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The Court of Appeals did not address the volume of information presented by Petitioners to demonstrate that those omissions did not render the program false. Op. | Party Submissions | 28.596298 | 30.74629 | 35.628838 |
National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) by November 27, 2023. | Legal Decisions | 12.524337 | 15.401379 | 19.86112 |
Justice Devine here would likewise be entitled to cure signature defects. He filed his application nearly a month before the statutory deadline. Ex.C. Chairman Rinaldi accepted the application on December 1, 2023. Ex.C. Understandably, Rinaldi did not identify that some of Justice Devine’s signers had, at least facially, previously signed Relator’s application, because Relator did not file his application until three days later. Ex.B. So even though it was possible for Chairman Rinaldi, as the Election Code contemplates, to have identified this facial deficiency and offered Justice Devine an opportunity to cure in the seven days between Relator’s filing and the statutory deadline, Rinaldi did not provide that opportunity. So just like the candidates in Francis, Holcomb, and Sharp, Justice Devine would be “entitled to an opportunity to cure and be included on the primary ballot.” Holcomb, 186 S.W.3d at 554. | Party Submissions | 9.638814 | 9.378316 | 10.771791 |
Liberty incorrectly argues that all it had to do was plead “the contract was signed by the mayor and therefore properly executed.” The only authority Liberty cites for this proposition is the Court of Appeals opinion in this very case. A city “may contract only upon express authorization of the city council. .. by vote of that body reflected in the minutes.” City of Bonham, 871 S.W.2d at 767. The “proof of the governing body’s acts may only be supplied by the authenticated minutes of the meeting at which the action occurred, unless the minutes have been lost or destroyed.” Id. With regard to the pleading burden, “[a] plaintiff suing to establish a contract with a city has the burden to both plead and prove that the minutes show the council’s act in authorizing or ratifying the contract.” Id. “Persons or entities contracting with the governmental unit are charged by law with notice of the limits of their authority and are bound at their peril to ascertain if the contemplated contract is properly authorized.” Id. | Party Submissions | 8.116504 | 8.78288 | 8.776295 |
We conclude that RLB and McCarthy contractually waived their respective rights under section 272.001 to void the forum-selection clause and the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. We must now determine whether MVP has an adequate remedy by appeal. | Party Submissions | 11.775132 | 14.447681 | 16.858671 |
It would be good if you could describe this process for registration and how long it takes to obtain registrations ?736 520. Ms Jensen replied on 12 June 2013: The attached regulations for registration and reporting when fishing in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction are sent for information. | Legal Decisions | 32.266895 | 31.968086 | 35.958717 |
For example, while both providers generally alleged that the reports were deficient as to causation, neither objected to the reports ’ discussion of foreseeability at any stage. The Court of Appeals, though, raised the objection sua sponte to find the reports deficient on this issue. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. | Party Submissions | 13.062988 | 12.233491 | 13.231383 |
The point is that Willacy created an exception to the finality of § 1.111(e) agreements for fraud and for fraud only. Of course, there will be an exception for fraud. How could there not be an exception for fraud? But, this Court did not make a judicial exception to the explicit legislative finality of § 1.111(e) agreements for any other reason. If anything, by not over-ruling the long list of cases affirming the finality of § 1.111(e) agreements, and even citing as authoritative Bastrop and MHCB, what this Court did was accentuate that the exception to finality of § 1.111(e) agreements is for fraud and fraud only. Fraud is a fundamentally different thing than a mutual mistake. Fraud in overt and intentional wrongdoing, a deliberate attempt to obtain a result that is neither equitable nor within the object of the statute. Willacy at 51-52. | Party Submissions | 8.693484 | 7.996301 | 9.042076 |
Aside from the Contract, Liberty claims that it is “obligated—by its permit and simple plumbing realities—to provide treatment to wastewater reaching its WWTP, including Ames’s flows exceeding the TAV.” Liberty’s Response at 14-15. However, there is nothing in Section 26.121 of the Texas Water Code (general prohibition against unauthorized waste discharges cited by Liberty) or in Liberty’s TPDES wastewater permit that requires it to specifically treat Ames’s wastewater in excess of the TAV. The real reason that Liberty has continued to accept Ames’s wastewater is that if Liberty cut off Ames, it would be cutting off service to its OWN RESIDENTS within part of Liberty’s Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (“CCN”). | Party Submissions | 10.768422 | 9.915249 | 11.102002 |
The court of appeals below opined correctly. The agreement of the parties pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e) is final and not subject to review save for fraud. | Party Submissions | 11.594917 | 12.816456 | 13.912354 |
West Headnotes (1) [1] Workers' Compensation Remand in General In employee's direct action against employer alleging bad faith denial of reasonable and timely workers' compensation benefits, Supreme Court would grant employee's petition for review of affirmance of summary judgment for employer and would remand for appropriate action, where dispute over compensability of claim was never resolved by Workers' Compensation Commission and Supreme Court could not determine whether it was still possible for employee to proceed before Commission, that has exclusive jurisdiction over entitlement to benefits. | Party Submissions | 14.159123 | 12.770441 | 13.08028 |
GREG ABBOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS; COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS, AND CITY OF FRISCO, TEXAS, Appellees On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 219-02595-2020. Opinion delivered by Justice Pedersen, III. Justices Goldstein and Rosenberg participating. | Party Submissions | 3.446253 | 4.478031 | 4.94076 |
The Legislature can rectify a mistaken judicial interpretation, and if it does not do so, there is little reason for courts to reconsider a prior statutory construction. Id .... [U]nless the Supreme Court has overruled its decision or the Legislature has superseded it by statute, [an intermediate appellate] court is bound by [the Supreme Court of Texas’s] statutory interpretation .... | Party Submissions | 8.154589 | 8.75327 | 8.661431 |
