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"[T]his case is not one in which review under ORS 34.010 to ORS 34.102 was unavailable had it been timely filed, or a case in which another specific statutory or a common-law remedy exists for which there is jurisdiction over the cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | 5,416,287 | b |
"[T]his case is not one in which review under ORS 34.010 to ORS 34.102 was unavailable had it been timely filed, or a case in which another specific statutory or a common-law remedy exists for which there is jurisdiction over the cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | 5,416,287 | b |
Plaintiffs challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court's decision in Feres. Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Feres, we must follow it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.3d 863, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 3, 20",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | 12,398,423 | b |
Plaintiffs challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court's decision in Feres. Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Feres, we must follow it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.3d 863, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | 12,398,423 | b |
Plaintiffs challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court's decision in Feres. Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Feres, we must follow it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.3d 863, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”)."
} | 12,398,423 | a |
The HOA's lien, which attached prior to FHFA's placing of Fannie Mae into conservatorship, is not extinguished by section 4617(j)(3) and does not lose its priority status, so the HOA is not deprived of its property interest. However, section 4617(j)(3) does prevent the HOA from selling the Property at foreclosure'free and clear of Fannie Mae's Deed of Trust, and "at some point a delay in the ability to exercise property rights may constitute a compensable taking." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "19 F.3d 225, 225",
"parenthetical": "\"Unmitigated delay, coupled with diminishment of distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at some point, infringe on the entire 'bundle' of rights enjoyed by the Appellants to the point that a compensable taking occurs.\"",
"sentence": "Cebrick, 53 F.3d at 24 (finding that a delay in the enforcement of a tax lien against the FDIC caused by 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) at some point would rise to the level of a due process violation); see also Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 225 (“Unmitigated delay, coupled with diminishment of distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at some point, infringe on the entire ‘bundle’ of rights enjoyed by the Appellants to the point that a compensable taking occurs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "finding that a delay in the enforcement of a tax lien against the FDIC caused by 12 U.S.C. SS 1825(b",
"sentence": "Cebrick, 53 F.3d at 24 (finding that a delay in the enforcement of a tax lien against the FDIC caused by 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) at some point would rise to the level of a due process violation); see also Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 225 (“Unmitigated delay, coupled with diminishment of distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at some point, infringe on the entire ‘bundle’ of rights enjoyed by the Appellants to the point that a compensable taking occurs.”)."
} | 4,362,572 | b |
At oral argument, Joseph made additional arguments that were not raised before the district court or in any of his appellate briefs, such as that African Americans were systematically excluded from clinical trial inspections and that the FDA was allegedly testing Fenfluramine on minority young people in order to research their propensity for violence. These arguments are waived, however, as they were not raised in appellant's opening brief and were not argued in the district court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 708, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief'",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | 3,261,742 | b |
At oral argument, Joseph made additional arguments that were not raised before the district court or in any of his appellate briefs, such as that African Americans were systematically excluded from clinical trial inspections and that the FDA was allegedly testing Fenfluramine on minority young people in order to research their propensity for violence. These arguments are waived, however, as they were not raised in appellant's opening brief and were not argued in the district court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 708, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief'",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | 3,261,742 | b |
At oral argument, Joseph made additional arguments that were not raised before the district court or in any of his appellate briefs, such as that African Americans were systematically excluded from clinical trial inspections and that the FDA was allegedly testing Fenfluramine on minority young people in order to research their propensity for violence. These arguments are waived, however, as they were not raised in appellant's opening brief and were not argued in the district court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 708, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief'",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below”); cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief’)."
} | 3,261,742 | a |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 194, 207",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 229, 229",
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | b |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 229, 229",
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | a |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 229, 229",
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | b |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 194, 207",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | a |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | a |
You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.\"",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there are no per se rules\" in deciding whether consent was voluntary",
"sentence": "See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary)."
} | 4,310,326 | a |
P14 Probable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home. And an officer's general conclusions about drug dealers' habits are, standing alone, insufficient to justify a search of a suspected drug dealer's home. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 Wn. App. 348, 357",
"parenthetical": "stating \"an officer's belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation\"",
"sentence": "Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 148-49 (holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (stating “an officer’s belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "138 Wn.2d 148, 148-49",
"parenthetical": "holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause",
"sentence": "Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 148-49 (holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (stating “an officer’s belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation”)."
