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The CIA has asserted that the information in the CIR was sent to the FBI through another cable, which may be why the CIR was not sent.
A CIA cable stated that Mihdhar�s travel documents, including a multiple entry U.S. visa, had been copied and passed �to the FBI for further investigation.� As discussed above, however, we found no evidence that this cable was correct and that this information had actually been provided to the FBI.
I.
Introduction In this chapter, we examine the FBI�s handling of intelligence information concerning two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
Mihdhar, Hazmi, and three other terrorists hijacked and crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.
The FBI has asserted that it learned in late August 2001 that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda operatives and that they had traveled to the United States in January 2000.
In August 2001, the FBI also discovered that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4, 2001, purportedly for a month-long stay.
In late August, the FBI initiated an investigation to determine whether Mihdhar was still in the country and to find him.
The FBI was still searching for him at the time of the September 11 attacks.
We examined the information that the Intelligence Community and the FBI had about Mihdhar and Hazmi prior to September 11.
We found no evidence indicating the FBI or any other member of the Intelligence Community had specific intelligence regarding the September 11 plot.
However, beginning in late 1999 and continuing through September 11, 2001, we found five junctures at which the FBI either learned of intelligence information about Mihdhar and Hazmi, could have learned of additional intelligence information about them, or could have developed additional information about their location and terrorist connections.
These five junctures were: Yet, despite these ongoing discussions and opportunities for the FBI to learn about and focus on Mihdhar and Hazmi, including their presence in the United States, the FBI was not made aware of and did not connect important details about them until late August 2001, a short time before they participated in the terrorist attacks.
Even in August, the FBI�s search for Mihdhar and Hazmi was not given any urgency or priority, and was not close to locating them by the time of the attacks.
In this chapter, we describe each of these five opportunities in detail.
We set forth the available intelligence information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar that existed at the time, whether the information was made available to the FBI, and what additional information about Hazmi and Mihdhar the FBI could have developed.
In the analysis section of this chapter, we evaluate the problems that impeded the FBI�s handling of the intelligence information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11.
II.
Background To investigate the issues involving Hazmi and Mihdhar, the OIG asked for and reviewed all documents the FBI had regarding them before September 11.
The FBI search for these documents included searches of its Automated Case Support system (ACS), Integrated Intelligence Information Application (IIIA) system,94 and CTLink.95 In addition, searches were conducted on archived FBI e-mail messages and the FBI Director�s briefing documents.
These searches were initially conducted in response to a request by the Congressional Joint Intelligence Committee�s Inquiry Staff, which was conducting its own inquiry into this subject.
The OIG also obtained direct access to ACS so that we could conduct our own searches for relevant documents.
In addition, we reviewed hard copy case and informant files to search for documents relevant to Mihdhar and Hazmi.
In addition to reviewing these documents, we conducted more than 70 interviews related to the Mihdhar and Hazmi matter.
These included interviews of FBI IOSs, special agents, attorneys, and supervisors who had access to some of the relevant information or participated in meetings or operations related to these hijackers.
We also interviewed FBI employees detailed to the CIA and FBI agents who participated in debriefings of intelligence sources who had relevant information.
Because much of the information discussed in this chapter of the report involves the FBI�s interactions with the CIA, we also obtained information directly from the CIA.
The DOJ OIG does not have oversight authority over CIA operations or personnel, and we therefore did not make assessments of the performance of CIA personnel.
That issue is the responsibility of the CIA OIG, which is conducting its own inquiry in response to the JICI report.
We had to rely on the cooperation of the CIA in providing access to CIA witnesses and documents that were relevant to the OIG�s oversight of the FBI.
We interviewed CIA staff operations officers, analysts, and supervisors, as well as CIA employees detailed to the FBI, including a CIA employee detailed to the FBI�s New York Field Office�s Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Initially, the CIA made available to the OIG for review various documents that the CIA�s �Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Review Group�96 had identified as being related to our inquiry.
