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One of the excerpts presented in exhibit R-043 is an excerpt from a sketch ( in Serbian: skica ) allegedly prepared based “ upon request 952-02-6-74/2004 ”. This excerpt includes a note “ Owner of the Buildings: ‘Obnova’JSC, Belgrade Dunavska St., 17 -19.”54 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess which authority prepared the sketch and determined that Obnova is the owner of the buildings depicted therein. | Legal Decisions | 27.610098 | 25.299742 | 24.733244 |
Any and all minutes and recordings from all meetings of the Planning Commission of the Assembly of the City of Belgrade during which the 2015 DRP was discussed by the Commission. | Legal Decisions | 21.929739 | 19.905577 | 22.024895 |
The Court ultimately awarded Husband the bonus he received for his work performed in 2019, but paid in February 2020, as his separate property. Id. | Party Submissions | 10.639098 | 15.490044 | 17.978922 |
The District Court denied Coinbase's motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase then filed an interlocutory appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).1 Section 16(a) authorizes **1919 an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. | Party Submissions | 3.275292 | 3.771579 | 3.487481 |
Instead of engaging directly with these arguments, Barina takes the nonexistent “endorsement” ball and runs with it. Petitioners’ opening Brief emphasizes that the Program’s alleged defamatory sting—that Barina “exploited” Thrash’s estate—is made principally during interviews with Ross and Martinez (in fact, the word “exploit” comes from Ross himself) and that is why the third-party-allegation rule applies. Pet. Br. at 24. Barina ignores Petitioners’ arguments, instead spending four pages discussing the ways in which the Program endorsed, or at a minimum “never challenged,” statements by Ross and Martinez, by citing nebulously the “editing” of the report, the name of the entire sixteen-episode series (Dirty Money), the song in the credits of the entire series, and even the commentary from an expert who is not referencing Barina in any way. Resp. Br. at 20, 25, 33. All of those arguments are designed to bolster an endorsement rule that simply does not exist. There is no rule that requires Petitioners to evaluate or comment on Ross and Martinez’s allegations at all. That is the whole point of the third-party-allegation rule—that Petitioners need not decide whether Ross and Martinez are correct, they just need to accurately report what they said. Gallaher v. Denton Media Co., Inc., No. 02-21-00164-CV, 2022 WL 2071779, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 9, 2022, no pet.) (holding that media defendants seeking rule’s protections only have to prove accurate reporting of allegations, not allegations’ underlying truth). The core concept behind the rule is that oftentimes it is the fact of the allegation being made that makes it newsworthy. Because Barina has not even attempted to contest whether Ross and Martinez’s allegations were accurately portrayed, the third-party-allegation rule applies without qualification. | Party Submissions | 8.010653 | 8.256886 | 8.305729 |
An Employee who is absent from work due to military leave, sick leave, or other bona fide leave of absence shall incur a Separation from Service on the first (1st) date immediately following the later of: (i) the six (6) month anniversary of the commencement of the leave; or (ii) the expiration of the Employee’s right, if any, to reemployment under statute or contract. Notwithstanding the preceding, however, an Employee who is absent from work due to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least six (6) months and that prevents the Employee from performing the duties of his position of employment or a similar position shall incur a Separation from Service on the first (1st) date immediately following the twenty-ninth (29) month anniversary of the commencement of the leave. | Contract | 2.98611 | 3.503583 | 3.461613 |
For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules. | Legal Decisions | 15.151161 | 16.802433 | 21.443403 |
Nonetheless, a course and scope determination would not rob the trial court of jurisdiction under these facts, it would simply determine whether Bay is a non-subscriber under the Act and whether it waives its common-law defenses pursuant to section 406.033 of the Texas Labor Code, at trial. | Party Submissions | 11.949555 | 16.352787 | 13.705525 |
Appellant benefits claimant challenged a decision from the 272nd District Court, Brazos County, Texas, which granted appellee carrier's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a case involving the payment of attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case. | Party Submissions | 7.342059 | 6.02375 | 6.525552 |
Division's administrative scheme for the award of attorney's fees to a claimant's attorney, and it provides in pertinent part: HN9 [ ] (a) An attorney's fee, including a contingency fee, for representing a claimant before the division or court under this subtitle must be approved by the commissioner or court. | Party Submissions | 9.951337 | 11.209262 | 13.879774 |
This Promissory Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without regard to its provisions concerning conflicts of law that would require the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction. | Contract | 2.965151 | 2.971143 | 3.383021 |
Article 10 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. | Legislation | 2.402981 | 2.463813 | 2.985608 |
Trinity East Energy, LLC (Trinity) held leases for mineral rights under approximately 2,000 acres of land in the City of Dallas (Dallas), along with surface rights to three areas (Surface Tracts) for potential mineral extraction. At the time of these leases, Dallas required a special use permit (SUP) for drilling. In addition to the Surface Tracts in Dallas, Trinity also held ownership or possessory interests in other properties in Farmers Branch and Irving which were properly entitled to extract minerals beneath Trinity’s leased areas. Trinity applied for but was denied the SUPs to drill from the Surface Tracts. Consequently, Trinity filed a lawsuit, arguing among other things that Dallas’ refusal to grant the SUPs for the Surface Tracts amounted to a regulatory taking of its property, including the entire 2,000-acre mineral estate. | Party Submissions | 6.154539 | 5.837347 | 6.190813 |
