zh
stringlengths 1
4.19k
| en
stringlengths 1
3.42k
|
|---|---|
o 解除所有的核指挥和控制飞机的空中待命状态；以及 | ○ Removal of all nuclear command and control aircraft from constant airborne alert; and |
o 使 AGM-129 型先进巡航导弹和 AGM-69 型短程攻击导弹(两者都为空对地导弹)退役。 | ○ Retiring the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile and the AGM-69 Short-Range Attack Missile (both air-to-ground missiles). |
美国核武库透明度 | U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Transparency |
美国在2010年5月不扩散条约审议大会上首次公布了它的核武库总量，详列了 1962 年至 2009 年的年度库存量，以及 1994 年至 2009 年拆除的核武器年度总量。 | • At the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States released for the first time its nuclear stockpile totals, detailing annual stockpile levels from 1962 to 2009 and annual totals of nuclear weapons dismantled from 1994 to 2009. |
今天，美国的核武库是 1956 年以来最小的。 | • Today, the United States has the smallest stockpile since 1956. |
美国有成千上万枚核弹头已经退役。退役弹头已撤出其运载平台，不能运作，而且正在依次等待拆除。 | • The United States has retired many thousands of nuclear warheads. Retired warheads have been removed from their delivery platform, are not functional, and are in the queue for dismantlement. |
美国在 2010 年和 2014 年销密并报告了自己的核弹头库存量。 | • The United States declassified and reported its nuclear warhead stockpile in 2010 and 2014. |
2015 年，美国再次销密其 2014 财年年底之前的核武库数据。截至 2014年 9 月 30 日，现役和非现役核弹头总库存为 4 717 枚。 | • In 2015, the United States again declassified its nuclear stockpile data through the end of fiscal year 2014. As of September 30, 2014, the total stockpile of active and inactive nuclear warheads was 4,717. |
2013 年 9 月 30 日以来又额外拆除了 299 枚核弹头，1994 年至 2014 年拆除的弹头总数为 10 251 枚。 | • An additional 299 warheads have been dismantled since September 30, 2013, with a total of 10,251 warheads dismantled between 1994 and 2014. |
2015 年，美国报告说，约 2 500 枚弹头已退役，正在等待拆除。 | • In 2015, the United States reported that approximately 2,500 warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. |
这些行动已导致我们库存的核武器总数自冷战高峰期以来削减了约85%，在《不扩散条约》开始生效的 1971 年以来削减了 82%左右。 | • These actions have resulted in about an 85 percent reduction in total nuclear weapons in our stockpile since the height of the Cold War, or about 82 percent reduction since 1970 when the NPT entered into force. |
1992 年以来，美国已有 12 类核武器退役并被拆除，其中包括以下的最新型核武器：W79、W62、W56 和 B53。 | • Since 1992, the United States has retired and dismantled 12 nuclear weapon types, including the most recent types: the W79, W62, W56, and the B53. |
最后一枚“战斧”陆上攻击导弹的海军 W80-0 弹头已经退役并已被拆除。 | • The last W80-0 warhead for the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Navy (TLAM-N) was retired from service and has been dismantled. |
美国在 2015 年 4 月宣布，奥巴马总统将寻求资金，以便将退役的美国核弹头的拆除速度提高 20%。 | • The United States announced in April 2015 that President Obama will seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent. |
美国的政策是不研发新的核武器。剩余核弹头延长使用寿命方案不支持核武器的新军事任务或为核武器提供新的军事能力。 | • It is U.S. policy not to develop new nuclear weapons. Life extension programs for remaining nuclear warheads will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities for nuclear weapons. |
旨在替换老化基础设施和延长现有弹头使用寿命的核武库维护与管理方案能够在促使进一步裁减核武器的同时维持可靠的威慑力。 | Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programs to replace aging infrastructure and extend the life of existing warheads can enable further nuclear reductions while maintaining a credible deterrent. |
这些活动推进了美国为实施《全面禁止核试验条约》制定计划，美国已签署并打算批准该《条约》。 | These activities advance U.S. planning for implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which the United States has signed and intends to ratify. |
“3+2”战略将核武器类型从十二个整合为五个，包括将 B61 型自由下落炸弹的四个变体合为一个(B61-12)，使美国核武库中最后的兆吨级武器 B83 得以退役，并将炸弹数量减少一半。 | The “3+2” strategy consolidates nuclear weapon types from twelve to five, including consolidating from four variants of the B61 gravity bomb into one (B61-12), allowing the B83, the last megaton-class weapon in the U.S. arsenal, to be retired, and reducing the number of bombs by a factor of two. |
削减裂变材料和合并设施 | Fissile Material Reductions and Facility Consolidation |
除了核武器库存相关信息外，美国还公布了它根据武器方案生产的用于军事或非军事用途的钚和高浓铀的总量。 | • In addition to information on the nuclear weapon stockpile, the United States has made public the total amounts of U.S. plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced by the weapons program for military or non-military use. |
