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Around the same time, the CIA officer sent a cable to CIA Headquarters that described the FBI�s need for reporting directly through FBI channels, as opposed to CIA channels.
The CIA office then asked permission to provide electronic copies of TDs to Max so that Max could send the same reporting through FBI channels.
In anticipation of the Cole agents� interview of the source, the CIA case officer had sent a cable asking the Bin Laden Unit to touch base with FBI Headquarters regarding the case status and the planned trip of the New York FBI agents.
The CIA case officer noted that the source was �currently of very high interest to our [FBI] colleagues.� Through their work on the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the subsequent discovery of the terrorist plot to attack New York landmarks, the New York FBI became the primary office for the investigation of al Qaeda, eventually leading to the indictment of Bin Laden in the Southern District of New York in November 1998.
The other primary case agent on the Cole investigation was out of the country during the events discussed in this section of the report.
According to the NSA, its average response time to FBI requests for approval to pass information to criminal investigators was one to five business days.
The NSA information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar was from late 1999 and early 2000, and contained the initial caveat stating that information could not be disseminated to law enforcement officials without approval from OIPR.
By the time FBI Headquarters was dealing with this information in the summer of 2001, the new caveat was being placed on NSA reporting, and FBI Headquarters was operating under the understanding that the NSA General Counsel had to approve dissemination of NSA counterterrorism information to criminal investigators.
John told the OIG that in this detail to the FBI he acted as the CIA�s chief intelligence representative to ITOS Section Chief Michael Rolince.
John stated that he did not have line authority over anyone at the FBI and that his primary role was to assist the FBI in exploiting information for intelligence purposes.
The report did not mention Mihdhar�s visa, Hazmi�s travel to the United States [INFORMATION REDACTED].
[INFORMATION REDACTED].
As previously discussed, after Quso was detained in Yemen, he acknowledged that he had received $7,000 from someone named Ibrahim, which Quso asserted he took to Bangkok, Thailand on January 6, 2000, to deliver to �Khallad,� a friend of Ibrahim�s.
Mihdhar had traveled to Bangkok on January 8.
As noted above, John was correct � Khallad was not in any of these three photographs.
After September 11 it was learned that the person the source had identified as Khallad was actually Hazmi.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri was al Qaeda�s chief of operations in the Persian Gulf and was suspected to have been involved in the attack on the Cole.
According to Donna, at the time he was believed to be the �on-scene commander� for the Cole attack, and the IOSs had been assigned the task of trying to locate him based on the intelligence reporting on him.
He has since been arrested outside the United States.
CTLink is a database administered by the CIA and used to disseminate information within the Intelligence Community.
Only a limited number of New York agents had actually met Quso.
The others had only seen photographs of him.
When we asked Scott whether an intelligence-designated agent could have been provided the information outside the presence of the criminal agents, Scott agreed that could have been done, but he did not think of it at the time and no one else suggested it.
During his subsequent testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee, however, Scott said that the wall must not have been at issue because the criminal agents could have just left the room and any information could have been related to an intelligence agent.
Donna�s contemporaneous notes reflect this information.
It appears as the last entry on the notes, indicating that this was discussed at the end of the meeting.
As described earlier, Peter and John had exchanged several e-mails about the Malaysia meetings and the photographs.
However, it is unclear based upon the information available to us exactly what Peter knew at this point.
He said he was unable to remember exactly what additional information he had on June 11, 2001.
We believe it likely that the agents were confusing the post-meeting discussions with the showing of the photographs at the meeting.
It is important to note, however, that this NSA information originally had been routed not only to FBI Headquarters but also to the New York FBI Office in late 1999 and early 2000.
A policy in the Intelligence Community, which is designed to protect intelligence sources and methods, is that the originator of intelligence information controls the further dissemination of the information.
This policy is described as originator controlled, or �ORCON.� Dissemination of ORCON information requires permission from the originating agency to further disseminate the information outside the receiving agency.
Apparently unbeknownst to the involved FBI and CIA personnel, the Yemeni authorities already had been given the photographs on January 3, 2001, six months before anyone at the FBI received the photographs.
As discussed above, we found no evidence that this information had, in fact, been provided to the FBI.
Apparently the desk officer was unaware that clearance had been received and that the photographs had been shared with Yemeni officials.
Mary told the OIG that she took a week of annual leave during August, which she thought was during that week, and she thought that the meeting therefore had not occurred.
Although the e-mail references a meeting, Mary and Donna both told us that they had no recollection of any meeting on August 15 or any one prior to August 22.
Mary was copied on an e-mail from John to Peter in mid-May, 2001, in which John discussed the travel of Mihdhar and others who appeared to be �couriers on a sort.� In this e-mail John stated, among other things, that �Nawaf� [Hazmi] had traveled with someone from Bangkok to Los Angeles to Hong Kong.
Mary stated to the OIG that she received this e-mail before she was �up to speed� on the Malaysia meetings.
There is some discrepancy in witness statements on whether this meeting occurred on August 22 or August 23.
Although it is unclear on which date this meeting occurred, we believe the meeting occurred on August 22, 2001.
The problem of INS departure records not being complete or accurate is described in an August 2001 OIG report entitled �The Immigration and Naturalization Service�s Automated I-94 System.� Investigation conducted after September 11 found that Hazmi had remained in the United States.
Donna was unable to recall how she first discovered the information on the Khallad identification.
We were unable to find any documents or other evidence clarifying this issue.
At this time, several agencies maintained separate watchlists.
