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The Response argues that Delaware has adopted a narrow definition of self-dealing that protects Alpesh from liability. Resp. 10-19. It posits that the highest priority of Delaware law is to protect the “power and autonomy” of Alpesh to control CKC Partners, unimpeded by a derivative lawsuit filed by Mr. Condon. Resp. 11. The response spins a web of technicalities to prevent the meritorious claims of Mr. Condon and CKC Partners from seeing their day in court. | Party Submissions | 12.295578 | 13.225101 | 12.501482 |
Capítulo 12 del Tratado y (ii) las pérdidas o daños sufridos, en tanto que el segundo corresponde a la fecha en la que el inversionista somete su reclamación a arbitraje y, como consecuencia de ello, finaliza el cómputo del término de prescripción. De conformidad con el Artículo 12.30 del Tratado, esta corresponde al día en que “la solicitud de arbitraje ... del demandante: (a) ha sido recibida por el Secretario General de conformidad con el párrafo 1 del Artículo 36 del Convenio del CIADI ...”. | Legal Decisions | 5.898611 | 8.40541 | 7.291585 |
The United States objects to Request No. 1.g for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.811079 | 13.460091 | 14.848947 |
On March 4, 2020, the court presiding over the tort suit [*19] issued an order abating that case until, inter alia, the resolution of any matters properly before DWC. At the time that order issued, the statute of limitations had not yet run on the Martinez Family's potential claim. After that statute of limitations had run, the Martinez Family sought to lift the abatement of the tort suit so they might pursue any common-law remedies. But when the trial court granted that motion and lifted the abatement on February 11, 2021, Texas Mutual's suit for judicial review was still pending, and there was therefore no final administrative determination that might allow the court to lift the abatement. See Tyler Asphalt, 107 S.W.3d at 843-44 . | Party Submissions | 7.029891 | 7.487228 | 8.093491 |
If the Court concludes that the delegation provision is not unconscionable, it can proceed no further. It should vacate the order of the trial court and remand this case with instructions to refer the dispute into arbitration so that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable can be decided. | Party Submissions | 6.949979 | 7.93683 | 8.10771 |
Even if Barina’s interpretation of the gist were correct (it is not), and the Program accused her of exploiting Thrash’s estate, Barina has not shown that claim to be materially false. To the contrary, Petitioners’ substantial and irrefutable evidence, set forth above, supports the allegation that Barina legally exploited Thrash’s estate, and did so for personal gain.9 See Pet. Br. at 22. | Party Submissions | 12.396952 | 14.670716 | 14.745838 |
See supra Part I.A. The ruling is so flatly wrong that Respondents’ only merits-based defense is a policy argument that itself conflicts with the statute. Respondents try to muddy the issue presented, but to no avail. And their suggestion that the same outcome might happen under the proper legal standard is wrong but at least should not preclude review—and certainly should not deter the Court from summarily reversing on just the narrow legal question presented here. Even putting aside the importance of the issue or the conflicting decisions, the legal errors below are so glaring that the Court should correct them through a per curiam opinion resolving the meaning of “require” and leaving other issues for remand. And by doing so, the Court can avoid the confusion that courts, litigants, and members of the auto industry will suffer from the decisions below. With or without oral argument, the Court should reverse. | Party Submissions | 14.421264 | 14.739919 | 14.511287 |
The issue is not just that the medical bills and liens are excessive. The additional issue is that the Respondents attempted to and did actually collect on the excessive amounts. The court of appeals should have taken as true the below evidence when ruling on the summary judgment on Petitioners’ Chapter 12 claim: The medical bills were anchored to the liens; The Texas PricePoint records list the reasonable charges that Petitioners should have been charged; and The affidavit of all 47 patients that are in evidence are true in that Respondents actually collected the grossly excessive amounts repeatedly over the course of several years. If the court of appeals had properly followed the summary judgment standard, it would have found that: The liens were grossly excessive; Respondents were filing each lien with knowledge that they were grossly excessive, and therefore, fraudulent; and Respondents knowingly caused Petitioners financial injury because they actually intended to and did collect on the grossly excessive liens repeatedly. Or, at the very least, the court of appeals should have found these are fact issued to be decided by a jury. By dismissing the reasonableness claim without conducting a proper factual analysis and/or submitting the question to the jury, the court of appeals committed error. Thus, summary judgment was improper on this issue. | Party Submissions | 9.346231 | 8.563638 | 9.719483 |
Respondents repeat their mantra that an agreement to the “value” of unidentified “transmission lines” necessarily constitutes an agreement to the objective characteristics of the lines, including their length and voltage capacity in Wilbarger County. See Respondents’ Brief at 11-15. This argument is a red herring. The incorrect mileage at issue is not the number of miles of Sharyland’s 345kV transmission line taxed in Wilbarger County—it is the number of miles of Sharyland’s 345kV transmission line in Texas. | Party Submissions | 8.789935 | 9.963964 | 9.645626 |
Therefore, without the express consent of the relevant coastal States (namely Norway and the Russian Federation in the present instance), these fisheries are illegal as they would be in contravention of Article 77(2) of UNCLOS. | Legal Decisions | 10.457943 | 11.216683 | 13.169766 |
Citing Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, the Seventh Court nonetheless faulted Dr. Tappan for offering only that there was a “mere possibility” of a link between the providers ’ conduct and the eventual harm. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *4 (citing Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52). | Party Submissions | 10.055576 | 13.195913 | 14.877593 |
The answer to this question is yes, there is a distinct claim in respect of the alleged damage to Sea & Coast or rather to Mr Pildegovics’ investment in Sea & Coast. That claim exists because Mr Pildegovics’ shares in Sea & Coast, which are part of the investment, have lost value due to Norway’s breaches of the BIT. | Legal Decisions | 17.403372 | 15.05368 | 16.16883 |
Allowing the Court of Appeals’ ruling in this case to stand would endanger all manner of documentary storytelling and other types of investigative reporting. | Party Submissions | 17.371658 | 12.663219 | 17.028181 |
Arbitration Rule 33 4.1. The participation of all the members of the Tribunal by any appropriate means of communications is required at the first session, case management conferences, hearings and deliberations, except as otherwise provided in the Arbitration Rules or unless the Parties agree otherwise. | Legal Decisions | 8.991719 | 9.42044 | 9.38015 |