2009 年，美国报告的钚库存量为 95.4 公吨。美国在 1994 年和 2007 年宣布的 61.5 公吨的钚为过剩，并不再将之作为裂变材料用于核弹头。 | • In 2009, the United States reported the plutonium inventory was 95.4 metric tons (MT). In 1994 and 2007, the United States declared 61.5 MT of plutonium as excess and removed from further use as fissile material for use in nuclear warheads. |
根据美国和俄罗斯《钚管理和处置协定》，美国和俄罗斯将各自处置不少于 34 公吨的被宣布为超过防御需求的武器级钚。美国仍然致力于支持《钚管理和处置协定》以及国际原子能机构(原子能机构)发挥该《协定》核查双方处置方案的作用。 | • The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) requires the United States and Russia each to dispose of no less than 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium each country has declared excess to defense needs. The United States remains committed to the PMDA and to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) role in verifying both sides’ disposition programs under this agreement. |
美国和俄罗斯《钚生产反应堆协定》正在实施之中。根据该协定，1995年以来这些如今已关闭的反应堆生产的所有武器级钚都在军事方案之外，并且这些反应堆受到双边监测。 | • Implementation of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement is ongoing. Under this agreement all weapon-grade plutonium produced since 1995 by these now-shutdown reactors remains outside of military programs, and the reactors are under bilateral monitoring. |
美国截至 2004 年的高浓铀库存总量为 686.6 公吨。美国在 1994 年和2005 年的申报中宣布，不再将该库存量的相当大一部分，即 374 公吨的高浓铀作为裂变材料用于核弹头。 | • The total U.S. HEU inventory as of 2004 was 686.6 MT. In declarations in 1994 and 2005, the United States declared that a significant portion of that inventory totalling 374 MT of HEU would be removed from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads. |
美国迄今已从申报的高浓铀中稀释了总量超过 146 公吨的高浓铀，这些材料足以用作 5 800 余件核武器的材料。随着目前稀释更多材料的工作取得了进展，稀释高浓铀的总量将继续增加。稀释后该材料不会被进一步用作核弹头的裂变材料。 | To date, the United States has down-blended a total of more than 146 metric tons of HEU from these declarations — enough material for more than 5,800 nuclear weapons. The total amount of down-blended HEU will continue to increase as the current down-blending effort for additional material progresses. Down-blending removes this material from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads. |
o 这种高浓铀中有 17.4 公吨已经根据《自愿提交协定》在符合原子能机构保障监督要求的设施中被稀释为低浓铀，供在“铸剑为犁倡议”的“美国保证燃料供应”机制中使用，为面临供应中断的美国伙伴提供有保证的备用低浓铀燃料。 | ○ 17.4 MT of this HEU was down-blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU) in facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under the Voluntary Offer Agreement for use in the American Assured Fuel Supply, a U.S. swords-to-ploughshares initiative that provides back-up LEU fuel assurances to U.S. partners in the event of a disruption in supply. |
o 总之，美国在原子能机构监测下将超过 50 公吨的过剩高浓铀稀释为低浓铀。监测费用全部由美国负担。 | ○ In total, the United States has down-blended more than 50 MT of excess HEU to LEU under IAEA monitoring. The cost for this monitoring was covered in full by the United States. |
将从过剩高浓铀中提供高达 160 公吨供军舰电力推进之用，从而将对生产新的高浓铀或建造新的高浓铀浓缩设施的需求推迟好几十年。 | Up to 160 MT of the excess HEU will be provided for use in naval ship power propulsion, postponing the need for production of new HEU or construction of a new HEU enrichment facility for many decades. |
在冷战后最重要的核不扩散成果中，美国和俄罗斯成功完成了 1993 年美国和俄罗斯《高浓铀购买协议》主要的不扩散、和平利用和裁军目标。根据这一里程碑式的协议，俄罗斯 500 公吨源自武器的高浓铀已转化成为低浓铀并被运往美国，在美国，这些低浓铀作为美国核能反应堆的燃料用于和平目的。 | • In the most important nuclear non-proliferation achievements of the post-Cold War period, the United States and Russia successfully completed the major non-proliferation, peaceful use, and disarmament goals of the 1993 United States-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. Under this landmark Agreement, 500 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU was converted to LEU and shipped to the United States where it was used for peaceful purposes as fuel in American nuclear power reactors. |
该《协议》消除了相当于大约 20 000 枚核弹头的俄罗斯源自武器的高浓铀，经稀释的低浓铀被用来生产美国在 2003-2013 十年期间每年产出的全部核能的一半。在此期间美国生产的全部电力的 10%直接来自前苏联核弹头销毁工作所产生的核燃料。 | This Agreement eliminated approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads equivalent of Russian, weapons-origin HEU, with the resulting downblended LEU used to produce half of all nuclear energy generated annually in the United States for the ten year period from 2003-2013. Approximately ten percent of all electricity produced in the United States during this period came directly from the nuclear fuel from the elimination of former Soviet nuclear warheads. |