Both section 31.004(a) and section 24.008 cover more than just res judicata. Section 31.004(a) explicitly goes beyond prohibiting giving “res judicata” effect to lower court decisions by also prohibiting them from having effect as “estoppel by judgment”—i.e., “collateral estoppel.” Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied). And section 24.008 reaches further still, explicitly forbidding courts from giving any legal effect to the result in an eviction proceeding that would “bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” And both statutes have long been interpreted to reach further still, preventing “a judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction from controlling the results in a suit in a district court” for any reason—legal or factual. Genender v. Kirkwood, 506 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting McClendon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. | Party Submissions | 4.911246 | 5.253634 | 5.036213 |
Notably, “endangerment under subsection (D) focuses on evidence related to the child’s environment.” In the Interest of V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet. h.). “Environment refers to the acceptability of living conditions, as well as a parent’s conduct in the home.” Id. “A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger and the parent is aware of the danger but consciously disregards it.” Id. Moreover, “in evaluating endangerment under subsection D, the court is to consider the child’s environment before the Department obtained custody.” Id. “Subsection D is not a basis for termination of parental rights if the parent was unaware of the endangering environment.” Id. “There must be clear and convincing evidence both of endangerment and the parent’s awareness of the endangering environment.” Id. | Party Submissions | 4.742224 | 5.036838 | 5.168136 |
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 requires experts to be “qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer testimony. TEX. R. EVID. 702; see also Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996). And, although the Walkers are correct that rules about expert qualifications should not be interpreted rigidly (Pet. Br. at 40), not every “medical doctor can always testify on any issue against any other medical doctor in a medical malpractice case.” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 152; see also In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 304-05 (Tex. 2012) (“Credentials are important, but credentials alone do not qualify an expert to testify. We have observed, for example, that “a medical license does not automatically qualify the holder ‘to testify as an expert on every medical question.’”). | Party Submissions | 4.631329 | 4.777434 | 4.774784 |
Contrary to HSMiller’s assertions, this case does not involve an intellectual dilemma for trial judges in legal malpractice cases. It does not require the Court to revisit its writings on incidental instructions or consider a new twist to what might be “incidental.” There is no 6 dilemma here, only an abuse of discretion and harmful error. Under the Court’s established caselaw, the jury instruction was erroneous and reversible. | Party Submissions | 13.915406 | 13.530499 | 15.010422 |
The distinct characteristics of Rafiei’s case set it apart from this Court’s jurisprudence on prohibitive arbitration costs. Rafiei’s case presents compelling evidence that the arbitration agreement he entered into is unconscionable due to the potential prohibitive costs associated with the arbitration process. Unlike Shattenkirk, Rafiei's agreement provides a clear and detailed fee structure under the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, eliminating any speculative nature regarding the associated costs. Moreover, the absence of protective measures, such as expenditure ceilings, distinguishes this case from In re Poly-America and makes it more analogous to Santorsola, putting Rafiei at risk of bearing exorbitant fees without any ceiling or limit. A dditionally, the application of the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which lack cost caps, creates a significant distinction from In re Olshan. Overall, the arbitration agreement in this case, due to its detailed fee structure and lack of protective measures, threatens his ability to effectively vindicate his rights, rendering the agreement unconscionable. | Party Submissions | 8.698645 | 8.651826 | 9.344319 |
This Court has been clear that in defamation-by-gist cases, the “potential chilling effect [on speech] is especially strong.” Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 632 (Tex. 2018). The appellate court committed two errors in applying that complex doctrine by (1) creating an endorsement exception to the third-party-allegation rule that simply does not exist; and (2) failing to consider the truth of the actual facts the Program reported, rather than those Barina claims were omitted. This Court should grant review and reject those arguments, lest they infect Texas defamation law and imperil the press’ ability to report on complex social issues and advocate for systemic change. | Party Submissions | 10.270462 | 10.658038 | 11.136606 |
Article 1 The information that is required to be automatically exchanged pursuant to Part XX of Income Tax Act, as added by Section 78(1) of the Budget Implementation Act, 2023, No 1, and the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on automatic exchange of information on income derived through digital platforms (‘DPI-MCAA’) currently signed by the competent authorities of Canada and Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (‘the signatory Member States’) is equivalent, within the meaning of Section I, subparagraph A(7) of Annex V to Directive 2011/16/EU, to the information specified in Section III, paragraph B, of Annex V to Directive 2011/16/EU. | Legislation | 5.343817 | 5.143191 | 5.171105 |
For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage. | Legal Decisions | 11.485278 | 10.376781 | 11.849436 |
Both parties rely on Loya v. Loya, 473 S.W.3d 362, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 526 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2017), which is the most recent Texas Supreme Court opinion discussing adiscretionary bonus received by aspouse post-divorce. | Party Submissions | 5.504387 | 5.792528 | 5.858214 |
While this Court has never directly addressed a negligent undertaking in the context of either a public pool or an artificial condition, the logical extension of Wilson suggests that the City negligently undertook a duty to make Buttercup pool safe according to the Mandatory Safety Rule. Wilson, 8 S.W.3d at 636. The court of appeals’ holding is a sweeping pronouncement that owners and operators of public pools have no duty at all to protect patrons from the perils of swimming even when they promise that they will keep the premises safe. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *7. Such a holding is out of step with this Court’s jurisprudence. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 627. This Court should grant this petition to clarify under what circumstances a governmental unit assumes a duty by posting a Mandatory Safety Policy. | Party Submissions | 9.427371 | 9.594152 | 9.705868 |
