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According to Fleming Defendants’ analysis, a party can impliedly consent to be bound by an agreement relating to collateral estoppel through statements made to the court in a motion or response, and according to Texas law, to make such an implied agreement, the party must obtain mutual assent with the trial court, which can include the court ruling in the party’s favor. | Party Submissions | 15.002705 | 13.433231 | 16.38239 |
The issue of the umbrella clause 477. Article V of Annex III of the Treaty, once again invoked by Claimant, sets forth: COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS Each Party shall comply with its commitments regarding investment and shall, in no way, impair, through the adoption of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, the management, development, maintenance, utilisation, usufruct, acquisition, expansion or transfer of said investments. | Legal Decisions | 13.847005 | 13.48274 | 16.162163 |
All of the Dow factors contemplate some form of control over solid waste. See id. As shown below, Midland not only lacked control over the alleged Contaminants, it had no knowledge that the waste even existed. Midland did not come into contact with the waste, did not make any decisions regarding the disposal of the waste nor did it have the authority or obligation to do so, and it did not actually dispose of the waste. (CR 54.) Midland satisfied none of the Dow factors, and without some concrete causal nexus, Midland cannot be a “person responsible” for the alleged Contaminants at issue. | Party Submissions | 10.625692 | 13.043784 | 12.592944 |
Several other jurisdictions do recognize such a common law duty. See, e.g., Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 427 Pa. 14, 18, 233 A.2d 874, 877 (1967) (“[w]herever people publicly congregate to swim, dive and divert themselves in the water, a lifeguard is a compelling necessity”); Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 442, 20 So. 2d 484, 485 (1945) (same); Page v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-13, 2005 WL 1106893, at *4 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (recognizing limited duty of reasonable care to supervise minors at pools under Michigan law). The Court should address whether Texas law recognizes such a common law right. | Party Submissions | 5.113198 | 5.132223 | 5.290509 |
The Payment Schedule that the Participant has designated for the Participant’s Retirement Account applies to amounts paid from the Retirement Account and any Specified Date Accounts included in the Separation from Service Benefit. For the avoidance of doubt, the Payment Schedule designated by a Participant for the Retirement Account shall not apply to any Separation from Service Account, and the Payment Schedule designated by a Participant for any Separation from Service Account shall not apply to the Retirement Account, any Specified Date Account or any other Separation from Service Account. The payment of a lump sum or the initial payment of annual installments from any Account as provided under this Section 6.2(a) shall be subject to the payment delay for Specified Employees set forth in Section 6.1(a). | Contract | 5.055868 | 4.547153 | 5.430689 |
Galovelho does not dispute the fact that the restrictions on restaurant operations that he complained of no longer exist. However, he relies on exceptions to the mootness doctrine for matters that are capable of repetition but evading review – 19– and for matters voluntarily abandoned by the defendant. We disagree that either exception should apply in this case. | Party Submissions | 14.424191 | 18.392694 | 16.802637 |
Even if the 2019 settlement agreement were otherwise a bar to Oncor’s claim under one of respondents’ theories, the district court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the settlement under the mutual-mistake doctrine. The Third Court of Appeals recently agreed with Oncor in the parallel appeal of the Mills County proceeding, based upon this Court’s decision in Willacy County, supra. See Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. NTU LLC v. Mills Cent. Appraisal Dist., 660 S.W.3d 288, 297-300 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. requested). That court got it right, for the reasons already stated in Oncor’s initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 37-40. | Party Submissions | 7.394823 | 7.350834 | 8.689643 |
Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request. | Legal Decisions | 14.538063 | 10.749494 | 13.81025 |
McCarthy Subcontract -3-01-12-2017 Rev. on behalf of Subcontractor’s subcontractors and suppliers (at any tier) jointly payable to Subcontractor and such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers. Subcontractor and such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers shall be responsible for the allocation and disbursement of funds included as part of any such joint payment. In no event shall any joint payment be construed to create any (1) contract between McCarthy and Subcontractor’s lower tier subcontractors and suppliers; (2) obligations from McCarthy to such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers; or (3) rights in such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers against McCarthy. | Party Submissions | 5.605175 | 5.041706 | 5.913452 |
HN12 [ ] When construing a statute, courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless the Legislature provided a definition. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2013); Hopkins v. | Party Submissions | 5.937854 | 9.491259 | 8.048897 |
Properly understood and applied here, Griggs divests the district court of control over only a narrow slice of the case. The interlocutory appeal addresses an order declining to compel arbitration. Griggs merely prevents the district court from modifying that order— i.e., Griggs prevents the district judge from revisiting whether to compel arbitration while the appeal is pending. Griggs does not stop the district court from proceeding on matters other than arbitrability. | Party Submissions | 7.777042 | 9.502467 | 10.009873 |
Being part of the management team of a Texas Corporation is an obvious availment of the Respondent’s right to do business in Texas, and clearly embraces the possibility that he may be haled into Texas Courts. | Party Submissions | 17.88425 | 18.220797 | 19.169212 |