在最近二十年的大多数时间里，根据《高浓铀购买协议》稀释的核材料数量大概相当于每天约三个弹头的高浓铀。 | The amount of nuclear material downblended under the HEU Purchase Agreement was equivalent to roughly three warheads worth of HEU per day for most of the last two decades. |
在为期 20 年的该《协议》所涉期间，两国在其各自的核设施中相互监测了透明度，以确保俄罗斯加工的所有高浓铀都源自武器，并确保以此种材料生产的所有低浓铀在美国完全用于和平目的。 | During the 20-year Agreement, both countries exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring in their respective nuclear facilities to ensure that all HEU processed in Russia was of weapons-origin and that all LEU produced from that material was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States. |
在裁减美国库存的同时，美国合并了若干个为维持此种库存所需的场址。当今现有的核综合体较小，不仅适于通过基于科学的管理支持我们持久的核武器库存，也适于我们应对扩散、恐怖主义和其他全球性威胁的能力。 | • In parallel to reductions in the U.S. stockpile, the United States has consolidated the number of sites needed to maintain it. Today’s current nuclear complex is smaller and geared to support not only our enduring nuclear weapons stockpile through science-based stewardship, but also our capability to address proliferation, terrorism, and other global threats. |
核综合体在 1980 年由 14 个场址组成，今天则由 8 个场址组成，其员工人数比冷战结束时减少了三分之二。 | • In 1980, the nuclear complex was made up of 14 sites. Today, it consists of eight, and its workforce has been reduced by two-thirds since the end of the Cold War. |
核综合体的规模从 1980 年代初大约 10 600 平方公里的高点缩小到其原先规模的大约一半，即 5 600 平方公里。 | • From a high point of approximately 10,600 square kilometres in the early 1980s, the size of the complex has shrunk to approximately half its original size, 5,600 square km. |
缩小核综合体的主要行动包括以下方面： | • Key actions to reduce the complex include the following: |
在 1987 年停止生产用于武器的钚，并关闭了华盛顿里奇兰的汉福德以及南卡罗来纳州艾肯的萨瓦纳河场址所有的钚生产反应堆； | Cessation of production of plutonium for weapons in 1987 and closure of all plutonium production reactors at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, and at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; |
关闭并停止运行汉福德的核再加工工厂； | Closure and decommissioning of the Hanford Site nuclear reprocessing plants; |
在 1964 年停止生产用于武器的高浓铀并关闭田纳西州橡树岭的K-25 浓缩综合体； | Cessation of production of HEU for weapons in 1964 and shutdown of the K-25 enrichment complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; |
改变俄亥俄州朴茨茅斯和肯塔基州帕迪尤卡浓缩厂的性质，使之仅支持民用核燃料生产； | Conversion of enrichment plants in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, to support civil nuclear fuel production only; |
关闭并停止运行俄亥俄州弗纳尔德进料物质生产中心和科罗拉多州洛基弗拉茨钚心生产设施，以及俄亥俄州迈阿密斯堡和佛罗里达州皮内拉斯的 Mound 厂和 Pinellas 核武器部件生产厂； | Closure and decommissioning of the Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald, Ohio, the Rocky Flats plutonium pit production facility in Colorado, and the Mound and Pinellas plants for nuclear weapons components in Miamisburg, Ohio, and Pinellas, Florida; |
消除桑迪亚国家实验室、劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室以及洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室技术区 3 和 18 中其数量足以建造核装置的第一/二类特殊核材料，并将第一/二类材料并入洛斯阿拉莫斯的 55 技术 | Removal of Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), quantities large enough to construct nuclear devices, from Sandia National Laboratories, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Technical Areas 3 and 18 at Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as consolidation of Category I/II material into TA-55 at Los Alamos; |
将高浓铀贮存库并入新建的田纳西州橡树岭的 Y-12 高浓铀材料设施；以及 | Consolidation of HEU storage into the newly constructed HEU Materials Facility at Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and |
将非心钚并入萨瓦纳河场址的 K 区材料贮存设施。 | Consolidation of non-pit plutonium into the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility at the Savannah River Site. |
美国自 1992 年以来已没有进行过核爆炸试验。以前的内华达试验场已更名为内华达国家安全场所，现在支持一项扩大的任务，使之包括库存管理，还支持一系列活动，据以支助发展各种技术来支持实现不扩散目标。 | • The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992. The former Nevada Test Site has been re-named the Nevada National Security Site and today supports an expanded mission to include stockpile stewardship but also a range of activities supporting research and development of technologies to support non-proliferation goals. |
展望未来，美国的新核战略预期将在一段时间内从保留大量的非部署核弹头转向建设反应更敏感的基础设施。我们正在投资于建设一种更现代化的、可据以进一步裁减总核力量的有形基础设施。 | • Looking forward, the new U.S. nuclear strategy anticipates shifting from retaining large numbers of non-deployed nuclear warheads towards a more responsive infrastructure over time. We are investing in a more modern physical infrastructure that would allow for further reductions in total nuclear forces. |
