context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
The actual malice standard is subjective; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually entertained a serious doubt. Although this fact may be proved by circumstantial rather than direct evidence, "the plaintiff must establish that even in relying upon an otherwise questionable source the defendant actually possessed subjective doubt." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 730, 730",
"parenthetical": "when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant's having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known",
"sentence": "Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F.Supp. 779, 794 (D.D.C.1990) (plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant’s sources were convicted felons); see St. Am-ant, 390 U.S. at 730, 88 S.Ct. at 1325 (when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant’s having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "747 F.Supp. 779, 794",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant's sources were convicted felons",
"sentence": "Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F.Supp. 779, 794 (D.D.C.1990) (plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant’s sources were convicted felons); see St. Am-ant, 390 U.S. at 730, 88 S.Ct. at 1325 (when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant’s having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known)."
} | 3,695,755 | b |
The actual malice standard is subjective; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually entertained a serious doubt. Although this fact may be proved by circumstantial rather than direct evidence, "the plaintiff must establish that even in relying upon an otherwise questionable source the defendant actually possessed subjective doubt." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "747 F.Supp. 779, 794",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant's sources were convicted felons",
"sentence": "Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F.Supp. 779, 794 (D.D.C.1990) (plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant’s sources were convicted felons); see St. Am-ant, 390 U.S. at 730, 88 S.Ct. at 1325 (when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant’s having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 1325, 1325",
"parenthetical": "when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant's having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known",
"sentence": "Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F.Supp. 779, 794 (D.D.C.1990) (plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that some of defendant’s sources were convicted felons); see St. Am-ant, 390 U.S. at 730, 88 S.Ct. at 1325 (when defendant had implicated sheriff and union leader in alleged wrongdoing, actual malice could not be inferred from defendant’s having relied solely upon affidavit of union dissident of unknown veracity and having failed to verify allegations with sources who might have known)."
} | 3,695,755 | a |
Because we conclude that C.S.'s fundamental right to the assistance of counsel was not implicated in this case, we further conclude that the court was not required in this instance to give C.S. a detailed advisement regarding her decision to appear pro se. Indeed, it appears to us, based on the circumstances leading to Davis's withdrawal, that C.S. knew very well what risk her conduct posed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "785 P.2d 129, 131",
"parenthetical": "\"The totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.\"",
"sentence": "See People in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo.1990) (“The totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.”); see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989)(holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting, the court may consider “[a] defendant’s lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel,” “including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel” “or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel,” and “[t]he timeliness of defendant’s request for new counsel” particularly “when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel ... under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 P.2d 87, 94",
"parenthetical": "holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting, the court may consider \"[a] defendant's lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel,\" \"including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel\" \"or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel,\" and \"[t]he timeliness of defendant's request for new counsel\" particularly \"when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel ... under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance\"",
"sentence": "See People in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo.1990) (“The totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.”); see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989)(holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting, the court may consider “[a] defendant’s lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel,” “including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel” “or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel,” and “[t]he timeliness of defendant’s request for new counsel” particularly “when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel ... under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance”)."
} | 9,295,316 | a |
SDCL 53-3-3. Ensuing negotiations evidence absence of intent that the purchase agreement constitutes a final and complete agreement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "479 N.W.2d 496, 500",
"parenthetical": "finding a contract where the purchase agreement contained all necessary terms and conditions and any remaining negotiations involved the contract for deed",
"sentence": "See Sabow v. Hall, 323 N.W.2d 861, 863 (S.D. 1982) (finding no final and complete agreement where negotiations between parties continued after offer and purchase agreement were signed); cf. Rusch v. Kauker, 479 N.W.2d 496, 500 (S.D.1991) (finding a contract where the purchase agreement contained all necessary terms and conditions and any remaining negotiations involved the contract for deed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "323 N.W.2d 861, 863",
"parenthetical": "finding no final and complete agreement where negotiations between parties continued after offer and purchase agreement were signed",
"sentence": "See Sabow v. Hall, 323 N.W.2d 861, 863 (S.D. 1982) (finding no final and complete agreement where negotiations between parties continued after offer and purchase agreement were signed); cf. Rusch v. Kauker, 479 N.W.2d 496, 500 (S.D.1991) (finding a contract where the purchase agreement contained all necessary terms and conditions and any remaining negotiations involved the contract for deed)."