The foregoing statements from the Karnes court order denying class certification prove mutual assent between Fleming Defendants and the Karnes court on the principle that the individual issues predominated over the common issues for the Wilson Plaintiffs’ cases. That position necessarily precludes any form of collateral estoppel, including offensive and defensive, because one of the essential elements of collateral estoppel, both offensive and defensive, is that the legal issues sought to be litigated in the second action must be identical to those in the first action. (XXII CR 13815) see also Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979) (“Collateral estoppel...has the...purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy...”) (emphasis added). Thus, the foregoing constituted an Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreement between Fleming Defendants and the court. | Party Submissions | 5.600673 | 5.116178 | 5.955275 |
After offering his review of Mrs. Walker’s medical records, Dr. Tappan lists several claimed departures by Dr. Castillo and says one—an alleged failure to recognize recurrent decelerations and minimal variability—put H.W. at risk for (but never says this caused ) “hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy.” (CR.669 [Standard of Care ¶5]). He then guesses H.W. may have sustained an “arterial ischemic stroke.” (CR.670). Dr. Tappan never explains whether “hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy” is the same as “arterial ischemic stroke,” or if they even are related. | Party Submissions | 10.664271 | 12.756373 | 12.461574 |
Statement of Interest and Purpose TADA represents the interests of the Texas franchised motor vehicle and heavy-duty truck dealers before federal and state legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and federal and state courts. TADA's concerns encompass its members, the franchised dealers, as well as the residents whom the Texas dealers serve through the sale and service of new and used motor vehicles. | Party Submissions | 8.202899 | 7.908811 | 8.482851 |
The arbitration agreement coupled with the AAA Construction Industry Rules incontrovertibly underscores the agreement's unilateral nature and unconscionability. The absence of expenditure ceilings is particularly alarming. Such frameworks compel homebuyers like Rafiei to navigate a gauntlet of prohibitive fees — effectively a deterrent to those without immediate expansive financial means. Rafiei's predicament of contemplating substantial sums for merely initializing the arbitration process exemplifies this. | Party Submissions | 20.028605 | 19.495104 | 20.27989 |
The Respondent’s objection is threefold: (i) the request lacks specificity and is overbroad, (ii) lack of relevance, and (iii) confidentiality based on the Agreement on Confidentiality signed by the Negotiating Parties20. | Legal Decisions | 9.123764 | 7.649582 | 9.712234 |
The Committee shall designate the periods (each, a “Performance Period”) with respect to which a Participant may be granted the opportunity to earn one or more payouts. The first Performance Period shall commence January 1, 2019. Unless otherwise determined by the Committee, the Performance Period shall be United Rentals’ fiscal year. | Contract | 7.017481 | 6.365444 | 7.810903 |
Arbitration Rules contain a presumption in favour of an award of costs to the successful Party. The Tribunal thus has a discretion regarding whether to make an award of costs and, if so, on what terms. Costs fall into two distinct categories: the costs of the arbitration, including the fees and expenses of the Members of the Tribunal, and the costs incurred by the Parties for their legal representation, for retaining the services of experts and for incidental expenses (“ Costs of Representation ”). | Legal Decisions | 6.165535 | 5.180349 | 6.494623 |
Respondents point to Tax Code section 42.21(b) as authority for their argument that the Board is not a proper party to this lawsuit. See Respondents’ Brief at 43-44. According to respondents, because Chapter 42 of the Tax Code authorizes a property owner to appeal an appraisal review board’s determination of a motion filed under section 25.25, and section 42.21(b) was enacted after section 25.25(g), the bar in section 42.21(b) applies and prohibits Oncor from naming the Board as a defendant. Oncor addressed this argument in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 48-50. | Party Submissions | 4.756349 | 4.996605 | 5.010975 |
A.S. was then questioned about her relationship with C.W., father of R.W., who had relinquished his rights. 3 RR 68. The exchange alluded to law 2 At the time of trial, A.S. was serving a 300-day sentence in the Smith County Jail. | Party Submissions | 13.695278 | 13.825585 | 16.354591 |
Commenting on Oncor ’ s argument on the point, the court in Wilbarger held: Had the legislature intended an agreement under section 1.111 to only preclude challenges asserted under section 25.25(d), it could have easily so specified. We cannot interpret the absence of language in a statute in a manner contrary to express language contained elsewhere in the code. | Party Submissions | 14.966664 | 17.941576 | 18.573742 |
In this case, the ARB has exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes, and the Texas Property Tax Code provides exclusive remedies for property owners to protest their tax liabilities. | Party Submissions | 10.144066 | 11.950746 | 10.977351 |
And the attempt to bypass Zuniga and Gandy by assigning “only” proceeds is nothing more than a mirage. The assignment of proceeds here did not prevent the collusion and position-shifting that this Court prohibited in Zuniga and Gandy. In any event, one Texas 21 court of appeals has barred an assignment of proceeds for the same reasons that assignments of claims are barred in Texas. See Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). There, the terms of the settlement agreement between the former plaintiff and the original defendant gave 90% of the recovery of funds from the malpractice litigation against the original defendant’s lawyer, absolute control over the litigation, and the unfettered right to settle to the former plaintiff. Id. The court held that the agreement constituted an assignment of claims that violated public policy. Id. at 634. | Party Submissions | 8.176903 | 8.584207 | 8.746405 |