多边军备控制 | Multilateral Arms Control |
美国重申致力于谈判一项又称为《裂变材料禁产条约》(《禁产条约》)的禁止生产用于核武器或其他核爆炸装置的裂变材料条约 。 | • The United States reaffirms its commitment to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, also known as Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). |
作为一项临时措施，美国积极参与联合国政府专家组的工作，该政府专家组将就可能有助于达成一项《裂变材料禁产条约》的各种可能的方面提出建议。任期两年的政府专家组于 2014 年 3 月在日内瓦召开了第一次会议，我们希望，它将有助于激励和振兴裁军谈判会议关于《裂变材料禁产条约》的工作并取得进展。 | • As an interim step, the United States actively participated in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to an FMCT. We are hopeful that this two-year GGE, which first convened in Geneva in March 2014, will serve to motivate and revitalize work on FMCT and progress within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). |
《全面禁止核试验条约》(《全面禁试条约》)符合每个国家的安全利益，因此美国将依然致力于批准《全面禁试条约》并使其生效。 | • The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interest of every nation, and the United States remains committed to ratifying the CTBT and bringing it into force. |
美国向全面禁试条约组织筹备委员会提供了最多的年度财政捐助，支付该委员会年度预算 22%以上的经费。在美国援助下，截至 2014 年 12月 31 日，经认证的国际监测系统站点和建成的放射性核素实验室的总数为 281 个，相当于整个网络的 83%。 | • The United States makes the largest annual financial contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, paying more than 22 percent of the Commission’s annual budget. With U.S. assistance, as of December 31, 2014, the total number of certified International Monitoring System (IMS) stations and radionuclide laboratories completed was 281. This amounts to 83 percent of the total network. |
美国正在协助发展《全面禁试条约》核查制度的现场视察要素。通过美国以自愿捐助实物形式捐助的重要设备、专门知识和研究，美国在支持2014 年 12 月在约旦进行的有史以来规模最大的现场视察综合实地演练方面发挥了主要作用。 | • The United States is helping to develop the on-site inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime. Through significant U.S. voluntary contributions-in-kind of equipment, expertise, and research, the United States played a major role in supporting the largest ever on-site inspection Integrated Field Exercise conducted in Jordan in December 2014. |
2015 年期间，美国同 5 常其他国家一道举行了一系列技术专家会议，以讨论和确定 5 常国家在今后就《全面禁试条约》相关问题开展合作的领域。 | • Through 2015, the United States, along with the rest of the P5, convened a series of meetings of technical experts to discuss and identify areas for future P5 collaboration on CTBT-related issues. |
核查，包括研究和发展 | Verification, Including Research and Development |
有效的核查是不扩散、军备控制和建立无核武器世界的必要条件。在国家逐步进行核裁军时，必须采用能查明违约行为和监督履约情况的核查方法和技术。 | • Effective verification is an essential condition for non-proliferation, arms control and achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations and monitoring compliance must be in place as states move step-by-step toward nuclear disarmament. |
通过信息共享和建立信任措施实现的透明度可提高可预测性并建立信任和信心，从而有助于稳定和安全。 | • Transparency through information sharing and confidence-building measures contribute to stability and security by enhancing predictability and building trust and confidence. |
根据《新裁武条约》进行的核查增强了世界上两个最大核大国之间的稳定和可预测性。该《条约》有力和全面的核查条款使双方相互信任它们正在履行本身的义务。在美国和俄罗斯之间分享的关于每一方各自核力量的准确和及时的信息减少了产生误解和错觉的风险。该《条约》的核查制度包括以下方面： | • Verification under the New START Treaty increases stability and predictability between the world’s largest nuclear powers. The Treaty’s robust and extensive verification provisions provide mutual confidence that both sides are living up to their obligations. The accurate and timely information shared between the United States and Russia on each side’s respective nuclear forces diminishes the risks of misunderstanding and misperception. The Treaty’s verification regime includes the following: |
每一方每年在临时通知后对部署和非部署的核洲际弹道导弹、潜射导弹和重型轰炸机进行 18 次现场视察，比根据以前的《裁武条约》进行的视察更具侵扰性，可使每一方确认部署在洲际弹道导弹和潜射导弹上的核弹头实际数目或部署在重型轰炸机上的核武器的实际数目； | 18 short-notice on-site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed nuclear ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers each year for each party that are more intrusive than those conducted under the previous START agreement, allowing each party to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs or nuclear armaments on heavy bombers; |
受《条约》管制的某些物品的额外展览和演示； | Additional exhibitions and demonstrations of certain items subject to the Treaty; |
提高核查有效性的国家技术手段；以及 | National technical means to improve verification effectiveness; and, |