Texas Bar No. 24058017 [email protected] Darryl W. Pruett Texas Bar No. 00784795 [email protected] 4201 W. Parmer Lane, Suite A100 Austin, Texas 78727 (512) 476-9944 (512) 472-2599 fax I certify that based on a word count run on Microsoft Word 365, this Reply contains 2,320 words, excluding the portions exempt from the word count under Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). | Party Submissions | 5.401112 | 7.0826 | 7.102036 |
Any and all documents based on which the company Selfnest doo was inscribed as an owner of a part of a former land plot No. 39/1 CM Stari grad (Claimants understand that the land plot was renumbered, and its borders changed recently). | Legal Decisions | 50.656845 | 51.0672 | 60.633667 |
Under Delaware law, as summarized in CKC’s petition, a material personal benefit must be alleged only in the absence of self-dealing. PFR at 16-17. The cases cited by the majority opinion fall within category 3 of Delaware’s demand-futility rubric, governing directors or managers who are insufficiently “independent.” See PFR at 17. Alpesh’s self-dealing does not fall within that category of cases. Adopting a mistaken analysis that was not briefed by the parties, the majority committed error. | Party Submissions | 16.566807 | 15.780079 | 17.839186 |
ANYTHING HEREIN TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, and in lieu of the terms and provisions contained in Sections 91.401 through 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, the parties hereto specifically agree that the following provisions shall apply to this Lease and all royalty payments made hereunder or any other rights as provided in the above listed sections, and that such provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code shall not be applicable; such parties further, by their signatures below, waive any and all rights which might be claimed or asserted under such Sections 91.401 and 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code; thus, it is specifically provided that: A. All rentals and royalties which may become due hereunder shall be payable at addresses shown in Exhibit “B” or at such other place, if any, as may be specified by written directive of the royalty owner, as to such owner's interest. | Party Submissions | 6.094868 | 5.922526 | 6.12571 |
Unless and until such time as Shares are issued in settlement of vested Performance Share Units, the Participant shall have no ownership of the Shares allocated to the Performance Share Units and, subject to the provisions of Section 7, shall have no rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares. Upon settlement, the Company shall cause the Company’s transfer agent to issue a certificate or certificates for the Shares in the name of the Participant, or to make a book entry record of such issuance, and the Participant shall thereupon have all rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares, including the right to vote such Shares and to receive all dividends and other distributions paid with respect to such Shares. The Company may place on the certificates representing the Shares such legend or legends as the Company may deem appropriate and the Company may place a stop transfer order with respect to such Shares with the transfer agent(s) for the Shares. | Contract | 3.227843 | 3.609975 | 3.474357 |
To speed up the deployment of electricity transmission and clean energy, with proper input from affected communities, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 36.84754 | 29.194666 | 32.883076 |
Indeed, the court of appeals did not consider the undisputed evidence when it errantly decided this based solely on Tostado’s allegations. Op. | Party Submissions | 24.959913 | 26.65285 | 28.100895 |
The United States objects to Request No. 3.h for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a. | Legal Decisions | 9.011099 | 13.992557 | 15.441607 |
As the lower court acknowledged, sections 25.25(g) and 42.21(b) “seem to be in conflict.” See Appendix J to Oncor’s Brief at 766. To the extent they do, this Court should resolve the conflict in accordance with established rules of statutory construction. The more specific provision in section 25.25(g) should control. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994). | Party Submissions | 5.495711 | 5.844324 | 5.933273 |
To require the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study and submit a report on the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of certain products produced in the United States and in certain foreign countries, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.04068 | 4.601257 | 5.255618 |
However, the day after filing its omnibus response, Galovelho also filed its Second Amended Petition, which added allegations that the Emergency Orders were “ invalid because they are unconstitutional and illegal under Texas Law.” The pleading alleged equitable claims based on the Emergency Orders, including claims for both injunctive and declaratory relief. Galovelho pleaded that he was denied due process rights to notice and a hearing before the Emergency Orders took effect and that restaurants were being denied equal protection of the law without a rational basis for the deprivation. He prayed that appellees be permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the Emergency Orders and that the court enter judgment declaring the various Emergency Orders unconstitutional and invalid. | Party Submissions | 7.912094 | 8.102428 | 8.527712 |
Termination. The Company, by action taken by its Board of Directors, may terminate the Plan and pay Participants and Beneficiaries their Account Balances in a single lump sum at any time, to the extent and in accordance with Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(j)(4)(ix). If a Participating Employer terminates its participation in the Plan, the benefits of affected Employees shall be paid at the time provided in Article VI. | Contract | 4.877133 | 4.660209 | 5.649619 |
The SLSA requires a written contract between the staff leasing company and its client company and that written contract must provide that the leasing company “shares, as provided in Subsection (b), with the client company the right of direction and control over employees assigned to a client's worksite. Garza at 478. The leasing company further decides whether to obtain workers' compensation coverage, and its election is binding on its client. Garza at 478. If the leasing company elects to provide workers' compensation coverage, its policy covers both the leasing company and its client. If it doesn‘t, then both employers BERRY CONTRACTING, L.P., d/b/a Bay Ltd. And Juan..., 2017 WL 1806766... | Party Submissions | 12.195769 | 10.813388 | 12.445635 |
