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This Court’s review is especially warranted because the El Paso court’s ruling conflicts with the Austin court’s decision interpreting the same word “require” in the same statutory provision. | Party Submissions | 10.836923 | 10.632899 | 11.373175 |
The same fee order quoted above describes what the Bankruptcy Judge believed the Plan accomplished: “[P]resumably, some affiliates and insiders of the Debtor have been spared from lawsuits by the Judgment Creditors, for so long as the Debtor pursues 18 its claims against its insurer and former counsel pursuant to the Debtor’s Plan.” See In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, 2010 WL 4638882, at *5 (emphasis added). In short, the Bankruptcy Court did not assume or hold the proceeds assignment was valid. | Party Submissions | 13.607262 | 14.953474 | 14.900991 |
HN7 [ ] Section 409.003 of the Labor Code provides that a "claim" may be initiated by "[a]n employee or a person acting on the employee's behalf. .. not later than one year after the date on which. .. the injury occurred." Here, it is undisputed that Hellas—not the Martinez Family—requested burial reimbursement from Texas Mutual, which then remitted that sum to Hellas. It is also undisputed that Texas Mutual was the one to request the [*15] benefit review conference. The question thus becomes whether either of these parties could be construed as "a person acting on the employee's behalf" such that, per the statutory definition, that party could initiate a claim. Under the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to characterize Texas Mutual as having acted on Bruno's behalf given that its stated goal in requesting the benefit review conference was to take a position contrary to that of Bruno's beneficiaries. See Behalf, Black's Law Dictionary (referring to actions taken "in the interest, support, or defense of" or "in the name of, on the part of, [or] as the agent or representative of"); Baker v. Travelers Ins., 483 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ) (referring to beneficiaries as standing "in the shoes of a deceased workman"). Hellas similarly adopted a position materially adverse to the legal arguments raised by Bruno's beneficiaries. Thus, because no one was acting on behalf of Bruno or his beneficiaries in initiating this "claim," it seems unlikely that there was anything more than a potential claim for benefits at the time of the proceedings before the administrative law judge and the appeals panel. However, we need not resolve that question to dispose of this case, as we [*16] conclude that DWC had exclusive jurisdiction over the question of eligibility regardless of whether there was, in fact, a pending claim or merely a potential claim. | Party Submissions | 6.069799 | 6.1769 | 6.215943 |
Yellowfin also emphasizes Holy Cross’s reasoning that no “affirmative action towards foreclosure” is required to accelerate “a note secured by real property” because that would “mean the foreclosure posting or sale would be the triggering event bringing about the right to hold a foreclosure sale.” 44 S.W.3d at 570; see Resp. Br. 9. Once again, though, that reasoning does not apply post -foreclosure. Before foreclosure, no affirmative steps toward foreclosure are required beyond “(1) notice of intent to accelerate, and (2) notice of acceleration” to accelerate the loan. Holy Cross, 44 S.W.3d at 566. Holy Cross ’s point was that the loan had been accelerated prior to foreclosure once those two requirements were met. Id. at 570. That observation says nothing about what happens to the loan after foreclosure, which is the relevant question here. As explained earlier, see Opening Br. 26-27, foreclosure in fact accelerated the junior loan. | Party Submissions | 9.338558 | 9.597974 | 10.092752 |
A restricted stock grant of 1,585 shares of common stock on January 12, 2024, under the Company’s Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Award and Incentive Plan. Such shares vest over a period from March 31, 2024 to March 31, 2027. | Contract | 4.301925 | 4.278101 | 4.535248 |
To amend the Small Business Act to require Federal agencies to testify and report on scores received under the scorecard program for evaluating Federal agency compliance with small business contracting goals, to testify for failure to meet Governmentwide contracting goals, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 9.407908 | 8.189923 | 8.783127 |
All pleadings and accompanying documentation shall indicate the LANGUAGE in which they are submitted (e.g. SPA=Spanish; FR=French; ENG= English). Such indication should be reflected both i) in the name used to identify each individual electronic file and ii) in the Consolidated Hyperlinked Index (which shall be attached to each submission). | Legal Decisions | 11.452225 | 12.279235 | 12.973431 |
In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (1998) In April 1995, Gaetjen, who is mildly retarded, was employed as a bus person at a Luby's Cafeteria in Houston, Texas. At that time, Gaetjen was sexually assaulted over the course of three days by a fellow employee, Antonio Aguirre. Following the incidents, Gaetjen filed a complaint with the Houston Police Department and a workers' compensation claim. On May 15, 1995, Luby's workers' compensation carrier, TIG Premier Insurance Company (“TIG”), denied the claim on the ground that Gaetjen did not sustain a compensable injury. Gaetjen did not seek review of this determination. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. Ch. 410 (Vernon 1996). In August 1996, Aguirre was convicted of sexually *815 assaulting Gaetjen and sentenced to five years in the Texas Penitentiary. | Party Submissions | 3.98568 | 3.967247 | 4.171512 |
B. Royalties on production shall be paid on a calendar month basis. The royalty for the month in which production is first marketed shall be paid on or before the first day of the calendar month next following the expiration of sixty (60) days from the execution date of the completion report or potential test for the well that is filed with the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the respective royalty payments for each subsequent calendar month of production shall be made on or before the first day of each successive calendar month following the calendar month in which the first payment is due. | Party Submissions | 6.47251 | 6.653939 | 7.447229 |
To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify ican Rescue Plan Act of 2021, including amounts paid on behalf of a deceased participant or beneficiary, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.692601 | 6.227986 | 6.309098 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date. | Party Submissions | 8.685042 | 7.921706 | 8.740299 |
No claim or right arising out of a breach of this Agreement can be discharged in whole or in part unless agreed to in writing executed by TDCC and UCC. Any such waiver shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent breach. | Contract | 6.203993 | 5.875178 | 8.301369 |
