establishing duty of care); City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2009) (“[A]lthough the recreational use statute references a trespasser standard, it actually creates a specialized standard of care, one not exactly consistent with the common-law trespasser standard.” (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 286 –87 (Tex. 2006))). Gross negligence is defined as “an act or omission involving subjective awareness of an extreme degree of risk, indicating conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.” Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 623 (quoting Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 287). “[W]hat separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant ’ s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care. ” La.–Pac. Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245, 246–47 (Tex. 1999) (first citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985); and then citing Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981)). | Party Submissions | 3.685006 | 3.937819 | 3.887713 |
Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 14.2(1), (3), and (4) of USMCA ( i.e., the provisions identified in Request No. 1.b) by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 14.2(1), (3), and (4) of USMCA. | Legal Decisions | 5.429821 | 5.748617 | 5.86153 |
The definition of “self-dealing” is not so narrow. Self-dealing is defined as “an occurrence in which the fiduciary uses the advantage of his position to gain a benefit at the expense of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.” Mims-Brown v. Brown, 428 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Parsons v. Trichter & LeGrand, P.C., No. 14-21-00284-CV, 2022 WL 17099869, at *7 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 22, 2022, no pet.) (citing KMC Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 83 (Tex. 2015)). | Party Submissions | 3.505091 | 3.858378 | 3.542799 |
In Abshire, for example, the court of appeals found the preliminary expert report deficient because “in the face of several possible conclusions regarding when in the chain of events” Abshire’s back injury occurred, the expert had apparently failed to explain how his conclusions were “medically preferable to competing inferences that [were] equally consistent with the known facts.” HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. of Beaumont, LLC v. Abshire, 561 S.W.3d 193, 215 (Tex. App. — Beaumont 2017), rev’d sub nom., Abshire v. Christus Health Se. Tex., 563 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2018). | Party Submissions | 6.169819 | 6.223948 | 6.672222 |
Subsets and Splits