text
stringlengths 89
3.77k
⌀ | category
stringclasses 4
values | saul-7b_perplexity
float64 1.76
124
⌀ | llama2-7b_perplexity
float64 1.8
127
⌀ | mistral-7b_perplexity
float64 1.76
157
⌀ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
First, Yellowfin emphasizes that “[w]here there is a debt secured by a note, which is in turn, secured by a lien, the note and the lien constitute separate obligations.” Resp. Br. 8 (quoting Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied)). We do not disagree, but that is beside the point. The note and the lien do constitute separate obligations. So, we acknowledge that the junior lienholder may seek to recover the remaining debt on a note even after foreclosure extinguishes its lien. Santos simply argues that the lender must bring that action within the limitations period. See Opening Br. 25-26. Similarly, we do not contest that a lender may sue to recover a debt on a note without first foreclosing. See Resp. Br. 18 (citing Carter v. Gray, 81 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. 1935)). Our point is only that when a foreclosure does occur, the foreclosure triggers the limitations period because at foreclosure, the full amount of the debt becomes due. See Opening Br. 28-29. | Party Submissions | 5.399433 | 5.787012 | 5.901568 |
MVP does not dispute that RLB filed the lawsuit well within the statute of limitations. Sanders v. Hathaway, No. 01-18-00661-CV, 2019 WL 2932847, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The right to disaffirm is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.”). Thus, RLB does not claim it had “unlimited” time to void the forum-selection clause: the statute of limitations provides a time limitation. | Party Submissions | 5.067389 | 5.581425 | 5.279376 |
In order to adequately sell and service the motor vehicle buyer, each franchised dealer location must have a sufficient supply of new motor vehicles so as to continue to remain operational. | Party Submissions | 16.740227 | 16.293503 | 18.944548 |
HN12 [ ] Common Law Writs, Mandamus A writ of mandamus will issue when a trial court does not abate a tort suit while a suit for judicial review of a Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation decision is pending. Mandamus relief is afforded where a trial court fails to abate tort litigation while suit for judicial review of Workers' Compensation Commission decision remained pending. | Party Submissions | 10.489432 | 11.241903 | 11.970759 |
As Fleming Defendants have been saying all throughout this appeal, if a litigant makes an agreement with the court relating to collateral estoppel, express or implied, then the litigant is bound by that agreement. They should be bound by their agreement that individual issues predominate over common issues, which necessarily precludes collateral estoppel of any kind, and their motion for summary judgment on collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment should be denied. | Party Submissions | 10.837518 | 11.869658 | 12.989908 |
Christus Spohn Health System Corp. v. High and Rector , 658 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2022, pet. denied).1 As such, this would fall under the professional or administrative services component of the second element of a medical liability claim. Christus stated that patient identification involves professional or administrative services in its response to the petition for review. (Christus Rsp. 20). | Party Submissions | 10.375767 | 13.166787 | 12.903166 |
All of this ended with Dr. Castillo’s failure to properly perform the delivery itself. By 15:50, Dr. Castillo noted that H.W.’s head was at a +2 station with “large caput”— that is, a swelling of the scalp that occurs after prolonged engagement of the fetal head in the birth canal. App. 7, CR 666. When Dr. Castillo made her first surgical incision at 16:56, she also observed that “the head was very low in pelvis” and that she “could not reach it into the pelvis at all.” App. 7, CR 666. | Party Submissions | 7.583006 | 9.436166 | 8.104341 |
WHEREAS, reference is made to the agreements set forth on Exhibit A hereto (the “Specified Agreements”, and each a “Specified Agreement”), each entered into between Dow and Dow Hydrocarbons and Resources LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“DHRL”). | Contract | 8.045815 | 5.038997 | 7.728262 |
In the absence of a showing of subterfuge, the agreement was disposi- tive of Defterios’s independent-contractor status. E.g., Newspapers, Inc. | Party Submissions | 19.228617 | 22.562944 | 24.008682 |
B) The damages regarding the failure to adjust the tipping fees 536. Upon the Tribunal’s finding that Respondent violated the FET by failing to revise the tipping fees – as provided for in the Concession Agreement697 – the consistency of the damage suffered in this regard is reflected in the maintenance of the tipping fees during the landfill operation period, which, necessarily, has an impact on the calculation of the cash flows considered for the valuation of the expropriation, calculated using the DCF method. | Legal Decisions | 18.27104 | 14.471882 | 16.354877 |
The court reversed the trial court's judgment in the employer's favor and rendered judgment affirming the appeals panel's decision that denied the employer's reimbursement claim. The court conditionally granted the employer's mandamus petition. | Party Submissions | 5.347033 | 5.736198 | 6.213685 |
Intervenor further questioned A.S. about October 2021, when law enforcement was called due to a domestic issue between A.S and C.W. 3 RR 120-21. | Party Submissions | 14.604191 | 17.59086 | 25.64918 |
To affirm the State of Texas’s right to implement operational protections along the southern border, to authorize the State to construct a physical border wall in areas where the international border is not adequately protected with physical barriers, and to allow reimbursement from the Federal Government. | Legislation | 14.20398 | 12.040446 | 11.613874 |
Amendment, each reference in the Employment Agreement to “this Agreement,” “hereunder,” or words of like import shall mean and be a reference to the Employment Agreement, as amended by this Amendment. | Contract | 3.308368 | 3.540119 | 4.950152 |
It is the section’s preliminary assessment that there are good reasons for considering the snow crab as a sedentary species which is thus subject to shelf jurisdiction. This means that the snow crab in this case is regulated by the relevant shelf state (s). We have understood that the snow crab at the moment is mainly located on the Russian shelf. However, we have been informed by IMR that it will be able to move over to the Norwegian shelf. | Legal Decisions | 13.986667 | 13.248114 | 14.299116 |
III. Bay Does Not Meet the Statutory Requirements of Section 406.123 Therefore, the Trial Courts Order Striking Bay's Exclusive Remedy Defense Should be Affirmed. | Party Submissions | 10.566083 | 10.296051 | 13.829829 |