HN3 [ ] Breach, Breach of Contract Actions A workers' compensation insurance policy is a three-party contract between the carrier, the employer, and the employee. The carrier owes the employee a duty of good faith and fair dealing: a duty on the part of the carrier to deal fairly and in good faith with an injured employee in the processing of a worker's compensation claim. Accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract. | Party Submissions | 7.37845 | 7.391607 | 8.021379 |
The Walkers rely heavily on this Court’s decision in E.D. by & through B.O. v. Texas Health Care, P.L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2022), analogizing that obstetrical malpractice case with this one to urge the same result. ( See, e.g. Pet. Br. at 29-30). On the surface it’s a fair comparison. But analyzing the Fort Worth Court’s opinion in E.D., as compared with the Amarillo Court’s opinion here, shows why this Court’s focus is more appropriately directed elsewhere. | Party Submissions | 8.136167 | 8.648595 | 8.544417 |
To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the majority ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.” Ante, at 1920 – 1921. But even the majority's policy concerns do not support its rule. | Party Submissions | 11.278501 | 14.405491 | 14.957464 |
To amend the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recre- ation Act to permanently authorize the Every Kid Outdoors program, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.840455 | 3.880777 | 4.913226 |
Taking into account Respondent’s objections that the Request is not for a “narrow and specific category of documents”, Claimant is prepared to limit its Request No. | Legal Decisions | 16.295687 | 17.04863 | 18.152084 |
This AGREEMENT (“Agreement”), entered into as of November 1, 2023, between Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”), a New York corporation, and The Dow Chemical Company (“TDCC”), a Delaware corporation. TDCC agrees to supply the UCC Group (as defined below) with certain products and services under the terms and conditions set forth below. | Contract | 4.454892 | 3.802631 | 4.830467 |
We grant the motion to transfer, and we will appoint the MDL Pretrial Judge and designate an MDL Pretrial Court by a separate order. Existing stays will remain in place until appointment of the MDL Pretrial Judge. | Party Submissions | 9.594477 | 16.646864 | 12.20176 |
This was a fact issue for which a jury could have decided that the vesting period for determination under Tex. Fam. Code § 3.007(d) should have been something less than the 3 years used, and most likely just 6 months. This would have had a great effect on the amount of community. | Party Submissions | 16.65206 | 17.652948 | 17.287216 |
The Lawyers then filed a petition for review with this Court asking it, among other things, to reverse the Fifth Court’s legal-malpractice-assignment holding. See Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P ., No. 16-0875. The parties also filed briefs on the merits on all issues raised, including the assignment issue, before the Court denied review. Id. | Party Submissions | 12.602456 | 10.610556 | 12.286983 |
Once a responsible third party has been designated, and after an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move to strike the designation on the ground that there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant's alleged injury or damage. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(l). The court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated person's responsibility for the claimant's injury or damage. Thus, the question for the trial court is whether the defendant produced sufficient evidence, more than a scintilla, for a reasonable jury to find the responsible third party responsible for a portion of the claimant's injury or damages. | Party Submissions | 3.860001 | 4.369934 | 4.241274 |
Respondents also emphasize that both Westwood and the tenant in Kemp complained they had suffered “mistreatment” from their landlo rds that occurred in the aftermath of losing a forcible entry and detainer action in a justice of the peace court — and yet the tenant in Kemp could not maintain a constructive-eviction claim in district court. (Resp. 30) But the result in Kemp did not flow from any hard-and-fast rule that constructive-eviction claims are categorically unavailable to the evicted tenant, that compliance with an eviction order co nclusively establishes “voluntary abandonment” or disproves damages, or that “testimony” about “perceived mistreatment” simply “doesn’t matter” in a constructive eviction action. ( Id .) Instead, t he tenant’s claim failed simply because of the absence of causation: She could not carry her burden of establishing “that the premises was abandoned because of the complained-of condition.” (Resp. 23, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *3) (emphasis in original) Specifically, the tenant had no “evidence demonstrat[ing]” that she “abandoned the property as a direct consequence of the [landlord’s] triggering acts” because she merely “vacated only after being lawfully evicted.” (Id. 24, 34, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *4) That is why the tenant’s ad mission that she “moved out of the premises” immediately after the “writ of possession was issued”— rather than after any supposed acts of interference by the landlord — was considered dispositive. (Resp. 29, quoting Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *3) But none of that can be said about Westwood, because the record here is replete with evidence that Westwood decided to leave only because of Responde nts’ repeated wrongful acts, and did not merely abandon the property after receiving an eviction order. | Party Submissions | 7.021514 | 7.445715 | 7.286269 |
This Court has never formally adopted the two-prong analysis that originated in the Lindsey case. The recitation by Justice Hecht in Bradshaw seems to state that only a legal sufficiency analysis of the evidence would apply to the abuse of discretion standard, not a factual sufficiency review. Possibly Justice Hecht used this language as a reflection of this Court’s jurisdictional limitation to only questions of law, leaving questions of factual sufficiency to the courts of appeals. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity from this Court as to the abuse of discretion standard of review creates uncertainty in the law, particularly in family law appeals. 1. The standard for legal sufficiency is whether there is more When there is zero evidence on a vital fact or the evidence amounts to no more than a scintilla, a legal sufficiency challenge will succeed. | Party Submissions | 10.025597 | 9.370071 | 11.010935 |
