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Neither this Court’s rules nor longstanding equitable principles tolerate this sort of gamesmanship. A litigant may not bypass the ordinary judicial process and seek relief initially in this court absent a “compelling reason” to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e). An imminent deadline in the election context cannot serve as such a reason when a relator manufactures time pressure through weeks of unilateral delay. And that imminent deadline itself supplies an independent reason to deny relator’s petition: this Court “decline[s] to implement even ‘seemingly innocuous’ alterations to election laws on the eve of an election,” lest “partisan adversaries. .. lie in wait with lawsuits that create chaos.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. 2022). | Party Submissions | 9.600545 | 10.189792 | 10.466414 |
If this court were to conclude Sonic was entitled to recover reimbursement under the circumstances of this case, we must conclude that Sonic's rights as a subclaimant [**5] survived Cochran's rights as a claimant. Sonic's argument proposes that this conclusion is evidenced in the plain language of the provisions, but construing the statute as a whole, we disagree. Sonic failed to establish that its right to reimbursement under the statute as a "subclaimant" survived or exceeded Cochran's ability to recover benefits, as a matter of law. | Party Submissions | 8.854478 | 8.957616 | 9.313655 |
Components that contribute to the value of Oncor’s property in Wilbarger County include the size and length of its electrical lines and their voltages. Even if the previous owner made a mistake about the individual characteristics of its transmission lines in Wilbarger County, its mistake would be one of value since those components are subsumed into the value. However, Oncor’s predecessor made an agreement with Wilbarger CAD over value, and Oncor should not be allowed to renege on its agreement. The length, size, and capacity of its lines, each of them individual characteristics of value, were resolved in the form of the dollar amount of value to which Oncor’s predecessor agreed. The burden was on Oncor’s predecessor to be more diligent in ascertaining what it actually owned in Wilbarger County before executing the agreement that it did, and Oncor’s remorse that its predecessor did not do so does not now make that agreement voidable. The 2019 agreement, executed under TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e), precludes any consideration of the merits of Oncor’s claims under § 25.25 of the Texas Tax Code. | Party Submissions | 8.487876 | 9.911081 | 8.794939 |
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/432/oj 1/4 (4) The Income Tax Act, as amended by the Budget Implementation Act, 2023, No 1, applies provisions of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2020 Model Rules for Reporting by Platform Operators with respect to Sellers in the Sharing and Gig Economy (), supplemented by the OECD 2021 Model 6 Reporting Rules for Digital Platforms: International Exchange Framework and Optional Module for sale of goods ( ). | Legislation | 9.322319 | 9.711471 | 9.409625 |
Commenting on Oncor’s argument on the point, the court in Wilbarger held: The problem with this argument is that the legislature has expressly stated otherwise. | Party Submissions | 17.454462 | 24.693825 | 22.3712 |
The J.J. Johns Trust owns a non-participating royalty interest under a tract covered by four “Tract 4/14” Leases: three from Bordages owners (Leases H, I, and K) and a fourth from the Hooks interests (Lease J). The severance put all of that trust’s Tract 4 interests into Bordages. See Bordages Oral Argument Exhibit 6. And the Hooks, who held the executive rights for the J.J. Johns Trust under Lease J, were of course placed into the Hooks case. | Party Submissions | 16.101864 | 17.214392 | 18.455389 |
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Plan to be executed by its duly authorized officers on this 7th day of November, 2023. | Contract | 2.937335 | 4.003196 | 4.402823 |
In May, the district court held a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction. At the end of [*9] the hearing, the district court issued an order overruling the plea to the jurisdiction. The Martinez Family then filed its original proceeding in this Court, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because it has no jurisdiction to review an agency order that, as the Martinez Family characterizes it, is void or moot. The Martinez Family seeks mandamus relief ordering the district court to grant the plea to the jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition "to prohibit Respondent and the district court from considering the merits of the void [agency] Order." HN1 [ ] "The standards generally applied in a mandamus proceeding are well established." In re Turner, 500 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (cleaned up). "[M]andamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law" and only where the petitioning party lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Id. (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)). A trial court has no discretion to misapply the law. Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) ). In the two competing petitions for mandamus relief, each petitioner alleges that one of the trial courts misconstrued the governing statutes and existing precedent in evaluating its jurisdiction over this dispute. | Party Submissions | 3.914248 | 4.517748 | 4.395641 |
Respondent adopts Petitioner’s Statement of Jurisdiction, save that Respondent does not concede that the appeal presents an important question of law or that failing to resolve the dispute will have any wide-ranging effect. | Party Submissions | 10.938396 | 10.676979 | 12.493083 |
Furthermore, nothing in the majority's decision today “materially advance[s] the ultimate termination of the litigation.” To the contrary, the majority concludes that neither side “conclusively proved its case with regard to the exclusive-remedy defense,” leaving the question to be decided by a jury and remanded the case for trial. This type of protracted litigation should be discouraged and not serve as a basis for permissive appeals. | Party Submissions | 9.31099 | 10.295435 | 11.301984 |
The parties’ intent is to be construed from the text. That this provision imposes compounded Late Charges is evident from the words. | Party Submissions | 33.472454 | 40.998325 | 44.36752 |
For 2023 and each year of employment thereafter, Executive shall receive a grant of at least $2,500,000 annually, or higher at the Board’s discretion. | Contract | 8.613704 | 8.624916 | 9.931394 |
AA CHILD WATER SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONS. (a) In this section: (1) AA "Body of water" means an artificial or natural body of water, including a swimming pool, lake, or river, typically used for recreational swimming, bathing, or play. The term does not include a wading pool. | Party Submissions | 5.551442 | 5.280877 | 5.859518 |
By contrast, the court of appeals here reasoned that because the termination clause did not expressly except prior breaches, past-due obligations were terminated. (Slip Op. at 16.) But that holding conflicts with this Court’s holding that a breach-of-contract claim accrues when the contract is breached. Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 39. It also conflicts with other courts that have held that terminating a contract does not terminate liability for prior breaches. See, e.g., Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petrol., Inc., 737 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 2013); Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Gulsby Eng’g, Inc., 365 S.W.3d 54, 66 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). II. Correcting This Error And Resolving The Split Among The The lower court’s holding is not only wrong on the law but also leads to absurd results and perverse incentives for guarantors. This Court should grant this Motion for Rehearing to avoid confusion among parties and the courts of appeal. | Party Submissions | 6.111689 | 6.293786 | 6.279842 |