} | 11,766,426 | b |
"We have often stated . . . that it is reasonable for police officers to suspect guns to be associated with illegal drug selling operations. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "255 Conn. 268, 284",
"parenthetical": "Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .",
"sentence": "State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 284, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001) (Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .); see also United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 231, 238",
"parenthetical": "dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon",
"sentence": "State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 284, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001) (Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .); see also United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)"
} | 4,086,240 | a |
"We have often stated . . . that it is reasonable for police officers to suspect guns to be associated with illegal drug selling operations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 231, 238",
"parenthetical": "dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon",
"sentence": "State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 284, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001) (Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .); see also United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .",
"sentence": "State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 284, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001) (Connecticut courts repeatedly have noted that [t]here is a well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms . . .); see also United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (dealing in narcotics sufficient for reasonable belief in potential for violence and presence of weapon).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)"
} | 4,086,240 | b |
The Clerk of Court is a state employee and, consequently, is a state agent for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "864 F.Supp. 839, 843",
"parenthetical": "dismissing official-capacity claims against Pucinski because her status as Clerk of Court made her a state agent and triggered Eleventh Amendment immunity",
"sentence": "Curry v. Pucinski, 864 F.Supp. 839, 843 (N.D.Ill.1994) (dismissing official-capacity claims against Pucinski because her status as Clerk of Court made her a state agent and triggered Eleventh Amendment immunity)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that, in Illinois, a court clerk is a state employee",
"sentence": "See also Warren v. Stone, 958 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir.1992) (finding that, in Illinois, a court clerk is a state employee)."
} | 9,496,267 | a |
First, the evidence it is "reasonable to expect" must be "easily available" to the applicant. Second, even the failure to produce easily available evidence cannot be held against an applicant unless he was given the opportunity to explain at the asylum hearing why that evidence was not produced. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.3d 679, 688",
"parenthetical": "reversing adverse credibility determination, and rejecting government argument that asylum applicant had failed to credibly explain absence of corroborating evidence, because \"Arulampalam was not 'given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Sidha, 220 F.3d at 1091 & n. 3 (“The petitioner must be given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence---- In this case Petitioner was specifically asked to explain the lack of corroboration and presented an explanation that both the IJ and BIA explicitly found incredible.”); see also Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 688 (9th Cir.2003) (reversing adverse credibility determination, and rejecting government argument that asylum applicant had failed to credibly explain absence of corroborating evidence, because “Arulampalam was not ‘given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence.’ ”) (citing Sidha)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The petitioner must be given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence---- In this case Petitioner was specifically asked to explain the lack of corroboration and presented an explanation that both the IJ and BIA explicitly found incredible.\"",
"sentence": "See Sidha, 220 F.3d at 1091 & n. 3 (“The petitioner must be given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence---- In this case Petitioner was specifically asked to explain the lack of corroboration and presented an explanation that both the IJ and BIA explicitly found incredible.”); see also Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 688 (9th Cir.2003) (reversing adverse credibility determination, and rejecting government argument that asylum applicant had failed to credibly explain absence of corroborating evidence, because “Arulampalam was not ‘given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence.’ ”) (citing Sidha)."