Respondent makes the argument that the preclusive effect of a 1.111(e) agreement is limited to the substance of the Agreement as expressed therein. Therefore, Respondent argues, because the Agreement did not expressly address the possibility of mistake it left such questions open to challenge. The key to this argument is the assumption that the Agreement as set forth does not itself implicitly express agreement as to the absence of mistake. The substance of the Agreement is quite simply the appraised value of the power lines. This perforce includes the calculations that produced it, along with everything else that went into negotiating the final number. Respondent argues that in order for the Agreement to be effective in barring its suit, it would have had to include some reference to the actual data and calculations. The Agreement as to value implicitly assents to the way it was calculated. Were this not sufficient, the actual Agreement includes an express waiver of the right to “any future proceeding in this matter.” The subject of the Agreement is described as “2019 Total County Appraisal Value $78,801,960.00” (RR 322). The argument, if any, is what “matter” was contemplated by the parties. Respondent argues that it is limited to the substance of the protest that was filed by Sharyland, which claimed that the value of the property was over market and unequal. (RR 319-320). It seems fairly obvious that this would cover any issues concerning the appraised value agreed to. The language used is inclusive, and not, as Respondent contends, exclusive. V. RESPONDENT’S SUIT IS BARRED BY WAIVER. | Party Submissions | 10.761701 | 10.026316 | 10.788294 |
HN3 [ ] Because the erroneous denial of a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party skews the proceedings, potentially affects the litigation's outcome, and compromises the defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record, such an error ordinarily renders the appellate remedy inadequate. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509-10 (Tex. 2017). The same problems arise when a trial court erroneously grants a motion to strike a responsible third party designation. In re Molina, 575 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding). Thus, we conclude, the appellate remedy is also ordinarily inadequate when a trial court commits such an error. | Party Submissions | 5.542262 | 6.335403 | 6.146092 |
Walker reiterated his demand that Rinaldi reject Devine’s ballot on January 5, 2024. Pet. Ex. D. Rinaldi responded that same day, refusing to remove Devine from the ballot. Despite not having sought judicial relief in the interim either in an appropriate district court or court of appeals, Walker sought mandamus relief later that day—fifty-three days after Devine submitted his application. See Pet. at 16. | Party Submissions | 11.452048 | 13.114567 | 13.582864 |
On May 22, 2020, Galovelho filed suit against Abbott, Collin County, and Frisco. He alleged that the Emergency Orders had effected a taking of its property, and he sought $2 million in damages. In June 2020, all three defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the takings claims. Galovelho filed an omnibus response, clarifying that its claims for regulatory takings should be analyzed as categorical takings under Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), or alternatively, as traditional takings pursuant to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). | Party Submissions | 4.188552 | 4.200246 | 4.52143 |
Cancellation of Deferrals. The Committee may cancel a Participant’s Deferrals: (i) for the balance of the Plan Year in which an Unforeseeable Emergency occurs; or (ii) during periods in which the Participant is unable to perform the duties of his or her position or any substantially similar position due to a mental or physical impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least six months, provided cancellation occurs by the later of the end of the taxable year of the Participant or the fifteenth (15th ) day of the third (3rd) month following the date the Participant incurs the disability (as defined in this clause (ii)). | Contract | 4.132273 | 3.882211 | 4.784317 |
Annexes I and II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 are replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Regulation. | Legislation | 3.349659 | 3.765287 | 6.02622 |
She went to Baptist in May 2015, when she was approximately thirty-seven weeks pregnant, to deliver her baby. (CR.665). After more than twelve hours of labor, H.W. was born via cesarean delivery. (CR.666). He required resuscitation at three minutes of age and was eventually transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit. (CR.666-67). H.W. was discharged home eighteen days later. (CR.667). | Party Submissions | 4.743235 | 6.015458 | 5.393896 |
Request No. 1.a Agreement on Confidentiality and that neither the Claimants nor the Arbitral Tribunal’s members qualify as individuals allowed to have access to the same. | Legal Decisions | 30.869387 | 24.44077 | 35.63436 |
During the divorce hearing, Wife asked the court to award her half of Husband’s anticipated bonus as community property. Husband obj ected that he had yet to receive the bonus, and the court “cannot divest separate property money he received in years aer the divorce.” Other than stating that Husband typically received ayearly bonus in February, neither party provided additional evidence about the anticipated bonus. The trial court did not rule on its characterization and division. | Party Submissions | 16.57434 | 18.37117 | 18.292253 |
At minimum, the Election Code’s prohibition on individuals signing multiple candidates’ petitions is unconstitutional as applied to these facts. This prohibition cannot be constitutionally applied if the candidate has no opportunity to cure his petition and the penalty is decertification from the ballot. Cf. State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 497, 500 (Tex. 2002) (considering whether ballot requirement was reasonable “as applied to” the candidate). There is no question that Justice Devine has ample support to be on the ballot and is not a “frivolous candidate[].” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. Justice Devine could not have known of the alleged defects until after his application was accepted, and there is no dispute that he could have corrected the defects. Any possible state interest in enforcing statutory deadlines and ballot access requirements to avoid “chaos” that would otherwise “accompany the democratic process,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (cleaned up), is not advanced here. Relator has caused chaos by delaying for weeks, skipping the lower courts, and demanding that this Court grant mandamus in an original proceeding within three business days during an imminent election. | Party Submissions | 8.053302 | 8.07535 | 8.402516 |
Matured (as in Matured Claim) “A claim based on a debt that is due for payment.” Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). | Party Submissions | 11.125611 | 11.895051 | 14.576327 |
The United States objects to Request No. 2.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a. | Legal Decisions | 9.11884 | 13.763 | 15.672507 |
