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Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Footnote 20 of Annex 14-C of USMCA November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Footnote 20 of Annex 14-C of USMCA. | Legal Decisions | 5.935795 | 6.258969 | 6.269201 |
Samson even asserted in T.S. Reed that a holding it perceived in Hooks on the legal issue of whether overlapping pooled units could coexist “controls” the severed case: Samson’s Appellant’s Brief filed January 6, 2014, in T.S. Reed at 46, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3660681b-414e-4201-8236-5556e611eedd&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=f87ea8a4-6125- 4514-b749-457e5b1e1bf5. | Party Submissions | 18.41855 | 12.492108 | 18.908466 |
Debra Kirby, with CASA, testified next for Intervenors. 4 RR 176. Kirby told the jury she was on A.S.’s previous CPS case. 4 RR 182. Kirby described for the jury an incident where she went to A.S.’s home, but A.S. was not there due to having a tire replaced. 4 RR 185. Kirby had a tire replaced at the same time, but A.S. was not there. Kirby further agreed to previous drug use by A.S. in the other CPS case. 4 RR 193. Kirby testified that termination was in the best interest of R.W. 4 RR 197. Kirby then told the jury the Holley factors and how they applied to R.W. and A.S. 4 RR 198-99. If the jury terminated A.S.’s rights to R.W., Kirby testified that she would like to see R.W. adopted by the Intervenors. 4 RR 202. | Party Submissions | 5.356937 | 5.997455 | 5.907018 |
Section 4.07. Termination. This Agreement shall terminate and thereafter be of no further force and effect for all Parties at such time as Penske Corporation ceases to Beneficially Own 30% or more of the Voting Securities then outstanding. | Contract | 7.23831 | 6.290192 | 8.291701 |
Certificate of Compliance I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Word Perfect and contains 1960 words as determined by the computer’s software word count function. | Party Submissions | 11.108248 | 15.182954 | 14.670412 |
If Texas Property Code § 51.003(a) were to toss aside these well-established doctrines, it would introduce tremendous uncertainty into an intensely important area of finance. Lenders would have to scour the real property records constantly to avoid an acceleration they played no part in, and risk foregoing all of their rights due to a foreclosure in which they neither participated nor benefited. The borrower would no longer have the option of keeping current on less onerous obligations; their entire financial situation must crumble without hope of salvage. It belies reason that the Legislature intended such things when it passed Section 51.003(a). A more rational interpretation is that the Legislature intended to force a timely disposition of matters related to the fair market value of the real property soon after the property was foreclosed, as to the parties who conducted and were subject to the foreclosure. Less rational is the concept that the Legislature intended to effect a sweeping change to long-standing jurisprudence. | Party Submissions | 11.407332 | 12.599104 | 12.414192 |
Delapenas have failed to identify any condition, artificial or otherwise, at Buttercup Pool that was not open or inherent to swimming. | Party Submissions | 94.115456 | 82.082855 | 126.0468 |
In categorically resolving these conflicts in favor of the pro-arbitration party, the majority's analysis comes down to this: Because the proarbitration party gets an interlocutory appeal, it should also get an automatic stay. Ibid. ; see L. Numeroff, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie (1985). But Congress *759 was entitled to give one without the other. And the right to interlocutory appeal is valuable on its own. It is, as the majority explains, “a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment.” Ante, at 1919. Even without a stay, if the interlocutory appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish and the dispute goes to arbitration. | Party Submissions | 8.908724 | 9.535014 | 8.087907 |
Before the trial court heard the defendants’ objections, the parties reached an agreement that the Walkers could have thirty days to serve supplemental or amended reports, and that the Walkers would not request a thirty-day extension from the trial court. (CR.650). The Walkers then timely served updated reports from Dr. Tappan (CR.663-71) and Dr. Null (CR.708-09), and Dr. Castillo again objected and moved to dismiss. (CR.649-62). | Party Submissions | 10.148432 | 11.807512 | 11.310703 |
The act of zoning divides property within a city into classifications such as residential, commercial, industrial, and mixed-use based on community needs determined by elected and appointed city officials. While each city’s zoning ordinance is distinct, they usually establish classifications and define permitted uses within those classifications, either by right or through special permits where needed. Special use permits (SUPs), which can also be known by other names, allow certain uses within classifications, if the property meets defined criteria, subject to community approval. For instance, in Georgetown, Texas, using property for “fuel sales” (i.e. a gas station) is not permitted at all in Georgetown’s RE and RL residential zones; however, fuel sales are permitted in Georgetown’s C-1 and C-3 commercial zones and only with an SUP.14 Hotels, on the other hand, are a use that is permitted by right in any area in Georgetown zoned C-1 and C-3.15 Crucially, eligibility for an SUP does not guarantee its approval, differentiating an SUP from which is a potential use contingent on receiving a permit from an inherent right to use property for a certain purpose. | Party Submissions | 7.581092 | 7.938105 | 7.594707 |
Weatherford claims that the possibility of additional discovery would somehow allow it to uncover evidence in support of Midland’s connection to the off-Site Contaminants. However, and as discussed more fully in Section D of the Argument, Weatherford had the opportunity to connect Midland to its SWDA claim, and it failed to do so. Midland presented evidence in Carl Craigo’s affidavit that established that the only evidence that could show that Midland permitted the alleged disposals would be through its discharge permitting/licensing program, and no such permit or license exists for the alleged disposers. Proceeding through additional discovery to seek evidence that Midland already established does not exist would undercut the very purpose of governmental immunity—to prevent governmental entities from being erroneously and improperly dragged into timely and costly litigation efforts. | Party Submissions | 15.032466 | 17.311117 | 17.218346 |
If contractors and subcontractors may waive their right to have a dispute heard in court, then they also may waive their right to have a dispute heard in a Texas court. | Party Submissions | 7.786779 | 8.222411 | 8.471938 |
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband one hundred percent of the marital residence as his separate property. We sustain Wife’s first issue. | Party Submissions | 5.85653 | 7.06578 | 7.922903 |
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine that protects the State and its agencies from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008). Governmental immunity offers the same protections for the State’s political subdivisions, including its cities. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022) (first citing Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. 2019); and then citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003)). By design, immunity shields public treasuries from mistakes made by government officials and employees. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). “[I] mmunity thus protects the public as a whole by preventing potential disruptions of key government services that could occur when government funds are unexpectedly and substantially diverted by litigation. ” Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. 2015). | Party Submissions | 3.781093 | 4.311451 | 3.966358 |
