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Further, the impact would extend beyond § 2301.467(a)(1) because it is only one of several provisions in Chapter 2301 of the Texas Occupations Code stating that manufacturers/distributors “may not require” specified dealer conduct. | Party Submissions | 15.516642 | 12.127419 | 16.432018 |
The requested documents will show over which land plots and buildings Luka Beograd had the right of use prior and subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement between Luka Beograd and Serbia dated 6 March 1975 submitted as R-060. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to demonstrate that Luka Beograd did not have the right of use over Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 — as Serbia incorrectly argues in this arbitration. | Legal Decisions | 14.159326 | 14.983212 | 15.133223 |
Because the erroneous denial of a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party skews the proceedings, potentially affects the litigation's outcome, and compromises the defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record, such an error ordinarily renders the appellate remedy inadequate. The same problems arise when a trial court erroneously grants a motion to strike a responsible third party designation. Thus the appellate remedy is also ordinarily inadequate when a trial court commits such an error. | Party Submissions | 7.187741 | 8.230549 | 8.341481 |
So, although his OB-GYN credentials are impressive, standing alone they do not qualify him to offer opinions about the medical cause or the proximate cause of H.W.’s claimed neurological injuries. Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d at 304-05. Nonetheless, Dr. Tappan does just that—offers his opinion that H.W. “possib[ly]...sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke likely due to intrapartum factors...” (CR.670); “sustained an in-utero asphyxia injury during the final one to one and a half hours of labor...” (CR.671); and “would have been born without neurologic injury” had he been delivered sooner. (CR.671). | Party Submissions | 7.282974 | 9.114426 | 9.234694 |
By this letter, the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction submitted: 1. the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP with a Report on the participation of the public, interested authorities and organizations in the public inspection of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP; 2. the Amendment and Supplement to the Report on the participation of the public, interested authorities and organizations in the public inspection of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP; 3. the Report on public inspection; and 4. the Amendment and Supplement to the Report on public inspection. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 6.532683 | 5.653275 | 6.953675 |
Any and all documents referred to on page 14 (pdf) of exhibit R-052 based on which Luka Beograd’ right of use over land plot No. 47 in the CM Stari grad was registered in the land book. RELEVANCE Claimants position in this arbitration is that Obnova has a right of use over land plot No. 47 ever since it constructed its buildings on this land plot. The requested documents will show the basis on which Serbia registered Luka Beograd as the user of this land plot No. 47 and that the inscription was incorrect. | Legal Decisions | 19.768847 | 18.632395 | 19.217669 |
IBA Rules, Respondent must show that the requested documents are subject to that privilege within the scope of Article 9.2(b). | Legal Decisions | 24.15409 | 25.673378 | 35.007572 |
The record clearly establishes that Deegear “knowingly treated his limited knowledge of the facts surrounding the mistake as sufficient” at the time Attaway questioned his figures. At that point, Deegear could have easily contacted someone at Sharyland and checked his numbers. But instead of following up, he simply told Attaway that everything was fine, and Sharyland assumed the risk that he was wrong by signing the agreement, In Smith v Lagerstam No. 03-05-00275-CV, 2007 WL 2066298, at *1 (Tex. App. July 19, 2007 mem. op. not reported) (Appendix B hereto) a case very much like this one on its facts, the seller of certain gas production royalty interests claimed mistake as to the number of wells involved, which had increased over time and affected the consideration agreed to. However, the evidence showed that “despite the fact that her royalty payments had increased significantly in recent years [she] failed to ascertain or investigate the value of her interest prior to selling it.” The opinion of the Third Court of Appeals in Lagerstam is well and carefully reasoned and stands for the proposition that once becoming aware of a possible mistake, a party who could but does not investigate that mistake before entering into a contract affected by it may not later avoid the contract on the basis of that mistake. | Party Submissions | 10.347205 | 12.378545 | 11.11868 |
A.S. was further questioned about the day of R.W.’s birth. 3 RR 84. A.S. went to the hospital for an emergency and was questioned about stopping before the hospital to purchase cigarettes. 3 RR 85. The jury heard that R.W. was “exposed to opiates and methamphetamines while in utero,” was five weeks early, and was treated for withdrawals and breathing issues. 3 RR 104. A.S. was then questioned regarding her Facebook posts beginning in early 2021. 3 RR 88. The content of the posts indicated a desire to give up drug use, seek sobriety and healthy relationships. 3 RR 88-90. The trial court suspended A.S.’s visitation in December of 2022. 3 RR 111. Through Intervenor’s further questioning, the jury was made aware that A.S. had a strained relationship with the Intervenor’s and had cursed at them. 3 RR 116. | Party Submissions | 6.837704 | 6.482308 | 6.938011 |
RLB has not shown an abuse of discretion by the court of appeals, and thus RLB is not entitled to mandamus relief. | Party Submissions | 6.611777 | 10.873347 | 12.178267 |
Further amplifying the problems with the reports was each physician’s lack of qualifications to offer opinions about causation. It’s not surprising Dr. Tappan’s causation opinion was full of difficult-to-comprehend medical jargon; as an obstetrician, he failed to offer any facts establishing his qualifications to opine about what caused an infant’s claimed brain injury, and nothing in his report or CV suggests otherwise. Hiding behind confusing strings of unexplained medical-ese persuaded the trial court; it should not carry the day here. | Party Submissions | 14.142517 | 15.322761 | 17.420168 |
Withholding. The Participating Employer shall have the right to withhold from any payment due under the Plan (or with respect to any amounts credited to the Plan) any taxes required by law to be withheld in respect of such payment (or credit). Withholdings with respect to amounts credited to the Plan shall be deducted from Compensation that has not been deferred to the Plan. | Contract | 4.756946 | 5.424094 | 5.970691 |
If Dr. Tappan wanted to explain how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged negligence caused H.W.’s injuries, he had a final opportunity in his “Conclusion” section. Alas, he fared no better there. First, he made the conclusory statement that the departures from the standard of care were “a substantial factor in causing the injuries suffered by baby [H.W.]....” (CR.670, listing injuries). That was plainly insufficient to comprise an objective good faith effort to comply with section 74.351. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460 (“merely incanting words will not suffice” to establish claim’s merit). | Party Submissions | 10.336426 | 12.13622 | 12.221211 |