} | 1,016,437 | b |
P14 Probable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home. And an officer's general conclusions about drug dealers' habits are, standing alone, insufficient to justify a search of a suspected drug dealer's home. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "138 Wn.2d 148, 148-49",
"parenthetical": "holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause",
"sentence": "Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 148-49 (holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (stating “an officer’s belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"an officer's belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation\"",
"sentence": "Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 148-49 (holding that broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (stating “an officer’s belief that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep records and materials in safe houses is not, in our judgment, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence of a person connected to the grow operation”)."
} | 1,016,437 | a |
An accused initiates communication by making a statement that "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation[.]" | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "462 US 1039, 1045-46",
"parenthetical": "asking \"Well, what is going to happen to me now?\" initiated communication",
"sentence": "Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1045-46, 103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983) (asking “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” initiated communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "73 Or App 53, 58-59",
"parenthetical": "inquiring about \"the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth\" did not show willingness to discuss the investigation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Crawford, 73 Or App 53, 58-59, 698 P2d 40 (1985) (inquiring about “the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth” did not show willingness to discuss the investigation)."
} | 4,469,446 | a |
An accused initiates communication by making a statement that "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation[.]" | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "73 Or App 53, 58-59",
"parenthetical": "inquiring about \"the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth\" did not show willingness to discuss the investigation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Crawford, 73 Or App 53, 58-59, 698 P2d 40 (1985) (inquiring about “the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth” did not show willingness to discuss the investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asking \"Well, what is going to happen to me now?\" initiated communication",
"sentence": "Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1045-46, 103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983) (asking “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” initiated communication)."
} | 4,469,446 | b |
An accused initiates communication by making a statement that "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation[.]" | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "73 Or App 53, 58-59",
"parenthetical": "inquiring about \"the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth\" did not show willingness to discuss the investigation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Crawford, 73 Or App 53, 58-59, 698 P2d 40 (1985) (inquiring about “the charge itself * * * what it carried and so forth” did not show willingness to discuss the investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asking \"Well, what is going to happen to me now?\" initiated communication",
"sentence": "Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1045-46, 103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983) (asking “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” initiated communication)."
} | 4,469,446 | b |
It remains an open question of law, at least in the First Circuit, whether there is related-to jurisdiction over a case against a non-debtor, third-party defendant who has a potential (as opposed to an actual) claim for contribution or indemnity against the debtor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor's bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.\"",
"sentence": "See Cambridge Place, 2010 WL 6580503, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142954 (noting that “[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also In re Santa Clara County Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. BAP 1998) (“[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor’s bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to 'related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Cambridge Place, 2010 WL 6580503, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142954 (noting that “[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also In re Santa Clara County Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. BAP 1998) (“[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor’s bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.”)."
} | 4,200,462 | b |
It remains an open question of law, at least in the First Circuit, whether there is related-to jurisdiction over a case against a non-debtor, third-party defendant who has a potential (as opposed to an actual) claim for contribution or indemnity against the debtor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to 'related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Cambridge Place, 2010 WL 6580503, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142954 (noting that “[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also In re Santa Clara County Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. BAP 1998) (“[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor’s bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor's bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.\"",
"sentence": "See Cambridge Place, 2010 WL 6580503, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142954 (noting that “[t]he First Circuit has not yet addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating whether contractual indemnification obligations give rise to ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also In re Santa Clara County Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. BAP 1998) (“[T]he determination of whether a removed state court proceeding is sufficiently related to a debtor’s bankruptcy to confer subject matter jurisdiction is complicated by what appears to be contradictory opinions.”)."