High and Rector filed a Petition for Review on December 28, 2022, to which this Court requested a response. On September 29, 2023, this Court denied the petition. Thereafter, this Court granted a one-week extension of time within which to file a motion for rehearing from that denial which was granted. Petitioners now file this motion for rehearing. | Party Submissions | 6.160091 | 7.247343 | 7.522081 |
WARNINGS TO PARTIES: FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR CHILD SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD MAY RESULT IN FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS. | Party Submissions | 2.706836 | 2.934218 | 2.928344 |
See supra pp. 1–3, 11; Pet. 10, 17–20. That is why the TADA has weighed in here, urging this Court’s review. | Party Submissions | 12.143404 | 22.169739 | 17.726353 |
HSMiller’s Merits Brief repeatedly suggests that the testimony given at this trial was a legal error, as when an attorney mistakenly testifies that the statute of limitations is four years when it is actually two years, which the trial court had to correct for the jury. (Cross Pet’r’s Br. at 14-15, 19-20) This analogy has no merit here. To begin, as shown above, the court’s instruction was wrong on the law. Also, the expert testimony here addressed mixed questions of strategy and law; that is a far cry from misstating the proper statute of limitations for a cause of action. | Party Submissions | 12.976459 | 12.325516 | 14.419198 |
The very essence of public policy strives to ensure that all individuals, irrespective of their financial stature, enjoy equitable access to justice. Within the framework of this arbitration agreement, a clause that places potentially limitless costs on a party, without any defined cap or limitation, poses a palpable threat to this foundational objective. Such a clause could very well dissuade many individuals from advancing their legitimate claims, paralyzed by the looming shadow of prohibitive expenses. In this context, the disparity between a Rafiei and Lennar — a titan in the housing industry — becomes painfully evident. Lennar, as of 2022, stood as the second-largest home construction company in the United States based on revenue. | Party Submissions | 10.479141 | 10.82998 | 10.830616 |
Payment Schedule applicable to such Account(s) to which Deferrals have been allocated in accordance with Section 4.1(b) above shall be a payment on the commencement date specified in Section 6.1 for such Account and the form of payment specified in Section 6.2 for such Account. For clarity, a Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement may establish one or more Separation from Service Accounts and/or Specified Date Accounts with different Payment Schedules from any such Accounts established under prior Compensation Deferral Agreements, subject to the limitation on the number of Accounts set forth in Section 4.1(d) below. | Contract | 5.990686 | 6.101815 | 7.731985 |
The term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall extend until October 31, 2024, and shall continue from year-to-year thereafter, unless earlier terminated in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement (the “Term”). Either UCC or TDCC may elect at any time to terminate this Agreement by providing the other with at least six (6) months' advance written notice of termination. | Contract | 3.909688 | 3.717121 | 4.311497 |
The facts of this case are highly analogous to Wilson where this Court permitted a claim that “the Department undertook a duty to make it safe for park visitors to use the river, and that it breached such a duty.” Wilson, 8 S.W.3d at 636. As the Plaintiffs explained, “by putting up signs about its flood warning systems, the Department encouraged visitors’ reliance that the park rangers were monitoring the river and would provide adequate warning if dangerous conditions developed. Id. at 635-36. And as this Court noted “there is evidence that [the Department] attempted to control the conduct of visitors to the park.” Id. | Party Submissions | 9.608873 | 10.262509 | 10.183826 |
Should this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus compelling Respondent to reject the ballot application of John Devine, and withdraw his certification to the Secretary of State of John Devine for Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, on the 2024 Republican General Primary Ballot? | Party Submissions | 12.273232 | 11.90568 | 13.95003 |
To amend title 23, United States Code, to require transportation planners to consider projects and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.437966 | 3.327384 | 4.387555 |
None of these documents were provided to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 16.452517 | 16.52025 | 17.389772 |
This case also involves an open question in a context the Court has written about recently: the judicial-proceedings privilege. The heart of the Naths’ claims are that the Hospitals wrongfully filed abstracts of judgment—that caused a real-estate contract to fall through—on property owned by both of the Naths even though the Hospitals had no final judgment against Dr. Nath in the sanctions case, and had never even sued Usha Nath. In an acknowledged question of first impression, the court of appeals incorrectly extended the privilege to abstracts of judgment and upheld the trial court’s improper dismissal of the Naths’ claims under the TCPA and Rule 91a. 2022 WL 1038372, at *7, 11. | Party Submissions | 11.330795 | 11.534462 | 12.174765 |
Parties on 2 November 2023 acknowledging the Parties’ agreement regarding the due dates for the filing of the Request and the Claimants’ Opposition to the Respondent’s Request for a Stay of Enforcement (the “ Response ”). | Legal Decisions | 12.342756 | 14.189304 | 16.198072 |
Clause 12 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-010) provides: “The failure to comply with any of the obligations undertaken by that the (sic.) COMPANY under this Agreement, as well as with those deriving from the documents attached hereto, shall give rise to the termination of the Agreement.” (a) Has the Investment Agreement been terminated by Respondent on the basis of Clause 12 or on any other basis? (b) If so, when and how, with reference to the record in this proceeding? | Party Submissions | 7.859564 | 6.221598 | 8.015174 |
Barina’s claim that the Program includes ‘outside information’ is without legal basis.13 Barina suggests that this Court held in KBMT that the fair-report privilege only applies when a publication “confine[s] itself to information from ... court proceedings.” Resp. Br. at 41 (citing KBMT, 492 S.W.3d at 715). Barina fundamentally misunderstands the Court’s reasoning in KBMT. In highlighting that the defendant’s broadcast was a “simple, accurate, fair, and brief restatement of the [official proceeding at issue],” this Court was merely emphasizing that a report may lose the protections of the privilege if it misstates or mischaracterizes an official report’s contents, as the defendant broadcaster did in Neely v. Wilson,14 which KBMT cited. Id. This Court was not suggesting that the privilege was lost if additional, truthful material from outside the official report was included for context. | Party Submissions | 9.57726 | 9.167212 | 9.814351 |