Texas’ jurisprudence is also currently in line with other states – deviating from it absent express Legislative intent is not necessary. See, e.g., Collins Asset Group, LLC v. Alialy, 139 N.E.3d 712 (Ind. 2020)(multiple accrual dates for cause of action with optional acceleration clause); City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 237 (Utah 1991) (“when a junior becomes unsecured due to foreclosure by the senior lienor, the junior is not barred by the one-action rule from proceeding against the debtor on the note”); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Holden, 60 N.E.3d 1243 (Ohio 2016)(action on note and action on mortgage are separate and distinct remedies); Kepler v. Slade, 896 P.2d 482, 485 (New Mex. 1995)(in the absence of a “one action” rule statute, suit on note and foreclosure action may be filed separately at mortgagee’s option). | Party Submissions | 7.559849 | 7.483882 | 7.688345 |
Dr. Tappan likewise failed to explain factually any link between the claimed “asphyxia event” Dr. Null identified and the eventual subacute infarction. (CR.670). These omissions also may not be supplied by inference. Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556. As the Court of Appeals appropriately noted, Dr. Tappan said nothing specific about how claimed breaches by Dr. Castillo proximately caused H.W. to suffer a large subacute infarction involving the majority of his left cerebral hemisphere—the event Dr. Tappan indicated caused H.W’s long-term impairments. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4. (CR.670). | Party Submissions | 10.585629 | 13.982692 | 12.77737 |
Relator, East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), filed this original proceeding to challenge Respondent's order striking its designation of responsible third parties.1 We deny the writ. | Party Submissions | 11.408374 | 21.217108 | 22.754026 |
The Walkers classify the Court of Appeals’ criticisms of Dr. Tappan’s and Dr. Null’s reports as an inappropriate extension of Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson. It’s not. The Court of Appeals wrote that, although both experts “proffered a litany of allegedly deficient conduct, they failed to explain how and why each caused, within reasonable medical probability, [H.W.’s] eventual subacute infarction before birth.” Walker, 2022 WL 17324388 at *5. The Walkers interpret that sentence as a new requirement that experts opine that each individual act of each provider proximately caused the outcome. (Pet. Br. at 26). Not so. | Party Submissions | 12.715606 | 13.053191 | 13.689559 |
TADA respectfully requests the Court to grant the Petitioner’s motion for rehearing and petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand for further proceedings. | Party Submissions | 8.065119 | 8.811913 | 9.592224 |
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 2775 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). | Party Submissions | 3.623483 | 4.789708 | 5.360325 |
Arbitrators’ fees and expenses Prof. Diego P. Fernández Arroyo USD 432,615.92 Mr. Christian Leathley USD 228,049.60 Prof. Marcelo Kohen USD 276,243.74 ICSID’s administrative fees USD 262,000.00 Direct expenses USD 214,385.12 Total 584. The above arbitration costs have been paid out of the advances made by the Parties in equal parts. | Legal Decisions | 9.788629 | 8.992416 | 10.475242 |
Section 10. Funding. The Plan, as a “severance pay arrangement” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(B)(i) of ERISA, is intended to be, and shall be administered and maintained as, an unfunded welfare benefit plan within the meaning of Section 3(1) of ERISA. This Plan is a “top hat” plan that is available to a select group of management. The Plan shall not be funded through a trust, an insurance contract or otherwise, and all benefit payments under the Plan shall be made from the general assets of the Company. Accordingly, a Participant shall not have any claim against specific assets of Company, and shall be only a general creditor, with respect to any rights the Participant may have under the Plan. All expenses and costs in connection with the operation of the Plan shall be borne by Company. | Contract | 4.223347 | 4.556908 | 4.636999 |
This Court ultimately held that the appellate court erred in upholding the denial of Richmont’s motion to compel on a ground that was not presented to the trial court. | Party Submissions | 8.750015 | 9.309787 | 9.663838 |
In any event, to the extent the Court of Appeals did require the experts to address each of the litany of alleged departures, that was nothing new or improper in a case with multiple defendants. See, e.g., Intra-Op Monitoring Svcs., LLC v. Causey, No. 09-12-00050-CV, 2012 WL 2849281 at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, July 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hen a plaintiff sues more than one defendant, the expert report must set forth the standard of care applicable to each defendant and explain the causal relationship between each defendant’s individual acts and the injury.”) (emphasis added); and Conner v. Patrick, No. 12-10-00405-CV, 2012 WL 1264464 at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler, Apr. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). | Party Submissions | 4.059992 | 4.243769 | 4.09132 |
I acknowledge that the subject matter of the protest filed on the above date concerning the property described above has been settled. I hereby withdraw my protest and waive my right to any further proceedings in this matter. Describe actions to be taken: 2019 Total Value for Wilbarger Co. for 2019 -$55,068,090. As Oncor has acknowledged, the subject of the protest was the value of Oncor’s transmission lines. What might be ambiguous about the § 1.111(e) agreement defies imagination. | Party Submissions | 15.792122 | 16.067892 | 17.228489 |
Korean Government should fail to comply with any court order as Lone Star asserts, the Korean judiciary will no doubt be able to address such non-compliance. | Legal Decisions | 21.098526 | 30.237154 | 36.403706 |
Legal Action. A Claimant may not bring any legal action, including commencement of any arbitration, relating to a claim for benefits under the Plan unless and until the Claimant has followed the claims procedures under the Plan and exhausted his or her administrative remedies under such claims procedures. | Contract | 5.374182 | 6.239642 | 7.119724 |