在该《条约》数据库发生变化时通知对方的全面通知系统，这些变化诸如有调动、飞行试验以及《条约》问责物品的部署。截至 2015年 4 月，美国和俄罗斯已通过各自设在华盛顿特区和莫斯科的减少核危险中心交换了 8 300 多份此种通知。 | An extensive system of notifications to inform the other party when changes occur to the Treaty’s database, such as movements, flight tests, and deployments of Treaty-accountable items. As of April 2015, the United States and Russia have exchanged over 8,300 such notifications through their respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington, D.C., and Moscow. |
迄今，美国和俄罗斯已按照《新裁武条约》进行了 150 余次现场视察。按《条约》进行的现场视察以及其他核查措施使每一方都能继续信任美国和俄罗斯交换的数据的确凿性。 | • To date, more than 150 on-site inspections have been conducted by the United States and Russia under the New START Treaty. Treaty on-site inspections and other verification measures enable each side to maintain confidence in the validity of data exchanged by the United States and Russia. |
展望未来，且为了兑现我们根据《不扩散条约》所做的承诺，美国正在支持开展一系列研究和发展活动，扩大未来协定需要我们开展的核查技术相关工作的范围。我们每年都投入数百万美元来增强这些能力。 | • Looking to the future and in keeping with our NPT commitments, the United States is supporting a range of research and development (R&D) activities, expanding our work on verification technologies needed for future agreements. We are making multi-million dollar investments each year to advance these capabilities. |
美国发起了一项新倡议——核裁军核查国际伙伴关系，目的是使核武器国家和无核武器国家一道应对未来核裁军核查方面的挑战。3 月 19 至20 日在华盛顿特区举行了一次启动会议，与会者来自 28 个国家、欧洲联盟和罗马教廷。 | • The United States launched a new initiative — the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification — to bring together nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states to address future nuclear disarmament verification challenges. A kick-off meeting was held in Washington, D.C. on March 19-20, involving participants from 28 states, the European Union, and the Holy See. |
国际伙伴关系的目标是评估并在可能的情况下制定应对核武器生命周期中的监测和核查挑战的方法——包括材料的生产和控制、弹头的生产、部署、存储、拆除和处置。伙伴关系将建立在从美英技术合作方案和美国-挪威倡议等努力中吸取的经验教训的基础上。美国政府将通过一个正式的公私伙伴关系与核威胁倡议合作。 | • Goals of the International Partnership are to assess and potentially develop approaches addressing monitoring and verification challenges across the nuclear weapons lifecycle — including material production and control, warhead production, deployment, storage, dismantlement, and disposition. The Partnership will build on lessons learned from efforts such as the U.S.-UK Technical Cooperation Program and the UK-Norway Initiative. The U.S. Government will work with the Nuclear Threat Initiative through an official public-private partnership. |
2000 年以来，美国和联合王国根据 1958 年《共同防御协定》参与了一个广泛的合作方案，以便开发和评估核查未来的核武器裁减举措所需的方法和技术。这项工作包括： | • Since 2000, the United States and United Kingdom have engaged in an extensive program of cooperation under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement to develop and evaluate methodologies and technologies required to verify future nuclear weapon reduction initiatives. This work includes: |
评价核武器设施中的限制准入程序； | evaluating managed-access procedures at nuclear weapons facilities; |
制定证实所申报核武器的属性的程序； | developing procedures to confirm declared nuclear weapon attributes; |
研究核武器及部件监管链； | examining the chain of custody for nuclear weapons and components; |
评价核武器、部件及材料的受控储存情况； | evaluating the monitored storage of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; |
制定验证检验设备的程序；以及 | developing procedures for the authentication of inspection equipment; |
通过我们与联合王国以及其他伙伴的合作，美国的核查研究举措为应对重大的技术挑战发展了能力，如监测弹头，包括监测贮存库中非部署弹头的能力，以及按类型区分弹头的能力。 美国正在开展核弹头建模和计量活动，目的是制定一套全面的核弹头和组件识别标志。由此产生的数据将支持对可能因今后的条约核查活动显示的敏感信息进行评估，并将进一步指导今后在辐射探测和信息保护领域的研究和发展工作。 美国正在开展核弹头生命周期“端对端”监测能力现场演示和评价，包括在内华达国家安全场所进行的弹头贮存和运输监测演示和评价。目前正在发展和评估各种技术，据以向可能进行监测的一方做出保证：一定会在其整个生命周期、包括在长期贮存和拆除期间衡算和跟踪核弹头。 在 2018 年期间与能源部国家实验室开展的一项重要工作中，美国将研究在监测下拆除核武器的程序和技术，其基础是一个为期三年的监管链项目，该项目以 2014 年 1 月的演示实验而告终，该项目： 为测试和评价监管链技术的技术研究与发展开发了一个有代表性的环境，并开展了一系列技术评价活动；以及 为支持对弹头所负说明之责开发技术，包括评价一个利用射频识别标签来计算视察物品的实时系统的潜在可行性，并测试其在视察情境中可能的运用。 