For example, the question arises with characterization of real property where an earnest money contract is executed prior to marriage in one party’s name, then the parties marry and take title in both names. The long-standing rule is that where property is purchased by contract for deed, the inception of title doctrine relates back to the inception of the contract. Welder, 44 S.W. at 281; Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ.). “It is well- established that a claim to real property can arise before the legal title or evidence of title has been attained.” Welder, 44 S.W. at 281. | Party Submissions | 6.907898 | 7.412284 | 6.915822 |
Donald J. Trump did not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. | Legislation | 4.858257 | 4.560072 | 6.449912 |
To require the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program for evidence- based perinatal mental health prevention for pregnant and postpartum members of the Armed Forces and dependents, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.590031 | 5.018051 | 6.8641 |
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it temporarily enjoined Appellant Travis Evans ("Evans") from competing with Appellee C. Woods, Inc. | Party Submissions | 6.011387 | 6.859349 | 7.546878 |
Section 11. Amendment and Termination. The Plan may be amended or terminated, in whole or in part, at any time by the Plan Administrator, subject to approval, as appropriate, by the Company’s Board of Directors. Except as provided below, any such Plan amendment or termination may apply to all, or any designated class or classes of employees (including, without limitation, former employees). Except as provided below, upon termination of the Plan, the Company shall have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder, and all Plan benefits and all Company and Plan Administrator obligations under the Plan shall cease. Notwithstanding the above, except with a Participant’s consent, no such amendment or termination shall impair the rights of a Participant with respect to benefits payable hereunder if such Participant ceased to be an Eligible Associate and became entitled to payment of a Severance Benefit under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 hereof prior to the date such amendment or termination was adopted. | Contract | 3.968735 | 4.087672 | 4.087921 |
In the Wierzchula case, the appellee acquired a claim to the property at the time the purchase money contract was entered. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d at 732. The earnest money date being prior to the marriage of the parties, the appellee's right of claim to the property preceded the marriage, and the character of the property as separate property was established and the community property presumption was rebutted. Id. | Party Submissions | 7.342992 | 9.409154 | 8.811455 |
Accordingly, Weatherford lacks both pieces of the proverbial puzzle for arranger/acceptor status: it cannot show Midland acted to accept or arrange for a disposal of this waste, and it cannot even demonstrate that there was a disposal in the first place. In its analysis of “arranger” status, this Court in R.R. Street adopted the totality of the circumstances test as described in Mathews v. Dow Chemical Company, 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1525 (D. Col. 1996). In this test, the Court considers the following factors in determining arranger or acceptor status: whether the entity (1) owned or possessed the solid waste in question; (2) had the authority to make disposal decisions; (3) had the obligation to make disposal decisions; (4) exercised control over decisions regarding the waste’s disposal; or (5) actually disposed of the solid waste. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 242. Weatherford misapplies each of these factors in an attempt to show that Midland had knowledge of the activities of an intervening third party. But even as such, this Court in R.R. Street showed that knowledge is not enough to establish “acceptor” or “arranger” status, stating that “[a]dditional factors include ‘a party’s knowledge (or lack thereof) of the disposal.’” Id. Thus, by this Court’s own precedent, even accepting as true Weatherford’s unsupported (and factually disproven) allegations that Midland knew of a disposal, that knowledge alone would not be enough to trigger arranger or acceptor status. | Party Submissions | 6.094535 | 6.550449 | 6.349036 |
To direct the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice to implement anti-trafficking recommendations of the Government Ac-countability Office. | Legislation | 10.641707 | 9.285733 | 11.187929 |
The only evidence HSMiller describes that goes to the RTP-designation decision is testimony that the jury would have put “85% to 100%” responsibility on Flaven. See Resp’t’s Br. at 56-57. The Lawyers have already cited law holding that conclusory statements 38 from expert witnesses and testimony from biased legal “fact witnesses” amounts to no evidence of the objective prong in a legal malpractice gross negligence claim. See Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009). Regardless, evidence about what may have ultimately happened had an RTP designation been permitted and a motion to strike denied is irrelevant. | Party Submissions | 15.680223 | 14.935886 | 16.274849 |
Raising awareness and encouraging the prevention of stalking by expressing support for the designation of January 2024 as ‘‘National Stalking Awareness Month’’. | Legislation | 6.57179 | 5.607779 | 9.21346 |
In Dr. Tappan’s view, Dr. Castillo should have realized that the non-reassuring tracing at 15:15 suggested that baby H.W. would be acidotic and thus at risk of hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (a brain injury caused by insufficient oxygen); App. 7, CR 669 ( “ Dr. Castillo failed to recognize that recurrent decelerations, minimal variability, and absent accelerations, suggest that the baby would likely be acidotic and therefore would be at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. ”); see also App. 5, CR 217 (defining metabolic acidosis and hypoxia ischemia); id. at CR 437 (defining hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy). | Party Submissions | 6.417648 | 7.072728 | 6.750763 |
Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built before the creation of Obnova ’s predecessor Otpad. 68 Requested documents are documents prepared by the authorities maintaining Cadastral Plans for other public authorities in connection with urban planning projects. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s c ontemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises. | Legal Decisions | 15.061023 | 15.071633 | 15.585567 |
I certify that this brief complies with the typeface and word-count requirements set forth in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. This brief has been prepared using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman font for the text and 12-point Times New Roman font for any footnotes. This brief contains 1,150 words, as determined by Microsoft Word’s word-count feature, excluding those portions exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). | Party Submissions | 3.073049 | 4.009615 | 4.575328 |
Whether attorneys (TREC licensed or nonlicensed) are exempted from REC’s state consumer real estate contract protection allows Attorney usage to violate UPHPA, Bus. & Com. Code 26 – Fraud, 27 – Fraudulent Transfers, Gov. Code Sec 51.903 – Action on Fraudulent Lien on Property, Penal Code 31 – Theft, 32 – ‘Considerations’, and other violations; granting Appellee default ‘Title’ and complete ownership of Appellant’s inherited real estate (surface, mineral), mineral leases, real property developments, and other unlawful gains (personal, financial, business, political, other) are State and Federal Penal Code (State, Federal) offenses (theft, civil rights violations, other), granting Court Orders Cancellations, Change of Venue, Change of Venue Hearings. | Party Submissions | 22.509901 | 18.355015 | 20.90009 |
