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Respondent disputes this. Respondent points to Article 1(3)(b) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, which requires the investor to prove its seat is in the territory of Cyprus and argues that regardless of whether the Tribunal applies international law or Cyprus law to determine what "seat" means under the BIT, the term "seat" requires effective management by the Cyprus entity, which the Cypriot Claimants failed to prove. | Legal Decisions | 7.111317 | 8.690043 | 7.86413 |
C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable. | Party Submissions | 7.634686 | 7.763022 | 8.385379 |
In his testimony, referred to: estimated extraction rates as referred to at pp. 47-49 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-10), with “an increasing curve that goes beyond Please explain the basis for these statements by reference to the evidence in the record. 126. was referring to the estimated initial production forecast contained in the environmental impact statement attached as Annex 2 to the 1986 Investment Agreement.335 As shown by the numbers on the bars toward the right-hand side of the graph that appears on the left in Figure 14 below, the 1986 Investment Agreement anticipated that extraction volumes could surpass six million tons per year. | Party Submissions | 17.533041 | 14.601854 | 18.168974 |
As stated in § 2, vessels that are to fish in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction must be registered through notification to the Directorate of Fisheries. Attached is the registration form that can be used. [...] The registration notification will be processed and information about the vessel will be sent to the NEAFC Secretariat in London. | Legal Decisions | 13.3089 | 14.145903 | 12.440787 |
App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied)). So it makes little difference whether Respondents “disclaimed any appellate issue about res judicata,” whether the court of appeals insisted “it was not ruling on res judicata,” or whether the “opinion cites no case about res judicata.” (Resp. 16) The opinion’s underpinning logic is more akin to collateral estoppel anyway, because the court of appeals treated “the issue” of Westwood’s abandonment of the premises as having been “decided” in the forcible entry and detainer proceeding, and therefore preventing “relitigation” of the issue in district court. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am ., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992). In any event, the fact that the court held that the forcible entry and detainer proceeding’s result “precluded [Westwood] from recovering damages,” and prevented Westwood from being able to satisfy “at least one element” of its “constructive eviction and breach of contract claims,” showed the court’s belief that the result in an eviction proceeding will control the different proceedings in district court. (Op. 2, 6) And that violates Texas statutes defining the boundaries between the jurisdiction of Texas district courts and lower courts in eviction cases regardless of the particular reason for that preclusion. Respondents do nothing to prove otherwise except to insist those boundaries pertain only to “res judicata” when they plainly do not. | Party Submissions | 8.647799 | 9.084266 | 9.416718 |
Deep within Texas law, and indeed the legal fabric of many jurisdictions, lies a wariness of unconscionable contracts or clauses. Such contracts, perceived as lopsided or oppressive, are often deemed unenforceable. An arbitration clause that leaves a party vulnerable to unfettered costs, especially when there's a stark financial disparity between the two parties, can easily be painted with the brush of unconscionability. To enforce such clauses would be to flout public policy, which guards against the enforcement of inequitable agreements. | Party Submissions | 9.337794 | 9.304716 | 9.740095 |
The Manns argue that Bay has produced no evidence of a written agreement, and therefore summary judgment was proper. However, contrary to the Manns' assertion, Bay's record evidence supports the existence of a fact issue concerning whether a “written agreement” exists. See Briggs, 337 S.W.3d at 283. This evidence includes a policy manual from Valero which sets out the terms by which Valero will supply ROCIP coverage to subcontractors such as Bay, and which provides that the manual's terms were mandatorily “incorporated by reference into” the subcontractor's contract with Valero. The ROCIP policy itself is also probative of the existence of a written agreement, especially given that the policy was signed by Bay and makes multiple references to binding both Bay and the policy “sponsor” Valero, and it refers to Bay's execution of a “written contract” with Valero “to provide workers compensation insurance in connection with the designated premises.” Finally, Bay submitted an affidavit from Bay's vice-president of safety and human resources which attests that there was a written agreement called the “Alliance Services Agreement.” Viewed in the light most favorable to Bay, see SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641, this evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ concerning the existence of a written agreement to provide ROCIP coverage. See Helix Energy, 522 S.W.3d at 431. Thus, Bay has successfully created a fact issue on the existence of a written agreement. This fact issue prevents the Manns from conclusively negating the employer element. See id. The trial court's summary judgment disposing of Bay's affirmative defense cannot be affirmed on the basis of this element. See id.; see also Toal, 2001 WL 1382513, at *2. | Party Submissions | 6.856376 | 6.987265 | 7.138884 |
In describing the pervasive regulatory scheme created by the Property Tax Code, the court in Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. O'Connor & Assocs ., 267 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet. ) stated the following: The Tax Code sets forth administrative procedures for aggrieved property owners to protest their tax liabilities. A property owner may protest to the Board the appraised value of the owner's property, the inclusion of the property on the appraisal records, a failure by the chief appraiser or the Board to provide the property owner with any notice to which the owner is entitled, and any other action by the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or Board that applies to and adversely affects the property owner. The Board must schedule a hearing on the property owner's protest. .. Review in the district court is by trial de novo, and the district court may enter any order necessary to preserve rights protected by and impose duties required by the law. Therefore, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes, and property owners generally must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. | Party Submissions | 4.839163 | 5.40361 | 5.164997 |