} | 4,200,462 | a |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "695 P.2d 156, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit\" before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | 7,464,489 | b |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "free copies of \"material on file\" available to inmate only when he \"demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief'",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | 7,464,489 | a |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "840 S.W.2d 165, 166",
"parenthetical": "free copies of \"material on file\" available to inmate only when he \"demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief'",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | 7,464,489 | a |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 P.2d 272, 274",
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "695 P.2d 156, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit\" before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | 7,464,489 | a |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 P.2d 272, 274",
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "free copies of \"material on file\" available to inmate only when he \"demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief'",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | 7,464,489 | a |
For the inmate requesting documents in anticipation of a collateral attack on his conviction, adequate opportunity to present his claims requires first and foremost meaningful access to the post-conviction procedures provided by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq. That access does not require the state to underwrite the inmate's efforts to overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with doeu-ments | 3/4 " 1/8 0 comb the record for errors." An inmate therefore cannot make a showing of particularized need absent a properly filed application for post conviction relief which sets out specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested documentation for support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 P.2d 272, 274",
"parenthetical": "\"[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack\"",
"sentence": "See Payton, swpra; State v. Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.1977) (“[d]ue process and equal protection surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute grounds for collateral attack”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "840 S.W.2d 165, 166",
"parenthetical": "free copies of \"material on file\" available to inmate only when he \"demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief'",
"sentence": "Cf. Cutbirth v. State, 695 P.2d 156, 159 (Wyo.1985) (“a petition for post-conviction relief must be on file and the district court must determine that the petition has merit” before an inmate will receive free copies of transcripts); Reed v. State, 310 Ark. 651, 840 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1992) (free copies of “material on file” available to inmate only when he “demonstrates some compelling need for specific documentary evidence to support an allegation contained in a petition for post conviction relief’)."
} | 7,464,489 | a |
Perhaps because Executive Coach did not raise this argument until its reply brief, the district court did not rule on it, and "we do not normally consider issues which the district court did not rule upon." To the extent that the argument is properly before us, we And that Executive Coach has not met its burden to demonstrate that conflict preemption applies: It has not shown that it is impossible to comply with its warranty obligation and the FMVSS, nor has it established that its warranty obligation "stands as an obstacle" to the objectives of the Safety Act or the FMVSS. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.3d 863, 880",
"parenthetical": "burden is on party asserting federal preemption of state law",
"sentence": "Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (internal quotation omitted); Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880 (8th Cir. 2009) (burden is on party asserting federal preemption of state law); see also Fabian, 628 F.3d at 282-83 (holding that common law misrepresentation claims were not preempted because they did not conflict with a FMVSS)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "628 F.3d 282, 282-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that common law misrepresentation claims were not preempted because they did not conflict with a FMVSS",
"sentence": "Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (internal quotation omitted); Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880 (8th Cir. 2009) (burden is on party asserting federal preemption of state law); see also Fabian, 628 F.3d at 282-83 (holding that common law misrepresentation claims were not preempted because they did not conflict with a FMVSS)."
} | 12,275,437 | a |
In the labor context, "state contract law must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions." As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed in a similar situation, an agreement between a union and an employer regarding the terms under which an employee will return to work is "a creature wholly begotten by the [collective bargaining agreement]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49",
"parenthetical": "holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement",
"sentence": "Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law); see also Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1997) (same); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 380, 383",
"parenthetical": "holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law",
"sentence": "Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law); see also Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1997) (same); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement)."
} | 5,737,648 | b |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of a defendant's guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness's personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness's identification.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | a |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "367 S.E.2d 197, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of a defendant's guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness's personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness's identification.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | b |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | b |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | a |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 1533, 1546",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis\" of admissibility of eyewitness identification",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of a defendant's guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness's personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness's identification.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | a |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 1533, 1546",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis\" of admissibility of eyewitness identification",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "367 S.E.2d 197, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of a defendant's guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness's personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness's identification.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | a |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 1533, 1546",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis\" of admissibility of eyewitness identification",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | a |
Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 1533, 1546",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis\" of admissibility of eyewitness identification",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”)."
} | 4,237,427 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 11,780,382 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in plain error cases appellant bears \"burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 245, 251",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | b |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no prejudice from the admission of that testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 565, 571",
"parenthetical": "no bar in this Circuit to \"dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (in plain error cases appellant bears “burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 571 (D.C.Cir.1996) (no bar in this Circuit to “dual testimony as both a fact and expert witness”); see also United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s predisposition and guilt and fact that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony during summation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996)."