Under Texas law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that each employer obtain its own insurance to avoid common law liability. One is the blanket statutory coverage under the Staff Leasing Services Act (“SLSA”). See TEX. LAB. CODE § 91, et seq. The other is a ROCIP under Texas Labor Code § 406.123. Both exceptions require written contracts. | Party Submissions | 10.209635 | 9.392747 | 11.198422 |
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioners pray that the Court grant the Petition for Review, reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, and that Petitioners have such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled. | Party Submissions | 3.098897 | 4.650197 | 5.111219 |
HARMLESS TDCC FROM AND AGAINST, ANY AND ALL CLAIMS WHICH ARE MADE, ASSERTED OR ALLEGED AGAINST TDCC BY ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS OR ANY OTHER PERSON, OR WHICH ARISE IN FAVOR OF ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS OR ANY OTHER PERSON, ORIGINATING FROM ANY SOURCE IN CONNECTION WITH (a) TDCC ACTING AS AN AGENT OR DELEGATE FOR ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS, AND/OR (b) THE FAILURE OF A UCC SUBSIDIARY TO FULLY ACCEPT, ABIDE BY, OR COMPLY WITH, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND/OR (c) ARRANGED PURCHASES AND/OR ARRANGED SALES, AND/OR (d) THE USE OR APPLICATION, BY A UCC MEMBER OR ANY OTHER PERSON, OF ANY PRODUCT SUPPLIED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT. | Contract | 4.312409 | 3.797618 | 4.328479 |
Furthermore, it is doubtful at best that there was mutual mistake. The mistake happened when Oncor, or its predecessor, erroneously rendered miles of lines to Wilbarger CAD and then signed a settlement agreement with Wilbarger CAD to the effect that the values were accurate. Oncor made the mistake. Wilbarger CAD simply took Oncor at its word and listed the property according to Oncor’s representations and agreement. G. Oncor erroneously cites to Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal. | Party Submissions | 12.569267 | 15.305717 | 13.705845 |
Neither Wilson Plaintiffs’ participation in pre-trial proceedings nor their long-shot goal of obtaining offensive collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment would trigger Taylor Privity Path 3. A simple reading of its plain language demonstrates that it is talking about formal legal representations, including class action representatives, trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries. Nobody is claiming that the Harpst plaintiffs were class representatives, trustees, guardians, or other fiduciaries for the Wilson Plaintiffs, so Taylor Privity Path 3 does not apply. Without such formal legal representation relationships, parties with similar claims based on similar underlying facts or parties that share the same lawyer or co-parties in pre-trial proceedings do not qualify for Taylor Privity Path 3. | Party Submissions | 13.155199 | 11.763436 | 14.259373 |
We sustain Bay's first issue. This requires us to consider whether summary judgment in favor of the Manns could be affirmed on any other basis. | Party Submissions | 18.20009 | 47.652134 | 55.47588 |
Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search. | Legal Decisions | 12.293462 | 19.341578 | 15.236405 |
Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) 4. Was Randy Mann in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his accident? | Party Submissions | 7.039799 | 6.720871 | 8.171048 |
En el caso de procedimiento de arbitraje el Tribunal determinará, salvo acuerdo contrario de las partes, los gastos en que estas hubieren incurrido en el procedimiento, y decidirá la forma de pago y la manera de distribución de tales gastos, de los honorarios y gastos de los miembros del Tribunal y de los derechos devengados por la utilización del Centro. Tal fijación y distribución formarán parte del laudo. | Legal Decisions | 6.463492 | 9.107375 | 7.896973 |
The issue of expropriation 300. Article XI of Annex III of the Treaty, invoked by Claimant, provides: CONDITIONS FOR EXPROPRIATION Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalised either directly or indirectly through the application of measures equivalent to expropriation, except for reasons of public interest, in non-discriminatory fashion, and after payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, in a freely convertible currency and in accordance with due process of law and with the general principles of treatment established in Articles III and IV. | Legal Decisions | 6.182825 | 5.05581 | 6.67274 |
The City argued that there is no waiver under the TTCA for a premises liability claim that does not allege a physical defect in the property. City’s Reply Brief, p.16. Relying on Sampson, the court of appeals agreed, holding that the City’s failures were not an actionable premises liability claim. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *4-5. Both the City and the court of appeals appear to read Sampson to limit premises defect claims against a governmental unit to conditions of real property only. See id. | Party Submissions | 7.547547 | 7.909855 | 8.697322 |
HN2 [ ] Burdens of Proof, Movant Persuasion & Proof When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, a reviewing court examines the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if reversing, renders such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, the reviewing court takes as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulges every reasonable inference, and resolves any doubts in his favor. | Party Submissions | 3.504646 | 4.409035 | 4.12569 |
After Mann filed suit against Bay for the injuries caused by Alvarez, Bay answered with a general denial and the affirmative defense of exhaustion of remedies. 22 To end the litigation against it, Bay then urged its own workers' compensation carrier to cover Mann's injuries and provide him benefits. 23 Prior to the underlying lawsuit, Bay took no steps to assist Mr. Mann in obtaining benefits. | Party Submissions | 12.416101 | 11.553502 | 17.266354 |
While the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue, the providers also objected to both doctors’ qualifications to offer causation testimony. Citing judicial efficiency, this Court has exercised its discretionary authority to consider undecided issues when addressing the sufficiency of preliminary exert reports. See Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 226; Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. 2018) ( “ Although the court of appeals did not address the report ’ s sufficiency as to breach and causation, the parties argued those issues here, and we will address them in the interest of judicial economy); see also Tex. R. App. P. 53.4. The Walkers respectfully request that the Court address the qualifications objections here for similar reasons. | Party Submissions | 8.59312 | 9.033302 | 9.171258 |