The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction, and this interlocutory appeal ensued. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 51.014(a)(8). | Party Submissions | 2.788081 | 3.242906 | 4.062979 |
The first opinion in this trilogy was Bustamante v. Ponte, which rejected “a stringent but for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence shows that multiple providers’ concurrent negligent acts combine to cause an injury. 529 S.W.3d 447, 457 (Tex. 2017). Bustamante confirmed that to satisfy a legal sufficiency review in such cases, claimants are required to adduce evidence of a ‘reasonable medical probability’ that their injuries were caused by the negligence of one or more defendants. Id. (citing Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532–33 (Tex. 2010) (quoting, in turn, Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399–400 (Tex. 1993)). | Party Submissions | 5.354751 | 5.511341 | 5.727419 |
In addition, at trial, Osprin segregated its attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the realization of the Contributions from those incurred in prosecuting its other claims against TX 1111 and Backes. Those attorney fees, costs, and expenses totaled over $1.1 million, of 25 which the trial court only awarded those incurred from March 2018 through February 12, 2020. | Party Submissions | 12.552676 | 11.334738 | 14.577213 |
In his conclusions of law, the hearing officer determined that (1) Cochran sustained a compensable injury while working in Alabama, (2) he was Sonic's employee at that time, (3) Cochran was entitled to all rights and remedies under the TWCA, (4) Sonic timely filed notice of Cochran's injury under the Labor Code, but (5) because Cochran elected to "pursue a remedy and 10 Sonic had filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion, which the trial court also denied in its order. There are no issues raised concerning the court's denial of that summary judgment motion. recover compensation" under Alabama's workers' compensation laws, he was barred from recovery under the TWCA; consequently, (6) Sonic was not entitled to reimbursement from TMI under the TWCA for compensation and medical payments made to Cochran. Sonic appealed only the last two determinations: Cochran's election [**14] of remedies and its right to reimbursement. Because the hearing officer's remaining conclusions were not appealed, they are final and establish that Cochran was Sonic's employee at the time of the accident and he suffered a compensable injury. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.169 ( HN4 [ ] "A decision of a hearing officer regarding benefits is final in the absence of a timely appeal by a party. .. ."). In affirming the hearing officer's decision, the appeals panel noted that it was undisputed Cochran did in fact receive workers' compensation benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws and, as a subrogation claim, Sonic was not entitled to reimbursement. | Party Submissions | 5.413036 | 5.59219 | 5.903292 |
Expressing support for the designation of January 30, 2024, as CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy) and RHI (repeated head impacts) Awareness Day. | Legislation | 6.468268 | 5.735739 | 6.810324 |
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.403(a) (emphasis added).4 But that Natural Resources Code interest rate provided does not apply if the parties specify a rate of interest in their written agreement. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 26, 55 (Tex. App. 2015), aff’d, 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017) (parties specified a different rate). | Party Submissions | 6.897209 | 7.257219 | 7.033501 |
The Republican Party of Texas accepted applications to seek its nomination to Place 4 on this Court between November 11 and December 11, 2023. See Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). With the 2024 elections upcoming, Devine has again sought the Republican Party’s endorsement for Place 4 on this Court. JOHN DEVINE CAMPAIGN, https://justicedevinetx.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Devine submitted his application to the Republican Party for that endorsement on November 13, 2023. See, e.g., 2024 Primary Filing Information, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEXAS, https://texasgop.org/filing-information-24/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). That application and its contents became public information on filing, and Chairman Matthew Rinaldi, head of the Republican Party of Texas, accepted Devine’s application on December 1. See, e.g., Candidate Information, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://candidate.texas-election.com/Elections/getQualifiedCandidatesInfo.do (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). By accepting Devine’s application, Rinaldi determined that the application facially complied with Texas law; as of December 1, neither Devine nor Rinaldi had notice of any potential duplicate or ineligible signatures in Devine’s application. | Party Submissions | 3.910147 | 4.010362 | 3.987627 |
Thus, neither expert offered sufficient evidence of his education, training, or experience to offer opinions about the medical cause and/or the proximate cause of H.W.’s neurological injuries. This provides an alternative basis to affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. | Party Submissions | 10.489542 | 16.02692 | 13.38867 |
Meanwhile, proceedings continued in the trial court. Bay filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Manns' claims. Bay maintained that because Mann sustained a work-related injury and was covered by a workers' compensation policy, the exclusive-remedy defense prevented the Manns from filing a personal injury suit against Bay. The trial court denied Bay's motion. | Party Submissions | 6.520458 | 5.838952 | 8.025624 |
Braun factors to the record in this case, a new opinion from this Court can affirm the vitality of the “reasonable-certainty standard” and demonstrate the ease with which it can—and must—be applied in this case and future cases. But by failing to explain clearly how Romero can be applied properly, the Court will only create further confusion on an obviously consequential issue in every civil trial. | Party Submissions | 24.423967 | 28.756582 | 26.566517 |