Subcontractor's Work as required by McCarthy including the progress of materials or equipment to be provided under this Agreement that may be in the course of preparation or manufacture. | Party Submissions | 23.818138 | 28.057566 | 34.492542 |
A parent-child relationship may be terminated if a trial court finds that parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engage in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). “Endanger” under subsection E “means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.” In the Interest of D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). As well, “there must be evidence of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well -being as the direct result of the parent’s conduct.” Id. at 811-12. Courts consider “what the parent did both before and after the child’s birth to determine whether termination is necessary.” Id. at 812. As well, “termination ... m ust be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.” Id. | Party Submissions | 3.531406 | 4.189135 | 4.337035 |
Thus, under Osprin’ s interpretation the termination clause only applies before there is a default by the borrower and ceases to apply to the two primary obligations at the moment those obligations are activated. Yet, the termination clause provides that any and all of Backes ’ s obligations under the guaranty shall terminate and does not limit the scope of the obligations or except any obligations, whether mature or not. Further, the termination clause provides that termination occurs when the tax credit rehabilitation is completed, again with no limitation that the completion must be accomplished before the note matures or before default by the borrower. | Party Submissions | 18.975834 | 16.241829 | 20.577208 |
To promote space situational awareness and space traffic coordination and to modify the functions and leadership of the Office of Space Commerce, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 12.065433 | 10.662614 | 13.563283 |
McCarthy Subcontract -13-01-12-2017 Rev. payment to McCarthy of the entire cost of Subcontractor’s default and termination from the balance of the Subcontract Amount and the amounts paid, as provided above, to McCarthy by Subcontractor, or its surety if Subcontractor has provided Bonds per Article 6 of this Agreement, shall be paid without interest to Subcontractor by McCarthy. | Party Submissions | 14.444918 | 12.240916 | 15.472301 |
On the one hand, Respondents insist that because the agreed judgment functions as a “Rule 11 agreement,” it must be interpreted as a contract and cannot be contradicted by any evidence “outside the bound” of the agreed judgment itself— including the otherwise-undisputed evidence of Respondents’ interference with Westwood’s right to possess the premises underlying its constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 28-29, quoting Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.58 (Tex. 2007)) Yet on the other, Respondents insist that Westwood’s supposedly “voluntary” “Rule 11 agreement” only matters “as evidence that [Westwood] left voluntarily.” (Resp. 33-34) But either way, this supposed “agreement” does not mitigate the plain violation of Texas law that the court of appeals committed in this case. | Party Submissions | 8.588604 | 8.449175 | 9.140861 |
Similar language in other reported cases – such as interest on an outstanding sum or an unpaid balance, especially if combined with periodic interest accrual – have been found to “unambiguously” require compounding. See, e.g., Bair Chase Prop. Co., v. S & K Dev. Co., 260 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied); Crosby-Mississippi, 40 F.3d at 1489 (Miss. law).3 The Bordages Leases’ provision for Late Charges based on the “amount due,” moreover, is distinguishable from instruments that impose only simple interest with language that imposes only “interest on interest.” See, e.g., Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (“matured unpaid principal and interest shall bear interest at [] 10% per annum”). | Party Submissions | 8.721947 | 8.972737 | 9.583032 |
Statement of Facts Freedom of speech means you can say whatever you want. What you can’t do is lie, and then expect not to be held accountable for it. | Party Submissions | 8.513682 | 7.761092 | 8.998544 |
Trust : By reference to these provisions, case-law and academic literature largely endorse the view that, save for fringe cases, pursuant to Article 41 of the ICSID Convention, tribunals must address jurisdictional objections irrespective of when they were raised. | Party Submissions | 14.964366 | 16.630268 | 17.263664 |
The determination of quantity and quality of product purchased by a UCC Member from TDCC hereunder shall be made in accordance with the customary procedures and practices of the industry. | Contract | 26.617085 | 22.618446 | 34.5213 |
Spring I.S.D., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987). And the ultimate goal in any statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature to the greatest degree possible. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021, 311.023 (West 2013). We cannot ignore the Legislature's direction that the proportionate responsibility chapter does not apply to certain actions. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.002(c). HN13 [ ] Furthermore, we recognize that designation of a responsible third party is not listed in the TWCA as a prohibited defense for nonsubscribers. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(a). However, under the express terms of the TWCA, an employee must still prove that her employer was negligent to prevail at trial. Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(d). If a third party was ultimately responsible, an employer may [*12] still be able to defeat an employee's negligence claim. | Party Submissions | 4.519008 | 4.862299 | 5.091272 |
Request No. 18: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents relating to certain conferences, meetings or political events organized by the Claimant for the Respondent, the number of such events having been reduced by the Claimant in his Application, compared to his initial request. Again, such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is argued in the Claimant’s rubric on the “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”. Moreover, the large majority of the requested documents relate to events organized in the public field and which were documented in the public domain. Although the Claimant is also requesting “internal communications”, he did not specify in any way the documents or their nature he is looking for. | Legal Decisions | 15.009274 | 13.031782 | 14.134088 |
