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He explained this role as involving coordination between the FBI and CIA when they wanted to conduct joint interviews or when the CIA requested assistance with a law enforcement matter.
Eric and Craig had access via computers on their desks to the CIA�s internal cables.
Eric said that while he was at the CIA, he attempted to read all incoming Bin Laden Unit cables.
However, he said that the amount of cable traffic was overwhelming and was too much for one individual to read consistently.
In contrast, Craig told the OIG that he did not believe his job was to read all the cable traffic and that he did not even attempt to do so.
Another FBI employee detailed to the Bin Laden Unit, an Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) who we call �Mary,� was assigned to CIA Headquarters from the FBI�s Washington Field Office in April 1998.
Although she was assigned to work on issues of mutual interest to the FBI and the CIA, such as the East African embassy bombings,102 she also was assigned to work on unilateral CTC matters.
She said that as a desk officer, she read and responded to cable traffic that was pertinent to the matters she was assigned.
She nominally reported to a supervisor in the FBI�s Washington Field Office, but her work was assigned by her CTC supervisors at the Bin Laden Unit.103 The Washington Field Office also detailed to the CTC a special agent, who we call �Dwight.� His performance evaluations were done by the Washington Field Office, but his assignments came from CTC managers.
He focused on the financial aspects of terrorism and obtained information through the CTC to help identify and investigate persons who were responsible for funding terrorism.
He had access to CIA cables and reviewed them for potential leads or other information related to terrorist financing.
An FBI New York Field Office agent from its Bin Laden squad, who we call �Malcolm,� was also detailed to the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit in early 1999 at the request of John O�Neill, the New York Field Office Special Agent in Charge for Counterterrorism at the time.
Malcolm replaced another New York Field Office Bin Laden squad agent who had left the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit in August 1998.
Malcolm told the OIG that he was not given instructions as to his specific duties at the CIA.
He said he understood his job there was to be the �eyes and ears� of the New York Field Office and �to monitor� New York Field Office cases.
He said his role was to �facilitate inquiries of mutual interest� and to act as a liaison for FBI offices around the country by following up on tracing requests and reporting on their status.
He stated that he also spent a significant amount of time coordinating with the CTC in preparation for and during the trials that arose out of the FBI�s investigations into the East African Embassy bombings.
He told the OIG that he did not review all cables; he reviewed only the cables that he thought were interesting, generally based solely on his review of the cable subject line.
He said he reported to an SSA in the New York Field Office, not to anyone at the CIA.
III.
Factual chronology regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar In this section of the report, we discuss in detail the five junctures before September 11, 2001, during which the FBI had an opportunity to obtain or develop information about Mihdhar and Hazmi but did not.
We describe in chronological order the sequence of events regarding these five opportunities, including the information that the FBI obtained or could have obtained about Hazmi and Mihdhar.
Many of the witnesses told the OIG they did not have specific recollection of the events and conversations related to the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter.
In addition, we found few notes and documents relating to these events and conversations.
The following is our best reconstruction of the events based on the participants� recollections and the existing documentary evidence.
We show a timeline of the Hazmi and Mihdhar events described in this chapter on the next two pages of the report.
This section describes the initial development and dissemination of intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] The intelligence led to a surveillance operation in Malaysia in which it was discovered that Mihdhar had a valid multiple-entry U.S. visa and photographs of Mihdhar meeting with other al Qaeda operatives were taken.
There were several ways the FBI could have acquired this information from the CIA � through a CIR from the CIA to the FBI, informally through conversations between a CIA employee and FBI Headquarters employees, and through the FBI employees detailed to the CIA reviewing the CIA cable traffic.
We reviewed whether this information was in fact passed to the FBI by the CIA, and based on the evidence, concluded that while the CIA passed some of the information about Mihdhar to the FBI, it did not contemporaneously pass the information about Mihdhar�s U.S. visa to the FBI.
We concluded it was not disclosed by the CIA until late August 2001, shortly before the September 11 terrorist attacks.
We also reviewed whether FBI detailees to the CIA contemporaneously acquired this information and what action, if any, they took with respect to this information.
Hazmi and Mihdhar Timeline - Part I [Image Not Available Electronically] Hazmi and Mihdhar Timeline - Part II [Image Not Available Electronically] [Image Not Available Electronically] [Image Not Available Electronically] In addition, the CIA learned in March 2000 that Hazmi had boarded a United Airlines flight in Bangkok, Thailand, bound for Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 2000.104 We also reviewed whether the FBI was informed of this information, and concluded that it did not learn about this information until August 2001.
In late 1999, the Intelligence Community developed significant intelligence information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
At this time, the Intelligence Community was on high alert because of concerns involving possible terrorist activity planned in conjunction with the coming of the new Millennium.
