Datasets:
shivendrra
/
consolidated-datasets

Dataset card Data Studio Files Community
1
text
stringlengths
0
82.7M
Donna also said that she had not invited Peter and because she was not in his chain of command, she did not ask him to be prepared.
However, the New York agents we interviewed told the OIG that they believed that CTC personnel were coming to the meeting in part to share information with them.
The fact that all the participants we interviewed described the meeting as unproductive and a �waste of time� highlighted that a more useful exchange of information could have occurred.
With respect to the [INFORMATION REDACTED], Donna had obtained only limited information from CIA employee John about the photos when she received them.
She did not ask general background questions such as whether anyone else in the photographs had been identified, or what else was known from the Malaysia meetings.
Donna told the OIG that because she believed the CIA provided her with everything she was entitled to know, she did not have an in-depth discussion about the photographs.
John said he did not recall anything about his discussions with Donna regarding the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Donna told the OIG that when the New York agents asked her questions about Mihdhar, the Malaysia meetings, and the photographs, she thought that they were reasonable questions, but she did not know the answers.
She stated that at the time she obtained the [INFORMATION REDACTED] from the CIA, she believed that they were only potentially related to Quso and their significance to the Cole would hinge on whether Quso was in the photographs.
We believe Donna should have asked the CIA additional questions about the photographs.
[INFORMATION REDACTED], she should have wanted to ascertain, and asked the CIA, what, if anything, was known about the purpose of the Malaysia meetings, who were the other participants at the meetings, what was known about the participants, and any other available information.
Donna also did not ask the CIA whether there were additional photos or documentation.
Donna told the OIG she was unaware that there could have been additional photographs or other relevant information available.
We believe that someone in her position should have known or at least asked for additional information about the subject of the photographs in preparation for the meeting.
We also were troubled by Donna�s inadequate efforts to obtain additional information after the June 11 meeting, particularly information about the Malaysia meetings, since it had been the subject of a dispute between Donna and Scott.
Although Donna told the New York agents that she would check with the CIA about additional information regarding the photographs and the Malaysia meetings, Donna made little effort to obtain this information until two months later, in August 2001.
Donna told the OIG that she believes that she made some unsuccessful follow-up phone calls to Peter and John about the photographs.
It is not clear from the documentary evidence how much Donna did before August to obtain the information, but she did not provide additional information to the New York agents about the photographs for at least two months.
We recognize that FBI analysts were overwhelmed with assignments and had to juggle many responsibilities, however, given the possible connections of this information to the Cole investigation, we believe Donna should have made more aggressive and timely efforts to obtain this information soon after the June 11 meeting and to keep the New York agents informed about what her follow-up efforts were.
By the same token, Scott, the New York Cole case agent, did little to follow up after the June 11 meeting to obtain information he requested [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Scott told the OIG he �often� asked Donna about the status of the information, but he was not provided any such information.
Donna contended that Scott did not follow up on his June 11 requests.
We found no evidence such as e-mails or other documents to support Scott�s claim that he raised the issue often with Donna.
We believe that neither Donna nor Scott made significant efforts after the meeting to obtain the information.
The FBI�s investigation in August 2001 to find Mihdhar and Hazmi As discussed above, on August 22, 2001, the FBI learned that Mihdhar and Hazmi had entered the United States in January 2000, that Mihdhar had again flown to New York on July 4, 2001, and that there was no record of either of them leaving the country.
The FBI also learned that Khallad had been identified in the Kuala Lumpur photographs.
Upon discovery of this information, the FBI opened an intelligence investigation in New York in an effort to locate Mihdhar.
Once again, however, the separation between intelligence and criminal information affected who could receive access to the information about Hazmi and Mihdhar.
This interpretation of the wall also hampered the ability of the FBI New York agents working on the Cole investigation to participate in the search for Hazmi and Mihdhar.
In addition, we found that the FBI�s efforts to locate Hazmi and Mihdhar were not extensive.
We do not fault the case agent assigned to locate them.
He was new and not instructed to give the case any priority.
Rather, we found that the FBI New York did not pursue this as an urgent matter or assign many resources to it.
The effect of the wall on the FBI�s attempts to locate Mihdhar As discussed above, Donna drafted an EC to the New York FBI requesting it open an investigation to locate Mihdhar.
She also called Chad, the FBI New York agent who primarily handled intelligence investigations for the Bin Laden squad, to give him a �heads up� about the matter, and she subsequently sent the EC to him.
She wrote in the e-mail that she wanted to get the intelligence investigation going and the EC could not be shared with any of the agents working the Cole criminal case.