In Fodge, a workers' compensation claimant brought suit against an insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Insurance Code and the DTPA. 63 S.W.3d at 802-03. The trial court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss, based on the insurer's argument that the claimant's causes of action were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC because they were all based on a denial of compensation benefits. The appellate court reversed, however, holding that the claimant's extra-contractual claims were unrelated to the compensation claims. Id. at 803. On review, the supreme court parsed the claimant's causes of action into three claims: (1) for compensation benefits due under the insurance policy, (2) for damages caused by the insurer's bad faith denial of benefits, and (3) for damages caused by the insurer's bad faith delay in handling the claim and in making payments. Id. The supreme court concluded that the first two claims involved issues within the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC because both required [**30] a determination that benefits were in fact due to the claimant. Id. at 804. However, the court concluded that the claims related to the temporary income benefits-- delays in communication with the claimant and in payment of the benefits, and an improper investigation-- were properly before the trial court and should not have been dismissed. Id. at 805 . | Party Submissions | 4.156054 | 4.331895 | 4.490405 |
At any time after the institution of the proceedings, a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation of its rights be recommended by the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to be preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that require such measures. | Legal Decisions | 6.679999 | 6.828592 | 6.796163 |
Here, by contrast, Dr. Tappan set out the facts — Mrs. Walker ’ s arrested labor and H.W. ’ s heartrate abnormalities — that put H.W. at risk of “ hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy” and how H.W.’s condition at birth suggested the possibility that he in fact suffered such an injury. App. 7, CR 668-69 (¶¶ 4-5); see also id. at CR 670. | Party Submissions | 11.082279 | 14.30537 | 14.236885 |
After notice and hearing and considering the evidence on the record, the trial court correctly struck Bay's affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies” because *10 Bay failed to prove that it had standing to assert the defense as a matter of law. | Party Submissions | 13.184805 | 13.622154 | 16.403963 |
I hereby certify that this Reply Brief on the Merits (when excluding the caption, table of contents, index of authorities, signature, certificate of compliance, and certificate of service) contains 7,496 words. | Party Submissions | 7.343671 | 9.003813 | 9.293414 |
Oncor asserts that “[t]he only time a section 1.111(e) agreement bars subsequent correction of a clerical error is when the agreement expressly addresses the clerical error .” 7 In support, Oncor states that Houston Cement and Bastrop do not say otherwise. Oncor ’ s characterization carefully avoids the fact that the cases cited do not stand for the “express” requirement that Oncor has read into the statute. | Party Submissions | 16.089802 | 15.959558 | 19.427357 |
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the September 21, 2021 Order and Final Judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. | Party Submissions | 5.477423 | 6.589803 | 6.794682 |
Change in Control. Change in Control, with respect to a Participating Employer that is organized as a corporation, occurs on the date on which any of the following events occur: (i) a change in the ownership of the Participating Employer; (ii) a change in the effective control of the Participating Employer; or (iii) a change in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of the Participating Employer. | Contract | 2.444177 | 2.623717 | 2.715741 |
Additionally, evidence about whether Terry considered naming Flaven as an RTP or thought HSMiller would benefit from submitting Flaven in the proportionate responsibility jury question also is irrelevant. See id. at 58. The proper inquiry concerns Terry’s decision to wait to seek leave to designate Flaven as an RTP until he knew more about Flaven, even if that meant designating Flaven late, and whether that decision was subjectively reckless and made with conscious indifference. See Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 796. There is no evidence that Terry had “actual awareness” that a motion for leave to designate an RTP filed less than 60 days would definitely be denied or that he himself acted with conscious indifference to the risk to 41 HSMiller in making this strategy call. See Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 138-39. | Party Submissions | 13.224515 | 13.169638 | 14.385221 |
PRAYER Because Bay does not have standing to assert an exclusive remedies affirmative defense, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. This suit *37 should be remanded to the trial court so that Mann may pursue his negligence case against Bay either as a non-employee pedestrian or as an employee against his non-subscribing employer. | Party Submissions | 13.758009 | 16.084404 | 17.818039 |
Respondents seek to create a misleading impression about the financial state of Manticore Fuels LLC, a company conceived by petitioner Rob Condon. CR454. Respondents also improperly cite ProPetro’s online 10-K filing from 2020, “reporting a deterioration of its financial position.” Resp. 7 n.2.4 This evidence also goes outside the face of the pleadings and offers a misleading snapshot. | Party Submissions | 20.595274 | 22.334185 | 22.80965 |
On December 22, 2020, MVP filed a plea in abatement in the Texas case. MVP contended that RLB’s and McCarthy’s claims against MVP in the Texas case should be abated in favor of the Oklahoma case because (1) the Oklahoma court had dominant jurisdiction because the Oklahoma case was the first-filed; and (2) the forum-selection clause in the MCC required that suit be filed in the District Court in Tulsa, Oklahoma. | Party Submissions | 5.515479 | 6.400462 | 6.646071 |
As Sonic acknowledges in its rehearing motion, the issue [**2] in this case is one of first impression. For that reason, our opinion cites to several cases dealing with subrogation issues rather than subclaimants, but this does not mean the two concepts were conflated. The issue we address in the opinion is whether Sonic's right to reimbursement under the TWCA is greater than Cochran's, not whether its rights are greater than a subrogee's. There was no dispute that Sonic was seeking reimbursement as Cochran's subclaimant, and the opinion does not attempt to define the parameters of that designation. As we note in footnote 13 of the opinion, "neither party raised any issues in the TWCC proceedings regarding Sonic's pursuit of benefits as a 'subclaimant' or the import of that designation." The opinion concludes that Sonic did not establish, as a matter of law, that it can recover under the TWCA as Cochran's subclaimant if Cochran was, in fact, barred from recovery under the statute. | Party Submissions | 6.977121 | 7.584764 | 7.050217 |