Marital Residence Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband aone hundred percent separate property interest in the marital residence because the evidence indicated he gied her afty-percent interest as her separate property. Husband responds the evidence was sufcient to support the trial court’s characterization of the marital residence such that there was no abuse of discretion. | Party Submissions | 12.29092 | 11.431443 | 11.900982 |
Separation from Service Benefit. A Participant who is entitled to receive a Separation from Service Benefit shall receive payment of his or her Retirement Account and each Separation from Service Account in a single lump sum, unless the Participant has elected on his or her Compensation Deferral Agreement to have an Account paid in annual installments. | Contract | 5.580848 | 5.515052 | 7.773268 |
See supra Part I.B. Market actors, as well as litigants and courts, will have to grapple with how to reconcile these decisions. Reported § 2301.467(a)(1) cases have been relatively infrequent, but this ruling risks an uptick in manufacturers/distributors imposing onerous new standards. And the infrequency of appellate cases on § 2301.467(a)(1) makes review here more appropriate because another chance may not arise soon, yet the statute will in the meantime have a widespread and important effect in the industry. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, ALJs, the Board, and lower courts should not be left to divine the law. The Court should grant review and provide clarity. | Party Submissions | 12.821163 | 12.254857 | 14.339621 |
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above. | Legal Decisions | 10.838362 | 10.699582 | 12.767634 |
Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) a certified self-insurer, the copy must be filed with the division. | Party Submissions | 12.567868 | 11.971361 | 15.008984 |
Galovelho argues that “ the only way a claim to the constitutionality of a statue, or actions thereunder, could be rendered moot is by some other declaration determining the statute or actions thereunder unconstitutional. ” It cites cases dealing largely with a plaintiff’s complaint about the defendant’s interpretation of a statute or application of a policy. See, e.g., Lakey v. Taylor ex rel. Shearer, 278 S.W.3d 6, 9 (Tex. App. — Austin 2008, no pet.) (dispute over Texas Department of State Health Services’ policy and practice regarding providing competency -restoration treatment to persons found incompetent to stand trial); Tex. Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (dispute over amount of civil penalty permitted for HMO’s failure to file annual Health Plan Employer Data Information Set report). These cases address the situation where a defendant abandons its position on the statutory interpretation or application of a policy and then contends the plaintiff’s claim is moot; the reviewing courts conclude that the parties’ same dispute could arise again if the government reasserts its interpretation or policy. See Lakey, 278 S.W.3d at 12; Tex. Health Care Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 847-- 48. | Party Submissions | 6.30343 | 6.838082 | 6.761828 |
Oncor attempts to distinguish Houston Cement by arguing that the “value of the inventory was a specific matter to which the agreements related,” citing Houston Cement at *3, Oncor’s Brief at 32. The alleged distinction is contrived. The value of the electric lines in question was “a specific matter to which the agreement[] [in this case] related. Appendix A, I C.R. 18. | Party Submissions | 17.838007 | 21.695385 | 23.201502 |
PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.265 In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".266 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.267 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. B, U : The request is overly broad Claimants seek "any and all" documents related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP in general, without specifying the time frame, and not only those dealing specifically with the reasons for rezoning the land plot located across the street from Dunavska 17-19 and 23 or addressing Obnova's alleged property rights. As a result, production of the requested documents would be unreasonably burdensome for Respondent. R, M : Claimants have not demonstrated the relevance and materiality of the requested documents. It is irrelevant in the context of the 2013 DRP that the 2015 DRP rezoned the land across from the Dunavska Plots, where a bus depot was located, for residential developments. At the time of preparation of the 2013 DRP (or before), the bus depot was not considered as a possible location for the bus loop and the relocation of the bus depot was considered only in June 2015.268 This request is yet another example of a "fishing 109 expedition", with Claimants seeking production of a time-unlimited category of documents, which Claimants consider to be helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. | Legal Decisions | 8.67601 | 9.1972 | 8.9737 |
Arbitration Rule 31 21.1. The Tribunal may convene, on its own initiative or if the Parties so request, case management conferences with the Parties in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 31 in order to (i) identify uncontested facts (e.g., joint chronology of facts); (ii) clarify and narrow the issues in dispute (e.g., address tribunal questions, decision tree, road map, matric and/or skeleton arguments); or (iii) address any other procedural or substantive issue related to the resolution of the dispute (e.g., appointment of Tribunal-appointed expert, production of evidence). | Legal Decisions | 7.321343 | 7.647887 | 7.719406 |
That Walker has no pre-election recourse is his own fault. The Court in Kha-noyan noted the relators’ delay of three weeks between passage of the complained-of map and filing the lawsuit. Yet here, Walker waited 53 days—over twice as long as the relators in Khanoyan—from Justice Devine’s application to the filing of this case seeking his removal from the ballot. Even accounting for some amount of time necessary to review signatures and draft a petition, Walker cannot begin to justify the weeks that he sat on his rights before seeking to upend an in-progress election. | Party Submissions | 18.923412 | 20.151054 | 21.142143 |
See Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Tex.1994) (stating to establish collateral estoppel, it is necessary that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the first action). Thus, the course and scope issue could be tried again in Smith County with a different result if the Harris County suit were tried first. In contrast, the Gaonas and Tyler are both parties to the Smith County suit; thus, its determination on course and scope would bind the parties if it were tried first. See id. | Party Submissions | 6.817756 | 9.390268 | 8.143816 |