} | 666,155 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 464, 473",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 273, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | a |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 464, 473",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | a |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 464, 473",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | a |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 464, 473",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 273, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | a |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | a |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 273, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles.\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (“[Fjindings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that “determinations of motive and intent .... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 4,207,184 | b |
Here the claimed injury is allegedly the result of a policy of the municipality, i.e., the passage of a budget reduction plan. (Compl. P 119.) Therefore, claims against its officers in their official capacities are in reality claims against the Town of North Hemp-stead itself. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28",
"parenthetical": "finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality",
"sentence": "See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against Zwirn, both as Supervisor and Board Member, and Newburger, D’Urso, Johnson and Cunningham, as Town Board Members, must be dismissed, not because these parties have immunity but merely because the Town is the real party in interest. See e.g., Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. at 706-07 (official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1991) and Kohn v. Muda, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill.1991); cf. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. at 120-21 (motion to dismiss official-capacity claims on legislative immunity denied); Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality), aff'd, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "830 F.Supp. 706, 706-07",
"parenthetical": "official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity",
"sentence": "See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against Zwirn, both as Supervisor and Board Member, and Newburger, D’Urso, Johnson and Cunningham, as Town Board Members, must be dismissed, not because these parties have immunity but merely because the Town is the real party in interest. See e.g., Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. at 706-07 (official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1991) and Kohn v. Muda, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill.1991); cf. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. at 120-21 (motion to dismiss official-capacity claims on legislative immunity denied); Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality), aff'd, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984)."
} | 7,834,593 | b |
Here the claimed injury is allegedly the result of a policy of the municipality, i.e., the passage of a budget reduction plan. (Compl. P 119.) Therefore, claims against its officers in their official capacities are in reality claims against the Town of North Hemp-stead itself. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality",
"sentence": "See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against Zwirn, both as Supervisor and Board Member, and Newburger, D’Urso, Johnson and Cunningham, as Town Board Members, must be dismissed, not because these parties have immunity but merely because the Town is the real party in interest. See e.g., Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. at 706-07 (official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1991) and Kohn v. Muda, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill.1991); cf. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. at 120-21 (motion to dismiss official-capacity claims on legislative immunity denied); Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality), aff'd, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "830 F.Supp. 706, 706-07",
"parenthetical": "official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity",
"sentence": "See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against Zwirn, both as Supervisor and Board Member, and Newburger, D’Urso, Johnson and Cunningham, as Town Board Members, must be dismissed, not because these parties have immunity but merely because the Town is the real party in interest. See e.g., Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F.Supp. at 706-07 (official-capacity claims redundant because claim is made against local governmental entity) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1991) and Kohn v. Muda, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill.1991); cf. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F.Supp. at 120-21 (motion to dismiss official-capacity claims on legislative immunity denied); Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (finding immunity from personal liability for individual defendants but no immunity for the municipality), aff'd, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984)."
} | 7,834,593 | b |
(See DE 11 at 2). After considering State Farm's Motion, I find that impleader under Rule 14(a) is appropriate because State Farm's claims against Betancourt are based on Osorio's claim against State Farm. State Farm's claims for common law indemnification and contractual indemnification are not separate and independent claims arising out of the same facts as Osorio's claim against State Farm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 F.2d 643, 643",
"parenthetical": "denying third-party claim under Rule 14(a) and explaining that the Rule does not allow a third-party plaintiff to assert a separate and independent claim against a third-party defendant simply because it shares the same general set of facts as the main claim",
"sentence": "See Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 643 (denying third-party claim under Rule 14(a) and explaining that the Rule does not allow a third-party plaintiff to assert a separate and independent claim against a third-party defendant simply because it shares the same general set of facts as the main claim); see also Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1975) (impleader is appropriate when the third-party defendant’s potential liability depends on the outcome of the main claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 F.2d 747, 749",
"parenthetical": "impleader is appropriate when the third-party defendant's potential liability depends on the outcome of the main claim",
"sentence": "See Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 643 (denying third-party claim under Rule 14(a) and explaining that the Rule does not allow a third-party plaintiff to assert a separate and independent claim against a third-party defendant simply because it shares the same general set of facts as the main claim); see also Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1975) (impleader is appropriate when the third-party defendant’s potential liability depends on the outcome of the main claim)."
} | 4,279,110 | a |
Nor does it contain a proper motion or affidavit by the prosecutor explaining why the report could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Thus, under the rules, the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny the state's request to introduce the untimely disclosed evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 Ariz.App. 203, 205",
"parenthetical": "court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses",
"sentence": "See State v. Scott, 24 Ariz.App. 203, 205, 537 P.2d 40, 42 (1975) (court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony",
"sentence": "But see State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51, 141 P.3d 368, 385-86 (2006) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony)."