McCarthy Subcontract -10-01-12-2017 Rev. 5.6.2 Claims Made Requirements. If Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions coverage is written on a Claims Made basis, the Certificate of Insurance will clearly so state. In addition to the coverage specifications listed above, such policy shall provide, and the Certificate of Insurance will list, that the retroactive date coincides with or precedes Subcontractors commencement of Work under this Agreement, including any design or testing services related to the Project. If insurance is terminated for any reason, Subcontractor shall purchase an extended reporting provision of at least five (5) years to report claims in connection with this Agreement . | Party Submissions | 10.098434 | 9.264741 | 10.658172 |
Rafiei’s case is more analogous to AOF Servs., LLC v. Santorsola. No. 13-14-00641-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2975, at *7-8 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi Mar. 24, 2016). In that case, an individual entered into an arbitration agreement with a company which contained a fee-splitting provision. When the individual later filed suit against the company and the company moved to compel arbitration, the individual argued the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it would place too heavy a financial burden on him and effectively make his legal remedy unavailable. The fee-splitting arrangement required the individual to pay 20% of the arbitrator's compensation and the company to pay the remaining 80%. There was no explicit cap on the amount the individual would be obligated to pay. | Party Submissions | 4.353004 | 4.832874 | 4.720268 |
Delaware courts thus use the phrase economic reality: “The trend in this Court has been to award compound interest because it better comports with ‘fundamental economic reality.’” Henke v. Trilithic Inc., No. CIV.A. 13155, 2005 WL 2899677, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2005) (quoting Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc ., 2005 WL 1074364, at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005)); see Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer LP, 2022 WL 3650176, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) (“compound interest more accurately reflects the ‘fundamental economic reality’ that ‘[c]ompound interest is “the standard form of interest in the financial market.’”) (quoting ONTI, 751 A.2d 904 at 926 & n.88. | Party Submissions | 5.786127 | 5.966487 | 5.82927 |
Any and all documents representing the objection discussed as item 5 “ JKP Gradsko-saobraćajno preduzeće "Belgrade", Belgrade, 29 Kneginje Ljubice Str. (case file IX-03 No. 350.12-308/2014 as of 22/12/2014) ” at the 74th session of the Planning Committee of the Belgrade City Assembly, held on 18 June 2015, and referred to on page 2 (pdf) of exhibit R-103. | Legal Decisions | 20.13634 | 19.016745 | 16.531494 |
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a); see Henry v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. | Party Submissions | 3.193718 | 4.709157 | 3.936639 |
This Court should deny the mandamus petition for all the reasons explained above. But even if the Court were to consider the petition, the appropriate remedy, at most, is an opportunity for Justice Devine to cure the alleged signature defects. A. This Court’s precedents require providing Justice Devine an On mandamus, this Court has consistently declined to remove candidates from ballots for technical Election Code violations and has instead provided candidates opportunities to cure facial signature defects. | Party Submissions | 13.984695 | 12.310846 | 15.382769 |
We conclude that no live controversy exists based on Ga lovelho’s claims f or injunctive relief. It sought through these claims to be free of the limitations placed by the Emergency Orders; it has been freed by the rescission and expiration of those orders. We conclude the trial court correctly determined that Ga lovelho’s injunctive claims were moot and should be dismissed. We overrule its third issue. | Party Submissions | 15.06725 | 18.433506 | 21.953672 |
In any event, this Court has said more than once that analysis of expert reports must be confined to the reports’ four corners. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52. Consequently, the Walkers’ attempt to read more into Dr. Null’s report than he actually stated should be rejected. | Party Submissions | 8.626308 | 10.364612 | 9.88349 |
Having overruled each of Grant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering partition and the order requiring Grant to pay costs. | Party Submissions | 12.009193 | 19.84321 | 25.23186 |
To require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the impacts of seasonal and nonresident homeownership on data collected by the Bureau of the Census, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.408366 | 5.419417 | 5.205791 |
Barina’s attempt to distinguish Johnson v. Phillips, and to argue that it supports her rather than Petitioners, is likewise meritless. Johnson supports Petitioners’ argument that the Program contained opinion because a reasonable viewer, like a reasonable reader of the book at issue in Johnson, would understand it to be a recounting of one side of a debated topic. Pet. Br. at 32-33, citing 526 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Barina attempts to undercut that by noting, correctly, that the Court held that the book as a whole actually painted the plaintiffs as “honest and virtuous.” That conclusion, however, was about whether the book’s overarching depiction of the plaintiffs was “as a whole ... defamatory”—that is, whether the publication was susceptible to a defamatory meaning. Johnson, 526 S.W.3d at 536. It did not relate to the issue of whether the complained of statements were opinion. In fact, the Johnson Court looked to the context to determine that even if the book could be said to be defamatory, it contained nonactionable opinion. Id. at 539. | Party Submissions | 6.685098 | 6.648706 | 7.064654 |
Our vessels are ready for their voyage to SVALBARD zone in order to catch Snow crab. Our vessels all have appropriate Certificates and Licenses. | Legal Decisions | 41.62979 | 32.72115 | 41.8884 |
Russian sector of the Loop Hole. At that stage, for the reasons already given, any investment represented by the two vessels would not have been an investment in the territory of Norway. Thereafter, if it was intended that they would take crab off Svalbard, then this would not have been an investment in accordance with the laws and regulations of Norway. | Legal Decisions | 17.55101 | 17.308039 | 23.112072 |
This same analysis applies here. Petitioners’ claim is that the City failed to remedy an unreasonably dangerous condition (over 112 inadequately monitored children at a public po0l) and failed to promptly react once one of its employees became subjectively aware that the Mandatory Safety Policy was violated. CR34; CR139-40. This Court has generally affirmed analyzing these types of cases under a premises liability theory. See, e.g., Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983) (affirming premises liability theory for injuries arising from “usage of a self-service display of goods”). | Party Submissions | 11.620245 | 11.006717 | 11.829116 |