Wife denied having any retirement accounts with the City of Dallas despite the paystubs Husband introduced into evidence. She contended the paystubs were from before J.Y.O.’s birthin 2014. However, the rst paystub was dated September 24, 2010 and the last one was dated October 25, 2019. The paystubs showed Wife’s contributions to the accounts. She did not provide any documentatiOn contradicting the paystubs. Instead, she testied that the “confusion” regarding the status of any . retirement contributions occurred because when she returned to work in 2017, the City “mistakenly reenrolled” her for her prior benefits. She noticed the mistake in 2018, brought it to the payroll department’s attention, and was allegedly reimbursed approximately $2,000. | Party Submissions | 8.989675 | 9.794995 | 9.537643 |
First, RLB’s stance in the trial court was that none of its claims should be abated in favor of the pending Oklahoma lawsuit between MVP and McCarthy. R.0333-359, 681-87. It had no obligation to dissect its claims as MVP suggests. Second, MVP did not even seek dismissal initially in the trial court. Instead, in its initial filing (i.e., the plea in abatement), MVP sought “an Order ... abating McCarthy’s and RLB’s claims until such time as the Oklahoma Action is resolved[.]” R.0201; see also R.0251, 0518, 0580-81 (emphasis added). Not until after the trial court denied the plea in abatement did MVP seek, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration, for the trial court to “dismiss this lawsuit in favor of the first-filed Oklahoma Action.” R.0631. RLB responded to that motion, arguing there was no basis for the court to reconsider its decision. R.0681-82, 685. As the prevailing party, RLB had neither the obligation to respond to the motion for reconsideration nor the obligation to answer MVP’s new post-denial argument that the trial court should have dismissed the case. See City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012). Third, as explained, MVP had the burden to demonstrate that some or all of RLB’s claims were within the scope of the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law clause—it was not RLB’s burden to refute it. See Section II, supra. Thus, MVP’s contention that RLB “waived” its right to ask this Court for the alternative relief it seeks is unavailing. | Party Submissions | 5.673717 | 5.535336 | 6.061355 |
Bestor was required to have exhausted administratively his attempt to have his administrative attorney's fees paid by Service Lloyds, rather than having them deducted from his recovery. See Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804-05 ; Pickett, 239 S.W.3d at 835-36, 838; Roskey, 190 S.W.3d at 880-81 ; see also Duenez, 201 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding that claimant was required but failed to exhaust administrative remedies for declaratory judgment claim and attorney's fees over state employee's insurance coverage because that action and the injunction sought directly related to "payment of a claim"). | Party Submissions | 9.121502 | 8.659778 | 10.292159 |
Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. | Legal Decisions | 9.281955 | 12.851211 | 10.836967 |
Insurance coverage required to be provided by Subcontractor pursuant to this Article shall not include deductibles or SIRs in excess of $100,000. McCarthy reserves the right to request documentation which supports the Subcontractor’s ability to fund applicable deductibles or SIRs. Any applicable deductible or SIR associated with the Subcontractor’s insurance policies shall be the sole responsibility of the Subcontractor. Failure to satisfy any SIR does not relieve Subcontractor from its obligations and responsibilities with this Agreement. All deductibles and SIRs must be evidenced on the required Certificate of Insurance. | Party Submissions | 5.765486 | 4.981209 | 6.030341 |
Second, Barina does not meaningfully dispute that she has profited from her role. While she now claims that she only receives a “small” percentage of the sale of Thrash’s assets, she does not contest that her compensation allowed her to leave two full-time jobs once she became guardian. See Pet. Br. at 22-23. And she does not dispute, because she cannot, that prior to being placed under her authority, Thrash had a thriving business and an estate worth millions, but that once she took control, that business was closed and his home sold. CR1:377-78. | Party Submissions | 12.744408 | 14.910337 | 14.762241 |
To allow holders of certain grazing permits to make minor range improvements and to require that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior respond to requests for range improvements within 30 days, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 7.741086 | 9.164432 | 8.418524 |
Respondents’ argument about the name change is therefore restricted to only two isolated portions of the jury’s award. The first is the $23,331.37 the jury awarded to Westwood in “relocation expenses.” (2CR2906) These damages compensated Westwood for Respondents’ destruction of its security surveillance system (8RR116-17;16RR100-06 (PX148A)); for the locksmith Westwood had to hire to gain re-entry to the leased premises (8RR136-36, 152;16RR99 (PX148)); and for a sign that Respondents removed and refused to return (8RR203-04;16RR114). These expenses were “paid” by Westwood Motors. (Resp. 31 n.88) But despite what Respondents insist ( id .), those same expenses were “incurred” by Westwood, and thus the award compensated Westwood for its own losses. And under the collateral source rule, Respondents cannot prohibit Westwood from recovering for these losses simply because they were paid by another entity. See Big Bird Tree Service v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding collateral source rule precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits plaintiff received from someone else). | Party Submissions | 8.056851 | 7.493635 | 8.318688 |
The third case Respondents cite, MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 249 S.W.3d 68, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied), does not help them either. In that case, the appraisal district and property owner settled a protest concerning the market value of a refinery. MHCB (USA), 249 S.W.3d at 73. The appraisal district later attempted to value the property at $100 million more. Id. The property owner challenged the second valuation as outside the appraisal district’s authority because the second valuation was inconsistent with the settlement agreement. The district argued the court had no jurisdiction to consider that claim on the theory that an agreement under section 1.111(e) is not reviewable. The court of appeals held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether section 1.111(e) barred the district’s second valuation. Id. at 87. The court was careful to note it was not deciding the merits of the dispute, and remanded the case to the district court for merits proceedings addressing, among other things, the validity of the agreement under section 1.111(e). Id. at 89-90. | Party Submissions | 4.161874 | 4.251212 | 4.279003 |
Any and all documents included in the files maintained by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade’s with respect to its work on the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate the explanation provided at Request No. 48 above. | Legal Decisions | 29.28831 | 31.341688 | 40.86366 |