At oral argument, Justices Bland and Huddle inquired whether Bay, Ltd. met its burden to prove an allocation of the settlement amount and what sort of evidence meets the settling party’s burden under Sky View. This Court has held that the allocation can be made in the settlement documents or can be proven by extrinsic evidence. If an allocation different than stated in the settlement documents actually occurred, the trial court can consider that proof. Bay, Ltd. presented precisely the type of evidence this Court has authorized, and the trial court properly held that no settlement credit was required to avoid a double recovery. | Party Submissions | 15.171063 | 16.629217 | 16.144924 |
Viewed from the required perspective, Oncor’s pleadings and evidence show the motions Oncor filed under section 25.25(c) were not an attempt to “avoid” the agreement that Sharyland and P&A reached. Oncor accepts the matters the settlement did address (P&A’s total market valuation of Sharyland’s transmission line and the comparative equality of that valuation). Oncor seeks only to enforce the agreement the parties actually made, by correcting P&A’s undisputedly erroneous allocation of the agreed-upon market value to property in Wilbarger County (and the other counties in which the parties have not been able to rectify the error by agreement). Sharyland and P&A did not know the clerical error existed when they settled Sharyland’s protests, so their agreement could not logically have addressed that unknown error. | Party Submissions | 12.010565 | 12.489377 | 13.217523 |
Nutrition Act of 1966 to prohibit the use of cell-cultivated meat under the school lunch program and the school breakfast program. | Legislation | 10.617097 | 8.777073 | 12.047289 |
For eligible applicants for which administrative checks are completed, aid can be paid without waiting for all checks being made, notably those on applicants selected for on-the-spot checks. Nevertheless, all the on-the-spot checks shall be made not later than 6 months after the payments. | Legislation | 19.764214 | 20.86398 | 26.723135 |
Appellees argue that these equitable claims have been mooted by subsequent government orders. GA-34 provided that “there are no C ovid-19-related operating limits for any business or other establishment.” Similarly, all Collin County limitations on restaurants were rescinded, and all Frisco ordinances have expired. There are no longer any limitations on indoor dining in Texas. Thus, the regulations that were allegedly harming Galovelho no longer exist. | Party Submissions | 20.787182 | 22.647814 | 19.720434 |
Ironically, HSMiller, as a surrogate for BNC, argues that Flaven should have been an RPT in the underlying trial, but that none of these parties should have been submitted to the jury in the malpractice trial. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit their negligence and the decision was reversible error. | Party Submissions | 18.540583 | 22.60255 | 22.305841 |
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 7160) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the limitation on the amount certain married individuals can deduct for State and local taxes, and providing for consideration of the resolution (H.Res. 987) denouncing the harmful, anti-American energy policies of the Biden administration, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.816661 | 4.336165 | 4.519471 |
The language of the statute indicates the Legislature’s desire to compare responsibility for injuries rather than bar recovery, even if the claimant was partly at fault or violated some legal standard. Id. at 832. Thus, once again the Court considered an applicable legal standard that was violated — ingesting harmful, illegal drugs — that contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. Once again, the act itself was a tortious act and should be considered in the comparative responsibility question. | Party Submissions | 15.462343 | 15.420621 | 16.567411 |
Adopting Employer. Adopting Employer means an Affiliate who, with the consent of the Company, has adopted the Plan for the benefit of its eligible employees. | Contract | 5.921856 | 5.485047 | 7.116609 |
The court’s holding was case specific. The Walkers’ experts simply provided no causal link between the nurses’ action or inaction and the ultimate harm. Dr. Tappan, the obstetrician, alleged five breaches of the nursing standard of care: 1. The nurses should have discontinued Pitocin at 09:21; 2. The nurses should have applied a fetal scalp electrode at 09:25 and should have recorded “Montevideo units”; 3. The nurses did not “go up the nursing chain of command” at 12:52 when Dr. Castillo announced that she was leaving the hospital; 4. The nurses should not have continued to increase the dose of oxytocin at 15:25 when Dr. Castillo shortened the interval between oxytocin infusion rate increases; and 5. The nurses failed to administer terbutaline at 15:52 when Dr. Castillo made the decision to perform a cesarean delivery. (CR.793-94) No expert explained how or why any of these alleged nursing failures caused harm to the baby. | Party Submissions | 7.741981 | 6.720995 | 7.989366 |
In reply, Sonic argues that there is no issue of exclusive jurisdiction in this case and therefore, Tyler does not apply. Sonic asserts that its contract claims do not rest on a final determination of the issue in the judicial review case, and thus, there is no jurisdictional impediment to [**31] its contract claims going forward. Applying the analysis used by the Fodge court, we examine Sonic's contract claims in relation to the [*481] judicial review claims. See Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 803 . | Party Submissions | 11.020103 | 11.194765 | 12.207234 |
Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court proceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted § 16(a) against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). That Griggs principle reflects a longstanding tenet of American procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 157, 3 S.Ct. 136, 27 L.Ed. 888 (1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. -- , -- , 139 S.Ct. 1533, 1537, 204 L.Ed.2d 238 (2019) (THOMAS, J., joined by ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) (describing Griggs principle as “well settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) (“In general, filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal”). | Party Submissions | 2.528878 | 2.517042 | 2.723282 |
The Court today expands Griggs beyond what the Congress that enacted § 16 could have foreseen, let alone silently incorporated. Indeed, the majority can identify no other time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of all merits proceedings just because a distinct procedural question was on appeal. | Party Submissions | 22.620462 | 24.030645 | 31.156212 |
An event constitutes a Change in Control with respect to a Participant only if the Participant performs services for the Participating Employer that has experienced the Change in Control, or the Participant’s relationship to the affected Participating Employer otherwise satisfies the requirements of Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-3(i)(5)(ii). | Contract | 4.651938 | 4.400768 | 5.120795 |
