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Statement of Reasons included these statements but the extension was not granted is not a volte face on risk allocation or a flip-flop on the extension.1395 Claimants appear to invoke the Statement of Reasons as a public statement of MINEM’s position rather than the Draft Supreme Decree legislation itself.1396 In either case, the denial of the Third Extension Request was not unfair or inequitable treatment contrary to the FET standard. | Legal Decisions | 30.321842 | 21.726418 | 27.549438 |
Id., at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.401(a)(2). This contemplates that the lawsuit will center on the treatment of the illness, injury or condition of the patient, not the adequacy of the workplace or in this case, procedures for the identification of infants upon discharge from the hospital. | Party Submissions | 10.07969 | 10.878619 | 12.003921 |
These documents were contained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 12.094222 | 12.84508 | 12.831432 |
Making emergency supplemental appropriations in line with the President’s request in response to the ongoing attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty by Russia and in response to the attacks in Israel for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 7.360981 | 7.334461 | 7.153925 |
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001. Section 272.01 applies “only to a construction contract concerning real property located in this state.” Id. § 272.001(a). If the section applies, a forum-selection clause making any conflict arising under the contract subject to litigation in the courts of another state “voidable by the party obligated by the contract or agreement to perform the work that is the subject of the construction contract.” Id. § 272.001(b). | Party Submissions | 5.268385 | 6.071297 | 5.524796 |
The court of appeals erred when it refused to allow petitioners to replead their claims under a premises defect theory because it determined the City had no duty to enforce its own safety procedures. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Texas Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2002). The question of a legal duty is a multifaceted issue requiring courts to balance a number of factors. Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983); see also EDGAR & SALES, TEXAS T ORTS & REMEDIES § 1.03[2][b] (2000). Courts apply these factors along with common law principles.” City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 2009). | Party Submissions | 5.734128 | 5.871601 | 6.055641 |
Respondents acknowledge that the result in Kemp turned mainly on the fact that the tenant lacked the legitimate “right of possession” to the property necessary to maintain a constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 34, citing Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *4) Respondents claim that they too challenged Westwood’s right of possession by questioning whether Westwood’s renewal of the lease was effective. (Id.) But the two challenges are very different. The challenge brought by the landlord in Kemp was meritorious : The tenant was a holdover whose continued “possession [was] unlawful. ” (Pet. Br. 16, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *1-2) By contrast, Respondents’ challenge to Westwood’s right of possession in this case was specious. See supra, at pp. 8-9. Thus, unlike the tenant in Kemp, Westwood possessed the property rights necessary to maintain a claim for constructive eviction, and breach of contract. | Party Submissions | 6.550249 | 6.62817 | 7.05107 |
More still, in performing its de novo review of the Wright ’s expert reports, the Seventh Court ignored the providers’ specific objections (other than to note that there were many), failed to distinguish between the providers’ objections, and even raised and sustained objections that the providers themselves had never asserted at any stage of the proceeding. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *1. (“The arguments posed are many. They encompass the qualifications of the experts and whether their reports satisfy the applicable statute. ” ). | Party Submissions | 16.312397 | 15.076363 | 17.317362 |
The present case illustrates the point. [Husband’s] pension rights, a valuable asset built up by 24 years of community effort, under the French rule would escape division by the court as a community asset solely because dissolution occurred two years before the vesting date. | Party Submissions | 21.14654 | 29.70079 | 24.893639 |
In Tatum, the parents of a teenager who shot himself after a car accident published a paid obituary in the defendant newspaper stating that their son died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash. Id. at 621-22. The newspaper subsequently published a column that cited the obituary as an example of an undisclosed suicide, and lamented that “we, as a society, allow suicide to remain cloaked in such secrecy, if not outright deception.” Id. at 622. The parents sued, arguing that the column’s “gist” was defamatory of them, in that it implied that they acted deceptively in publishing the obituary, and that their deception “perpetuates and exacerbates the problem of suicide in others.” Id. at 636. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “[t]he column's gist has nothing to do with the [plaintiffs]. Rather, the column’s gist is that our society ought to be more forthcoming about suicide and that by failing to do so, our society is making the problem of suicide worse, not better.” Id.at 636 – 637 (emphasis added). | Party Submissions | 5.175942 | 5.153185 | 5.541698 |
Governmental immunity protects the State’s political subdivisions, including its cities, against suits and legal liability. See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022). The TTCA waives immunity for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property” if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2). | Party Submissions | 3.071334 | 3.923925 | 4.001314 |
This AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”), dated as of November 1, 2023 (the “Effective Date”), is entered into by and between The Dow Chemical Company, a Delaware corporation (“Dow”), and Union Carbide Corporation, a New York corporation and an Affiliate of Dow (“UCC”, and together with Dow, the “Parties” and each, a “Party”). | Contract | 2.622179 | 2.297785 | 2.867621 |
To amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to require a certain efficiency level for certain distribution transformers, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.974749 | 5.584624 | 5.824868 |
To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to make timely decisions on applications of retail food stores to accept benefits from recipients of supplemental nutrition assistance through on-line transactions, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.703341 | 4.338598 | 4.711851 |