First, Barina repeats the legally unfounded premise of her defamation claim— that Petitioners “endorsed” allegations made by Ross and Martinez in the Program (throwing in an equally unfounded “attribution” exception to the third-party-allegation rule). But tellingly, Barina wholly ignores Petitioners’ overarching point that Section 73.005(b)’s plain text contains no endorsement exception (or attribution requirement) at all. The precise issue over which Petitioners seek review is the court of appeals’ improper engrafting of such an exception out of whole cloth, writing words into the statute that do not exist. The third-party-allegation rule unequivocally bars Barina’s claim because the Program accurately quotes from third parties concerning matters of public concern. This Court should review and reverse the appellate court’s erroneous application of this important statute. The last time this Court sought to limit the rule in Neely v. Wilson,1 the Legislature reacted by statutorily enshrining, in broadly-phrased language, the rule’s critical protections. The appellate court’s efforts to limit the third-party-allegation rule’s reach by creating an endorsement exception (and an attribution requirement) should be checked before these judicially-imposed conditions swallow the legislative rule. | Party Submissions | 9.050477 | 9.704456 | 9.434121 |
Committee. Committee means the Employees of the Company appointed by the Board of Directors of the Company (or the appropriate committee of such board), and their replacements as authorized by the Board of Directors, to administer the Plan. | Contract | 7.503656 | 7.564351 | 10.08349 |
The Subcontract Amount will be paid subject to the terms of this Agreement in monthly payments of 100(%) percent of the work performed in any preceding month, in accordance with applications for payment prepared by Subcontractor (“Subcontractor’s Application for Payment”) and approved by McCarthy, the Owner and any other party whose approval is required by the Contract Documents and in accordance with the conditions set forth below, including, but not limited to, the condition precedent as set forth below of receipt by McCarthy of payment from the Owner. Subcontractor's Application for Payment shall be submitted on the form attached hereto in Exhibit 3 and acceptable to McCarthy, and in accordance with the approved Schedule of Values with such additional detailed or substantiating information as may be requested by McCarthy. Payments made on account of materials not incorporated in the work, but delivered and suitably stored at the site, or at some other location agreed upon in writing, shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract Documents. Subcontractor will provide monthly completed lien and claim waivers and affidavits from Subcontractor, sub-subcontractors and suppliers on the forms attached hereto in Exhibit 3, amounting to 100% of the partial payment that was paid to Subcontractor for the previous month. Failure to provide such forms will delay payment to Subcontractor. If requested by McCarthy, Subcontractor shall also provide evidence satisfactory to McCarthy that Subcontractor has paid for all labor, including fringe benefits and payments due under collective bargaining agreements. Payments to Subcontractor are conditioned upon the timely and strict compliance of Subcontractor’s Work with the Contract Documents, as determined by McCarthy in its sole discretion. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Subcontractor agrees that the approval and payment of Subcontractor’s Application for Payment does not constitute or imply acceptance by McCarthy or Owner of any portion of Subcontractor’s Work. Receipt by McCarthy of payment from the Owner is a condition precedent to McCarthy’s obligation to make payment of Subcontractor’s Application for Payment, in whole or in part, as approved by McCarthy, and as provided in this paragraph 2.1 and extra compensation as provided in paragraph 4.5 below. | Party Submissions | 4.731169 | 4.327787 | 4.791295 |
In the further alternative, the Court should affirm the remand of the case for a new trial for the reasons stated by the court of appeals, or for the further reasons not addressed by that court, discussed above. As HSMiller points out, the case has been tried twice already, as the unfortunate consequence of the BNC Sellers’ relentless pursuit of liquidity to satisfy the damages found in the underlying dispute. The waste of judicial resources is no fault of the Lawyers. | Party Submissions | 21.517178 | 20.09631 | 22.67585 |
Q.2. Was Defendant negligent as to brakes? Q.3. Was Defendant negligent as to lookout? Q.4. Was Plaintiff negligent? Q.5. Apportion considering brakes. Q.6. Apportion considering speed. Q.7. Apportion considering lookout. Q.8. Apportion considering brakes and speed. Q.9. Apportion considering brakes and lookout. Q.10. Apportion considering speed and lookout. Q.11 Apportion considering brakes, speed, and lookout. | Party Submissions | 2.773281 | 2.885747 | 3.099567 |
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b) the undersigned certifies that on December 14, 2023, I served this document upon counsel for all parties via email and the court’s e-filing system. | Party Submissions | 5.390062 | 6.622493 | 6.968561 |
When we apply this accepted definition of incidental here, it is clear that the RTP issue was a major issue at trial. The RTP issue was the first of four alleged malpractice acts. HSMiller submitted a gross-negligence question based solely on Terry’s actions relating to the RTP issue. And the RTP issue took up much of the testimony and closing arguments, as illustrated below. | Party Submissions | 19.8871 | 20.183384 | 23.589764 |
The issue of fair and equitable treatment 367. Article IV of Annex III of the Treaty, providing for the obligation to accord Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET” or “FET Standard”), sets forth: FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT Each Party shall ensure, at all times, fair and equitable treatment for investments and returns, which shall thus enjoy full protection and security, and shall not receive a treatment less favourable than established under international law. | Legal Decisions | 9.702886 | 8.756871 | 9.477433 |
Only if Bay has met the statutory requirements of TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.123 (a) and (f) does the court need to reach the issue of “course and scope of employment.” However, because the only reliable evidence in the record demonstrates that Bay will never be able to conclusively prove course and scope of employment at the time of Mann's injury, the court should affirm the trial court's order denying Bay's summary judgment by the trial court. | Party Submissions | 8.740591 | 9.989889 | 10.355951 |
As explained in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, this Court should grant review and solidify its unwavering stance against the degradation of the legal profession and the litigation process by holding the proceeds assignment here void. The Court should reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ decision holding to the contrary and render a take-nothing judgment on that basis. | Party Submissions | 12.783059 | 15.822751 | 15.099572 |
Whether a statutory exception or exclusion applies to a claim cannot be considered unless and until it is established that there is jurisdiction for a claim pursuant to the underlying statute in the first place. See State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (stating that before a court can address the merits of a case, it must first establish jurisdiction). As such, the Court should reject an invitation to issue an advisory opinion based on the false premise upon which Weatherford’s Petition relies—that the landfill-focused SWDA has any application whatsoever to a domestic sewer system. | Party Submissions | 7.741998 | 7.61548 | 8.013584 |
