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In addition, FBI policy provided that an asset�s bona fides �should be continually addressed,� even after the initial assessment was completed.
More specifically, the FBI field office is required to conduct a yearly evaluation of each informational asset and provide the evaluation report to FBI Headquarters.
This report is required to contain, among other things, the FBI�s number of contacts with the informational asset during the reporting period, a summary of the most significant information furnished by the informational asset, the number of preliminary inquiries and full investigations that were opened based on information provided by the informational asset, and �steps that have been taken to establish asset bona fides since last evaluation.� Although Stan would not have been required to obtain additional information about his informational asset�s boarders to complete this report, the FBI�s policy of continually vetting the credibility of its assets permitted Stan to seek more information about Hazmi and Mihdhar and the other boarders from his asset and run indices checks on any persons living with his informational asset.
We reviewed the informational asset�s file, Stan�s yearly evaluation of the asset, and Stan�s reporting on the bona fides checks conducted on the informational asset.
Based on our review, we were concerned by the lack of information included in the file in support of the bona fides checks conducted by Stan each year.
In each of the documents provided to FBI Headquarters about the informational asset that we reviewed, Stan wrote the following perfunctory paragraph: �Asset bona fides have been established through independently received reliable asset reporting, [redacted] and physical surveillance.� Stan maintained no predicating information in the file on these bona fides checks.
The file did not disclose which checks or surveillance had been conducted, by whom, when, or the results.
Without that material, the informational asset�s bona fides were merely verified through the attestation of Stan.
It is possible that Stan conducted numerous indices checks and conducted an exhaustive bona fides check on the informational asset each year.
It also is possible that he conducted minimal or no checks and merely attested to the informational asset�s credibility based on their personal history and relationship.
Because we were unable to interview Stan, we could not determine which was more likely.
However, no FBI policy described the level of detail to be contained in an asset file.
We believe the policy should require an asset file to contain at least minimal information to allow a reviewer to independently verify that an adequate background check has been conducted.
This information is necessary to allow FBI managers to determine whether the control agent is continuing to assess each informational asset�s credibility.
This information would also help ensure that the control agent has not become too comfortable with the informational asset and thus vulnerable to being misled or failing to obtain adequate information about the asset.
We also were concerned by the lack of policy or practice specifying what information from the asset must be documented.
The Hazmi and Mihdhar case clearly demonstrates that information must be documented to be useful.
Even if Stan had obtained the full names of Hazmi and Mihdhar from the informational asset, he would not have been required to document it in any retrievable format.
Without the requirement to document such information, the information would not have been accessible to other FBI personnel.
For information to be useful, it must be documented in a retrievable form and it must be available for consideration and analysis.
In sum, we believe that Hazmi and Mihdhar�s presence in San Diego should have drawn some scrutiny from the FBI.
Although unknown at the time, documenting their presence in San Diego in a searchable and retrievable manner would have provided an opportunity for the FBI to connect information in the future.
If Hazmi and Mihdhar�s presence in San Diego in 2000 had been documented, an FBI indices record check in August 2001, when the FBI received information from the CIA that Hazmi and Mihdhar had entered the United States, might have led the FBI to the San Diego information.
This connection would have provided substantive leads for the New York FBI�s effort to locate Mihdhar in August 2001.205 San Diego FBI�s failure to prioritize counterterrorism investigations As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1998 the FBI adopted a 5-year strategic plan that established the FBI investigative priorities in a 3-tier system.
Tier I priorities were �foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that directly threaten the National or Economic Security of the United States.� Tier II priorities were �crimes that affect the public safety or undermine the integrity of American society: drugs, organized crime, civil rights, and public corruption.� Tier III priorities were �crimes that affect individuals and property such as violent crime, car theft, and telemarketing scams�� On March 15, 1999, shortly after Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asserted the U.S. Intelligence Community was declaring war on Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, FBI Headquarters established national level priorities within its Counterterrorism Program.
Bin Laden and al Qaeda, along with the Bin Laden-allied Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al Gama�at al Islamiyya (IG), were designated as �priority group one� for the FBI�s counterterrorism efforts.
Our review of the Hazmi/Mihdhar chronology revealed no appreciable shift in resources by the FBI�s San Diego Field Office in response to these changed priorities.
We found that prior to September 11, 2001, the actual investigative priority for the San Diego Field Office was drug trafficking.
According to former San Diego Special Agent in Charge William Gore, the highest concentration of FBI agents and resources in San Diego was directed at combating drug trafficking based on the FBI�s process and procedures used each year to set priorities in its field offices.
He said that white-collar crime was the office�s second priority, and violent crime was its third priority.
Counterterrorism was only the fourth priority for the San Diego FBI office.
The counterterrorism efforts in San Diego were directed primarily at another terrorist organization and related groups not connected to Al Qaeda, and the majority of San Diego�s counterterrorism investigations targeted activities related to the indirect support of terrorism conducted by those groups.