Claimants allege that Obnova had the right of use (property right) over the Dunavska Plots, which was later expropriated by the adoption of the 2013 DRP. | Legal Decisions | 26.44517 | 23.608929 | 26.692486 |
Westwood unquestionably was the proper party to bring claims for constructive eviction and breach of contract because it was the party to the lease. (16RR36 (PX7); 10RR273-74) And Westwood was the entity that suffered the brunt of Respondents’ unlawful interference with its right to possess the premises. That made it the proper party to bring claims for breach of contract and constructive eviction. By contrast, Westwood Motors was never a party to this case. | Party Submissions | 10.425636 | 11.011879 | 11.486851 |
R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the documentation relating to the Report on the Strategic Environmental Assessment is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic "fishing expedition", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents containing information which Claimants consider to be helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. | Legal Decisions | 13.126842 | 11.598525 | 14.36812 |
Nor did the Court of Appeals ignore precedent suggesting expert reports should be read together. (Pet. Br. at 23). In fact, exactly the opposite is true. The Court of Appeals consistently referred to both experts’ reports, ultimately concluding that “the experts do not provide factual explanation of how or why [H.W.] would not have suffered the eventual infarction” even if the C-section commenced earlier. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4, *5 (emphasis added). | Party Submissions | 11.718047 | 11.564785 | 14.14743 |
Moreover, the district clerk can only issue execution for “the sum actually due when [the execution] is issued and the rate of interest upon the sum due.” TEX. R. C IV. P. 630; see also Yale v. Heard, 26 Tex. 639, 641 (1863) (“If there be evidence of payments brought to the knowledge of the clerk of the district court, he must credit them upon the execution, and as well the damages awarded upon the sum paid as the principal if the payment was made before the appeal or the suing out of the writ of error.”). If Bay, Ltd. attempted to collect more than was actually owed from either the Diocese or from Mendietta, injunctive relief would be available to stop the collection efforts. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.013. Other types of judgment collection tools also contain methods to determine the actual amount due on the judgment, taking into accounts payment made thereon. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 664a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 50(2). | Party Submissions | 8.558245 | 9.224577 | 8.774175 |
Because Bay moved for summary judgment on the exact same issue as Plaintiffs, Bay had the burden of establishing every element of its affirmative defense both in response and in its own motion. By failing to do so in either its own Motion for Summary Judgment or in its Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bay failed to establish an element of its affirmative defense as a matter of law. Regardless of whether Mann filed a traditional or no-evidence motion for summary judgment, Bay had the burden to prove that it met the mandatory requirements of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123 to support its defense and because Bay failed to establish standing to assert the affirmative defense, the trial courts' ruling striking the affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies should be affirmed. | Party Submissions | 6.96283 | 7.049633 | 8.294311 |
Section 51.003(a) ’s plain language covers actions brought by a junior creditor to recover post-foreclosure debt. Although Yellowfin accuses Santos of “seeking to rewrite the statute,” Resp. Br. 14, it never even discusses Section 51.003(a) ’s text. The reason for Yellowfin’s failure to do business with the statute’s words is clear: Section 51.003(a) unquestionably encompasses suits brought by the junior creditor after the senior creditor’s foreclosure. | Party Submissions | 7.965869 | 8.114684 | 8.688095 |
Tribunal is not at this point expressing any view as to whether USMCA Chapter 14 is ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. | Legal Decisions | 11.071085 | 12.109906 | 13.786517 |
Furthermore, the absence of a cost ceiling also paves the way for strategic manipulations. Without a clear boundary on expenses, there looms the very real possibility of abuse. Consider a scenario wherein one party, perhaps a larger corporation or entity with considerable financial leverage, intentionally prolongs or complicates the arbitration process. This would be a tactical move to inflate costs, further deterring the other party from seeking justice. Such manipulative strategies strike at the heart of arbitration's core philosophy, which champions efficiency and cost-effectiveness as its premier alternatives to traditional litigation. | Party Submissions | 12.649383 | 11.005607 | 12.916721 |
HN6 [ ] Under the quasi-estoppel principle, a party is precluded from asserting, [*10] to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) ; Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a party to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which it acquiesced, or of which it accepted a benefit. Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 864 ; Steubner Realty 19, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d at 164 . | Party Submissions | 4.309941 | 4.547216 | 4.573161 |
This motion complies with the requirements of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) and 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using “Microsoft Word 2010” in fourteen (14) point “Times New Roman” style font, and it contains 994 words, excluding the parts exempted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. | Party Submissions | 4.675783 | 5.162318 | 6.55956 |
Texas law clearly sets forth specific legal predicates for the affirmative defense of “exhaustion of remedies.” Oral argument will assist the court to focus on the evidence and authorities that demonstrate Bay lacks standing to raise the affirmative defense of “exhaustion of remedies” under the specific facts of this case. Due to the complex nature of this case, Appellees respectfully requests the court to consider granting additional time for oral argument. | Party Submissions | 9.503414 | 9.420986 | 10.367281 |