In 2011, the Legislature revised the Election Code, adding, among other things, a provision stating: “After the filing deadline. .. a candidate may not amend an application filed under Section 141.031.” Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 254 (H.B. 1135), §1, eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code §141.032(g)).3 The plain text of Section 141.032(g), however, states merely that “a candidate” lacks the ability to unilaterally “amend[]” an application after the statutory deadline expires. Id. (emphasis added). This Court’s decisions never once mention the word “amendment,” and instead discuss the equitable judicial remedy of “curing” a deficiency. E.g., In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 543 (directing trial court to “abate the underlying proceeding to allow Francis to cure the defect”). | Party Submissions | 5.004239 | 4.786088 | 5.057989 |
In this case, Osprin sued Backes to enforce the guaranty after Backes refused to pay the sums owed under the bridge loan after TX 1111 defaulted. Backes filed counterclaims under the UDJA asking, among other things, that the trial court declare that Backes’s obligat ions under the guaranty agreement were discharged upon Osprin’s receipt of the $23,823,193.05 in Contributions generated by the state tax credits related to the first state rehabilitation project. However, the tria l court determined that Backes’s obligati ons did not terminate until Osprin also received the Contributions generated by the state tax credits related to the second state rehabilitation project, which occurred on February 11, 2020. Since Osprin partially prevailed in its defense of Backes ’s UDJA claims and recovered the Contributions through the litigation, the trial court in its discretion awarded it attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes. | Party Submissions | 8.299175 | 7.460867 | 8.948712 |
R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF R ESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(3) (2011). “If the value of an unrequested benefit exceeds its cost to the claimant, an innocent recipient will be liable only for the cost.” Id. cmt. e. “‘Cost or value, whichever is less’” is thus the standard recovery in cases of mistaken improvement, if restitution is available at all from an owner not at fault.” Id. “Conversely, where the measurable value of a benefit is less than the cost of conferring it, a recipient who is at fault in the transaction creating unjust enrichment may be liable to make restitution in the amount of the claimant’s costs.” Id. “By contrast, benefits conferred at the defendant’s request are presumed to have value to the recipient equal to the lesser of market value and a price the defendant has expressed a willingness to pay, unless the circumstances of the transaction make this valuation inappropriate.” Id. In this case, Diocese requested the materials and services, albeit not from Bay, Ltd. (9RRPX15). The lease between the Diocese and Mendietta required him to make specified improvements and repairs to the property. (Id.). The stated consideration to Mendietta for the requested improvements was the ability to use the property for 25 years. (Id. Section IV Special Provisions). The Diocese knew that the required improvements had value—Cy Richards’ memo to Bishop Mulvey that referenced “guaranteed improvements....amounting to Three to Four Hundred Thousand Dollars.” (9RRPX17). | Party Submissions | 11.205145 | 11.736473 | 11.529166 |
ICKER ) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to Commending Blue Mountain Christian University for 150 years of service to the State of Mississippi and the United States. | Legislation | 24.104288 | 20.825626 | 31.990335 |
It is intended that the Plan shall conform with all applicable Section 409A Requirements. Accordingly, in interpreting, construing or applying any of the foregoing definitions or any of the terms, conditions or provisions of the Plan, the same shall be construed in such manner as shall meet and comply with Section 409A Requirements then applicable thereto, and in the event of any inconsistency with any Section 409A Requirements, the same shall be reformed so as to meet such Section 409A Requirements to the fullest extent then permitted without penalty (and without imposition or accrual of interest or additional taxes) under Section 409A. | Contract | 4.811143 | 5.030209 | 5.137841 |
Laura Beam, CASA Supervisor, testified for Appellant, A.S. 5 RR 73. Beam testified that she was present for A.S.’s probation hearing in Smith County. 5 RR 76. On cross-examination, Beam explained that she went to hearing because A.S. had not recently drug tested in the instant case. 5 RR 77. K. Alisha Santiago Thomas Thomas testified generally DFPS removal policies. 5 RR 82. On cross-examination, Thomas testified that positive drug tests were a contributing factor in a removal. 5 RR 85. L. A.S. | Party Submissions | 10.231877 | 10.928889 | 11.393333 |
Pursuant to its erroneous statement of the standard of review, the Court did not examine the evidence to determine if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the findings of personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Court embarked on a “sufficiency of the evidence inquiry” which is totally improper. An example, with regard to (Tab 3), the Opinion examines that exhibit de novo, and refers to the private placement as quote, “undated...” (Op. p. 5) The Court then goes on to examine Marsenison’s testimony, not with regard to whether it presents a scintilla of evidence to support the denial of the Special Appearance, noted that Marsenison denied that he had any business dealings with Integrity, that he hadn’t entered into any agreements with them, and denied having any Integrity management role and had no explanation why a photo appeared in the investor presentation. (Op. p. 7) This is clearly an examination of the evidence de novo and not to determine whether or not there is a scintilla of evidence. The Opinion goes on to examine the evidence, noting that Marsenison denied that he had any business dealings with Integrity, that he hadn’t entered into any agreements with Integrity, and denied having any Integrity management role, and had no explanation why a photo appeared in the investor presentation. (Op. p. 7) The Court goes on to note that Marsenison denied having business dealings Farias, Integrity or other business dealings with Victor Farias. (Op. p. 7) Another example of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, based upon an erroneous standard of review, reviewing the evidence de novo, instead of trying to determine whether or not a scintilla supports the Opinion of the trial court. | Party Submissions | 6.697153 | 6.733511 | 6.787649 |
This Court should grant the petition for review, reverse the decision below, hold Yellowfin’s claim time -barred, and remand the case for any necessary proceedings in the trial court. | Party Submissions | 13.227166 | 13.688773 | 15.378577 |
Appeal of Denied Claims. A Claimant whose claim has been completely or partially denied shall be entitled to appeal the claim denial by filing a written appeal with a committee designated by the Committee to hear such appeals (the “Appeals Committee”). A Claimant who timely requests a review of the denied claim (or his or her authorized representative) may review, upon request and free of charge, copies of all documents, records and other information relevant to the denial and may submit written comments, documents, records and other information relevant to the claim to the Appeals Committee. All written comments, documents, records, and other information shall be considered “relevant” if the information: (i) was relied upon in making a benefits determination; (ii) was submitted, considered or generated in the course of making a benefits decision regardless of whether it was relied upon to make the decision; or (iii) demonstrates compliance with administrative processes and safeguards established for making benefit decisions. The Appeals Committee may, in its sole discretion and if it deems appropriate or necessary, decide to hold a hearing with respect to the claim appeal. | Contract | 4.0596 | 4.397327 | 4.44588 |
