statement_idx
int64
0
8.09k
report
stringclasses
3 values
page_num
int64
18
2.84k
sent_num
int64
0
78
statement
stringlengths
13
4.29k
confidence
stringclasses
4 values
score
int64
0
3
split
stringclasses
2 values
2,800
AR6_WGII
73
25
High population growth and urbanisation in low-lying coastal zones will be the major driver of increasing exposure to sea level rise in the coming decades
high
2
train
2,801
AR6_WGII
73
26
By 2030, 108– 116 million people will be exposed to sea level rise in Africa (compared to 54 million in 2000), increasing to 190–245 million by 2060
medium
1
train
2,802
AR6_WGII
73
27
By 2050, more than a billion people located in low-lying cities and settlements will be at risk from coast-specific climate hazards, influenced by coastal geomorphology, geographical location and adaptation action
high
2
train
2,803
AR6_WGII
73
31
By 2100, compound and cascading risks will result in the submergence of some low-lying island states and damage to coastal heritage, livelihoods and infrastructure
very high
3
train
2,804
AR6_WGII
74
4
For example, in Europe, coastal flood damage is projected to increase at least 10-fold by the end of the 21st century, and even more or earlier with current adaptation and mitigation
high
2
test
2,805
AR6_WGII
74
5
By 2100, 158–510 million people and USD7,919–12,739 billion in assets are projected to be exposed to the 1-in-100-year coastal floodplain under RCP4.5, and 176–880 million people and USD8,813–14,178 billion assets under RCP8.5
high
2
train
2,806
AR6_WGII
74
6
Projected impacts reach far beyond coastal cities and settlements, with damage to ports potentially severely compromising global supply chains and maritime trade, with local to global geopolitical and economic ramifications
medium
1
train
2,807
AR6_WGII
74
7
Compounded and cascading climate risks, such as tropical cyclone storm surge damage to coastal infrastructure and supply chain networks, are expected to increase
medium
1
train
2,808
AR6_WGII
74
9
Changes in wave climate superimposed on sea level rise will significantly increase coastal flooding
high
2
train
2,809
AR6_WGII
74
10
The frequency, extent and duration of coastal flooding will significantly increase from 2050 (high confidence), unless coastal and marine ecosystems are able to naturally adapt to sea level rise through vertical growth and landward migration
low
0
train
2,810
AR6_WGII
74
11
Permafrost thaw, sea level rise, and reduced sea ice protection is projected to damage or cause loss to many cultural heritage sites, settlements and livelihoods across the Arctic
very high
3
train
2,811
AR6_WGII
74
12
Deltaic cities and settlements characterised by high inequality and informal settlements are especially vulnerable
high
2
train
2,812
AR6_WGII
74
13
Although risks are distributed across cities and settlements at all levels of economic development, wealthier and more urbanised coastal cities and settlements are more likely to be able to limit impacts and risk in the near- to mid-term through infrastructure resilience and coastal protection interventions, with highly uncertain prospects in many of these locations beyond 2100
high
2
train
2,813
AR6_WGII
74
14
Prospects for enabling and contributing to climate resilient development thus vary markedly within and between coastal cities and settlements
high
2
train
2,814
AR6_WGII
74
17
Health risks will be differentiated by gender, age, income, social status and region
high
2
train
2,815
AR6_WGII
74
19
Projections under mid-range emissions scenarios show an additional 250,000 deaths per year by 2050 (compared to 1961–1990) due to malaria, heat, childhood undernutrition and diarrhoea
high
2
train
2,816
AR6_WGII
74
21
Mortality and morbidity will continue to escalate as exposures become more frequent and intense, putting additional strain on health and economic systems
high
2
train
2,817
AR6_WGII
74
22
Vulnerable groups include young children (<5 years old), the elderly (>65 years old), pregnant women, Indigenous Peoples, those with pre-existing diseases, physical labourers and those in low socioeconomic conditions
high
2
train
2,818
AR6_WGII
74
24
Children and adolescents, particularly girls, as well as people with existing mental, physical and medical challenges, are particularly at risk
high
2
train
2,819
AR6_WGII
74
25