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and resolved the case on the ground that the MSA partitioned to the husband future income and earnings, which included the bonus. 526 S.W.3d at 45 1. The supreme court stated that whether the bonus qualied as community preperty did not affect its determination. | Party Submissions | 16.42045 | 17.746496 | 18.205286 |
This document sets forth the terms and conditions of the MSC Executive Severance Plan (the “Plan”), which is hereby adopted by MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. (“MSC”) for the benefit of the eligible employees of MSC and its subsidiaries to this document. MSC and all such designated subsidiaries hereinafter are referred to, individually and collectively, as the “Company.” This document sets forth the terms of the Plan and is applicable to such eligible employees of the Company who participate in the Plan in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 below. | Contract | 4.482727 | 4.049123 | 4.622688 |
HN2 [ ] Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Texas Natural Resources Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Texas Ass'n Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) . | Party Submissions | 3.039448 | 3.651512 | 4.188739 |
Notwithstanding the well-settled jurisprudence indicating that DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute over eligibility, including questions of employment status, in the context of a pending claim, the Martinez Family asks this Court to hold that DWC has no jurisdiction to resolve the question of employment in the context of an unfiled potential claim. | Party Submissions | 8.317866 | 9.222805 | 9.651085 |
Lastly, in Shattenkirk this Court found guidance in In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. 2010). In In re Olshan the homeowners who sued Olshan for improper foundation repairs had signed contracts requiring arbitration of disputes to be administered by the AAA and in accordance with the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. 328 S.W.3d at 886 –87. In arguing that the prohibitive cost of arbitration rendered the agreement unenforceable, the homeowners provided AAA invoices for other arbitrations in allegedly similar cases. Id. at 897. According to the AAA's commercial arbitration rules, this Court found that the “most a consumer will have to pay under these rules is $375 for the arbitrator.” Id. at 896. | Party Submissions | 5.693697 | 6.229386 | 6.407931 |
Respondents’ argument about the name change is therefore restricted to only two isolated portions of the jury’s a ward. The first is the $23,331.37 the jury awarded to Westwood in “relocation expenses.” (2CR2906) These damages compensated Westwood for Respondents’ destruction of its security surveillance system (8RR116-17;16RR100-06 (PX148A)); for the locksmith Westwood had to hire to gain re-entry to the leased premises (8RR136-36, 152;16RR99 (PX148)); and for a sign that Respondents removed and refused to return (8RR203-04;16RR114). These expenses were “paid” by Westwood Motors. (Resp. 31 n.88 ) But despite what Respondents insist ( id .), those same expenses were “incurred” by Westwood, and thus the award compensated Westwood for its own losses. And under the collateral source rule, Respondents cannot prohibit Westwood from recovering for these losses simply because they were paid by another entity. See Big Bird Tree Service v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding collateral source rule precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits plaintiff received from someone else). | Party Submissions | 8.649182 | 7.929054 | 9.111493 |
In this case, Sonic's evidence shows it is suffering financial burdens due to the Alabama judgment, the cost of which cannot be remedied by appeal. Also, as Sonic argues, its ability to prosecute the contract claims is hindered by continued abatement, because witnesses will disappear and memories will become impaired. These are ramifications of continued abatement that [**36] are not remedied by appeal. See Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 332. Finally, it is impossible to determine when abatement will end in this case. Because abatement appears indefinite, it violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Id. We conclude that the benefits of mandamus review of the trial court's abatement orders in this case outweighs its detriments, and Sonic lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. | Party Submissions | 7.631748 | 9.174042 | 8.744376 |
Grant did not appear at the January 20 hearing. The trial court found that Grant did not offer evidence of her inability to afford costs. It further found that Grant’s most recent statement of inability to afford costs, which was filed in January of 2023, reflected that (1) Grant has $5,053.95 in monthly income; (2) Grant stated the total value of her property was $70.00, but the attachments showed Grant owns (i) a home purchased in April of 2022 with an undisclosed equity and value, (ii) a 2021 Toyota Highlander purchased in August of 2021 with an undisclosed equity and value, and (iii) personal property which Grant pays $504 monthly to store; and (3) Grant failed to disclose her ownership of an undivided 3.334 percent interest in the 53.524-acre tract at issue, which the commissioners valued at $30,000 per acre. The trial court determined that Grant has the ability to pay court costs and granted Heo’s request. | Party Submissions | 6.706182 | 6.910089 | 7.165903 |
In case the documents responsive to this request include communications with the advisors of Claimants in relation to Mr Broshko's decision to acquire shares in Obnova, such communications are relevant and material to the outcome of the case, as explained by Respondent above. | Legal Decisions | 23.85564 | 23.385504 | 33.296402 |
Arbitration Rule 21 2.1. The Tribunal was constituted on 8 September 2023, in accordance with the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Parties confirmed that the Tribunal was properly constituted and that no Party has any objection to the appointment of any Member of the Tribunal. | Legal Decisions | 4.643333 | 5.46256 | 5.155256 |
Id., at 537. But this Court offered no further explanation or test to make this determination in future cases. Administrative or professional services seem more likely to involve services unrelated to the actual administration of medical care or treatment. So it would seem doubtful that every administrative or professional service rendered in a health care facility would trigger the TMLA. It would be helpful if this Court would articulate the factors or set forth a test to make that decision. | Party Submissions | 16.442513 | 18.917124 | 19.792559 |
Compounding has continued to spread across the country. See, e.g., Moose Agric. LLC v. Layn USA, Inc ., 639 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1157 (D. Colo. 2022) (“Because the parties here are sophisticated corporations engaged in an industrial-scale contract, and because plaintiffs have produced substantial evidence demonstrating the inequitable impacts of the delay in payment, compound interest is appropriate.”); Cent. Water Dist. Associates v. Cedar Meadow Lake Watershed Dist ., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 474, 954 N.E.2d 38, 44 (2011) (citing numerous cases) (“In so holding, we align ourselves with those courts who have recognized” that compounding reflects economic reality). | Party Submissions | 8.694283 | 7.871425 | 8.323161 |