In addition to concerns about attacks at New Year�s Eve celebrations, the Intelligence Community was concerned that a terrorist attack was planned for January 3, 2000, which in the Islamic calendar is considered a �night of destiny.�105 There were additional concerns about potential terrorist attacks coinciding with the end of Ramadan, around January 6, 2000.106 Several of these planned attacks were uncovered in December 1999.
For example, on December 1, 1999, in Jordan, a plot to disrupt New Year activities with explosives designed to kill thousands of revelers, including U.S. citizens, was uncovered and thwarted with the arrest of 16 people.
On December 14, 1999, Ahmad Ressam was stopped at the United States/Canadian border in Washington state as he attempted to enter the United States in a vehicle loaded with explosives.
It was determined later that he had intended to detonate the explosives at the Los Angeles airport.
To be prepared for possible terrorist activity at the end of 1999, the FBI activated its Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).
The SIOC is located in a secure area within FBI Headquarters and contains several meeting rooms, conferencing equipment, communications equipment, computers, and other operational equipment.
It allows the FBI to manage major investigations or other significant operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
During the Millennium period, the FBI operated its International Terrorism Operations Section from within the SIOC.
In addition, the FBI detailed field supervisors with counterterrorism experience and other counterterrorism personnel to the SIOC for around-the-clock monitoring and response to possible terrorist activities.
At the CIA, additional personnel were called in to work at the CTC and planned leave was canceled.
In addition, personnel from the CIA and other Intelligence Community agencies were detailed to work in the FBI�s SIOC.
During this period, personnel in the FBI�s SIOC prepared two daily briefings for the FBI Director and his executive staff, one at 7:30 a.m. and the other at 4:30 p.m. The daily briefings contained summaries of significant terrorism investigations and the latest intelligence related to counterterrorism.
Accompanying the briefings were daily threat updates prepared each afternoon for the Director and his executive staff.
The briefings and the threat updates were prepared by various people throughout the course of the day and night in the SIOC.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] The communications indicated that several members of an �operational cadre� were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000.
Analysis of the communications revealed that persons named Nawaf, Khalid and Salem were involved.
In early 2000, the NSA analyzed what appeared to be related communications concerning a �Khalid.�107 The NSA�s reporting about these communications was sent, among other places, to FBI Headquarters, the FBI�s Washington and New York Field Offices, and the CIA�s CTC.
At the FBI, this information appeared in the daily threat update to the Director on January 4, 2000.
A CIA desk officer working in the Bin Laden Unit who we call �Michelle� determined that there were links between these people and Al Qaeda as well as the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
In addition, the CIA identified �Khalid� as Khalid al-Mihdhar.
Mihdhar arrived [INFORMATION REDACTED], on January 5, 2000.
Mihdhar was traveling on a Saudi passport.
This passport contained a valid U.S. visa.
Mihdhar�s passport was photocopied and sent to CIA Headquarters.
Several CIA cables contemporaneously discussed Mihdhar�s travel and the discovery of his U.S. visa in his Saudi passport.
CIA records show that a CIA employee, who we call �James�108 and who was detailed to FBI Headquarters during the Millennium period, accessed one of these cables approximately two hours after it was disseminated in the morning, and he accessed another of the cables about eight hours after it was disseminated on the next morning.
James discussed some information about Mihdhar with two FBI Headquarters employees on the evening of January 5, which we detail in Section 7 below.
Dwight, the special agent detailed to the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit from the FBI�s Washington Field Office, also read the cables discussing Mihdhar�s U.S. visa within hours of each cable being disseminated.
CIA records also show that Dwight�s immediate supervisor in the Bin Laden Unit opened one of the cables soon after Dwight.
Dwight opened one of the cables, which reported that Mihdhar�s visa application had been verified and that he had listed New York as his intended destination.
Around 9:30 a.m. on the same morning, Dwight began drafting in the CIA�s computer system a CIR addressed to the UBL Unit Chief at FBI Headquarters and an SSA in the UBL Unit at FBI Headquarters who we call �Bob.� Dwight�s CIR also was addressed to the FBI�s New York Field Office.
The CIR first described the NSA information that had been received about Mihdhar, including the planned travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in early January.
The CIR also discussed the potential links between the suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East and the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
The CIR stated that photographs of Mihdhar had been obtained and would be sent to the FBI under separate cover.
The CIR detailed Mihdhar�s passport and visa information, including that Mihdhar had listed on his visa application his intended destination as New York and that he planned to stay three months.
Dwight also wrote that the CTC was requesting �feedback� on �any intelligence uncovered in FBI�s investigation� resulting from the information in the CIR.