VI. Alternatively, there is a bona fide question as to whether Mann was in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injuries. | Party Submissions | 8.662281 | 11.640286 | 12.69584 |
The City and the court of appeals interpret Sampson for the proposition that only claims arising from physical defects in property are actionable as premises liability claims. But this conflicts with this Court’s holding in Del Lago. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 776. After full briefing, this Court should grant this petition and clarify whether it meant to foreclose premises liability claims for a “use” of real property. | Party Submissions | 11.091771 | 11.359855 | 11.372318 |
IOLATIONS .—Multiple violations of this section that are part of the same scheme or continuing course of conduct may be charged, at the election of the Government, in a single count in an indictment or information.’’. SEC. 6. ILLEGAL MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES. | Legislation | 8.178405 | 7.83742 | 9.88971 |
Matt Marsenison was doing business pursuant to §17.042 in Texas by entering into a contract with Integrity as indicated by Exhibit 7 (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7 and Appendix, Tab 3), and committing numerous torts in Texas. Therefore, the only question is whether or not it is unconstitutional to exert personal jurisdiction over it. | Party Submissions | 21.899708 | 23.74152 | 28.922539 |
Samson urged the Ninth Court of Appeals to apply holdings by the First Court of Appeals in Hooks to the case severed from Hooks, on grounds that the doctrine “applies to severed actions,” even though decided by another court of appeals: Samson’s Appellant’s Brief filed January 6, 2014, in Samson Exploration, LLC, v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015), aff’d, 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017), Case No. 09-13-00366-CV, at 19, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3660681b-414e-4201-8236-5556e611eedd&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=f87ea8a4-6125- 4514-b749-457e5b1e1bf5. | Party Submissions | 8.116422 | 6.338093 | 7.975226 |
At the time Rafiei signed this contract, the effect of this oppressive language was such that it left Rafiei with no possible alternatives. Rafiei would have to pay a potentially unlimited amount of money – at a minimum, $7,675.00 up front – just to obtain a ruling on whether the Arbitration Agreement itself was unconscionable. Such egregious costs would, in effect, operate as a financial penalty on Appellee that would bar him from exercising his rights. | Party Submissions | 11.247888 | 12.234873 | 12.505342 |
I certify that this petition for review was served on the following counsel of record via electronic service pursuant to Rule 9.5(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on November 30, 2023. | Party Submissions | 4.528948 | 5.483357 | 5.612978 |
To prohibit the Federal Insurance Office of the Department of the Treasury and other financial regulators from collecting data directly from an insurance company. | Legislation | 11.697155 | 7.883988 | 11.455623 |
Samson would insert “late charges” into art XVII.D to change the meaning of the last sentence of the prior (Late Charge) provision. That last sentence specifies that Late Charges become “due and payable” at the end of each month. But Samson conjures a scenario in which that sentence specifies that paying a Late Charge at some future date will prevent lease termination. | Party Submissions | 23.282866 | 22.11543 | 23.5185 |
Letter from the Institute for the Protection of Nature of Serbia to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 03-853/2 dated 14 April 2008, together with all accompanying attachments. | Legal Decisions | 10.186834 | 9.305783 | 10.304575 |
After the sexual assault, Mesquite Logistics, a subscriber to workers' compensation under the Act, submitted a workers' compensation claim to its insurance carrier. The carrier electronically filed an “Employer's First Report of Injury” with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (“the DWC”), reporting a “mental trauma injury” sustained by Berrelez. The DWC assigned the matter a claim number. An adjustor with the insurance carrier contacted Berrelez by letter, asking that she contact the carrier to discuss the workers' compensation claim. The carrier determined Berrelez had a compensable injury for mental trauma and set medical reserves of $2,000.00. | Party Submissions | 6.936088 | 6.123063 | 7.44337 |
Rosenthal also presented clear and specific evidence that the article’s gist is not substantially true; specifically, she presented evidence that the Commission conducted an investigation and concluded that she engaged in no wrongdoing in obtaining SNAP benefits. | Party Submissions | 17.249449 | 22.738602 | 19.918404 |
The consolidated cases present the following issues: (1) whether Cochran's election to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws bars Sonic's recovery as Cochran's subclaimant under the TWCA; and (2) whether the trial court acted appropriately by continuing to abate Sonic's contract claims pending a final determination of the reimbursement claim. | Party Submissions | 9.888934 | 10.674179 | 11.714042 |
For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the Tribunal to order Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 6 is granted insofar as the Respondent shall provide the Claimant with the document(s) regarding the decision(s) to incarcerate the Claimant in the Salwa Road prison and to maintain his detention in this prison until July 1, 2020. The Request is dismissed in all other parts, which are unspecific and not substantiated for the purpose of preparing the Claimant’s forthcoming Memorial, and for the determination of the allegations contained therein in support of the Claimant’s claims. Moreover, the Request is moot in respect of the document the Respondent provided, as reported in the Summary presented by the Claimant. | Legal Decisions | 9.608666 | 9.356483 | 9.840865 |
This Chapter cited in 28 TAC § 19.2005, (relating to General Standards of Utilization Review); 28 TAC § 133.206, (relating to Spinal Surgery Second Opinion Process). | Party Submissions | 12.619537 | 11.251518 | 11.079087 |
Weatherford urges this Court to look solely at its pleadings, arguing that its pleadings alone were “sufficient to show governmental immunity has been waived.” Brief at 56. This misstates the burden in an evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction. In Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, the court differentiates between a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges jurisdiction based on the pleadings, and a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges jurisdiction by showing jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Midland’s plea was the latter. Midland presented evidence challenging Weatherford’s factual allegations, and Weatherford failed to offer admissible evidence to raise a fact issue to overcome Midland’s challenge. Miranda clearly states that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, and “to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the [T]rial [C]ourt's subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 221. The Court should reject Weatherford’s contention that pleadings alone, without review of the underlying Plea to the Jurisdiction evidence offered and admitted (and in Weatherford’s case, excluded as improper hearsay), are sufficient to confer jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 5.463461 | 5.910241 | 6.033662 |