Mr. Luis Gulano, General Manager of such company, requesting the Dominican President an appointment for Mr. Michael Lee-Chin and Mr. Asilis where “[t]he topics to be addressed are foreign investment and the [D]uquesa Landfill.” [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] As stated above, Mr. Lee-Chin was then introduced as “Minister of the Government of Jamaica Economic Growth Council.”17 [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] A package of Lajun documents dated “November 9, 2016” (same date as the alleged meeting) the first page of which reads “Information for the President” was also submitted as purported evidence of the meeting with the President.18 [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] 15. The majority asserts that “[t]he Tribunal fails to see any element that could lead to the conclusion that said meeting did not take place, as Respondent seems to suggest.”19 In other words, by reversing the burden of proof, my colleagues expected Respondent to submit negative evidence, i.e., to prove something that it states did not exist. That is not all. Even assuming that said meeting existed, the mere presence of Mr. Lee-Chin, introduced as a Jamaican minister and accompanying his son and Lajun’s Dominican investor, is not evidence of any ownership. That is compounded by the information transmitted to the Vice President of the Dominican Republic that introduced Claimant as an agent, not an investor. | Legal Decisions | 11.994579 | 11.980627 | 12.450334 |
Finally, Respondents’ effort to minimize the adverse consequences for tenants flowing from the court of appeals’ ruling—which the court itself entirely ignored— is likewise unavailing. If the law is as Respondents say it is, and any effort by a tenant to comply with an eviction order by departing the premises conclusively demonstrates “voluntary abandonment” of every right the tenant ever had to claim damages for wrongful eviction or breach of contract, then tenants must waste time, expend resources, and risk sanctions pursuing appeals from justice court which they know will likely to be fruitless simply to preserve their ability to maintain a claim in district court. (See Pet. Br. 23-24) The law should not require such futile and wasteful acts. | Party Submissions | 10.66622 | 10.505423 | 11.356714 |
Generally, “[a]n indemnity provision does not apply to claims between the parties to the agreement; instead, it obligates the indemnitor to protect the indemnitee against claims brought by a person not a party to the agreement. ” Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 20 S.W.3d 119, 130 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Wallerstein v. Spirt, 8 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. App. —Austin 1999, no pet.); Derr Const. Co. v. City of Houston, 846 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)). Nevertheless, an indemnity provision may be written such that the parties “agree to indemnify one another against claims they later assert against each other. ” Claybar v. Samson Expl., LLC, No. 09-16-00435-CV, 2018 WL 651258, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Ganske v. Spence, 129 S.W.3d 701, 708 (Tex. App. — Waco 2004, no pet.)). However, in order to show “ that an indemnity provision applies, the plaintiff must show that a third party has filed a claim against him or that the indemnity agreement contains language indicating that it applies to claims between the parties .” Id. (citing MG Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Moses Lopez Custom Homes, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 51, 63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Ganske, 129 S.W.3d at 708; Coastal Transp. Co., 20 S.W.3d at 130). | Party Submissions | 3.160627 | 3.249354 | 3.208015 |
Read in context, Dr. Tappan ’ s opinions were more like the report in Miller v. JSC Lake Highlands Operations stating that “the failure to timely remove the foreign body “can” lead to aspiration, which “can” be deadly. Miller, LP, 536 S.W.3d at 515 (“Read in context, Dr. Naeger opined that aspiration can be deadly and that it was deadly in this case.”). | Party Submissions | 20.504154 | 20.839058 | 25.052544 |
Because the Court of Appeals employed an erroneous standard of review, leading to an erroneous review of the evidence, the Petitioners, who were cheated out of millions of dollars, were denied redress against Matt Marsenison, against whom there is clearly more than a scintilla of evidence that he did business in Texas, committed torts in Texas and had an ongoing and continual relationship with Texas. | Party Submissions | 14.645884 | 15.475264 | 16.159616 |
Or as then-Justice Hecht said in Prudential, “[p] ublic policy that permits parties to waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of [the right to a] trial” in Texas. | Party Submissions | 20.651243 | 24.398884 | 25.658918 |
In addition — and perhaps more relevant here —“p arties can agree to opt out of the civil justice system altogether and submit future disputes to arbitration.” Id . | Party Submissions | 28.955303 | 41.145054 | 37.81951 |
In no way can the order approving the Plan or any other ruling from the Bankruptcy Court be viewed as that court’s approval of subsequent litigation decisions — made outside of bankruptcy after the Plan was approved — to collude and switch legal positions taken in the original trial. In fact, based on that Court’s own writings conveying its skepticism about the case, one must believe the Plan would not have been approved if this were the stated goal. | Party Submissions | 19.022337 | 18.560112 | 22.79101 |
Name, permanent mailing addresses, and work and home telephone numbers of each person accompanying the child or information about the group trip and its sponsor: Please sign and return to me the attached Consent for Child to Travel Outside the United States together with the child's original passports within ten days after you receive this notice and consent form, same being ______________________________, 20____. | Party Submissions | 18.411003 | 17.098919 | 19.315594 |
Furthermore, the court should look at the relationship between the witnesses and the matters upon which they testify. If uncontroverted evidence is from an interested witness, it does nothing more than raise a fact issue unless it is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted. TEX. | Party Submissions | 11.561601 | 14.62204 | 14.728818 |
The court of appeals’ opinion is at odds with this Court’s jurisprudence on premises liability as articulated in Del Lago. The opinion is also in conflict with administrative rules from the Health and Human Services Department, which mandate that owners and operators of public pools provide lifeguards and meet minimum safety standards to prevent drownings. The City undertook a duty to make the pool safe and was grossly negligent in failing to adhere to its own safety standards. This Court should address these important matters of first impression, which affect millions of Texans across the state who operate, own, or use public pools. | Party Submissions | 7.968936 | 8.306317 | 8.776556 |
In addition, Misti Ducharme testified that she had an additional meeting with Marsenison in Florida in 2018 regarding forming a new company, and she knew, at that time, Marsenison was no longer involved with Turbine. (RR Vol. 1, p. 6) This is direct evidence of Marsenison, individually, in no relation to Turbine, contemplating doing business with a Texas Company in Texas. | Party Submissions | 17.495554 | 19.936073 | 21.323153 |