} | 5,716,070 | a |
Nor does it contain a proper motion or affidavit by the prosecutor explaining why the report could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Thus, under the rules, the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny the state's request to introduce the untimely disclosed evidence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "141 P.3d 368, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony",
"sentence": "But see State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51, 141 P.3d 368, 385-86 (2006) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 Ariz.App. 203, 205",
"parenthetical": "court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses",
"sentence": "See State v. Scott, 24 Ariz.App. 203, 205, 537 P.2d 40, 42 (1975) (court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses)."
} | 5,716,070 | b |
Nor does it contain a proper motion or affidavit by the prosecutor explaining why the report could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Thus, under the rules, the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny the state's request to introduce the untimely disclosed evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "537 P.2d 40, 42",
"parenthetical": "court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses",
"sentence": "See State v. Scott, 24 Ariz.App. 203, 205, 537 P.2d 40, 42 (1975) (court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony",
"sentence": "But see State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51, 141 P.3d 368, 385-86 (2006) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony)."
} | 5,716,070 | a |
Nor does it contain a proper motion or affidavit by the prosecutor explaining why the report could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Thus, under the rules, the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny the state's request to introduce the untimely disclosed evidence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "141 P.3d 368, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony",
"sentence": "But see State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶¶ 48, 50-51, 141 P.3d 368, 385-86 (2006) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "537 P.2d 40, 42",
"parenthetical": "court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses",
"sentence": "See State v. Scott, 24 Ariz.App. 203, 205, 537 P.2d 40, 42 (1975) (court within its discretion ordering preclusion for untimely disclosure of defense witnesses)."
} | 5,716,070 | b |
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "Section 2254 presumes that federal courts already have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner.... [I]t is not itself a grant of habeas authority, let alone a discrete and independent source of post-conviction relief." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 651, 662",
"parenthetical": "\"Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by SS 2254.... \"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1008, 1008",
"parenthetical": "\"[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in SS 2241.\"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | 4,039,795 | b |
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "Section 2254 presumes that federal courts already have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner.... [I]t is not itself a grant of habeas authority, let alone a discrete and independent source of post-conviction relief." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by SS 2254.... \"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1008, 1008",
"parenthetical": "\"[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in SS 2241.\"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | 4,039,795 | b |
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "Section 2254 presumes that federal courts already have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner.... [I]t is not itself a grant of habeas authority, let alone a discrete and independent source of post-conviction relief." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1008, 1008",
"parenthetical": "\"[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in SS 2241.\"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by SS 2254.... \"",
"sentence": "In turn, § 2254(d), like other subsections of § 2254, implements and limits the authority granted in § 2241 for “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2254(a). See White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (“[Section] 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241.”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.... ”)."
} | 4,039,795 | a |
It is also clear that Captain Roth and the appellant were present at the deposition, and Captain Roth actively participated throughout the deposition including a thorough cross-examination of the deponent. In addition, Captain Roth was aware of the nature of SSgt Duncan's testimony based on his active participation in the Article 32 investigation on 7 August. Therefore, even though the written notice requirements of R.C.M. 702(e) were not completely satisfied, we find no prejudice resulted to the appellant. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "75 minutes elapsing between time defense was made aware of identity of intended deponent and time proceeding was opened was not reasonable notice",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Donati, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 34 C.M.R. 15, (C.M.A.1963) (75 minutes elapsing between time defense was made aware of identity of intended deponent and time proceeding was opened was not reasonable notice); United States v. Giles, 42 C.M.R. 880 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (a telephone call to accused approximately an hour and a half before the deposition and at a time when accused was drinking and in no condition to participate in the proceeding did not constitute reasonable written notice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Stewart, 3 C.M.R. 690 (A.F.B.R.1952) (notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition)."