美国还在开展研究和发展工作，以求加强今后其他的军备管制条约，包括： 支持《全面禁试条约》的技术，包括进行实地试验和演示，据以促进我们对地下核事件地震特征的认识； 这些活动包括评价《全面禁试条约》相关技术的有效性和侵扰性，以及以最佳方式进行目视观测、地震和声波探测、多光谱成像以及放射性核素输送和计量；以及 | and, enabling the testing of technology in operational environments. • Through our work with the UK and other partners, U.S. verification research initiatives develop capabilities to address major technical challenges, such as monitoring of warheads, including non-deployed warheads in storage, as well as capabilities to distinguish warheads by type. The United States is conducting a nuclear warhead modelling and measurement campaign to establish a comprehensive nuclear warhead and component signature set. The resulting data will support assessment of sensitive information that could be revealed as a result of future treaty verification activities, and will further guide future R&D in the areas of radiation detection and information protection. The United States is conducting field demonstrations and evaluations of nuclear warhead lifecycle “end-to-end” monitoring capabilities, to include warhead storage and transportation monitoring demonstrations and evaluations at the Nevada National Security Site. Technologies are being developed and assessed to provide assurance to a potential monitoring party that nuclear warheads are accounted for and tracked throughout their lifecycle, including during long-term storage and dismantlement. In a major effort through 2018 with the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories, the United States will examine procedures and technology required for the monitored dismantlement of nuclear weapons, building on a three-year chain-of-custody project that culminated in demonstration experiments in January 2014, which: developed a representative environment for testing and evaluating technology research and development (R&D) of chain-of-custody technologies and carried out a series of technical evaluations; and, developed technologies to support accountability of warheads including evaluating the potential feasibility of a real-time system for counting items of inspection using radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and tested its potential use in an inspection scenario. • The United States is also pursuing R&D to enhance other future arms control treaties, including: technologies to support the CTBT, including completion of field experiments and demonstrations to further our understanding of underground nuclear event seismic signatures; activities evaluating CTBT-related technologies for effectiveness and intrusiveness, optimizing visual observation, seismic and acoustic sensing, multi-spectral imaging, and radionuclide transport and measurement; and, |
建设对规定的裂变材料生产设施和可能在美国敏感场址的核查进行监测的能力。 | development of monitoring capabilities for defined fissile material production facilities and for possible inspections at sensitive U.S. sites. |
三. 透明和建立信任措施 | iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures |
2015 年 3 月，美国接待了来自 11 个《不扩散条约》无核武器缔约国以及联合国裁军事务厅的代表对洛斯阿拉莫斯和桑迪亚国家实验室的访问。访问包括情况通报、游览以及就美国武器库存维护与管理活动以及国家实验室在支持总统的军备管制和不扩散议程方面发挥的作用进行交流。 | • In March 2015, the United States hosted a visit to the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories for representatives from 11 NPT non-nuclear weapon States Parties and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs. The visit included briefings, tours, and exchanges on U.S. stockpile stewardship and management activities, and the role played by the national laboratories in support of the President’s arms control and non-proliferation agenda. |
5 常会议进程 | The P5 Conference Process |
美国致力于同它的 5 常伙伴交往，推进《不扩散条约》的各个方面。5常的活动是为今后可能涉及美国和俄罗斯以外各方的协定奠定基础的必不可少的手段。 | • The United States is committed to engaging its P5 partners to advance all aspects of the NPT. P5 activities are an essential means for laying the foundation for future agreements that could involve parties beyond the United States and Russia. |
5 常正在就核武器相关问题开展定期对话，其深刻程度为往年所未见。继 2009 年在伦敦、2011 年在巴黎、2012 年在华盛顿和 2013 年(由俄罗斯主办)在日内瓦以及 2014 年在北京举行的会议后，联合王国于 2015年 2 月在伦敦主办了第六次 5 常会议。每次会议都以上次会议的成功以及日益增加的 5 常闭会期间工作量为基础。 | • The P5 are pursuing regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues to an extent unseen in prior years. The United Kingdom hosted the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015, following the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, 2013 (Russia-hosted) Geneva, and 2014 Beijing Conferences. Each Conference has built on the success of the last and an increasing amount of P5 intersessional work. |
5 常在这些会议上交流了从各自国家角度出发的关于核理论、战略稳定和国际安全的观点，以求增强了解并增进战略信任。 | • At these Conferences the P5 have exchanged views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability, and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain better understanding and build strategic trust. |
