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Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 were wounded in the attack.
IIIA is a database designed to capture comprehensive amounts of information from counterintelligence, international, and domestic terrorism investigations.
The system includes information ranging from biographical data on persons to profiles of terrorist groups.
The FBI describes the system as �conducive to putting together information regardless of office of origin or case.� CTLink is a shared database used for the dissemination of intelligence information among agencies within the Intelligence Community.
The CIA formed the DCI Review Group in late 2001 to assist the CIA in determining why it had not detected the September 11 plot.
The group included former CIA case officers and CIA OIG personnel.
The CIA also has field offices within the United States that are part of the National Resources Division within the Directorate of Operations.
They are responsible for the overt collection of foreign intelligence volunteered by individuals and organizations in the country.
Other FBI employees were also detailed to the CIA during this time.
However, the FBI detailees to the CTC�s Bin Laden Unit were the only ones relevant to the issues in this review.
A CIA employee was the other deputy chief in the Bin Laden Unit.
Both the FBI detailee and the CIA employee reported to the chief of the Bin Laden Unit, a CIA employee.
Eric told the OIG that when he arrived at Bin Laden Unit, he �walked into a buzz saw� and there was a great deal of animus from CIA employees toward the FBI detailees.
Eric said this experience was vastly different from his tenure in another CTC section, where he was readily accepted and integrated into the CIA�s operations.
No one filled the deputy chief position between January 2000 and July 2000.
On August 7, 1998, nearly simultaneous vehicle bombs were detonated at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring over 4,000.
Her position was later transferred from the Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters� Usama Bin Laden Unit.
Mihdhar was also on the same flight, but that fact apparently was not known within the Intelligence Community until much later, in August 2001.
During the course of the Cole bombing investigation, it was learned that an attack also had been planned against the U.S.S. The Sullivans in Aden, Yemen, on the same date.
That attack failed because the attack boat sank before reaching its target.
Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar.
Ramadan begins when authorities in Saudi Arabia sight the new moon of the ninth month.
The NSA had additional information in its database further identifying �Nawaf� as Nawaf al-Hazmi, a friend of Khalid.
However, the NSA informed the OIG that it was not asked to conduct research on these individuals at that time, and it did not uncover that information on Hazmi.
It was thought at the time that Salem might be Hazmi�s younger brother, and this was later confirmed.
The CIA has asked the OIG not to identify the true names of CIA employees for operational reasons.
According to John, once CIRs were drafted the CIA�s standard operating procedure was for the drafter to �coordinate� the CIR in the computer system, which notified the persons designated by the drafter that there was a CIR that required their attention.
He said that it was not standard operating procedure to access CIRs in draft form.
We did not determine whether the CIA actually contacted the INS pursuant to this suggestion.
As we discuss below, we did determine INS records reflect that Mihdhar first entered the United States on January 15, 2000, and only entered again on July 4, 2001.
This cable also was read by James, the CIA employee detailed to the FBI�s SIOC.
As detailed below, he later discussed some of its contents with an FBI Headquarters employee.
James wrote these e-mails in response to an e-mail from another CIA employee who was detailed to the FBI SIOC.
That employee reported on the morning of January 6 that he had been asked by an FBI employee for the latest on Mihdhar.
James responded in a series of e-mails that he had already briefed the FBI.
The final e-mail by James sets forth the details of his briefings.
In fact, Mihdhar had traveled to the U.S. with Hazmi on January 15, 2000.
This fact was not discovered by anyone in the Intelligence Community until August 2001.
Yousaf left Bangkok on January 20 for Karachi, Pakistan.
Some time after September 11, Yousaf was determined to be Tawfiq Muhammad Salih Bin Rashid al Atash, a/k/a Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole attack.
We discuss the FBI�s discovery of information about Khallad and the Cole attack, and the FBI�s opportunities to connect Khallad to the Malaysia meetings, in Section III, C below.
Mihdhar and Hazmi were placed on watchlists by other countries, including Thailand.
Once a supervisor approved a CIR for release, it was electronically disseminated by a unit in the CIA known as the Policy Community Action Staff.
CIA records show that Eric released five CIRs during his tenure at the Bin Laden Unit.
The fifth detailee � the manager who we call Craig � did not arrive at the CTC until July 2000.
The detailees also told the OIG that they did not necessarily read all of the cables they accessed.
They explained that they often skimmed cables to determine if any action was required on their part or to find specific information in connection with a particular assignment or issue.
When we showed Mary copies of an e-mail written by the CTC officer who had briefed SSA Bob and Ted, which indicated that she was copied on the e-mail, she said that she did not recall having read the e-mail.
This kind of individual is often referred to as an �informant� - the common vernacular for an individual providing information to an investigative agency.
Within the FBI�s foreign intelligence program, they are known as assets.
Mihdhar departed from Los Angeles on Lufthansa Airlines.
Bayoumi was employed by the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation from 1975 until 1995 and became a contractor for the organization beginning in 1995.
In Section IV B 1 of this chapter, we examine the investigative steps taken by the FBI in this preliminary inquiry and assess the appropriateness of the decision to close the inquiry.
Dyson is an American Caucasian who converted to Islam.