} | 5,703,430 | b |
It is also clear that Captain Roth and the appellant were present at the deposition, and Captain Roth actively participated throughout the deposition including a thorough cross-examination of the deponent. In addition, Captain Roth was aware of the nature of SSgt Duncan's testimony based on his active participation in the Article 32 investigation on 7 August. Therefore, even though the written notice requirements of R.C.M. 702(e) were not completely satisfied, we find no prejudice resulted to the appellant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Stewart, 3 C.M.R. 690 (A.F.B.R.1952) (notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "75 minutes elapsing between time defense was made aware of identity of intended deponent and time proceeding was opened was not reasonable notice",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Donati, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 34 C.M.R. 15, (C.M.A.1963) (75 minutes elapsing between time defense was made aware of identity of intended deponent and time proceeding was opened was not reasonable notice); United States v. Giles, 42 C.M.R. 880 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (a telephone call to accused approximately an hour and a half before the deposition and at a time when accused was drinking and in no condition to participate in the proceeding did not constitute reasonable written notice)."
} | 5,703,430 | a |
It is also clear that Captain Roth and the appellant were present at the deposition, and Captain Roth actively participated throughout the deposition including a thorough cross-examination of the deponent. In addition, Captain Roth was aware of the nature of SSgt Duncan's testimony based on his active participation in the Article 32 investigation on 7 August. Therefore, even though the written notice requirements of R.C.M. 702(e) were not completely satisfied, we find no prejudice resulted to the appellant. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a telephone call to accused approximately an hour and a half before the deposition and at a time when accused was drinking and in no condition to participate in the proceeding did not constitute reasonable written notice",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Donati, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 34 C.M.R. 15, (C.M.A.1963) (75 minutes elapsing between time defense was made aware of identity of intended deponent and time proceeding was opened was not reasonable notice); United States v. Giles, 42 C.M.R. 880 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (a telephone call to accused approximately an hour and a half before the deposition and at a time when accused was drinking and in no condition to participate in the proceeding did not constitute reasonable written notice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Stewart, 3 C.M.R. 690 (A.F.B.R.1952) (notice received by defense counsel approximately 1 hour before deposition)."
} | 5,703,430 | b |
This principle of double recovery, known as the collateral source rule, provided that "compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." The collateral source rule was not applicable in situations in which a plaintiff's compensation was attributable to the defendant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 1372, 1379",
"parenthetical": "In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57, 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) (“Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.”) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. Damages § 201 (1938)); see also Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir.1977) (In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.). Nor did the collateral source rule apply to compensation “gratuitously furnished” to a plaintiff by a governmental body."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 Colo. 350, 356-57",
"parenthetical": "\"Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.\"",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57, 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) (“Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.”) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. Damages § 201 (1938)); see also Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir.1977) (In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.). Nor did the collateral source rule apply to compensation “gratuitously furnished” to a plaintiff by a governmental body."
} | 12,053,761 | b |
This principle of double recovery, known as the collateral source rule, provided that "compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." The collateral source rule was not applicable in situations in which a plaintiff's compensation was attributable to the defendant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 1372, 1379",
"parenthetical": "In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57, 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) (“Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.”) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. Damages § 201 (1938)); see also Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir.1977) (In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.). Nor did the collateral source rule apply to compensation “gratuitously furnished” to a plaintiff by a governmental body."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "229 P.2d 659, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.\"",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57, 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) (“Benefits received by the plaintiff from a source other than the defendant and to which he has not contributed are not to be considered in assessing the damages.”) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. Damages § 201 (1938)); see also Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir.1977) (In an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that portion of plaintiffs Social Security benefits that were funded by federal government contributions were not collateral sources and, thus, were subject to setoff.). Nor did the collateral source rule apply to compensation “gratuitously furnished” to a plaintiff by a governmental body."
} | 12,053,761 | b |
We acknowledge that the Court in Groetzinger "confined" its construction of the term "trade or business" to the statutory provision at issue in that case, and that the Court "[did] not purport to construe the phrase where it appears in other places." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 889, 889-90",
"parenthetical": "declining to rely on Groetzinger because the term \"trade or business\" has different meanings \" 'depending upon the [statutory] provision in which it is used' \"",
"sentence": "But see Ditello, 974 F.2d at 889-90 (declining to rely on Groetzinger because the term “trade or business” has different meanings “ ‘depending upon the [statutory] provision in which it is used’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 794, 794",
"parenthetical": "\"Although the Groetzinger court considered a provision of the tax code, we find its definition helpful in distinguishing trades or businesses [under ERISA] from purely personal activities or investments.\"",
"sentence": "See Personnel, 974 F.2d at 794 (“Although the Groetzinger court considered a provision of the tax code, we find its definition helpful in distinguishing trades or businesses [under ERISA] from purely personal activities or investments.”). Indeed, the parties have offered no better interpretation, and we can imagine none."