None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 14.367309 | 17.40334 | 14.598733 |
Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court did not err in dismissing Berrelez's claims based on her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act. Berrelez's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, mandating dismissal of Berrelez's claims against Mesquite Logistics. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal. | Party Submissions | 3.834733 | 4.624466 | 4.821259 |
Perhaps more importantly, however, Respondents’ effort to explain away the court of appeals’ opinion as merely enforcing some “voluntary agreement” between Westwood and Virtuolotry is irreconcilable with the opinion itself. In that opinion, the court of appeals never even looked for such an agreement because it would have been irrelevant under the court’s analysis, which focused solely and impermissibly on the “preclusive” legal effect of Westwood’s decision to withdraw its appeal in the county court and enter into the agreed judgment. Indeed, the court of appeals concluded that it would take an agreement to vary the judgment’s otherwise applicable legal effect. It contended that to preserve its claims in the district court, Westwood would have had to force Respondents into including a concession in the agreed judgment that an “act of Virtuolotry or Boyd” was “the cause for its decision to abandon its appeal” (Op. 5) or “qualifying” the abandonment to clarify its intention to assert a continuing “right to possession” (Op. on Rehr’g 2). Westwood, however, did not have to do either. Respondents’ effort to rewrite the opinion shows how scant its arguments really are. II. The actual reasons behind the court of appeals’ decision are indefensible. | Party Submissions | 12.25825 | 12.904956 | 12.655799 |
This is a suit for damages. The trial judge who signed the Order in this case is The Honorable Judge Norma Gonzales, sitting in the 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas. The Order in question denied a Special Appearance on behalf Mark Marsenison. The parties to this appeal are Petitioners, Charles & Donna Ross, Stephen Brown, Doug Butler, Jep & Judy Canon, Pete Carlsson, Teresa & Joe Coldewey, Jessica Curry, Angela Eaton, Ronny & Stephanie Fikes, John & Margaret Gallagher, Gary & Mary Griffin, Chase James, Mike Kelley, John LaMaestra, Nunzio & Marcella LaMaestra, Ed Long, Patrick McNamara, Jules Morris, Lawrence Neil, Andrea & Denis Pantel, Mike Saenz, John Sconiers, Lynsie Shaw, Terrah Shaw, Randall Shirley, Corina Southers, Cynthia Strunk, Ted & Cecelia Tencza, Jr., Ted Tencza, Mary Beth Tindell, Richard & Bonnie Urbanek, Thomas Valdez and Peter Velasquez, and Defendant, Mark Marsenison. The appeal was to the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas. The Opinion of the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas was authored by The Honorable Luz Elena D. Chapa. Motion for Rehearing en Banc was denied by The Honorable Luz Elena D. Chapa. Citation of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals is Mark Marsenison v. Charles & Donna Ross, et al.; In the Fourth Court of Appeals -San Antonio, Texas, No. 04-22-00098-CV, from the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2019-CI-02392, Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the Special Appearance of Mark Marsenison. No Findings of Facts or Conclusions of Law were filed. | Party Submissions | 8.188069 | 8.359839 | 8.60623 |
In August 2018, RLB commenced its dredging work. R.403 ¶62. But RLB failed to achieve the average daily production rates set in the Subcontract. R.398 ¶28. | Party Submissions | 12.035483 | 16.624846 | 18.554462 |
Id. at *1. And the consequence for violating that personal-delivery standard was not franchise termination; instead, the distributor would charge back the payments it had made to the dealer under the program. | Party Submissions | 23.310266 | 27.482946 | 29.546804 |
Unlike the expert in Wright, Dr. Tappan did not conclude that adhering to the standard of care would have resulted in only the possibility of a better outcome. Compare Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52–53 (noting that expert opined that “if the x -rays would have been correctly read and the appropriate medical personnel acted upon those findings then Wright would have had the possibility of a better outcome. ”) with App. 7, CR 671. Rather, Dr. Tappan was unequivocal that “ had Dr. Castillo decided for cesarian delivery at or about 15:15 and had she atraumatically delivered Baby [H.W.] by 15:45 ...H.W. would have been born without neurological injury.” App. 7, CR 671. Based on the fetal heart tracings and H.W.’s condition at birth, then, Dr. Tappan believed that Dr. Castillo could have avoided neurological injury had she only delivered by cesarian section (or operative vaginal delivery) at 15:15 as the standard of care required. App. 7, CR 668; 670-71. | Party Submissions | 7.189766 | 8.202454 | 7.962814 |
Finally, the Diocese has a remedy if it pays Bay, Ltd.’s damages: it has a contractual right of indemnity against Mendietta. In the ranch lease, the Diocese and Mendietta agreed: (10RRDX1). While the Diocese nonsuited its claims against Mendietta, it did so without prejudice to refiling those claims, (1CR402–04), and the claims have likely not even accrued. | Party Submissions | 16.575823 | 17.415491 | 21.220636 |
Microsoft Word 365 reports it to contain 3623 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1). | Party Submissions | 9.034343 | 16.982807 | 21.33491 |
THE DUTY TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS ANY PERSON, BY VIRTUE OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT OR ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD. | Party Submissions | 4.884803 | 4.655909 | 5.088189 |
Payment Bond (collectively “Bonds”) shall be furnished in the full amount of this Agreement on the forms in Exhibit 4, attached hereto. The Bonds are to be executed by a surety company or companies authorized to execute such Bonds in the State of the location of the Project, which are on the Department of Treasury’s Listing of Approved Sureties, Department Circular 570 (“Treasury List”), have an A.M. Best rating of A- or higher, and are acceptable to McCarthy and be written in favor of McCarthy and others, if so listed on Exhibit 4. The Bonds furnished shall require the attorney-in-fact who executes the Bonds on behalf of the surety to affix thereto a certified and current copy of their power of attorney. In the event of a claim under the Bonds, McCarthy shall be paid, as and when incurred, by the surety the entire cost incurred, as provided in Article 9 below, including, but not limited to, any support, administrative, legal and court costs McCarthy incurs in the enforcement of its rights under the Bonds. The cost of the Bonds is included in the Subcontract Amount, and upon McCarthy’s request, the surety shall furnish to McCarthy an affidavit executed by the surety’s attorney-in-fact stating the actual cost (net of any rebates, discounts or refunds) to the Subcontractor of the Bonds. If the Subcontract Amount increases by Change Order, McCarthy reserves the right to request that Subcontractor require its surety provide a rider to the bonds increasing the penal sum to the then current Subcontract Amount. | Party Submissions | 5.867795 | 5.053901 | 5.460226 |
null | Legal Decisions | null | null | null |