The party who seeks to assert that propexty is his separate property must prove its'separate character by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. | Party Submissions | 12.016437 | 21.694614 | 18.821106 |
S.W.3d at 406—07. Adened contribution plan is one in which the employer and/or employee make contributions to an individual account set up for the employee. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d at 407 n.4. | Party Submissions | 9.130664 | 11.609237 | 13.349361 |
The episode intersperses dramatic animations to illustrate or visually interpret the guardianship narratives. When [Tonya] speaks, the camera zooms in on her hands and feet to show fidgeting but does not give the same visual treatment to Ross, Laura, Brittany, or Ross’s assistant, Jo Ann Rivera. When the camera cuts away from [Tonya], the viewer is shown highlighted documents or statistics or general commentary from guardianship critics to suggest inconsistency, but the segment does not similarly treat Ross, Laura, Brittany, or Rivera. | Party Submissions | 18.687342 | 17.79341 | 20.628439 |
And Respondents do even less to square the court of appeals’ decision with the decisions of this Court and other Texas courts interpreting the statutes that control this case, except to ignore those interpretations and attempt to tease out factual distinctions in those decisions. Respondents try to recruit Marshall v. Housing Authority of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006) to their side by holding it up as an example of how a “tenant’s voluntary choices have consequences in litigation with a landlord.” (Resp. 40) But that is feeble support indeed, given Westwood ’s proof that its own “choices” were in no way voluntary. And Respondents’ argument should not serve to distract from Marshall’s true importance, which establishes that a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action is limited to a final determination only “of the right to immediate possession” of the property — reserving all other issues for the district court. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. T hat holding is fatal to the court of appeals’ effort to convert the agreed judgment of immediate possession into a determination of the right of ultimate possession to the property. | Party Submissions | 8.856877 | 9.219127 | 9.28937 |
If courts judicially broaden the legislatively dictated finality of § 1.111(e) agreements the effect will be to nullify the explicit finality of § 1.111(e) agreements. For example, if the mutual mistake theory of contract invalidity is applicable to § 1.111(e) agreements, the doctrine of want of consideration may equally be available. It is highly tenuous that any § 1.111(e) agreement has consideration. No money is exchanged; the parties just agree on a value. | Party Submissions | 8.649589 | 9.210258 | 9.594831 |
If required by Exhibit 6, U.S. Longshore and Harborworkers (USL&H) Act coverage endorsement shall be required as part of the Subcontractor’s Worker’s Compensation Insurance. | Party Submissions | 9.803562 | 9.554709 | 11.940983 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date. | Party Submissions | 8.685042 | 7.921706 | 8.740299 |
This conclusion rests on at least three fundamental errors. To begin, rather than applying this Court ’s Chapter 74 preliminary expert report jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on the sufficiency analysis in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, to elevate the scope of review. 649 S.W.3d at 179 At the same time, the Court of Appeals ignored authorities requiring it to read the expert reports together and to credit all of the experts’ opinions. See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 517; Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians, 461 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. 2015) (noting discretion of trial court to fully credit all the expert ’ s statements and opinions, rather than viewing them in isolation). Finally, the Court of Appeals compounded the error when it failed to tether its analysis the providers ’ specific objections as Chapter 74 requires. | Party Submissions | 10.923351 | 10.27689 | 11.680935 |
Disposition in the Court of Appeals: The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed all of Petitioners’ claims. City of Cedar Park v. Delapena, No. 13-21-00341-CV, 2022 WL 16993493 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2022, pet. filed.). Justice Benavides delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Contreras and Justice Tijerina. | Party Submissions | 4.066242 | 4.467096 | 4.170969 |
In other words, there is no “chain of events” to tie any claimed fault to the alleged hypoxic event, stroke, or whatever the experts think happened (which is not clear). Dr. Tappan instead points to three intrapartum factors that may have led to a “possibl[e]” perinatal arterial ischemic stroke: (1) prolonged second-stage labor, (2) fetal heart rate abnormalities, and (3) trauma at the time of delivery. (CR.794) Even if this was sufficient to explain causation (it was not) none of these are linked to nurses’ conduct. Instead, Dr. Tappan opines that had Dr. Castillo delivered the baby by reverse breech extraction, the baby would “not likely have suffered these complications and injuries.” (CR.793) Dr. Null also opined that “had [H.W.] been delivered one to one and a half hours sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.” (CR.805) If anything this is a doctor issue – not a nursing one. | Party Submissions | 9.710636 | 9.981476 | 10.662642 |
In Respondents’ telling, Westwood merely decided to leave the location where it had sold cars for more than four years as part of a “broader strategic decision to shut ” down its business, “leave the warehouse space that it no longer needed,” “and make a fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) And, according to Respondents, upon losing the forcible entry and detainer action, Westwood simply “announced its intention” to “vacate the premises” and “withdraw its appeal” in an exchange of letters. (Resp. 11-12, 28, citing 16RR307(DX42)) Nothing could be further from the truth. | Party Submissions | 12.700077 | 12.760084 | 14.243478 |
Automated Collection, 156 S.W.3d at 559. The burden shifted to RLB to provide reasons why the forum-selection clause should not be enforced. | Party Submissions | 10.06961 | 12.227053 | 14.901758 |
McCarthy, the Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents shall be added as additional insureds to the Subcontractor’s Pollution Liability policy. Coverage afforded to these additional insureds will be primary to and noncontributory with, any other insurance available to such additional insureds. Subcontractor’s Contractors Pollution Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation against all additional insureds. | Party Submissions | 5.67316 | 5.470745 | 6.524897 |
Nicaragua invokes, i.e., the prospect of an unpaid costs award, is hypothetical and, in any event, reparable through the courts of enforcement. | Party Submissions | 25.178755 | 33.223953 | 33.83823 |
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general c omments above. | Legal Decisions | 12.588654 | 12.775115 | 14.910369 |
