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Recognizing that the Buckley framework might control here, the Unions contend that the most stringent level of review under that framework -- one equal to strict scrutiny -- must apply because the VCA "limits the quantity of political speech." Although the Unions are correct that we apply a standard akin to strict scrutiny when reviewing limits on political expenditures, that is not the case with respect to political contributions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "\"Although a less stringent standard of review applies to limits on political contributions, we conclude that the standard for expenditure limits operates identically to strict scrutiny review.\"",
"sentence": "Ho- mans, 366 F.3d at 906 (“Although a less stringent standard of review applies to limits on political contributions, we conclude that the standard for expenditure limits operates identically to strict scrutiny review.”); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134, 124 S.Ct. 619; Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 440 (“Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 440, 440",
"parenthetical": "\"Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do.\"",
"sentence": "Ho- mans, 366 F.3d at 906 (“Although a less stringent standard of review applies to limits on political contributions, we conclude that the standard for expenditure limits operates identically to strict scrutiny review.”); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134, 124 S.Ct. 619; Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 440 (“Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do.”)."
} | 4,069,722 | a |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same flexibility extends to the EPSDT mandate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 431, 439",
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | 4,198,231 | b |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same flexibility extends to the EPSDT mandate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05",
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | 4,198,231 | a |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same flexibility extends to the EPSDT mandate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.”); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439, 124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among “various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act” to comply with the “general EPSDT statute”)."
} | 4,198,231 | a |
. This reading of section 5K1.1 does not insulate the government from judicial review where the government has agreed in a plea agreement to file a motion in return for a defendant's assistance. That situation is, of course, wholly distinct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "905 F.2d 3, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a SS 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.1991) (“once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement”); see also United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a § 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.”); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1016 (\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 1073, 1075",
"parenthetical": "\"once the government uses its SS 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.1991) (“once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement”); see also United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a § 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.”); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1016 (\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure”)."
} | 10,521,527 | b |
. This reading of section 5K1.1 does not insulate the government from judicial review where the government has agreed in a plea agreement to file a motion in return for a defendant's assistance. That situation is, of course, wholly distinct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "902 F.2d 1016, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.1991) (“once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement”); see also United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a § 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.”); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1016 (\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 1073, 1075",
"parenthetical": "\"once the government uses its SS 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.1991) (“once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement”); see also United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a § 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.”); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1016 (\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure”)."
} | 10,521,527 | b |
The first issued raised by the Vessel Owners as been resolved by the Fifth Circuit in Davis's favor. The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that a concession as to the sufficiency of the surety is not a prerequisite to the court imposing a stay of limitation of liability proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1575, 1575",
"parenthetical": "holding that to be sufficient, stipulations must state than no judgment will be asserted in excess of the value of the limitation fund",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991) (explaining that plaintiffs properly stipulated that no judgment would be enforced above the valuation of the vessel and freight contained in the complaint); See also, Magnolia Marine Transport, 964 F.2d at 1575 (holding that to be sufficient, stipulations must state than no judgment will be asserted in excess of the value of the limitation fund)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "943 F.2d 576, 578",
"parenthetical": "explaining that plaintiffs properly stipulated that no judgment would be enforced above the valuation of the vessel and freight contained in the complaint",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991) (explaining that plaintiffs properly stipulated that no judgment would be enforced above the valuation of the vessel and freight contained in the complaint); See also, Magnolia Marine Transport, 964 F.2d at 1575 (holding that to be sufficient, stipulations must state than no judgment will be asserted in excess of the value of the limitation fund)."
} | 9,463,186 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 88, 97",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 88, 97",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as [their] language.”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.Supp. 825 (C.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) (Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)."
} | 5,621,314 | b |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir.1998) (“[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.”) (citation and quotation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 72, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.”). A suit against government officers in their official capacities is actually a suit against the government entity that employs the officers."
} | 3,820,068 | b |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.”). A suit against government officers in their official capacities is actually a suit against the government entity that employs the officers."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir.1998) (“[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.”) (citation and quotation omitted)."