Nor does the 1997 amendment to Section 16.035, the statute of limitations for a suit for foreclosure or for the recovery of real property under a real-property lien, require a different result. That amendment just reworded “lien debt” as “real property lien” to clarify that all liens were governed by the more specific statute of limitations for liens, Section 16.035, rather than the more general statute of limitations to enforce a negotiable instrument, Section 3.118. See Texas Legis. Council, Summary of Enactments 75th Legislature 38 (1997). As the State Bar Committee comments on Section 3.118 observe, “because of their particular nature, the statute of limitations provisions of section 16.035 and 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, relating to actions with respect to debts secured by liens on real property, and section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code, relating to actions to recover deficiencies after nonjudicial foreclosures, should be interpreted to control, in appropriate circumstances, over the provisions of section 3.118.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118 cmt. (West Supp. 2021). The Legislature thus made clear that the more specific statute of limitations for real-property liens controlled over the more general statute of limitations for liens, just as Section 51.003(a)’s more specific limitations period for post foreclosure deficiencies controls here instead of more general limitations periods. See Opening Br. 23-24. And by enacting shorter statutes of limitations in Sections 16.035 and 51.003, the Legislature decided that actions related to foreclosure should be commenced sooner than should general, non-foreclosure-related actions for debt recovery. | Party Submissions | 4.870143 | 4.804348 | 4.95645 |
According to the Claimant, the contours of the concept are unclear and the Respondent has failed to show its relevance in the case at hand. In particular, in the Wena v. Egypt case cited by the Respondent, the tribunal rejected the argument based on repose as the respondent had had “ ample notice of the ongoing dispute ,” just like in the case at hand. The Claimant argues that the Respondent could not have reasonably believed that the claims had been abandoned and that it was aware of its breach of the rights of power generators and their investors. 349. The Claimant is of the view that it is also not estopped from bringing its claims. | Legal Decisions | 10.72791 | 10.881919 | 10.790804 |
Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request. | Legal Decisions | 14.538063 | 10.749494 | 13.81025 |
The Request is overly broad and hence producing responsive documents would impose an unreasonable burden on the Respondent. Indeed, the Request refers to all documents “between and/or among the Respondent”. This formulation potentially includes countless unidentified State entities. Despite the Claimant’s assertion to the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that a foreign investor has a foundational understanding of the host-State's legal structure and the core functions of its entities, which would allow it to tailor its document production requests accordingly at least to some extent. Yet, the Claimant has made no attempt to narrow down the relevant State entities, unlike with Requests 15 and 17 infra. | Legal Decisions | 10.294473 | 12.334429 | 10.974443 |
Nonetheless, Bay still doesn't qualify as a subclaimant. “A person qualifies as a sub-claimant if he has provided compensation, directly or indirectly, to or for an employee or legal beneficiary; if he has sought and been refused reimbursement from the insurance carrier; and if he has filed a written claim with the Division.” Texas Mutual at 75 (citing Tex. Lab. Code § 409.009). | Party Submissions | 9.224008 | 8.554522 | 10.748561 |
None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 14.367309 | 17.40334 | 14.598733 |
The purpose of the Plan is to attract and retain key employees by providing each Participant with an opportunity to defer receipt of a portion of their salary, bonus, commission, and other specified compensation (if any). The Plan is not intended to meet the qualification requirements of Code Section 401(a) but is intended to meet the requirements of Code Section 409A and shall be operated and interpreted consistent with that intent. | Contract | 3.685836 | 3.947204 | 4.764504 |
Ifyou have answered “Yes" t0 Question Number 30r Question Number 4. then answer Question Number 5. Otherwise, d0 not answer Question Number 5. | Party Submissions | 21.039232 | 32.305992 | 28.889244 |
To require the National Small Business Development Center Advisory Board to submit an annual report on the activities of the Board and other information, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.060386 | 6.959288 | 7.355348 |
To the extent the majority concludes the court's instruction was a direct comment “on the weight of the evidence or advises the jury of the effect of their answers,” I disagree. To be a direct comment on the weight of the evidence, the issue submitted must suggest to the jury the trial court's opinion on the matter. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1998). An impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence occurs when “after examining the entire charge, it is determined that the judge assumed the truth of a material controverted fact, or exaggerates, minimizes, or withdraws some pertinent evidence from the jury's consideration.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ). Similarly, to directly advise the jury of the legal effect of its answers, the issue submitted must instruct the jury how to answer each question in order for the plaintiff or defendant to prevail. Id. (citing Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict—1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 43 (1979)). The instruction does none of these things. | Party Submissions | 5.407687 | 6.087701 | 5.928456 |
Section 17. Overpayment. If, due to mistake or any other reason, a person receives Severance Benefits under the Plan in excess of what the Plan provides, that person shall repay the overpayment to the Company in a lump sum within 30 days of the Company providing notice to such person of the amount of overpayment. If such person fails to so repay the overpayment, then without limiting any other remedies available to the Company, the Company may deduct the amount of the overpayment from any other amounts which become payable to that person under the Plan or otherwise. | Contract | 4.205263 | 4.297531 | 4.342707 |
Finally, Judge Rosenthal held that fee-splitting was unconscionable as a matter of law in James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (S.D. Tex. 2021). But that case was decided under California law, id. at 1033, which is evidently inconsistent with Texas law. | Party Submissions | 6.903828 | 7.648456 | 7.936969 |