LAW, AND EXCEPT AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5.1(b), SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, PENALTIES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE, OR FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE, OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK AND OBLIGATIONS AS PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING EXTRA WORK, AND FROM ANY CLAIM, DAMAGE, LOSS OR EXPENSE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS, DISEASE, DEATH, INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY INCLUDING THE LOSS OF USE RESULTING THEREFROM, ARISING OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR SUBCONTRACTOR’S PERFORMANCE OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SUBCONTRACTOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER SUCH INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS SHALL ONLY APPLY TO THE EXTENT CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR FAULT, THE BREACH OR VIOLATION OF A STATUTE, ORDINANCE, GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION, STANDARD, OR RULE, OR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY SUBCONTRACTOR OR ANYONE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY SUB-CONTRACTOR OR ANYONE FOR WHOSE ACTS SUBCONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE, SUCH OBLIGATIONS SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO NEGATE, ABRIDGE, OR OTHERWISE REDUCE ANY OTHER RIGHT OR OBLIGATION OF INDEMNITY WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE EXIST AS TO ANY PARTY OR PERSON DESCRIBED IN THIS PARAGRAPH 5.1. (b) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS, DISEASE, DEATH, OR INJURY TO ANY EMPLOYEE, AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE OF SUBCONTRACTOR OR ANY OF ITS SUBCONTRACTORS OF ANY TIER, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH CLAIM, DAMAGES, LOSS OR EXPENSE IS CAUSED IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF A PARTY INDEMNIFIED HEREUNDER. SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL PROCURE LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH 5.1. (c) TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW VIOLATIONS ARISING OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR SUBCONTRACTOR’S PERFORMANCE OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK. | Party Submissions | 2.013536 | 1.836104 | 2.021375 |
On pages 14 of the brief, several federal courts that have held fee-splitting provisions to be per se unconscionable are mentioned.3 The first is Gray v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 314 Fed. App’x 15 (9th Cir. 2008), but that opinion was vacated slightly a month after it was decided. Gray v. Rent-A-Center West, 295 Fed. App’x 155 (9th Cir. 2008). Consequently, it adds little to the discussion. is going to have to pay the expenses of his lawsuit at all, nor does he suggest that he has requested the AAA to waive its costs and fees. | Party Submissions | 7.578088 | 8.275366 | 8.540001 |
Request No. 3: Withdrawn. The Claimant states that he is prepared to withdraw the Request regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for arbitration. Without ruling on the pertinence of this argument, the Tribunal notes that the Claimant accepts not to be provided the docume nts referred to although he declares that they “are relevant and material to demonstrate the Respondent’s breach of the Claimant’s rights” under the BIT. In other words, in respect of this and other requests that were withdrawn, the evidentiary value of th documents does not prevent the Claimant from preparing his forthcoming Memorial where he will “assess the appropriate remedies that the Claimant is seeking”. Order accordingly. | Legal Decisions | 14.541911 | 13.452988 | 14.198858 |
The United States objects to Request No. 3.d for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.219722 | 12.76708 | 14.631578 |
Specifically, the Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendants’ motions to dismiss because the Walkers’ experts’ reports failed to address causation as to certain alleged breaches, opined on causation only in terms of possibilities, and, on other alleged breaches, lacked adequate factual explanations about how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged negligence proximately caused H.W. to suffer a large perinatal subacute infarction (or stroke) involving the majority of his left cerebral hemisphere. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *1-5. It therefore issued a memorandum opinion reversing the trial court’s order, dismissing the Walkers’ claims with prejudice, and remanding for a determination of defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at *5. | Party Submissions | 6.92968 | 6.756074 | 7.635732 |
This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 273.061, Texas Election Code, which permits the Texas Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in order to ensure compliance with the state’s election laws. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 273.061. | Party Submissions | 4.527399 | 4.462714 | 4.733819 |
Demonstrated expertise is particularly necessary in health care liability claims. As the Court has noted, “given the increasingly specialized and technical nature of medicine, there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every licensed medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 463 (quoting Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996)). The statute also recognizes this necessity, requiring the expert to be certified in the subject matter of testimony or have other “substantial training or experience, in the area of health care relevant to the claim” and be “actively practicing health care in rendering health care services relevant to the claim.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.402(c) (emphasis added). A trial court abuses its discretion by holding an unqualified expert to be qualified. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 463. | Party Submissions | 4.840861 | 4.802997 | 5.218486 |
Arbitration Rule 30 15.1. The arbitration shall proceed in accordance with the Procedural Timetable attached hereto as Annex B, except if the Tribunal, upon a showing of good cause by either Party or on its own initiative, decides to amend the timetable. | Legal Decisions | 6.409037 | 6.460973 | 6.877061 |
Moody filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, contending that this suit is barred by the exclusivity provision of the act because Douglas was injured in the course and scope of her employment. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006) (providing, HN1[ ] recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the 1 Apparently, Moody filed the required employer's notice of injury, and its workers' compensation carrier disputed that the injury was compensable. Although Douglas did not timely file a workers' compensation claim, she requested an administrative decision on whether her injury was compensable. During the proceeding, she apparently urged [*3] the somewhat unusual position that her injury was not compensable, hoping to prevent a subsequent bar to this negligence suit against Moody. 2 Moody did not attach the decisions of the hearing officer or appeals panel to its motion for summary judgment, but these decisions were attached to the carrier's motion for summary judgment. and referenced in Moody's motion. Further, the history of the workers' compensation proceeding in this case is undisputed because, in her live petition, Douglas recited the pertinent facts. exclusive remedy for work-related injury of employee covered by workers' compensation insurance); see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.034 (Vernon 2006) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, an employee of workers' compensation subscriber waives common-law right to recover damages for injuries sustained in course and scope of employment). 3 The trial court signed [*4] an interlocutory order, followed by a final order, granting Moody's motion and ruling that Douglas take nothing. | Party Submissions | 5.853747 | 6.252175 | 6.275258 |
Instead, there was evidence Husband opened a401(k) in 2015 with a $124,323.36 deposit. The record contains no evidence indicating whether the deposit was from community prOperty or separate property. Husband provided no evidence tracing the character of the funds deposited in 2015. At the time of the divorce, the value of the 401(k) had increased through adiversied portfolio, including employer contributions, to $353,091.43. He provided no evidence-considering the growth of the account through these diversied investments. Thus, all those earnings belonged to the community estate at the time of the divorce. 1d. | Party Submissions | 11.624554 | 12.384842 | 13.465413 |