} | 3,820,068 | a |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir.1998) (“[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.”) (citation and quotation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.”). A suit against government officers in their official capacities is actually a suit against the government entity that employs the officers."
} | 3,820,068 | b |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district court reasonably considered both convictions in calculating his sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 357, 365",
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | 3,629,397 | a |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district court reasonably considered both convictions in calculating his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | 3,629,397 | b |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district court reasonably considered both convictions in calculating his sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor’s threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain “no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution”)."
} | 3,629,397 | a |
Plaintiffs complain of injury resulting from defendant's capping program as a whole. The capping program, in turn, was furthered by defendant's predicate racketeering acts, Complaint 1124; however, it was more than merely a series of violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes. What injured plaintiffs was not any one particular letter or telephone call, but the underlying scheme as a whole, which enabled defendant to perpetrate an ongoing systematic corporate-survival strategy to violate plaintiffs' hard-earned rights to employee benefits, in violation of ERISA. As such, plaintiff has adequately alleged injury beyond that caused by the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "741 F.2d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves",
"sentence": "Cf., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, supra, 741 F.2d at 517 (racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 413, 413",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury alleged as a result of a pattern of mail and wire fraud",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander Grant, supra, 742 F.2d at 413 (racketeering related injury alleged as a result of a pattern of mail and wire fraud); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F.Supp. 1061, 1070 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (plaintiffs’ injuries the result of a “pervasive, ongoing and debilitating” scheme “not confined to specific monetary losses resulting from discrete acts of mail and wire fraud”)."
} | 3,737,057 | b |
Plaintiffs complain of injury resulting from defendant's capping program as a whole. The capping program, in turn, was furthered by defendant's predicate racketeering acts, Complaint 1124; however, it was more than merely a series of violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes. What injured plaintiffs was not any one particular letter or telephone call, but the underlying scheme as a whole, which enabled defendant to perpetrate an ongoing systematic corporate-survival strategy to violate plaintiffs' hard-earned rights to employee benefits, in violation of ERISA. As such, plaintiff has adequately alleged injury beyond that caused by the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "576 F.Supp. 1061, 1070",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' injuries the result of a \"pervasive, ongoing and debilitating\" scheme \"not confined to specific monetary losses resulting from discrete acts of mail and wire fraud\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander Grant, supra, 742 F.2d at 413 (racketeering related injury alleged as a result of a pattern of mail and wire fraud); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F.Supp. 1061, 1070 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (plaintiffs’ injuries the result of a “pervasive, ongoing and debilitating” scheme “not confined to specific monetary losses resulting from discrete acts of mail and wire fraud”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "741 F.2d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves",
"sentence": "Cf., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, supra, 741 F.2d at 517 (racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves)."
} | 3,737,057 | a |
However, to fulfill the intent of Congress and to harmonize the application of SS 1930(a)(6) with these sections of the Code, the court believes that the quarterly fees should be considered post-confirmation administrative expenses not specifically addressed in the plan. Consequently, the payment of such expenses should not be. considered a modification of the plan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 385, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. at 228; In re McLean Square Associates, 201 B.R. at 440; see also, United States Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764 (W.D.Pa.1997) quoting, In re Richardson Service Corp., 210 B.R. at 335 (“A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.”); but see, In re Salina Speedway, Inc., 210 B.R. at 855-56; In re Hudson Oil Co., 210 B.R. at 385-86 (remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan); In re Burk, 205 B.R. at 796-99."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.\"",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. at 228; In re McLean Square Associates, 201 B.R. at 440; see also, United States Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764 (W.D.Pa.1997) quoting, In re Richardson Service Corp., 210 B.R. at 335 (“A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.”); but see, In re Salina Speedway, Inc., 210 B.R. at 855-56; In re Hudson Oil Co., 210 B.R. at 385-86 (remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan); In re Burk, 205 B.R. at 796-99."
