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Foreclosure by another lienholder cannot have acted automatically as acceleration of the Note or began accrual of Respondent’s rights to enforce the Note. “A claim generally accrues when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy.” Sowell, 416 S.W.3d at 598. But foreclosure by another lienholder is not ipso facto an authorization for all lienholders to seek a judicial remedy. If Petitioner had remained current on all of her obligations under the Note throughout the for eclosure by the senior lienholder, Petitioner’s interpretation would nonetheless have required the holder of the Note to sue within two years – and potentially litigate the fair market value of the Property even though it had not carried, sold, or benefited from it. | Party Submissions | 11.049442 | 10.583758 | 11.49428 |
Respondents insist that Oncor is attempting to avoid a binding agreement, upon which the District purportedly has relied to its detriment. See Respondents’ Brief at 4-5 & 28-30. But again, Oncor does not seek to undermine or change the agreement the parties made to settle Sharyland’s protests of the subjective market valuation of all of its transmission lines. Oncor seeks to enforce that agreement by correcting a clerical error that the parties did not know about or address when they executed the 2019 settlement. See also Oncor’s Brief at 40-42. | Party Submissions | 8.88208 | 10.090779 | 10.366789 |
Weatherford’s argument is based on the single premise that the SWDA’s domestic sewage exclusion was misapplied by the Court of Appeals. | Party Submissions | 17.42109 | 18.565561 | 21.938326 |
Rafiei acknowledges that he relies upon the affidavit of David Joeckel to show that arbitration is disproportionately expensive when compared with litigation. Brief at 28. But there are a number of reasons the Joeckel affidavit does not support that assertion. | Party Submissions | 8.98097 | 11.749876 | 12.983227 |
The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under § 16(a) reflects common sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs rule avoids these detrimental results. | Party Submissions | 9.224296 | 9.225664 | 9.990809 |
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO CREDIT AND GUARANTY AGREEMENT, dated as of November 20, 2018 (this “Amendment”), to that certain Credit and Guaranty Agreement, dated as of October 31, 2018 (as amended, modified, restated or supplemented from time to time in accordance with its terms, the “Credit Agreement”), among United Rentals (North America), Inc. (the “Borrower”), United Rentals, Inc. and certain of its subsidiaries as the Guarantors party thereto, the financial institutions party thereto from time to time (the “Lenders”), Bank of America, N.A., as agent for the Lenders (in such capacity, together with any successor in such capacity, the “Agent”), and the other parties thereto. | Contract | 2.121805 | 1.991702 | 2.131779 |
As explained above, the requested documents will show: ( i ) whether Serbia intended to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises from the very beginning of the process of the 2013 DRP’s preparation; and ( ii ) whether either the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction or the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” had considered Obnova’s right s to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP and, if so, what was their contemporaneous understanding of these rights. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material for two issues in this case. First, they are relevant and material to assess whether the decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises was unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory and in line with the principle of proportionality. Second, they are relevant and material to assess whether Ser bia’s contemporaneous view on Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 was consistent with the position that Serbia takes in this arbitration — i.e. that Obnova does not have any rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.222 The requested documents are not unreasonably burdensome to produce The letters listed in the request represent all letters exchanged between the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction and the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” that are mentioned in the 2013 DRP documentation available to Claimants. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that if there are any additional responsive documents, their number should be limited. | Legal Decisions | 5.589926 | 5.787227 | 5.742634 |
Third, Rafiei’s calculation of a $6,000 limit for “fees and expenses up front” does not make any sense. His affidavit indicates that he makes $20,000 a month, or $240,000 a year. CR115, ¶1. He specifically indicates that his disposable income after expenses is $6,000 a month, which is $72,000 a year. Id. at ¶ 2. | Party Submissions | 6.653846 | 7.749754 | 7.546045 |
Petitioners only lose the protection of the fair-report privilege if the Program leaves Barina in a “worse light than the proceedings themselves.” KBMT, 492 S.W.3d at 716. Because the Program does not, the privilege applies. The Court should grant review to address this important issue. | Party Submissions | 19.150629 | 19.846342 | 21.244713 |
Nutrition Act of 1966 to prohibit the use of cell-cultivated meat under the school lunch program and the school breakfast program. | Legislation | 10.617097 | 8.777073 | 12.047289 |
When the Court considered whether a breach of an implied warranty, under the UCC article 2, violated an applicable legal standard, the Court again noted that the nature of an implied warranty is a tort. See JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. 2008). | Party Submissions | 7.69647 | 7.103601 | 8.732551 |
In response to Question No. 4, the jury found Steven Terry liable for $6 million in exemplary damages and Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P. liable for $1 million in exemplary damages. The issue of attorney's fees damages arising from the property owners’ post-judgment collection efforts and the bankruptcy proceedings against HSM was presented to the trial court for resolution. The court signed a final judgment awarding HSM “$15,395,910.20 (representing $14,303,316.50 in actual damages, plus prejudgment interest of $3,444,575.25, both having been appropriately reduced by a settlement credit of $6,000,000), plus additional prejudgment interest at the rate of $1,635.60 per day from December 20, 2019, until the day before this judgment was signed, [ ] $6,000,000 in exemplary damages against Defendant Steven K. Terry, and [ ] $1,000,000 in exemplary damages against Defendant Newsom, Terry & Newsom.” Terry timely brought this appeal. | Party Submissions | 6.106632 | 6.043304 | 6.357358 |