On behalf of the Texas Automobile Dealers Association ("TADA"), a non-profit organization that represents the franchised motor vehicle dealers in Texas, this Amicus Curiae Letter is submitted in connection with the above-cited cause. | Party Submissions | 5.265506 | 4.751278 | 5.909396 |
R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of a public utility company is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic "fishing expedition", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. | Legal Decisions | 13.49372 | 12.744462 | 14.78311 |
Specified Employee Identification Date. Specified Employee Identification Date means December 31, unless the Employer has elected a different date through action that is legally binding with respect to all nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by the Employer. | Contract | 6.222188 | 7.382544 | 7.837106 |
Article 6 The demarcation may be lifted when, based on the surveys referred to in Article 5, the specified pest is not detected in the demarcated area for at least four consecutive years. | Legislation | 14.073754 | 14.758454 | 14.934572 |
IRECTOR .—’’ before ‘‘The 2 term’’; and 3 (4) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by in-4 serting ‘‘S TATE .—’’ before ‘‘The term’’. 5 SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 6 Section 305(a) (20 U.S.C. 9624(a)) is amended to 7 read as follows: 8 ‘‘(a) I N G ENERAL .—There are authorized to be ap-9 propriated— 10 ‘‘(1) for fiscal year 2024— 11 ‘‘(A) such sums as may be necessary to 12 carry out section 302; and 13 ‘‘(B) such sums as may be necessary to 14 carry out section 303; and 15 ‘‘(2) for each of the 5 succeeding fiscal years, 16 such sums as may be necessary to carry out sections 17 302 and 303.’’. 18 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 19 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Advancing Research in 20 Education Act’’ or the ‘‘AREA Act’’. 21 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 22 The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 23 Sec. 1. Short title. Sec. 2. Table of contents. Sec. 3. Short title; table of contents for public law. | Legislation | 3.124542 | 2.765506 | 3.253245 |
That remains true in 2024. The primary has already begun. As Walker concedes, ballots are about to be printed. Texans have been able to apply for ballots by mail since New Year’s Day, see Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024), and early voting is set to begin in mere weeks. Indeed, the Texas Secretary of State “recommends completing your ballots not later than the 60th day before election day, which is Friday, January 5, 2024.” Election Advisory No. 2023-27, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Dec. 23, 2023), available at https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2023-27.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2024) (emphasis omitted). Local officials following the Secretary of State’s recommended best practices therefore already completed their ballots before Walker filed his mandamus petition. And in order to comply with federal law, local election officials must “mail ballot[s] to military and overseas voters not later than Saturday, January 20, 2024.” Id. ; see also 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (state responsibilities under the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (“MOVE”) Act). It is already too late to change the March primary ballot without massive upheaval. | Party Submissions | 3.968998 | 4.172995 | 4.103443 |
The rule against considering extraneous evidence in construing an unambiguous contract “ does not, however, prohibit courts from considering extrinsic evidence of the facts and circ umstances surrounding the contract’s execution as ‘an aid in the construction of the contract’s language.’” URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 765 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Sun Oil Co. (Del.) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981)). “When construing an unambiguous instrument, we may consult facts and circumstances surrounding its execution to aid our interpretation. ” Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 682, 690 (Tex. 2022) (citing URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 757). N evertheless, “[w ]e cannot employ surrounding facts and circumstances to make contract language say something it unambiguously does not or to determine ‘ that the parties probably meant, or could have meant, something other than what their agreement stated. ’” Id. (quoting URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 757). “ Rather, the ‘ facts and circumstances can only provide context that elucidates the meaning of the words employed, and nothing else, ’ and they can only give contract language a meaning to which it is ‘ reasonably susceptible. ’” Id. (quoting URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 765). “ In other words, such evidence may not be ‘ used to add, alter, or change the contract ’ s agreed-to terms. ’” Id. (quoting Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 485 (citing URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 758)). Such extraneous evidence includes “consist ent collateral agreements. .. between parties concerning the relationship of several distinct obligat ions between them.” ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. 2010) (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. 1958)). | Party Submissions | 5.217484 | 5.058713 | 5.185916 |
Because this suit is based on allegations that Defendants improperly charged, as expenses, the costs of the echocardiogram screening program, the differing expense provisions in the attorney-client contracts would require individualized consideration of the charges about which Karnes complains in this case. This is particularly true of those provisions that confer broad discretion on the attorneys in the charging of expenses to clients. (VII CR 4137-38). | Party Submissions | 17.731503 | 13.700213 | 20.27336 |
KCSR’s discussion of Harris County v. Smith is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, KCSR fails to acknowledge that Smith was decided three years before this Court decided Romero and, therefore, cannot be the controlling authority on how to apply the “reasonable-certainty standard” that the Court had not yet articulated. But even if it could, Smith addresses damages, not liability. | Party Submissions | 10.113406 | 10.067163 | 12.742327 |
To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish nonvisual accessibility standards for certain devices with digital interfaces, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.203694 | 5.240822 | 6.218219 |
Further, Dr. Tappan’s extensive teaching and supervisory experience, as detailed in his report, shows that he has the knowledge and experience necessary to opine on the causation of diverse neonatal injuries, including infant hypoxia. App. 7, CR 663. | Party Submissions | 16.771461 | 15.755023 | 21.19511 |
Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 27 and 29, this Procedural Order sets out the Procedural Rules that govern this arbitration. The timetable is attached as Annex B . | Legal Decisions | 6.806923 | 6.971089 | 7.107393 |