The majority opinion, however, transmogrifies Griggs into a sweeping stay of “pre-trial and trial proceedings” on not just arbitrability, but also the merits. Ante, at 1918. According to the majority, if the question on appeal is “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then the district court loses control over “ the entire case.” Ante, at 1919 – 1920 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). | Party Submissions | 7.5613 | 8.11007 | 8.46767 |
Bay does not have a workers' compensation policy that protects it from suit for the negligent acts of its employee Defendant Alvarez, so it lacks standing to assert the exclusive remedies defense for his acts. 34 Bay cleverly brushes past this critical fact and instead asks the court to assume that Mann is covered by Valero's ROCIP, and that the actions of Bay, through Defendant Alvarez, are protected. This is a legal non-sequitur. Mann's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment challenged Bay's standing to raise the affirmative defense of exhaustion of remedies by producing a relevant policy to demonstrate that Bay was protected from common *23 law suit for the acts of its non-ROCIP employee who struck and injured Mann. To date, Bay has not shown that Defendant Alvarez was within the scope of people covered under Valero's ROCIP. Therefore, the trial court's decision to strike Bay's exclusive remedies defense should be affirmed. | Party Submissions | 10.620838 | 10.698406 | 11.932684 |
The first Dow factor considers ownership or possession of the pollutant. Midland did not own or possess the solid waste in question. See (CR 54.) Weatherford hypothesizes that such waste was generated and disposed of at off-site electronics manufacturing facilities. Brief at 7–11. Through its own petition, Weatherford places the ownership/possession in the hands of an unnamed third party. (CR 17.) If Weatherford’s allegations were true, such third party disposals would constitute illegal acts and would be in direct violation of Midland’s ordinances. Midland did not voluntarily accept such wastes, and Weatherford is unable to show that Midland had any connection whatsoever with the alleged disposal. (CR 54.) More importantly, Midland did not own the Contaminant at issue, meaning that the first prong of the Dow factors was not met. Thus, the very first element of the Dow factors fails when considering that—even under Weatherford’s set of facts—a third party, not Midland, owned or possessed the alleged pollutants. | Party Submissions | 10.298887 | 10.160231 | 10.768736 |
Respondents’ effort to draw support for the decision below from Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) is also unavailing. Respondents claim that Kemp first established their position that “compliance” with the eviction order in the forcible entry and detainer action constitutes “voluntary abandonment of the premises” under all circumstances—meaning that even a tenant who offers “testimony” that it abandoned its challenge to the eviction and surrendered the premises only because of “mistreatment” from its landlord interfering with its right of possession cannot maintain a claim for constructive eviction in district court. (Resp. 16, 30) Of course, such a result would be indefensible. It would be in direct conflict with section 31.004(a) and section 24.008, and the many decisions establishing that even the tenant who loses the right to immediate possession in a forcible entry and detainer action can still contest ultimate possession and recover damages in district court. The result Respondents urge also makes no sense: A party’s right to pursue a constructive-eviction claim requires an eviction as an element of the claim. It cannot be defeated by an eviction—or by a party’s compliance with a wrongful eviction order. Otherwise, no constructive-eviction claim could ever lie. It is thus no surprise that Kemp in fact adopted no such rule. | Party Submissions | 6.947544 | 7.400649 | 7.262673 |
Respondents completely ignore this passage from the court’s order on rehearing, instead emphasizing two carefully curated snippets from the main opinion—one suggesting that Westwood did not “identify any act” by Respondents as the cause “for its decision to abandon the appeal” and vacate the premises, and another noting that Westwood vacated “without qualification.” (Resp. 22 quoting Op. 5, 6) But the full context of these passages makes clear that the court of appeals was not speaking about any absence of evidence that Respondents had constructively evicted Westwood, or that Westwood had failed to complain of that constructive eviction. And no such contention could have been maintained, because the record is replete with evidence of Respondents’ acts of interference with Westwood’s right of possession that forced it to leave—and Westwood’s repeated complaints about that interference. The court was instead speaking about the contents of the agreed judgment and Westwood’s supposed failure to indicate its continued “protest” against Respondents’ harassment, which the court deemed fatal to Westwood’s claims in the district court, regardless of Westwood’s evidence of constructive eviction. ( See Pet. Br. 22) Accordingly, the passage on which Respondents rely in trying to prove the court of appeals’ opinion rested on the evidence actually proves the opposite—that it rested entirely on the purported legal effect of the agreed judgment. | Party Submissions | 8.652053 | 9.48258 | 9.429806 |
A second presumption arises when a conveyance from one spouse as the sole grantor in a real property deed is made to the other spouse as the grantee. In that event, there is a presumption that a gift was intended. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a gift was not intended in the transaction or that the conveyance was procured by fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. | Party Submissions | 4.299498 | 4.718487 | 5.072167 |
In order not to have any problems with the allowed area for catching we kindly ask you to inform us about the coordinates of conservancy areas where we have not the right to catch. | Legal Decisions | 27.165035 | 27.682966 | 27.904016 |
HN6 [ ] Standards of Review, Abuse of Discretion The trial court's ruling on a motion to strike presents a legal question. Thus, an appellate court's review, even under the abuse of discretion mandamus standard, is de novo. Under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court defers to the trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but an appellate court reviews the trial court's legal determinations de novo. | Party Submissions | 5.126471 | 5.415519 | 5.172745 |
Luby's will forever lose the benefit of that bargain if forced to trial and then the Commission subsequently decides Gaetjen's claim is compensable. Cf. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Tex.1992) (holding that a party who is erroneously deprived of the benefits of an arbitration contract under the Federal Arbitration Act is without adequate remedy by appeal and entitled to mandamus relief). Such a result would nullify the very purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act. Cf. In Re Bruce Terminix Co., 41. Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 941 (June 5, 1998) (there is no adequate remedy by appeal for denial of the right to arbitration because the very purpose of arbitration is to avoid the time and expense of trial and appeal). | Party Submissions | 6.348308 | 7.833521 | 7.768376 |