We found that the San Diego FBI focused little to no investigative activity on al Qaeda prior to September 11.
San Diego FBI personnel stated to us that they had believed there was no significant al Qaeda activity in San Diego based on information from their sources and investigative activities.
The former supervisor of the San Diego counterterrorism squad explained their job at the field office level was to �shake the tree and see what fell out� in relation to potential terrorism activities in their area.
Although San Diego agents assigned to counterterrorism conceded they had received little to no specific training concerning Bin Laden or al Qaeda, they asserted that al Qaeda did not have a significant presence in San Diego prior to September 11.
Yet, al Qaeda was present in San Diego, unbeknownst to the FBI.
Hazmi and Mihdhar resided in San Diego.
Unfortunately, the San Diego agents were not focusing on al Qaeda.
Even though FBI Headquarters had designated al Qaeda as the number one counterterrorism priority, the San Diego FBI was not attempting to identify individuals that were associated with al Qaeda.
Since September 11, many San Diego agents have been moved from other squads and assigned to counterterrorism.
Significantly, the San Diego office opened a large number of intelligence investigations on potential al Qaeda subjects immediately after September 11.
Obviously, the focus and priorities dramatically changed after September 11.
But there is no reason to believe the al Qaeda presence in San Diego began only after September 11.
If San Diego�s focus on counterterrorism and al Qaeda had occurred earlier in San Diego, there would have been a greater possibility, though no guarantee, that Hazmi�s and Mihdhar�s presence in San Diego may have come to the attention of the FBI before September 11.
However, it is important to note that San Diego�s allocation of resources before September 11 and the lower priority it gave to the Counterterrorism Program were not atypical of FBI field offices before September 11.
In an OIG September 2002 audit report entitled �A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation�s Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management,� we found that �Although the FBI has developed an elaborate, multi-layered strategic planning system over the past decade, the system has not adequately established priorities or effectively allocated resources to the Counterterrorism Program.� Furthermore, the OIG report found that resources were not allocated consistent with the FBI�s priorities � particularly at the field office level � because of the lack of �management controls� in the FBI�s �complicated and paper-intensive strategic planning process.� Instead of allocating resources based on FBI priorities, field offices allocated resources primarily based on previous caseloads in the field office.
According to the report, prior to September 11, �the Bureau devoted significantly more special agent resources to traditional law enforcement activities such as white collar crime, organized crime, drug, and violent crime investigations than to domestic and international terrorism investigations.� For example, in 2000 twice as many FBI agents were assigned to drug enforcement than to counterterrorism.
Thus, the San Diego�s office allocation of resources was not different from many other FBI field offices, despite the stated priorities of the FBI.
Events in the spring and summer of 2001 As described in the factual chronology, the FBI had several opportunities in the spring and summer of 2001 to obtain critical intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi.
Although the FBI and the CIA were discussing Mihdhar, Khallad, and the Cole investigation throughout the spring and summer of 2001, the FBI did not become aware of the critical intelligence involving Mihdhar�s U.S. visa and subsequent travel to the U.S. until late August 2001.
As we discussed above, we believe that systemic problems regarding information sharing between the two agencies contributed to the FBI�s failure to obtain this information earlier.
But restrictions within the FBI also contributed to the FBI�s failure to acquire critical information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11.
In this section, we discuss those problems.
Restrictions on the flow of information within the FBI By the summer of 2001, the effect of the various restrictions within the FBI on information sharing � commonly referred to as �the wall� � had resulted in a nearly complete separation of intelligence and criminal investigations within the FBI.
This separation greatly hampered the flow of information between FBI personnel working criminal and intelligence investigations, including information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar in the summer of 2001.
As discussed in Chapter Two, in late 1999 the FISA Court had become the �wall� for purposes of passing FISA information on targets of a particular terrorist organization from FBI intelligence investigations to criminal investigations.
Any information that intelligence agents wanted to give to criminal agents had to be provided to the FBI�s NSLU, which then provided it to OIPR, which then provided it to the FISA Court, which then had to approve the passage of the information to criminal agents.
In addition, after the FISA Court was notified in the fall 2000 about errors in approximately 100 FISA applications, a significant portion of which related to the FBI�s representations about the �wall� procedures in al Qaeda cases, the FISA Court imposed new restrictions on the FBI�s handling of FISA information.
The FISA Court required a certification from all individuals who received FISA information stating that they understood this requirement.
The FISA Court exempted CIA and NSA personnel, who often received FISA information from the FBI, from this certification requirement.
But the FISA Court required that the CIA and NSA indicate on the information they provided to the FBI whether the information had been obtained based on FISA information previously provided to them by the FBI (called �FISA-derived information�).
In response, the NSA decided that it was more efficient not to delay dissemination of intelligence while checking to see if it was derived from FISA, and it therefore placed a caveat on all NSA counterterrorism reports to the FBI stating that before information could be considered for dissemination to criminal personnel, the FBI had to check with the NSA General Counsel about whether the intelligence was FISA-derived.