Michelle, the Bin Laden Unit desk officer who originally had taken notice of the information about Mihdhar and his connections to Al Qaeda, accessed Dwight�s draft CIR less than an hour after Dwight drafted it at approximately 9:30 a.m. Around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Michelle added a note to the CIR in the CIA�s computer system: �pls hold off on CIR for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit].� CIA records show that the same morning, the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit, who we will call �John,� also had read the cable indicating that Mihdhar�s visa was valid and that New York had been listed as his intended destination.
Around 6:30 p.m. on the same day, John again accessed this cable and then another cable, the same two CIA cables about Hazmi and Mihdhar in the CIA�s computer system that Dwight had used in drafting the CIR.
CIA records do not indicate that John accessed Dwight�s draft CIR.109 CIA records show that the CIA employee detailed to FBI Headquarters who we call James and who discussed the Mihdhar information with two FBI Headquarters employees, also accessed the draft CIR on the day it was drafted.
In addition, two other FBI detailees accessed the draft CIR: Eric, the other Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit, accessed it two hours after Dwight began writing it, and Malcolm, the New York Field Office�s detailee to the Bin Laden Unit, accessed it two days later.
CIA records show that as of eight days later the CIR had not been disseminated to the FBI.
In an e-mail to John in mid-January, Dwight had attached the draft CIR and wrote, �Is this a no go or should I remake it in some way.� The CIA was unable to locate any response to this e-mail.
By mid-February, the CIR had not been sent to the FBI and was still in draft form in the CIA�s computer system.
CIA records show that Dwight e-mailed a CIA contractor who handled computer matters and asked him to delete several draft cables in the computer system unrelated to this matter, but to save the draft CIR concerning Mihdhar.
The contractor accessed the draft cable in the system the next day.
When we interviewed all of the individuals involved with the CIR, they asserted that they recalled nothing about it.
Dwight told the OIG that he did not recall being aware of the information about Mihdhar, did not recall drafting the CIR, did not recall whether he drafted the CIR on his own initiative or at the direction of his supervisor, and did not recall any discussions about the reasons for delaying completion and dissemination of the CIR.
Malcolm said he did not recall reviewing any of the cable traffic or any information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
Eric told the OIG that he did not recall the CIR.
The CIA employees also stated that they did not recall the CIR.
Although James, the CIA employee detailed to FBI Headquarters, declined to be interviewed by us, he told the CIA OIG that he did not recall the CIR.
John (the Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit) and Michelle, the desk officer who was following this issue, also stated that they did not recall the CIR, any discussions about putting it on hold, or why it was not sent.
On the same day that Dwight was drafting the CIR, the CIA reported in an internal cable additional information about Mihdhar.
The cable stated that it appeared that, despite his multiple entry visa, Mihdhar had not yet traveled to the United States.
The cable then stated that it was up to the CTC as to whether anyone should inquire with the INS to verify whether Mihdhar had traveled to the United States.110 The cable also reported additional information about Mihdhar while he was in Dubai.
CIA records reveal that this cable also was read by FBI detailee Dwight.
However, Dwight did not include in the draft CIR the additional information about the lack of any indication that Mihdhar had traveled to United States or the additional information about Mihdhar in Dubai.111 Also on the same day that Dwight was preparing the CIR, Michelle, the Bin Laden Unit desk officer who was following the issue of Mihdhar, prepared a lengthy cable to several stations summarizing the information that had been collected at that point on Mihdhar and three other individuals who also were possibly traveling to Malaysia.
The cable began, �After following the various reports, some much more credible than others, regarding a possible [Bin Laden]-associated threat against U.S. interests in East Asia, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
This cable then summarized the CIA�s information that indicated several individuals were planning to travel to Malaysia.
In the paragraph describing Mihdhar, Michelle stated that Mihdhar�s travel documents, including a multiple entry U.S. visa, had been copied and passed �to the FBI for further investigation.� This cable �the fifth CIA cable to discuss Mihdhar�s U.S. visa � did not state by whom or to whom Mihdhar�s travel documents were passed.
It also did not indicate how they had been passed, or provide any other reference to the passage of the documents.
Because this cable was an internal, operational cable, it was not forwarded to or copied to the FBI.
This cable was disseminated to various CIA stations approximately three hours after Michelle had noted in the cable system that Dwight was directed to hold off on sending his draft CIR to the FBI �for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit].� When we interviewed Michelle, she stated that she had no recollection of who told her that Mihdhar�s travel documents had been passed to the FBI or how they had been passed.
She said she would not have been the person responsible for passing the documents.
According to Michelle, the language in the cable stating �[the documents] had been passed� suggested to her that someone else told her that they had already been passed, but she did not know who it was.