Then in January 2011, the taxpayer filed a motion to correct the 2009 and 2010 values of its property under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) (as Oncor did), arguing that, due to clerical errors, both valuations included inventory that had been in transit and not yet located in Harris County on January 1 of each respective year. Id. The appraisal review board dismissed the taxpayer’s motion with respect to both years for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the taxpayer’s lawsuit, holding that “[b]ecause those final values were matters on which protests either could have been filed or had been filed but not yet determined by the board, the agreements are final as to those values.” Id. at *2. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly granted the appraisal district’s plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at *3. | Party Submissions | 6.239271 | 6.036961 | 6.449687 |
Liberty has affirmatively demonstrated a valid waiver of governmental immunity under Texas Local Government Code, Section 271.152, by which certain contracts with a governmental entity are subject to such waiver. Texas Local Government Code, Section 271, provides that a “‘[c]ontract subject to this subchapter ’” means: (A) a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity[.] ” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151(2)(A). The central purpose of the Contract here is to provide wastewater treatment service to Ames, specifically to “provide for the treatment and disposal of waste from such system by LIBERTY’S wastewater plant.” (CR 32, 43.) Such wastewater treatment and disposal services are services that invoke the immunity waiver, as courts have consistently held. Partners Dewatering Int’l, L.C. v. City of Hondo, No. 13-13-00340-CV, 2015 WL 3637853, at *5 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2015, pet. denied) (holding that “collecting, hauling, and disposing of all sludge generated by the WWTP constituted a service under [Chapter 271]” for which immunity was waive d) (alteration in original); W. Travis Cnty. Pub. Util. Agency v. Travis Cnty. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 12, 537 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (noting that water treatment and delivery is a service that was provided by one of the contracting parties). Accordingly, Liberty’s service to Ames— wastewater treatment and disposal — is a service for which immunity is waived. | Party Submissions | 5.349266 | 5.486497 | 5.582953 |
Laporta explained that Husband’s incentive plan indicated that disbursement of the bonus was at the sole discretion of Bank of America. It was not tied to any commissioned work, and until the bonus was received, it was an “expectancy,” not an entitlement. The court ultimately awarded the February 14, 2020 bonus as. Husband’s separate property. | Party Submissions | 13.422267 | 15.564 | 17.249903 |
Suarez v. City of Texas City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). For example, in Shumake, the plaintiffs alleged that a hidden man-made culvert created a powerful undertow that caused their nine-year-old daughter to drown in a state park. 199 S.W.3d at 281. The supreme court concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for gross negligence under the Recreational Statute, in part, because the powerful undertow created by the hidden man-made culvert represented a latent defect that was not open and obvious. Id. at 288. | Party Submissions | 4.513784 | 4.851662 | 5.110028 |
To be sure, this Court has said that when the Legislature does decide to prohibit waiver of statutory rights, it must “speak clearly.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 6. | Party Submissions | 8.771312 | 10.783719 | 10.799262 |
The Amarillo Court of Appeals agreed that “no doubt, something happened leaving child and parent to suffer the consequences. ” App. 3, Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. But relying on this Court’s recent opinion in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152, 179 (Tex. 2022), the Court of Appeals found the expert reports deficient as to causation, reversed the trial court, and dismissed the case. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3-5. | Party Submissions | 6.581045 | 7.179318 | 7.062749 |
Here, in support of their negligence claims, petitioners alleged that the hospital “had a duty to correctly and securely identify each infant in the hospital and to ensure that discharge of each infant be with his or her parent of family.” (CR1 8). This duty not only does not mention record keeping, it does not implicate it either. In fact, as the petition so aptly stated, “There is no other plausible explanation for this occurrence other than Defendant’s negligence.” (CR1 9). Petitioners were correct. This case should have been treated as a simple negligence case. There was no reason to try to strain to fit it into the TMLA. E. An expert report would serve no function under these facts or in most other switched at birth cases – it should be obvious that a claim that infants were switched at birth has merit and is not frivolous, so there is no need to deter these claims. | Party Submissions | 12.68718 | 14.734775 | 13.719646 |
Trinity II potentially turns community-first land use governance on its head and elevates a landowner’s economic objectives above the community’s interest in public health, safety, and welfare as expressed through the zoning process. When the Dallas community, acting via statutorily-defined public processes, deemed the Surface Tracts’ drill sites incompatible with its standards, it faced a near $44 million judgment, including interest, payable from public funds. If upheld, Trinity II could shift discretionary zoning decisions from community-focused local governance to a process influenced by the fear of costly litigation and damages based on a particular landowner’s hopes and dreams. This may not matter as much in cities with sufficient funding and legal staff to fight cases as they come up; however, of the approximately 1,799 cities in Texas, only about 129 have a population in excess of 25,000.18 In fact more than a third of the population of Texas resides in just 20 cities, with the bulk of cities having fewer than 5,000 people. 19 It is imperative to consider the disproportionate impact the Trinity II decision could have on smaller Texas cities with limited financial and legal resources. These municipalities often lack the robust legal defenses and financial cushions necessary to withstand the pressures of protracted litigation or the threat of substantial damages arising from Lucas claims. This vulnerability could lead to a chilling effect on the essential zoning and regulatory actions these cities undertake to protect public interests. Consequently, there is a risk that smaller cities may become overly cautious or inclined to make concessions unfavorable to community interests, simply to avoid the potential financial burdens of litigation. Therefore, we urge this Court to recognize the unique challenges faced by these smaller municipalities in its consideration of the Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing. The decision in this case should not inadvertently create an environment where the fear of regulatory takings claims unduly constrains the ability of cities, especially those with limited resources, to effectively govern and protect the welfare of their communities. | Party Submissions | 8.224952 | 8.232853 | 8.549101 |