Mental health impacts are expected to arise from exposure to extreme weather events, displacement, migration, famine, malnutrition, degradation or destruction of health and social care systems, climate-related economic and social losses and anxiety and distress associated with worry about climate change
very high
3
train
2,820
AR6_WGII
74
27
Globally, temperature- related mortality is projected to increase under RCP4.5 to RCP8.5, even with adaptation
very high
3
train
2,821
AR6_WGII
74
29
In Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, urban heat-related excess deaths are projected to increase by about 300 yr-1 (low emission pathway) to 600 yr-1 (high emission pathway) during 2031–2080 relative to 142 yr-1 during 1971–2020
high
2
train
2,822
AR6_WGII
75
2
Reduced marine and freshwater fisheries catch potential is projected to increase malnutrition in East, West and Central Africa (medium to high confidence) and in subsistence- dependent communities across North America
high
2
train
2,823
AR6_WGII
75
4
These projected changes will increase diet-related risk factors and related non-communicable diseases globally and increase undernutrition, stunting and related childhood mortality, particularly in Africa and Asia
high
2
train
2,824
AR6_WGII
75
6
Climate change is projected to put 8 million (SSP1-6.0) to 80 million people (SSP3-6.0) at risk of hunger in mid-century, concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America
high
2
train
2,825
AR6_WGII
75
7
These climate change impacts on nutrition could undermine progress towards the eradication of child undernutrition
high
2
train
2,826
AR6_WGII
75
9
Dengue vector ranges will increase in North America, Asia, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa under RCP6 and RCP8.5, potentially putting another 2.25 billion people at risk
high
2
train
2,827
AR6_WGII
75
10
Higher incidence rates of Lyme disease are projected for the Northern Hemisphere
high
2
train
2,828
AR6_WGII
75
11
Climate change is projected to increase malaria’s geographic distribution in endemic areas of sub-Saharan and southern Africa, Asia and South America (high confidence), exposing tens of millions more people to malaria, predominately in east and southern Africa, and up to hundreds of millions more exposed under RCP8.5
high
2
train
2,829
AR6_WGII
75
13
At 2.1°C, thousands to tens of thousands of additional cases of diarrhoeal disease are projected, mainly in central and east Africa
medium
1
train
2,830
AR6_WGII
75
14
Morbidity from cholera will increase in central and east Africa (medium confidence), and increased schistosomiasis risk is projected for eastern Africa
high
2
train
2,831
AR6_WGII
75
15
In Asia and Africa, 1°C warming can cause a 7% increase in diarrhoea, an 8% increase in E. coli and a 3% to 11% increase in deaths
medium
1
train
2,832
AR6_WGII
75
16
Warming increases the risk of food-borne disease outbreaks, including Salmonella and Campylobacter infections
medium
1
train
2,833
AR6_WGII
75
17
Warming supports the growth and geographical expansion of toxigenic fungi in crops (medium confidence) and potentially toxic marine and freshwater algae
medium
1
train
2,834
AR6_WGII
75
18
Food safety risks in fisheries and aquaculture are projected through harmful algal blooms (high confidence), pathogens (e.g., Vibrio) (high confidence), and human exposure to elevated bioaccumulation of persistent organic pollutants and mercury
medium
1
train
2,835
AR6_WGII
75
20
Cardiovascular disease mortality could increase by 18.4%, 47.8% and 69.0% in the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s respectively under RCP4.5, and by 16.6%, 73.8% and 134% under RCP8.5 compared to the 1980s
high
2
train
2,836
AR6_WGII
75
21
Future risks of respiratory disease associated with aeroallergens and ozone exposure are expected to increase
high
2
train
2,837
AR6_WGII
75
23
In many regions, the frequency and/or severity of floods, extreme storms and droughts is projected to increase in coming decades, es- pecially under high emissions scenarios, raising future risk of displacement in the most exposed areas
high
2
train
2,838
AR6_WGII
75
24
Under all global warming levels, some regions that are pres- ently densely populated will become unsafe or uninhabitable, with movement from these regions occurring autonomously or through planned relocation
high
2
train
2,839
AR6_WGII
75
26