To promote space situational awareness and space traffic coordination and to modify the functions and leadership of the Office of Space Commerce, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 12.065433 | 10.662614 | 13.563283 |
To amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to strike provisions relating to the maximum civil penalties for violations of product safety standards. | Legislation | 8.620973 | 6.965145 | 8.925964 |
Barina has no meaningful response to these facts. First, Barina denies that she offered to end the guardianship proceedings in exchange for a portion of Thrash’s estate. Resp. Br. at 29, citing CR1:911 at 32:40. Her self-serving denial is unpersuasive. | Party Submissions | 12.850095 | 16.486277 | 15.918319 |
The United States objects to Request No. 2.a. Claimants have not established that the requested documents are relevant to the U.S. preliminary objection or material to its outcome. | Legal Decisions | 17.028614 | 17.520935 | 19.822111 |
The following analysis is ultimately unnecessary and any opinion by a court on the matter would be advisory, as Weatherford has failed to meet its burden to show jurisdiction over a SWDA claim against Midland; however, we address Weatherford’s contentions regarding the Court’s precedent to show there are no inconsistencies between the Trial Court’s and Court of Appeals’ application of existing law to the facts in the underlying case and this Court’s SWDA precedent. | Party Submissions | 11.931591 | 15.05973 | 14.500828 |
Subcontractor agrees to promptly make good without cost to the Owner or McCarthy any and all defects due to faulty workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the guarantee or warranty period so established in the Contract Documents, and if no such period be stipulated in the Contract Documents, then such guarantees shall be for a period of one year from date of completion and acceptance of the Project by the Owner. Such warranty obligation of Subcontractor includes all costs to remove or correct work of Subcontractor or others not otherwise covered by said warranty in order to perform the warranty work. Receipt by McCarthy of all guarantees or warranties stipulated by the Contract Documents is required prior to processing Subcontractor's final payment. This warranty shall be in addition to all other warranties and remedies, expressed or implied, under the law or the Contract Documents. | Party Submissions | 6.137283 | 5.509247 | 6.495163 |
Bonus “A premium paid in addition to what is due or expected; esp., a payment by way of division of a business's profits, given over and above normal compensation <year-end bonus>.” Bonus, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). | Party Submissions | 12.41152 | 11.780493 | 14.123173 |
Further, Respondents failed to address Petitioners’ point that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct summary judgment standard. Specifically, the court of appeals failed to consider all evidence favorable to Petitioners as true, committing an error of law of substantial importance to Texas. In fact, Respondents specifically ask this Court to disregard the summary judgment standard by refusing to consider admitted evidence that is favorable to the Petitioners. The Texas PricePoint records list reasonable prices of certain medical services provided to each patient. These records were admitted into evidence. Respondents argue, “this Court should refuse to consider the evidence.” Respondents’ Br. at 20. | Party Submissions | 10.465386 | 10.479923 | 10.1531 |
On 1 April, the EU sent a letter to NEAFC and all delegation leaders informing them that an EU vessel intends to conduct experimental fishing for snow crab and red king crab in parts of the Smutthullet in accordance with Recommendation 19:2015 (recommendation related to the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in NEAFC’s regulatory area). The relevant area is the Russian continental shelf, cf. the Demarcation Agreement of 2010. If the snow crab and red king crab are considered sedentary species, they will be subject to shelf jurisdiction and it will be up to the coastal state to decide on any experimental fishing in the relevant area, cf. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77 (2). Given that the relevant area where experimental fishing is to be carried out is subject to Russian shelf jurisdiction, it is Russia that has the clearest interest in pointing this out to NEAFC. At the same time, the snow crab will eventually also be able to be on the Norwegian shelf and it will therefore be in Norway’s interest to point out to NEAFC that NEAFC here cannot allow experimental fishing without the coastal state’s consent. | Legal Decisions | 8.374954 | 7.323232 | 8.291339 |
Naba’a, an owner of Sargeant, and/or members of his family. Id at 181. This personal dislike is reflected in Respondent’s own decision to file a suit against not only Sargeant, but Mr. Abu Naba’a personally, in the Dominican Republic’s local administrative courts. See Claimant’s Memorial ¶ 102. Respondent’s Memorial makes clear that it considers Mr. Abu Naba’a’s, as well as his son’s, personal relationship with members of the Dominican government relevant and material because it includes numerous unsubstantiated allegations about Sargeant’s corruption due to those relationships. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 248. Indeed, Respondent’s Memorial cites multiple extremely negative articles about Mr. Abu Naba’a’s son. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 248(v), n. 139, R-0042, R-0043. If Mr. Abu Naba’s personal relationships and his son’s personal relationships were not relevant, Respondent would not have mentioned them multiple times in its Memorial. | Legal Decisions | 7.242801 | 7.453052 | 7.759432 |
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made. | Legal Decisions | 25.689241 | 30.791883 | 37.788612 |
By 15:25, H.W.’s non-reassuring fetal heartrate pattern was Category II-III, with minimal variability, inadequate accelerations (less than 15 minutes above baseline for longer than 15 seconds), and recurrent decelerations. App. 7, CR 668-69. In response, Dr. Castillo should have ordered uterine resuscitative measures and decreased Pitocin to reduce uterine contraction frequency. Id. Instead, she did the opposite — ordering Nurse Beukleman to increase Pitocin to 15-minute intervals, a move that went against a BSA protocol mandating longer, 30-minute intervals: According to ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 116, a patient with Category II tracing, absent accelerations, and minimal FHR variability should be treated with intrauterine resuscitative measures, including lateral positioning, maternal oxygen administration, IV fluid bolus, and reduction of uterine contraction frequency by decreasing oxytocin. Dr. Castillo failed to meet the standard of care at 15:25 on 05/22/2015 when she ordered the Pitocin to be increased every 15 minutes despite strong (90-100 mmHg) contractions every 1-3 minutes, lasting 70-120 seconds, when there was a non-reassuring FHR pattern (Category II-III) manifest by minimal variability, inadequate accelerations (less than 15 by 15), and recurrent decelerations. She did so despite signing the BSAH’s Oxytocin Infusion Protocol orders (Plaintiff 0000216) mandating that Pitocin only be increased every 30 minutes. | Party Submissions | 6.993574 | 7.622967 | 6.945244 |