Essentially, Osprin asks us to change the wording used by the parties to the guaranty by adding qualifying language to its broad scope, such as: “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty, except those obligations that are matured, fixed, and non-executory, shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation [of the Texaco building] ” ; or, alternatively, “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation [of the Texaco building], provided such construction and completion occurs before any default by borrower .” However, when a clause is clear and enforceable based on its terms, as in this case, we “‘cannot rewrite the parties’ contract or add to or subtract fro m its language. ” URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 770 (quoting Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 242 (Tex. 2016)). | Party Submissions | 7.594883 | 7.85355 | 8.061703 |
Survey, Abstract 1152, and described as partof a 29.14 acre tract inthat certain Warranty Deed dated November 25,1911, from C. | Party Submissions | 13.59903 | 19.076845 | 24.261969 |
The Plan constitutes an unsecured promise by a Participating Employer to pay benefits in the future. Participants in the Plan shall have the status of general unsecured creditors of the Company or the Adopting Employer, as applicable. Each Participating Employer shall be solely responsible for payment of the benefits of its employees and their beneficiaries. The Plan is unfunded for Federal tax purposes and is intended to be an unfunded arrangement for eligible employees who are part of a select group of management or highly compensated employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA. Any amounts set aside to defray the liabilities assumed by the Company or an Adopting Employer will remain the general assets of the Company or the Adopting Employer and shall remain subject to the claims of the Company’s or the Adopting Employer’s creditors until such amounts are distributed to the Participants. | Contract | 3.148469 | 3.200556 | 3.595902 |
Particularly given the lack of explanation of the significance of these various cases, it is difficult to know exactly what Rafiei wants the Court to take away from them. None of the cases are presented as support for an argument that the Court needs to change Texas law. | Party Submissions | 14.725426 | 17.345015 | 16.804731 |
Appellee/Defendant: Sharon West 7015 Anderson St. Texas City, TX 77591 [email protected] Citation Certified Mail Rejected No Counsel on Record IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .........................................................ii. | Party Submissions | 24.469915 | 22.481722 | 33.259445 |
Specified Employee Effective Date. Specified Employee Effective Date means the first (1st) day of the fourth month following the Specified Employee Identification Date, or such earlier date as is selected by the Committee. | Contract | 4.966161 | 8.200097 | 6.959206 |
HN2 [ ] Appeals, Appellate Briefs Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), (h) requires that a brief state the issues presented for review and contain argument. | Party Submissions | 10.653976 | 14.467677 | 12.854928 |
Subsequent to Zuckerberg, Delaware courts have continued to rule that demand is excused in cases involving self-dealing. E.g., Atallah v. Malone, No. 2021-1116-SG, 2023 WL 4628774, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2023) (demand futility established by self-dealing alone). The Zuckerberg decision did not change substantive Delaware law in this respect. PFR at 18 (citing Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d at 1059). The Response deflects the majority opinion’s sua sponte The majority opinion held, sua sponte, that Condon was required to obtain Alpesh’s approval before filing suit on the ground because the loot he received through his self-dealing may not have been “substantively” important to him. Respondents did not brief this argument in the lower courts because it is definitively incorrect. Unsurprisingly, they now argue that the majority did not adopt an “unsanctioned ‘subjective material benefits test.’” Resp. 14. This argument ignores the majority opinion’s actual analysis. | Party Submissions | 9.973918 | 10.267992 | 10.516812 |
Simply put, such extreme costs to obtain a threshold ruling are too great for Rafiei to bear. To that end, Rafiei has provided his own affidavit in support of his contention that the delegation provision is unconscionable. Specifically, Rafiei had testified he could not afford to pursue his claims through arbitration and would be forced to abandon his claim (such as his claim that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable) if he was required to pay more than $6,000.00 in arbitration fees and expenses. This testimony is itself evidence, inherently, that Rafiei anticipated having to pay expenses out of his own pocket as the case progressed. Additionally, the mere fact that Rafiei pled his claim’s value as more than one million has no bearing on whether his claim will be overtaken by the expenses of arbitration – the overtaking doesn’t happen at end of a case post -resolution, it happens on the front end and prevents a party from ever reaching trial because they simply cannot afford to maintain the litigation that long. | Party Submissions | 11.08582 | 11.08438 | 11.474257 |
Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-010) provides: “The COMPANY undertakes, before commencing the Project, to obtain, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions, the permits, licenses and authorizations that may be necessary for the execution of said Project.” With reference to the above and any other relevant provision: What is the legal situation under Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement in relation to permits, licenses and authorisations that become applicable subsequent to the commencement of the Project? | Party Submissions | 8.035697 | 6.334037 | 8.110317 |
To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to modify eligibility for prevented planting insurance under certain drought conditions, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.142331 | 4.60879 | 5.847395 |
This AMENDED AND RESTATED EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”), entered into as of February 27, 2023 by and between OneSpan North America, Inc. (the “Company”), and Matthew Moynahan (“Executive”), amends and restates in its entirety the Executive Employment Agreement effective as of November 29, 2021 (the “Effective Date”) by and between the Company and the Executive (the “Prior Agreement”). | Contract | 2.742474 | 2.260456 | 2.771254 |
Permission must be stated in the order to be appealed. An order previously issued may be amended to include such permission. The permission must identify the controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and must state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. | Party Submissions | 6.406937 | 8.147169 | 8.084943 |