To establish in U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security an EB–5 Regional Center Program Advisory Com-mittee. | Legislation | 7.499344 | 7.416022 | 9.446797 |
After Dr. Castillo and Baptist answered (CR.22-44), the Walkers served initial expert reports from James Tappan, M.D. (CR.57-65) and Donald Null, M.D. (CR.453-54) in an effort to support their claims against Dr. Castillo.1 Dr. Castillo objected to the reports and moved to dismiss. (CR.45-56).2 She objected: (i) neither Dr. Tappan nor Dr. Null were qualified to offer the opinions they did (CR.48-50); (ii) their reports were too vague and conclusory about standard of care and Dr. Castillo’s claimed breach (CR.50-51); and (iii) their opinions about causation failed because neither explained how or why any alleged breach of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo purportedly caused H.W.’s injuries. (CR.51-54). | Party Submissions | 6.883466 | 7.60753 | 7.427364 |
This First Amendment to the Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”), between United Rentals, Inc. (the “Company”) and Matthew J. Flannery (“Executive”), is made effective as of November 9, 2023. | Contract | 4.433069 | 3.482464 | 4.231847 |
ANYTHING HEREIN TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, and in lieu of the terms and provisions contained in Sections 91.401 through 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, the parties hereto specifically agree that the following provisions shall apply to this Lease and all royalty payments made hereunder or any other rights as provided in the above listed sections, and that such provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code shall not be applicable; such parties further, by their signatures below, waive any and all rights which might be claimed or asserted under such Sections 91.401 and 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code; thus it is specifically provided that:... B. Royalties on production shall be paid on a calendar month basis. The royalty for the month in which production is first marketed shall be paid on or before the first day of the calendar month next following the expiration of sixty (60) days from the execution date of the completion report or potential test for the well that is filed with the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the respective royalty payments for each subsequent calendar month of production shall be made on or before the first day of each successive calendar month following the calendar month in which the first payment is due. | Party Submissions | 5.749214 | 5.516983 | 5.877889 |
In contrast, Rafiei's case is not built on speculative assertions or hypothetical scenarios. The sales contract he entered into clearly defines the costs associated with the arbitration process under the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. The detailed fee structure, combined with additional expenses such as the cost of a hearing room and arbitrator compensation, offers concrete evidence of the costs Rafiei would incur, which differentiates his case from the speculations presented in In re Olshan . | Party Submissions | 13.117801 | 14.440115 | 14.415653 |
With respect to the potential costs of a complete arbitration on the merits, Rafiei ignores the Texas jurisprudence on unconscionability. This can be seen on the very first page of his brief when he suggests that he is “ at risk of bearing exorbitant fees without any ceiling or limit.” Respondent’s Amended Brief, p. 5 (emphasis added). But being “at risk” is not the test— this Court has specifically held that “evidence of the ‘risk’ of possible costs of arbitration is insufficient evidence of the prohibitive cost of the arbitration forum.” In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 833, 895 (Tex. 2010)). | Party Submissions | 9.352122 | 9.210826 | 10.309733 |
No Employment Contract. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to constitute a contract of employment between an Employee and a Participating Employer. | Contract | 5.712207 | 7.085813 | 9.68504 |
Contrary to the Walkers’ assertion, nothing in the Amarillo Court’s opinion reflects that the “real reason” it reversed the trial court’s decision was because it did not “believe” the experts’ opinions. (Pet. Br. at 35). To the contrary, the Court accepted all the statements made by the experts but ultimately recognized the glaring omission by both: failing to explain how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged breaches proximately caused what Dr. Tappan contends was the injury-causing event, the perinatal arterial ischemic stroke/subacute infarction before birth and revealed on the MRI and MRA. (CR.670). | Party Submissions | 12.752666 | 13.675023 | 14.399115 |
HN7 [ ] The determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission depends on whether the claim is based on a claimant's entitlement to benefits. See In re Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. App.-- Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 805 ). The issue is not whether a particular type of claim, such as a tort or statutory claim, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Rather, the determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission depends [**9] on whether the claim is based on an alleged delay or denial of a workers' compensation benefit. | Party Submissions | 4.929937 | 5.267163 | 5.385667 |
Liberty completely fails to address the prohibitions in the Contract for exceeding the TAV, and simply contends that Ames is responsible for the amount “due and owed” that Ames agreed to pay in the Contract. Just because a damages provision is stated in a contract does not make it automatically “due and owed” and enforceable. Every liquidated damages provision that has been found by a Texas court to be an unreasonable penalty was agreed to and stated in the contract. Failure to pay an unreasonable penalty does not waive Ames’s immunity. | Party Submissions | 13.109425 | 13.646404 | 14.07795 |
Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell , 505 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 2016). The professional or administrative services also must be directly related to healthcare. | Party Submissions | 10.732622 | 9.665577 | 16.960901 |
If this Court agrees that RLB voided any potentially applicable forum-selection/choice-of-law, venue, or waiver provisions in the MCC and Subcontract when it filed this suit in a Texas court, the Court need not reach any other issue raised in the parties’ briefing. Agreeing with RLB on this statutory construction issue should result in this Court vacating the court of appeals’ opinion and instruction to dismiss the Texas lawsuit. But even if the Court disagrees, it should conclude that the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions did not govern RLB’s claims in the first place—since RLB is not a party to the MCC and MVP did not meet its burden to prove that the applicable MCC provisions “flowed down” to the Subcontract. The court of appeals erred in assuming these provisions apply and declining to reach this issue. Opinion at 10. | Party Submissions | 7.657952 | 6.935221 | 8.079427 |
Authority in February 2014. On 5 February 2014, Mr Sofus Olsen of the Authority responded to an inquiry from Mr Ankipov which Mr Olsen summarised as “ whether EU-registered boats are free to deliver crab to approved crab receptions in accordance with our regulations ” and answered “ EU-registered fishing boats can deliver crab freely to Norwegian crab receptions. If the fishing is quota-regulated (king crab, for example), the boats must have a quota”.740 This exchange relates to the landing of crabs and says nothing about their harvesting. | Legal Decisions | 16.352802 | 14.691946 | 17.737844 |