The State Department watchlist was the VISA/VIPER system.
Within VISA/VIPER, the TIPOFF system focused on suspected terrorists.
The INS maintained the LOOKOUT system, which was also available to the Customs Service through TECS.
He was the acting Unit Chief of the UBL from June 28, 2001, until September 10, 2001.
According to the NSA, the request was approved later that same day.
This information officially was passed to the FBI in a CIR on August 30, 2001.
As discussed in Chapter Three, ECs are marked with a precedence level based on an escalating scale beginning at �routine;� �priority,� connoting some urgency; and �immediate,� connoting the highest level of urgency.
Jason told the OIG that he did not specifically recall this e-mail.
He said he was out of the office the majority of the time from June until September 11, 2001, due to a serious medical condition, and he did not return to work full-time until September 11, 2001.
Rob told the OIG that the squad�s Supervisory Special Agent acted as �the wall� between intelligence and criminal investigations during this period, and Jason could subsequently open a criminal investigation if warranted.
Rob told the OIG that he could not recall whether he had talked to anyone from the NSLU about this issue.
Rob told the OIG that the New York Field Office technically could have ignored Headquarters� recommendation and opened a criminal investigation.
However as a practical matter, the field would not normally ignore Headquarters� decision.
The MIOG is the FBI operational manual - Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines.
Donna asserted this reference actually related to the Attorney General�s FCI Guidelines that are contained in the MIOG.
Richard began working in the New York Field Office after graduating from the FBI Academy in June 2000.
After serving briefly on an applicant squad, a drug squad, and a surveillance squad, Richard was assigned to the UBL squad in July 2001.
Donna said she did not notice this discrepancy.
As we discuss below, neither did the New York FBI.
Patrick explained that agents often provided just the information and he completed the lookout form, but �new� agents often completed the form themselves.
Patrick estimated he received approximately 10 lookout requests each month.
Choicepoint� is a commercial service that mines information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and other identifying information from public sources (such as telephone directories, local taxing authorities, and court records), as well as purchase information from merchants or other companies.
The information is then consolidated into a large database and is accessible to law enforcement and other subscribers for a fee.
After September 11, however, the FBI located records on Hazmi in this commercial database.
We asked both the FBI and the CIA for any memoranda of understanding between the agencies specifying the job duties of any of the detailees.
The only MOUs we received, which were provided by the CIA, related to the administrative nature of the details, such as time and attendance reports, travel and training expenses, security clearances, and medical coverage.
The MOUs did not address their substantive duties or responsibilities.
For a fourth detailee, Mary, the FBI produced only a performance plan but no appraisal reports.
The performance plan was related to her duties as an FBI IOS.
Mary told the OIG that she was directed by CTC management based on her work as a CIA desk officer and was not evaluated by FBI personnel.
We also interviewed the first FBI employee detailed in March 1996 to Bin Laden Unit soon after it was created.
This detailee was an agent from the FBI�s New York Field Office, and he remained at the CTC until August 1998.
He said that he did not attempt to review all of the cable traffic.
He indicated, however, that when he did locate information of interest to the FBI, he did not encounter problems obtaining the CIA�s permission to share this information with the FBI.
Some CIA employees we interviewed stated that they, by contrast, believed that this was the function of the New York Field Office detailee.
We discuss this further in the next section.
Eric left the CTC in mid-January 2000, and Craig did not arrive at the CTC until July 2000.
Thus, between mid-January and July 2000 the FBI had no supervisory presence for the FBI employees detailed to work Bin Laden matters at the CTC.
The OIG is in the process of completing a comprehensive review of FBI�s analyst program.
The FBI agents do not routinely work in a SCIF area.
The computers on which they access ACS do not contain sensitive compartmented information or materials classified above Secret.
Because a high percentage of CIA traffic contains this information, the CIA detailee must work in a separate area.
We were informed that a separate SCIF for the JTTF is under construction in the San Diego Field Office.
However, this SCIF will only be large enough to accommodate three or four employees at any one time.
In accordance with the Attorney General�s Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines, a preliminary inquiry could be opened when there was information or allegations indicating that an individual is or may have been an international terrorist or a recruitment target of an international terrorist organization.
Preliminary inquiries were permitted to remain open for 120 days and had to be closed unless the FBI obtained sufficient evidence to open a full field investigation.
The file indicates that the decision not to conduct an interview was due to an investigation that included a proposed proactive element.
The FBI believed that the benefits of interviewing Bayoumi did not justify the risk to the proposed operation.
Country threats are defined by the FBI as foreign governments or entities whose intelligence activities are so hostile, or of such concern, to the national security of the United States that counterintelligence or monitoring activities directed against such countries are warranted.
As noted above, Stan has retired from the FBI and declined to be interviewed by the OIG.
The FBI defines �bona fides� to mean that the asset or informational asset �is who he/she says he/she is;� that the asset �has the position or access the asset claims to have;� and that the asset �is not working for or reporting to a foreign intelligence service or international terrorist organization without the knowledge of the FBI.� As noted, Mihdhar and Hazmi used their own names to open bank accounts, conduct financial transactions, obtain state identification cards, purchase a vehicle, obtain telephone service, take flying lessons, and rent an apartment while residing in San Diego.
Although not shared with Donna or known to anyone else in the FBI, the CIA also knew in June 2001 that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, that Mihdhar�s associate -- Hazmi -- had traveled to the United States in January 2000, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
As discussed above, Susan told the OIG that she did not recall this discussion with Donna.
One criminal agent worked on intelligence matters on a part-time basis.