In addition to its failure to show that Midland owns or operates a solid waste facility as defined under the SWDA, Weatherford also failed to provide evidence showing Midland meets the SWDA requirement for an “arranger or acceptor” of solid waste. This Court has maintained that statutory requirement connecting solid waste to a defendant’s action: in order to be liable as an arranger or acceptor of solid waste, there must be a “ causal nexus. .. between the defendant’s conduct and the disposal of the solid waste.” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 242 (emphasis added). R.R. Street further pointed to “some actual involvement in the decision to dispose of waste” as well as asking “whether the party assumed responsibility for determining [hazardous substances’] fate.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 242 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) and CPC Int’l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp ., 759 F.Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). As provided in support of Midland’s evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction, there is no actual involvement between the City and the alleged disposal, and there is no assumption of responsibility for the disposal. On the question of arranger/acceptor status under the SWDA, Midland is at most a passive recipient, but it certainly has demonstrated it had no agreement to accept illicit wastes expressly prohibited by City ordinance. | Party Submissions | 6.364553 | 6.200463 | 6.690442 |
Fifth, Rafiei’s evidence that he cannot afford the delegation arbitration is conclusory and speculative. A simple assertion that “I do not have that kind of money” does not satisfy the requirement of specific evidence. | Party Submissions | 17.994556 | 20.931227 | 21.060904 |
If Subcontractor fails to take any of the above actions within twenty-four (24) hours after receiving notice from McCarthy, McCarthy may take action to attempt to put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule, and deduct the entire cost of such actions from the amounts due or to become due Subcontractor. | Party Submissions | 5.983449 | 7.734847 | 7.437875 |
As Mr Broshko claims to have " believed " that Obnova would obtain compensation, the requested documents (serving as a basis for such belief) are in Claimants' possession, custody or control. | Legal Decisions | 40.153553 | 45.166943 | 53.05408 |
That loss of value is distinct from the loss suffered by North Star, because Sea & Coast and North Star are two different businesses with different business models. | Legal Decisions | 34.66493 | 34.676582 | 43.781956 |
This letter contains an opinion of the competent authority on a draft of the 2013 DRP provided pursuant to Article 44 of the Regulation on the Content, Method, and Procedure for the Preparation of Planning Documents (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia,” No. 31/2010, 69/2010, and 16/2011). The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the competent authorities, in this case the Institute for the Protection of Nat ure of Serbia, considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 9.910708 | 9.715619 | 8.920854 |
The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agreements. In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed an amendment to the Act; the amendment is codified at 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). Under § 16(a), when a district court denies a party's motion to compel arbitration, that party may take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–109, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). Notably, Congress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying —but not of orders granting —motions to compel arbitration. | Party Submissions | 2.6964 | 2.772528 | 2.717583 |
Cockerham case The Cockerham case is the controlling authority regarding the presumption of gift and rebuttal thereof when an asset is titled in both spouses’ names. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 162. There, the husband owned real property with his brother before marriage. During the marriage the brother wanted to divest his ownership. The husband and wife purchased the entire property from the brother, and it was titled in both husband and wife’s name. | Party Submissions | 7.314647 | 8.352853 | 7.902235 |
Argument Suppose you picked up this morning’s newspaper and your life was a front-page headline ... And everything they said was accurate ... But none of it was true? | Party Submissions | 35.139442 | 30.694273 | 34.567757 |
As there is currently activity from vessels from other countries in the area, I consider it expedient that Norway and Russia will continue to act in a coordinated manner in the further work to gain acceptance for this. I would also consider it expedient if, at the forthcoming session of the joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries Commission, we discuss how the snow crab is to be managed in the future. | Legal Decisions | 12.778909 | 16.177784 | 13.813412 |
The rule is recognized that one cause of action may, by amendment, be substituted for another. Ballard v. Carmichael, 83 Tex. 355, 18 S.W. | Party Submissions | 7.257859 | 9.926929 | 9.959656 |
Unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise, a transfer of employment or services between or among the Company and its Subsidiaries shall not be considered a termination of employment. Further, unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise, including through policies it may adopt from time to time regarding part-time work arrangements or reduced work schedules, and except as otherwise required by local law, for purposes of this Award only, any reduction in your regular hours of employment to less than thirty hours per week is deemed a termination of your employment with the Company or any Subsidiary. In case of termination of your employment for Cause or for a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics, the Award shall automatically terminate upon first notification to you of such termination, unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise. If your employment is suspended pending an investigation of whether you should be terminated for Cause or for a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics, all of your rights under the Award likewise may be suspended during the period of investigation. The Plan Administrator, the Vice President of Human Resources, the Associate General Counsel, Labor and Employment, or any other officer of the Company delegated such authority by the Plan Administrator shall have the exclusive discretion to determine when you are no longer actively providing services to the Company or any Subsidiary or when your rights under the Award may be suspended pending an investigation of whether you should be terminated for Cause or a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics. | Contract | 3.956115 | 3.852201 | 4.17956 |
Perhaps CCISD had no reason to question the numbers. After all, CCISD and Bellpas were both represented by the same law firm. | Party Submissions | 32.843998 | 38.524696 | 43.433662 |
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Generally, a writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. The relator has the burden of establishing these prerequisites, and this burden is a heavy one. | Party Submissions | 3.268627 | 3.780829 | 4.224205 |