HSMiller takes issue with statements in the Lawyers’ briefing suggesting that the BNC Sellers (the judgment creditors) and their counsel in the original suit control this litigation (Resp’t’s Br. at 25-26), but the Lawyers’ statements are accurate. HSMiller was 23 restricted in its ability to settle the case. It had to have the consent of the judgment creditor’s law firm, Stanley Iola, LLP, to settle any litigation up to the amount of $5 million. See Plan at 13, Art. VII (Pet’rs’ Br. at App. B, Tab 1 (PDF 145)). After that, it was required to use its best efforts to continue to pursue the claims against Terry. HSMiller argues it had full control over the litigation above $5 million. Although theoretically it did have full discretion to settle above $5 million, id., the idea that it also fully controlled the litigation does not ring true. The judgment creditors — the BNC Sellers — chose trial and appellate counsel for HSMiller in the malpractice trials and appeals, including one attorney who represented HSMiller in the earlier real estate litigation appeal as co-counsel with the Lawyers. Even the Bankruptcy Judge noted that HSMiller has “been spared from lawsuits by the Judgment Creditors, for so long as the Debtor pursues its claims against its insurer and former counsel pursuant to the Debtor’s Plan.” In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, 2010 WL 4638882, at * 5 (emphasis added). | Party Submissions | 10.255503 | 10.417658 | 11.300022 |
Second, Relator does not even attempt to account for the other tasks that election officials must perform besides printing ballots. For example, in a case concerning the March 2022 primary election, the Collin County Elections Administrator explained that his office would both “design and proof the ballots,” which “can take several days,” and “conduct logic and accuracy testing to ensure that there are no errors,” which “could take ten to fourteen days.” Decl. of Bruce Sherbet ⁋⁋ 10-11 (Dec. 10, 2021).2 Moreover, there is a substantial risk that some ballots have already been mailed. In a previous case, the Director of Elections for the Secretary of State noted his “understanding that the Travis County Clerk Dana DeBouvoir seeks to have ballots in the mail sixty days before the election day.” Decl. of Brian Keith Ingram ⁋ 17 (Dec. 13, 2021). This year, that date would be January 5—the same day Relator filed this lawsuit. Indeed, for this primary election cycle, 2 This Court relied on this declaration and the declaration of Brian Keith Ingram (cited below) in Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766 n.4, even though the declarations were originally filed in MALC v. Abbott, No. D-1-GN-21-006515 (250th Dist., Travis County). | Party Submissions | 8.290268 | 8.210475 | 8.470881 |
If, before the award is rendered, the parties agree on a settlement of the dispute or otherwise to discontinue the proceeding, the Tribunal, or the Secretary-General if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall, at their written request, in an order take note of the discontinuance of the proceeding. | Legal Decisions | 6.068268 | 7.432027 | 6.536598 |
The issue presented in this case was the need for two separate liability questions, not the speculated multitude of questions for each element of a claim. The trial court dealt with only two claims: (i) a humped crossing claim that involved a unique legal defense that required analysis of federal preemption law 30 and (ii) a Yield sign claim applying standard principles of negligence that, as held here, failed as a matter of law. The trial court's failure to submit separate questions as requested by KCSR allowed the jury to make a liability finding that was based on facts relevant only the legally insufficient yield sign claim. | Party Submissions | 19.129658 | 19.202078 | 21.203789 |
Anti-assignment Rule. No interest of any Participant, spouse or Beneficiary under this Plan and no benefit payable hereunder shall be assigned as security for a loan, and any such purported assignment shall be null, void and of no effect, nor shall any such interest or any such benefit be subject in any manner, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to anticipation, sale, transfer, assignment or encumbrance by or through any Participant, spouse or Beneficiary. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, however, the Committee has the discretion to make payments to an alternate payee in accordance with the terms of a domestic relations order (as defined in Code Section 414(p)(1)(B)). | Contract | 3.609479 | 3.457131 | 4.136595 |
Before turning to the Joeckel affidavit, we note that Rafiei’s briefing in this Court suggests that Rafiei himself would be paying fees and expenses in arbitration. If that is the case, presumably he would also be paying the expenses for litigating his case in the trial court. In fact, part of his burden of proof to show excessive costs is a comparison of the costs of arbitration with the cost of litigation. Olshan, 328 S.W.3d at 893-94. | Party Submissions | 10.423842 | 9.646835 | 11.974989 |
Conversely, in Rafiei's case, the agreement's detailed fee structure, combined with the lack of expenditure ceilings and the obligation for each party to bear its full costs, raises “specific” evidence of unconscionability. Without any protective measures or cost limitations in place, Rafiei will be discouraged (as he states in his affidavit) from pursuing arbitration, thereby undermining his ability to effectively vindicate his rights. | Party Submissions | 14.907785 | 13.759094 | 17.02432 |
The unilateral nature of Rafiei's agreement exacerbates the risk of prohibitive costs. Beyond the absence of expenditure ceilings, Rafiei's agreement mandates that each party bear its own costs in full. Such a requirement, particularly when combined with the potential for high arbitration costs, risks placing a disproportionate financial burden on one party, especially if that party lacks the resources of the opposing side. | Party Submissions | 8.858217 | 9.260315 | 9.770745 |
Facility of Payment to a Minor. If a distribution is to be made to a minor, or to a person who is otherwise incompetent, then the Committee may, in its discretion, make such distribution: (i) to the legal guardian, or if none, to a parent of a minor payee with whom the payee maintains his or her residence; or (ii) to the conservator or committee or, if none, to the person having custody of an incompetent payee. Any such distribution shall fully discharge the Committee, the Company, and the Plan from further liability on account thereof. | Contract | 4.554132 | 4.55518 | 5.328943 |
Appellant’s trial counsel last called A.S. to testify. 5 RR 87. A.S. testified to Respondent’s 1, a collection of drug tests for A.S. 5 RR 89. A.S. testified that R.W. was born prematurely due to a severe urinary tract infection which caused A.S.’s placenta to rupture. 5 RR 91. A.S. told the jury she never stopped to purchase cigarettes on the way to the hospital to deliver R.W. 5 RR 92. A.S. told the jury her plan was to live at her residence in Yantis once she was released from incarceration. 5 RR 97. A.S. indicated that of the 30 or 40 visits she had with R.W. almost all had gone well despite other testimony. 5 RR 104. A.S. explained that she was defensive during the case due to DFPS wanting to take her child away. 5 RR 107. On cross-examination, A.S. agreed to testing positive for methamphetamines in December of 2021 and again in October of 2022. 5 RR 121-22. A.S. admitted to using when Smith County Probation drug tested her in early 2023. 5 RR 134. After testimony concluded, the trial court held the charge conference, and the trial court read the charge to the jury. 5 RR 139-161. Intervenor’s, trial counsel for A.S, and Petitioner gave closing arguments to the jury. 5 RR 162-75. The jury then received the charge, and eleven jurors agreed to Questions 1 through 6 and named Intervenors as permanent managing conservators. CR 791-803. | Party Submissions | 5.857756 | 5.96025 | 6.026542 |