That passage perfectly encapsulates the court of appeals’ fundamental error— and the confusion that Respondents continue to sew before this Court: Both erroneously equate Westwood’s decision to turn over immediate possession of the premises with the abandonment of any right of possession Westwood ever had in the premises—regardless of Westwood’s reasons for leaving. But the reasons are everything in a constructive-eviction action. After all, a claim of wrongful eviction requires an “eviction”—indeed, Respondents admit that the tenant must “abandon[] the property within a reasonable time” to maintain such a claim. (Resp. 22, quoting Op. 5 n.3) But as Westwood has explained, and Respondents again ignore, it is the reason behind the abandonment that determines the viability of a claim for wrongful eviction: The tenant who simply abandons the leased premises because it wants to, or because it recognizes it has no claim of right to stay there, has no claim. See Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | Party Submissions | 7.338085 | 7.834111 | 7.83473 |
Petitioner respectfully prays that its petition for review be granted, that the court of appeals’ judgment be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. | Party Submissions | 3.772248 | 3.804704 | 4.095276 |
Account paid in annual installments, determined and paid in accordance with Section 6.2(f), over a period of two (2) to five (5) years, as elected by the Participant. | Contract | 9.418993 | 9.984229 | 12.479781 |
We REVERSE the trial court’s judgment awarding appellee H A O $311,788.24 as his separate property interest in his Bank of America 401(k) retirement account. We REMAND to the trial court for reconsideration of a just and right division in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED . | Party Submissions | 6.21942 | 7.9046 | 7.500722 |
Petitioner argues that Respondent’s case was time -barred because 1) the plain language of Section 51.003(a) renders it applicable to Respondent; 2) the Mandarino and Hays decisions were incorrect, or at least distinguishable; and 3) the foreclosure was the date that Respondent’s cause of action accrued. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected each of these arguments. | Party Submissions | 8.048824 | 7.649014 | 8.431603 |
In General. Notice of a denial of benefits (other than Disability Benefits) will be provided within ninety (90) days of the Committee’s receipt of the Claimant’s claim for benefits. If the Committee determines that it needs additional time to review the claim, the Committee will provide the Claimant with a notice of the extension before the end of the initial ninety (90) day period. The extension will not be more than ninety (90) days from the end of the initial ninety (90) day period and the notice of extension will explain the special circumstances that require the extension and the date by which the Committee expects to make a decision. | Contract | 2.794016 | 3.203481 | 3.116402 |
Weatherford claims that it satisfied this advance notice requirement as its ‘notice’ was issued before filing this claim. This is a misinterpretation of the court’s holding—a cost-recovery plaintiff should notify the defendant prior to initiation of remediation. A demand letter sent two decades after the initial remedial action began is not reasonable notice. | Party Submissions | 19.68542 | 20.15677 | 20.402782 |
WHEREAS, the Company has agreed to grant to the Participant an Award of Performance Share Units (each, as defined below), subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Award Agreement. | Contract | 4.996859 | 4.712044 | 6.170486 |
I refer to the agreed minutes from the meeting between you and the Minister of Fisheries Elisabeth Aspaker on 17 July in Malta, and the agreement between us that sedentary species in the Barents Sea, including snow crab, are subject Norwegian and Russian management competence in accordance with Article 77 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. | Legal Decisions | 10.397361 | 13.920267 | 10.170718 |
Section 9. Administration. The Severance Committee of MSC, shall be the plan administrator (the “Plan Administrator”). The Plan Administrator shall be responsible for the overall operation and administration of the Plan. The Plan Administrator may appoint or employ such persons as it, he or she may deem necessary to render advice with respect to any responsibility of the Company or the Plan Administrator under the Plan. The Plan Administrator shall have the exclusive discretionary power and authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to decide all questions concerning the operation and administration of the Plan including, without limitation, the eligibility of any person to participate in the Plan, the determination whether a Qualifying Termination under the Plan has occurred, the right to and amount of any benefit payable under the Plan to any individual and the date on which any individual ceases to be a Plan Participant. The Plan Administrator’s decisions hereunder shall be final and binding on all Participants and all other persons interested or claiming any interest under the Plan. The Plan Administrator may allocate to any one or more of the Company’s associates any responsibility it may have under the Plan and may designate any other person or persons to carry out any of its responsibilities under the Plan; provided, however, that the Plan Administrator shall not allocate or designate any responsibility with respect to a Participant who is an “officer” of the Company, within the meaning of Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 16”), who is subject to the filing requirements of Section 16. | Contract | 3.581001 | 3.649191 | 3.58984 |
As noted in the introduction, this case primarily revolves around Terry’s decision not to designate a person an RTP until Terry could gather more information about him. In fact, this is the only alleged negligent act at issue in HSMiller’s Cross-Petition and Brief.1 The potential RTP was James Flaven, whose company contracted to buy commercial real estate from a real estate consortium (the “BNC Sellers”). (6RR198; 17RR55, 90, 125, 160, 195, 230, 270, 300 (PX5-11)) While HSMiller’s statement of facts presents this RTP decision as a straightforward, “no brainer” determination, the decision was a complex strategy call for Terry and his firm. | Party Submissions | 16.891296 | 15.636477 | 17.4898 |
Under the family code there is a presumption that property possessed by either spouse at the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. | Party Submissions | 6.356832 | 7.971587 | 7.930223 |