This case concerns a written agreement entered into by co-Petitioner Mills County Appraisal District and Respondent Oncor Electric’s predecessor in title establishing the appraised value of certain electric power transmission lines belonging to Oncor and located in Mills County. Oncor subsequently filed a motion under ex. Tax Code §25.25(c) to correct the appraisal roll, seeking to avoid the agreement, on the ground that it was based on a mutual mistake of fact. The motion was heard by Petitioner Mills County Appraisal Review Board, which determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the provisions of §1.111(e) the agreement was final. The ARB dismissed the motion. Respondent appealed this dismissal to the District Court under Tex. Tax Code §42.01 et seq. and in the alternative under §25.25(g) of the Code, joining both the Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board. The ARB pleaded lack of jurisdiction under §1.111(e) and also under §42.21(b), which prohibits joinder of appraisal review boards to petitions for review of their decisions. In addition, the ARB pleaded that 25.25(g), which permits suits filed against an ARB for review of its determinations of motions made under §25.25 of the Tax Code, had been subsumed into Chapter 42, by amendment of §42.01, and made subject to that chapter’s bar on joinder of appraisal review boards. Finally, the ARB pleaded that the Tax Code provided a taxpayer remedy for the ARB’s dismissal of its protest, and that Oncor’s failure to exhaust it deprived the Court of jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 5.986669 | 6.030665 | 5.832808 |
On appeal, Berrelez contends the trial court erred in dismissing her suit against Mesquite Logistics. Relying on the “personal animosity” exception, she claims it was unnecessary for her to exhaust her administrative remedies because she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. Thus, she argues her claims are “exempted” from the Act. Mesquite disagrees, arguing that whether Berrelez was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault was an issue within the exclusive province of the DWC, mandating that she first exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. | Party Submissions | 5.68985 | 5.474995 | 5.981458 |
The Raymond decision has been unduly criticized for its lack of analysis explaining the conflicts with Cockerham. Professor Pamela George analyzed the possible reasoning for Raymond’s departure from the long-standing precedent of Cockerham. Pamela E. George, “Not Everybody Loves Raymond: How The Case Of Raymond V. Raymond Made A Shambles Of Interspousal Gift Presumptions And The Parol Evidence Rule In Matters Of Texas Community Property,” 50 St. Mary’s L.J. 809 (2019). “Although not an entirely renegade opinion, the Raymond analysis is so precariously founded as to be contrary to well-set Texas Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 813. First, the Raymond court may have applied an interspousal transfer theory, highlighting a distinction between spouse-to-spouse transfers as opposed to transfers involving a spouse and a third party. Under this theory the Raymond court appears to hold that a spouse-to spouse transfer results in a presumptive gift absent the high burden of proving accident, fraud, or mistake. This seems to imply an irrebuttable presumption that an interspousal conveyance itself establishes separate property character absent a threshold showing of accident, fraud or mistake. Such analysis is directly contrary to Cockerham. | Party Submissions | 10.451779 | 10.339114 | 10.606724 |
G) Summary 578. On the basis of the arguments raised in the foregoing chapters, the Tribunal finds that Respondent must compensate Claimant for the damages it actually caused as a result of violating its obligations under the terms of the Treaty. This compensation must fully cover both the income that Claimant should have received if reasonable tipping fees had been applied and the loss of 90% of the value of Lajun’s capital stock. The requirement to provide full reparation entails the application of interest on the aforementioned sum under the terms determined supra. | Legal Decisions | 13.982129 | 13.505138 | 14.201502 |
Respondents argue 402 Lone Star does not support the Petitioners’ argument because the issue on appeal was “whether the defendant knew that the amount was overstated.” Respondents’ Br. at 14. However, 402 Lone Star’s significance here is that the HOA used the lien’s enforcement power to foreclose on the property based on the overinflated redemption statement. See 402 Lone Star Prop., LLC v. Bradford, 04-16-00721-CV, 2017 WL 5759379, at *1-2, 5-6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 29, 2017), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom., 402 Lone Star Prop., LLC v. Bradford, 04-16-00721-CV, 2018 WL 1935576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 25, 2018). Similarly, Respondents use their Chapter 55 lien and its enforcement powers to collect overinflated hospital bills with the intent to cause financial injury to the patients. 402 Lone Star is also significant because the court recognized that the intent element is inherently a question for the jury. Id. at *5. Here, it is up to the jury to decide if Respondents’ use of their liens was fraudulent. | Party Submissions | 4.647211 | 4.767472 | 4.796106 |
Without Written Notice by April 1 -If L M O does not give H A O written notice by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for that year, L M O shall have possession of the child for forty-two consecutive days beginning at 6:00 p.m. on June 15 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on July 27 of that year. dismissed from school for the Christmas school vacation and ending at noon on December 28, and H A O shall have the right to possession of the child beginning at noon on December 28 and ending at the time school resumes after that Christmas school vacation. | Party Submissions | 7.429024 | 8.246437 | 8.254993 |
In addition, in connection with his commencing employment with the Company, Executive was awarded a special one-time grant of 500,000 RSU’s/PSU’s vesting as outlined below (“One-Time Special Grant”). | Contract | 9.393433 | 8.980666 | 8.602507 |
ARTICLE III(I) GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING TREATMENT Each Party shall admit and treat investments in a manner not less favourable than the treatment granted in similar situations to investments of its investors except for investments in areas to be identified in the Appendix to this Annex . | Legal Decisions | 12.723448 | 11.770416 | 16.361885 |
SUBPART C. Mark Marsenison is subject to jurisdiction in Texas as a result of committing a tort in Texas against a Texas resident. | Party Submissions | 47.797104 | 37.116367 | 56.960247 |
The trial court’s decision to deny UTRGV’s plea to the jurisdiction was based on this simple fact, and that decision was upheld by the court below. No basis to disturb that decision exists here. | Party Submissions | 10.062933 | 11.632308 | 13.256629 |
To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 and the Flood Control Act of 1968 to provide for provisions relating to collection and retention of user fees at recreation facilities, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.70512 | 4.48735 | 5.418208 |
CR:436. No community award was given here, either. Finally, the statutory formula hinged on when the “ grant could be exercised.” Tex. Fam. Code § 3.007(d)(2)(A),(B). It was very relevant, and a fact issue, that the company could decide to relax the grant dates to a lesser period, including for performance payment — Exhibit 26, page A-7. This was a fact issue repeated raised at trial, with Phillips 66 hardly ever waiting the full 3 years before vesting. | Party Submissions | 37.442165 | 40.168144 | 39.4533 |