Future migration and displacement patterns in a changing climate will depend not only on the physical impacts of climate change, but also on future policies and planning at all scales of governance
high
2
train
2,840
AR6_WGII
75
27
Projecting the number of people migrating due to slow onset events is difficult due to the multi- causal nature of migration and the dominant role that socioeconomic factors have in determining migration responses
high
2
train
2,841
AR6_WGII
75
29
High emissions/low development scenarios raise the potential for both increased rates of migration and displacement and larger involuntary immobile populations that are highly exposed to climatic risks but lack the means of moving to other locations
medium
1
train
2,842
AR6_WGII
76
1
Uncertainties about socioeconomic development are reflected in the wide range of projected population displacements by 2050 in Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia due to climate change, ranging from 31 million to 143 million people
high
2
train
2,843
AR6_WGII
76
2
Projections of the number of people at risk of future displacement by sea level rise range from tens of millions to hundreds of millions by the end of this century, depending on the level of warmings and assumptions about exposure
high
2
train
2,844
AR6_WGII
76
4
Planned relocation will be increasingly required as climate change undermines livelihoods, safety and overall habitability, especially for coastal areas and small islands
medium
1
train
2,845
AR6_WGII
76
5
This will have implications for traditional livelihood practices, social cohesion and knowledge systems that have inherent value as intangible culture as well as introduce new risks for communities by amplifying existing and generating new vulnerabilities
high
2
train
2,846
AR6_WGII
76
7
Future climate change may increase involuntary displacement, but severe impacts also undermine the capacity of households to use mobility as a coping strategy, causing high exposure to climate risks, with consequences for basic survival, health and well- being
high
2
train
2,847
AR6_WGII
76
8
The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to increase the adverse consequences of climate change since the financial consequences have led to a shift in priorities and constrain vulnerability reduction
medium
1
train
2,848
AR6_WGII
76
10
Under higher emissions scenarios and increasing climate hazards, the potential for societal risks also increases
medium
1
train
2,849
AR6_WGII
76
13
Cultural heritage is already being impacted by climate change and variability, for example in Africa, Small Island Developing States and the Arctic, where heritage sites are exposed to future climate change risk
high
2
train
2,850
AR6_WGII
76
18
Climate change may produce severe risks to peace within this century through climate variability and extremes, especially in contexts marked by low economic development, high economic dependence on climate-sensitive activities, high or increasing social marginalisation and fragile governance
medium
1
train
2,851
AR6_WGII
76
19
The largest impacts are expected in weather-sensitive communities with low resilience to climate extremes and high prevalence of underlying risk factors
medium
1
train
2,852
AR6_WGII
76
20
Trajectories that prioritise economic growth, political rights and sustainability are associated with lower conflict risk
medium
1
train
2,853
AR6_WGII
76
22
In all cities and urban areas, projected risks faced by people from climate-driven impacts has increased
high
2
train
2,854
AR6_WGII
76
24
Communities in informal settlements will have higher exposure and lower capacity to adapt
high
2
train
2,855
AR6_WGII
76
25
Most at risk are women and children who make up the majority populations of these settlements
high
2
train
2,856
AR6_WGII
76
26
Risks to critical physical infrastructure in cities can be severe and pervasive under higher warming levels, potentially resulting in compound and cascading risks, and can disrupt livelihoods both within and across cities
high
2
train
2,857
AR6_WGII
76
27
In coastal cities and settlements, risks to people and infrastructure will get progressively worse in a changing climate, sea level rise and with ongoing coastal development
very high
3
train
2,858
AR6_WGII
76
30
Growth is most pronounced in smaller and medium- sized urban settlements of up to one million people
high
2