In the first place, the facts in Willacy are egregious in the extreme. Therein, Willacy County Appraisal District (Willacy CAD) appraised a quantity of grain in the name of Sebastian. Sebastian protested, contending that the grain was really owned by DeBruce, and signed a §1.111(e) agreement with Willacy CAD to the effect that Sebastian was not the owner. Ultimately, it was determined that Sebastian really did own the grain, not DeBruce. When Willacy CAD again appraised the grain in Sebastian’s name, Sebastian used its fraudulently obtained § 1.111(e) agreement to assert that Willacy CAD was barred from contested the agreed upon ownership. Willacy at 33-34. In other words, Sebastian was using its own fraud as shield and sword to facilitate its further fraud. | Party Submissions | 8.657002 | 7.799001 | 8.814203 |
B) The Claimant’s position 228. Claimant rejects Respondent’s interpretation of Article XVII(2) of Annex III of the Treaty. | Legal Decisions | 18.173883 | 12.994412 | 13.653541 |
After a hearing on the motions (RR.1-42), the trial court signed a written order denying defendants’ motions. (CR.1318). | Party Submissions | 14.386812 | 17.827847 | 20.566465 |
Ninguna reclamación puede someterse a arbitraje conforme a esta Sección a menos que: (a) el demandante consienta por escrito someterse al arbitraje, de conformidad con los procedimientos previstos en este Tratado; y (b) la solicitud de arbitraje esté acompañada: (i) de la renuncia por escrito del demandante a las reclamaciones sometidas a arbitraje en virtud de este Artículo; y (ii) de las renuncias por escrito del demandante y de la empresa a las reclamaciones sometidas a arbitraje en virtud de este Artículo; de cualquier derecho a iniciar ante cualquier tribunal judicial o administrativo conforme a la ley de cualquier Parte, u otros procedimientos de solución de controversias, cualquier actuación respecto de cualquier medida que se alegue haber constituido una violación a las que se refiere este Artículo. | Legal Decisions | 4.278291 | 5.30199 | 4.983181 |
To amend title 18, United States Code, to revise recidivist penalty provisions for child sexual exploitation offenses to uniformly account for prior military convictions, thereby ensuring parity among Federal, State, and military convictions, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.203044 | 6.18573 | 6.300197 |
Code Section 409A. Code Section 409A means section 409A of the Code, and regulations and other guidance issued by the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service thereunder. | Contract | 3.53124 | 3.346357 | 5.052058 |
On October 22, 2020, MVP sued McCarthy in the District Court for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, pursuant to a forum-selection clause in the MCC, asserting, among other claims, that McCarthy is liable for RLB’s additional costs. Five days later, RLB filed its original petition, in Harris County, against MVP, alleging MVP is liable for RLB’s additional costs. RLB amended its petition in the Texas case by adding McCarthy and Travelers as defendants on October 30, 2022. | Party Submissions | 5.443748 | 5.64004 | 6.02407 |
The court of appeals correctly applied Section 74.351 and this Court’s precedent in determining the expert reports were insufficient as to BSA. | Party Submissions | 15.418786 | 16.048035 | 23.10323 |
To extend the authorization of certain grants to the governments of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.860284 | 4.412792 | 5.367593 |
Date of Payment under Modified Payment Schedule. Except with respect to modifications that relate to the payment of a Death Benefit or a Disability Benefit, the date payments are to commence under the modified Payment Schedule must be no earlier than five (5) years after the date payment would have commenced under the original Payment Schedule. Under no circumstances may a modification election result in an acceleration of payments in violation of Code Section 409A. | Contract | 6.915722 | 5.668834 | 8.793459 |
After providing an extensive case history, Dr. Tappan detailed Dr. Castillo’s multiple deviations from the applicable standard of care during H.W .’s delivery. These criticisms fell in into three main categories: (1) Dr. Castillo’s failure to perform a cesarian section or consider an operative vaginal delivery when Mrs. Walker’s labor arrested in the second stage at 15:15; (2) Dr. Castillo’s failure to recognize the signs that H.W. had low oxygen induced brain injury, which led her to mismanage labor and delay delivery even after she realized labor was not progressing at 15:52; and (3) Dr. Castillo’s failure to use the correct procedure when she ultimately delivered H.W. at 17.01. | Party Submissions | 7.632118 | 8.244308 | 8.161913 |
The City of Midland (“Midland” or the “City”) generally agrees with Weatherford’s statement of the case, with the exception of Weatherford International, LLC and Weatherford U.S., L.P.’s (collectively, “Weatherford’s”) mischaracterization of the Trial Court’s grant of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction was properly granted because Midland offered dispositive evidence that Weatherford failed to rebut, and thus Weatherford could not show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. As such, the Trial Court appropriately concluded that Midland retains its governmental immunity, and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (the “SWDA”) does not waive such governmental immunity. The domestic sewage exclusion was a secondary and additional basis for the Trial Court’s granting of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, but it was not the exclusive basis for such ruling. Thus, there was no need to determine whether an exception to a statute applied when Weatherford failed to trigger the Trial Court’s threshold jurisdictional requirements under that very statute. | Party Submissions | 5.307245 | 5.327261 | 5.45712 |
Following Orazul’s investment in Cerros Colorados, the Government adopted additional Measures that were inconsistent with the Electricity Law and increasingly interfered with Cerros Colorado. Throughout its adoption of these Measures, however, the Government continued reassuring power generators that the original market-based rules would be restored. | Legal Decisions | 26.389832 | 29.338287 | 30.135815 |
Weatherford states that the City cannot “naively claim it expected 100% compliance with its limitations on sewer discharges,” but fails to acknowledge that violations of ordinances by a third party are hardly foreseeable. Compare Brief at 50 with Nguyen v. SXSW Holdings, Inc., 580 S.W.3d 774, 785 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (”Defendants could negate the existence of a duty by conclusively establishing that the Plaintiffs’ injuries arose from criminal conduct and that the criminal conduct was not foreseeable.”). To analogize this to another common municipal function, regulation and control of traffic,15 a city that installs and maintains traffic lights and prohibits by ordinance the running of red lights is not liable for damages that occur from drivers who run the red lights. To require a strict liability standard for the simple ownership of traffic lights, or the ownership of a sewer system, would create an unnecessarily burdensome liability scheme for regularly-immune governmental entities. The operation and maintenance of a sewer system by a city is a well-established governmental function, and to hold such city liable for third party actions which are prohibited by law would improperly expand the scope of the SWDA and go beyond the intent of the Texas Legislature for this statute. | Party Submissions | 8.380456 | 8.707783 | 8.677266 |