Flaven’s only “duty” to the BNC Sellers was a contractual one, which the BNC Sellers argued in the underlying trial, cannot form the basis of an RTP designation. See 17RR740–45. Although the BNC 30 Sellers’ trial counsel in the underlying trial took a different position in the malpractice trial, HSMiller (who relied on testimony from the BNC Sellers’ former trial counsel) has pointed to no evidence or legal authority to support the position change, i.e., that the Flaven RTP designation would ever have been granted, no matter when it was filed. | Party Submissions | 17.621267 | 16.329466 | 20.166586 |
For the reasons stated herein, we deny the Martinez Family's petition for writ of mandamus but conclude that Hellas has met its burden to establish its right to mandamus relief. We therefore grant a conditional writ ordering the district court presiding over the tort suit (Travis County No. D-1-GN-19-004416) to abate the litigation until there is a final decision in the suit for judicial review of the DWC's final order. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c). The writ will issue only if the trial court [*23] fails to comply. | Party Submissions | 6.107637 | 6.450455 | 7.266273 |
Mesquite Logistics ultimately filed a motion to dismiss Berrelez's suit based on the *72 exclusive remedy provision of the Act and Berrelez's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies thereunder. Berrelez responded, arguing her claims were “excepted” from the Act pursuant to section 406.032(1) (C), which provides an insurance carrier is not liable for compensation if the employee's injuries were the result of an act of a third person who intended to injure the employee for personal reasons that were not directed at the employee as an employee or because of her employment. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032(1)(C) (West 2015). This exception is commonly referred to as the “personal animosity” exception. See, e.g., Walls Reg'l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806–07 (Tex. 1999); Nasser v. Sec. Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. 1987). | Party Submissions | 4.612546 | 4.714109 | 4.867735 |
Any and all documents representing “ the basic report of the Republic Geodetic Authority No. 952-297/03 of April 9, 2003 ” as referred to on page 1 of the Additional Report Regarding the Registration of Enterprise in Real Estate Cadaster prepared by the Republic Geodetic Institute of Serbia on 20 May 2003 (exhibit R-130) According to exhibit R-130, the requested documents show “immovables” owned or used by Obnova in April 2003. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to establish what was Serbia’s and Obnova’s contemporaneous understanding of Obnova’s rights to i ts premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. | Legal Decisions | 12.604605 | 12.646382 | 12.753202 |
The Tribunal’s analysis 586. Article 40(1) does not impose on the Tribunal the obligation to apply the principle by which arbitration costs are “borne by the unsuccessful party,” but instead states that the Tribunal may deviate from this rule at its discretion if it determines that a different apportionment is reasonable “taking into account the circumstances of the case.” As for the costs of legal representation and assistance, Article 40(2) grants the Tribunal broad discretion to apportion such costs in a reasonable manner taking into account the circumstances of the case. | Legal Decisions | 6.268173 | 5.630733 | 6.256427 |
The Walkers’ experts’ reports were insufficient to meet their burden under section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for all reasons identified in Baptist St. Anthony’s Brief on the Merits. Issue No. 2: The Walkers’ experts’ reports failed to “explain, to a reasonable degree, how and why [Dr. Castillo’s claimed] breach caused [H.W.’s] injury based on the facts presented.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539-40 (Tex. 2010). They were, therefore, insufficient to satisfy the Walkers’ burden under section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. | Party Submissions | 6.052038 | 6.155808 | 7.045227 |
F. ... If it is determined [by audit] that royalty owner has not been correctly paid all sums owed him, then Lessee shall reimburse the requesting royalty owner for all costs and expenses incurred by Lessor for such audit, together with all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon. | Party Submissions | 13.892136 | 13.196001 | 15.230511 |
Most of the time when a lawyer is accused of gross negligence in rendering professional services, he has either missed a limitations deadline so that the claim is entirely barred, or he has some personal interest in making the decision he made. There is neither here. This was a reasonable judgment call (an issue the courts are in a much better position to decide than a jury, given the legal complexities of the decision). Terry was not looking out for his own interest in making these strategic decisions. | Party Submissions | 13.793865 | 14.315336 | 15.034928 |
Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to grandfathering, continuation, or otherwise carrying forward obligations contained in NAFTA Chapter 11 by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to grandfathering, continuation, or otherwise carrying forward obligations contained in NAFTA Chapter 11. | Legal Decisions | 5.776032 | 6.215247 | 6.161199 |
The Lawyers’ third excuse is that Terry allegedly made a good- faith judgment call not to designate Flaven. Lawyers’ Brief at 76-77. | Party Submissions | 41.596066 | 41.581013 | 48.755753 |
Samson needs to substitute terms to support its erroneous interpretation. The leases distinguish between Late Charges and “interest.” They refer to Late Charges in only two places: arts. XVII.C and XVII.F (the audit provision). If an audit determines a royalty owner “has not been correctly paid all sums owed him,” the audit provision requires the Lessee to reimburse that owner for all costs and expenses of the audit, plus “all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon.” The leases thus distinguish and separate “late charges” and “interest.” Contracting parties are presumed to intend different things when they use different language in different parts of a contract. used different words. See Sundown Energy LP v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship, 622 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. 2021). “Late Charges” are triggered by past due royalties and compensatory royalties. Art. XVII.C. Such royalties include the usual reserved royalties on production subject to the lease (art. III), compensatory royalties on production not subject to the lease (art. VI.B), as well as shut-in royalties (art. III.B.5) and minimum royalties (art. V.H). “Interest” would be due on payments other than royalty, such as delay rentals (art. IV), force majeure payments (art. XIII), 25% of take-or-pay payments (art. XVII.J), and 25% of contractual modification benefits (art. XVII.J). | Party Submissions | 8.017886 | 7.790919 | 8.342921 |