The Review Group had gathered these and other documents during its review of the September 11 attacks and during additional searches conducted at the request of the JICI staff.
We did not have independent access to CIA databases, and therefore we could not independently verify that all relevant documents had been provided to us.
However, we had several lengthy sessions with members of the Review Group at which they identified the documents they used to support their conclusions regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
The CIA permitted us to review but not have a copy of these documents.
In addition, a member of the CIA General Counsel�s staff conducted additional searches for documents relevant to particular disputed issues.
As a result of that review, copies of additional relevant documents were also made available for our review.
In response to the JICI report issued in December 2002, the CIA OIG initiated a review in February 2003 of the CIA actions related to the September 11 attacks.
In July 2003 the CIA OIG review team informed us it had several more documents that were relevant to our review.
These documents were made available to us to review, and redacted copies of the documents were provided to us in November 2003.
The CIA OIG review team also provided additional relevant documents and information to us that it found during the course of its review.
In February 2004, however, while we were reviewing a list of CIA documents that had been accessed by FBI employees assigned to the CIA, we noticed the title of a document that appeared to be relevant to this review and had not been previously disclosed to us.
The CIA OIG had not previously obtained this document in connection with its review.
We obtained this document, known as a Central Intelligence Report (CIR).
This CIR was a draft document addressed to the FBI containing information about Mihdhar�s travel and possession of a U.S. visa.
As a result of the discovery of this new document, a critical document that we later determined had not been sent to the FBI before the September 11 attacks (see Section III, A, 4 below), we had to re-interview several FBI and CIA employees and obtain additional documents from the CIA.
The belated discovery of this CIA document delayed the completion of our review.
In this section of the chapter, we describe background information relevant to the interactions between the CIA and the FBI and the ways in which they exchanged intelligence.
We begin with a discussion of the CIA�s authority and mission, organization, forms of communications, and ways in which the CIA passed intelligence to the FBI.
We also discuss the role of the FBI�s employees who were �detailed� to work at the CIA.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA and established it as the nation�s lead foreign intelligence agency of the United States.
The CIA engages primarily in the clandestine collection of �foreign intelligence� information � information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign governments or organizations, including information about their international terrorist activities.
The CIA is charged with evaluating and disseminating the intelligence information it collects.
The CIA reports directly to the President through the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is the head of both the CIA and the Intelligence Community.
The DCI is the primary advisor to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence matters.
George Tenet was named to that position in 1997.
The work of the CIA is conducted primarily through three �directorates�: the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Each is led by a Deputy Director.
Below we briefly describe the relevant structure and positions within each directorate.
The Directorate of Operations is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence.
This takes place in field offices known as �stations.�97 Smaller cities may have �bases,� which are sub-offices of the stations.
�Operations officers,� also known as �case officers,� are responsible for collecting intelligence through contacts with human sources and through the use of technology.
Collection management officers, also known as �reports officers,� are responsible for taking raw intelligence reported by the operations officers and removing from it the information that reveals the source, method of collection, or other sensitive information.
The reports officers publish intelligence information in a form that can be made available to the Intelligence Community.
The head of a station or base is usually an operations officer and is known as a Chief of Station (COS) or Chief of Base (COB).
Stations and bases are usually grouped by geographic division and report to the chief of the geographic division at CIA Headquarters.
Within the geographic division at CIA Headquarters are �staff operations officers,� or �desk officers,� who provide operational research, advice, and other forms of case management support to the officers in the field.
The CIA�s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), which is based in the Directorate of Operations but which draws on all CIA resources, is charged with preempting and disrupting international terrorism.
The CTC is staffed by managers, analysts, operations officers, desk officers, and reports officers.
The CTC collects and analyzes strategic intelligence on terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism to ascertain the capabilities, sources of support, and likely targets of terrorist elements, and to furnish detailed information on terrorist-related intelligence to the Intelligence Community.
At the time of the events relevant to our review, the CTC operated a unit � that we call the �Bin Laden Unit� � that dealt exclusively with issues related to al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden.