Finally, this Court should address whether the Legislature through HHSC has legislatively imposed duties for all owners, managers, operators, or other attendants in charge of Class A or Class B public swimming pools. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 341.0645 (requiring compliance with rules adopted by commissioner to prevent drowning); see also TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, § 265.191 (requiring all Class A and Class B public pools to provide lifeguards). See also Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (holding city ordinance imposed duty of care on property owner). Other jurisdictions that have analyzed this issue have found these types of regulations impose a duty on the owner or operator. See, e.g., Coleman v. Shaw, 314 S.E.2d 154, 158 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (violation of health and safety regulation requiring lifeguards was negligence per se); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company v. McGivern, 208 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Ga. 1974) (acknowledging violation of ordinance requiring lifeguard or attendant can constitute negligence per se); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 471 (Cal. 1970) (statutory obligation to have a lifeguard imposed a duty). | Party Submissions | 3.982547 | 4.250672 | 4.210856 |
The parties' arguments in the judicial review case have evolved somewhat over the course of the proceedings. However, HN3 [ ] section 410.302 of the Labor Code [**13] provides that a trial court is limited to reviewing only those issues decided by the appeals panel. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.302(b) (Vernon 2006); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 164 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Further, a delineation of the matters at issue in the judicial review case facilitates our disposition of Sonic's mandamus petition. Therefore, we set out the issues addressed in the TWCC proceedings. | Party Submissions | 5.170556 | 5.869959 | 5.893932 |
For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the T Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 16: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents mostly prepared by the Claimant himself and relating in whole or in part to the encounter organized by the Claimant between Qatar representatives, including Dr Ali bin Smikh Al Marri and the company DENNYS in May and June 2019 for the purpose of developing infrastructure in Qatar. Such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”. | Legal Decisions | 18.912764 | 17.540846 | 20.107515 |
S.W.3d 52, 63 (Tex. 2013) (citing Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000)). | Party Submissions | 3.099789 | 3.876213 | 4.856197 |
Overview”, ASA Bulletin 22, (2/2004), p. 273. 1550 C-CS ¶ 10; see C-CS Annex A, Table B(1)(b); citing CL-280, Hydro S.r.l. and others v. Republic of Albania, counsel and case management. Even so, the Tribunal considers First Claimant’s costs to exceed what is reasonable in this case. | Legal Decisions | 21.630566 | 24.321976 | 25.078623 |
PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Cadastre, in accordance with the applicable regulations.178 In other words, the requested documents are “in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties”. 179 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Cadastre in order to obtain documents in question.180 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents, so it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants already obtained the Cadastre excerpts related to the land plots at Dunavska 17-19 (exhibits C-162 to C-164) as well as excerpts related to the plots located nearby (for example, exhibits C-323 to C-325), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. U, B : The request is unduly and overly broad and burdensome as it relates to all land book excerpts for land plots at Dunavska 17-19 and 23, which are not even specified, and to the Surrounding Area, which is also unspecified. The request potentially covers a large number of documents, which are very hard to identify. Also, Claimants’ request covers period of at least 56 years, even before the establishment of Obnova. 181 Respondent cannot reasonably be bound to produce all these documents. | Legal Decisions | 8.715206 | 9.280084 | 8.907555 |
Alternatively, the Court should reverse and render a take-nothing judgment because there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict in the malpractice trial on liability or damages. At a minimum, 58 the finding of gross negligence should be reversed and rendered, and the remainder of the case remanded for trial, either for the reasons the court of appeals found or because of the failure to submit proportionate liability under Chapter 33. | Party Submissions | 9.468039 | 10.430973 | 10.858213 |
Significantly, Backes’ s obligations under those two sections are not activated until the borrower defaults on the bridge loan note, whether by failure to pay the note in full upon maturity or by some other event of default, at which point, according to Osprin, they become matured and fixed. | Party Submissions | 24.56348 | 21.676565 | 32.04291 |
On the other hand, Rafiei's situation is dictated by the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which lack similar cost caps. This stark difference in applicable rules directly affects the financial implications for the parties involved, setting Rafiei's case apart from the scenario in In re Olshan. | Party Submissions | 19.878445 | 21.141548 | 26.314808 |
The Walkers’ case law on this point is distinguishable. In Livingston v. Montgomery, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that an obstetrician was qualified to offer opinions about the cause of a newborn’s neurological injuries. Livingston v. Montgomery, 279 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). But that was because he explained in his report how he had the requisite knowledge and expertise to “recognize the perinatal progression of hypoxia due to inadequate oxygenation...” and “knowledge and experience on the subject of hypoxia as it relates to the associated buildup of carbon dioxide (hypercapnia) that complicates ischemia....” Id. at 874. Dr. Tappan did not do the same. | Party Submissions | 6.848273 | 6.788009 | 7.509448 |
Upon consideration of this issue, we have concluded that French v. French should be overruled and the subsequent decisions which rely on that precedent should be disapproved. As we shall explain, the French rule cannot stand because nonvested pension rights are not an expectancy but a contingent interest in property; furthermore, the French rule compels an inequitable division of the rights acquired through community effort. Pension rights, whether or not vested, represent a property interest to the extent that such rights derive from employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division in a dissolution proceeding. | Party Submissions | 8.702558 | 9.071101 | 8.663078 |