} | 3,503,779 | b |
[C]ourts have recognized that a noose may constitute part of a hostile environment claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.\"",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"several hangman's nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area\" coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | 3,813,584 | b |
[C]ourts have recognized that a noose may constitute part of a hostile environment claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"several hangman's nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area\" coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 U.S. 21, 21",
"parenthetical": "\"It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.\"",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | 3,813,584 | a |
[C]ourts have recognized that a noose may constitute part of a hostile environment claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.\"",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"several hangman's nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area\" coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | 3,813,584 | b |
[C]ourts have recognized that a noose may constitute part of a hostile environment claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "983 F.2d 1573, 1583",
"parenthetical": "\"The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman's hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.\"",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"several hangman's nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area\" coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | 3,813,584 | b |
[C]ourts have recognized that a noose may constitute part of a hostile environment claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.\"",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"several hangman's nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area\" coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment",
"sentence": "See [Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 2001) ] (noting that “several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above [the plaintiffs] work area” coupled with racist jokes, including one about lynching, were sufficient to give rise to an inference of a hostile environment); see also Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989) (“It is hard to imagine an incident of this sort taking place in 1984. The grossness of hanging an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel, 983 F.2d 1573, 1583 (11th Cir.1993) (Fay, J., dissenting) (“The noose in [the workplace] context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or of disapproval, but of terror.... Not less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose in this context is intended to arouse fear.”); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Indeed, the noose is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”)."
} | 3,813,584 | b |
There is statutory support for the choice of venue and appellant/wife has not demonstrated that the court, for any other reason, should have ordered the case tried in Broward County. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court has broad discretion in dealing with matters of venue",
"sentence": "See § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1985); Groome v. Abrams, 448 So.2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (trial court has broad discretion in dealing with matters of venue); cf. Thames v. Thames, 449 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (dissolution of marriage action was improperly brought in Pinellas County where evidence showed that the place where the parties last resided with the intent to remain married was Alachua County, and there was no property subject to the litigation located in Pinellas County)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dissolution of marriage action was improperly brought in Pinellas County where evidence showed that the place where the parties last resided with the intent to remain married was Alachua County, and there was no property subject to the litigation located in Pinellas County",
"sentence": "See § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1985); Groome v. Abrams, 448 So.2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (trial court has broad discretion in dealing with matters of venue); cf. Thames v. Thames, 449 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (dissolution of marriage action was improperly brought in Pinellas County where evidence showed that the place where the parties last resided with the intent to remain married was Alachua County, and there was no property subject to the litigation located in Pinellas County)."