Any and all aerial and/or satellite photos of Belgrade, which include any part of Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and/or the Surrounding Area, made, commissioned and/or otherwise acquired or possessed by Serbian authorities, including but not limited to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Construction, Infrastructure and Transportation and/or the Republic Geodetic Authority (and their legal predecessors) between 1946 and 2005. | Legal Decisions | 8.191093 | 7.625408 | 8.401377 |
Company Contribution. Company Contribution means a credit by a Participating Employer to a Participant’s Account(s) in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the Plan. Company Contributions are credited at the sole discretion of the Participating Employer and the fact that a Company Contribution is credited in one year shall not obligate the Participating Employer to continue to make such Company Contribution in subsequent years. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, a reference to Company Contribution shall include Earnings attributable to such contribution. | Contract | 4.560457 | 4.08778 | 4.962564 |
Tiffany Harry, a former CVS worker for DFPS, testified next for Intervenor. 4 RR 96. Harry’s testimony concerned visits between A.S. and R.W. 4 RR 97. Harry testified that A.S. took care of R.W. at visits compared to C.W., but visits often had to be rescheduled and A.S. did not provide items for R.W. 4 RR 97-100. Harry further testified to other inflammatory behavior by A.S. such as her inability to hold a young R.W. and her use of the “F” in front of her other children. 4 RR 100. During cross-examination, Harry agreed that ETCADA made no further recommendations for A.S. in her service plan. 4 RR 108. Harry further agreed with Petitioner that A.S. was unwilling to test and admit drug use. 4 RR 112. F. Alisha Santiago Thomas Caseworker, Alisha Santiago Thomas, testified next for Intervenor. 4 RR 113. Thomas testified that when she took over the case from Harry, there were drug use and domestic violence concerns. 4 RR 115. Thomas further testified to failed compliance to drug test by A.S. in November of 2022, December of 2022 and January 2023, and such request was communicated by phone call and then a text message. 4 RR 118-120. Although ordered to provide support at a December 7th hearing, Thomas testified A.S. did not pay anything financial to R.W. 4 RR 125. Thomas further told the jury she followed up at the testing facility in December 2022, but A.S. and C.W. had not presented to test at the facility. 4 RR 127. Thomas further testified that she reached out to A.S. later in the month regarding drug testing to reschedule visitations. 4 RR 131. Thomas relayed that A.S. said she tested on December 7, but no results were ever received. 4 RR 135. | Party Submissions | 6.492653 | 6.82737 | 7.209451 |
Now they claim Flaven was a shoo-in as a responsible third party, yet in the original case, the plaintiff’s lawyer argued Flaven was not a proper RTP; now the former plaintiff’s lawyer claims the entire case was so weak he could not have won it absent “malpractice,” yet on appeal in the original case, he pointed to HSMiller’s and its agent’s “numerous and continuous misrepresentations and lies” that “led in a natural and continuous sequence” to the financial losses that would not have occurred “but for [HSMiller’s and its agents] misrepresentations.” Br. of Appellees at 1, 11, Defterios v. Dall. Bayou Bend, 350 S.W.3d 659 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (No. 05-08-01726-CV), 2009 WL 2565846, at *1, *11. | Party Submissions | 9.323582 | 10.289303 | 9.602793 |
The Property was also encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of First Franklin (the “deed of trust”). CR2:211 -222. The first lien was foreclosed on November 6, 2007, and conveyed by the substitute trustee to National City Bank. CR2:80-81. | Party Submissions | 8.363399 | 9.530001 | 9.864097 |
The case before this Court is nearly identical to Houston Cement Co. As in Houston Cement Co., Oncor’s predecessor, Sharyland, reached an agreement with Wilbarger CAD regarding the value of its property for tax year 2019 “thereby resolving the dispute.” Houston Cement Co. at *1; I C.R. 18. As in Houston Cement, Oncor filed a § 25.25 motion under several theories, including a § 25.25(c) motion for correction on the basis of clerical error. The Wilbarger ARB denied the motion. The Houston Cement case held that Cement and HCAD “clearly expressed harmony of opinion as to the final values of Cement’s combined business personal property and of its inventory in the signed, specifically written agreements. .. [b]ecause those final values were matters on which protests either could have been filed or had been filed but not yet determined by the board, the agreements are final as to those values.” Id. at *2. Here, Oncor and Wilbarger CAD clearly expressed the harmony of opinion, mistaken or not, that the value of inventory (transmission lines) in Wilbarger County was $55,068,090. I C.R. 18. Finally, in Houston Cement, Cement objected that it had evidence that showed that Cement did not discover the inventory errors until after the agreement was executed. Id. at *3. The court held that testimony and evidence regarding a mistake of fact was irrelevant because it was not relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id . | Party Submissions | 10.712352 | 10.743516 | 10.850729 |
Even if Bay had shown compliance with the written agreement requirement, it has not addressed the proper filing requirement nor placed any evidence in the record to demonstrate compliance with this mandatory requirement, so it is waived *19 and Bay is not entitled to the exclusive remedies protection as a matter of law. Once Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment on the exclusive remedy issue (which Plaintiffs have clearly done), Bay should have presented evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue, which it simply failed to do. ‘‘Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. 1972). | Party Submissions | 10.783094 | 10.577339 | 11.805043 |
Claimant cannot properly substantiate such relevance and materiality precisely because of the breadth of its request. Claimant is not requesting specific or precisely identified documents, but rather engaging in an unreasonably burdensome and disproportionate fishing expedition, in the search for arguments to build a case Claimant does not have and failed to prove. | Legal Decisions | 14.246589 | 16.414448 | 15.512968 |