The tenant’s claim in Kemp did not fail because of anything that occurred in the forcible entry and retainer action itself. Thus, there is no conflict between the result in Kemp and Texas law on the division of authority between the district courts and the justice of the peace courts, or the proper dividing line between the matters that be heard in a forcible entry and detainer action and those that must be heard in a constructive-eviction action. Thus, Kemp cannot be used to rationalize the conflicts created in this case between the basic statutory principles and the court of appeals’ untenable rule. | Party Submissions | 9.95514 | 11.660058 | 10.514892 |
By mistakenly relying on Thompson, not only did the Court of Appeals effectively review the trial court’s ruling de novo, but it also went as far as to identify supposed deficiencies that neither BSA nor Dr. Castillo raised at any stage of the litigation. | Party Submissions | 14.050963 | 13.810609 | 15.702013 |
For column 4: Indicate the approach: Eradication or Containment. Please, include as many rows as necessary, depending on the number of DA per pest and the approaches these areas are subject to. | Legislation | 34.20888 | 44.592457 | 49.071613 |
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE PLACE AND IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY A COURT ORDER MAY RESULT IN THE PARTY'S NOT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT. | Party Submissions | 3.830252 | 4.372088 | 4.322567 |
Section 4.03. Successors and Assigns; Parties in Interest. Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights or obligations under this Agreement shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by any Party without the prior written consent of the other Party (in the case of the Company, with such assignment or such consent to assignment being authorized by Independent Approval). Subject to the foregoing, the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns. Nothing in this Agreement, express or implied, is intended to confer any rights, remedies or causes of action under or by reason of this Agreement upon any Person other than the Parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns. | Contract | 2.829917 | 2.750739 | 3.372851 |
B, V, U : The request is unduly burdensome as it covers a period of 50 years. Respondent cannot reasonably be bound to produce all documents from this time period that relate to the Dunavska Plots. The request is also unduly broad and vague in that it captures all notes prepared in the course of conducting a geometric survey, regardless of whether said notes (or survey) concerned or had any bearing on the Objects in dispute. PCC : Claimants could have obtained these documents themselves by submitting a request to the Cadastre (see above request no. 9). R, M : The requested documents are also irrelevant to Claimants’ case and are not material for the outcome of the proceedings, as explained at request no. 9 above. Claimants' request is little more than a fishing expedition for documentation proving “when the buildings at Dunavska 17 -19, as well as Dunavska 23, were built”. Claimants have not identified any specific documen ts or category of documents that are in Respondent's possession which provide this information and instead are casting about for any potentially relevant information which might be in Respondent's possession. However, if Obnova built the Objects, as Claimants allege, Obnova (and therefore Claimants) would be in possession of documents proving the construction. | Legal Decisions | 11.916268 | 13.334859 | 12.260933 |
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made. | Legal Decisions | 26.068045 | 30.948666 | 38.062782 |
The United States objects to Request No. 1.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a. | Legal Decisions | 9.167935 | 13.633328 | 15.608652 |
Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1988). The court with the first-filed suit should proceed, and the other suit should be abated. See id. This rule applies when both courts are proper forums for the suit. See id. | Party Submissions | 6.121483 | 7.200235 | 7.957873 |
In sum, homebuyers like Rafiei should not, in equity and good conscience, be tethered to such a disproportionate and skewed agreement. III. Standard for Finding Arbitration Unconscionable While arbitration agreements are usually enforceable, Rafiei has presented the trial court with evidence that this arbitration agreement is unconscionable. See generally Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992). He argued that both the delegation provision and the broader arbitration agreement are unconscionable due to prohibitive costs. Indeed, what makes Rafiei’s case unique is that the agreement lacks a cap on expenses he would be required to pay throughout the arbitration process, whether it is conducted by one arbitrator or three. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement does not cap the amount Rafiei would likely be required to pay even in the initial phase addressing the delegation clause. | Party Submissions | 7.950553 | 8.503985 | 9.051168 |
Attorneys for Petitioner Westwood Motorcars, LLC 1. This brief in reply complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 6,393 words, excluding the parts of the petition exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9 .4(i)(l). | Party Submissions | 5.627812 | 6.166139 | 9.823965 |
Bustamante also discussed the evidentiary “equal-inference rule,” confirming that a claimant must exclude other plausible causes of an injury with reasonable certainty, but only when presented with evidence that other plausible causes exist. See Bustamante, 529 S.W.3d at 456-57. Even under a sufficiency review, however, a claimant need not “speculate” about other possible unknown causes and then disprove them. Id. at 457. | Party Submissions | 7.509541 | 8.700028 | 8.458674 |
IV. Assuming Bay Satisfied Section 406.123, no case holds that a ROCIP participant can apply the exclusive remedies doctrine outside the scope of the terms of the ROCIP itself. | Party Submissions | 42.483982 | 47.73558 | 52.195984 |
Under any of these provisions, Bay, Ltd. could recover under a passive receipts theory of recovery, which the Court should adopt expressly. | Party Submissions | 38.689625 | 44.08719 | 71.0206 |