} | 7,565,185 | a |
The defendants' contentions lack merit because income evidence from several years prior to the date of trial is probative with respect to establishing a defendant's net worth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32",
"parenthetical": "permitting \"evidence of the [defendants]' gross incomes\" during punitive damages phase of trial",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85",
"parenthetical": "denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant's 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because \"[evidence concerning a defendant's net worth is relevant to punitive damages.\" (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | 12,270,951 | a |
The defendants' contentions lack merit because income evidence from several years prior to the date of trial is probative with respect to establishing a defendant's net worth. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant's 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because \"[evidence concerning a defendant's net worth is relevant to punitive damages.\" (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32",
"parenthetical": "permitting \"evidence of the [defendants]' gross incomes\" during punitive damages phase of trial",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | 12,270,951 | b |
The defendants' contentions lack merit because income evidence from several years prior to the date of trial is probative with respect to establishing a defendant's net worth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting \"evidence of the [defendants]' gross incomes\" during punitive damages phase of trial",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85",
"parenthetical": "denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant's 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because \"[evidence concerning a defendant's net worth is relevant to punitive damages.\" (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | 12,270,951 | a |
The defendants' contentions lack merit because income evidence from several years prior to the date of trial is probative with respect to establishing a defendant's net worth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting \"evidence of the [defendants]' gross incomes\" during punitive damages phase of trial",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant's 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because \"[evidence concerning a defendant's net worth is relevant to punitive damages.\" (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995",
"sentence": "See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (permitting “evidence of the [defendants]’ gross incomes” during punitive damages phase of trial), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming an award of punitive damages based upon the fact that the defendant “testified that his income for the past three years had been between $80,000 and $105,000,” and that a jury “could well have found not ‘credible that a person whose income was in the $90,000 per year range had a net worth of only $30,000.” (citation omitted)); Bassi v. Patten, 592 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s 2007 tax return in a trial scheduled to commence in January 2009 because “[evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive damages.” (citing Breeden, 665 A.2d at 941 & n.19 (D.C. 1995))), Thus, the defendants’ assertions that the most recent income information does not accurately portray Dadlani’s financial condition at the time of trial goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility."
} | 12,270,951 | a |
Plaintiff also asks this court to "seize All Bonds (Special Documents of Title UCC SS 7201, UCC SS 7202, UCC SS 8102 et seq) and-Accounts regards Me and My PERSON; wind-up the Ens Legis: WILLIAM FREDERICK KEMP JR. The Federal Circuit has explained that the Court of Federal Claims "does not have general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code\"",
"sentence": "Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the court’s jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (holding that “[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the court's jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief",
"sentence": "Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the court’s jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (holding that “[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code”)."
} | 3,998,985 | b |
As a result, the majority finds no reason to remand this ease for the Board to conduct any further development or adjudication of the appellant's claim, which, in fact, imposes the issue exhaustion requirement that Sims prohibits. With the understanding that Sims precludes such a result regardless of the appellant's failure to raise this argument below, I believe that the Court should exercise its discretion to remand this matter to the Agency for proper adjudication of the direct service connection theory in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1255, 1263",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"appellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding\"",
"sentence": "See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378-79 (allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (stating that “appellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding”); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1244 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that this Court “is not a trier of fact and is not in a position to make ... factual determination[s]”); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). I also note that it should not matter what Mr. Robinson wrote on his Substantive Appeal, as both the statute and regulation governing the content of a Substantive Appeal use only hortatory language in'telling claimants what to include."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 1378, 1378-79",
"parenthetical": "allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance",
"sentence": "See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378-79 (allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (stating that “appellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding”); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1244 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that this Court “is not a trier of fact and is not in a position to make ... factual determination[s]”); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). I also note that it should not matter what Mr. Robinson wrote on his Substantive Appeal, as both the statute and regulation governing the content of a Substantive Appeal use only hortatory language in'telling claimants what to include."
} | 5,546,038 | b |
As a result, the majority finds no reason to remand this ease for the Board to conduct any further development or adjudication of the appellant's claim, which, in fact, imposes the issue exhaustion requirement that Sims prohibits. With the understanding that Sims precludes such a result regardless of the appellant's failure to raise this argument below, I believe that the Court should exercise its discretion to remand this matter to the Agency for proper adjudication of the direct service connection theory in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 1236, 1244",
"parenthetical": "stating that this Court \"is not a trier of fact and is not in a position to make ... factual determination[s]\"",
"sentence": "See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378-79 (allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (stating that “appellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding”); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1244 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that this Court “is not a trier of fact and is not in a position to make ... factual determination[s]”); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). I also note that it should not matter what Mr. Robinson wrote on his Substantive Appeal, as both the statute and regulation governing the content of a Substantive Appeal use only hortatory language in'telling claimants what to include."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 1378, 1378-79",
"parenthetical": "allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance",
"sentence": "See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378-79 (allowing this Court to hear an argument raised before it in the first instance, assuming.the Court has jurisdiction over the claim, or remand the matter to the Board for adjudication in the first instance); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (stating that “appellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding”); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1244 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that this Court “is not a trier of fact and is not in a position to make ... factual determination[s]”); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). I also note that it should not matter what Mr. Robinson wrote on his Substantive Appeal, as both the statute and regulation governing the content of a Substantive Appeal use only hortatory language in'telling claimants what to include."