Review Board possessed jurisdiction to review the agreement entered into between Oncor and the Mills County Appraisal District under Tex, Tax Code §1.111(e) or in the alternative (3) To reverse and render its determination on the Appraisal Review Board’s pleas to the jurisdiction not heard by the Third Court of Appeals., or to remand the same to the Court of Appeals. | Party Submissions | 15.200879 | 16.316715 | 19.858067 |
Respondents argue for the first time in their brief to this Court that the error Oncor seeks to correct is not a “clerical error” as defined in the Tax Code. See Respondents’ Brief at 18-19. This is a merits issue not properly before the Court, so the Court should not address it. But even if the Court were inclined to address this issue, Respondents are wrong. | Party Submissions | 6.263059 | 7.479259 | 6.965097 |
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (2006) provides that recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy for a work-related injury of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.034 (2006) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, an employee of a workers' compensation subscriber waives the common-law right to recover damages for injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment. | Party Submissions | 2.989856 | 3.778391 | 3.217065 |
To amend Public Law 88–657 to require greater transparency in the consider- ation of projects for the Forest Service Legacy Road and Trail Remedi-ation Program, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 11.552882 | 12.648239 | 11.851303 |
The requested documents are relevant and material because they will show the reasons for which JKP Gradsko-saobraćajno preduzeće "Belgrade" proposed to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23. | Legal Decisions | 19.41814 | 22.855433 | 19.303457 |
B) The Respondent’s position 401. Respondent alleges that it did not violate the applicable FET standard. First, Respondent notes that Claimant submits that the FET standard contained in the Treaty is broad and flexible, and that the dominant approach by investment tribunals has been to interpret fair and equitable treatment as an independent standard with an autonomous meaning. | Legal Decisions | 11.50526 | 10.708162 | 9.375915 |
The meager default interest rate on overdue royalties may be fixed at the start or fluctuate month to month, and may be computed as simple interest – the Code does not specify either. (Before that statute was adopted, this Court had approved simple interest for unpaid royalties. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 488 & n.8 (Tex. 1978).) The rest of Texas Natural Resources Code Sections 91.401 to 91.406 provide other default rules for royalty payments, timing, and interest on overdue royalties. | Party Submissions | 8.821522 | 8.891147 | 9.043819 |
Disability Benefit. In the event that a Participant becomes Disabled, he or she shall be entitled to a Disability Benefit. The Disability Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Participant’s entire unpaid Account Balance for all Accounts. The payment date for the Disability Benefit shall be no later than the end of the month following the calendar month in which the Committee determined that the Participant has become Disabled, with the actual payment date determined in the sole discretion of the Committee, and the Disability Benefit shall be based on the value of the vested (and, as applicable, unpaid) portion of the Accounts as of the last day of the calendar month in which the Committee makes a determination as to the Participant’s Disability. | Contract | 3.737736 | 3.471554 | 3.999118 |
Respondent does not voluntarily produce these documents by October 26, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce them by November 27, 2023. | Legal Decisions | 8.872431 | 11.805756 | 12.102904 |
Again, Riverside produced whatever INAGROSA documents that it could locate and always did so to the best of the corporation’s ability. | Party Submissions | 90.39583 | 87.16672 | 113.749405 |
Petitioner HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER requests this Court to grant review in this case on matters that are important to the jurisprudence of the state of Texas. First, while the standard of review in family law cases is the abuse of discretion standard, clarification is needed as to the parameters of that standard and specifically whether the abuse of discretion standard includes or excludes a factual sufficiency review of the evidence. | Party Submissions | 9.443156 | 9.353784 | 11.122731 |
An Alabama resident injured his back while working for the employer in that state. The carrier argued that the Alabama employee's election to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws barred the employer's recovery as the employee's subclaimant under the TWCA. The court found that because the employee recovered benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075(a) (2006) applied to bar him from receiving benefits under the TWCA. As the employer's claim for reimbursement was as the employee's subclaimant, once the employee was barred from receiving benefits under the TWCA, the employer was similarly barred. The employer did not prove, as a matter of law, it was entitled to receive reimbursement benefits under the TWCA as a subclaimant though the employee, its claimant, was barred. The court concluded that the trial court's decision to continue abatement of the employer's contract claims was improper and that the employer lacked an adequate remedy by appeal should abatement continue. Continued abatement unnecessarily denied the employer the opportunity to pursue its remedies against real parties for an indeterminable period of time. | Party Submissions | 5.842906 | 5.816291 | 6.101606 |
According to Article 46 of the Decision on city administration (“Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade,” No. 36/2004, 1/2005 -corr., 18/2006), the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction is the authority that was responsible for the preparation of the 2013 DRP.120 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors that the Secretariat took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its 54 premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and if so, the Secretariat’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 9.38072 | 10.382443 | 9.635035 |
Should a claim that infants were misidentified and switched at birth be held to fall under the TMLA based upon a duty to keep accurate medical records or be treated as a simple negligence case? | Party Submissions | 19.051428 | 26.963043 | 22.257647 |
You acknowledge that the Company from time to time may have agreements with other persons or with the United States Government, or agencies thereof, which impose obligations or restrictions on the Company regarding inventions made during the course of work under such agreements or regarding the confidential nature of such work. You agree to be bound by all such obligations and restrictions which are made known to you and to discharge the obligations of the Company under such agreements. | Contract | 6.080136 | 5.354652 | 8.316043 |
Regulation no. 1836 of 19 December 2014, as amended by Regulation no. 1833 of 22 December 2015, prohibiting catches of snow crab is fully consistent with Norway’s rights, jurisdiction and obligations as a coastal State under international law. The regulation also establishes the prohibition of harvesting snow crab within 12 nautical miles for all vessels that are granted exemption to harvest. | Legal Decisions | 7.60929 | 6.806045 | 7.640837 |