} | 3,668,111 | a |
In its brief, DOCS omits the sentence in the regulations immediately following the passage it quotes. That sentence indicates that "[o]ther impairments, however, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. SS 1630.2Q). This unquoted sentence undercuts DOCS's argument since it confirms that some diagnoses can reveal an impairment which is "inherently substantially limiting." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 566, 566",
"parenthetical": "noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity",
"sentence": "See also Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Fountain, 190 F.Supp.2d at 339 (noting that the general diagnosis “received chemotherapy” would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "190 F.Supp.2d 339, 339",
"parenthetical": "noting that the general diagnosis \"received chemotherapy\" would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability",
"sentence": "See also Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Fountain, 190 F.Supp.2d at 339 (noting that the general diagnosis “received chemotherapy” would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability)."
} | 9,109,048 | a |
In its brief, DOCS omits the sentence in the regulations immediately following the passage it quotes. That sentence indicates that "[o]ther impairments, however, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. SS 1630.2Q). This unquoted sentence undercuts DOCS's argument since it confirms that some diagnoses can reveal an impairment which is "inherently substantially limiting." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity",
"sentence": "See also Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Fountain, 190 F.Supp.2d at 339 (noting that the general diagnosis “received chemotherapy” would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "190 F.Supp.2d 339, 339",
"parenthetical": "noting that the general diagnosis \"received chemotherapy\" would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability",
"sentence": "See also Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (noting that some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Fountain, 190 F.Supp.2d at 339 (noting that the general diagnosis “received chemotherapy” would cause an employee to divulge a disability or perceived disability)."
} | 9,109,048 | a |
As to the events of September 9, IBP is also entitled to summary judgment. IBP's unavailing request for a second sample simply cannot be viewed as an intrusion -- let alone a substantial intrusion -- on plaintiff's privacy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 626, 626",
"parenthetical": "firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee's privacy",
"sentence": "Cf. Borse 963 F.2d at 626 (firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee’s privacy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "674 F.Supp. 1451, 1451",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.Supp. at 1451 (plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366-67 (Okla. 1994) (employer did not invade employee’s privacy by demanding random drug test); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1989) (where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy); Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Kan.1982) (employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages “as a result of an act that did not occur.”)."
} | 11,686,825 | b |
As to the events of September 9, IBP is also entitled to summary judgment. IBP's unavailing request for a second sample simply cannot be viewed as an intrusion -- let alone a substantial intrusion -- on plaintiff's privacy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 626, 626",
"parenthetical": "firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee's privacy",
"sentence": "Cf. Borse 963 F.2d at 626 (firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee’s privacy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "878 P.2d 360, 366-67",
"parenthetical": "employer did not invade employee's privacy by demanding random drug test",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.Supp. at 1451 (plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366-67 (Okla. 1994) (employer did not invade employee’s privacy by demanding random drug test); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1989) (where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy); Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Kan.1982) (employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages “as a result of an act that did not occur.”)."
} | 11,686,825 | b |
As to the events of September 9, IBP is also entitled to summary judgment. IBP's unavailing request for a second sample simply cannot be viewed as an intrusion -- let alone a substantial intrusion -- on plaintiff's privacy. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 S.W.2d 497, 502",
"parenthetical": "where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.Supp. at 1451 (plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366-67 (Okla. 1994) (employer did not invade employee’s privacy by demanding random drug test); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1989) (where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy); Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Kan.1982) (employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages “as a result of an act that did not occur.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 626, 626",
"parenthetical": "firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee's privacy",
"sentence": "Cf. Borse 963 F.2d at 626 (firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee’s privacy)."
} | 11,686,825 | a |
As to the events of September 9, IBP is also entitled to summary judgment. IBP's unavailing request for a second sample simply cannot be viewed as an intrusion -- let alone a substantial intrusion -- on plaintiff's privacy. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "538 F.Supp. 331, 333",
"parenthetical": "employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages \"as a result of an act that did not occur.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.Supp. at 1451 (plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366-67 (Okla. 1994) (employer did not invade employee’s privacy by demanding random drug test); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1989) (where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy); Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Kan.1982) (employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages “as a result of an act that did not occur.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 626, 626",
"parenthetical": "firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee's privacy",
"sentence": "Cf. Borse 963 F.2d at 626 (firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee’s privacy)."