Section 1. Effective Date and Plan Year. The “Effective Date” of the Plan shall be October 27, 2016. The “Plan Year” shall be the 12-consecutive month period beginning on January 1 and ending on December 31; provided, however, that, the first Plan Year shall be a short Plan Year beginning on the Effective Date and ending on December 31, 2016. This amendment and restatement of the Plan shall be effective March 21, 2023. | Contract | 2.947892 | 3.057707 | 3.047834 |
The ground assigned for the motion to dismiss the appeal was a want of jurisdiction in this court to take cognizance of it. | Party Submissions | 7.507087 | 12.77465 | 16.116377 |
Barina also contends the rule does not apply to the Program because nothing in the Program suggests that it contains third-party allegations. As a matter of law and logic, Barina’s argument is meritless: Petitioners are seeking the protection of the third-party-allegation rule for claims made by Ross and Martinez while being interviewed on camera. Barina’s Response, in fact, liberally quotes from Ross’ interview. E.g., Resp. Br. at 10-11, 22. Any reasonable viewer—and Barina herself—understands that Ross and Martinez are the ones making the statements, not Petitioners. Even if there were some kind of “attribution” requirement (there is not), it would be more than satisfied here. | Party Submissions | 9.778417 | 9.890111 | 10.045081 |
When parties delegate the decision of arbitrability to an arbitrator, a court “possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue.” TotalEnergies E&P USA Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 721 n.3 (Tex. 2023) (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019)). Thus, unless Rafiei can show that the delegation provision is unconscionably expensive, the Court must reverse the majority and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to refer the delegation provision to an arbitrator. | Party Submissions | 5.17932 | 5.225805 | 5.57514 |
Furthermore, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimants are willing to limit the scope of this request in the following way: • Production may be limited to documents that are in the possession, custody, or control of USTR (which led the USMCA negotiations); the U.S. State Department (the “State Department”) (which co-leads, or at a minimum plays a key role, in the negotiations of investment chapters in free trade agreements, like USMCA, and obviously plays a central role in investor-state dispute settlement matters);15 and the National Archives and Record Administration (the “National Archives”) (which maintains certain records of U.S. Government agencies),16 to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department. | Legal Decisions | 8.178466 | 7.57679 | 8.038894 |
Weatherford argues that the residual four-year statute of limitations did not begin unless and until the TCEQ approved the remediation plan. However, the statute itself indicates that the removal or remedial action itself is the requisite fact that starts the limitations period. Weatherford stated that the costs of the required remediation commenced between November 1998 and January 1999. (CR 14.) (noting that the TCEQ’s predecessor agency “required Weatherford to perform the response to the contamination.”). The statute of limitations began when Weatherford initiated remediation. To hold otherwise would allow Weatherford to recover costs from an action that occurred over two decades ago, which would contravene the very purpose of a statute of limitations. Further, potential defendants would essentially be barred from participating in the remediation itself. | Party Submissions | 8.713618 | 8.723266 | 8.864555 |
County, R.L.S. pled guilty to the burglary of a habitation offense and received deferred adjudication community supervision. In 2016, R.L.S. filed his petition for expunction of the Limestone County arrest. | Party Submissions | 7.085328 | 7.894753 | 10.2044 |
The testimony and exhibits at the hearing demonstrate that Respondent was subject to general jurisdiction. Most importantly is Exhibit 7. (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7, and Appendix, Tab 3). That Exhibit is a public offering on behalf of Integrity Aviation, LLC. (RR Volume 2, page 104) Integrity is a Texas Company. (RR Vol. 2, p. 27) Exhibit 7 shows that the “Management Team” of Integrity consists of Victor Farias and Matt Marsenison, among others and has pictures of both of those individuals. (RR Vol. 2, p. 108, and Appendix, Tab 3) In addition it shows and address of 2 Spencer Rd., Suite 103, Boerne, Texas. (RR Vol. 2, p. 109) As such, this is ample evidence that Respondent entered into a contract with a Texas resident, is an officer of a Texas Company participating in a public offering to raise money from investors, which contacts are obviously consistent and systematic. | Party Submissions | 10.226949 | 9.436292 | 10.801654 |
Unless and until such time as Shares are issued in settlement of vested RSUs, the Participant shall have no ownership of the Shares allocated to the RSUs and, subject to the provisions of Section 5, shall have no rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares. Upon settlement, the Company shall cause the Company’s transfer agent to issue a certificate or certificates for the Shares in the name of the Participant, or to make a book entry record of such issuance, and the Participant shall thereupon have all rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares, including the right to vote such Shares and to receive all dividends and other distributions paid with respect to such Shares. The Company may place on the certificates representing the Shares such legend or legends as the Company may deem appropriate and the Company may place a stop transfer order with respect to such Shares with the transfer agent(s) for the Shares. | Contract | 3.17878 | 3.510084 | 3.425943 |
App. 9, CR 709. decided for a cesarian delivery at 15:15, and that H.W. would been born without neurologic injury if he was delivered atraumatically by 15:45. Id. at 671. | Party Submissions | 20.58702 | 26.810562 | 25.698652 |
Justice Jewell observed that “[t]he initial filing fee for ‘nonmonetary claims’ is under $3,250 under the standard fee schedule; and it is only $2,000 under the “flexible” schedule.” Id. | Party Submissions | 17.753244 | 17.999413 | 18.470642 |
R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of the Secretariat for Environmental Protection is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic "fishing expedition", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful for in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants.199 In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".200 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the mentioned authority in order to obtain documents in question.201 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. | Legal Decisions | 11.757833 | 10.934832 | 12.008693 |