This Court followed Cockerham in its decision in Fellows. Fellows v. Fellows, 2000 EL 1073609 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.). This Court followed the Cockerham rule, stating: When a spouse uses separate property to acquire property during marriage and takes title to that property in the name of both spouses, a presumption arises that the purchasing spouse intended to make a gift of one-half of the separate funds to the other spouse.... However, the presumption can be rebutted by evidence of the absence of intent to make a gift. | Party Submissions | 5.513059 | 5.979543 | 5.884048 |
The Lucas Takings Claim Gal ovelho’s first claim alleged a categorical or per se taking, which occurs “ when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle. ” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court identified this categorical taking claim in Lucas, but limited it to “ the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted .” Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original). The Lucas C ourt’s use of emphasis underscores that a categorical taking occurs only when the government’s action destroys all economic value of the property at issue.6 That principle was – 8– subsequently confirmed, when the Court wrote that “[a]nything less than a ‘complete elimination of value, ’ or a ‘ total loss ’” would prevent such a taking claim. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330. | Party Submissions | 8.034753 | 9.163756 | 8.452898 |
This Court cites generally to the presumption that taking title to property in both spouses’ names which was previously the separate property of one spouse gives way to a presumption of gift of one-half of the spouse’s separate property interest to the other spouse. Id. at 168. | Party Submissions | 10.357803 | 12.297053 | 10.823388 |
Balancing jurisprudential considerations, both public and private, in determining whether an adequate remedy by appeal exists, while a reviewing court is mindful that abatement orders are incidental rulings of the trial court and lost profits do not establish an inadequate appellate remedy, it is also true that whether an appellate remedy is adequate should be guided by general principles rather than simple rules; it is not an abstract or formulaic determination and depends heavily on the circumstances presented. Mandamus review may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. | Party Submissions | 12.650589 | 12.067122 | 15.149854 |
Their second claim is based on the City’s failure to provide Catiana with a life jacket even though these safety devices were available for her use. The Delapenas contend that this claim falls within the integral safety component doctrine articulated in cases like Robinson v. Central Texas MHMR Center, 780 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1989). | Party Submissions | 13.860177 | 14.543515 | 14.430113 |
Sales Commissions. Sales commissions (as defined in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(a)(12)(i)) are considered to be earned by the Participant in the taxable year of the Participant in which the sale occurs. The Compensation Deferral Agreement applicable to any sales commissions, [if permitted by the Committee,] must be filed before the last day of the year preceding the year in which the sales commissions are earned, and becomes irrevocable after that date. | Contract | 5.978138 | 6.073853 | 6.882515 |
The MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan for Non-Executive Directors and Consultants (the “Plan”) is adopted effective as of November 1, 2023 by MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. (“the Company”). The Company intends that the Plan shall at all times be administered and interpreted in such a manner as to constitute an unfunded plan maintained primarily for the benefit of non-executive members of the Company’s Board of Directors and to fulfill the applicable requirements of Section 409A. | Contract | 3.552259 | 3.603732 | 3.754486 |
Bay submitted proof that at the time of the accident, Mann was employed as Bay's foreman for a project at the Bill Greehey Refinery owned by Valero (“the refinery”). The refinery is located on Up River Road and is relatively close to the site of the accident. | Party Submissions | 14.514236 | 14.63544 | 19.813097 |
On rehearing, Sonic asserts that this court's opinion contains two "substantial" analytical errors, as follows: (1) "it conflates [Sonic's] status as a subclaimant with that of a subrogee," and (2) it construes " [s]ection 406.075 [of the TWCA] to bar [Sonic's] reimbursement claim that does not depend on any 'election'" made by Cochran, Sonic's employee. Specifically, Sonic argues that the opinion holds there is no distinction between a subclaimant and a subrogee and asserts its claim for reimbursement under section 409.009 is greater than that of a subrogee. Sonic also argues that a reimbursement claim is independent and not derivative of the employee's right to recover. | Party Submissions | 6.07416 | 6.576248 | 6.818998 |
To amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to clarify the longstanding authority of States to use funds made available under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program to fund life-affirming services to empower pregnant women to choose life for their babies instead of abortion, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.322397 | 3.990111 | 4.329864 |
HN2 [ ] A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles. See In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998). When a trial court fails "to analyze or apply [*4] the law correctly," it has clearly abused its discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). "The trial court has no discretion in determining the law or applying the law to the facts." In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 668 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. 2023). However, when considering a writ of mandamus, "we court rather than its reasons." In re Stevens, 971 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, orig. proceeding). If the trial court expresses an incorrect legal reason for its ruling, we will nevertheless uphold the order on any other grounds supported by the record. Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141-42 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding). | Party Submissions | 3.759524 | 4.358823 | 4.163178 |
Diverging from its sister courts, the Seventh Court mistakenly relied on this Court’s recent opinion in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson to reverse. See Baptist St. Anthony ’ s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3,*5 (Tex. App. — Amarillo Nov. 29, 2022, pet filed) (citing Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152, 179 (Tex. 2022)). Even though Thompson involved a legal sufficiency review following final judgment, the Seventh Court misunderstood the opinion to impose a higher standard for preliminary expert reports — a standard that requires experts to preemptively explain why negligent acts that do not immediately precede an injury are not “ to attenuated ” to the harm. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *2 ,*5. | Party Submissions | 7.782347 | 7.368756 | 8.007264 |