train
2,859
AR6_WGII
77
1
These could amplify pre-existing stresses related to poverty, informality, exclusion and governance, such as in African cities
high
2
train
2,860
AR6_WGII
77
2
Climate change increases heat stress risks in cities (high confidence) and amplifies the urban heat island across Asian cities at 1.5°C and 2°C warming levels, both substantially larger than under present climates
medium
1
train
2,861
AR6_WGII
77
3
Urban population exposure to extreme heat in Africa is projected to increase from 2 billion person-days per year in 1985–2005 to 45 billion person-days by the 2060s (1.7°C global warming with low population growth) and to 95 billion person- days (2.8°C global warming with medium-high population growth)
medium
1
train
2,862
AR6_WGII
77
4
Risks driven by flooding and droughts will also increase in cities
high
2
train
2,863
AR6_WGII
77
5
Urban populations exposed to severe droughts in West Africa will increase (65.3±34.1 million) at 1.5°C warming and increase further at 2°C
medium
1
train
2,864
AR6_WGII
77
7
Higher risks from temperature and precipitation extremes are projected for almost all Asian cities under RCP8.5
medium
1
train
2,865
AR6_WGII
77
9
Unplanned rapid urbanisation is a major driver of risk, particularly where increasing climate-driven risks affect key infrastructure and potentially result in compounding and cascading risks as cities expand into coastal and mountain regions prone to flooding or landslides that disrupt transportation networks, or where water and energy resources are inadequate to meet the needs of growing settlements
high
2
train
2,866
AR6_WGII
77
10
These infrastructure risks expand beyond city boundaries; climate-related transport and energy infrastructure damage is projected to be a significant financial burden for African countries, reaching tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars under moderate and high emissions scenarios
high
2
train
2,867
AR6_WGII
77
11
Projected changes in both the hydrological cycle and the cryosphere will threaten urban water infrastructure and resource management in most regions
very high
3
train
2,868
AR6_WGII
77
12
South and Southeast Asian coastal cities can experience significant increases in average annual economic losses between 2005 and 2050 due to flooding, with very high losses in east Asian cities under RCP8.5
high
2
train
2,869
AR6_WGII
77
14
In small islands, degraded terrestrial ecosystems decrease resource provision (e.g., potable water) and amplify the vulnerability of island inhabitants
high
2
train
2,870
AR6_WGII
77
15
Projections suggest that 350 million (± 158.8 million) more people in urban areas will be exposed to water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5°C warming and 410.7 million (± 213.5) at 2°C warming
low
0
train
2,871
AR6_WGII
77
18
Climate change risks, including sea level rise, interact in intricate ways with non-climatic drivers of coastal change, such as land subsidence, continued infrastructure development in coastal floodplains, the rise of asset values and landward development adversely impacting coastal ecosystems, to shape future risk in coastal settlements
high
2
train
2,872
AR6_WGII
77
20
Some recent estimates of projected global economic damage from climate impacts are higher than previous estimates and generally increase with global average temperature
high
2
train
2,873
AR6_WGII
77
21
However, the spread in the estimates of the magnitude of this damage is substantial and does not allow for robust range to be established
high
2
train
2,874
AR6_WGII
77
22
Non-market, non-economic damage and adverse impacts on livelihoods will be concentrated in regions and populations that are already more vulnerable
high
2
train
2,875
AR6_WGII
77
23
Socioeconomic drivers and more inclusive development will largely determine the extent of this damage
high
2
train
2,876
AR6_WGII
77
26
In addition to market damage and disaster management costs, substantial costs of climate inaction are projected for human health
high
2
train
2,877
AR6_WGII
77
27
At higher levels of warming, climate impacts will pose risks to financial and insurance markets, especially if climate risks are incompletely internalised (medium confidence), with adverse implications for the stability of markets
low
0
train
2,878
AR6_WGII
78
2