Filing a Claim. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the Plan shall be filed in writing with the Committee which shall make all determinations concerning such claim. Any claim filed with the Committee and any decision by the Committee denying such claim shall be in writing and shall be delivered to the Claimant. | Contract | 4.868149 | 5.441052 | 6.204839 |
Permissive interlocutory appeals are provided by statute in section 51.014(d) of the civil practice and remedies code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). This statute has been strictly construed as a “narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.” City of Houston v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). | Party Submissions | 2.56439 | 2.875708 | 2.83505 |
Claimant confirms that I Squared Capital acquired an indirect interest in Cerros Colorados from Duke Energy through a newly created vehicle, Orazul Energía Holdings LLC. | Legal Decisions | 31.670872 | 37.477352 | 27.433933 |
January 20, 2017 to the present, National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Document Request No. | Legal Decisions | 23.641958 | 26.736044 | 35.41306 |
Disabled or Disability. Disabled or Disability means that a Participant is, by reason of any medically-determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months: (a) unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, or (b) receiving income replacement benefits for a period of not less than three months under an accident and health plan covering employees of the Participant’s Employer. The Committee shall determine whether a Participant is Disabled in accordance with Code Section 409A, provided, however, that a Participant shall be deemed to be Disabled if determined to be totally disabled by the Social Security Administration. The determination of whether a Participant is Disabled shall be made in compliance with Treas. Reg. §1.409A-3(i)(4). | Contract | 2.075344 | 2.386837 | 2.57656 |
On the basis of the evidence in the record, please summarize the legal options available for CALICA before domestic administrative and/or judicial proceedings against: (i) the alleged order of the President of Mexico to shut down La Rosita. | Party Submissions | 40.84147 | 37.97446 | 41.03864 |
This is the same sleight-of-hand that drove the holdings in Zuniga and Gandy. This Court should respond as it did in those cases and prohibit the assignment. If the Court concludes HSMiller still can pursue its claim, the only question remaining is whether a fair trial can be had after two trials based on collusion and position shifting. | Party Submissions | 27.698315 | 29.652739 | 33.412273 |
No evidence supports a finding that the Lawyers breached a duty of care to HSMiller by stipulating to Defatrios’s authority rather than fighting a losing battle. Nor does HSMiller offer any. The arguments in its Response Brief go to imagined, unpleaded, and 32 untried breaches: the alleged failure to object to the BNC Sellers’ counsel’s violations of the joint agreement about the stipulation (Resp’t’s Br. at 49) or agreeing to the stipulation when HSMiller was not, itself, negligent (which is irrelevant to whether it could have been liable based on actual or apparent authority). Resp’t’s Br. at 49-50. “[E]xpert testimony of an attorney is necessary to establish this standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by an attorney.” Border Demolition & Envt’l, Inc. v. Pineda, 535 S.W.3d 140, 156 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2017, no pet.) (quoting Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied)) (alteration in original)). | Party Submissions | 9.165831 | 9.744043 | 10.079952 |
Separation from Service Benefit. Upon the Participant’s Separation from Service for reasons other than death, he or she shall be entitled to a Separation from Service Benefit. The Separation from Service Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion (as applicable) of (i) the Participant’s Retirement Account, (ii) any Separation from Service Account(s), and (iii) any Specified Date Accounts with respect to which payments have not yet commenced, based on the value of such Account(s) as of the end of the calendar month immediately preceding the calendar month of distribution, payable in accordance with Section 6.2(a) below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Participant is a Specified Employee on the date of such Participant’s Separation from Service, the distribution from such Accounts will be made or begin on the first (1st) day of the seventh (7th) calendar month following the calendar month in which the Separation from Service occurs, to the extent necessary to avoid a “prohibited distribution” under §409A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Code (with any amounts otherwise payable prior to such seventh calendar month instead paid on the first (1st) day of such seventh (7th) calendar month). If the Separation from Service Benefit is to be paid in the form of installments, any subsequent installment payments will be paid on the anniversary of the first (1st) day of the seventh (7th) month. | Contract | 3.143361 | 3.170721 | 3.363224 |
Claimants’ Closing Statement, Transcript (Day 9), 18 March 2022, 1969:5-12. See also Tribunal Question 18A: “The Tribunal understands that the Amparo Action was initiated on 13 September 2016 by a private citizen, P. J. Begazo López, against various authorities of Respondent. In those proceedings, Claimants argue that some of the defendant authorities took positions in support of the validity of the environmental permits on which Claimants rely ( see Reply ¶ 293), and that authorities of Respondent continued to take that position on appeal, but were ultimately overruled in 2020 and 2021 ( see CD-01, Claimants’ Opening Presentation, Slides 48-49, C-305/R-070, C-295). | Legal Decisions | 12.314228 | 11.557486 | 13.052308 |
Claimants note Serbia’s agreement to produce the responsive documents. Claimants also note that Serbia has produced some of the responsive documents. However, Serbia has not produced a Site plan at a scale of 1:2500 that should be attached to the list of construction land on which the Preduzece luka I skladista “Beograd” transfers the right of use to the City of Belgrade with (see description of document No. 2 in the Claimants’ request). In addition, the documents produced by Serbia do not seem to be complete as they do not include certain annexes. Claimants will approach Serbia to resolve these issues but reserve their right to approach the Tribunal in case Serbia’s refuses to produce complete versions of all responsive documents. | Legal Decisions | 11.369938 | 11.373541 | 10.948086 |
Spatial Development Program, Construction Land Development Program and Port Program referred to in Article 7 of the agreement submitted by Serbia as exhibit R-060. | Legal Decisions | 45.371555 | 49.867607 | 70.830025 |
Subsets and Splits