Third, enforcing the Election Code’s signature requirements through mandamus directed to Chairman Rinaldi would violate the First Amendment. While the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates for statewide office enjoy statewide support, that interest in general must be balanced in each specific case against the Republican Party’s First Amendment associational rights to allow candidates to seek its endorsement as it sees fit. In the distinct case of a statewide elected official who has repeatedly sought and received that nomination and who has repeatedly received tens of thousands of votes from voters in the judicial district in question, that state interest is too attenuated to justify the First Amendment burden on the Republican Party’s associational rights. And at a minimum, adjudicating the Re-publican Party’s free-association claim would require this Court to resolve complex disputed facts—precisely that it cannot do in an original mandamus proceeding. | Party Submissions | 9.1822 | 8.737582 | 9.557367 |
The main subject of this appeal is Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. In the Manns' motion for summary judgment, they asserted that Bay did not qualify for two elements of the defense: Bay was not Mann's “employer,” as that term is used in the Act, and Mann was not injured while in the “course and scope” of his employment. The trial court summarily dispensed with Bay's exclusive-remedy defense, ruling in favor of the Manns. | Party Submissions | 6.703914 | 7.313452 | 7.27271 |
By its first and fourth issues, Bay asserts that it satisfied both elements of the exclusive-remedy defense which were challenged in the trial court: that Bay was Mann's “employer or an agent or employee of the employer” and that Mann's injury *322 occurred in the “course and scope” of his employment. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a). Bay asserts that it has conclusively proved these elements or, in the alternative, that there is at least a fact issue which prevents the summary disposal of this defense. | Party Submissions | 6.782917 | 8.482574 | 8.731544 |
Only if MVP met its initial burden would it then fall on RLB “to raise an affirmative defense to enforcing” the agreement. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). Until then, RLB had no burden to affirmatively assert that its claims were not within the forum-selection clause’s scope or present competing evidence. Id. Contrary to MVP’s claims otherwise, it was not undisputed that MVP satisfied this initial burden. | Party Submissions | 8.001932 | 8.13045 | 9.350537 |
Finally, as a conditional issue, a remand (at least) is required because the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider the responsibility of three other parties: HSMiller, the claimant; Defterios, the HSMiller agent involved; and Diamond State, the insurance carrier for HSMiller who negligently failed to settle the underlying case and paid money to settle the case below. This issue was not reached by the court of appeals, but if this Court gets to the issue, it should either affirm the remand on these grounds or ask the court of appeals to consider the issue. | Party Submissions | 15.562935 | 13.857365 | 16.137405 |
Raymond case Wife herein relies solely and summarily upon the decisions in Raymond to support her claim that the refinance deed involving husband and wife containing wife’s name as co-grantee creates an irrebuttable presumption of a gift of one-half of husband’s separate property asset to her. | Party Submissions | 19.930351 | 20.60582 | 24.004957 |
True, both this case and E.D. are obstetrical malpractice cases. But that is where the similarities end, at least insofar as the lower courts’ criticisms of the expert reports in each. In E.D., this Court faulted the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for its failure to consider the entirety of the expert report, and that focusing on only a small portion was unduly restrictive and tantamount to assessing credibility or believability. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 665-66, 667. | Party Submissions | 7.091873 | 7.688422 | 7.596757 |
Unforeseeable Emergency. An Unforeseeable Emergency means a severe financial hardship to the Participant resulting from an illness or accident of the Participant, the Participant’s spouse, the Participant’s dependent (as defined in Code section 152, without regard to section 152(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B)), or a Beneficiary; loss of the Participant’s property due to casualty (including the need to rebuild a home following damage to a home not otherwise covered by insurance, for example, as a result of a natural disaster); or other similar extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances arising as a result of events beyond the control of the Participant. The types of events which may qualify as an Unforeseeable Emergency may be limited by the Committee. | Contract | 2.665201 | 1.964434 | 3.203456 |
ATE .—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to overpayments of special financial assistance under section 4262 of the Em-ployment Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. 1104) occurring before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act. | Legislation | 5.519043 | 6.664343 | 7.117274 |
Any notice or filing required or permitted to be given to a Participant under this Plan shall be sufficient if in writing or hand-delivered, or sent by mail to the last known address of the Participant. | Contract | 4.558076 | 4.535558 | 5.41172 |
For purposes of this Section 7, capitalized terms not otherwise defined in the Plan shall have the meanings prescribed under the applicable Omnibus Plan. Except as provided in this Section 7, the terms of the Omnibus Plans and the applicable Award Agreements will continue to apply. | Contract | 4.777856 | 5.654748 | 5.633559 |
Because the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate the trial until the Commission makes its final decision, Luby's is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, the trial court should vacate is September 4, 1998 order denying abatement and enter the appropriate order. Writ will issue if the trial court fails to comply. | Party Submissions | 7.211793 | 9.053349 | 9.386745 |
As this Court summarized in yet another case, the rule is that the trial court has “authority” during an interlocutory appeal “to take further proceedings in the cause, unless in its discretion it orders them to be stayed, pending the appeal.” Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525, 17 S.Ct. 407, 41 L.Ed. 810 (1897). That authority is “recognized” by the 1891 Act but existed already as a traditional matter, “often exercised by other courts of chancery.” Ibid. | Party Submissions | 6.726599 | 6.578113 | 6.797468 |
Complete version of any and all sketches ( in Serbian: skice), excerpts of which are included in Serbia’s exhibit R-043. Where the requested documents cover a large area, it is sufficient to produce only the part of the document showing Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and the Surrounding Area plus the legend and any textual part of the document. | Legal Decisions | 22.931957 | 32.70225 | 29.103716 |