In addition, for each of the majority's concerns favoring a mandatory stay, there are countervailing considerations. The majority professes interest in “efficiency.” Ibid. But forcing district court proceedings to a halt— for months or years while the appeal runs its course—is itself inefficient. The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefits of arbitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party opposing arbitration loses the benefits of immediate litigation. A plaintiff's request for injunctive protection against imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the majority's rule. Similarly, while the majority laments settlement pressure on parties seeking arbitration, ibid., the rule it announces imposes settlement pressure in the opposite direction. With justice delayed while the case is on hold, parties “could be forced to settle,” ibid., because they do not wish—or cannot afford— to leave their claims in limbo. Incongruously, the majority inflicts these burdens on the party that won the arbitrability issue before the district court (the party opposing arbitration). | Party Submissions | 9.26393 | 9.366104 | 9.354009 |
This post-argument letter on behalf of the respondents is to supply additional information in answer to the Court’s questions in oral argument and matters raised by Petitioners in their post-submission letter dated October 26, 2023. | Party Submissions | 10.030523 | 11.936455 | 12.67326 |
The fact that Executive’s right to payments or benefits may be reduced by reason of the limitations contained in this Section 3.9 will not of itself limit or otherwise affect any other rights of Executive other than pursuant to this Agreement. In the event that any payment or benefit intended to be provided under this Agreement or otherwise is required to be reduced pursuant to this Section 3.9, the Company will effect such reduction by first reducing the lump sum cash payment related to Base Salary (a “Reduction”). In the event that, after such Reduction any payment or benefit intended to be provided under this Agreement or otherwise is still required to be reduced pursuant to this Section 3.9, the Company will effect such reduction by reducing other consideration due to Executive. | Contract | 4.568376 | 4.492084 | 5.442973 |
The United States objects to Request No. 2.g for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.705513 | 13.421783 | 15.284476 |
There is no sufficient governmental interest in prohibiting an otherwise-qualified individual from signing petitions to get multiple candidates on the ballot for the same office and election. Such a signer “express[es] the view” that both candidates “should be considered by the whole electorate”—regardless of which candidate the signer might vote for. Reed, 561 U.S. at 195. Moreover, the State lacks any sufficient interest in prohibiting a candidate from “band[ing] together” with a signer to obtain ballot access just because that individual already signed an opponent’s petition. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 586. Just as governments cannot prohibit individuals from making monetary contributions to multiple candidates for the same office and election, this holds true for the equally expressive act of petition signing. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 204-05 (2014). | Party Submissions | 5.860833 | 5.896936 | 6.178798 |
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above. | Legal Decisions | 10.838362 | 10.699582 | 12.767634 |
Further, as explained, the Texas Legislature has mandated that lawsuits involving Texas contractors and Texas construction projects should be heard in Texas courts. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 272.001. Oklahoma has no material interest in this lawsuit, and this dispute has no relationship to Oklahoma. Finally, when applying the principle of comity, the proper remedy is abatement of the second-filed suit—not dismissal. VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). | Party Submissions | 6.939209 | 6.911664 | 7.590567 |
Reading Walker in its entirety demonstrates that the Court of Appeals meant only that the experts failed to causally link any of the alleged breaches to H.W.’s injury (i.e., implicitly recognizing that causally linking one would be enough for the case to proceed4). In its opinion, the Court went through each departure Dr. Tappan listed, compared all of them with his and Dr. Null’s causation opinions, and then determined each of them fell short of explaining how and why Dr. Castillo’s actions in particular proximately caused H.W.’s injuries. Id. at *2-*5. So the Walkers are right. The Court of Appeals deemed each causation opinion insufficient—not because the Court required something more of their experts after Thompson, but because each of the opinions failed on their own under long-standing expert report jurisprudence (such as Wright, Scoresby, and Zamarripa). | Party Submissions | 14.254958 | 15.313763 | 15.897864 |
While this Court has appellate jurisdiction to evaluate the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction under Texas Government Code, Section 22.001(a), it would be imprudent to exercise such jurisdiction to grant review of a case that does not present a novel question of law. This case is a routine dismissal of a claim against a governmental entity wrongly hauled into litigation, and the Court would risk issuing an impermissible advisory opinion if it granted review and expanded the reach of Texas solid waste disposal law. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (stating that advisory opinions would constitute “a legislative enlargement of a court’s power”). | Party Submissions | 5.940001 | 5.748791 | 6.034151 |
Ultimately, the amici curiae seek to clarify the application of Lucas analysis in regulatory takings. Trinity II has complicated Lucas’ framework by deeming the public fully liable for property value losses that are not total, but merely reductions from the maximum potential. Given the profound implication this could have on future zoning decisions, the amici urge this court to approve the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that before the public can be made to compensate a landowner for a regulatory taking, the Lucas standard requires the total eradication of a property’s value. | Party Submissions | 14.850904 | 14.499314 | 14.391293 |
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to the conflict of laws principles thereof. | Contract | 2.672489 | 3.088202 | 3.838058 |
In contrast to a tenant like the one in Kemp, a tenant who abandons a leased premise because the landlord’s harassment forces it to leave— as Westwood did here — has established the central element of a constructive-eviction claim. And it does not matter whether that decision is forced upon the tenant before, during, or after the eviction proceeding on appeal from the judgment. | Party Submissions | 13.800602 | 13.709214 | 16.123272 |
Petitioner, HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER submits his Petition for Review. For clarity, Petitioner, HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER will be referred to herein as “Husband”; Cross-Petitioner, LAUREN OKSUZLER will be referred to as “Wife”; and the 469TH Judicial Court of Collin County, Texas will be referred to as “trial court”. The August 17, 2020, Final Decree of Divorce will be referred to as “Order.” The Clerk’s Record and the Reporter’s Record will be referred to as “CR” and “RR” respectively. | Party Submissions | 4.99105 | 5.253313 | 5.130446 |