Much smaller effects are estimated for less warming, lower vulnerability and more adaptation
medium
1
train
2,879
AR6_WGII
78
3
Regional estimates of GDP damage vary
high
2
train
2,880
AR6_WGII
78
4
Severe risks are more likely in (typically hotter) developing countries
medium
1
train
2,881
AR6_WGII
78
5
For Africa, GDP damage is projected to be negative across models and approaches
high
2
train
2,882
AR6_WGII
78
7
If future climate change under high emissions scenarios continues and increases risks, without strong adaptation measures, losses and damage will likely be concentrated among the poorest vulnerable populations
high
2
train
2,883
AR6_WGII
78
9
Higher growth scenarios along higher warming levels increase exposure to hazards and assets at risk, such as sea level rise for coastal regions, which will have large implications for economic activities, including shipping and ports
high
2
train
2,884
AR6_WGII
78
10
The high sensitivity of developing economies to climate impacts will pose increasing challenges to economic growth and performance, although projections depend as much or more on future socioeconomic development pathways and mitigation policies as on warming levels
medium
1
train
2,885
AR6_WGII
78
12
This wide range of effects underscore the impact of climate change on welfare and the adverse effects on vulnerable populations
medium
1
train
2,886
AR6_WGII
78
15
They exacerbate existing stressors and constrain adaptation options
medium
1
train
2,887
AR6_WGII
78
17
Some compound and cascading impacts occur locally, some spread across sectors and socioeconomic and natural systems, while others can be driven by events in other regions, for instance through trade and flows of commodities and goods through supply chain linkages
high
2
train
2,888
AR6_WGII
78
19
For example, cascading effects on food webs have been reported in the Baltic due to detrimental oxygen levels
high
2
train
2,889
AR6_WGII
78
21
Compound risks to health and food systems (especially in tropical regions) are projected from simultaneous reductions in food production across crops, livestock and fisheries (high confidence), heat-related loss of labour productivity in agriculture (high confidence), increased heat-related mortality (high confidence), contamination of seafood (high confidence), malnutrition (high confidence) and flooding from sea level rise
high
2
train
2,890
AR6_WGII
78
22
Malnourished populations will increase through direct impacts on food production with cascading impacts on food prices and household incomes, reducing access to safe and nutritious food
high
2
train
2,891
AR6_WGII
78
23
Food safety will be undermined from increased food contamination for seafood with marine toxins from harmful algal blooms and chemical contaminants, worsening health risks
high
2
train
2,892
AR6_WGII
78
25
Extreme weather events result in cascading and compounding risks that affect health and are expected to increase with warming
very high
3
train
2,893
AR6_WGII
78
26
Compound climate hazards can overwhelm adaptive capacity and substantially increase damage
high
2
train
2,894
AR6_WGII
79
2
Fewer habitats, less biodiversity, lower coastal protection (medium confidence) and decreased food and water security will result (medium confidence), reducing the habitability of some small islands
high
2
train
2,895
AR6_WGII
79
6
Losses become systemic when they affect entire systems and can even jump from one system to another (e.g., drought impacting rural food production contributing to urban food insecurity)
medium
1
train
2,896
AR6_WGII
79
8
Flows of commodities and goods, as well as people, finance and innovation, can be driven or disrupted by distant climate change impacts on rural populations, transport networks and commodity speculation
high
2
train
2,897
AR6_WGII
79
9
For example, Europe faces climate risks from outside the area due to global supply chain positioning and shared resources
high
2
train
2,898
AR6_WGII
79
10
Climate risks in Europe also impact finance, food production and marine resources beyond Europe
medium
1
train
2,899
AR6_WGII
79
12
Impacts and risks include reduced access to and productivity of future fisheries, regional and global food and nutritional security (high confidence), local livelihoods, health and well-being (high confidence) and loss to sociocultural assets, including heritage sites in all Arctic regions
very high
3
train