Chad forwarded the EC to his squad supervisor, Jason, who nevertheless disseminated the EC via e-mail within the Bin Laden squad, including to the criminal agents assigned to the Cole investigation.
Scott read the EC and contacted Donna regarding it.
Donna informed Scott that he was not supposed to have read the EC because it contained NSA information that had not been cleared to be passed to criminal agents.
Donna told Scott that he needed to destroy his copy.
Scott responded that the effort to locate Mihdhar [INFORMATION REDACTED], and he argued with Donna regarding the designation of the investigation as an intelligence matter.
Donna asserted that, because of the wall, criminal agents were not yet entitled to the underlying intelligence provided by the NSA, and [INFORMATION REDACTED], the FBI could not establish any connection between Mihdhar and the Cole criminal investigation.
Scott, Donna, and acting UBL Unit Chief Rob then spoke via conference call.
Scott argued that the investigation should be opened as a criminal investigation and that more resources and agents could be assigned to a criminal investigation by New York.
He also argued that criminal investigative tools, such as grand jury subpoenas, were far quicker in obtaining information than the tools available in intelligence investigations.
Donna consulted with an NSLU attorney, Susan.
According to Donna, Susan concurred that the matter should be handled as an intelligence investigation and that because of the wall, a criminal agent could not participate in the search for or any interview of Mihdhar.207 When Donna advised Scott of Susan�s opinion in an e-mail message, Scott responded by e-mail that he believed the wall was inapplicable.
Scott ended his message by suggesting that because of the NSLU�s position, people were going to die and that he hoped that NSLU would stand by its position then.
The way that FBI Headquarters handled the Mihdhar information reflected its interpretation of the requirements of the wall prior to September 11.
First, because the predication for the search for Mihdhar originated from the NSA reports, this information could not be immediately shared with criminal agents.
Instead, it first had to be cleared for dissemination by the NSA, which would determine whether the intelligence was based on FISA information.
If so, the information had to be cleared for passage to the criminal agents � the information had to be provided to the NSLU, which then provided the information to OIPR, which then provided it to the FISA Court, which then had to approve the passage of this information to criminal agents.
In fact, the limited INS information concerning Mihdhar�s and Hazmi�s entries into the United States was the only unrestricted information in the EC immediately available to the criminal investigators.
[INFORMATION REDACTED], the decision to open an intelligence investigation resulted in certain restrictions.
FBI Headquarters employees understood that they needed to ensure that they avoided any activities that the FISA Court or OIPR could later deem �too criminal� and could use as a basis to deny a FISA application.
This included preventing a criminal agent from participating in a subject interview in an intelligence investigation.
While Scott was correct that the wall had been created to deal with the handling of only FISA information and that there was no legal barrier to a criminal agent being present for an interview with Mihdhar if it occurred in the intelligence investigation, FBI Headquarters and NSLU believed that the original wall had been extended by the FISA Court and OIPR to cover such an interview.
Scott�s frustration over the wall was similar to Henry�s [INFORMATION REDACTED] when Henry was told by Don that seeking prosecutor involvement prematurely could potentially harm any FISA request.
Scott, like Henry, wanted to pursue a criminal investigation and became frustrated when he was advised by FBI Headquarters that he could not proceed in the manner he deemed appropriate.
Scott�s perception was that FBI Headquarters had misconstrued �the wall� and the wall had been inappropriately expanded.
He told the OIG that he believed the wall should only relate to FISA or FISA-derived information.
Like the Minneapolis FBI, Scott believed that he was being �handcuffed� in the performance of his job and that FBI Headquarters �erred on the side of caution� in its approach to intelligence information.
FBI Headquarters, on the other hand, acted in accordance with its experience with OIPR and the FISA Court.
FBI Headquarters believed that OIPR and the FISA Court required strict adherence to the procedures for the passage of intelligence information to criminal investigations and required separating criminal and intelligence investigations.
Donna explained that the FISA Court�s mandates resulted in the need for the FBI to create a near complete separation between intelligence and criminal investigations in order to effectively use intelligence information.
Rob also told the OIG that there were �land mines� in dealing with intelligence versus criminal information, and it was difficult to appropriately straddle the two sides.
Our review of this case showed that the wall had been expanded to create a system that was complex and had made it increasingly difficult to effectively use intelligence information within the FBI.
The wall � or �maze of walls� as one witness described it � significantly slowed the flow of intelligence information to criminal investigations.
The unintended consequence of the wall was to hamper the FBI�s ability to conduct effective counterterrorism investigations because the FBI�s efforts were sharply divided in two, and only one side had immediate and complete access to the available information.