By: _________________________ Eric C. Opiela State Bar No. 24039095 [email protected] I hereby certify that I have reviewed the above Reply Brief and have concluded that every factual statement in the said petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or record. I further certify that the documents contained in the appendix are true and correct copies of those documents in the possession of Relator. | Party Submissions | 6.261147 | 8.137688 | 8.571839 |
What is the legal situation under Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement specifically in relation to Claimant’s La Rosita lot and the alleged requirement to obtain a CUSTF (Authorisation for Soil-Use Change in Forested Terrains / Autorización de Cambio de Uso del Suelo en Terrenos Forestales)? | Party Submissions | 15.255747 | 17.525333 | 16.7157 |
That standard has been met here. Contrary to Yellowfin’s assertion, see Resp. Br. 19-21, this case involves not a simple delay in enforcement but rather an intentional failure by the holders of the junior indebtedness to contact Santos or inform her whether any balance was still outstanding after foreclosure. | Party Submissions | 18.538567 | 20.227926 | 26.029758 |
Taub v. Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 456 n. 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed.1990)). | Party Submissions | 3.437334 | 4.111869 | 4.110705 |
The guaranty also contained a termination clause that provided: that any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of that certain building generally located at 1111 Rusk Street in Houston, Texas. | Party Submissions | 8.335047 | 9.626923 | 10.094163 |
E : As stated in Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, the case file for this decision does not exist as this is a draft decision.192 In fact, this draft concerns the same case file from Claimant’s request no. 32. | Legal Decisions | 30.087784 | 24.96453 | 26.653687 |
Despite that Mann has very little to no memory of the pedestrian-vehicle accident itself, there is no conclusive evidence that he was in the course and scope of employment as claimed by Bay. Thus, it is a bona fide fact question for the jury to decide if Bay has standing to assert the defense at all. | Party Submissions | 16.56973 | 17.830088 | 19.916313 |
Nor can Respondents reframe the court of appeals’ decision as the mere enforcement of a “voluntary agreement” by which Westwood abandoned its ultimate right to possess the premises or gave up its claims in district court (Resp. 21-22, 33)—because Westwood did no such thing. Respondents place great weight on the fact that Westwood did not merely dismiss its appeal in the forcible entry and detainer action, but further “affirmatively agree[d]” to the agreed judgment (Resp. 16). To Respondents, this makes the dismissal effective as a “Rule 11 agreement” ( id. 21, 28). They also insist that this supposed “agree[ment]” in the agreed judgment is far more critical to understanding the lower court’s decision of the court below than the agreed judgment’s legal effect as a “judgment.” (Resp. 20) But Westwood’s previous counsel agreed to that judgment only “AS TO FORM.” (DX43) And Respondents have taken inconsistent positions on whether this “Rule 11 agreement” actually exists (Resp. 33) and what it is supposed to do. | Party Submissions | 10.381674 | 10.444229 | 10.607753 |
The time crunch is Relator’s fault. According to Relator’s evidence, Justice Devine’s petition was filed on November 14. Exs.A,C. At that time, Relator was the only individual who could have possibly known about these alleged defects. Yet he waited until December 27, 2023, to bring his administrative challenge to Chairman Rinaldi. Ex.A. Even then, his letter invoked no urgency. Ex.A. Only on January 5, 2024 (the same day Relator filed this lawsuit in this Court), did he follow-up with Rinaldi, demanding action “within the next hour.” Ex.D. Relator cannot demand this Court work on an emergency schedule and remove Justice Devine from the ballot when he waited 52 days to file this mandamus petition. | Party Submissions | 9.461176 | 10.50596 | 10.44661 |
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to evaluate the Court of Appeals’ decision if the appeal presents a question of law important to the jurisprudence of the state. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a). However, it would be imprudent to exercise such jurisdiction to grant review of a case that does not present a novel question of law, particularly where, as is the case here, governmental immunity is waived for a payment-for-services contract. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. Further, contrary to Ames’s contention, there is no conflict between the courts of appeals on any issue of law meriting review, as Ames simply contends that the Court of Appeals reached an unfavorable conclusion in the underlying case (the underlying Contract is a payment-for-services agreement for which immunity was waived), and other courts — reviewing different contracts with different terms — have reviewed those different contracts and decided in some cases immunity was not waived. | Party Submissions | 7.008101 | 7.378702 | 7.039249 |
Foremost, Oncor ignores the express language of section 1.111(e)(2) which makes such agreements final with regard to any matter “which may be corrected under § 25.25.” The statute is not specific to section 25.25(c-1) or (d), it simply refers to section 25.25, which presumably encompasses all sub-sections of section 25.25. And, of course, cases such as Houston Cement have held that section 25.25(c) motions are precluded by a section 1.111(e) agreement. | Party Submissions | 8.649461 | 9.018712 | 9.49421 |
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement for the purpose of establishing the terms and conditions of RSUs (as defined below) that have been granted to the Participant. | Contract | 5.372641 | 5.013163 | 6.888831 |
There are no disputed facts in this case. At this point, there is no dispute that (1) when Cochran received the Alabama judgment on July 13, 2001, for purposes of section 406.075, he "elected" to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws; 11 (2) Cochran did in fact receive benefits under Alabama's laws; (3) Sonic filed its claim for reimbursement under the TWCA on July 17, 2001; and (4) [*476] Sonic sought reimbursement as Cochran's subclaimant. In light of these undisputed [**15] circumstances, the question before us in this appeal is a narrow one: if a claimant is barred from recovering benefits under the TWCA due to his election to pursue and recover benefits under the laws of another state, is that claimant's subclaimant barred from receiving reimbursement under section 409.009 after the claimant's "election" has occurred? | Party Submissions | 5.923515 | 6.078299 | 6.008611 |