If jurisdiction exists to litigate the intention of parties on such settlement agreements, a good deal of the purpose of entering them is negated. Parties enter settlement agreements to avoid litigation, not to spawn new subjects of litigation. | Party Submissions | 19.137695 | 18.34012 | 21.460014 |
The recent case of Stearns v. Martens follows the Cockerham authority and disregards contrary conflicting opinions. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). In Stearns, the controversy involved the characterization of certain shares of stock as wife’s separate property. Id. The stock originated from a pool company started by husband before marriage. Id. at 545. During the marriage, the pool business sold and stock was issued to husband and to wife individually in the new entity. Id. Thereafter, husband transferred his stock to wife with a written agreement. Id. The agreement is silent as to any characterization of the consideration, the stock, or whether the transfer was a purchase or a gift. Id. at 547. | Party Submissions | 6.534656 | 6.945729 | 6.573627 |
The United States objects to Request No. 2.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.064806 | 12.094721 | 13.66326 |
En realidad, el medio, el gran medio, el gran mecanismo de control jurisdiccional de este acto está en el juicio de amparo. Es el juicio de amparo el medio de impugnación, digamos, por excelencia en materia administrativa, es el recurso efectivo al que se refiere el artículo 25 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Es, digamos, el mecanismo que en México utilizamos cuando no vemos otra manera de arreglar las cosas: es el juicio de amparo. Y el juicio de amparo es perfectamente procedente en esta situación. | Party Submissions | 6.456569 | 7.853212 | 7.022533 |
If an amount to be paid under this Plan is payable in two or more installments, each installment shall be treated as a separate payment for purposes of Section 409A. To the extent any expense reimbursement or in-kind benefit to which a Participant is or may be entitled to receive under the Plan constitutes non-exempt “deferred compensation” for purposes of Section 409A of the Code, then (i) such reimbursement shall be paid to the Participant as soon as administratively practicable after the Participant submits a valid claim for reimbursement, but in no event later than the last day of the Participant’s taxable year following the taxable year in which the expense was incurred, (ii) the amount of expenses eligible for reimbursement, or in-kind benefits provided, during any taxable year of the Participant shall not affect the expenses eligible for reimbursement, or in-kind benefits to be provided, in any other taxable year of the Participant, and (iii) the Participant’s right to reimbursement or in-kind benefits shall not be subject to liquidation or exchange for another benefit. A termination of employment shall not be deemed to have occurred for purposes of any provision of this Plan providing for the payment of any amounts or benefits subject to Code Section 409A upon or following a termination of employment unless such termination is also a “separation from service” within the meaning of Code Section 409A and, for purposes of any such provision of this Plan, references to a “termination,” “termination of employment” or like terms shall mean “separation from service.” Nothing in this Plan shall operate or be construed to cause the Plan to fail to comply with the requirements of Code Section 409A and, to the extent applicable, it is intended that the Plan comply with the provisions of Code Section 409A and shall be administered in a manner consistent with that intent. Any provision of this Plan that would cause the Plan or any payment made hereunder to fail to satisfy Code Section 409A shall have no force and effect until amended by the Company to comply with Code Section 409A (which amendment may be retroactive to the extent permitted by Code Section 409A) and may be made by the Company without the consent of any Participant. | Contract | 1.804489 | 1.994681 | 1.867827 |
MVP asserts that McCarthy and RLB irrevocably waived all “objections” to the forum-selection clause, including on the basis of section 272.001. Although McCarthy and RLB both argue that they have not waived their right to void the forum selection clause under section 272.001, each has different arguments, which we address below. | Party Submissions | 8.540363 | 9.270439 | 9.154922 |
December 2014 and entered into force on 2 January 2015. The Regulations on the Prohibition of Catching Snow Crabs (the “ 2014 Regulations”)21 were adopted under the Marine Resources Act 2008.22 The Regulations provided: § 1 General prohibition It is prohibited for Norwegian and foreign vessels to catch snow crabs in the territorial waters of Norway (Norges territorialfarvann), including the territorial waters at Svalbard, the economic zone and the fishery protection zone at Svalbard. For Norwegian vessels, the prohibition also applies to international waters. | Legal Decisions | 6.349913 | 6.453796 | 6.970785 |
And Defterios’s decision to lie to his own lawyer undermined Terry’s ability to properly perform his job. See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co ., 20 S.W.3d 692, 695-96, 701-03 (Tex. 2000) (holding that insurance company’s negligence in disrupting or harming the insured’s defense was relevant in suit). | Party Submissions | 8.294915 | 11.002068 | 9.926602 |
Most obviously, World Car was prejudiced by the decisions below. It is entitled to a decision properly applying the plain language of § 2301.467(a)(1), especially to protect it from future actions by HMA. | Party Submissions | 24.976206 | 32.3189 | 46.08509 |
Sonic did not provide the trial court, or this Court, with authority to support its contention that its ability to recover benefits under the TWCA as a subclaimant survived Cochran's election and recovery of benefits under Alabama's laws. In the trial court, Sonic argued [**19] it is entitled to reimbursement simply because the requirements of section 409.009 have been satisfied, suggesting its ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA is independent of Cochran's ability to recover benefits. However, HN8 [ ] a derivative claim under the TWCA is not independent of the employee's claim. See Franks v. Sematech, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 959, 960, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227 (Tex. 1997) (examining a carrier's subrogation claim, stating "[t]here is but one cause of action for an employee's injuries, and it belongs to the employee."). It follows that, as a subclaimant, Sonic's ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA should be coextensive with Cochran's ability to recover benefits. 13 Cf. id. (reasoning that a carrier who asserts a subrogation claim asserts a claim that belongs to the employee). | Party Submissions | 6.146252 | 6.106134 | 6.419238 |