WHEREAS, the Agent and the Borrower wish to amend Section 13.2(a) of the Credit Agreement pursuant to Section 13.1(c). | Contract | 5.088223 | 5.008307 | 7.521907 |
Article 9 Member States shall, by 30 April of each year, submit to the Commission and the other Member States a report on the measures taken during the preceding calendar year, and on their results, pursuant to Articles 2 to 8. | Legislation | 4.037453 | 5.198649 | 4.724522 |
The common law operates very differently than statute law. It is, as is universally recognized, is a living thing. It changes over time, as different applications are considered by different courts in the light of particular conditions. The ability of the courts to tailor common law principles to changes in the circumstances in which they are applied is one of its great strengths. But statute law is different. Statutes generally concern themselves with specific situations, where what’s needed is a clearly stated rule that doesn’t stretch, not to be changed until the Legislature changes it. That is the great strength of statute law. In other words, common law is fluid: statute law is stiff. | Party Submissions | 10.832346 | 10.182214 | 10.535069 |
On the one hand, Respondents insist that because the agreed judgment functions as a “Rule 11 agreement, ” it must be interpreted as a contract and cannot be contradicted by any evidence “outside the bound s ” of the agreed judgment itself — including the otherwise-undisputed evidence of Respondents’ interference with Westwood’s right to possess the premises underlying its constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 28-29, quoting Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.58 (Tex. 2007)) Yet on th e other, Respondents insist that Westwood’s supposedly “voluntary” “Rule 11 agreement ” only matters “as evidence that [Westwood] left voluntarily.” (Resp. 33 -34) But either way, this supposed “agreement” does not mitigate the plain violation of Texas law that the court of appeals committed in this case. | Party Submissions | 9.790456 | 9.614259 | 10.167829 |
This Court held in Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 SW2d 61 (Tex. 1983), that: When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. ...The test for the application of this no evidence/scintilla rule is that if reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that the evidence offered to support the existence of a vital fact lacks probative force, it will be held to be the legal equivalent of no evidence. However, there is some evidence, more than a scintilla, if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds as to the existence of the vital fact. At 63. That is clearly the case here. | Party Submissions | 4.291165 | 6.872316 | 5.704786 |
To amend the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act to use funds in the lump sum catch-up payment reserve fund to make payments to Iran hostages and their families. | Legislation | 12.061365 | 8.673066 | 10.866058 |
Like the intermediate opinions in Abshire and E.D., then, the intermediate opinion here improperly relied on common-law legal sufficiency standards when it demanded that the Walkers’ experts preemptively explain “why an act transpiring some six or more hours before the occurrence of harm was not too attenuated to the eventual harm.” Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *4. | Party Submissions | 18.760935 | 20.204212 | 20.059929 |
The description of a benefit review conference is set forth in Section 410.021 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Section reads, in its entirety: A benefit review conference is a nonadversarial, informal dispute resolution proceeding designed to: (1) explain, orally and in writing, the rights of the respective parties to a workers' compensation claim and the procedures necessary to protect those rights; (2) discuss the facts of the claim, review available information in order to evaluate the claim, and delineate the disputed issues; and (3) mediate and resolve disputed issues by agreement of the parties in [*17] accordance with this subtitle and the policies of the division. | Party Submissions | 5.901993 | 6.769857 | 6.282165 |
R: No se ha emitido, es correcto, porque se encuentran en valoración todas las pruebas que ha presentado la empresa CALICA. P: ¿Por 15 meses? ¿Es muy difícil de evaluar esa prueba, señor Vilchis? R: Debido a la extensión, en este caso más de 900 hectáreas; debido al cambio de uso de suelo, a las especies que se ha afectado y sobre todo al tipo de ecosistema y a la cantidad de arbolado que se removió, sí requiere ese tiempo para poder analizar las pruebas. | Party Submissions | 10.595067 | 16.804115 | 12.332723 |
Finally, there was no negligence here, much less gross negligence. And the “evidence” HSMiller presented to support both negligence and gross negligence is nothing more than conclusory testimony. | Party Submissions | 13.492542 | 15.585028 | 17.734394 |
Request No. 7 is granted insofar as the Respondent shall provide the Claimant with the document(s) regarding the decision(s) to place and maintain the Claimant under house arrest between July 1, 2020 and October 31, 2020. The Request is dismissed in all other parts, which are unspecific and not substantiated for the purpose of preparing the Claimant’s forthcoming Memorial, and for the determination of the allegations contained therein in support of the Claimant’s claims. The Tribunal further notes that some of these other parts appear to relate to other matters, such as “detention”, “sentences”, and “travel documentation”. | Legal Decisions | 9.653388 | 8.63717 | 8.267734 |
In contrast, Rafiei's sales contract unambiguously adopts the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, specifying a detailed fee structure. Such explicit terms offer a clear picture of Rafiei's financial obligation, making it distinguishable from the ambiguity presented in Shattenkirk . | Party Submissions | 23.283638 | 23.940525 | 30.532764 |