In any case, the Court of Appeals’ decisions cited by Yellowfin do not warrant any respect as to the issues here. One case cited by Yellowfin does not address the statute of limitations issue at all. See Washington v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2022 WL 16646409, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The other two decisions, Smith v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2023 WL 2596070 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), and Thompson v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2023 WL 17492 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), rely largely on Santos— the decision under review — which says nothing about whether that decision is correct. | Party Submissions | 4.247794 | 4.392364 | 4.600907 |
To amend title 31, United States Code, to provide for a joint meeting of the Congress to receive a presentation from the Comptroller General of the United States regarding the audited financial statement of the executive branch, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.507883 | 3.433525 | 4.556135 |
This case presents a similar pattern. While the nurses are accused of not gathering or reporting additional data, there is no indication that the outcome would have been any different if they had. There is no explanation of what Dr. Castillo (or anyone else) would have done differently if the additional data was obtained and reported. Further, Dr. Castillo was aware of the clinical presentation, including the fetal heart rate, and was at the bedside for the majority (if not all) of the critical time periods. (CR.789-90) Nowhere in the reports is there an indication that the nurses could have done anything in contradiction to Dr. Castillo’s orders, or that they could have administered or discontinued medication when Dr. Castillo was aware of the clinical presentation and in the room and giving orders to them. As in Zamarripa, there is no causal link between the alleged nursing failures and the ultimate harm. See also Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Davidson, No. 14-15-00643-CV, 2016 WL 2935715, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (report insufficient when showed physicians were aware of clinical findings and now showing additional communications with physician would have made a difference); Hollingsworth, 353 S.W.3d at 523 (expert failed to explain what actions would have resulted from initiation of chain of command, rendering report insufficient). Courts cannot create missing explanations. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461. The Amarillo Court was correct to recognize and apply this truism. | Party Submissions | 7.101499 | 6.748719 | 7.694784 |
Death Benefit. In the event of the Participant’s death, his or her designated Beneficiary(ies) shall be entitled to a Death Benefit as set forth in Section 6.1(c). The Death Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Participant’s unpaid vested Account Balances and shall be payable in a single lump sum. | Contract | 3.720348 | 3.32753 | 4.019126 |
Devine disingenuously cites to John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) for a jumbled assertion that signers “’express the view”’ that the candidate ‘”should be considered by the whole electorate’” – even ‘”if the signer is agnostic’” as to whether that candidate should be elected” Id. at 195. However, that case has absolutely nothing to do with a situation where an individual is restricted to signing a candidate ballot petition for only one candidate. Notably, every single case cited by Devine relates to matters other than ballot application petition signatures. Reed, 561 U.S. at 191 (concerning “whether disclosure of referendum petitions in general [violates the First Amendment]); Clingman, 544 U.S. 581 (upholding semi-closed primary system); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (federal campaign finance regulation; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding prohibition against appearing twice on a ballot); Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2020) (upholding governor’s mail ballot order during pandemic); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)(upholding write-in restrictions). | Party Submissions | 5.733837 | 5.733896 | 5.986148 |
Misstatements of the law. But these repeated phrases also did something more harmful by misleading and confusing the jury and misstating the court’s obligation to strike an RTP if no evidence has been produced for its responsibility. | Party Submissions | 55.61448 | 39.969467 | 59.587776 |
MVP appears to rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 52 (citing, e.g., In re Longoria, 470 S.W.3d 616, 625 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding)). MVP does not explain what aspect of equitable estoppel it asserts, but this Court has not recognized the “concerted-misconduct doctrine” in the forum-selection clause context. Pinto Tech., 526 S.W.3d at 446. And as to “direct benefits” estoppel, in the arbitration context, this Court has concluded it is not enough that a party’s claim “relates to” a contract containing an arbitration agreement. G.T. Leach Builders, 458 S.W.3d at 527 (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). “Instead, the party must seek ‘to deprive a direct benefit’—that is, a benefit that ‘stems directly’—from that contract.” Id. (quoting Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 741). | Party Submissions | 4.580792 | 4.901804 | 4.709198 |
This letter contains certain objections to the Report on the Strategic Environmental Assessment of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights. | Legal Decisions | 17.441835 | 17.356758 | 18.328842 |
The Klorer-Reed owners argued their facts differed enough from Hooks to overcome Samson’s ratification defense, but ultimately lost that argument. See T.S. Reed, 521 S.W.3d at 38. But Samson contended that they could not even oppose Samson on the merits due to whatever Hooks had held. According to Samson, Hooks supplied the “law of the case” for the other owners in the original Klorer case. In its later appeal to this Court, Samson’s oral argument exhibits reflected that “law of the case” argument it had started making in the trial court: Tab 11 in Samson’s Oral Argument Exhibits in Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017), Case No. 15-0886, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=841dac28-f4d9-476b-8945-f9d5b916c7d5&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=c5cd9329-01f3- 4033-acb9-9f37288e1961. | Party Submissions | 11.699096 | 9.794521 | 11.796212 |
This RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is made as of the Date of Grant set forth above by and between UNITED RENTALS, INC., a Delaware corporation, having an office at 100 First Stamford Place, Suite 700 Stamford, CT 06902 (the “Company”), and Awardee (together with the Company, the “Parties”), currently an employee of the Company or an affiliate of the Company. | Contract | 2.963199 | 3.0404 | 3.011105 |
As MVP seems to concede, MVP’s Brief at 28, MVP was required to “(1) establish the existence of a valid [forum-selection] agreement; and (2) show that the claims asserted are within the scope of the agreement.” Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P ., 564 S.W.3d 105, 117 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); see also In re Harris Corp., No. 03-13-00192-CV, 2013 WL 2631700, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 4, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Geo-Tech Found. Repair v. Leggett, No. 02-16-00289-CV, 2017 WL 1173840, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, it was MVP’s initial burden to establish both that RLB was bound by and that RLB’s claims fall within the scope of MCC paragraph 47.7 containing the forum-selection/choice-of-law and “waiver” provisions. Although forum-selection clauses may be presumed valid and enforceable, this presumption does not relieve MVP of its initial burden. | Party Submissions | 4.230504 | 4.677586 | 4.443434 |
Beginning with Sonic's argument that it is entitled to reimbursement under section 409.009 because the voluntary payments were made prior to Cochran's election to recover benefits under Alabama's laws, although Sonic's payments preceded the Alabama judgment, this does not necessitate the conclusion that Sonic is therefore entitled to seek benefits under the TWCA after Cochran was barred from receiving [*478] benefits. 16 Under section 406.075, Cochran was barred from recovering benefits under the TWCA when Sonic pursued reimbursement under section 409.009 as Cochran's subclaimant. | Party Submissions | 9.258673 | 9.397491 | 10.247473 |
Allowing parties to avoid their accrued breaches of contract through delay is the antithesis of Texas lending law. Indeed, the Opinion directly conflicts with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in Person v. MC-Simpsonville, SC-1-UT, LLC, No. 03-20-00560-CV, 2021 WL 3816332 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 27, 2021, no pet.), upholding the principle that a prior breach is enforceable notwithstanding subsequent attempt to trigger sunset termination. A tenant defaulted on its lease obligations and the landlord sued the tenant and guarantor. Id. at *2. As here, the guaranty agreement provided that the guarantor’s obligations would “be immediately due and payable. .. immediately upon the occurrence of a default under the Lease.” Id. at *3. In this case, the termination clause was arguably triggered during the litigation, and the Opinion assumed arguendo that the guaranty terminated. Id. at *2. | Party Submissions | 6.678836 | 6.987827 | 7.210388 |
Article 4 Italy shall carry out administrative and on-the-spot checks in accordance with Articles 59 and 60 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( ). | Legislation | 6.249851 | 6.206704 | 7.634445 |
As with a person who chooses not to wear a seatbelt and then is injured in an accident, or a person who ingests illegal substances and then dies, HSMiller’s negligent decisions also should have been considered when the malpractice jury was deciding who contributed to causing the underlying judgment against it. See Nabors, 456 S.W.3d at 559-64 (holding that plaintiff’s fault in increasing their damages by not wearing seat belts must be submitted in the liability and apportionment questions); Arrendondo, 408 S.W.3d at 830-32 (holding that deceased’s own comparative negligence in ingesting illegal drugs should be submitted to jury). | Party Submissions | 8.454894 | 8.329508 | 8.955867 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date. | Party Submissions | 8.685042 | 7.921706 | 8.740299 |
Petitioner claims the appellate court “mischaracterized” its own standard of review to justify its request for rehearing, and created a split in authority on how to determine motions to compel arbitration when two contracts are at issue. | Party Submissions | 13.673474 | 12.924476 | 12.519939 |
A parent-child relationship may be terminated if a trial court finds that a parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). When deciding whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence of a parent who “knowingly places or knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions or surrounding which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of a child,” ... “the relevant time frame ... is before the child w as removed.” Ybarra v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. App. —Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). As well, “abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of child’s home can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional wellbeing of a child.” In the Interest of C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d at 392-93 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.). | Party Submissions | 3.511612 | 4.071948 | 4.06012 |
This is a pleading burden, as this Court has determined that “[i]f additional facts would be necessary to state. .. a viable claim falling within a waiver or exception to immunity, then the plaintiff has not affirmatively demonstrated the court's jurisdiction. In such a case, a plea to the jurisdiction should be granted.” Id. | Party Submissions | 10.069621 | 11.764946 | 14.432688 |
Cadaster Plans ( in Serbian: katastarski planovi ) that have been prepared between 1946 and 1995 and include Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and the Surrounding Area. | Legal Decisions | 13.736109 | 15.6471 | 12.990314 |
First, there is no showing that Joekel’s arbitration experience is with claims similar to Rafiei’s claims. Joeckel handles “employment and nonsubscriber cases.” CR108. That is an important practice area, but the cases are not shown to be similar to high value products liability personal injury cases. Recall that Rafiei’s injuries occurred when a garbage disposal exploded with enough force to create the potential of a seven-figure damage award. | Party Submissions | 20.28527 | 23.840603 | 24.30496 |
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER prays this Court reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to the characterization of the marital assets in question and affirm the judgment of the trial court; or, alternatively, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to the rendering of judgment and, instead, remand the matter to the trial court for new trial on the merits of the remaining issues. | Party Submissions | 6.359674 | 7.049382 | 8.218748 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results. | Party Submissions | 4.423625 | 3.996976 | 5.107457 |