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663-664. The Party has no Rule that allows Respondent to accept ballot applications that are noncompliant with Texas law. By the same token, he cannot choose to reject his political enemies’ ballot applications just because he asserts the Party does not want to associate with them. Respondent is the party chair, not the Party. The Party has not imbued him with the power to refuse to comply with state law. Respondents’ assertion of a First Amendment right to pick and choose what laws he wants to follow falls flat. Respondent cites Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Dem. Ctrl. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1989) for the proposition that the Party, and ostensibly himself as Chair, generally has a First Amendment right to determine who gets to run in a primary election. But that is not what Eu was about. Eu concerned state laws restricting the ability of a political party to issue endorsements in primary elections, and regulating internal party governance. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219. Indeed, the Eu Court expressly upheld the ability of a state to preserve the integrity of its election process by regulating the primary election process. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231, citing e.g. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 785-786 (1974) (upholding Texas petition law). Rather, the 8 Supreme Court has consistently taken the opposite of Respondent’s position. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (upholding Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system statute as not infringing on the associational rights of parties); Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1076 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1290, 203 L.Ed.2d 414 (2019) (upholding state regulation of nominating general election candidates). Respondent’s assertion of a First Amendment right to defeat mandamus must be rejected by this Court. | Party Submissions | 4.598585 | 4.407025 | 4.683736 |
Nor can Respondents avoid review by supplying their own version of the analysis they think the Board and court silently did. The specifics of how the proper legal standard would apply to these facts is no reason to deny review because the legal errors about what § 2301.467(a)(1) means need correction regardless, and application of the proper standard can be left for remand. But Respondents are also wrong about what the evidence shows, as a differently-composed Board initially concluded in this case. Pet. App. C. | Party Submissions | 22.6031 | 23.530098 | 23.808247 |
This Twenty-Seconded Amendment to the Amended and Restated Revolving Credit Agreement (this “Amendment”) is made effective as of October 1, 2023, and is entered into among Union Carbide Corporation, as Borrower (“Borrower”) and The Dow Chemical Company, as Lender (“Lender”) (together, the “Parties”). | Contract | 5.011242 | 3.562133 | 5.153553 |
This Court has said the standard is “lenient;” a claimant has a “fair opportunity to show his claim is not frivolous.” Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549. Still, an expert must “explain, to a reasonable degree, how and why the breach caused the injury based on the facts presented.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539-40 (Tex. 2010). | Party Submissions | 7.381745 | 7.823247 | 8.042579 |
To be entitled to the requested mandamus relief, a party must show that a trial court's order is a clear abuse of discretion and that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. To determine whether a party has an adequate remedy by appeal, an appellate court balances jurisprudential considerations implicating both public and private interests. When the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate. | Party Submissions | 3.655659 | 4.445942 | 4.519157 |
Jurisdiction (“ Rejoinder ”) together with the Second Witness Statement of Mr. Severo Buenalaya (“RWS-Buenalaya II”); the Second Legal Opinion of Mr. Ricardo Leyva (“ RER-Leyva II"); the Expert Report of Mr. Richard Tabors (“RER-Tabors”); the Second Expert Report of Mr. César Gutiérrez (“RER-Gutiérrez II”); the Second Expert Report of Compass Lexecon (“ RER-CLEX II ”) and its respective Exhibits; Exhibits R-060bis, R-109 to R-216; and Legal Authorities RL-23bis, RL-028 to RL-059. 55. On September 24, 2021, Claimants requested that the Tribunal strike from the record the PSR Report, RER-Tabors, and all passages of Peru’s Rejoinder submission (and accompanying documents) in which either of the two reports were cited. | Legal Decisions | 10.284184 | 8.893886 | 10.307838 |
The court of appeals correctly described the nature of the case. Daniel and Kristin Walker sued Dr. Rhodesia Castillo, Kristen Walker’s obstetrician, and Baptist St. Anthony, the Hospital where Mrs. Walker delivered, when the providers ’ collective negligence caused baby H.W. to suffer a significant brain injury during labor and delivery. CR 7-17. | Party Submissions | 20.737232 | 22.796488 | 23.088919 |
Thus, unlike an abstract of judgment, a lis pendens is a communication made during the course of a judicial proceeding that accomplishes the goal of informing and protecting the rights of the general public. See Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 771; James, 637 S.W.2d at 916; Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 913. But the privilege should not be extended to cover an abstract of judgment that does not accomplish the privilege’s central purpose. See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 49 (“The judicial-proceedings privilege[’s] ... purpose is to facilitate open and vigorous litigation of matters inside the courtroom.”). As the dissenting chief justice urged in Prappas and the dissenting justice in Bayou Terrace noted: “we should not apply its protection to a deliberate, ex parte act done after the trial had been concluded,” “with the explicit intention of stopping [a property] sale.” Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 800 (Brown, C.J., dissenting); see also Bayou Terrace, 881 S.W.2d at 818 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). This caution should be heeded even more so here as the Hospitals expressed that was their sole purpose filing the abstracts when no judgment was in place against Dr. Nath. | Party Submissions | 8.954234 | 8.275663 | 8.741454 |
Our opening brief explains (at 32-36) that if even the applicable statute of limitations does not bar Yellowfin’s claim, Yellowfin and its predecessors -in-interest waived any acceleration rights by waiting over twelve years to assert those rights. Yellowfin responds by pointing to provisions in the Note that permitted the lender to waive or delay enforcement of its rights under the Note. That argument runs headlong into this Court’s precedent, which recognizes that “a party’s rights under a nonwaiver provis ion may indeed be waived expressly or impliedly.” Shields Ltd. v. Boo Nathaniel Bradberry & 40/40 Enters., 526 S.W.3d 471, 482-83 (Tex. 2017). A party waives a right notwithstanding a nonwaiver provision when it “intentionally engage[s] in conduct inconsistent with claiming the right to enforce the nonwaiver agreement.” Id. at 485. | Party Submissions | 8.035195 | 7.919313 | 8.74487 |