} | 11,686,825 | a |
Moreover, Sherman has failed to show a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Juror #12's statements were not so inherently prejudicial such as to deny Sherman a fair trial because (1) the comments did not necessarily brand Sherman as a criminal who had committed the specific crimes at issue in this case; and (2) the comments did not link Sherman to any other criminal violations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "272 Ga. 684, 688",
"parenthetical": "Where prospective juror's comments \"neither necessarily implied Appellants' guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations,\" the remarks were not inherently prejudicial and did not deprive the Appellants of their right to begin their trial with a jury \"free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.\"",
"sentence": "See Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688 (5) (531 SE2d 84) (2000) (Where prospective juror’s comments “neither necessarily implied Appellants’ guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations,” the remarks were not inherently prejudicial and did not deprive the Appellants of their right to begin their trial with a jury “free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.”) (citation and punctuation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "juror's comment during voir dire that the defendant was a \"firebug\" was inherently prejudicial where the defendant was on trial for arson",
"sentence": "Cf. Moore v. State, 156 Ga. App. 92 (1) (274 SE2d 107) (1980) (juror’s comment during voir dire that the defendant was a “firebug” was inherently prejudicial where the defendant was on trial for arson)."
} | 4,109,956 | a |
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has explained that the Court of Federal Claims "does not have general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the courts jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief",
"sentence": "Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the courts jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed.Cir.) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010); Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (holding that “[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code\"",
"sentence": "Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the courts jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed.Cir.) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010); Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (holding that “[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code”)."
} | 3,999,206 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "532 P.2d 303, 306",
"parenthetical": "stating that the \"combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner's due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska's constitution\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | 6,927,749 | b |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "913 P.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | 6,927,749 | b |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | 6,927,749 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 A.2d 1114, 1121",
"parenthetical": "holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | 6,927,749 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Michigan's lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are \"functionally separate\" and are handled by different individuals",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | 6,927,749 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that Michigan's lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are \"functionally separate\" and are handled by different individuals",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | 6,927,749 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that Montana's attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | 6,927,749 | a |
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter",
"sentence": "But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "995 P.2d 923, 928",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that Montana's attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency)."
} | 6,927,749 | b |
For purposes of legal analysis, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not actually possess the gun." (Citations omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "265 Conn. 35, 47-48",
"parenthetical": "under capital felony statute, General Statutes SS 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim's age while acting with intent requisite for murder",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "aggravating factors under General Statutes SS 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to SS 53a-8",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | 6,775,696 | a |
For purposes of legal analysis, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not actually possess the gun." (Citations omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under capital felony statute, General Statutes SS 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim's age while acting with intent requisite for murder",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "aggravating factors under General Statutes SS 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to SS 53a-8",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | 6,775,696 | a |
For purposes of legal analysis, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not actually possess the gun." (Citations omitted.) | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "aggravating factors under General Statutes SS 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to SS 53a-8",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 Conn. App. 161, 168",
"parenthetical": "accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes SS 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | 6,775,696 | b |
For purposes of legal analysis, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not actually possess the gun." (Citations omitted.) | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "aggravating factors under General Statutes SS 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to SS 53a-8",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes SS 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon",
"sentence": "State v. Davis, supra, 792; see also State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 47-48, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (under capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b [8], accessory need not be aware of victim’s age while acting with intent requisite for murder); State v. Tucker, 9 Conn. App. 161, 168, 517 A.2d 640 (1986) (accessory to assault in second degree under General Statutes § 53a-60 [a] [2] need intend only to aid in causing physical injury, not that such injury be caused by dangerous instrument or deadly weapon); cf. State v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 437-38 (aggravating factors under General Statutes § 53a-46a [i] arising from manner in which capital felony was committed by principal may be imputed to defendant as accomplice pursuant to § 53a-8)."