In the event that Bay is relying on the policies themselves to constitute the required written agreement, it should “go without saying” that the policies themselves don't qualify as the “written agreement” because they are contracts between an insurance company and its insured and not an agreement between general contractors and subcontractors as required under a plain reading of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123. | Party Submissions | 10.926159 | 12.434513 | 14.115459 |
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 2.938983 | 3.319711 | 3.7098 |
A report that states the expert’s opinion in a conclusory manner is not a good faith effort to comply with the TMLA. Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 459-60 (Tex. 2017); Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). A conclusory report is one that offers no basis, or whose basis is unsupported by the facts. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. 2010) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009)). Courts are precluded from filling gaps in a report by drawing inferences or guessing as to what the expert likely meant or intended. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53; Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb, 228 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding the court may not “draw[] inferences or guess[] as to what the expert likely meant or intended”). The expert must do more than “provide[] insight” about the plaintiff’s claims and should instead provide a basis for his statements and tie his conclusions to the facts. Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 52. Causation must be clearly stated and cannot be inferred. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. | Party Submissions | 3.779203 | 4.066425 | 4.304108 |
Any and all responses to the objections submitted during the public insight period for the 2013 DRP, which were provided by the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction, including but not limited to the revised responses provided in accordance with the conclusions of the City Assembly of Belgrade’s Planning Commission from the 251st session held on 7 February 2013. | Legal Decisions | 11.589536 | 10.267289 | 11.094985 |
Claimants have conducted a reasonable search for any responsive documents and confirm that no responsive documents are in their possession and control. | Legal Decisions | 12.076639 | 17.141665 | 18.657537 |
The court of appeals dismissed Petitioners’ claims, denying them a chance to plead a premises defect claim. Relying on Sampson, the court held the TTCA permitted claims for physical defects only. The court then went further and held that, notwithstanding the TTCA, the City could not be liable for failing to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool by enforcing its own safety rules. | Party Submissions | 10.407818 | 9.875175 | 11.166386 |
Four, the merits of RLB’s bond and prompt-payment claims need not be determined by a Texas court. Cf. Matl Constr. Co. v. Jim Connelly Masonry, Inc., No. | Party Submissions | 23.38335 | 33.26668 | 35.533184 |
In concluding its opinion, the Court held the experts’ reports were deficient because “they failed to explain how and why each [defendant] caused, within reasonabl[e] medical probability, [H.W.’s] eventual subacute infarction....” Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5. The Court then stated, “[t]o the extent that the trial court held otherwise, it abused its discretion.” Id. (emphasis added). Although E.D. holds that “[c]lose calls go to the trial court” in reviews under an abuse of discretion standard,6 this was not a close call; both experts either provided only conclusory, ipse dixit opinions, or they failed to provide causation opinions (both cause in fact and foreseeability) for any alleged standard-of-care breach. To the extent the trial court thought these types of opinions satisfied the statute, respectfully, it did fail to follow guiding rules and principles and did abuse its discretion. | Party Submissions | 9.574966 | 10.003742 | 10.274121 |
On February 12, 2020, the trial court held ahearing in which Wife asked the trial court to order Husband to tender to the court’s registry any bonus money he \ recejved pending the court’s ruling on the characterization of the bonus. Wife anticipated Husband would receive abonus, if any, on February 15, 2020. | Party Submissions | 9.492978 | 11.276161 | 10.61007 |
The other cases cited by the Walkers are readily distinguishable because the reports in those cases provided significantly more causal explanation than the reports do here. In Miller v. JSC Lake Highland Operations, LP, the health care provider did not notice a dental bridge in the patient’s airway shown on an x-ray. 536 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. 2017). This finding on the x-ray was readily tied to “foreign body aspiration,” the cause of death listed on the autopsy report. Id. There was a direct connection between the aspiration due to a foreign body and the x-ray showing a foreign body in the airway. In Abshire v. Christus Health Southeast Texas, the expert faulted the providers for not noting the patient’s brittle bone disease in her medical history. 563 S.W.3d 219, 224-25 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). This failure was problematic because had it been provided, the patient would have been placed on bed rest in such a way to alleviate pressure of the spine such that her compression fracture would not have progressed, which would have prevented paraplegia. Id. Unlike here, the expert explained what would have happened had the nurses reported clinically relevant information and why it would have made a difference.5 Id. at 224. | Party Submissions | 7.386289 | 7.555255 | 7.822325 |
The Martinez Family insists that Bruno was not yet a Hellas employee at the time of his injury, arguing that Bruno had applied for a position but had not yet been hired and emphasizing that Hellas itself initially denied Bruno's status as an employee when it learned of the injury. Notwithstanding the status of Bruno's employment application and its early statements on the subject, Hellas now characterizes Bruno as an employee when he sustained the fatal injuries. | Party Submissions | 12.699787 | 11.726915 | 13.808269 |