Norway expects everyone to follow applicable regulations in Norwegian maritime areas, and we want to leave no doubt that such regulations will be enforced consistently as conveyed in the above mentioned note to the EU, and in accordance with international law. | Legal Decisions | 24.134708 | 19.018532 | 25.465946 |
In the event that, in its discretion, the Company purchases an insurance policy or policies insuring the life of a Participant or any other property, to allow the Company to recover or meet the cost of providing benefits, in whole or in part, hereunder, no Participant or Beneficiary shall have any rights whatsoever therein or in the proceeds therefrom. The Company shall be the sole owner and beneficiary of any such insurance policy or property and shall possess and may exercise all incidents of ownership therein. | Contract | 5.56857 | 5.594204 | 6.338109 |
To redesignate the Richard H. Poff Federal Building located at 210 Franklin Road Southwest in Roanoke, Virginia, as the ‘‘Reuben E. Lawson Fed-eral Building’’, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 10.281235 | 7.88706 | 9.424397 |
Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union . | Legislation | 2.766044 | 3.244868 | 3.945695 |
Except in the case of an Employee on a bona fide leave of absence as provided below, an Employee is deemed to have incurred a Separation from Service if the Employer and the Employee reasonably anticipated that the level of services to be performed by the Employee after a date certain would be reduced to twenty percent (20%) or less of the average services rendered by the Employee during the immediately preceding thirty-six (36) month period (or the total period of employment, if less than thirty-six (36) months), disregarding periods during which the Employee was on a bona fide leave of absence. | Contract | 2.968937 | 3.385877 | 3.26267 |
On January 20, 2021, Santos filed a Motion for New Trial. CR1:178-187. That same day, Santos also filed a second Plea to the Jurisdiction. CR1:188-213. On March 18, 2021, the Court denied Santos’ Motion for New Trial. CR1:249. That same day, the Court denied Santos’ second Plea to the Jurisdiction. CR1:250. On March 19, 2021, Santos filed her Notice of Appeal. CR1:254. On July 12, 2022, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of Yellowfin. | Party Submissions | 3.06723 | 3.353981 | 3.437086 |
This requirement helps ensure that potentially viable claims are not improperly dismissed when a report is deficient but curable. See Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556 (explaining that the TMLA allows a claimant a thirty-day period to cure deficiencies before the trial court finally determines that the report is inadequate and the claim must be dismissed). | Party Submissions | 8.240006 | 8.96574 | 10.880461 |
Title The union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property; the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself. | Party Submissions | 18.465446 | 19.408531 | 18.7928 |
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control, with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration. Claimants object to production of such documents on two grounds: First, the vast majority, if not all, of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege (Articles 9(2)(b) and 9(4) of the IBA Rules). | Legal Decisions | 6.202608 | 6.709038 | 6.506791 |
Thompson itself reiterated the law requiring substantial factor and but-for causation. The intermediate court in that case had only applied substantial factor causation (and not but-for causation) on the theory that the negligent acts of multiple defendants had concurrently caused the injury. Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 638 S.W.3d 218, 232 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021). This Court explained that was error: a plaintiff must prove but-for causation even when the negligence of multiple providers is at issue. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d at 160. The court of appeals here made no such error. Instead, the court correctly required the expert reports to explain proximate cause for each defendant. | Party Submissions | 6.918113 | 7.737842 | 7.813419 |
For these reasons, Petitioners ask the Court to request full briefing, grant this petition for review, reverse the court of appeals, and reinstate the trial court’s judgment denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, allowing them to replead as necessary. Alternatively, Petitioners ask the Court to reverse and remand to the court of appeals to reconsider the arguments raised in Petitioners motions for rehearing. Petitioners ask for any further relief to which they might be entitled. | Party Submissions | 5.566392 | 5.995114 | 6.529 |
Fax. (940) 553-2305 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT WILBARGER COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD As required by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I certify that, according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare this brief, the brief contains 10,688 words. | Party Submissions | 5.638892 | 6.535393 | 7.279499 |
First, a “covenant not to execute” is a “covenant in which a party who has won a judgment agrees not to enforce it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 458 (11th ed. 2019). The forbearance agreement contains a specific covenant not to execute on the judgment unless Mendietta defaults under the agreement: “Bay, Ltd. shall not take any further or other action to collect on said Final Judgment unless Mendietta fails to timely perform the terms of this Agreement.” (2CR916). Thus, so long as Mendietta owns the property, is alive, is not in foreclosure, does not allow any other claims against the property, and is making payments toward the constitutional lien on his homestead, Bay, Ltd. cannot take action to enforce the judgment. (Id.). If Mendietta somehow won the lottery or obtained sufficient assets to pay the judgment, Bay, Ltd. would still be unable to collect more than the $750/month payments toward the constitutional lien on the homestead, so long as Mendietta complies with the forbearance agreement. (Id.). If Mendietta won the lottery and then voluntarily paid the judgment, it would not be a secret that the Diocese would be unable to discover. The same is true for Mendietta if the Court reinstates the judgment against the Diocese, the Diocese pays toward the judgment, and Bay later is able to collect against Mendietta. Established judgment collection rules provide many methods by which the Diocese and/or Mendietta would learn about payments toward the judgment. If Mendietta voluntarily satisfies the $1.9 million judgment in full, Bay, Ltd.’s judgment and any judgment lien would be extinguished. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.006(b) (“A properly filed abstract of the judgment continues to constitute a lien under Section 52.001 until the earlier of the 20th anniversary of the date the abstract is recorded and indexed or the date the judgment is satisfied or the lien is released.”). If all or a portion of the judgment is satisfied through payment, release, or execution, Texas Property Code section 52.005 allows for proof of judgment satisfaction in the form of returns on execution by the officer making the return, as well as a receipt, acknowledgment, or release signed by the judgment creditor, all of which must be filed in the county property records. TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.005. Indeed, before seeking any sort of execution, Bay, Ltd. would be required to file an abstract of judgment that discloses the amount of any payments made toward the judgment. Id. § 52.003(a)(8). | Party Submissions | 6.258959 | 6.272266 | 6.4508 |