The Court of Appeals, therefore, appropriately dismissed their claims, and its decision should be affirmed. Dr. Castillo also prays the Court tax her costs of appeal against the Walkers and grant her all other relief as this Court deems just. | Party Submissions | 14.748232 | 17.493118 | 20.034658 |
To direct the Federal Communications Commission to establish a program to make grants available to States to inform Medicaid enrollees, SNAP participants, and low-income residents of potential eligibility for the Af-fordable Connectivity and Lifeline programs of the Commission, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 7.08252 | 8.04708 | 7.169703 |
Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.1996) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702). Under the TMLA, a witness offering opinion testimony on causation must be otherwise qualified “ under the Texas Rules of Evidence. ” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.351(r)(5)(C). Texas Rule of Evidence 702, in turn, instructs that a witness may offer causation testimony when “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702)). | Party Submissions | 4.061016 | 4.348128 | 4.374694 |
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to require the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test a model to improve access to specialty health services for certain Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. | Legislation | 4.561616 | 3.978542 | 3.914954 |
Arbitration, the exact paragraphs of which they reference: See Request for Arbitration, par.31-32, pp. 9-10 and Exhibit 20. | Legal Decisions | 19.873846 | 22.078732 | 22.397356 |
Just so. This Court should dismiss Walker’s petition for failure to comply with Rule 52.3(e) or deny it as coming too late. | Party Submissions | 17.808327 | 18.30965 | 26.613745 |
The trial court’s order made the jurisdictional resolution a priority, while allowing Galovelho to request leave to amend its pleadings if it wished to do so. By – 25– failing to seek leave to amend, Galovelho has failed to preserve error for our review. We overrule Gal ovelho’ s sixth issue. | Party Submissions | 14.87567 | 21.807598 | 20.271603 |
Sept. 21, 2021) and M.S.A. § 334.01 (“interest shall not be compounded”); North Dakota ( see Haider v. Montgomery, 423 N.W.2d 494, 495 (N.D. 1988) and N.D.C.C., 47-14-09 (“in the computation of interest the same may not be compounded”); South Dakota ( see S.D.C.L. § 51A-12-15); and Wisconsin ( see WISC. STATS ANN. §138.05 (interest upon any bond, note, or other instrument or agreement, “shall not be compounded, nor shall the interest thereon be construed to bear interest, unless an agreement to that effect is clearly expressed in writing”). Texas has no comparable statute pertinent to this case. | Party Submissions | 5.994404 | 5.482203 | 6.882409 |
Seabron and Mr. Heo waived an appraisal and a determination by the Court of the fair market value of the Property. | Party Submissions | 21.181118 | 26.589226 | 31.157831 |
To redesignate the Richard H. Poff Federal Building located at 210 Franklin Road Southwest in Roanoke, Virginia, as the ‘‘Reuben E. Lawson Fed-eral Building’’, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 10.281235 | 7.88706 | 9.424397 |
In Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999), the court found that requiring an employee to pay for one-half the arbitrator’s fees failed to pass the “accessible forum” requirement for federal statutory claims. This Court has interpreted Shankle as “holding that fee-splitting arrangements per se unconscionable” and rejected that holding. In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 356 (Tex. 2008). The Fifth Circuit has similarly rejected Shankle, as have several other federal circuit courts. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 712 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Morris on v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 659-60 (6th Cir. 2003); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555 -56 (4th Cir. 2001). | Party Submissions | 4.793912 | 4.461528 | 4.888916 |
Bay is not arguing on appeal that Mann is covered under Bay's own workers' compensation policy so that argument is waived on appeal. Nonetheless, the *12 uncontested summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Bay's non-ROCIP policy specifically excludes Bay employees assigned to Valero's Bill Greehey Refinery. 26 Thus, Bay has not and cannot come forward with a policy that it obtained for itself and it must seek its coverage elsewhere. | Party Submissions | 21.278751 | 24.650896 | 28.142355 |
R: [...] Hay que decir que la empresa lo hizo: interpuso un juicio de amparo, al menos está documentado en el expediente, el 431 del 2022 ante el juez séptimo del distrito de Quintana Roo, y pidió la suspensión. Lo que ocurrió es que pidió la suspensión o reclamó actos con relación a predios distintos a La Rosita. Lo pidió respecto a La Adelita y El Corchalito, si no mal recuerdo. | Party Submissions | 11.734534 | 20.803543 | 15.139202 |
RLB respectfully requests the Court grant mandamus relief and vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and instructions to the trial court to dismiss the Texas Lawsuit. RLB requests such other relief to which it is entitled. | Party Submissions | 10.195427 | 13.09626 | 14.486446 |
Wilbarger CAD, as a political subdivision of the state, is immune from the present action under the DJA because governmental immunity bars DJA actions against the state and its political divisions absent a legislative waiver. See TEX. TAX CODE § 6.01(c); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. | Party Submissions | 6.802906 | 7.687158 | 7.557105 |
The case of Zeon Chemicals, L.P. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-20-00798-CV, 2022 WL 619681 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] March 3, 2022, no pet. ) is not opposed. Therein, the appraisal district and property owner entered a § 1.111(e) agreement regarding value, but did not enter any agreement regarding Zeon’s application for exemption. The court held that Zeon was still free to contest the denial of its exemption. Oncor cites the case for the proposition that § 1.111(e) agreements only cover matters which they purport to cover. Wilbarger CAD does not disagree. The fallacy in Oncor’s argument is that its § 25.25(c)(1) and (3) motion does seek to alter value, the only subject of the § 1.111(e) agreement at issue. An exemption is not a value issue. Note that value is determined under Chapter 23 of the Tax Code while exemptions are covered under Chapter 11. See also TEX. TAX CODE § 25.02, which specifies the contents of an appraisal record. It requires, among other things, a listing of the appraised value of the property, subsections (a)(5) and (6) and any applicable exemption, subsection (9). It does not require the description of how many miles of what type of transmission line or any other detail of the appraisal of the property in issue. That is because things such how many miles of what type of transmission line constitute the subject property is subsumed in value. Exemptions are something else. | Party Submissions | 5.971199 | 6.803719 | 6.059965 |