美国和俄罗斯联邦向其他 5 常国家通报了它们的核军备控制核查和通知经验，以使其更加熟悉促进裁军进程不可逆性、透明度和可核查性的务实安排。 | • The United States and Russian Federation have briefed the other P5 states on their nuclear arms control verification and notification experience to foster greater familiarity with practical arrangements that promote the irreversibility, transparency, and verifiability of the disarmament process. |
美国参加了由中国主持的创建“关键核术语汇编”5 常工作组。该小组将在不扩散条约 2015 年审议大会上发布第一版《术语汇编》。在 2015 | • The United States participated in the P5 Working Group to create a “Glossary of Definitions of Key Nuclear Terms” chaired by China. The group will release a first edition of the glossary at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. |
将在不扩散条约 2015 年审议大会上发布第一版《术语汇编》。在 2015年 2 月伦敦 5 常会议上，5 常指出它们打算在未来修订和更新《术语汇编》。这项工作通过加强对关键的军备控制和不扩散概念的共同理解，为实现《不扩散条约》目标做出重要贡献，并且能够帮助为涉及所有五个国家的最终核谈判奠定基础。 | At the London P5 Conference in February 2015, the P5 noted their intention to revise and update the Glossary in the future. This work substantially contributes to NPT goals by improving mutual understanding of key arms control and non-proliferation concepts and can help lay the groundwork for eventual nuclear negotiations that involve all five states. |
美国专家正在与 5 常专家合作审查 5 常在改进和维持《全面禁试条约》核查制度方面的合作以及查明我们独特的经验如何能够促进进一步加强《全面禁试条约》监测机制。 | • U.S. experts are working with P5 counterparts to review P5 collaboration on improving and maintaining the CTBT verification regime and to identify ways our unique experience can contribute to further strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime. |
美国主办了一次与《全面禁试条约》有关、关于现场视察设备的数据质量目标的讲习班，所有 5 常国家都参加了该讲习班。 | • The United States hosted a CTBT-related workshop, with participation by all P5 states, on data quality objectives for On-Site Inspection equipment. |
5 常在 2015 年 2 月发布了一项声明，鼓励各国做出努力，使医用同位素生产释放到环境中的氙气对《全面禁试条约》国际监测系统的影响最小化。 | • The P5 released a statement in February 2015 encouraging states to undertake efforts to minimize the impact of xenon gas released into the environment from medical isotope production on the CTBT’s International Monitoring System. |
美国在2013年接待了法国和联合王国对内华达国家安全场所(前内华达试验场)的透明度视察访问。美国和联合王国还在合作发展核查程序和技术，并向我们的 5 常伙伴们做了情况介绍。 | • The United States hosted France and the United Kingdom for a transparency visit to the Nevada National Security Site (the former Nevada Test Site) in 2013. The United States and United Kingdom also briefed our P5 partners on cooperative work developing verification procedures and technologies. |
5 常间的交往是一种长期投资，可据以加强《不扩散条约》、建立信任，并为建立无核武器世界所需开展的工作奠定更坚实的基础。我们将继续致力于促进 5 常间的交往，尤其是就核查工作进行交往，以过去的经验以及应对我们在监测未来协议方面将面临的艰巨挑战的需要为基础。 | • P5 engagement is a long-term investment in strengthening the NPT, building trust, and creating a stronger foundation for the work required to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue working to advance P5 engagement, particularly on verification work, building on past experience and the need to address difficult challenges we will face in monitoring future agreements. |
其他建立信任措施和协议 | Other Confidence-Building Measures and Agreements |
直接保密通信系统，又称为“热线”，是旨在供美国和俄罗斯最高层(自1963 年起)以及美国和中国(自 1998 年起)使用的应急和非应急安全通信系统。该系统由各国政府维持，以确保使领导人做好准备，来处理我们在国际上面临的所有的国家安全危机。 | • The Direct Secure Communication System, also known as the “Hotline,” is an emergency and non-emergency secure communication system intended for use by the highest leadership of the United States and Russia (since 1963) and with China (since 1998). The system is maintained by each government to ensure that leaders are prepared to manage the full range of national security crises we face internationally. |
美国减少核危险中心设在国务院，为美国政府提供与苏联的四个核继承国、欧洲安全与合作组织 50 多个参与国以及禁止化学武器组织的每周七天、每天 24 小时的政府对政府的直接通信，以支持关于核武器、常规武器、化学武器和网络问题的 14 项国际协议、条约和安排。减少核危险中心每年处理约 14 000 份通知，并提供五种语文的通知译文，必要时还要增加其他国家和语文。 | • The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), located in the Department of State, provides the U.S. Government with 24-hour, seven-day-a-week, direct government-to-government communications in support of fourteen international, agreements, treaties, and arrangements on nuclear, conventional, chemical and cyber issues, with the four nuclear state successors to the Soviet Union, the over 50 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The NRRC processes approximately 14,000 notifications annually, providing translations for notifications in five languages, with the capacity to add additional countries and languages at need. |