The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain tort claims against governmental entities, including claims for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2). This waiver encompasses “two distinct tort causes of action: one arising from tangible personal property and one arising from a premises defect.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. 2004)). A plaintiff’s claim must be one or the other, but it cannot be both. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 233). | Party Submissions | 2.701631 | 3.268827 | 3.239777 |
Between the filing of the motion to dismiss and corresponding hearing, Dunn amended her petition to include allegations that ETMC Athens failed to provide a safe place to work and was negligent at the time of the incident. ETMC Athens is a nonsubscriber to workers' compensation. Following the dismissal of Dunn's claims against Woolverton and ETMC EMS, ETMC Athens filed a motion to designate them as responsible third parties. Dunn did not object, and Respondent granted the motion. | Party Submissions | 8.776857 | 8.08195 | 9.709797 |
These documents were contained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 12.094222 | 12.84508 | 12.831432 |
The Diocese claims that Question 2 in the jury charge was erroneous because it did not submit the increased value of the Ranch due to the improvements. The Diocese then argues that because there was no evidence of increased value, a rendition is appropriate. But that’s not correct. | Party Submissions | 13.140504 | 16.766594 | 15.180012 |
During the due diligence period, the buyer has the right to receive information from the seller to determine the suitability of the property. | Party Submissions | 6.080436 | 6.517295 | 7.416418 |
Although the Property Tax Code allows a property owner to file an administrative protest to the appraisal review board of certain actions, such as the inclusion of the owner’s property in the appraisal records pursuant to Chapter 41 or other corrections under § 25.25, Oncor is prohibited from pursuing any such remedy when it has agreed to an appraised value with the chief appraiser. The cases interpreting § 1.111(e) hold that such agreements are final and the trial court does not have jurisdiction to review it. See MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 249 S.W.3d 68, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ); Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet. ). Note that § 1.111(e) specifically makes the agreement controlling over any matter that may be brought by a motion under § 25.25, the exact remedy Oncor has sought to employ. | Party Submissions | 4.60261 | 4.912537 | 4.538584 |
Finally, Barina emphasizes Thrash’s unmentioned dementia diagnosis, see Resp. Br. at 2, 4, 7, 10, as if that omission would positively affect a viewer’s perception of her actions. It would not. The medical exam, which reported moderate dementia, noted no deficit in long-term memory; basic recognition, comprehension, or communication ability; or inability to attend to basic activities of daily living. CR1:699. Thrash’s treating physician also reported that Thrash did not lack capacity as late as January 2019, CR2:4303, less than a year before the probate court upheld the guardianship. In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 4, 2019, pet. denied). Far from justifying for the viewer Thrash’s permanent guardianship, then, the inclusion of the full context of the dementia diagnosis would have suggested to viewers that Barina fought to keep Thrash in a guardianship that he did not then need, let alone want. | Party Submissions | 7.941135 | 8.547878 | 8.97648 |
Therefore, contrary to the Gaonos' argument that the statutory process was complete upon the appeals panel issuing its decision, the Act expressly provides the decision, though binding, is not final during the pending judicial review. Id. § 410.205(b). | Party Submissions | 15.905769 | 22.23598 | 20.975903 |
Liberty argues that the Contract provides for only one service. Liberty’s Response at 23. This ignores the construction of the Contract. The Contract details multiple obligations and prohibitions (for both parties) in its terms. Liberty is not obligated to provide treatment for certain industrial waste (Section 3.3); Liberty is not obligated to accept wastewater above the TAV (Section 3.5 and 4.1); Liberty is obligated to accept wastewater flows up to the TAV (Section 4.1); Ames is to provide retail sewer service within certain areas (Section 4.2); Ames may not provide retail sewer service within other areas (Section 4.2). The Contract involves more than wastewater simply being accepted by Liberty from Ames. | Party Submissions | 9.618516 | 8.619372 | 10.253735 |
Similarly, this Court has repeatedly stated that if a promissory note contains an optional acceleration clause, limitations does not automatically start to run upon default, and that an action accrues “only when the holder actually exercises its option to accelerate” the entire note. Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001); Hammann v. H.J. McMullen Co., 62 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. 1933). The Wolf opinion disapproved of any case “to the extent they can be read to require affirmative action towards foreclosure to trigger acceleration of a note secured by real property when the parties’ agreement does not require such action.” Wolf, 44 S.W.3d at 569-70. The Court explicitly rejected the concept that an action to foreclose a lien constituted acceleration, claiming that the result would be “nonsensical”, since the act of foreclosure cannot be both the triggering event and the right itself. Id, at 570. | Party Submissions | 6.533464 | 6.818201 | 6.783667 |
These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 13.390581 | 13.452183 | 14.155488 |
This conclusion is underscored by the fact that, at oral argument, they were unable to identify any material difference in a subsequent trial with yet another small group of plaintiffs. | Party Submissions | 17.399033 | 22.567863 | 25.39995 |
Just as the record does not support MVP’s assertion that RLB’s “sole objection to the forum-selection clause’s enforcement” was that the MCC’s choices of Oklahoma forum and law could be voided under Section 272.001, the record also does not support that “the trial court apparently based its ruling on that objection.” MVP’s Brief at 29. To the contrary, although the court noted during the hearing that “it seems to all pin on whether or not this 272[.]001 is something that’s going to be applicable in this instance,” the court also noted it would look at the parties’ arguments before making its final decision. See 04/23/2021.Tr.12-13. Further, the court’s orders are not limited to Section 272.001, but specifically note that its rulings were based on the plea in abatement, motions, responses, replies, supplements, and “any other item presented to the Court” by the parties. R.0580, 725-26. | Party Submissions | 8.56195 | 9.602786 | 9.072819 |