Once the NSA determined whether the information was FISA-derived, the FBI had to comply with the wall procedures for passing FISA-derived information to criminal agents or prosecutors.
If the information was not FISA-derived, it could be passed directly.
FBI Headquarters personnel became wary that any involvement of criminal agents in intelligence investigations could present problems for the FBI with the FISA Court.
A former ITOS unit chief described the FISA Court�s certification requirement as a �contempt letter� and said that it �shut down� the flow of information in the FBI.
He further stated that FBI Headquarters employees became worried that any misstep in handling FISA information could result in harm to their careers because an FBI agent was banned from appearing before the FISA Court and OPR began an investigation on him.
These three factors � the Court had become the screener in al Qaeda cases, the certification requirement imposed by the FISA Court, and concerns about violating the Court�s rules � combined to stifle the flow of intelligence information within the FBI.
FBI employees described this to the OIG as the walls within the FBI becoming �higher� over time.
New York FBI agents told the OIG that the walls were viewed as a �maze� that no one really understood or could easily navigate.
As we discuss below, these walls affected the FBI personnel�s discussions about the Mihdhar information at the June 11, 2001, meeting in New York and the FBI�s decision to open an investigation to locate Mihdhar in August 2001.
Problems at the June 11 meeting At the June 11, 2001, meeting, FBI Headquarters and CIA CTC personnel discussed with New York FBI investigators issues relating to the Cole investigation.
At the time of this meeting, the FBI analyst who we call Donna had received information from the CIA concerning travel in January 2000 of an al Qaeda operative named Khalid al-Mihdhar to Malaysia through Dubai.
[INFORMATION REDACTED]206 After receiving the information from the CIA, Donna had conducted her own record check on Mihdhar in CTLink and discovered the NSA information from late 1999 and early 2000 associating [INFORMATION REDACTED].
This NSA intelligence about Mihdhar would have been important to the FBI agents conducting a criminal investigation [INFORMATION REDACTED].
However, Donna did not share this information with the criminal agents at the June 11 meeting because of concerns about the wall.
By this time, the FBI was operating under the requirement that all NSA counterterrorism information had to be reviewed by the NSA�s General Counsel�s Office for a determination of whether it was FISA-derived before it could be considered for dissemination to criminal agents.
Because she had not yet asked the NSA whether the information could be passed, Donna did not provide the New York agents with any of the NSA information.
That information would have been important to the New York agents who were working the Cole investigation because they specialized in al Qaeda operations and at the June 11 meeting showed great interest [INFORMATION REDACTED].
That information may also have provided the criminal agents with additional leads and could have led to the information that Mihdhar and Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000.
We recognize that the caveat on sharing any NSA counterterrorism information did not mean that the criminal agents were prohibited from ever obtaining access to the NSA information on Mihdhar.
But if the information was FISA-derived, the caveat created a delay in the criminal agents receiving the information because of the lengthy procedures that had to be followed to share the information with them.
With respect to the information Donna had received from the CIA about the Malaysia meetings, Donna showed the photographs to New York agents and asked whether they could identify [INFORMATION REDACTED].
After one of the agents made a tentative identification, the agents asked questions about Mihdhar and the photographs.
The agents continued to ask Donna questions about Mihdhar, the Malaysia meetings, and the photographs on June 11 after the meeting.
As we discussed above, it is unclear how much questioning occurred during the actual meeting and how much occurred after the meeting.
Donna was unable to answer most of the agents� questions because she had not obtained the information from the CIA.
This, in our view, was not because of the wall, but was because of Donna�s failure to plan the meeting adequately or ask sufficient questions from the CIA in advance of the meeting.
First, we believe the planning for the June 11 meeting was flawed.
Although Donna and other IOSs frequently traveled to New York to work on the Cole investigation, she told the OIG that this was the first time that she had arranged for a meeting involving CTC personnel in New York.
Yet, according to what the meeting participants told the OIG, the purpose and the agenda of the meeting were not clear.
The participants agreed that they knew there was going to be a discussion of the investigative results on the Cole attack.
The New York agents believed that the CTC and FBI Headquarters had information to share with New York.
Donna and the CTC participants, however, described the meeting as a �brainstorming� session to determine what new leads could be pursued and what FBI Headquarters could do to assist New York.
No agenda was prepared and no supervisors were consulted for their input about the meeting.
Even though Donna said that she called the meeting to explore further leads or avenues of investigation in the Cole case, she apparently did not ask the CTC participants to be prepared to present information or answer questions.
Mary and Peter told the OIG they were not in a position to discuss the Cole investigation.
Mary said she was not up to speed about the Cole investigation or the Malaysia meetings.
Peter told the OIG that as an analyst at the CIA, he did not have authority to discuss CIA information at the meeting and he was merely �tagging along.� Donna told the OIG that she considered Mary to be another FBI employee at the meeting, and for this reason did not provide her with any specific instructions in preparation for the meeting.