The requested documents are further relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute, as they would serve to corroborate Respondent's objections to the admissibility of the Cypriot Claimants' claims, specifically Respondent's objection that Kalemegdan's acquisition of the Obnova shares was an abuse of process. | Legal Decisions | 11.060468 | 13.964952 | 13.562616 |
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ i Nature of the Case : This is an action by Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp. to enforce a promissory Note. Deysi R. Santos (“Santos”) executed the second lien Note at issue on April 28, 2005. The first lien was foreclosed on November 6, 2007, rendering the second lien Note unsecured. Yellowfin purchased the Note on August 29, 2019, and is the holder and payee of the Note. With all necessary conditions met, Yellowfin filed this lawsuit on June 12, 2020, seeking judgment for $21,023.13 and an award of its fees and costs. On July 23, 2020, Santos counterclaimed for fraud and violation of the Texas Debt Collection Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Yellowfin as to all claims and counterclaims on December 22, 2020. This appeal followed. | Party Submissions | 5.742276 | 5.607499 | 6.125665 |
Contents of Notice. If a benefits claim is completely or partially denied on review, notice of such denial shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for denial in plain language. | Contract | 8.195972 | 12.249744 | 12.17826 |
Nothing in this Agreement is intended to conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) or create liability for disclosures of trade secrets that are expressly allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b). | Contract | 2.550376 | 3.040094 | 3.044639 |
None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant. The requested information is not at Claimant’s disposal because it is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 15.314683 | 17.08176 | 15.799723 |
Lastly, a core concern in assessing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is whether the costs associated with arbitration would preclude a party from effectively vindicating their rights. In In re Olshan, this Court found no legally sufficient evidence that the homeowners would face arbitration fees that would deter them from accessing the arbitral forum, thanks to the cost protections offered by the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. Id. at 897. | Party Submissions | 8.583846 | 9.163167 | 10.972971 |
Additionally, Devine fails to provide the context of his Reed citation. Ironically, the Reed Court delineates that “the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process” overrides Appellant’s (in Reed) spurious 10 challenges. Reed, 561 U.S. at 197. The Supreme Court further explains that the State’s interest is particularly strong “with respect to efforts to root out fraud... but the State’s interest is not limited to combating fraud; it extends to efforts to ferret out invalid signatures caused not by fraud but by simple mistake, such as duplicate signatures or signatures of individuals who are not registered to vote in the State.” Id. The Reed Court goes on to opine that “the State’s interest also extends more generally to promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process.” Id. at 198. | Party Submissions | 7.558338 | 7.151539 | 8.565219 |
Compound interest has become overwhelming as the modern trend. Delaware courts have called it the trend, precisely because modern participants in a market economy think in terms of compounding. See ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that, “[i]t is simply not credible in today’s financial markets that a person sophisticated enough to perfect his or her appraisal rights would be unsophisticated enough to make an investment at simple interest—in fact, even passbook savings accounts now compound their interest daily”) (footnote omitted). | Party Submissions | 12.399896 | 11.367022 | 12.709004 |
Disability Benefit. A Participant who is entitled to receive a Disability Benefit shall receive payment of such benefit in a single lump sum. | Contract | 4.968453 | 5.836928 | 8.917373 |
The request seeks “[a]ll documents” that any agency, official, or employee of any of the three USMCA Parties “prepared, proposed, or exchanged. .. or that otherwise pertain to positions considered or taken by any of them” in connection with the specified topics. | Legal Decisions | 14.794007 | 20.236681 | 19.234863 |
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT DOES NOT JUSTIFY DENYING THAT PARTY COURT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD. REFUSAL BY A PARTY TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY FAILURE TO PAY COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT TO THAT PARTY. | Party Submissions | 2.774132 | 3.012515 | 3.151779 |
The language in the charge, however, incorporates the passive receipt doctrine acknowledged by numerous courts both before and after Heldenfels, including an opinion authored by Justice Bland while serving on the First Court of Appeals. See Cristobal v. Allen, No. 01-09-00126-CV, 2010 WL 2873502, at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] July 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain.”). In fact, in the Diocese’s requested jury question and proposed instructions, the Diocese included an instruction that stated: “A party ‘takes an undue advantage’ when it wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which it would be unconscionable to retain.” (2CR855-56). Thus, even if the trial court had given the Diocese’s proposed charge, we would arrive at the same place—applying the passive receipts doctrine. | Party Submissions | 6.095419 | 6.525109 | 6.608241 |
Nor is it accurate that Dr. Castillo and Baptist failed to challenge foreseeability. ( See Pet. Br. at 38). As the Walkers acknowledge, this appeal is about, among other things, the sufficiency of their experts’ causation opinions. And “proximate cause has two components: (1) foreseeability and (2) cause-in-fact.” Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460. If, as the Walkers concede (see id.), Dr. Castillo challenged the lack of proximate cause opinions, and foreseeability is an element of proximate cause, how did she fail to challenge foreseeability? | Party Submissions | 8.196876 | 8.385833 | 8.502043 |
Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force, Aviation Liability insurance covering all aircraft used in connection with the Project. Such insurance shall include coverage for bodily injury and property damage. All such insurance shall contain a breach of warranty endorsement in favor McCarthy. | Party Submissions | 9.400261 | 7.952462 | 12.178612 |