} | 11,849,100 | b |
However, to fulfill the intent of Congress and to harmonize the application of SS 1930(a)(6) with these sections of the Code, the court believes that the quarterly fees should be considered post-confirmation administrative expenses not specifically addressed in the plan. Consequently, the payment of such expenses should not be. considered a modification of the plan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 385, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. at 228; In re McLean Square Associates, 201 B.R. at 440; see also, United States Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764 (W.D.Pa.1997) quoting, In re Richardson Service Corp., 210 B.R. at 335 (“A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.”); but see, In re Salina Speedway, Inc., 210 B.R. at 855-56; In re Hudson Oil Co., 210 B.R. at 385-86 (remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan); In re Burk, 205 B.R. at 796-99."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "\"A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.\"",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. at 228; In re McLean Square Associates, 201 B.R. at 440; see also, United States Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764 (W.D.Pa.1997) quoting, In re Richardson Service Corp., 210 B.R. at 335 (“A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.”); but see, In re Salina Speedway, Inc., 210 B.R. at 855-56; In re Hudson Oil Co., 210 B.R. at 385-86 (remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan); In re Burk, 205 B.R. at 796-99."
} | 11,849,100 | b |
(Tr. at 37-41, 53-58, 494.) This points up the danger of basing a decision on the claimant's mental condition at a particular point in time, rather than considering the entire record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "630 F.3d 710, 710",
"parenthetical": "\"As we have explained before, a person who suffers from a mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single moment says little about her overall condition.\"",
"sentence": "See Punzio, 630 F.3d at 710 (“As we have explained before, a person who suffers from a mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single moment says little about her overall condition.”); see also Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773 (stating that “when a patient ... is only unpredictably able to function in a normal work environment, the resulting intermittent attendance normally precludes the possibility of holding down a steady job”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "692 F.3d 773, 773",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"when a patient ... is only unpredictably able to function in a normal work environment, the resulting intermittent attendance normally precludes the possibility of holding down a steady job\"",
"sentence": "See Punzio, 630 F.3d at 710 (“As we have explained before, a person who suffers from a mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single moment says little about her overall condition.”); see also Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773 (stating that “when a patient ... is only unpredictably able to function in a normal work environment, the resulting intermittent attendance normally precludes the possibility of holding down a steady job”)."
} | 4,322,268 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 U.S. 212, 218",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 U.S. 212, 218",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. Ciocchetti] about the nature of the charge[ ]" against him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (stating that, under an indictment “drawn in general terms,” a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment); cf. United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 929 (10th Cir.1988) (“[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)."
} | 4,073,520 | a |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 P.3d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | 6,987,752 | b |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 P.3d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 P.3d 1208, 1221",
"parenthetical": "district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | 6,987,752 | a |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 P.3d 1208, 1221",
"parenthetical": "district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsideration void); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Colo.App.2002) (rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review); see also In re Marriage of Marson, 929 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo.App.1996) (where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo.App.2006) (district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order); In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo.App.2004) (magistrate had no power to decide motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order; nevertheless, district court could construe motion for reconsideration as motion for district court review, and decide it as such)."
} | 6,987,752 | b |
One may certainly question the wisdom of Ms. Lounds's approach in light of our precedent. Specifically, our caselaw indicates that explicitly race-based conduct should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether a workplace environment is sufficiently polluted with racially offensive harassment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that \"if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerned in Chavez, a holistic analysis may actually unearth the racial dimension of conduct that may superficially appear to be race-neutral. 397 F.3d at 833 (“Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1097 (noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that “if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn”). We are not, however, in the business of making arguments for the parties."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "684 F.3d 960, 960",
"parenthetical": "\"Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerned in Chavez, a holistic analysis may actually unearth the racial dimension of conduct that may superficially appear to be race-neutral. 397 F.3d at 833 (“Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1097 (noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that “if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn”). We are not, however, in the business of making arguments for the parties."