Galovelho does not attempt to fit its claim within the Steele understanding of a compensable claim for damage of property short of an actual taking. Instead, relying largely on two recent concurring opinions by supreme court justices, he simply equates the damages he alleges from temporary restrictions to an actual taking. We do not read either of the concurring opinions to make that same equation. See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 182–88 (J. Young concurring); Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777–82 (Tex. 2021) (J. Busby concurring). And each of the majority opinions in those cases addresses the taking alleged under established federal jurisprudence. See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d at 181 (applying Penn Central factors); Jim Olive Photography, 624 S.W.3d at 771-74 (applying Lucas progeny to takings claim). | Party Submissions | 7.841754 | 8.534709 | 7.999489 |
Recognizing February 4, 2024, as ‘‘World Cancer Day’’, and its theme ‘‘Close the Care Gap’’, to raise awareness about and launch efforts to eliminate racial and ethnic inequities and disparities in cancer care both in the United States and globally. | Legislation | 7.385587 | 5.054706 | 7.796262 |
Separation from Service Account. Separation from Service Account means an Account established pursuant to a Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement that becomes effective and irrevocable on or after the Second Restatement Date and shall be payable as part of a Participant’s Separation from Service Benefit under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) and as otherwise provided under the terms of this Plan. The Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement that establishes a Separation from Service Account shall also designate a Payment Schedule that applies only to the Account Balance of such Account. | Contract | 5.3668 | 4.750742 | 6.026758 |
Oncor claims that forcing refund of taxes for prior years poses no hardship for the taxing units since it only paid the sums not in dispute. The argument fails to comprehend how property taxes work. By July 25 of each year, appraisal districts are charged with certifying values to taxing units. TEX. TAX CODE § 26.01. Appraisal districts enter settlement agreements such as the one in question in order to reach certainty on the values they certify to the taxing units. Taxing units calculate their no new tax rate, voter approval rate, notices and ultimate tax rate to adopt based on those values and set their budgets accordingly. TEX. TAX CODE §§ 26.04, 26.05, 26.06, 26.07, 26.08 et al. The revenue is allocated and budgeted, and is an element of the tax rate regardless whether the property owner pays it. | Party Submissions | 8.967955 | 9.16436 | 8.920112 |
An Employee is a key employee if he or she meets the requirements of Code Section 416(i)(1)(A)(i), (ii), or (iii) (applied in accordance with applicable regulations thereunder and without regard to Code Section 416(i)(5)) at any time during the twelve (12) month period ending on the Specified Employee Identification Date. Such Employee shall be treated as a key employee for the entire twelve (12) month period beginning on the Specified Employee Effective Date. | Contract | 3.70402 | 3.888484 | 4.579448 |
Jurisdictional basis for this Petition is found in V.T.C.A., §22.001(a), because this appeal presents a question of law that is important to the jurisprudence of the state concerning jurisdiction over non-residents to answer for torts committed in Texas. | Party Submissions | 7.577463 | 9.178124 | 9.225088 |
Nor can Respondents reframe the court of appeals’ decision as the mere enforcement of a “voluntary agreement” by which Westwood abandoned its ultimate right to possess the premises or gave up its claims in district court (Resp. 21-22, 33)—because Westwood did no such thing. Respondents place great weight on the fact that Westwood did not merely dismiss its appeal in the forcible entry and detainer action, but further “affirmatively agree[d]” to the agreed judgment (Resp. 16). To Respondents, this makes the dismissal effective as a “Rule 11 agreement” ( id. 21, 28). They also insist that this supposed “agree[ment]” in the agreed judgment is far more critical to understanding the lower court’s decision of the court below than the agreed judgment’s legal effect as a “judgment.” (Resp. 20) But Westwood’s previous counsel agreed to that judgment only “AS TO FORM.” (DX43) Indeed, Respondents have taken inconsistent positions on whether this “Rule 11 agreement” actually exists (Resp. 33) and what it is supposed to do. | Party Submissions | 10.263586 | 10.375755 | 10.491441 |
Payment Schedule. Payment Schedule means the date as of which payment of an Account under the Plan will commence and the form in which payment of such Account will be made. | Contract | 14.43383 | 12.30903 | 20.35854 |
McCarthy, the Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents shall be added as additional insureds for on-going and Completed Operations under Subcontractor's Commercial General Liability Policy. Coverage afforded to these additional insureds will be primary to and non-contributory with, any other insurance available to such additional insureds. The Commercial General Liability Policy additional insured coverage shall be provided on the combination of ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 10 04 13 and CG 20 37 04 13 or equivalent as determined and approved by McCarthy, and a copy of such endorsement shall be attached to the required Certificate of Insurance. Additional Insured Endorsements that limit coverage to less than what is required by this Subcontract will not be accepted unless otherwise limited by applicable law. Subcontractor will provide additional insured coverage to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law for the longer of ten (10) years after Substantial Completion of the Project or the statute of repose in the state in which the Project is located. Commercial General Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation against all additional insureds. | Party Submissions | 5.396879 | 4.80444 | 5.640471 |
To express the sense of the Senate regarding the constitu- tional right of State Governors to repel the dangerous ongoing invasion across the United States southern border. | Legislation | 23.375212 | 19.989065 | 29.18889 |
The Response does not make a serious attempt to defend the majority’s “subjectivity” analysis. Resp. 15-16. Instead, it falls back on its mistaken arguments that this case does not involve self-dealing. Resp. 16-18. Those arguments are unavailing. Supra 5-8. | Party Submissions | 10.714651 | 11.722144 | 11.692843 |
Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rule 38 18.1. Any person may present evidence as a witness, including a Party or a Party’s officer, employee, or other representative. | Legal Decisions | 14.951795 | 15.951349 | 18.053286 |