The issue of compensation in situations involving war or other conflicts 266. Article X of Annex III of the Treaty, relied upon by Respondent, sets forth: COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES Investors of one Party whose Investments in the territory of the other Party suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the latter Party shall be accorded by the latter Party treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favourable than that which the latter Party accords to investors of any third State. | Legal Decisions | 5.461285 | 4.956156 | 5.22329 |
The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system of community property is, that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be their community property. It would be an unnecessary consumption of time, to quote authorities for this proposition. | Party Submissions | 7.978719 | 9.370576 | 8.929934 |
Perhaps more importantly, however, none of the evidence Respondents cite played any part in the court of appeals’ decision. The court refused to consider it. Nor did the court rely on any “Rule 11 agreement” memorialized in the agreed judgment (Resp. 21, 28) because it deemed the judgment’s contents themselves unimportant. All that mattered to the court below was the judgment’s very existence, which purportedly “precluded” Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach-of-contract claims in district court. (Op. 6) That conclusion conflicts with Texas statutes and this Court’s precedent, creates conflicts among the lower courts, strips eviction proceedings of the jurisdictional limits necessary to ensure their efficiency, threatens the separation of powers and the jurisdictional boundaries between Texas district courts, and creates intractable practical problems for Texas tenants. It therefore raises issues of substantial importance to Texas jurisprudence that this Court should review and resolve. | Party Submissions | 12.352074 | 11.817583 | 12.544428 |
Second, in considering a sufficiency review of the evidence, the court of appeals exceeds the proper scope of review when it disregards circumstantial evidence as to a question of characterization of marital assets and only considers the absence of direct evidence to determine a question of legal versus factual sufficiency. | Party Submissions | 15.02282 | 15.276129 | 18.596704 |
Petitioner (Oncor) presents a distorted and somewhat imaginative Statement of Facts that inaccurately characterizes the core issues as attributable to mistakes made by Wilbarger CAD or its appraisers. What actually happened is Oncor, or its predecessor Sharyland, rendered what it now represents as incorrect figures on the miles of its grades of transmission lines. I C.R. 334-335. Wilbarger CAD appraised the transmission lines. I C.R. 129-130. Oncor protested the values. I C.R. 207-208. Then Oncor and Wilbarger CAD reached an agreement on the two accounts, specifying the values agreed upon without any other detail. I C.R. 18. That agreement is also attached at Appendix A to this brief and is the seminal document to this appeal. | Party Submissions | 12.792873 | 13.150818 | 12.831823 |
The snow crab eats and lives on the bottom all its life except in the larval phase where the larvae live in the upper water masses up to several months before they settle. | Legal Decisions | 14.677967 | 15.84861 | 16.14385 |
I hereby certify that on October 23, 2023 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petit ioners’ Oral Argument Exhibits has been electronically filed and served on all counsel below. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(1), 9.5(b)(1). | Party Submissions | 7.007726 | 8.993308 | 9.614192 |
I, a resident of (state, or country if other than U.S.), accept and agree to the terms of the Restricted Stock Unit Award described in this Agreement and in the Plan, acknowledge receipt of a copy of this Agreement, the Plan and the applicable Plan Summary, and acknowledge that I have read them carefully and that I fully understand their contents. | Contract | 5.644772 | 6.507969 | 6.707486 |
HN5 [ ] Equitable estoppel may be asserted to bar a defendant from raising a particular defense. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 n. 1 (Tex. 2004). To establish equitable estoppel, a party must prove (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that the representation [*9] should be acted on, (4) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge of those facts, (5) who detrimentally relied upon the misrepresentation. Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991) (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 418, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1952) ). | Party Submissions | 3.537114 | 4.063348 | 3.948682 |
Because, under the termination clause, all of Backes ’s obligations under the guaranty terminated upon the completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building, and because the trial court entered an unchallenged fact-finding establishing when the completion occurred that was supported by evidence at trial, we find that the trial court did not 18 err in entering a take-nothing judgment in favor of Backes. We overrule Osprin’s fir st, second, and fifth issues. | Party Submissions | 13.742709 | 15.895283 | 16.635586 |
Section 4.10. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Stockholders Agreement (as defined below), embodies the complete agreement and understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. Except as provided below, this Agreement supersedes and preempts any prior understandings, agreements or representations by or between the Parties, written or oral, that may have related to the subject matter hereof in any way. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event of any conflict between this Agreement and the Stockholders Agreement by and among Mitsui & Co., LTD., Mitsui & CO (U.S.A.), Inc. (“Mitsui”), Penske Corporation and Penske Automotive Holdings Corp. (collectively, “Penske”), dated as of July 30, 2013 (as it may be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time (solely to the extent such amendment, supplement or restatement relates to the election of directors of the Company, Mitsui’s tag-along rights, and Penske’s obligations under Section 2.3 thereof), the “Stockholders Agreement”), including Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 thereof, the terms of the Stockholders Agreement shall control, and nothing in this Agreement shall require Penske Corporation to take any action (or fail to take any action) that would, or would reasonably be expected to, result in a breach of the Stockholders Agreement. | Contract | 2.956896 | 2.614536 | 3.040936 |
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to eliminate certain fuel excise taxes and impose a tax on greenhouse gas emissions to provide revenue for maintaining and building American infrastructure, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.129734 | 5.261197 | 5.828108 |
Signature of Presiding Juror Printed Name of Presiding Juror __ Our verdict is not unanimous. Eleven of us have agreed to each and every answer and have signed the certificate below. | Party Submissions | 15.5485 | 23.37455 | 23.44038 |