} | 4,086,628 | b |
One may certainly question the wisdom of Ms. Lounds's approach in light of our precedent. Specifically, our caselaw indicates that explicitly race-based conduct should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether a workplace environment is sufficiently polluted with racially offensive harassment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that \"if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerned in Chavez, a holistic analysis may actually unearth the racial dimension of conduct that may superficially appear to be race-neutral. 397 F.3d at 833 (“Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1097 (noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that “if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn”). We are not, however, in the business of making arguments for the parties."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 F.3d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "\"Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerned in Chavez, a holistic analysis may actually unearth the racial dimension of conduct that may superficially appear to be race-neutral. 397 F.3d at 833 (“Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1097 (noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that “if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn”). We are not, however, in the business of making arguments for the parties."
} | 4,086,628 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | 4,329,796 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | 4,329,796 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under” direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes); see also Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713 (5th Cir.2015) (concluding that the \"acting under” sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus” requirement was not satisfied)."
} | 4,329,796 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18, 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281, 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. Choate, 151 Ariz. 57, 57-58, 725 P.2d 764, 764-65 (App.1986) (when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former § 13-4033(2) of interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claim because it “is constitutionally mandated”)."
} | 75,260 | b |
The privilege is construed narrowly and the party asserting it has the burden of establishing all of its essential elements. On this motion, PBGC argues that IH waived any privilege as to the documents it seeks. Because the court believes that IH's treatment of the communications at issue is inconsistent with any intention to maintain their confidentiality, the PBGC's motion is granted in substantial part. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1302, 1314",
"parenthetical": "affirming an order allowing newspapers access to corporation's special litigation committee report where the report was used as evidence in a motion to terminate a shareholder's derivative suit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487 (transmission of information for use in preparing a tax return destroys any expectation of confidentiality that might otherwise have existed); Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D.Ill.1981); cf. In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir.1984) (affirming an order allowing newspapers access to corporation’s special litigation committee report where the report was used as evidence in a motion to terminate a shareholder’s derivative suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 487, 487",
"parenthetical": "transmission of information for use in preparing a tax return destroys any expectation of confidentiality that might otherwise have existed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487 (transmission of information for use in preparing a tax return destroys any expectation of confidentiality that might otherwise have existed); Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D.Ill.1981); cf. In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir.1984) (affirming an order allowing newspapers access to corporation’s special litigation committee report where the report was used as evidence in a motion to terminate a shareholder’s derivative suit)."
} | 7,403,393 | b |
The .legality of simply owning, possessing, carrying, or concealing the knives was irrelevant. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 P.2d 781, 784",
"parenthetical": "trial court \"should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy”); see also People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657, 663 (Colo.App.1999) (“[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given”), rev’d on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo.2001)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "988 P.2d 657, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy”); see also People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657, 663 (Colo.App.1999) (“[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given”), rev’d on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo.2001)."
} | 8,993,669 | a |
The .legality of simply owning, possessing, carrying, or concealing the knives was irrelevant. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy”); see also People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657, 663 (Colo.App.1999) (“[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given”), rev’d on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo.2001)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 P.2d 781, 784",
"parenthetical": "trial court \"should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy”); see also People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657, 663 (Colo.App.1999) (“[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given”), rev’d on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo.2001)."
} | 8,993,669 | b |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "799 So.2d 243, 248",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families\"",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | 8,988,778 | a |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "738 So.2d 962, 963",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge's concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence\"",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | 8,988,778 | b |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "629 So.2d 1014, 1015",
"parenthetical": "listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families”); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating “[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge’s concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one defendant will be incarcerated while another will be given a nonincarcerative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So.2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure)."