The Bin Laden Unit was later merged into a larger group in the CTC.
Although staffing levels fluctuated, approximately 40-50 people worked within the Bin Laden Unit before September 11, 2001.
The Bin Laden Unit was known as a �virtual station� because it operated from within CIA Headquarters but collected and operated against a subject, much as stations in the field focus on a country.
The Directorate of Intelligence, the analytical branch of the CIA, is responsible for the production and dissemination of timely, accurate, and objective intelligence analysis on foreign policy issues.
It focuses analysis on key foreign countries, regional conflicts, and issues such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
The Directorate of Intelligence is primarily composed of analysts who concentrate on particular areas of expertise.
For example, intelligence analysts are assigned a particular geographic region to monitor the leadership, motivations, plans, and intentions of foreign governments in relation to U.S. national security interests.
Additionally, counterterrorism analysts stationed in the CTC produce a range of long-term intelligence products about terrorist organizations and provide tactical analytic support to intelligence operations.
The Directorate of Science and Technology is responsible for creating and applying technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.
It employs a broad range of professionals, including computer programmers, engineers, scientists, and linguists.
Official internal communications between entities within the CIA are normally conducted by an electronic communication known as a �cable.� Cables are addressed to the stations, offices, or units within an office from which some action is expected.
Information acceptable for sharing with a foreign government service is put into a section of a cable called a �tear line.� The CIA shares intelligence with the rest of the Intelligence Community through a communication known as a �TD� (�Telegraphic Dissemination�).
TDs can be sent to other Intelligence Community agencies, including the FBI, and are available to the Intelligence Community through the Intelink system.
Another type of intelligence report used by the CIA when conducting business with other agencies is a CIR, or �Central Intelligence Report.� CIRs are used for disseminating information to a specific agency or group of agencies.
CIRs to the FBI normally concern something occurring in the United States, involving a U.S. person or an ongoing FBI investigation.
In addition to formal methods of communicating by the CIA to the FBI, much information can be shared with the FBI informally.
CIA and FBI employees who have similar positions and expertise develop relationships and communicate informally while working together on related matters, either by secure telephones or in person.
In addition, meetings are sometimes held to discuss a matter or a piece of intelligence that is of value to both agencies.
According to the CIA employees we interviewed, when the CIA passed intelligence information or other kinds of information verbally or by another informal mechanism to the FBI, the information exchange normally would be documented through a TD or a CIR.
However, they said that not every telephone call or conversation was documented.
In 1996, the FBI began detailing employees to work in the CIA�s CTC.
During the time period relevant to this chapter of the report, five FBI employees were detailed to the CTC�s Usama Bin Laden Unit in four separate positions.
Two of the positions were filled by personnel from the FBI�s Washington Field Office, and one position each was filled from the FBI�s New York Field Office and FBI Headquarters.98 One of the FBI detailees assigned to Bin Laden Unit, who we call �Eric,� held a supervisory position as a deputy chief of the Bin Laden Unit.99 Eric, an FBI Headquarters supervisor in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, was detailed to the CTC as a branch chief for a particular terrorist group in September 1997.
In March 1999, FBI Headquarters transferred him from that part of the CTC to the deputy chief position in the Bin Laden Unit.
According to Eric, he was told by FBI Assistant Director Neil Gallagher that there were a lot of problems between the FBI�s New York Field Office and the Bin Laden Unit and that he needed to mend the relationship.100 Eric stated that although he acted as a liaison between the CIA and the FBI, his primary job was to perform substantive work related to the Bin Laden Unit�s mission.
Eric left the Bin Laden Unit in January 2000 and was replaced in July 2000 by an FBI employee who we call �Craig.�101 By this time, the Bin Laden Unit had been placed into a newly formed group, which was a much larger organization than the Bin Laden Unit.
Craig was designated as a deputy chief in the new, larger group.
He described his primary job as being a �referent� for law enforcement issues.