The wall was not, however, the only impediment in the FBI�s handling of the investigation to find Mihdhar and Hazmi.
We found there were also other problems in how the search for Mihdhar and Hazmi was handled.
Allocation of investigative resources We found that prior to the September 11 attacks, the New York Field Office focused its al Qaeda counterterrorism efforts on criminal investigations, but it did not expend a similar effort on intelligence investigations or the development of intelligence information.
New York agents told the OIG they believed that criminal prosecution was the most effective tool in combating terrorism.
They asserted that criminal investigations are also a preventive activity and the FBI had always focused on preventing terrorism, even before September 11.
They pointed to the TERRSTOP investigation in 1993, an investigation to uncover a terrorist plot to attack New York City landmarks, and the criminal investigation into the East African embassy bombings.
Prosecutors also argued that criminal investigations and prosecutions are an effective preventive measure against terrorism.
Testifying before the Joint Intelligence Committee, Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), stated, �[W]e viewed the terrorist investigations and prosecutions we did from 1993-2002 as a prevention tool.� Patrick Fitzgerald, currently the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and formerly an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the SDNY, told us that it is a misconception that there has to be a difference between prosecution and gathering intelligence.
He added that the SDNY prosecutions produced a �treasure trove of [intelligence] information.� However, prosecutors also realized criminal investigation and prosecution were not the only means of countering terrorism.
White stated, �the counterterrorism strategy of our country in the 1990s was not, as I have read in the media, criminal prosecutions.� She further stated, �none of us considered prosecutions to be the country�s counterterrorism strategy, or even a major part of it.� As Fitzgerald told us, �in order to connect the dots, you need people to gather the dots.� Although we agree criminal investigations are a highly effective counterterrorism tool, intelligence investigations were not given nearly the same level of resources and attention in the FBI�s New York Field Office before September 11, 2001.
This criminal focus was clear in the assignment of personnel on the New York Bin Laden squad.
From October 2000 to June 2001, only one agent on the Bin Laden squad was designated as the �intelligence� agent � the agent we call �Chad.� The remainder were designated as �criminal� agents.208 Chad told us that he was inundated with intelligence investigations and information, and he rarely had enough time even to review all the incoming Bin Laden intelligence information, let alone to digest, analyze, or initiate the procedures to pass the information to the criminal agents where applicable.
Chad also told us that the �intelligence� agent designation was �not a desirable position� within the Bin Laden squad.
He described himself as the �leper� on the squad due to �the wall.� Furthermore, Chad stated that the intelligence side of the squad received far less and lower quality resources.
The handling of the investigation to locate Mihdhar provides a clear indication of the primacy of the criminal over intelligence investigations in the New York office.
On August 28, 2001, the New York Field Office opened an intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar based upon Donna�s EC.
Donna told the OIG that she believed there was some urgency to the Mihdhar investigation, not because of any evidence that he was operational, but because he could leave the United States at any time and the opportunity to find out as much as possible about him would be lost.
She said she therefore called Chad about the EC in advance, which she did not normally do.
However, when she sent the EC to New York, she assigned the matter �routine� precedence, the lowest precedence level.
When asked about this discrepancy, Donna told the OIG that the Mihdhar investigation was �no bigger� than any other intelligence investigation that the FBI was pursuing at the time.
The New York Bin Laden squad relief supervisors, who we call �Jay� and �David,� told the OIG that they recognized that there was some urgency to the Mihdhar investigation.
Yet, the FBI in New York did not treat it like an urgent matter.
The investigation was given to an inexperienced agent � �Richard� � who had only recently been assigned to the Bin Laden squad.
This was his first intelligence investigation.
As one of the largest field offices in the FBI, with over 300 agents assigned to the JTTF, the New York Field Office could have assigned additional or more experienced agents who were not involved in the Cole criminal investigation to assist Richard.
However, the New York Field Office Bin Laden Squad was focused on criminal investigations.
As a result, the designation of the Mihdhar matter as an intelligence investigation, as opposed to a criminal investigation, undermined the priority of any effort to locate Mihdhar.
Finally, we also noted that there was a clear predicate for a criminal investigation that no one appeared to notice at the time.
In her EC, Donna noted that Mihdhar had previously traveled to the United States, according to information she had obtained from the INS.
After the FBI�s intelligence investigation was opened, she obtained and forwarded to Richard a copy of Mihdhar�s June 2001 visa application on which he stated that he had not previously been issued a visa and had never traveled to the United States.
Thus, there was a clear basis to charge Mihdhar criminally with false statements or visa fraud.