} | 8,988,778 | b |
A court's determination of whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive is not as clear as one would hope and is not as objective as one would think. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 1135, 1142",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Entrepreneur\" is merely descriptive as the name of a magazine because an \"entirely unimaginative, literal-minded person\" would understand its meaning",
"sentence": "Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1114; Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1197. The dictionary definition may be relevant in the analysis of whether a mark is descriptive because it shows how the public may view the mark and what, if any, mental step is needed. Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1116; see Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1015 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979)(“While not determinative, dictionary definitions are relevant and often persuasive in determining how a term is understood by the consuming public ... ”); cf. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that “Entrepreneur” is merely descriptive as the name of a magazine because an “entirely unimaginative, literal-minded person” would understand its meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While not determinative, dictionary definitions are relevant and often persuasive in determining how a term is understood by the consuming public ... \"",
"sentence": "Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1114; Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1197. The dictionary definition may be relevant in the analysis of whether a mark is descriptive because it shows how the public may view the mark and what, if any, mental step is needed. Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1116; see Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1015 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979)(“While not determinative, dictionary definitions are relevant and often persuasive in determining how a term is understood by the consuming public ... ”); cf. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that “Entrepreneur” is merely descriptive as the name of a magazine because an “entirely unimaginative, literal-minded person” would understand its meaning)."
} | 12,270,812 | b |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | 11,662,594 | b |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | 11,662,594 | a |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | 11,662,594 | a |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427)."
} | 11,662,594 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 U.S. 572, 575",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 U.S. 572, 575",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | b |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | b |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.”); see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine)."
} | 4,291,018 | b |
Some of the contents of P-10 (the three-ring binder sent by Brown & Connery to Green) are clearly confidential and not subject to disclosure. The selection process used to assemble P-10, and the grouping of the photographs and documents represent the mental impressions of Plaintiffs counsel and are protected work product. This also was protected work product. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 F.R.D. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel”); see Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 280 (noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "170 N.J.Super. 73, 73",
"parenthetical": "the expert \"was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel\"",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel”); see Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 280 (noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification)."
} | 7,851,833 | b |
Some of the contents of P-10 (the three-ring binder sent by Brown & Connery to Green) are clearly confidential and not subject to disclosure. The selection process used to assemble P-10, and the grouping of the photographs and documents represent the mental impressions of Plaintiffs counsel and are protected work product. This also was protected work product. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 F.R.D. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel”); see Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 280 (noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the expert \"was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel\"",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel”); see Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 280 (noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification)."
} | 7,851,833 | b |
The instant situation is but one of the complications resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby. Accordingly, we urge the Alabama Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Kirby, particularly that portion relating to the right to appeal Kirby motions, in light of the fact that a question exists as to whether the grant or denial of Kirby motion is even appealable. We believe that the ultimate decision to resentence a defendant based on the amendment to the HFOA is a decision that is within the discretion of the circuit court and one that should not be subject to appellate review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "severely limits the issues this Court will consider on the appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider a sentence",
"sentence": "See also Prestwood v. State, 915 So.2d 580 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (severely limits the issues this Court will consider on the appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider a sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 So.2d 239, 239",
"parenthetical": "granting probation is discretionary with the circuit court and not subject to appellate review",
"sentence": "Compare Gilmore v. State, 669 So.2d 239, 239 (Ala.Cr.App.1995) (granting probation is discretionary with the circuit court and not subject to appellate review)."
} | 8,427,698 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corollary application of the no-fault threshold to be dependent upon a claimant's right to vote or his domicile or citizenship in Florida. Although this statutorily mandated insurance is not a government program, a more provincial definition would raise other questions of a constitutional dimension. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause); see also Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 79 Cal.App.4th 1437, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 825 (2000) (finding workers’ immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding claimant’s status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury)."
} | 11,083,941 | b |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "439 U.S. 282, 287-89",
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | 276,364 | a |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | 276,364 | b |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’s authority over a prisoner ends at the state’s geographical border.”); cf. Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1991) (District of Columbia did not waive jurisdiction over habeas petitioner by transferring him to federal prison in Kansas). Finally, Mr. Abordo’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is misplaced, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), and in any event, Minnesota was not enforcing Hawaii’s penal judgment."
} | 276,364 | b |
Subsets and Splits