Alternatively, and only after this court deems coverage available somehow, *8 and if this court then deems the several versions of Mann's activities on the morning of his accident as constituting admissible summary judgement evidence, then and only then is the court presented with a bona fide fact question regarding course and scope as an affirmative defense. Several versions of course and scope fail to conclusively establish anything. Bay seems to argue that since a majority of the factual accounts place Mann in course and scope, that it is conclusively established. | Party Submissions | 21.252188 | 26.058445 | 23.836401 |
Berrelez resigned from Mesquite Logistics and never contacted the insurance carrier. Rather, counsel for Berrelez sent a demand letter to Mesquite Logistics. Thereafter, Berrelez filed suit against Mesquite Logistics and Mascorro. As to Mesquite Logistics, Berrelez asserted a premises liability claim, alleging Mesquite Logistics “had actual or constructive knowledge that the premises were unsafe, that these conditions posed an unreasonable risk, and that it did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm, and that such failure proximately caused injuries to Berrelez who was, then and there, an invitee on the premises.” Berrelez also asserted Mesquite Logistics committed numerous acts of gross negligence. As is pertinent to this appeal, Berrelez alleged in her live pleading that she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. She alleged her injuries were the result of an intentional act by Mascorro, who acted upon personal reasons that were not based on Berrelez's status as an employee of Mesquite Logistics. | Party Submissions | 4.9148 | 5.04199 | 5.567649 |
During the marriage, Husband worked for Bank of America, and Wife worked for the City of Dallas. Both contributed to retirement plans during their employment. | Party Submissions | 8.290945 | 9.60462 | 9.309558 |
Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (2018) Berrelez was employed by Mesquite Logistics as a housekeeper at Mesquite Lodge. According to Berrelez, Mesquite Lodge provides housing for oil field workers. Berrelez claims her duties as housekeeper included cleaning rooms, removing trash, and providing clean linens and bedding for the guests. One day, when Berrelez was on duty, a Mesquite Lodge guest, Manuel Hugo Mascorro, sexually assaulted her. Mascorro ultimately pled guilty to indecent exposure. | Party Submissions | 5.896354 | 6.171466 | 5.900058 |
The Texas Election Code contains specific requirements that an application 8 for a place on the ballot must meet. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.031; In re Tex. House Republican Caucus PAC, 630 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) ("Section 141.031 contains requirements for '[a] candidate's application for a place on the ballot that is required by this code.'") ( citing TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.031(a)). In addition to the requirements of Section 141.031, candidates for justice of the supreme court must additionally include a petition containing a minimum of 50 signatures from each court of appeals district. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(g). “A candidate for public office must comply with all statutory requirements to be entitled to have his or her name included on the ballot." In re Armendariz, 245 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, orig. proceeding); see T EX. E LEC. CODE § 172.021; Wallace v. Howell, 707 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (stating that "statutory requirements concerning candidacy for political office are mandatory and are to be strictly enforced). | Party Submissions | 3.31445 | 3.480222 | 3.535648 |
Oncor debunked this argument at length in its initial brief (see Oncor’s Brief at 16-33). Respondents continue to assert it, though, citing three cases. Oncor addressed two of them— Houston Cement Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 25, 2013, no pet.) and Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.)—in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 20 n.10 and 31-33. | Party Submissions | 3.596101 | 3.81506 | 3.999363 |
If trial had taken place on either the first or second setting, the termination date would not yet have triggered and OSPrin would have recovered the full amount due. But after Guarantor repeatedly delayed trial, he argued that the Sunset Termination Provision had been triggered—after the initial trial date, but before the trial finally took place. Because the trial court accepted this argument, the Guarantor successfully avoided making any payment towards his guaranty and was not held liable for any of the damages caused by his contractual breach. | Party Submissions | 14.891697 | 17.745941 | 16.775246 |
To strike the balance, a preliminary expert report must “represen t an objective good faith effort” to provide a fair summary of the expert’ s opinions on the applicable standards of care, how the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(l), (r)(6)). | Party Submissions | 5.760319 | 6.860638 | 7.775129 |
This case concerns a putative class action filed against Coinbase in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Abraham Bielski sued on behalf of Coinbase users who allege that Coinbase failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from the users’ accounts. | Party Submissions | 7.257723 | 6.644572 | 7.070126 |
To amend the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 to improve mapping under the National Flood Insurance Program, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 2.818443 | 2.481926 | 2.835608 |
I, Thomas C. Hall, hereby certify that I have reviewed this Petition and have concluded that every factual statement in this Petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or record. | Party Submissions | 8.509526 | 11.020111 | 12.07621 |
Unsurprisingly, this Court agreed that fee-splitting provisions that operate to prohibit the full and effective vindication of statutory rights are not enforceable. Id. at 356 (citing Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d at 572). Still, while this Court recognized the same policy concerns articulated by courts holding fee-splitting arrangements per se unconscionable, it required “ some evidence” that a complaining party will likely incur arbitration costs in such an amount as to deter enforcement of statutory rights in the arbitral forum. Id. | Party Submissions | 9.232444 | 8.424198 | 9.872847 |
If the matter had been briefed by the parties, it is unlikely the majority would have reached this erroneous conclusion. The cases the majority cited do not deal with self-dealing in any of its forms— transactional, usurpation, or other misconduct. They were not cases like this one, in which Alpesh secretly arranged to cancel management fees that Manticore was paying to CKC, so he could receive $1.1 million in salary over a two-year period. CR462, ¶ 35 and CR467, ¶ 44. | Party Submissions | 14.523575 | 16.038265 | 16.418978 |