Id. (internal citations omitted). Essentially, the Court clarified that, unlike cases in which an employer is a subscriber to workers' compensation, an employee must prove negligence against a nonsubscribing employer. | Party Submissions | 8.016025 | 11.019912 | 10.651106 |
Part of Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 23 is located on a part of former land plot N o. 39/1. According to excerpts from the Real Estate Cadaster, this land plot was registered as privately owned by Selfnest doo.168 Claimants consider that this registration is incorrect and Obnova has the right of use over the respective part of this land plot. Clarification of Selfnest’s alleged ownership is relevant and material to establish the area subject to Obnova’s rights. | Legal Decisions | 16.889423 | 18.10891 | 17.97844 |
As Oncor noted in its initial brief, the agreement at issue in Houston Cement was materially different from the one at issue in this case. In Houston Cement, the agreement included “itemized descriptions of the initial and final appraised values of several types of property, including inventory .” Houston Cement, 2013 WL 3243281 at *1 (emphasis added). The property owner later sought to correct the agreed-upon values under Tax Code section 25.25(c), arguing that “both valuations included inventory that had been in transit and not yet located in Harris County” at the relevant times. Id. The court of appeals held that the valuation of inventory could not be corrected because “the value of inventory was a specific matter to which the agreements related,” id. at *3, and the parties had “clearly expressed harmony of opinion as to the final values of Cement’s combined business personal property and of its inventory in the signed, specifically written agreements,” id. at *2 (emphasis added). | Party Submissions | 9.024481 | 8.854517 | 9.506242 |
In sum, Douglas failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel theories. Accordingly, we overrule her sole issue and affirm the summary judgment in favor of Moody. | Party Submissions | 6.157743 | 9.125145 | 9.190209 |
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the form requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and contains 2,175 words (except for those items excluded by Rule 9.4(h)(1)). /s/ Deborah Race Deborah Race CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On October 20, 2023, I electronically filed this Motion for Rehearing from Denial of Petition for Review with the Clerk of the Court using e-File, TxCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record. | Party Submissions | 4.61774 | 6.0759 | 6.96451 |
This Court has recognized that differential diagnosis enjoys widespread acceptance as a valid diagnostic technique in the medical community and that it has been subjected to use, peer review, and testing. Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2010). And at least one appellate court has held that reasoning similar to Dr. Null ’ s satisfied a post-trial sufficiency review on similar facts. See Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 280 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (expert testimony was sufficient when expert linked brain injury to hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy based on baby’s clinical and laboratory symptoms while ruling out other potential causes of similar injury). | Party Submissions | 7.650584 | 7.168097 | 8.096573 |
But they also claim his “extensive teaching and supervisory experience, as detailed in his report, shows that he has the knowledge and experience necessary to opine on the cause of diverse neonatal injuries....” ( Id. ). To support that claim, the Walkers cite to one page of Dr. Tappan’s report in which he describes his qualifications. ( Id., citing to CR.663). There, Dr. Tappan lists his expertise in managing pregnancies and deliveries and “working with obstetrical nurses.” (CR.663). | Party Submissions | 13.546588 | 11.85679 | 16.075064 |
Rafiei moves on to Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterprises, Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013). Rafiei offers Gandee as an example of a plaintiff that successfully demonstrated that an arbitration provision was unconscionably expensive. But the evidence in Gandee is much more persuasive than the evidence proffered by Rafiei. First, Ms. Gandee estimated that her claim was worth “roughly $3,500 in actual damages.” Id. at 604. Rafiei has pled that his claim is worth $1,000,000. Gandee presented evidence that her AAA fees would be $4,775, so the fees would obviously outweigh any award that she might obtain. Id. She also proved that she was currently unemployed and her husband’s income was “substantially consumed” by living expenses. Id. Rafiei’s evidence shows that he makes $240,000 a year. | Party Submissions | 6.924017 | 6.993969 | 7.377063 |
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (original proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016). | Party Submissions | 2.252419 | 2.260012 | 2.471483 |
Petitioners were limited to claiming a latent, physical defect, which the facts did not support. Id. at *7. But the court also struggled with what duties the City owed to Catiana. Id. Unable to fully answer these questions, the court held whatever duties may exist, the City had no duty to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool as they are “open” and “obvious.” Id. (citing Mullens v. Binsky, 719 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)). This is apparently a matter of first impression in Texas. See id. (citing Ohio law). The court also seemingly agreed with the City that because it had no duty to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool, it also had no enforceable duty to provide lifeguards. See id. | Party Submissions | 8.803297 | 8.636065 | 9.123566 |
Taken that broadly, the mandatory-general-stay rule the Court adopts today would upend federal litigation as we know it. Aware that any interlocutory appeal on a dispositive issue grinds the plaintiff's case to a halt, defendants would presumably pursue that tactic at every opportunity. This would occur, for example, in interlocutory appeals available *761 as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) from orders granting preliminary injunctions. Any defense lawyer worth her salt would invoke the right to take that appeal and throw up some objection— to venue, jurisdiction, or a dispositive element of the merits—to trigger a mandatory stay. For plaintiffs, then, every preliminary-injunction motion becomes a trap: Even if the motion is granted, the defendant can take that opportunity to stop the trial court proceedings in their tracks. Facing these destabilizing consequences, the majority stops short of following its own reasoning to that ominous conclusion. Today's holding reaches only arbitration appeals under § 16(a). Ante, at 1918, 1921 – 1922. And it might well be that the concerns motivating today's mandatory-general-stay rule do not extend beyond arbitration. So the majority will not commit, for example, to concluding that appeals over non-arbitration forum-selection clauses warrant the same mandatory stay. Ante, at 1922 – 1923. | Party Submissions | 7.826606 | 7.939748 | 8.098838 |