McCarthy Subcontract -15-01-12-2017 Rev. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this Agreement, the day and year first above written, which together with the Contract Documents as defined herein represent the entire and integrated agreement between the parties hereto, supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or agreements, oral or written, and may only be amended or modified as defined in Article 4 hereof. | Party Submissions | 6.982206 | 5.782522 | 7.936218 |
Specified Date Benefit. Specified Date Benefit means any benefit(s) payable to a Participant under the Plan in accordance with Section 6.1(b). | Contract | 6.373446 | 6.284412 | 9.323156 |
For the denial of a Disability Benefit, the notice will also include a statement that the Appeals Committee will provide, upon request and free of charge: (i) any internal rule, guideline, protocol or other similar criterion relied upon in making the decision, (ii) any medical opinion relied upon to make the decision, and (iii) the required statement under Section 2560.503- l (j)(5)(iii) of the Department of Labor regulations. | Contract | 6.323806 | 7.896293 | 7.466354 |
In Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1975), writ refused n.r.e., a bonus paid to a spouse shortly after divorce was held to be his separate property. Although the court did not explain its reasoning, it appears that the fact that the bonus was not received during marriage was of controlling significance. Note, however, that the Texas Supreme Court later abandoned the requirement that the right to receive property after divorce had to vest before the right became divisible upon divorce [Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976)]. | Party Submissions | 6.218443 | 5.939579 | 6.234036 |
Security for Costs, based on Riverside’s lack of liquid assets8, is unfounded given the high value of Riverside’s investments in Nicaragua, currently under Nicaraguan control. Nicaragua already holds assets exceeding the $4 million security for costs it seeks, rendering the risk of nonpayment of an adverse cost award against Riverside negligible. | Party Submissions | 14.972303 | 15.112008 | 19.433565 |
To amend the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act to authorize the use of Commodity Credit Corporation funds for emergency assistance to dairy producers in the case of livestock relocation and feed crop losses due to natural disasters, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.138865 | 4.177126 | 5.068802 |
As to the second ground, Respondent further notes that Claimants fail to explain why this exercise would be unreasonably burdensome aside from their speculative claim that this might encompass "hundreds" of communications with "Claimants' legal or other advisors". In other words, it could happen that there are only several documents corresponding to Respondent's requests. | Legal Decisions | 14.759849 | 15.416593 | 17.37101 |
But, even assuming Dr. Null’s qualifications are sufficient, the Amarillo Court properly dismissed the Walkers’ claims because, between Dr. Null’s conclusory opinion about causation (that never even mentions Dr. Castillo) and the fact that Dr. Tappan’s opinions were deficient for the reasons argued, the Amarillo Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Dr. Castillo’s motion to dismiss. The two expert reports, even when read together, fail to represent an objective good-faith effort to “summarize the causal relationship between [Dr. Castillo’s] failure to meet the applicable standards of care and [H.W.’s] injury.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ opinion and judgment should be affirmed. | Party Submissions | 7.796785 | 8.716696 | 8.982354 |
Before the Court are two original proceedings arising from related lawsuits—each filed in a Travis County district court—resulting from a workplace injury that led to the death of 20-year-old Pedro Jovany "Bruno" Martinez. In cause No. 03-21-00182-CV, alleged employer Hellas Construction, Inc., seeks mandamus [*2] relief from the district court's order lifting the abatement of a tort suit brought by Bruno's family (Martinez Family) against Hellas. Real parties in interest are the Martinez Family and T.F. Harper & Associates, L.P., the general contractor allegedly responsible for the construction site. In cause No. 03-21-00233-CV, the Martinez Family seeks mandamus relief from the district court's order overruling its plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of its own suit for judicial review of a final order from the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation (DWC). Real party in interest in the latter cause is Texas Mutual, which provides Hellas's workers' compensation policy. For the reasons that follow, we will grant the relief sought by Hellas and deny the relief sought by the Martinez Family. | Party Submissions | 4.815665 | 5.015725 | 4.916442 |
R.007. Accordingly, a soil study was made a prerequisite to the ability of the contractor to prepare a fixed price for this work. R.744, R.453. | Party Submissions | 21.46566 | 23.932352 | 25.795727 |
Respondents’ effort to minimize the adverse consequences for tenants flowing from the court of appeals’ ruling— which the court itself entirely ignored — is likewise unavailing. If the law is as Respondents say it is, and any effort by a tenant to comply with an eviction order by departing the premises conclusively demonstrates “voluntary abandonment” of every right the tenant ever had to claim damages for wrongful eviction or breach of contract, then tenants must waste time, expend resources, and risk sanctions pursuing appeals from justice court which they know will likely to be fruitless simply to preserve their ability to maintain a claim in district court. ( See Pet. Br. 23-24) The law should not require such futile and wasteful acts. | Party Submissions | 10.779495 | 10.461701 | 11.650007 |
The timeline of Khanoyan is itself instructive. This Court wrote on January 6, 2022 that “no amount of expedited briefing of judicial expediency at this point can change the fact that the primary election for 2022 is already in its early stages.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766. That election “began” with the candidate filing period, and the Court noted that “[b]allots must be finalized very soon to comply with deadlines for mailing ballots to military and overseas voters.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “any relief that we theoretically could provide here would necessarily disrupt the ongoing election process.” Id. | Party Submissions | 9.419805 | 9.625185 | 9.73195 |
This Court has held that “the candidate’s own fault is a consideration when weighing the right to equitable relief,” though “mistakes” are “not an absolute bar” to relief. In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. 2002). Justice Devine is not at fault. He acted in good faith that signers would follow instructions and that Chairman Rinaldi would inform him if his signatures were defective. See Tex. Elec. Code §141.032(e). Neither happened. It would be inequitable to block Justice Devine from the primary ballot on these facts. | Party Submissions | 8.952038 | 8.989563 | 9.657594 |