Sargeant’s 2013 Contract. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 111. Claimant is entitled to such Cargo Manifests and Declarations to evidence that Respondent ignored identical provisions in the contracts of State and Dominican-owned AC-30 suppliers, but is using such a provision to target Sargeant and avoid honoring the 2013 Contract. | Legal Decisions | 26.055016 | 26.03838 | 31.207808 |
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. | Party Submissions | 8.470454 | 9.081414 | 9.365897 |
Subcontractor's Work or submittals shall not relieve Subcontractor from its obligation to perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. | Party Submissions | 5.763784 | 8.487578 | 11.694551 |
In this case, Carol Ann Henry sought payment of workers' compensation medical benefits related to a back injury allegedly sustained while working at a Dillard's store. Dillard, which was self-insured, denied Henry's claim because it was not job-related and notified the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission of its decision. Nevertheless, Dillard paid Henry benefits without admitting the validity of the claim. The dispute over the compensability of Henry's claim has never been resolved before the Commission. | Party Submissions | 6.796783 | 7.370245 | 7.264406 |
As a preliminary matter, mandamus may have been unnecessary from either this Court or the court of appeals had Walker elected to file a petition in an appropriate district court. District courts have the authority to entertain challenges to whether a candidate’s application for the ballot complies with the Election Code’s requirements. See, e.g., Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081 (empowering courts to grant injunction to prevent “a violation or threatened violation of this code”); In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 537-38 (Tex. 2006) (reviewing district court’s issuance of temporary injunction directing removal of candidate from ballot). Given that Devine’s application became public information on November 13, Walker had all the information he needed to allege that Devine’s application did not satisfy statutory requirements by mid-November. At that point, Walker could have availed himself of several ordinary mechanisms for seeking accelerated relief, from asking the trial court for an expedited hearing to applying for a temporary restraining order to seeking a temporary injunction.1 Any of these might have sufficed to resolve Walker’s dispute, at least on a preliminary basis, well before last-minute mandamus relief might have become necessary. And if Walker failed before the district court, he likewise could have sought an expedited appeal, Rule 29.3 relief from the court of appeals, or then—if nothing else proved adequate—he could have sought mandamus relief from the appropriate court of appeals. Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061(a). These willingly foregone options foreclose any argument that Walker pursued mandamus relief because he lacked any other adequate options to press his claim. | Party Submissions | 6.518537 | 6.140085 | 6.72 |
On February 11, 2021, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) filed suit seeking the protection of child, for conservatorship, and for termination in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, against Appellant — A.S. CR 16-27. Within its Petition, DFPS pled the following grounds for 1 removal: grounds D, E, K, O, and P of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. CR 23-24. A.S. was served with the Petition on February 16, 2022. CR 78. After the Adversary Hearing that occurred on March 16, 2022, DFPS was made the Temporary Managing Conservator of R.W. CR 162-74. The Family Plan of Service was filed on April 5, 2022. CR 176. Intervenors — the paternal grandparents of R.W. — filed a Petition of Intervention on October 4, 2022. CR 351. Within the petition to intervene, Intervenors incorporated all “allegations and documents filed by the Department.” CR 354. Intervenors filed their First Amended Petition on March 1, 2023. CR 553. Within the First Amended Petition, Intervenors expanded — beyond what DFPS had previously pled in its original Petititon — the grounds for termination against A.S. CR 559-61. 1. Trial Testimony 1 The suit was also filed against, alleged father, C.W. However, he is not a party to the instant appeal. | Party Submissions | 5.074185 | 5.238087 | 5.553676 |
Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III Galovelho, LLC appeals the trial court’s September 21, 2021 Order and Final Judgment, which dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with prejudice after granting appellees’ original and supplemental pleas t o the jurisdiction. In seven issues, Galovelho challenges the trial court’s jurisdictional rulings on its claims for takings and for equitable relief and the trial court’s earlier order requiring leave of court – 2– before Galovelho further amended its pleadings. W e affirm the trial court’s Order and Final Judgment. | Party Submissions | 8.197265 | 9.070206 | 10.055224 |
The trial court granted the parties’ divorce on December 9, 2019 but did not rule on characterization and division of the marital estate. Id. | Party Submissions | 8.720673 | 10.676879 | 9.510406 |
TMI argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sonic on the reimbursement claim because section 406.075 bars Cochran's recovery of benefits under the TWCA and, as Cochran's subclaimant, Sonic is likewise barred from recovering under that statute. In response, [*474] Sonic contends that section 406.075 does not apply in this case because the compensation payments to Cochran were voluntary and were made prior to his receipt of the Alabama judgment. Sonic asserts it is entitled to recover the benefits from TMI because it satisfied the provisions of section 409.009 . | Party Submissions | 7.027273 | 7.412801 | 8.492975 |
This computer-generated document complies with the word-count limitations set forth in TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because it contains 5214 words, excluding the parts of this document exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, I have relied on the word-count program contained within Microsoft Word. | Party Submissions | 3.834777 | 5.665005 | 6.262618 |
Appellant workers' compensation carrier challenged a judgment of the 157th District Court, Harris County, Texas, in favor of appellee employer on the employer's reimbursement claim that had been denied under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA). The employer sought a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to lift abatement of its contract claims against the carrier. The court consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion. | Party Submissions | 6.950654 | 6.005137 | 6.796401 |