Instead of proposing modifications that could allow EOG’s wells to recover riverbed minerals, Ammonite demanded compulsory pooling even though the riverbed minerals would not be recovered by EOG’s wells. That was its position at the offer stage, 5.SCR.258, and in its MIPA application, e.g., 1.SCR.218-19, so that is the proposition the Commission rejected, FOF 7, 9, 11; COL 5. that this applicant failed to show that pooling is “necessary to prevent waste.” FOF 11; COL 5; Commission Resp. BOM at 23; see Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 102.011. That does not foreclose a future MIPA applicant from proving that forced pooling will “prevent waste” despite present lack of drainage—perhaps even on a theory like the one Ammonite advances in this Court. That is, Ammonite or another applicant might show that a forced-pooling order would prevent waste by removing “a contractual barrier” (Letter at 6) to recovery that is technically achievable and economically feasible. But such an applicant would need to make a fair and reasonable offer, see Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 102.013(b), and present evidence to the Commission establishing such achievability and feasibility. Ammonite did neither. Ammonite points to no evidence in the administrative record showing that recovery of riverbed minerals by EOG’s wells is technically achievable or economically feasible through modifications, much less that Ammonite proposed such a thing in its MIPA offers. See 3.SCR.3-8, 33-35, 5.SCR.257-59; COL 2. | Party Submissions | 8.669555 | 8.607518 | 9.300607 |
None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of the seizure of the assets or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 13.483333 | 15.683864 | 14.543471 |
For that matter, “virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’ ” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). “Such motions can be made in virtually every case.” Ibid. Does every interlocutory appeal concerning a case-dispositive issue now trigger a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings? | Party Submissions | 6.073421 | 5.306412 | 6.337313 |
Husband did present was not “of asubstantive and probative character to support the-decision.” S'ee In reMarriage ofC:.A.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 383 (Tex. App—Dallas 2013, no pet). | Party Submissions | 15.722351 | 15.761842 | 18.307926 |
HN4 [ ] "An agency has exclusive jurisdiction [over a claim] when a statutory scheme indicates the Legislature intended the statutory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the statute is addressed." Tyler Asphalt, 107 S.W.3d at 838 (citing Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002) ). "Typically, if an agency has exclusive jurisdiction [over a claim], a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial [*12] review of the agency's action." Id. (footnote omitted). "Until then, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without prejudice those claims within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction." Id. (citing Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221 ). | Party Submissions | 4.388565 | 4.822601 | 4.89967 |
First, Walker fails at the threshold. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(e) directs mandamus applicants to seek relief from the appropriate court of appeals, if available, and only to seek relief initially in this Court if “compelling reasons” require it. As Walker concedes (at 3–4), the Election Code vests concurrent mandamus jurisdiction in both this Court and the courts of appeals. He was therefore obligated to seek relief in the court of appeals first, which he failed even to attempt. His sole stated reason for bypassing the court of appeals—an imminent need to print primary ballots—fails because Walker has had all the information needed to seek judicial relief for months or, measured charitably, at least weeks. He could have sought mandamus from the court of appeals on an expedited basis on that timeline; his failure to do so is fatal. | Party Submissions | 7.395428 | 8.593761 | 7.85531 |
Fourth , Respondents are wrong to downplay the legal errors below by claiming there is no evidence of a “require[ment]” under the correct standard. | Party Submissions | 47.990173 | 36.966667 | 53.863293 |
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL......................................................i Wilbarger CAD disagrees with Oncor’s phrasing of the issues. The issues are more properly phrased: 1. May a property owner seek to change the appraised value of its property under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25 after entering a binding and final agreement with the chief appraiser pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e)? 2. May a property owner bypass the pervasive regulatory scheme of the Texas Tax Code and lower the appraised value of its property under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act? 3. Is an appraisal review board a proper party to a suit to correct the appraisal roll notwithstanding TEX. TAX CODE § 42.21(b), which provides that a petition for review may not be brought against the appraisal review board? | Party Submissions | 5.560766 | 6.058888 | 5.747854 |
Q. Let me just clarify. You’re not saying that she was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury, are you? | Party Submissions | 6.975568 | 9.062058 | 11.345321 |
Furthermore, the basis of the Trial Court’s granting of the Plea to the Jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming that decision was jurisdiction-based, and as a result, this Court need not entertain any substantive law analysis when Weatherford failed to meet its threshold burden to connect Midland to the harm Weatherford alleges. Weatherford continues to push a strained argument that a regulatory statute for landfills should also extend to govern sewer systems, even after it failed to introduce a genuine issue of material fact (when it had the opportunity to do so) that might subject Midland to the statute. The fact that the Court of Appeals agreed with the obvious evidence-supported proposition that Midland’s sewer system transports domestic sewage—and thus was not a “solid waste facility”—does not give Weatherford a pass on its failure to present baseline jurisdictional evidence under the statute it relies upon. | Party Submissions | 11.650957 | 11.99841 | 12.826648 |
The term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall automatically expire on the one (1) year anniversary of the Effective Date (the “Term”). No Party shall have any obligation under this Agreement after the expiration of the Term (other than in respect of any obligations incurred during the Term, which shall survive the expiration of the Term). Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no Party shall have any obligation hereunder to extend the Term. | Contract | 3.278374 | 2.939273 | 3.469294 |