It also substantially harms lenders by impeding their ability to enforce guaranty agreements. Guaranty agreements regularly include termination provisions, and a lender that cannot enforce a guaranty without a substantial risk of the termination provision eliminating the guarantor’s liability for a past breach will be less likely to operate in Texas. Texas law’s emphasis on enforcing contracts makes it an attractive place for business investment, and this Court should not permit any departure from those values. | Party Submissions | 10.696897 | 9.544827 | 11.872925 |
Rusk at San Jacinto also sought to participate in the Texas program to help fund the Texaco building project. Once received, the state tax credits would be allocated to TX 1111. TX 1111 would then monetize the tax credits by selling them to Stonehenge Capital Co., a tax credit investor, through an affiliated entity, Rusk Investor, LLC. Rusk Investor’s cash payments for the state tax credits were referred to as either “contributions” or “capital contributions” (hereinafter Contributions). TX 1111 filed its original Part B in the Texas program on August 25, 2015, which matched its federal program Part 2 as it existed at that time. At that time, the Texas program was set up as a single rehabilitation project. | Party Submissions | 11.818494 | 9.541009 | 12.430979 |
The Stantons do not have this issue here since they are not seeking any benefit from the Subcontract, but rather from Petitioner’s contract with 4415 W. Lovers. The Subcontract containing the arbitration provision could have never been created in this case, and Respondents would still be able to pursue their third-party breach of contract claim against Petitioner because that Subcontract has absolutely no bearing on this claim, and Respondents derived no benefit from its existence. | Party Submissions | 12.370302 | 13.731263 | 14.697042 |
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as ‘‘the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’’. | Legislation | 5.107908 | 3.847686 | 4.243269 |
Except as indicated above on this Exhibit A, I have no Prior Developments to disclose pursuant to Section 3(a) of this Agreement and no agreements to disclose pursuant to Section 4 of this Agreement. | Contract | 8.077254 | 7.96996 | 10.325438 |
Designation of a responsible third party is not listed in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) as a prohibited defense for nonsubscribers. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(a). However, under the express terms of the TWCA, an employee must still prove that her employer was negligent to prevail at trial. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(d). | Party Submissions | 4.592887 | 5.188987 | 5.000612 |
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, in the event of a payment to be made, or a benefit to be provided, pursuant to this Agreement based upon Executive’s “separation from service” (as defined below) for a reason other than death at a time when Executive is a Specified Employee (as defined below) and such payment or provision of such benefit is not exempt or otherwise permitted under Section 409A without the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty (as defined below), such payment shall not be made, and such benefit shall not be provided, before the earlier of the date which is the first day of the seventh month after Executive’s separation from service or 30 days after Executive’s death. All payments or benefits delayed pursuant to this Section 3.8 shall be aggregated into one lump sum payment to be made as of the Company’s first business day following the first day of the seventh month after Executive’s separation from service (or if earlier, as of 30 days after Executive’s death). | Contract | 3.165057 | 3.491851 | 3.355121 |
Fisheries” where “a fishing vessel under the EU flag will land live snow crabs at approved Norwegian reception stations” was that: 1. In principle, EU vessels can land fish, including snow crab to Norway on an equal footing with Norwegian fishing vessels [...] . | Legal Decisions | 30.976452 | 35.16503 | 39.77216 |
And finally, to whatever extent the Martinez Family might raise additional arguments that the agency's order is void, we would also reject those arguments as a basis for mandamus relief. HN11 [ ] We have held that an agency order may be subject to collateral attack as a void order on just two grounds: because "the order shows on its face that the agency exceeded its authority" or because "a complainant shows the order was obtained by extrinsic fraud." Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2003, pet. denied). Here, the Martinez Family has not shown how the face of the DWC order indicates that the agency exceeded its authority. Nor has the Martinez Family alleged that the DWC order resulted from fraud. | Party Submissions | 6.352418 | 6.453911 | 7.000484 |
RLB now disputes whether and under what conditions section 272.001 may be contractually waived. But RLB offers three contradictory arguments. | Party Submissions | 21.791147 | 25.929428 | 29.58321 |
This case involves seven oil and gas leases. 4CR5086-87; 6CR8176-83. Hooks involved three leases. 4CR5458-59. Different owners of undivided interests in one tract (Tract 4) granted Samson four different “Tract 4/14” Leases that covered their interests. Three leases were from Bordages case owners: Leases H, I, and K (1CR1202-35, 1236-67, 1289-1314). The fourth was from the Hooks interests: Lease J (1CR1268-88). | Party Submissions | 12.99321 | 12.932473 | 13.776738 |
In Signal Int’l Texas L.P. v. Orange Cty., Texas, No. 09-13-00412-CV, 2014 WL 7183667, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 18, 2014, pet. denied), the Ninth Court of Appeals declined to apply the contract-law principle of mutual mistake to an agreement under § 1.111(e). | Party Submissions | 4.675292 | 5.422834 | 5.034247 |
To provide that an individual who uses marijuana in compliance with State law may not be denied occupancy of federally assisted housing, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 7.043193 | 6.024899 | 7.621117 |
To require the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Directors at the international financial institutions to advocate opposition to projects that make use of forced labor. | Legislation | 7.448222 | 6.362896 | 11.699367 |
Samson asserted in rebuttal that it is not collaterally estopped because this case involves a question of law, then agreed with Justice Young that an exception for a case with “a non-party” applies here – apparently under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §29(7) (1982). Though this Court has not specifically cited that section, it has generally cited Section 29. See Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994). | Party Submissions | 9.420141 | 9.557825 | 10.189544 |
At trial, trial counsel for Intervenors began questioning and called A.S., mother of R.W., to testify. 3 RR 14. A.S. agreed that she had other children but did not have custody of them. 3 RR 14-18. When asked, A.S. agreed that in December 2021, she had tested positive on a hair follicle test for methamphetamines and opiates. 3 RR 18. A.S. also tested for prescribed oxycodone. 3 RR 19. A.S. was questioned about the family plan of service—I-1. 3 RR 23. A.S. was asked to take a parenting class, provide a prescription for oxycodone, complete a psychological, an ETCADA assessment, and random drug testing. 3 RR 24-28. A.S.’s psychological was admitted as I-2. 3 RR 29. The psychological, was from a previous CPS case, not the current case, and included why A.S.’s older children were removed and DFPS concerns in a previous case. 3 RR 30. No motion in limine prevented the jury from hearing this. | Party Submissions | 7.618813 | 7.004576 | 7.804752 |