Serbia relies on certain agreements submitted as exhibits R-007 to R-010, R-012 to R-017 and RJ-011 to argue that Obnova allegedly did not have the right of use over its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.14 According to their respective wording, most of these agreements were supposed to include, at minimum, a “ scheme ” or “ outline ” depicting premises that were object of these agreements. However, the copies of the agreements submitted by Serbia do not include any annexes. As a result, the agreements submitted by Serbia are incomplete and do not make it clear to which land plots and/or buildings these agreements relate. For example, the agreement submitted as R-008 merely r efers to “the land-warehousing area in the cargo port zone on the Danube in Belgrade with a surface area of 7630 m2. ”15 This description is clearly insufficient to identify the exact location of the land in question and thus to assess whether it relates to Obnova’s current premises. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to assess whether the agreements submitted by Serbia: ( i ) relate to Obnova’s current premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 in the first place and, if so; ( ii ) what was the exact extent of rights and obligations that Obnova had under each of these agreements with respect to its current premises. | Legal Decisions | 7.532549 | 7.866935 | 7.502658 |
Relevant and material to whether other AC-30 suppliers were similarly situated to Claimant, had contracts with similar terms to the 2013 Contract, and/or had contracts that suffered from the same alleged “irregularities” as the 2013 Contract. | Legal Decisions | 14.277042 | 13.585109 | 15.762631 |
Yellowfin complains that applying this statute of limitations to all lienholders would require it to monitor actions on the property securing its interests and prove the fairness of a foreclosure it did not conduct. Resp. Br. 7, 14. But Yellowfin’s extratextual concerns cannot override Section 51.003’s plain text. In any case, t his “carefully crafted deficiency judgment statute with its two-year limitations period and other protections for borrowers and creditors” “adds balance to the mortgagor -mortgagee relationship regarding deficiency judgments ... by circumscribing mortgagees’ rights to seek deficiency judgments and specifying rights that borrowers have regarding alleged deficiencies.” PlainsCapital Bank v. Martin, 459 S.W.3d 550, 554-55 (Tex. 2015). Section 51.003 thus “is intended to protect borrowers and guarantors,” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. 2014); see Opening Br. 15-16, not debt buyers like Yellowfin. | Party Submissions | 8.588546 | 8.232665 | 8.998863 |
Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and does not have in its possession, custody or control the documents identified in the request. | Legal Decisions | 6.933465 | 13.208681 | 9.727286 |
Id. The Jaguar incentive program, which expected the dealer to deliver vehicles directly to end users to receive incentive payments, was distinct from the dealer agreement. | Party Submissions | 32.96945 | 25.535255 | 44.739075 |
So, because Yellowfin ’s predecessor (the original holder of the junior indebtedness) was entitled to seek the full amount remaining on the accelerated junior loan at foreclosure, that is when its cause of action accrued. See Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). Recall that Section 16.004(a)(3) provides that a suit on a “debt” must be brought “not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3). Yellowfin brought suit twelve years after its cause of action accrued at foreclosure, so its suit is untimely under Section 16.004’s four -year limitations period. Alternatively, Section 3.118 provides that a suit on a negotiable instrument must be brought six years after the note’s accelerated due date. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118. Because the accelerated due date here was at foreclosure, Yellowfin’s suit is untimely under that section, too. | Party Submissions | 4.704043 | 4.917105 | 4.891709 |
However, “i nformation ” within the City’s pool safety policy “is not tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or palpable qualiti es.” See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001) (citing Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. 1994)). | Party Submissions | 5.481241 | 6.365073 | 6.038575 |
Rafiei then focuses on Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044 (Vt. 2011). Response at 14-15. Glassford is not on point. The home inspection contract involved in that case was held to be unconscionable. The contract had a $285 limitation of liability provision. Id. at 1046. In contrast, the contract referred to, but did not contain, an arbitration provision that required the customer to pay an arbitration fee that would be at least $1350. Id. at 1046-47. The contract also provided that the inspection company could recover costs, attorney’s fees, and insurance policy deductibles if the company prevailed, but had no equivalent provision for the customer. Id. at 1047. Unsurprisingly, the court found for the homeowner. Id. at 1046. | Party Submissions | 6.056764 | 5.820105 | 6.197393 |
PCC : According to Respondent’s best knowledge, the requested court files from 1964 are no longer in Respondent's possession, custody or control due to the passage of time.18 In addition, Claimants have not explained why the requested documents are not already in its possession, custody or control since Obnova was a party to this court proceeding. | Legal Decisions | 12.848707 | 13.680482 | 15.780134 |
As each franchised location is dependent upon their manufacturer or distributor (hereinafter referred to as an "OEM," original equipment manufacturer) for their supply of motor vehicles, it is incumbent upon each OEM to adequately apportion and make available a sufficient allocation of product to each franchisee. | Party Submissions | 11.630808 | 11.882395 | 12.199765 |
Even if Section 51.003(a) doesn’t apply, Yellowfin’s suit remains untimely under any other statute of limitations. That is because Yellowfin’s cause of action accrued at foreclosure — when the loan was accelerated. No relevant limitations period permits a lender to wait for twelve years to recover a debt remaining after a foreclosure sale, as Yellowfin seeks to do here. | Party Submissions | 10.278259 | 10.007907 | 11.393099 |
Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), is like the others. The obstetrician expert there wrote in his expert report that he was “familiar with the probable causes of...hypoxic-ischemic injuries in babies generally and with the probable causes of the injuries to [Cornejo’s baby] in this case.” Id. at 122. | Party Submissions | 7.023312 | 6.72619 | 7.352986 |
To start, Dr. Tappan noted that Ms. Walker was in second-stage arrested labor by 15:15, when she had been pushing for four hours, H.W.’s head was not descending in the birth canal, and the fetal monitoring strip was non-reassuring, with minimal variability, inadequate accelerations, and recurring decelerations. App. 7, CR 668. | Party Submissions | 12.761086 | 13.963502 | 15.050114 |