} | 6,775,696 | b |
Contrary to Duenas-Gonzalez's contention, no Brady violation occurred. The government offered neither false evidence nor perjured testimony. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 1201, 1204",
"parenthetical": "holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that the prosecution’s inadvertent use of perjured testimony can constitute a Brady violation); Cf. United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 452, 455",
"parenthetical": "noting that the prosecution's inadvertent use of perjured testimony can constitute a Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that the prosecution’s inadvertent use of perjured testimony can constitute a Brady violation); Cf. United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial)."
} | 4,100,127 | b |
The district court indisputably erred in imposing a 320-month sentence. However, because Gjuraj received a concurrent 320-month sentence on the narcotics distribution charge, Gjuraj fails to show that the error affected his substantial rights or the "fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "561 F.3d 108, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if the district court erroneously imposed sentences of 151 months on Counts Two, Three, and Five, Samas cannot show (as he must for plain error review",
"sentence": "Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1429 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 640 (2d Cir.2002) (“[A]n erroneous sentence on one count of a multiple-count conviction does not affect substantial rights where the total term of imprisonment remains unaffected ....”); see also United States v. Samas, 561 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“Even if the district court erroneously imposed sentences of 151 months on Counts Two, Three, and Five, Samas cannot show (as he must for plain error review) that the error affected his substantial rights, because those sentences are to run concurrently with the mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months on Count Four.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "286 F.3d 622, 640",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n erroneous sentence on one count of a multiple-count conviction does not affect substantial rights where the total term of imprisonment remains unaffected ....\"",
"sentence": "Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1429 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 640 (2d Cir.2002) (“[A]n erroneous sentence on one count of a multiple-count conviction does not affect substantial rights where the total term of imprisonment remains unaffected ....”); see also United States v. Samas, 561 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“Even if the district court erroneously imposed sentences of 151 months on Counts Two, Three, and Five, Samas cannot show (as he must for plain error review) that the error affected his substantial rights, because those sentences are to run concurrently with the mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months on Count Four.”)."
} | 5,898,723 | b |
Notwithstanding the complications hindering its development, Dr. Noble's testimony was effective, as demonstrated by the jury's acceptance of thirty-four of the fifty-nine mitigating circumstances. Whether Dr. Noble could have been more effective if corroborated by other evidence is speculative. We must, under the law, judge the reasonableness of the lawyers' conduct as of the time their actions occurred, not the conduct's consequences after the fact. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "949 F.2d 1354, 1363",
"parenthetical": "\"When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”); see also Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir.1991) (“When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 689, 689",
"parenthetical": "\"A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”); see also Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir.1991) (“When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.”)."
} | 11,173,261 | b |
Notwithstanding the complications hindering its development, Dr. Noble's testimony was effective, as demonstrated by the jury's acceptance of thirty-four of the fifty-nine mitigating circumstances. Whether Dr. Noble could have been more effective if corroborated by other evidence is speculative. We must, under the law, judge the reasonableness of the lawyers' conduct as of the time their actions occurred, not the conduct's consequences after the fact. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "949 F.2d 1354, 1363",
"parenthetical": "\"When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”); see also Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir.1991) (“When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”); see also Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir.1991) (“When examining ineffective assistance claims, however, we must appreciate the practical limitations and tactical decisions that trial counsel faced.”)."