It is unreasonable for an OEM to require a specific new motor vehicle sales number for a franchisee to fulfill when that OEM does not make the inventory available and franchise termination is in the offing. | Party Submissions | 26.263624 | 19.915854 | 24.777061 |
The dealer is an OEM’s captive buyer for the OEM’s vehicles and parts. This symbiotic relationship gives the OEM additional control for the distribution of its vehicles and parts. The dealer has no such captive buyer for the sale of its new motor vehicles as the dealer’s buyer has hundreds of models and lines and locations to choose from for purchase at any given time. | Party Submissions | 15.040561 | 11.771576 | 15.788294 |
As to the fair-report privilege, Barina claims the Program is not privileged as a report of the guardianship proceedings because it includes information “from outside those proceedings while ignoring critical information and reports within the proceedings.” Resp. Br. at 41. But this argument is specious at best. | Party Submissions | 19.982237 | 21.95196 | 23.41678 |
Thus, based on the Opinion guarantors for bank loans and in any lending transaction can unilaterally avoid complying with their obligations by strategically delaying payment until a termination clause becomes effective. This precedent further incentivizes guarantors with termination clauses to draw out litigation until their breach is moot. The Court should grant this Motion for Rehearing to prevent such gamesman that unreasonably and unnecessarily strains judicial and party resources. | Party Submissions | 16.64526 | 18.879932 | 21.00521 |
Accordingly, Tyler has no adequate remedy by appeal from the trial court's abuse of discretion in refusing to abate the underlying *846 suit until judicial review is complete. We sustain Tyler's first issue. | Party Submissions | 11.162261 | 11.730105 | 18.350426 |
An appraisal review board or court must necessarily examine a settlement agreement to discern what the agreement covered and what the parties are precluded from protesting further. In fact, this Court noted that the appraisal review board could not change a settlement agreement. The language which Oncor quotes out of the opinion to the effect that “we disagree that this is a jurisdictional question” is taken out of context. What the Court said was not jurisdictional was whether there were two protests, not whether the settlement agreement under section 1.111(e) was subject to revision. In that case, the property owner and lessee both filed protests. The appraisal district and owner settled. Then the lessee, Coastal, filed protests. The appraisal district argued the settlement with the owner precluded the protest by the lessee pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 41.413(b). The trial court had to examine the prior protest to determine whether it concerned the same matters as Coastal ’ s protest. In other words, which party — lessee or owner — was entitled to appeal under Texas Tax Code Chapter 42. The holding does not make the prior agreement subject to review and interpretation; it simply recognizes that, prior to determining whether the prior agreement precluded latter protest, the finder of fact had to determine what the prior protest covered. To hold otherwise would not make much sense. But this Court did not address the jurisdictional finality of an agreement made under section 1.111(e) . | Party Submissions | 9.844883 | 9.586862 | 10.019233 |
See Pet. App. B at 26–27. For example, the Board’s final finding on § 2301.467(a)(1)—that “[m]easuring sales efficiency does not require adherence to unreasonable sales or service standards”—simply concluded the Board’s (incorrect) analysis in the prior findings that the standard here was not “require[d].” Pet. App. B. at 26–27. The only § 2301.467(a)(1) issue decided below, and before this Court, is whether HMA “require[d]” the sales-efficiency standard. | Party Submissions | 9.032315 | 9.201073 | 9.478613 |
McCarthy Subcontract -4-01-12-2017 Rev. take some or all of the following actions at no additional cost to McCarthy: .1 Increase manpower in such quantities as will substantially eliminate the backlog of work and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule. .2 Increase the number of working hours per shift, shifts per working day, working days per week, or the amount of equipment, or any combination of the foregoing which will substantially eliminate the backlog of work and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule. .3 Reschedule activities to achieve maximum practical concurrency of accomplishment of activities and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule. | Party Submissions | 7.573535 | 7.791011 | 8.187329 |
HSMiller then argues that the instructions did not instruct on facts but on the law, ( id. at 19-24) so they could not be a comment on the weight of the evidence. Terry has already discussed at length why the instruction incorrectly states the law on RTPs. Beyond that, the record does not support this argument. The second non-statutory instruction and the first non-statutory instruction went further than they should have by nudging the jury in favor of one party and directly commenting on evidence, and directly favoring one side’s evidence over the other’s. See Newsom, 2022 WL 3908542, at *9 (“By expanding the RTP instruction to specifically state what Terry could 37 have done, the trial court necessarily implied what it believed Terry should have done.”). | Party Submissions | 13.622602 | 13.130262 | 14.295027 |
For column 12: ‘Method sensitivity’ means the probability of a method to correctly detect pest presence. The method sensitivity is defined as the probability that a truly positive host tests positive. It is the multiplication of the sampling effectiveness (i.e. probability of selecting infected plant parts from an infected plant) by the diagnostic sensitivity (characterised by the visual inspection and/or laboratory test used in the identification process). | Legislation | 16.366194 | 14.272653 | 18.651459 |
Oncor ’ s argument necessarily implies that sections 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) repeal section 1.111(e)(2), at least in part, without so much as mentioning the repeal. Courts will not interpret one statute as repealing another absent a clear intent of the Legislature to do so. Rather, the statutes should be read in harmony with each 29 other. | Party Submissions | 9.694184 | 10.477864 | 11.109295 |
Recently this Court has reaffirmed that “[c]harge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.” In re Estate of Poe, 648 S.W.3d 277, 285-93 (Tex. 2022). The court of appeals correctly held that the second non-statutory instruction went too far, and the harm from the improper second non-statutory instruction only buttresses that court’s decision. | Party Submissions | 10.125228 | 9.339448 | 10.494385 |
In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) [8] Administrative Law and Procedure Exclusive or original jurisdiction Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation. | Party Submissions | 10.043101 | 10.329432 | 10.444305 |
To amend the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 to provide for continuous improvement of organic standards, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 3.722511 | 3.912181 | 3.764935 |
Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.003(a). But the Legislature deliberately excluded that language from section 272.001. E.g., Hogan, 627 S.W.3d at 169. | Party Submissions | 7.892285 | 9.189388 | 13.040886 |
The designation of a person as a vice president does not by itself have a standardized or customary meaning associating particular functions or authority with the position. | Party Submissions | 17.83128 | 17.603174 | 18.018602 |