As each dealer competes with many lines and models besides other dealers, the OEM can sell all of its product to its franchisees; however, it must do so in a fair and reasonable manner so that each dealer is adequately supplied and able to meet the demands of their market. Whether an OEM rises to the “fair and reasonable” and adequate supply requirement14 is only determined on a case-by-case basis. | Party Submissions | 14.308881 | 12.793194 | 15.004851 |
Whether an expert witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion under the relevant statutes and rules lies within the trial court ’ s sound discretion. | Party Submissions | 12.089217 | 15.211013 | 14.93285 |
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course. | Legal Decisions | 12.391204 | 10.437552 | 13.697888 |
To reauthorize the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, the Educational Technical Assistance Act of 2002, and the National Assessment of Edu-cational Progress Authorization Act, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 3.40988 | 3.175049 | 3.553121 |
Invalid or Unenforceable Provisions. If any provision of this Plan shall be held invalid or unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect any other provisions hereof and the Committee may elect in its sole discretion to construe such invalid or unenforceable provisions in a manner that conforms to applicable law or as if such provisions, to the extent invalid or unenforceable, had not been included. | Contract | 3.262439 | 2.991254 | 3.602068 |
Lessor shall be a third-party beneficiary of any gas purchase contract and/or transportation agreement entered into between Lessee and any purchaser and/or transporter or pipeline company of Lessor's gas, irrespective of any provision of said contracts to the contrary. Further, Lessor shall be entitled to Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the value of any benefits obtained by or granted to Lessee from any gas purchaser and/or transporter for the amendment, modification, extension, alteration, consolidation, transfer, cancellation or settlement of any gas purchase contract and/or transportation agreement. | Party Submissions | 5.735617 | 6.179997 | 6.635365 |
While a trial court must instruct the jury on the law, the trial court should neither misstate the law nor comment on the weight of the evidence. Here, the jury instruction incorrectly stated the law on a crucial issue at trial — harmful error as a matter of law. Importantly, HSMiller does not argue “harmless error,” apparently conceding that the instruction was harmful if the Court agrees it was wrong. HSMiller’s query on how a trial judge can prevent or correct incorrect legal testimony with instructions is an issue for another day. | Party Submissions | 14.980212 | 13.771852 | 15.821487 |
Respondent has raised the question of whether Claimants seek documents prepared by the Canadian or Mexican governments that were not shared with the U.S. | Legal Decisions | 18.948206 | 23.626316 | 25.266848 |
The San Antonio court of appeals has followed the Cockerham rule as well. Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Bahr involved a creditors rights suit where a creditor sued husband and wife for fraudulent transfer of an asset to avoid a debt. Id. at 725. Wife claimed the property was her separate property as a result of a deed executed by husband as grantor to wife as grantee. Id. The issue involved whether parol evidence was admissible to contradict the deed recitations. Id. at 726. The San Antonio court of appeals agreed that parol evidence is admissible when a deed does not expressly recite the character and use of the property conveyed. Id. at 727. | Party Submissions | 4.554164 | 5.522667 | 4.843203 |
Subcontractor binds itself to McCarthy in performing its obligations hereunder to all terms and conditions of the Contract Documents, including, but not limited to, McCarthy's Contract with the Owner. McCarthy's Contract with the Owner (hereinafter “Owner Contract”), excluding financial data, and all other Contract Documents listed in Exhibit 2 will be made available to Subcontractor upon Subcontractor's written request. In the case of conflict between this Agreement and the other Contract Documents, Subcontractor shall be bound by the more stringent requirement as determined by McCarthy. If the Owner Contract has not been finalized with the Owner, McCarthy reserves the right to modify this Agreement based upon the finalized Owner Contract and Subcontractor consents to such modifications and agrees to be bound to the finalized Owner Contract. | Party Submissions | 4.792527 | 4.260226 | 4.945793 |
This section, like the others immediately preceding it, remains unnecessary to the Court’s decision on Weatherford’s Petition, as Midland has demonstrated its immunity from suit. Nonetheless, Midland addresses the statute of limitations issue, as Weatherford raised it in its Petition. Statutes of limitation exist to give plaintiffs a reasonable time to present their claims as well as to protect defendants and courts from having to deal with stale claims. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990) (stating that claims that are not brought in a timely manner can result in the loss of evidence, through the “death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, [and the] disappearance of documents or otherwise.”). | Party Submissions | 6.505355 | 7.017108 | 7.391522 |
FERGUSON BRASWELL FRASER KUBASTA, PC 2500 Dallas Parkway, Suite 600 Plano, Texas 75093 Telephone: (972) 378-9111 Facsimile: (972) 392-8901 This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word. Relying on the word count function in that software, I certify that this motion contains 1,695 words (exclusive of the caption, statement of issues, signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance, and certificate service). I also certify that the size font complies with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (e). | Party Submissions | 5.487544 | 6.876828 | 6.78145 |
Here, Oncor argues that it discovered it was mistaken after it made its section 1.111(e) agreement. But that does not change the fact that there was harmony of opinion as to the value according to the agreement at the time of agreement. Because that final value was a matter on which a protest could have been filed, and indeed was filed and then denied, the agreement is final as to value. | Party Submissions | 17.664728 | 19.558615 | 19.831448 |
First, under section 10, “[a] person who improves the real or personal property of another, acting by mistake, has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011). This Court, in Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, cited this provision to support its holding that “[t]he principle is well established in equity that a person who in good faith makes improvements upon property owned by another is entitled to compensation therefor.” 282 S.W.3d 419, 425 & n.28 (Tex. 2008). While this Court’s statement in Wagner & Brown and the Restatement include a requirement of good faith on the party making the improvements, the Diocese neither requested an instruction on Bay, Ltd.’s good faith nor objected to its omission from the charge. (6RR57–60; 2CR855-56). | Party Submissions | 6.8977 | 7.247463 | 7.477172 |