Request No. 2 is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents allegedly relating to the seizure of his assets on January 13, 2020, which would allow him “to effectively substantiate his arguments in its Memorial concerning the existence and ultimately the validity of the seizure and in turn effectively demonstrate an illegal expropriation in breach of the France-Qatar BIT”. The assets concerned are those of the Claimant before the alleged seizure. The Claimant cannot, at the present stage, search for the production of evidence to be submitted together with his forthcoming Memorial or thereafter. This denial may not be understood as preventing him from introducing or pleading the relevant allegations in his Memorial. | Legal Decisions | 14.851542 | 12.945689 | 14.82865 |
In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (1998) Administrative Law and Procedure Primary Jurisdiction When the legislature has committed a matter to an agency, the agency's primary jurisdiction is exclusive. | Party Submissions | 7.162189 | 7.788914 | 7.828269 |
Indeed, a waiver provision such as this one may be more descriptive. .. than a waiver referencing [Business and Commerce] Code section numbers.” Id. | Party Submissions | 26.531778 | 48.749954 | 42.15466 |
Assuming arguendo, that there is an applicable policy that would entitle Bay *26 to the Affirmative Defense of Exhaustion of Remedies, there is a bona fide question as to whether Mann was in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injuries. | Party Submissions | 12.34615 | 12.725122 | 15.236391 |
Two key legal principles should govern this Court’s construction of the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions. First, courts “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its language.” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted). Second, even if this Court were to conclude that a party may contractually waive its Section 272.001 rights, a party only contractually waives its constitutional or statutory rights “by intelligently, voluntarily, and knowingly relinquishing a known right” and “[t]o be effective, a waiver must be clear and specific .” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2014) (emphasis added); Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis added). | Party Submissions | 4.942788 | 4.933085 | 4.975208 |
RLB must be determined in the same court in the same place — Tulsa County, Oklahoma — under the same claims and dispute-resolution procedures. | Party Submissions | 31.85565 | 33.903694 | 40.128727 |
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a) because this appeal presents questions of law that are important to the jurisprudence of the state. The Supreme Court should consider granting this petition for review as it involves at least: 1) conflicting court of appeals’ decisions on two important point of law1 and 2) the construction of a statute. TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(A). | Party Submissions | 6.301753 | 7.322776 | 7.079438 |
This proceeding was filed directly with the Texas Supreme Court because time is of the essence. Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding). Due to the short schedule for obtaining relief as a result of ballot deadlines, and the inability to preserve the Supreme Court’s appellate review jurisdiction in the event this case would be first-filed at the Court of Appeals, this proceeding is properly first filed in this Court. Id ; Fitch v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 834 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. 1992) (enjoining effect of the court of appeals' order removing candidate from primary ballot in order to protect supreme court's jurisdiction to review appellate court's mandamus order); In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 4 558, 561 (Tex. 2006); The Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 93-94 (Tex. 1997). Given that the issue presented is of “statewide importance” and “the urgency of the time constraints” requires immediate intervention, this proceeding is properly first-filed in this Court. Sears, 786 S.W.2d at 249-250. | Party Submissions | 5.586633 | 5.134583 | 5.474946 |
For column 11: Indicate an estimation of the sampling effectiveness. Sampling effectiveness means the probability of selecting infected plant parts from an infected plant. | Legislation | 37.432934 | 29.492203 | 53.360504 |
The court of appeals accepted Christus’ argument that High and Rector’s claims were “premised on allegations of noncompliance with practices set forth in Chapter 133 of the Texas Administrative Code which ‘provides procedures for obtaining a hospital license; minimum standards for hospital functions and services; [and] patient rights Id., at 383 n.4. | Party Submissions | 18.390831 | 17.372152 | 18.714884 |
Joeckel’s “routine case expenses” are $30,000. CR109. That may be about right for employment and non-subscriber cases, but it is not shown to be comparable to large personal injury products liability cases. | Party Submissions | 27.273026 | 23.868599 | 32.985836 |
The Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (Secondary Lien) (the “Deed of Trust”) in favor of First Franklin encumbering real property and improvements located at 8806 Stonefair Lane, Houston, Texas 77075 (the “Property”). CR2:60-76. | Party Submissions | 8.678266 | 10.969798 | 11.92813 |
Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search. | Legal Decisions | 12.293462 | 19.341578 | 15.236405 |
To amend title 31, United States Code, to provide small businesses with additional time to file beneficial ownership information, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.204429 | 5.042259 | 5.809672 |
Parties in Court of Appeals: Appellant is Oncor Electric Delivery Company NTU LLC. Appellees are Mills Central Appraisal District and Mills County Appraisal Review Board. | Party Submissions | 12.146823 | 12.474775 | 15.046529 |
Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force Commercial Automobile Liability insurance. Such Automobile Liability insurance must include coverage equivalent to Symbol 1 (Any Auto) to include all owned, non-owned and hired automobiles. | Party Submissions | 12.506843 | 9.580023 | 15.526222 |
S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1936, writ ref'd). That function lies solely with this Court. Id. | Party Submissions | 4.350839 | 6.523192 | 9.732332 |