Gal ovelho’s equal protection claim alleged that the Emergency Orders “determin[ed] which people, businesses, services, and groups are permitted to operate their business, and who must shut down their business on the whim of Government ,” and identified no “discernable, legitimate, criteria that has any rational relationship to the governmental interest of stopping the spread of Covid-19. ” Its due process claim asserted that “[n]o local government or state government has ever provided notice of deprivation, notice of hearing, a hearing, or any meaningful review of the actions of the state and local government. ” Gal ovelho sought injunctive relief from the purportedly unconstitutional effects of the Emergency Orders. | Party Submissions | 10.719437 | 11.67189 | 11.555003 |
To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the organization of the Office of Survivors Assistance of the Department of Veterans Affairs. | Legislation | 3.967735 | 3.403801 | 3.826381 |
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 991 (Cal. 2003), requires that arbitration costs in employment cases must be paid by the employer in all instances. See Response at 14. As mentioned above, that position has been rejected by this Court in Poly-American. The Little opinion has been questioned by a California federal district court which raised the concern that the decision is inconsistent with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. | Party Submissions | 7.391146 | 7.941522 | 8.923232 |
Samson Got the Cases Severed by Promising They Would Be Treated Equally In November 2006, the Bordages and Hooks owners were in the same lawsuit against Samson. Their nine nearly identical leases were collectively called “Tract 4/14 Leases” based on the numbers Samson had assigned the three tracts they covered. 1CR229-34, 252-54. The owners had filed suit seeking (among other things) damages for unpaid royalties and Most Favored Nations royalties on the nearly $200 million in revenues Samson had derived from their lands, plus associated lease Late Charges. 1CR223-25, 229-34; 4CR5508-09, 5513-18; 5CR5944-49, SuppCR144. The Hooks had also sued Samson for fraudulently inducing them to agree to pooling one of the gas units. 1CR234-39. | Party Submissions | 13.394368 | 12.473606 | 14.318774 |
In the further alternative, the Court should affirm the remand of the case for a new trial for the reasons stated by the court of appeals or for the further reasons not addressed by that court, discussed above. As HSMiller points out, the case has been tried 43 twice already, as the unfortunate consequence of the BNC Sellers’ relentless pursuit of liquidity to satisfy the damages found in the underlying dispute and HSMiller’s attempt to blame everyone but itself for the adverse result. The waste of judicial resources is no fault of the Lawyers. | Party Submissions | 20.938988 | 19.575764 | 22.811531 |
See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221(a), (b). Counsel: For APPELLANT: Stuart F. Lewis, Law Office of Stuart F. Lewis, Bryan, TX. For APPELLEE: Dwaine Boydstun, Harris & Harris, Austin, TX. | Party Submissions | 7.277199 | 8.608413 | 9.35192 |
This is a personal injury case that necessarily raises the initial question of Bay's standing to raise the exclusive remedy affirmative defense. In order to do so, Bay must first prove it complied with the statutorily required conditions set forth in the Texas Labor Code § 406.123, the statute that governs the type of co-employer agreements referred to as Rolling Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“ROCIPs”). Then, if the court determines that Bay has met the mandatory statutory requirements, the court will be faced with a question of first impression: whether *3 Bay has standing to seek immunity under a worker's compensation policy for the actions of an employee-tort-feasor who is outside of a potential policy clearly intended to cover and protect a work-site and its statutory participants. There is no authority for Bay to rely upon to expand the scope of a workers' compensation policy's coverage outside of its own terms. | Party Submissions | 11.029882 | 10.413596 | 11.931137 |
B. SMITH COUNTY COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. [16] We agree with Tyler that the Smith County court has exclusive jurisdiction because determination of the course and scope issue is committed to the statutory workers' compensation process, judicial review is a part of that process, and judicial review must occur in Smith County. 1. COURSE AND SCOPE ISSUE COMMITTED TO STATUTORY WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCESS *839 [17] [18] The Texas Workers' Compensation Commission clearly has exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability because the Act vests the power to determine whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely in the Commission, subject to judicial review. | Party Submissions | 5.749735 | 5.608153 | 6.367701 |
On Petition for Review from the Eleventh Court of Appeals, Eastland Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 55.3 and in response to this Court’s request, the City of Midland respectfully submits its response brief on the merits. | Party Submissions | 6.962801 | 6.721995 | 6.934588 |
Justice Huddle posed the following hypothetical: if Bay had gone “through each of these injuries described in the final judgment, and for this particular one said, ‘We allocate $100,000 of the 1.9 to this injury,’ would that be sufficient to carry their burden, and you would have a $100,000 settlement credit? Or do you think that you would then sort of look behind the allocation and test its veracity somehow?” Counsel for the Diocese agreed at oral argument that extrinsic evidence could be used. He suggested, however, that Bay, Ltd. should have allocated an amount to each of the 23 injuries. But that’s conflating the Sky View steps. | Party Submissions | 17.362022 | 19.596148 | 19.68709 |
Arbitration Rule 29(4)(i) 23.1. Recordings shall be made of all hearings and sessions. The recordings shall be provided to the Parties and the Tribunal Members. | Legal Decisions | 12.883772 | 13.804397 | 14.599623 |
Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built bef ore the creation of Obnova’s predecessor Otpad.46 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises. | Legal Decisions | 12.996551 | 14.173433 | 13.771451 |
The instruction to exclude only the later-in-time signature, Tex. Elec. Code §141.066(c), compounds the constitutional problems. If anything, a duplicative signature shows that the individual changed his mind and supports the second candidate more. The State’s instruction to treat differently two candidates who received the same signature from the same individual does not serve any sufficient governmental interest and is entirely arbitrary. | Party Submissions | 21.259655 | 28.600233 | 18.761078 |
Subsets and Splits