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made. | Legal Decisions | 25.689241 | 30.791883 | 37.788612 |
A party may not argue a theory on appeal that is different from that presented in the trial court. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 458 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. | Party Submissions | 3.950349 | 4.77253 | 4.69038 |
As successor-in-interest, OSPrin stepped into Lender’s shoes and is entitled to enforce Lender’s rights. Notwithstanding the adverse parties’ attempts to confuscate the matter, the critical issue is whether Texas 1 OSPrin anticipates that the Texas Bankers Association will file an amicus curiae brief in support of rehearing OSPrin’s Petition for Review and appropriately enforcing guaranties upon default by borrowers because it is a material concern for Texas banks. | Party Submissions | 15.753764 | 17.35644 | 18.415989 |
The only question before the Court of Appeals was “whether [the Walker s’] expert reports provided enough information for the trial court to conclude they constituted a good-faith effort.” See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 516. If a reasonable gatekeeper is satisfied, so is the Legislature. | Party Submissions | 14.293046 | 13.957618 | 14.954872 |
Appendix Page 2 D. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, upon the failure of Lessee to pay Lessor the royalty payments as provided herein, the Lessor may, at Lessor's option, elect to terminate said Lease by serving written notice on Lessee at the address shown herein, of Lessor’s intention to terminate said Lease within not less than thirty (30) days of receipt, or any time thereafter. Should Lessee pay Lessor all royalty payments past due during said period, with interest as provided herein, this Lease shall not terminate. However, upon the failure of Lessee to pay Lessor said past due royalty payments during said notice period, Lessor may elect to terminate this Lease, and title to said land shall revert to Lessor. Lessor may elect to terminate said Lease, after the expiration of said notice period, by serving notice of termination, filing a copy of said notice with the County Clerk in which said land is located. The effective date of said termination shall be the date said termination is filed with the said County Clerk. In the event of the termination of said Lease in this manner, Lessee shall not remove any of Lessee's equipment, fixtures, or personal property located on said land, unless so instructed by Lessor, and if so instructed, such property shall be removed within thirty (30) days of notice to Lessee. In the event Lessor prohibits the removal of such property from the leased premises, then it shall become the property of Lessor, at the option of Lessor. | Party Submissions | 4.213658 | 4.19724 | 4.287937 |
Arbitration Rule 31 20.1. A pre-hearing organizational meeting shall be held at a date determined by the Tribunal after consultation with the Parties. It shall comprise a videoconference between the Tribunal and the Parties and address any outstanding procedural, administrative, and logistical matters (including modality of interpretation and transcription) in preparation for the hearing. | Legal Decisions | 8.427768 | 9.357902 | 9.410773 |
Q.. .. is what constitutes the roadway easement called Windemere Road today any different than it was, to your recollection, in 1995? | Party Submissions | 31.424406 | 46.697018 | 49.00155 |
Guidance is also needed from this Court on the legal ramifications of the Hospitals improperly encumbering a specific piece of real property (that was not the subject of the sanctions case) belonging not only to Dr. Nath, but also to Usha Nath (who was not a party to the sanctions case), before the Hospitals even had a final judgment in the sanctions case. The court of appeals held there are no legal consequences based on the “judicial-proceeding privilege.” Id. at *11. As the Naths explained in their petition, the Hospitals manipulated the system, will continue to do so, and only this Court can restore even a modicum of fairness to these proceedings—and help move these parties’ disputes toward resolution. | Party Submissions | 11.374618 | 11.192673 | 11.903916 |
HSMiller also does not respond to the Lawyers’ legal sufficiency arguments about two other alleged breaches: presenting a “substandard defense,” and inadequate communication by the Lawyers. Compare Resp’t’s Br. at 38-52, with Pet’rs’ Br. at 65-70. These will not be addressed further. | Party Submissions | 13.408894 | 12.290124 | 17.057291 |
HSMiller’s additional claims that the Bankruptcy Plan and everything related to it are sacrosanct and that the Lawyers are collaterally attacking the Plan also blinks at reality. The Bankruptcy Plan simply approved an assignment of proceeds from the debtor to its very limited creditors and approved the Debtor’s agreement that it would pursue its claims against its former lawyers. See Plan at 10-11, 26 (Pet’rs’ Br. at App. B, Tab 1 (PDF 142-43, 158)). | Party Submissions | 16.509682 | 16.171122 | 18.38307 |
The Committee shall have power to designate employees and other persons (other than non-employee directors of the Company) who provide services to the Company as eligible participants in this Plan (“Participants”). If an individual is hired after the Performance Period commences, the individual may become a Participant in the Plan, and the amount of his or her Bonus may be pro-rated to reflect the portion of the Performance Period worked. The Committee shall have the authority at any time to remove Participants from this Plan for that Performance Period. | Contract | 5.855161 | 5.473876 | 6.244022 |
Note there is no case from this Court that disavows the express holding of Cockerham permitting the admission of parol evidence regarding the intent of the parties to a real property deed under dispute. | Party Submissions | 20.178852 | 27.94724 | 30.580046 |
Respondent’s possession, custody, or control because they are part of the documents that were confiscated by the Respondent or they are of the type typically generated in the course of conducting business with the Claimant. | Legal Decisions | 11.95053 | 14.110325 | 17.334902 |
PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Directorate for Construction Land and Urban Development of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.209 In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".210 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Directorate in order to obtain documents in question.211 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. | Legal Decisions | 12.209973 | 13.563525 | 13.676836 |