The focus of the alleged malpractice claim concerned decisions counsel in the underlying trial made regarding a purported responsible third party. The RTP issue was a core issue at trial. HSMiller frames its issue as an intellectual conundrum facing all trial judges in legal malpractice cases. It asserts that legal malpractice cases warrant different rules for the introduction of evidence and jury charge instructions. | Party Submissions | 27.065052 | 23.338343 | 29.521336 |
To direct the Federal Communications Commission to issue reports after activation of the Disaster Information Reporting System and to make improvements to network outage reporting, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 12.610992 | 10.82474 | 12.593829 |
Pildegovics claims, and Norway denies, that Norway’s actions resulted in Sea & Coast’s business drying up as North Star and its other customers ceased harvesting snow crab and thus no longer required the services of Sea & Coast. | Legal Decisions | 30.583582 | 40.945248 | 34.86647 |
Contemporaneous documents concerning any information about, due diligence on, or inquiry into, the rights of Obnova as regards the Objects and the Dunavska Plots and/or Obnova's entitlement to compensation in relation to the 2013 DRP obtained by Mr Broshko from 2012 onwards, and in particular between 24 February 2016 and 14 November 2017, i.e. between the Land Directorate's letter announcing the planned demolition of Obnova's buildings affected by the 2013 DRP and the time of the alleged investment, including any communications, e-mails, analyses, notes, or memoranda on this issue, in particular exchanged between (i) Mr Broshko and/or his advisors or representatives or MLI on the one hand and (ii) Mr Rand or his advisors or representatives, and/or the Ahola Family Trust and/or their advisors or representatives, and/or the Cypriot Claimants and/or their advisors or representatives, and/or Mr Obradović and/or his advisors or representatives, and/or Obnova and/or its advisors or representatives on the other hand. | Legal Decisions | 7.531967 | 7.650682 | 7.776451 |
To authorize rural health facilities to use certain Federal agricultural credit assistance for the purpose of refinancing debt obligations, updating necessary services, technology, and equipment, and supporting ancillary needs. | Legislation | 29.192356 | 23.723837 | 30.572025 |
Pierce also is irrelevant here because the objection in this case was made to the two paraphrased non-statutory instructions that directly addressed a single, major issue running throughout trial: to survive a motion to strike Flaven as an RTP, was Terry required to show more than a simple breach of contract? Since the second paraphrased non-statutory instruction explicitly instructed the jury on this legal issue, the trial court would have known what issue Terry was addressing. (8RR7-20, 34-35, 185-190; 9SCR8405-08; 20RR658-61; CR541-52) Regardless of what objections Terry did or did not make at the charge conference, Terry is entitled to respond to HSMiller’s claim that the court of appeals holding should be reversed because the instruction improperly stated the law. | Party Submissions | 17.552418 | 17.997885 | 18.93944 |
IT IS ORDERED that until the child reaches age seven (7), the electronic communication shall be for a period of up to fifteen (15) minutes. | Party Submissions | 10.419911 | 16.031055 | 16.007662 |
It is Respondent's case that Claimants have not discharged their burden of proof in establishing that Kalemegdan has made an "investment" within the meaning of both Article 1(1) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT and Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. They have provided no evidence that Kalemegdan made a contribution or otherwise "caused" an investment to be made in Serbia, whether through the expenditure of money or some other effort in exchange for the Obnova shares. On the contrary, Kalemegdan passively acquired the Obnova shares, without having paid any consideration and without any apparent ability to fund Obnova. | Legal Decisions | 7.397762 | 7.279314 | 7.003083 |
To require reports on critical mineral and rare earth element resources around the world and a strategy for the development of advanced mining, refining, separation, and processing technologies. | Legislation | 14.882284 | 13.04291 | 15.149365 |
Second, given the vague wording of Serbia’s request, potential responsive documents would cover, for example, any forms of communication between Coropi’s shareholders and/or Coropi’s directors and Claimants’ lega l or other advisors. There are potentially hundreds of such responsive documents. A search for all such documents and their potential production, or even their inclusion in a privilege log, would be unreasonably burdensome (Article 9(2)(c) of the IBA Rules). | Legal Decisions | 14.258789 | 14.114956 | 15.590688 |
Several of Weatherford’s statements of fact assume evidence expressly excluded by the Trial Court and mischaracterize the facts as they relate to Midland’s sewer system. As such, the City provides this restated Statement of the Facts. | Party Submissions | 21.793642 | 23.858355 | 27.900928 |
Mr. Lukas Montoya Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler 3-5 rue du Conseil-Général P.O. Box 552 CH-1211 Geneva 4 Switzerland [email protected] 8.6. The Assistant shall submit his claims for fees and expenses to the ICSID Secretariat on a quarterly basis. | Legal Decisions | 11.173159 | 10.240156 | 10.443163 |
This Court in 2015 reversed the First Court of Appeals’ initial decision in Hooks and remanded it for further action. Samson still insisted that the prior First Court of Appeals decision in Hooks bound the other owners in the severed case as to “all issues the Supreme Court’s decision did not reverse or address”: Samson’s Supplemental Brief of February 23, 2015, to the Ninth Court of Appeals in T.S. Reed, at 18, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=0068f947-108a-4c7d-a96e-519858e251aa&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=50524136-16e0- 4ed2-80f0-742a82871955. | Party Submissions | 12.166149 | 9.572712 | 12.186073 |