That passage perfectly encapsulates the court of appeals’ fundamental error— and the confusion that Respondents continue to sew before this Court: Both erroneously equate Westwood’s decision to turn over immediate possession of the premises with the abandonment of any right of possession Westwood ever had in the premises —regardless of Westwood’s reasons for leaving. But the reasons are everything in a constructive-eviction action. After all, a claim of wrongful eviction requires an “eviction”—indeed, Respondents admit that the tenant must “abandon[] the property within a reasonable time” to maintain such a claim. (Resp. 22, quoting Op. 5 n.3) But as Westwood has explained, and Respondents again ignore, it is the reason behind the abandonment that determines the viability of a claim for wrongful eviction: The tenant who simply abandons the leased premises because it wants to, or because it recognizes it has no claim of right to stay there, has no claim. See Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | Party Submissions | 7.489019 | 8.009151 | 7.985628 |
Alternate Weekend Possession -In lieu of the weekend possession described in the foregoing paragraph, L M O shall have the right to possession of the child not more than one weekend per month of L M O choice beginning at 6 :0 0 p.m. on the day school recesses for the weekend and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the day before school resumes after the weekend. L M O may elect an option for this alternative period of weekend possession by giving written notice to H A O within ninety days after the parties begin to reside more than 100 miles apart. If L M O makes this election, L M O shall give H A O fourteen days' written or telephonic notice preceding a designated weekend. The weekends chosen shall not conflict with the provisions regarding Christmas, Thanksgiving, the child's birthday, and Father's Day possession below. | Party Submissions | 6.632889 | 6.787742 | 6.989055 |
They also ignore that Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) is materially distinguishable from this case for the same reason. In Acme Brick, the settlement agreement expressly addressed the applicability of a tax exemption. Acme Brick, 428 S.W.3d at 916. The court said the district was bound to apply the exemption because “[t]he document plainly reflects an agreement between the District and Acme about the value of Acme’s property, including the application of the pollution-control exemption to the Property .” Id. (emphasis added). The court reiterated that “[t]he document signed by Capitol and Acme specifically states that the proper values ( including the application of the exemption ) have been agreed upon by the District’s representative and Acme. .. .” Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court noted that “[t]he District does not dispute that it reached an agreement with Acme that Acme’s Property qualified for the pollution-control exemption in the tax years 2004 through 2007 or that the agreement constitutes a Section 1.111(e) agreement between the parties on the value of the Property.” Id. at 917. The court held that section 1.111(e) barred the district from taking “subsequent action that is contrary to that agreement. .. .” Id. at 918 (emphasis added). That is why the court of appeals in that case determined that the agreement barred subsequent litigation of the applicability of the exemption. Id. at 919. Even more important to this case, the Acme Brick court confirmed that district courts do have jurisdiction to determine the scope and effect of an agreement under section 1.111(e) to resolve disputes like this one. Id. at 915 n.3. The District and Board simply ignore these aspects of Acme Brick . | Party Submissions | 4.504702 | 4.846167 | 4.512728 |
Amendments. The Company, by action taken by its Board of Directors, may amend the Plan at any time and for any reason, provided that any such amendment shall not reduce the vested Account Balances of any Participant accrued as of the date of any such amendment or restatement (as if the Participant had incurred a voluntary Separation from Service on such date) or reduce any rights of a Participant under the Plan or other Plan features with respect to Deferrals made prior to the date of any such amendment or restatement without the consent of the Participant. The Board of Directors of the Company may delegate to the Committee the authority to amend the Plan without the consent of the Board of Directors for the purpose of: (i) conforming the Plan to the requirements of law; (ii) facilitating the administration of the Plan; (iii) clarifying provisions based on the Committee’s interpretation of the document; and (iv) making such other amendments as the Board of Directors may authorize. | Contract | 3.912193 | 3.652281 | 4.143992 |
Second, Stanley, the BNC Sellers’ lawyer in the underlying trial, admitted arguing in the underlying trial that HSMiller perpetrated a fraud on the public by making it look like Defterios was a corporate officer and by giving him the title of vice president. (6RR192-94, 253) His change of course in the malpractice trial is one of the reasons assignments of control and interest should be void as against public policy. | Party Submissions | 35.1533 | 31.450354 | 38.523197 |
And Section 51.003(a) defines “deficiency” as the difference between “the price at which real property is sold at a foreclosure sale” and “the indebtedness secured by the real property.” As our opening brief explains (at 13-16), Yellowfin’s suit falls squarely within that definition. Yellowfin seeks to recover the indebtedness that was secured by Deysi Santos’s home before it was sold at a foreclosure sale. Yellowfin’s suit is thus for “the amount remaining on a debt after applying the proceeds realized at a foreclosure sale ,” which is “one of the very definitions of ‘deficiency.’” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2014) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 514 (10th ed. 2014)). Courts have also referred to a junior lender’s post foreclosure debt in particular as “a deficiency” and its suit to recover that debt as seeking a “deficiency judgment.” See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 102 (Cal. 1963). | Party Submissions | 6.33264 | 5.531913 | 6.325998 |
Is Respondent’s counterclaim directed against Claimant’s original claim and/or against Claimant’s ancillary claim? Was it brought timely with respect to each, as applicable? | Party Submissions | 12.41796 | 11.957367 | 13.855667 |
A negligence case against a nonsubscribing employer is an action for workers' compensation benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. party in interest: Mr. Collen A. Clark, Mr. Jon L. Anderson, Mr. R. Connor Barbe, Ms. Linda Le Jones. For East Texas Medical Center Athens, Relator: Casey Campbell, Mr. William O. Ashcraft, Ms. Christina Gratke Nason, Mr. David M. Walsh IV. | Party Submissions | 20.8028 | 26.586977 | 23.995703 |
This document serves as a basis for discussion at the Working Party on Fisheries Policy. It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the official position of the Commission. It is intended solely for those to whom it is addressed. In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers that it cannot attach any weight to this document. Even if it could, however, the draft Note does no more than reiterate that the EU takes a different view of the Svalbard Treaty from the Norwegian Government and the Supreme Court. For the reasons already given the Tribunal cannot rule on that difference. Neither the EU draft nor the article by Justice Skoghøy afford any support to the Claimants’ argument that they suffered a denial of justice. | Legal Decisions | 10.927832 | 11.351213 | 11.108026 |
Subsets and Splits