《防止意外事故措施协定》(《美利坚合众国和苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟关于减少爆发核战争危险的措施的协定》)和《改善美苏直接通信联系措施协定》(及附件《对 1963 年 6 月 20 日谅解备忘录及附件的补充和修改》)于 1971 年签署并生效，其目的包括提供即时或预先通知并通过“热线”便利紧急通信。 | • The Accidents Measures Agreement (Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and the Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link (with Annex, Supplementing and Modifying the Memorandum of Understanding with Annex, of June 20, 1963) were signed and entered into force in 1971, inter alia, to provide for certain immediate or advance notification and to facilitate urgent communications via the “Hotline.” |
《弹道导弹发射通知协定》(《关于洲际弹道导弹和潜艇弹道导弹发射通知的协定》)是在 1988 年签署的。根据该《协定》，美国和俄罗斯同意至少提前 24 个小时相互通知任何试验发射洲际弹道导弹或潜射导弹的发射日期、发射区和弹着点。《新裁武条约》规定的发射通知按照《关于洲际弹道导弹和潜艇弹道导弹发射通知的协定》提供。 | • The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement (Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launcher Ballistic Missiles) (BMLNA) was signed in 1988. Pursuant to this Agreement, the United States and Russia agreed to provide each other with notifications, no less than 24 hours in advance, of dates, launch areas, and impact sites for any test launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Notifications of launches under the New START Treaty are provided in accordance with the BMLNA. |
《防止弹道导弹扩散海牙行为准则》在海牙 2002 年 11 月的一次会议上由 93 个国家通过。根据该《准则》的自愿的透明度和建立信任措施，美国在政治上承诺提供关于发射弹道导弹和空间运载火箭的发射前通知(减少核危险中心协助进行通知工作)，并提交关于我们的空间和弹道导弹政策的年度声明。 | • The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) was adopted at a November 2002 conference by 93 countries in The Hague. Under the Code’s voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, the United States politically commits to provide pre-launch notification of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles (the NRRC assists in the notification process), as well as submits annual declarations of our space and ballistic missile policies. |
1994 年 1 月公布的《美国-俄罗斯总统关于解除瞄准目标的声明》宣布，双方承诺确保到 1994 年 5 月美国和俄罗斯不再将洲际弹道导弹和潜射导弹瞄准对方。在发生极不可能的意外发射美国核武器时，武器将落入公海。 | • The U.S.-Russia Presidential Declaration on Mutual Detargeting, issued in January 1994, announced the commitment of both sides to ensure that, by May 1994, the United States and Russia no longer had ICBMs and SLBMs targeting each other. In the highly unlikely event of an accidental launch of a U.S. nuclear weapon, the weapon would land in the open ocean. |
四. 其他相关问题 | iv. Other Related Issues |
专用于裁军条约的实施、视察和拆除的资源实例 | Examples of Resources Devoted to Disarmament Treaty Implementation, Inspections, and Dismantlement |
美国将大量资源用于履行其根据它已执行的许多裁军和军备控制协定和安排所做的承诺。 | • The United States expends considerable resources in fulfilment of its commitments under the many disarmament and arms control agreements and arrangements that it has implemented. |
美国还致力于资助拆除核武器，并计划至迟于 2022 财政年年底拆除所有在 2009 年前退役的所有核武器。此项拆除计划目前比时间表提前了10%。美国在 2015 年 4 月宣布，奥巴马总统将寻求供资以便将退役的美国核弹头的拆除速度提高 20%。过去五年期间，美国已为拆除武器支出了逾 2.25 亿美元。 | • The United States is committed to funding nuclear weapons dismantlement, and plans to dismantle all nuclear weapons retired prior to 2009 no later than the end of Fiscal Year 2022. This dismantlement plan is currently 10% ahead of schedule. The United States announced in April 2015 that President Obama will seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent. The United States has spent over $225 million on weapons dismantlement in the past five years. |
在 2014 至 2018 财政年度期间转变已部署核力量的结构，使之符合《新裁武条约》规定的 2018 年的限额，这项工作预计将耗资 3 亿美元。 | • Transitioning the deployed nuclear force structure to meet the 2018 limits of the New START Treaty is expected to cost $300 million from fiscal years 2014 to 2018. |
在 2014 年历年期间，美国消除了 52 个用于发射民兵三型导弹的和一个用于发射和平卫士导弹的洲际弹道导弹发射井，迄今为止根据《新裁武条约》完成了 103 个洲际弹道导弹发射井的消除工作。仅这些消除工作就花费了大约 2 000 万美元。美国还接待了 18 次视察。 | During calendar year 2014, the United States eliminated 52 ICBM silos for the Minuteman III and one for the Peacekeeper, completing the elimination of 103 ICBM silos to date under the New START Treaty. The cost of these eliminations alone was approximately $20 million. The United States also hosted 18 inspections. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.