Arbitration Rule 6 13.1. The ICSID Secretariat shall be the channel of written communications between the Parties and the Tribunal. | Legal Decisions | 10.238266 | 10.465095 | 10.971412 |
The Election Code’s prohibition on individuals signing multiple candidates’ petitions burdens both signers’ and candidates’ First Amendment rights and corresponding speech and association rights under Texas law. Signers “express the view” that the candidate “should be considered by the whole electorate”—even “if the signer is agnostic” as to whether that candidate should be elected. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 195 (2010) (cleaned up). Petition signing therefore “implicates a First Amendment right” and “remains expressive even when it has legal effect in the electoral process.” Id. Likewise, candidates have the First Amendment right to associate with other citizens: “the First Amendment, among other things, protects the right of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (cleaned up). | Party Submissions | 5.116575 | 5.281791 | 5.444338 |
Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request. | Legal Decisions | 14.538063 | 10.749494 | 13.81025 |
First Year of Eligibility. In the case of the first (1st) year in which an Eligible Employee becomes eligible to participate in the Plan, if permitted by the Committee, he or she has up to thirty (30) days following his or her initial eligibility to submit a Compensation Deferral Agreement with respect to Compensation to be earned during such year. The Compensation Deferral Agreement described in this paragraph becomes irrevocable upon the end of such thirty (30) day period, or such earlier date as the Committee may provide. The determination of whether an Eligible Employee may file a Compensation Deferral Agreement under this paragraph shall be determined in accordance with the rules of Code Section 409A, including the provisions of Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(a)(7). A Compensation Deferral Agreement submitted under this paragraph applies only to Compensation earned on and after the date the Compensation Deferral Agreement becomes irrevocable. | Contract | 3.235705 | 3.284162 | 3.511897 |
Petitioner ’s request for rehearing should be denied. The Appellate Court’s Opinion does not conflict with the past precedent of this Court, nor does it create a split of authority. The Appellate Court properly applied the correct standard of review through every step of its analysis. Furthermore, the opinions of this Court cited by Petitioner are not disrupted by the Appellate Opinion as they can co-exist in harmony given the significant factual and legal deviations this matter has from those upon which Petitioner relied. Therefore, Respondents respectfully request the Court deny Petitioner ’s Motion for Rehearing, and grant such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled. | Party Submissions | 6.412977 | 6.422806 | 6.89489 |
Buttercup Pool ’s written safety policy requires camps to actively supervise campers with at least one camp counselor for every ten campers. Under the policy, if a camp does not have enough counselors present to satisfy this requirement, the camp should be denied entry to the pool. Some evidence in the record suggests that, on the day in question, High Hopes Summer Camp was admitted to the pool with only ten 1 This appeal was transferred to us from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV ’ T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). | Party Submissions | 6.003859 | 7.361416 | 7.005 |
This case is the result of Oncor filing a motion under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) to attempt to avoid that agreement. | Party Submissions | 17.508886 | 18.388931 | 22.89863 |
Eleven months later, Dunn filed a motion to strike the designation of responsible [*3] third parties. She urged, in part, that Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which includes the responsible third party statute, does not apply to the case because it is an action to collect benefits under the workers' compensation laws of Texas. In response, ETMC Athens argued, in part, that Dunn waived her objections to the designations, Dunn failed to argue there was no evidence supporting the designations, and that its status as a nonsubscriber does not alter the availability of a responsible third party designation. After conducting two hearings, Respondent granted the 3 ETMC EMS v. Dunn, No. 12-19-00152-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1006, 2020 WL 562971, at *6, 8 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 5, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). motion to strike. This original proceeding followed. | Party Submissions | 5.78297 | 6.21614 | 6.497609 |
Separation from Service Benefit. Separation from Service Benefit means the benefit payable to a Participant under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) of the Plan as a result of the Participant’s Separation from Service. | Contract | 3.29502 | 3.372491 | 3.98436 |
The election by Executive to not renew any Successive Term pursuant to Section 1.1 shall not be a termination for Good Reason and shall not entitle Executive to Severance Pay. However, the election by the Company to not renew any Successive Term pursuant to Section 1.1 shall be deemed to be a termination without Cause effective as of the termination of the Successive Term and shall entitle Executive to Severance Pay as hereinafter provided or the severance benefits described in Section 3.6 hereof, as applicable. | Contract | 4.569641 | 5.255111 | 5.945509 |
In April 1997, almost two years after the incident, Gaetjen filed the underlying negligence suit against Luby's. On December 10, 1997, after discovery revealed information about Aguirre's past criminal record and after urging by Luby's counsel, TIG reopened Gaetjen's claim. The parties proceeded to a benefit review conference and then a contested case hearing. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. §§ 410.021, 410.024, 410.151 (Vernon 1996). On June 21, 1998, the hearing officer found Gaetjen sustained a compensable injury and ordered TIG to pay benefits. On July 7, 1998, Gaetjen appealed this ruling. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.202 (Vernon 1996). Ten days later, Luby's requested an abatement of the September 8, 1998 trial, pending a final decision by the Commission. Luby's did not obtain a ruling on its motion. | Party Submissions | 4.255477 | 4.400853 | 4.614439 |
The Tribunal’s analysis A) Overview 530. As per its previous findings, the Tribunal will calculate the damages Respondent must pay Claimant based on the finding that an indirect creeping expropriation and a violation of both the FET and the umbrella clauses exist, to the extent stated in each section. | Legal Decisions | 22.82208 | 18.111015 | 20.961636 |
Subsets and Splits