He has since changed his name to Caysan Bin Don.
Dyson provided the information to the FBI in an interview after September 11.
Halal is an Arabic word meaning �lawful� or �permitted.� Bayoumi left the United States for some of the time Hazmi and Mihdhar lived in the apartment.
INS records do not indicate when Bayoumi left the country, but the records indicate that he obtained a United States visa in Jeddah on May 10, 2000, and returned to the United States on May 31, 2000.
Bayoumi left the United States permanently in July 2001 and was living in England on September 11, 2001.
Bayoumi�s bank records show a cash deposit in the exact amount of the rent and security deposit ($1,558).
Mihdhar�s financial records also indicate that he opened an account with a deposit of $9,900 in cash within seven minutes of Bayoumi�s cash deposit, which suggests that they were in the bank together.
The OIG was not able to interview the asset.
The Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry had attempted to interview the asset without success.
The Committee then submitted interrogatories that the asset declined to answer, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The asset indicated through his attorney that if subpoenaed by the Committee, he would not testify without a grant of immunity.
There is some dispute about whether Hazmi and Mihdhar actually responded to an advertisement for boarders posted by the asset or whether they were introduced to the asset.
The OIG did not have access to the witnesses who could address this issue.
Stan was interviewed twice by the JICI staff, and he testified before the Joint Intelligence Committee.
After his retirement from the FBI, Stan declined repeated requests for an OIG interview.
The OIG does not have authority to subpoena individuals and cannot compel former Department of Justice employees to submit to an interview.
Initially the asset was not paid.
In July 2003, the asset was given a $100,000 payment and closed as an asset.
The FBI opened an investigation after September 11 to determine whether the asset was involved in the attack.
The asset has consistently maintained after September 11 that he had no suspicions about Hazmi and Mihdhar.
The results of a polygraph examination on his potential role were inconclusive.
Based on its investigation, however, the San Diego FBI concluded that the informational asset had not been complicit in plotting the attacks.
The OIG was permitted to review the transcripts of Stan�s testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee�s Inquiry.
Information developed after September 11, 2001, revealed this was a misidentification, and the person identified as Khallad was actually Hazmi.
We discuss this misidentification in detail below.
The primary mission of FBI Legat Offices is to establish liaison with foreign law enforcement agencies to support the FBI�s investigative activities overseas.
While Legat staff may become involved in specific investigations, they have no law enforcement authority in foreign countries.
For a description of the role and responsibilities of FBI Legats, see the OIG report entitled, �Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attach� Program� (March 2004).
As discussed above, FBI detailees to the CTC had access to these CIA cables, but the review and dissemination of source information to the FBI was not considered their responsibility.
When a witness is interviewed as part of a criminal investigation, the FBI prepares an FD-302 to document what was said in the interview.
When information is being obtained as part of an intelligence investigation, the FBI documents the information in an EC.
There was often a significant lag time between the interview and the completion of the documentation due to a variety of factors, including the intensity of investigative activity, the agents� extensive travel, and the required review of the documentation by FBI supervisors before dissemination.
Max told the OIG that at the time he and the CIA case officer believed that this photograph had come from the FBI�s New York Field Office.
Max added that it was not uncommon for him not to know the source of photographs that were shown to the source and that the source was shown hundreds of photographs.
Although FBI agents from New York had traveled overseas several times in 2000 to interview the source, in December 2000 the agents with the appropriate language abilities were tied up in Yemen after the Cole attack and were unable to travel to debrief the source.
Therefore, the FBI relied on the CIA to conduct this debriefing.
As previously discussed, the CIA had reported previously in an internal March 2000 cable that Mihdhar, Hazmi, and another individual had left Malaysia on January 8, 2000, and traveled together to Bangkok.
The CIA cable referred to its forwarding of only one Kuala Lumpur surveillance photograph, although subsequent cables showed that the receiving office received two Kuala Lumpur photographs to show the source.
It is unclear why the sending office sent only two of the photographs instead of all three of the Kuala Lumpur photographs it had.
In fact, CIA cables suggest this information was not shared with the FBI.
We saw several CIA cables during this time that discussed working with the FBI in relation to the FBI�s investigation of the Cole attack.
For example, we saw a December 2000 cable stating that the FBI had provided an update on its investigation of the location associated with telephone numbers the CIA had provided to the FBI in connection with an investigation, and the office that drafted the cable asked to be advised of whether the two offices to whom the cable was addressed were aware of additional information that could assist the FBI.
However, we saw another December 2000 cable, which discusses Khallad and other information not related to Khallad, which specifically instructed two CIA offices to share with the FBI the other information in the cable that was not related to Khallad, but it did not instruct the offices to share the information regarding the possible connection of the Malaysia meetings and Khallad.
As noted above, information developed after September 11, 2001, revealed this was a misidentification, and the person identified as Khallad was actually Hazmi.
This failure to identify Khallad in the photograph known to be of Mihdhar should have ended the theory that Mihdhar and Khallad were the same person.
Although no witness can recall the details of this particular debriefing, it is possible that Max, who lacked the appropriate language skills for a debriefing, either photocopied or hand wrote the information from the documents thus explaining his absence at the time that the photographs were shown to the source.