The Walkers claim that that the court of appeals erred in addressing components of proximate cause based on a novel theory that the defendants did not use the words “foreseeability” in their objections. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the party must make only a timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial court of the complaint and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The Walkers cite no case law supporting the argument that BSA’s 9 pages of briefed objections were not specific enough as to causation. (CR.763-86) The few cases they do cite are entirely different. See Pepper v. Wilson, No. 02-22-00107-CV, 2023 WL 2534626 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (defendant did not list order overruling objections in notice of appeal); Thompson v. Fong, 650 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (defendant argued for the first time on appeal reports were “no report at all” so plaintiff was not entitled to 30 days to cure); Williams v. Mora, 264 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.— Waco 2008, no pet.) (issue on whether objection to speculation was same as to conclusory). | Party Submissions | 6.048866 | 6.227358 | 6.569046 |
The dispute here turns on a subset of cases— those in which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary standard. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749. All agree that an interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. See ibid. | Party Submissions | 5.749182 | 6.120441 | 6.268127 |
DWC promulgated Rule 141.1, et seq., in part to clarify the process governing benefit review conferences. HN8 [ ] Rule 141.1 provides, "A request for a benefit review conference may be made by an injured employee, a subclaimant, or an insurance carrier." See 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 141.1. It continues, "An employer may request a benefit review conference to contest compensability when the insurance carrier has accepted the claim as compensable." See id. | Party Submissions | 5.920548 | 7.580242 | 6.4745 |
Explaining that he has extensive experience with newborns who require cooling, neonatal respiratory problems, and management of patients with birth asphyxia, Dr. Null also concludes he is “qualified to discuss the etiology of [H.W.’s] condition at birth.” (CR.708). What Dr. Null does not say is that he has education, training, or experience in diagnosing the cause of birth asphyxia or perinatal brain injuries. Because he also failed to establish his qualifications to opine on the causes of the particular condition at issue, this renders his opinion insufficient, too. See Alonzo, 2013 WL 6073431 at *4. | Party Submissions | 9.064087 | 10.719642 | 11.0455 |
These regulations apply to Norwegian citizens and persons resident in Norway who fish with Norwegian vessels in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction that are not regulated by regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or entities with their own reporting provisions. The regulations also applies to NEAFC’s regulatory area.738 522. The Tribunal considers that the response refers only to catching of snow crab by Norwegian vessels; the attached regulations are applicable only to Norwegian vessels. It is true that, as the Claimants maintain, the response did not make clear that foreign vessels had no right to harvest crab on the Norwegian continental shelf without Norwegian authorization,739 but that was not the question raised and the response simply does not address that question. The response speaks of fishing and of waters outside the jurisdiction of a State and the Tribunal agrees with the Claimants that this was how Norwegian officials saw the matter at the time, but this was a technical exchange relating to registration requirements and it would be wrong to read much into it. | Legal Decisions | 13.492886 | 12.377398 | 12.966522 |
Husband challenged the admissibility of parol evidence and cited to the Raymond irrebuttable presumption as to the deed recitations. Id. at 709. Husband argued that the terms of an unambiguous deed cannot be varied by parol evidence absent evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. at 709. | Party Submissions | 8.150727 | 10.413854 | 10.556174 |
The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court. Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Geter, 620 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tex. 2021). If a contract has a certain and definite meaning, the contract is unambiguous, and we will construe it as a matter of law. Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 682, 690 (Tex. 2022). The fact that parties may advance different interpretations of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous. Id. | Party Submissions | 4.225129 | 5.148802 | 4.763042 |
The jury instruction provided the basis for all these arguments. This Court has held that an awkward wording of a question was at most an incidental comment on the weight of the evidence. Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987) (jury question ended with “which was a proximate cause of her blindness?”). The instruction here, however, was more akin to that in Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1978), 42 where the Court concluded an instruction that marshaled the facts for one party was a violation of Rule 277 and more than an incidental comment on the weight of the evidence. 562 S.W.2d at 453. | Party Submissions | 7.104186 | 7.727789 | 7.432447 |
The election process is well underway. The application period to run in the Re-publican primary has been closed for nearly a month. See Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elec-tions/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). As Walker acknowledges, Pet. at 2, mail ballots for the Republican Primary will be sent to primary voters beginning 12 days from now, on January 20, 2024. Indeed, as Walker likewise admits, election authorities in the various counties across this State must begin printing these ballots imminently. By Walker’s estimate—which the Republican Party of Texas has no reason to dispute—this printing will begin in the next few days. Pet. at 2. | Party Submissions | 6.142472 | 7.135728 | 6.772571 |
McCarthy Subcontract -7-01-12-2017 Rev. matters in question between McCarthy and Subcontractor not relating to claims included in 4.3 shall be resolved in the manner provided in Article 11 herein. | Party Submissions | 21.71623 | 20.601143 | 25.348177 |