She also offers a vague statement about going up the chain of command but does not state any corresponding breach. (CR.844) The statement is wholly unexplained, rendering it insufficient. Similarly, the generic sentence, “life-threatening situations, such as cardiac and respiratory distress must be prevented” does not set a standard of care or breach and is not based on or related to any facts in this case. (CR.844) See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (opinion that hospital should have monitored patient more closely was conclusory). | Party Submissions | 13.082039 | 15.59869 | 14.278969 |
In Briggs, Toyota relied upon the affidavit of a regional claims manager, Dale Wimer. Wimer's affidavit referenced an agreement along with a slew of conclusory statements, but no actual agreement, just as Bay has done in this case. Id at 284-85. *18 Thus, David Carlin's affidavit likewise fails to satisfy the statute's “written agreement” requirement. | Party Submissions | 16.064358 | 17.300142 | 18.653433 |
The sole question before this Court is whether a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes. | Party Submissions | 10.690025 | 11.079373 | 12.226007 |
In sum, only after the party seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause meets its burden on the threshold issues—including the clause’s applicability to the claims at issue—does the burden then shift to the other party to demonstrate a reason why the clause should not be enforced. E.g., Harris Corp., 2013 WL 2631700, at *2. MVP did not meet its initial burden to prove the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions were incorporated into the Subcontract, RLB was bound by them, and they governed RLB’s claims. RLB has never conceded that it was bound by MCC paragraph 47.7 or that it governed RLB’s claims. And the MCC and Subcontract were before the trial court for its review—and the contract language supports the court’s decision denying MVP’s motions. This Court should conclude the court of appeals erred in refusing to reach this issue and instead assuming MCC paragraph 47.7 applies to RLB and its claims. | Party Submissions | 7.312999 | 7.321306 | 7.668649 |
While not reached by the intermediate court, the reports also failed to adequately set out standard of care and breach. “Identifying the standard of care is critical: Whether a defendant breached his or her duty to a patient cannot be determined absent specific information about what the defendant should have done differently.” Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880. | Party Submissions | 10.301192 | 13.963936 | 12.843745 |
I hereby certify that on November 6, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing letter has been electronically filed and served on all counsel below. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(1), 9.5(b)(1). | Party Submissions | 4.666585 | 6.764343 | 7.078383 |
Tribunal does not have to review all of the measures in dispute in this arbitration, when assessing the existence of the “ same measures. ” 81 104. The Respondent’s “all or nothing approach” is therefore inapplicable in the present circumstances, given t he Respondent’s acknowledgment that this Tribunal has several more measures for adjudication than the two measures related to blocking of the bank account and deposit of VAT refunds into the blocked accounts by the SAT. Simply stated, the Respondent itself has resiled from its position that the breach of the waiver in relation to the entitlement and recovery of the VAT refunds, based on the initiation of the VAT Arbitration, means that the Tribunal has no ability to proceed on the several other measures in dispute in this ongoing arbitration. | Party Submissions | 15.321881 | 14.148737 | 16.04149 |
Specified Date Benefit. If the Participant has established one or more Specified Date Accounts, he or she shall be entitled to a Specified Date Benefit with respect to each such Specified Date Account. The Specified Date Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Specified Date Account, based on the value of that Account as of the end of the month designated by the Participant in the applicable Compensation Deferral Agreement. Payment of the Specified Date Benefit will be made or begin no later than the end of the month following the designated month, with the actual payment or commencement date determined in the sole discretion of the Committee. | Contract | 4.169125 | 3.928207 | 4.767519 |
There are two appellate decisions on essentially the same facts: The first is the decision below, Wilbarger Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Oncor Electric Delivery Co. NTU, LLC, 660 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2022, pet. pending), which in all respects holds for Wilbarger CAD’s position. Unfortunately, the other, Oncor v. Mills Cty. Appraisal Dist., 660 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. – Austin 2022, pet. pending) disagrees and holds for Oncor’s position by application of the contract theory of mutual mistake of fact. The Seventh Court of Appeals’ decision is correct. This Court should deny the petition in this case and grant the petition in the Mills case. | Party Submissions | 5.751312 | 5.670272 | 6.014197 |
It simply could not be clearer. If the Legislature cannot limit the power of an agency with this language that is this positive and direct, then it simply cannot be done. | Party Submissions | 18.80605 | 21.160524 | 23.784378 |
Trial Court Disposition: The 125th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas; the Honorable Kyle Carter, presiding, denied MVP’s plea in abatement as well as a later-filed motion for reconsideration. R.0725, R.05802 (App. C to Relator’s Pet.). | Party Submissions | 10.103093 | 12.860038 | 12.112569 |
In arguing otherwise, Dr. Castillo and BSA relied exclusively on the only outlier, Tenet Hospitals, Ltd. V. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398, 406-07 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2011, no pet.). De La Riva, like this case, involved a birth injury claim against a hospital and obstetrician. 351 S.W.3d 398. The plaintiff offered expert reports from a nurse, an obstetrician, and a pediatric neurologist. 351 S.W.3d 398. The hospital defendants objected in the trial court that the pediatric neurologist did not address the nurses ’ conduct. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d at 405-406. The court of appeals agreed that the neurologist ’ s causation opinion was lacking as to the nurses and that the nurse expert could not fill the gap. Id. at 405. The court also held that the obstetrician/gynecologist was not qualified to opine as to causation because his report did not even try to establish his qualifications to do so. Id. at 407. | Party Submissions | 4.038028 | 4.467937 | 4.281235 |
Subsets and Splits