However, the Court notes that this presumption can be rebutted with evidence establishing a lack of intent to make a gift. Id. In other words, the Court permitted the admission of parol evidence to rebut the specific terms of the deed transferring title to the property. The evidence showed that the husband relied on his lawyer to draft the paperwork to buy out the brother’s interest in the land. Id. Further, the trial court found that the method of transfer was a means of convenience to complete the purchase. Husband testified that no intent to make a gift was intended. Id. Therefore, the presumption of gift was rebutted. Id. | Party Submissions | 7.552241 | 7.928222 | 8.126716 |
Finally, in the alternative, the Delapenas ask for an opportunity to amend their pleadings to allege a premises defect claim based on evidence “ that the City has [since] placed a lifeguard chair directly over where Catiana drowned.” We address each theory of liability and whether it fits within the TTCA’s waiver of immunity. | Party Submissions | 19.385036 | 23.708954 | 25.706182 |
Although the TWCA's waiver of defenses is intended to encourage employers to subscribe to the workers' compensation system, the "especially punitive litigation regime for non-subscribing employers." HN9 [ ] Absent intentional misconduct, employees still must prove all the elements of a common law negligence claim to prevail against nonsubscribing employers. "In other words," as the Fifth Circuit observed in this [*8] case, TWCA "section 406.033(a)(1)-(3) may limit an employer's defenses, but it does not eliminate an employee's burden to establish his common law claim." This burden, of course, includes the burden to prove that a defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, which is the issue that our general rule and exceptions address. | Party Submissions | 9.082793 | 9.021298 | 9.581368 |
TDCC warrants that all product purchased from TDCC by a UCC Member hereunder shall meet the specifications set forth in Exhibit A. THE FOREGOING IS TDCC'S SOLE WARRANTY REGARDING PRODUCTS AND SERVICES SUPPLIED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, AND IS MADE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF AND EXCLUDES ANY AND ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND ALL OTHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THOSE PROVIDED BY STATUTE OR COMMON LAW. TDCC MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE PRODUCTS OR SERVICES SUPPLIED HEREUNDER. EACH UCC MEMBER, WITH RESPECT TO ANY PRODUCT RECEIVED BY SUCH UCC MEMBER HEREUNDER, ASSUMES ALL RISK, RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE USE OR APPLICATION OF SUCH PRODUCT, AND TDCC SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY WHATSOEVER FOR THE USE OR APPLICATION OF ANY SUCH PRODUCT. | Contract | 2.998328 | 2.158263 | 3.159396 |
For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage after the Respondent has had the opportunity to respond to the allegations. | Legal Decisions | 9.796039 | 9.282198 | 9.969571 |
Here, under the fourth version of events, Mann was walking to his vehicle to avoid the discomfort of being soaked by rain, which was incident to his work out of doors at the refinery. See Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. 1988) (finding, as a matter of law, that where an employee was soaked in gas and paint due to his job and was injured when he went to take a bath to resolve his “personal discomfort,” the injured employee remained within course and scope at the time of his injury). Even assuming the fourth version to be true, the personal comfort doctrine favors the conclusion that Mann is not excluded from course and scope for simply trying to escape the rain. See id. | Party Submissions | 10.16484 | 11.004011 | 12.191678 |
To begin, “incidental” is generally understood to refer to something that is not the major issue or primary part of something. As one dictionary explains, incidental can mean “accompanying but not a major part of something,” or “occurring by chance in connection with something else,” or, in reference to expenses, “an incidental detail, expense, event, etc.: an allowance to cover meals, taxis, and other incidentals .” Incidental, New Oxford American Dictionary 878 (Stevenson & Lindberg, 3d ed. 2010) In the last example, the trip itself and maybe a conference or meeting is the major, primary event; expenses related to food and travel are incidental, in that they occur only because the conference or meeting is occurring and are insignificant in relation to the main event. | Party Submissions | 8.928418 | 8.880831 | 9.278782 |
In re Holcomb, a companion case, held that a candidate for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was “entitled to an opportunity to cure and be included on the primary ballot” where his petition included duplicative signatures that the candidate could have remedied. 186 S.W.3d 553, 554-55 (Tex. 2006). As this Court explained, duplicative signatures made the petition invalid, “but the Election Code”—then as now—“does not mandate that the candidate therefore be punished by exclusion from the ballot.” Id. at 555; see also In re Sharp, 186 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. 2006) (similar). | Party Submissions | 4.855568 | 5.426916 | 5.106861 |
B.The trial court lacked jurisdiction because Oncor failed to exhaust administrative remedies Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, and failure to do so deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d 952, 954–55 (Tex.1990). Where protests or motions before the ARB are dismissed without hearing the merits. Under Tex. Tax Code §41.45(f), which provides that where a property owner is denied a hearing before an Appraisal Review Board to which it is otherwise entitled may sue that ARB directly for an order compelling it to provide that hearing. This would have been the proper avenue for Oncor to follow, but it did not. Such suits, moreover, must be brought within 60 days of receiving notice of the ARB’s action. Unified Housing of Parkside Crossing, LLC v. Appraisal Rev. Bd. of Williamson Cnty., No. | Party Submissions | 6.646244 | 6.804101 | 6.640498 |
Arbitration Rule 38 19.1. A Party may be called upon by the opposing Party to produce at the hearing for cross-examination any factual or expert witness whose written testimony has been advanced with the Pleadings. | Legal Decisions | 14.010366 | 13.572097 | 15.588551 |
To require the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to establish procedures and reporting requirements for incidents relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.408138 | 6.80535 | 6.756167 |
Petitioners misread the Romero opinion. In Romero, plaintiff sued a hospital, two physicians, and a nurse for injuries caused by a negligently delayed blood transfusion. 10 The liability theories against the hospital included both (i) negligence and (ii) malice in credentialing a surgeon. The jury found all parties at fault and were required to apportion fault between all parties. 11 On appeal, it was determined that no evidence supported the credentialing claim.12 The hospital argued that harmful error mandated reversal under Casteel because the jury was allowed to consider the legally unsupported credentialing facts when determining how much fault to apportion to the hospital.13 This Court in Romero agreed and held that 7 Mot., p. 7. 8 Mot., p. 7-8. 9 Id. 10 166 S.W.3d at 219. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 220. 13 Id. at 225-26. | Party Submissions | 6.415319 | 6.48199 | 6.887016 |
Subsets and Splits