Also please inform us – do we have the right to catch the snow crab less than 12 nautical miles from Svalbard and islands around Svalbard. | Legal Decisions | 19.800423 | 21.032545 | 21.767492 |
Page 4 of Addendas 1 and 2 for the first time by instituting the Lima Arbitration on 27 December 2018;12 or (iv) the decision to declare the RER-Contract automatically terminated for not reaching the POC on the specified date, and without any right to compensation whatsoever for CHM, even though CHM had not caused the termination and had made millionaire investments as from the execution of the RER-Contract in February 2014. | Legal Decisions | 19.227884 | 21.203342 | 21.8503 |
On December 22, 2020, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Yellowfin on all claims, awarding Yellowfin $21,023.13 in damages and $5,160.00 in attorney’s fees plus costs, interest, and conditional fees should Santos seek a new trial or appeal. CR2:269-270. Implicit in the Court’s judgment is a finding that Yellowfin has standing to pursue its claims and that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 7.208262 | 7.032326 | 7.739962 |
To be clear, the Claimant is not seeking to have the freezing of PEM’s bank accounts undone including the funds that were on deposit at the time of the seizure, which could be viewed as directed at a measure being challenged in this arbitration. | Legal Decisions | 19.67512 | 19.484333 | 22.936523 |
After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered its final order that Osprin take nothing on its claims against TX 1111 and Backes and entered a declaratory judgment that any and all obligations of Backes under the guaranty were terminated and discharged by virtue of completing the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the project; that Backes recover from Osprin his attorney fees and expenses after February 12, 2020, in the amount of $736,330.51; that Osprin recover from Backes its attorney fees and expenses from March 2018 through February 12, 2020, in the amount of $861,760.76; and that Backes recover his appellate attorney 14 Stonehenge and Rusk Investor had previously been dismissed from the lawsuit. | Party Submissions | 8.291565 | 8.572432 | 9.645915 |
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.302 provides that a trial court is limited to reviewing only those issues decided by the appeals panel. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.302(b) (2006). | Party Submissions | 3.93265 | 5.163854 | 4.573027 |
Subcontractor’s operations include the transportation of any hazardous material, Automobile Liability policy shall contain coverage for transportation of hazardous materials by endorsement CA 99 48 or its equivalent. The Automobile policy will attach a MCS-90 endorsement. | Party Submissions | 14.408185 | 13.096359 | 17.473606 |
In the 2022 memorandum opinion from City of Dallas v. Trinity East Energy, LLC ( Trinity II ), the Dallas Court of Appeals inappropriately applied Lucas taking analysis to this case, potentially broadening its scope beyond established boundaries.2 Despite memorandum opinions lacking formal precedential value, they are still influential, and without Supreme Court reconsideration, this ruling could lead to confusion in future takings jurisprudence. | Party Submissions | 15.027962 | 14.690703 | 16.031082 |
If the court of appeals opinion stands, any party who has ever been in litigation will have an absolute privilege permitting the filing of any abstract of judgment— even if filed harassingly or maliciously and expressly intended to prevent a property sale solely to protect the party’s own pocketbook—and apparently even if the party never had a judgment against a property owner (as with Mrs. Nath) supporting interference with the owners’ property rights. The Court should take the opportunity to answer this open question that directly affects the property rights of even nonlitigants, such as Usha Nath. | Party Submissions | 21.642761 | 16.86532 | 23.49833 |
The 1615 Tabor, LLC opinion was first concerned with whether there was a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity from a suit for correction of the appraisal roll. It concluded that “without an express waiver of sovereign immunity or governmental immunity, courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against the State or its political subdivisions. Id at *3, citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. 2006). The court confirmed that an appraisal district is a political subdivision and, “as such, appraisal districts generally are immune from suit.” Id, citing see Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). However, the Court was ultimately concerned with the narrowness of the limit to a statutory waiver of immunity. Oncor may attempt to frame the Houston Court’s application of Houston Cement as favorable to its position when it concluded that “the Texas Tax Code provides a limited statutory waiver of immunity that allows property owners to seek judicial review of an appraisal review board’s determination of a motion to correct filed under TEX. TAX CODE section 25.25.” Id, citing Houston Cement Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., No.14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, *2 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ) (mem. op.). However, the 1615 Tabor, LLC court immediately qualifies: “ But this statutory waiver does not extend to judicial review of an agreement between a property owner or the owner’s agent and an appraisal district ‘which may be protested to the appraisal review board or ... ‘which may be corrected under [Texas Tax Code] [s]ection 25.25 ... An agreement under Texas Tax Code section 1.111(e) is final, and thus does not come within the statutory waiver of immunity allowing judicial review.” Id. (emphasis added) citing TEX. | Party Submissions | 4.961509 | 5.062693 | 4.926907 |
Whereas: (1) On 19 December 2013, UPL Europe Limited submitted an application for the approval of the active substance asulam-sodium to the United Kingdom, the rapporteur Member State, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. | Legislation | 5.186306 | 4.962954 | 5.380453 |
Appellee Sonic Systems International, Inc. filed a motion for rehearing in the referenced cause, which is denied. We issue this supplemental opinion, however, to address the issues raised by Sonic. | Party Submissions | 11.241617 | 9.62725 | 14.453511 |
Subsets and Splits