Relying on the word count function of the computer software used to prepare this document, the undersigned certifies that this document contains 900 words (excluding the sections excepted under TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1)(B) and was typed in 14-point font with footnotes in 12-point font. | Party Submissions | 5.909261 | 9.185355 | 8.947674 |
For column B: Indicate the details of the survey, depending on the specific legal requirements for each pest. Indicate with N/A when the information of certain column is not applicable. The information to be provided in these columns is related to the information included in the column 10 ‘Detection methods’. | Legislation | 23.184439 | 23.222178 | 26.246685 |
On weekends that do not occur during the regular school term, beginning at 6:00 p.m., on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the following Sunday. | Party Submissions | 4.757559 | 5.086133 | 5.138338 |
Third, Relator’s ungrounded speculation about how much “lead time” county officials need, Pet.2, does nothing to allay the concerns that this Court has frequently expressed about disruption. See Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766; Hotze, 627 S.W.3d at 645-46. “At a bare minimum, a party who asks a court to take action that could disrupt the election calendar after the election process has begun has the duty to explain the practical consequences of the requested judicial action.” Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764-65 (emphasis added). Relator’s best-case scenarios are fanciful, and he has not shown how the razor-thin margins he proposes will avoid disruptions in each of the State’s 254 counties. On that basis alone, this Court should deny relief. | Party Submissions | 7.56704 | 7.967044 | 8.075877 |
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to apply a 6 percent excise tax on large endowments of certain private colleges and universities, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 3.762401 | 3.230662 | 3.635787 |
Art. XVII.C (emphasis, carriage returns, and indents added). When triggered by a past due royalty, a Late Charge is based on the “amount due.” It commences on the day after the past due royalty could have been timely made. It continues every calendar month thereafter, until paid. The last sentence dictates that each Late Charge becomes due and payable on the last day of each month. The next month, the “amount due” includes whatever was previously due that is unpaid, plus the prior month’s Late Charge (and any other amounts that came due). | Party Submissions | 11.9565 | 13.659555 | 12.492915 |
The trial court correctly struck Bay's exclusive remedies affirmative defense. Bay's legal right to raise the defense rests on two necessarily sequential issues which Bay has failed to prove: 1) that Bay met the legal requirements of a written agreement and proper filing requirement under TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.123(a) and (f) respectively; and 2) the legal availability of the “exclusive remedies” defense to shield Bay from common law liability for the acts of an employee (Alvarez) who was outside of the class of people protected from common law suit under any purported workers' compensation policy. Since Bay has failed to prove either, the trial court correctly struck Bay's exclusive remedies defense. | Party Submissions | 9.205133 | 9.346477 | 9.614739 |
Annual installment payments are determined and paid in accordance with Section 6.2(f), over a period of two (2) to fifteen (15) years, as elected by the Participant in his or her initial Compensation Deferral Agreement establishing the Account. The Retirement Account shall be established automatically in a Participant’s initial Compensation Deferral Agreement following his or her entry into the Plan. If for any reason a Retirement Account is not established or the payment schedule not designated, the Participant shall be deemed to have established a Retirement Account that pays in a lump sum. | Contract | 6.749858 | 5.85086 | 7.341615 |
Rafiei does not indicate how his affidavit shows that the delegation provision is unconscionable. But when the Court examines Rafiei’s affidavit, CR115-116, several aspects of it become apparent. | Party Submissions | 15.92691 | 20.625912 | 19.247936 |
Authorizing the use of the Capitol Grounds for the National Peace Officers Memorial Service and the National Honor Guard and Pipe Band Exhibition. | Legislation | 8.076576 | 3.835331 | 9.615246 |
Executive agrees and acknowledges that any annual or long-term cash, equity or equity-based incentive or bonus compensation paid, provided or awarded to the Executive is subject to the terms and conditions of the Company’s clawback policies, which may be amended from time to time, and may be subject to the requirement that such compensation be repaid to the Company or its affiliates after it has been distributed to Executive. | Contract | 6.320039 | 5.832674 | 7.40736 |
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). Moreover, when deciding if termination is in the best interest of the child, appellate courts are to “strictly scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent.” In the Interest of N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet). Specifically, “termination ‘can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.” Id. At the time of trial, R.W. was not old enough to communicate his wishes. Thomas, Kirby and Susan Shirley provided testimony that termination was in the best interest of R.W. However, the jury heard testimony that A.S. had attended many visits during the life of the case and was undoubtedly bonded to R.W. There was discretion to make A.S. a possessory conservator of R.W. with no visitation. A.S., having resolved her criminal charges, had plans to live in her home in Yantis. This C ourt should strictly scrutinize the jury’s decision that termination of A.S.’s rights was in the best interest of R.W. See id. | Party Submissions | 6.624393 | 6.864005 | 7.298413 |
When Pitocin was finally discontinued at 15:48, moreover, Dr. Castillo again breached the standard of care and defied the BSA oxytocin infusion policy by failing to administer terbutaline, a drug that would have stopped contractions and helped to restore oxygenated blood flow: According to the BSAH Women’s Center Oxytocin Infusion Protocol, signed by Dr. Castillo, terbutaline 0.25 mg was to be administered subcutaneously for a Category II or III FHR pattern that does not respond to discontinuance of oxytocin infusion. Dr. Castillo was present at 15:48 when the Pitocin was discontinued, and witnessed the persistence of contractions as close as 1.5 minutes apart, lasting 60-90 seconds, with intensity up to 100 mmHg, in association with an elevated FHR baseline, decelerations, minimal variability, but without accelerations. Yet Dr. Castillo failed to follow the hospital’s protocol or to meet the ACOG standards by assuring that her patient received terbutaline, a drug that would have arrested contractions and helped to restore oxygenated blood to the baby. App. 7, CR 669. | Party Submissions | 6.486918 | 7.834491 | 6.608537 |
For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage. | Legal Decisions | 11.485278 | 10.376781 | 11.849436 |
On June 4, 2019, Catiana Delapena visited Buttercup Pool as part of an outing with her day camp High Hopes Summer Camp (High Hopes). CR32. Catiana was six (6) years old and had Down Syndrome. CR31. As Catiana’s parents explained to High Hopes, because of her condition, she could not swim, and she needed to wear a lifejacket at all times when near a pool. CR32. | Party Submissions | 9.680205 | 12.658554 | 10.235848 |
Subsets and Splits