When construing a statute, courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless the Legislature provided a definition. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2013). And the ultimate goal in any statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature to the greatest degree possible. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021, 311.023 (West 2013). | Party Submissions | 2.967258 | 3.507507 | 3.245067 |
That is exactly the problem with Dr. Tappan’s report. True, he established he has extensive experience managing pregnancies and deliveries, including difficult deliveries. (CR.663). But “nowhere does his [report or] curriculum vitae indicate he has any experience, training or education in the field of [pediatric] neurology or, more specifically, brain injuries.” Alonzo, 2013 WL 6073431 at *4. He is, therefore, not qualified to offer an opinion about the cause(s) of H.W.’s claimed brain injuries. | Party Submissions | 10.338131 | 11.109969 | 11.562958 |
Perhaps Walker could advance other interests that the Code’s signature requirement advances; perhaps he could demonstrate that those interests outweigh the heavy burdens that enforcing them through removing Justice Devine from the ballot would impose. But the point, just as in Brady, is more fundamental: a court may not resolve disputed questions of fact like these through original mandamus proceedings, such as this one. Brady, 795 S.W.2d at 714. That this fact-intensive balancing test would be necessary to resolve Walker’s entitlement to relief on the merits is sufficient to deny him mandamus in the first place. | Party Submissions | 12.13258 | 16.181864 | 14.156864 |
NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: YOU MAY USE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF CHILD CUSTODY SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER. A PEACE OFFICER WHO RELIES ON THE TERMS OF A COURT ORDER AND THE OFFICER'S AGENCY ARE ENTITLED TO THE APPLICABLE IMMUNITY AGAINST ANY CLAIM, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE, REGARDING THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED IN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFICER'S DUTIES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER THAT RELATE TO CHILD CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY PRESENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT AN ORDER THAT IS INVALID OR NO LONGER IN EFFECT COMMITS AN OFFENSE THAT MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS AND A FINE OF AS MUCH AS $10,000. | Party Submissions | 3.022759 | 2.897692 | 3.015569 |
Amerigo, Inc., No. 10-05-00041-CV, 2006 WL 22213, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 4, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yellowfin has acknowledged as much. 1CR216 (“ Yellowfin’s Note is not ‘ secured by ’ anything and has not been since the November 6, 2007 foreclosure sale. ”). | Party Submissions | 8.234325 | 8.49171 | 9.805809 |
To start, the purported signature failures were outside of Justice Devine’s knowledge and control. For nearly three weeks—between when Justice Devine filed his application and Relator filed his—Relator himself is the only person who could have spotted the alleged defects. Justice Devine did everything right. He collected 73 signatures from the Eighth Court of Appeals District, Ex.C—almost 50% more than required. Tex. Elec. Code §172.021(g). Relator never alleges—much less proves—that Justice Devine ever had any indication that any of these signatures lacked validity. | Party Submissions | 13.361382 | 12.565034 | 14.112654 |
This Agreement is intended not to result in the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty and shall be administered, interpreted and construed in a manner consistent with such intent. For purposes of Section 409A, each installment in a series of payments shall be treated as a separate payment. | Contract | 3.679543 | 4.243711 | 4.365204 |
The so-called “emergency” is entirely of Relator’s own making. He could have sought judicial relief as early as November 15, 2023, but he instead waited until December 27, 2023, to contact Respondent Rinaldi. He then waited another full week before filing this proceeding—skipping every other court. “Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (cleaned up). Mandamus “aids the diligent and not those,” like Relator, “who slumber on their rights.” In re Self, 652 S.W.3d 829, 830 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (cleaned up). | Party Submissions | 4.981601 | 5.782972 | 5.408154 |
Further, Oncor’s attempted distinction between the unit appraisals that are applied to power lines and other appraisals is artificial. If jurisdiction exists to litigate the intentions of parties and thought processes behind the agreements in this case, there is no legal distinction for such jurisdiction not existing in any case. Certainly Oncor has pointed to none. It claims unit appraisals are complex. Perhaps, but so are peaking power plant appraisals and a host of other appraisals which appraisal districts routinely perform. Nor is there any legal bright line for what appraisal are or are not complex, nor any authority for allowing jurisdiction for review of agreements concerning the complex ones but not the non-complex ones. | Party Submissions | 16.859247 | 17.246168 | 18.251678 |
Account Balance. Account Balance means, with respect to any Account, the total payment obligation owed to a Participant from such Account as of the most recent Valuation Date. | Contract | 7.341578 | 7.460939 | 9.541674 |
General Liability Insurance may be arranged under a single policy for the full limits required or by a combination of underlying policies with the balance provided by an Excess or Umbrella Liability policy. If Excess or Umbrella Policies are used, coverage must be on a follow-form basis. Coverage under such policies shall be primary and non-contributory to McCarthy’s, the Owner’s and any others as noted above and must be maintained for the longer of ten (10) years after Substantial Completion of the Project or the statute of repose in the state in which the Project is located. | Party Submissions | 6.558612 | 7.032157 | 7.05301 |
In the demarcated areas, the competent authorities shall carry out intensive annual surveys, as referred to in Article 19(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031, to detect the presence of the specified pest, taking into account the information referred to in the Authority’s pest survey card. | Legislation | 8.57974 | 7.370755 | 8.574861 |
The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expectations of the Cypriot Claimants as regards the possible use and development of the Dunavska Plots by Obnova, and (ii) the Cypriot Claimants' knowledge at the time of making the investment regarding the possible designation of the Dunavska Plots for use for the bus loop and hence the foreseeability of the investment dispute. | Legal Decisions | 12.522706 | 14.646125 | 13.182898 |
Subsets and Splits