The trial court’s instruction that the Lawyers “could rely on evidence of the proposed transaction, its failure, and the identity of a responsible third party as the defaulting buyer in resisting a motion to strike a designation of a responsible third party” (App. A (CR587)) is contrary to Chapter 33 and this Court’s decisions. Chapter 33 specifies that it applies to “any cause of action based on tort in which a defendant, settling person, or responsible third party is found responsible for a percentage of the harm for which relief is sought.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.002(a)(1). | Party Submissions | 9.829014 | 10.446411 | 10.132224 |
The United States objects to Request No. 1.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.146792 | 12.026213 | 13.331881 |
As to the expert’s opinion about causation, the court concluded he sufficiently established his expertise in determining how shoulder dystocia can occur during delivery and injuries that can result from dystocia. Id. at *9. True, the court also said there is no “per se requirement that an expert be a pediatric neurologist to opine on causes of fetal brain injury occurring labor and delivery.” Id. at *9. But that doesn’t mean an expert like Dr. Tappan can entirely omit any discussion about his qualifications on that particular topic, yet offer the opinions anyway. | Party Submissions | 11.72873 | 11.850173 | 12.816414 |
You are instructed that clear and convincing evidence means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. | Party Submissions | 4.047316 | 5.641304 | 6.279291 |
Plan and any other nonqualified deferred compensation plan or portion thereof that is treated as a single plan under such section. | Contract | 10.106173 | 13.378137 | 22.527489 |
App. – San Antonio 2017, pet denied). Under this method of review, it is generally accepted by the courts of appeals that factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence are weighed in the first prong and overall harm in the division is weighed in the second. | Party Submissions | 13.516629 | 24.860632 | 27.006067 |
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question No. 1. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. | Party Submissions | 10.57395 | 9.929672 | 12.078883 |
And so, in each of the cases relied on by the Walkers, the experts established within the four corners of their report and/or CV their specific experience, knowledge, or training to support their opinions. Dr. Tappan has not. His report is limited to explaining his familiarity and experience with pregnancy and delivery management, and neither his report nor his CV says anything about his familiarity and experience with diagnosing or determining the cause of fetal brain injury or perinatal subacute infarctions. (CR.787-88, 796-803). Thus, he was not qualified to opine on the medical cause and the proximate cause of H.W.’s brain injuries, and this provides an alternative basis to affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. | Party Submissions | 11.124906 | 11.774936 | 11.883845 |
If the agreed value of a section 1.111(e) agreement is so frail that it can be altered or destroyed by a challenge on some of the component parts of the value, then a section 1.111(e) agreement can never be enforced. By Oncor ’ s reasoning, to ever be enforceable, a section 1.111(e) agreement regarding, say, a building, would have to explicitly state agreement toward each individual building component taken into account for valuation. What Oncor is proposing is that a court may look behind the appraisal roll to start altering aspects of the appraisal process. Looking behind 26 TEX. TAX. CODE § 23.01(b). | Party Submissions | 11.958208 | 14.072278 | 13.676796 |
On appeal, BSA challenged the reports’ adequacy as to causation, standard of care, and breach. See Appellant BSA Hospital’s Brief in Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo). BSA also argued that the experts were not qualified to give opinions in all of the areas that they each did. Id. at p. 35-37, 45. | Party Submissions | 6.823982 | 7.487378 | 7.963727 |
Letter from the Public Utility Company “Zelenilo Beograd” to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 3325/2 dated 17 April 2008, together with all accompanying attachments. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate explanation from Request No. 34 above. | Legal Decisions | 19.478285 | 19.591845 | 20.201712 |
B. Striking Affidavits [22] In the same vein, the Manns object to an affidavit drawn up by Pamela McShann, a representative of the insurance carrier who issued Bay's standard workers' compensation policy. But the basis of the Manns' argument is that the insurance carriers are agents of Bay, a theory we have already rejected. See id. | Party Submissions | 14.230485 | 17.787754 | 19.5336 |
To amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to permit leave for bone marrow or blood stem cell donation, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 3.34498 | 3.112937 | 3.339375 |
Tex.Civ.Prac.&Rem. Code §17.042 mandates that a non-resident does business in Texas if the non-resident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state. | Party Submissions | 3.790895 | 4.974911 | 4.506609 |
The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Bestor's claim for [**12] attorney's fees and properly granted Service Lloyd's motion to dismiss. We overrule Bestor's first issue and need not address his second issue relating to the trial court's alternative grant of summary judgment. The trial court's order dismissing Bestor's case is affirmed. | Party Submissions | 6.427404 | 7.195922 | 8.07233 |
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (“ DG Mare ”) on 5 August 2015. The letter stated: The Commission writes to refer to the discussions in the Fishery Attaches meeting of 30 July last in relation to snow crab fisheries in the so-called “Loop Hole” of the NEAFC Regulatory Area. | Legal Decisions | 13.234419 | 14.945276 | 16.01802 |
Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word, this Brief on the Merits contains 6,231 words, excluding the portions of the motion exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i). | Party Submissions | 7.005487 | 10.489087 | 13.09981 |
In no event shall the Company be required to provide a tax gross-up payment to Executive with respect to any Section 409A Penalty. | Contract | 6.007609 | 7.663803 | 9.709028 |
In September 2020, after RLB and McCarthy had issued multiple reports regarding the issue of the differing site conditions, MVP again denied RLB’s claim based on McCarthy’s denial of the existence of a differing site condition, denial of liability for RLB’s claim, and purported failure to pursue timely RLB’s pass-through claim. | Party Submissions | 8.813634 | 11.317582 | 10.051705 |
Subsets and Splits