Luxury Travel Source v. American Airlines, Inc., 276 SW3d 154 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth, 2008, no writ) holds that: Even if a nonresident corporate officer's acts were undertaken in a corporate capacity, that officer may still be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum if those actions were tortious or fraudulent and if the tortious or fraudulent actions satisfy the three Michiana minimum contacts factors: (1) only the defendant's contacts with the forum count; (2) the acts relied on must be purposeful rather than merely fortuitous; and (3) the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the forum.11 Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785, 788-89; Niehaus v. Cedar Bridge, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.); SITQ, 111 S.W.3d at 651. At 166. This is exactly the situation with regard to Marsenison. The allegations are that Marsenison’s actions were tortious and fraudulent, and clearly satisfy the three Michiana contacts factors. This case involves negligence and breach of warranty actions against out of state Defendants where the issue is personal jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 6.315927 | 6.242671 | 6.733275 |
Requiring an explanation to causally connect those earlier departures with H.W.’s ultimate injury was not novel. See Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324, 329-30 (Tex. 2008) (defendants’ negligence too attenuated from suicide to have been a substantial factor), and Shenoy v. Jean, No. 01-10-01116-CV, 2011 WL 6938538 at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Dec. 29, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A causal link can be too attenuated to satisfy the causation requirement for an expert report.”). Contrary to the Walkers’ claim (Pet. Br. at 28-30), the Amarillo Court did not bemoan the lack of evidence about earlier departures. It simply recognized that neither expert—faced with Dr. Tappan’s statements that those acts were departures from the standard of care—explained how and why those alleged breaches were causally connected to H.W.’s stroke or asphyxia some six or more hours later. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4. | Party Submissions | 6.951367 | 7.17467 | 7.134518 |
On January 29, 2003-- more than sixty days after receiving notice-- Service Lloyds disputed Bestor's claim on the ground that his condition was preexisting. Bestor prevailed in a contested administrative hearing and in Service Lloyds's administrative appeal based in part on a ruling that Service Lloyds did not contest the compensability of Bestor's injury within sixty days and thus waived its right to contest compensability. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.021(c) (Vernon 2006). During the administrative process, Bestor's attorney was awarded and was paid attorney's fees in the amount of $ 11,868.02, but those payments were paid directly to Bestor's attorney out of Bestor's [**2] benefits, i.e ., by deducting them from Bestor's recovery. See id. § 408.221(b) ("Except as provided by Subsection (c) or Section 408.147(c), the attorney's fee shall be paid from the claimant's recovery."); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1995) . | Party Submissions | 5.196026 | 4.949529 | 5.43465 |
An administrative declaration of ineligibility is governed by Section 145.003 of the Election Code, which provides that a candidate may be declared ineligible only if: (1) the information on the candidate’s application for place on the ballot indicates that the candidate is ineligible for the office; (2) facts indicating that the candidate is ineligible are conclusively established by another public record; or (3) the candidate fails to pay the filing fee or submit a petition in lieu of a filing fee. | Party Submissions | 4.359475 | 4.204546 | 4.499797 |
Beyond the immediate barriers to access, this absence of a cost cap ushers in a chilling effect on potential claimants. Many, even those armed with robust claims, may find themselves deterred from seeking rightful relief, weighed down by the risk of exorbitant, uncontrollable costs. This goes beyond individual hesitance — it chips away at the very integrity of the contract. When one party operates with the knowledge that the other is effectively deterred from seeking redress, accountability is undermined. | Party Submissions | 12.1219 | 12.796726 | 13.373235 |
According to ACOG Obstetric Care Consensus No. 1, the most common indication for primary cesarean delivery is labor dystocia. Non-reassuring fetal tracing is the second most common indication and requires assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia and acidosis. Dr. Castillo failed to recognize that recurrent decelerations, minimal variability, and absent accelerations, suggest that the baby would likely be acidotic and therefore would be at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. In the absence of accelerations of the fetal heart rate, defined in a fetus at or after 32-weeks gestation as an increase in the FHR of at least 15 beats above baseline and lasting for at least 15 seconds, ACOG recommends eliciting accelerations by fetal scalp or vibroacoustic stimulation. Dr. Castillo also failed, not only to attempt to elicit accelerations but to pursue an expedited delivery after making the decision for a cesarean section at 15:52. As a result of the leisurely preparation for surgery, the operation did not begin until 16:56, during which 64 minutes the FHR baseline was tachycardic (165 bpm), the variability was minimal, accelerations were absent, and there were recurrent decelerations, all signs consistent of ongoing fetal hypoxia and acidemia. App. 7, CR 670; App. 5, CR 217 (defining hypoxia as decreased oxygen in tissue and metabolic acidosis acidemia as the increase in lactic acid in the blood that results from hypoxia). | Party Submissions | 5.973399 | 6.279669 | 6.125902 |
But Thompson did not address—much less alter—the well-established standards for evaluating the sufficiency of preliminary expert reports that this Court affirmed only one week before Thompson issued. See E.D. by & through B.O. v. Tex. Health Care, P.L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Tex. 2022). | Party Submissions | 7.599675 | 7.969697 | 9.350042 |
For column 22: Indicate the outbreak notifications of the year when the survey took place. The outbreak notification number does not need to be included when the competent authority has decided that the finding is one of the cases referred to in Article 14(2), Article 15(2) or Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031. In this case, indicate the reason for not providing this information in column 25 (‘Comments’). | Legislation | 9.069807 | 8.549337 | 9.595634 |
A breach of contract without more is not a tort. As this Court first explained almost 40 years ago in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986), and reiterated in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLanney: Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by law—apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart from the manifested intention of the parties—to avoid injury to others. | Party Submissions | 7.529107 | 7.824365 | 8.387351 |
Rather than address this argument head on, Barina inaptly invokes D. Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal,2 a case involving a mislabeled column about a Dallas socialite. This characterization, however, undercuts rather than supports the court of appeals’ decision. Rosenthal was a defamation-by-gist case about an article that focused solely on, and made critical statements only about, the plaintiff. But here, the Program is not about Barina and does not make statements only about Barina. It is about guardianship abuse in general, and this Court has consistently cautioned that simply placing a plaintiff in the context of a larger dispute does not mean all of the statements about that larger controversy are defamatory of the plaintiff. It is precisely because this case is not like Rosenthal that this Court’s review is warranted. | Party Submissions | 11.168336 | 11.095713 | 11.807991 |
Subsets and Splits