H. The provisions of this Article XVII. shall not apply where Lessor has elected to take Lessor's royalty in kind or market separately Lessor’s royalty share of production under the terms of this Lease. | Party Submissions | 17.933712 | 19.454702 | 21.06457 |
Based on the above, we hold that Bestor's claim for attorney's fees-- whether grounded in contract or tort-- is based on Service Lloyds' dispute of Bestor's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits and is thus within the Division's exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, a Division of Workers' Compensation administrative rule governs the procedure for contesting the award of attorney's fees in workers' compensation administrative proceedings. Rule 152.3 provides in part: HN8 [ ] (d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, an attorney, claimant, or carrier who contests the fee fixed and approved by the commission shall request a benefit contested case hearing. The request shall be made by personal delivery or first class mail and be filed with the commission field office handling the claim or the central office of the commission no later than the 15th day after receipt of the commission's order. A claimant may request a hearing by contacting the commission in any manner no later than the 15th day after [**10] receipt of the commission's order. The contesting party other than a claimant [*554] shall send a copy of the request by personal delivery or first class mail to the carrier and the other parties, including the claimant and attorney. | Party Submissions | 7.266112 | 6.637267 | 7.259853 |
Construing the Election Code in any other manner would run into substantial constitutional problems. Texas’s law prohibiting individuals from signing multiple ballot petitions for the same office and then invalidating the later signature, Tex. Elec. Code §141.066, infringes core First Amendment rights of candidates and signers. No sufficient governmental interest justifies this prohibition, and it certainly cannot be constitutionally applied on these facts to remove Justice Devine from the ballot. | Party Submissions | 12.346062 | 12.296478 | 12.649964 |
This letter contains an opinion of the competent authority on the Report on the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 16.794525 | 13.59372 | 16.255219 |
To direct the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to submit to Congress a report on the amount of waste collected on certain Federal land along the southern border of the United States, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.101615 | 5.363321 | 5.633334 |
Likewise, in the present case, merely conducting pre-trial together does not create privity between the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs. Fleming Defendants cite some pre-trial motions and responses as alleged proof of Wilson Plaintiffs being in privity with the Harpst plaintiffs, but they fail to prove privity. All the Wilson Plaintiffs were focused on their own cases. Although they would have liked to get offensive collateral estoppel, that weren ’ t likely to get it, and they were all preparing for their own individual trials. All the pre-trial motions, such as when Fleming sought to strike an expert or vice versa, were handled under the assumption that each individual Wilson Plaintiff would eventually be held to those rulings when their individual trial came up, and they were each acting on behalf of themselves and no one else. | Party Submissions | 12.284332 | 11.979133 | 12.880581 |
Any and all documents included in the files maintained by the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction with respect to its work on the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate the explanation provided at Request 47 above. | Legal Decisions | 28.291052 | 31.59176 | 37.9029 |
In any event, “we look to the true nature of the dispute” rather than the plaintiff’ s characterization of the claims. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 513 (Tex. 2019). Here, the true nature of the Delapenas’ claim is that City employees failed to act when, instead of enforcing the City’s policy and denying the camp admission, they granted the camp access to the premises without ensuring campers would be adequately supervised by camp counselors. | Party Submissions | 6.522283 | 7.960406 | 7.644366 |
Beoland was the plan commissioner for the 2013 DRP141 and was responsible for, among other things, financing of the 2013 DRP and participating in the plan development. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors Beoland took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and if so, Beoland’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 17.779812 | 16.197906 | 15.85466 |
For column 1: Indicate the name of the geographical area, outbreak number or any information that allows identification of this demarcated area (DA) and the date when it was established. | Legislation | 30.178488 | 28.160543 | 30.835316 |
Special exceptions must be decided on the face of the pleadings. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. 1994). Alpesh’s declaration was filed in conjunction with his verified plea in abatement and his special exceptions in response to the First Amended Petition. CR160. While this declaration may have been proper as support for his plea in abatement, it is inadmissible in relation to his special exceptions. | Party Submissions | 7.326025 | 8.462611 | 7.972325 |
After the Texas Supreme Court resolves the aforementioned cases, we ORDER the parties to promptly file a motion to reinstate this appeal. | Party Submissions | 13.846282 | 21.519403 | 20.819134 |
Discretion of Appeals Committee. All interpretations, determinations and decisions of the Appeals Committee with respect to any claim shall be made in its sole discretion and shall be final and conclusive. | Contract | 5.019516 | 5.232907 | 6.021822 |
Collin Creek Assisted Living, Inc. v. Faber , 671 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. 2023). This case involves the second element. | Party Submissions | 8.100645 | 10.963045 | 13.319608 |
The evidence is conclusive that there was a mistake in the deed. At the time of the refinance, Wife was not a titled owner of the property and should not have been listed as a grantor in the deed. (6RR D 754–760). That evidence alone is sufficient to discredit any presumptive effect of the deed. Further, the circumstantial evidence regarding the purpose of the transaction to refinance the mortgage, the clear mistake made in the deed, Wife being in charge of the refinance process, and the fact that neither party was an attorney with knowledge of gift presumptions, combined with the trial court’s observation of the credibility of the witnesses is sufficient to draw the required inference that Husband did not intend to convey ownership to Wife as a grantee. (5RR 40:15–23, 41:12–25, 43:3–25, 44:1-4). | Party Submissions | 7.789531 | 8.053782 | 8.414558 |
Subsets and Splits