} | 11,173,261 | b |
As a threshold matter, the materials compiled to support the investigation and prosecution of Sorin's unlawful options backdating activities were "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7(C). Even though Dickstein Shapiro originally created many of these documents, Exemption 7(C) applies to documents "compiled" by the government regardless of then-original source. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 U.S. 153, 153",
"parenthetical": "\"A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents\"",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.Supp. 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for \"law enforcement purposes\" under Exemption 7(A",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | 12,277,881 | a |
As a threshold matter, the materials compiled to support the investigation and prosecution of Sorin's unlawful options backdating activities were "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7(C). Even though Dickstein Shapiro originally created many of these documents, Exemption 7(C) applies to documents "compiled" by the government regardless of then-original source. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for \"law enforcement purposes\" under Exemption 7(A",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 U.S. 153, 153",
"parenthetical": "\"A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents\"",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | 12,277,881 | b |
As a threshold matter, the materials compiled to support the investigation and prosecution of Sorin's unlawful options backdating activities were "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7(C). Even though Dickstein Shapiro originally created many of these documents, Exemption 7(C) applies to documents "compiled" by the government regardless of then-original source. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents\"",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.Supp. 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for \"law enforcement purposes\" under Exemption 7(A",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | 12,277,881 | a |
As a threshold matter, the materials compiled to support the investigation and prosecution of Sorin's unlawful options backdating activities were "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7(C). Even though Dickstein Shapiro originally created many of these documents, Exemption 7(C) applies to documents "compiled" by the government regardless of then-original source. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for \"law enforcement purposes\" under Exemption 7(A",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents\"",
"sentence": "See John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153, 110 S.Ct. 471 (“A compilation, in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents”) (citations omitted); see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F.Supp. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.) (unsolicited complaint letters directed to the Federal Trade Commission were compiled for “law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(A) when, at the time of the FOIA request, the letters constituted “an important element in the record of an active investigation”), aff'd, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980)."
} | 12,277,881 | b |
In an attempt to shoehorn this case into that category, the dissent hints that a federal court may be without jurisdiction to approve a settlement agreement that requires the Executive to make an unappropriated expenditure. No authority is cited for that proposition and the legal signposts in this area instead point in the opposite direction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128",
"parenthetical": "'We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 U.S. 501, 523",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | 12,276,948 | b |
In an attempt to shoehorn this case into that category, the dissent hints that a federal court may be without jurisdiction to approve a settlement agreement that requires the Executive to make an unappropriated expenditure. No authority is cited for that proposition and the legal signposts in this area instead point in the opposite direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128",
"parenthetical": "'We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | 12,276,948 | a |
In an attempt to shoehorn this case into that category, the dissent hints that a federal court may be without jurisdiction to approve a settlement agreement that requires the Executive to make an unappropriated expenditure. No authority is cited for that proposition and the legal signposts in this area instead point in the opposite direction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128",
"parenthetical": "'We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court.”); cf. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 128 (1999) (‘We do not believe ... that Article III bars federal courts from entering consent decrees that limit executive branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.”)."
} | 12,276,948 | b |
The term "reasonably" indicates that an objective standard should apply. The term "reasonably" is not ambiguous. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase \"might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit\" was unambiguous and \"perfectly clear\"",
"sentence": "Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., 136 Cal.App.3d 673, 186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514 (1982) (in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase “might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit” was unambiguous and “perfectly clear”); see also Coregis Ins. Co. v. Camico Mut. Ins. Co., 959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (C.D.Cal.1997) (“a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222",
"parenthetical": "\"a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit\"",
"sentence": "Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., 136 Cal.App.3d 673, 186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514 (1982) (in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase “might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit” was unambiguous and “perfectly clear”); see also Coregis Ins. Co. v. Camico Mut. Ins. Co., 959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (C.D.Cal.1997) (“a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit”)."
} | 3,973,015 | a |
The term "reasonably" indicates that an objective standard should apply. The term "reasonably" is not ambiguous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222",
"parenthetical": "\"a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit\"",
"sentence": "Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., 136 Cal.App.3d 673, 186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514 (1982) (in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase “might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit” was unambiguous and “perfectly clear”); see also Coregis Ins. Co. v. Camico Mut. Ins. Co., 959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (C.D.Cal.1997) (“a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514",
"parenthetical": "in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase \"might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit\" was unambiguous and \"perfectly clear\"",
"sentence": "Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., 136 Cal.App.3d 673, 186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514 (1982) (in context of professional liability insurance policy, the phrase “might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit” was unambiguous and “perfectly clear”); see also Coregis Ins. Co. v. Camico Mut. Ins. Co., 959 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (C.D.Cal.1997) (“a reasonable person would have foreseen that the conduct alleged ... might form the basis of a claim or suit”)."
} | 3,973,015 | b |
First, the Court notes that Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity for claims arising under the Voting Rights Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 507, 518",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has \"concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515",
"parenthetical": "\"it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | 4,231,747 | b |
Subsets and Splits