} | 5,546,038 | b |
To hold otherwise would limit EPA's ability to exercise its section 404(c) authority to situations where a state has not issued a section 401 certification. That interpretation would be inconsistent with the broad "whenever" language employed in.section 404(c), and it also does not fit within the structure of section 404, which designates EPA as the ultimate de-cisionmaker with respect to the enumerated types of environmental consequences of section 404 discharges. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "618 F.Supp. 1184, 1184",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the section 404(c) veto is to have any meaning at all, the EPA must be able to disagree with the Corps' conclusions.\"",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; Mingo Logan, 714 F.3d at 614 (“[S]ection 404(b) makes equally clear ... that the Administrator has, in effect, the final say on the specified disposal sites ‘whenever’ he makes the statutorily required ‘unacceptable adverse effect’ determination.”); see also Newport Galleria Grp., 618 F.Supp. at 1184 (“[I]f the section 404(c) veto is to have any meaning at all, the EPA must be able to disagree with the Corps’ conclusions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "714 F.3d 614, 614",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]ection 404(b) makes equally clear ... that the Administrator has, in effect, the final say on the specified disposal sites 'whenever' he makes the statutorily required 'unacceptable adverse effect' determination.\"",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; Mingo Logan, 714 F.3d at 614 (“[S]ection 404(b) makes equally clear ... that the Administrator has, in effect, the final say on the specified disposal sites ‘whenever’ he makes the statutorily required ‘unacceptable adverse effect’ determination.”); see also Newport Galleria Grp., 618 F.Supp. at 1184 (“[I]f the section 404(c) veto is to have any meaning at all, the EPA must be able to disagree with the Corps’ conclusions.”)."
} | 4,208,494 | b |
Thus, any further attempts to argue the merits of Rosete are deemed frivolous and an abuse of the judicial process. Furthermore, if Encarnado files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration)."
} | 950,830 | b |
Joseph F. Nascimento and his minor daughter Kendall E. Nascimento appeal pro se the district court's dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), of their civil rights action seeking reversal of a Montana state court decision regarding the custody of Kendall Nascimento. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 287, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case",
"sentence": "See H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 610, 613",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings",
"sentence": "See H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case)."
} | 243,883 | b |
To preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must "precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review." All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 F.3d 842, 842",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a “mental state” requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment’s failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant “did not reserve the right to challenge ‘the sufficiency of the indictment’ in other respects”); see also Cain, 155 F.3d at 842 (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "546 F.3d 416, 416",
"parenthetical": "holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a \"mental state\" requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a “mental state” requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment’s failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant “did not reserve the right to challenge ‘the sufficiency of the indictment’ in other respects”); see also Cain, 155 F.3d at 842 (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.”)."
} | 5,895,335 | b |
To preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must "precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review." All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 F.3d 842, 842",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a “mental state” requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment’s failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant “did not reserve the right to challenge ‘the sufficiency of the indictment’ in other respects”); see also Cain, 155 F.3d at 842 (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59",
"parenthetical": "noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment's failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant \"did not reserve the right to challenge 'the sufficiency of the indictment' in other respects\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a “mental state” requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment’s failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant “did not reserve the right to challenge ‘the sufficiency of the indictment’ in other respects”); see also Cain, 155 F.3d at 842 (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.”)."
} | 5,895,335 | b |
See Way I, 496 So.2d at 129. Further, during the resentencing, although the sentencing order stated that the record supported a finding that the murder was CCP, the order also stated that the trial court had not relied upon this aggravating circumstance because the State had not asserted its applicability during the resentencing proceedings. Because the jury had not been instructed on this aggravating circumstance and the trial court stated it did not consider this aggravating circumstance, even if the record does not support the imposition of this aggravating circumstance, we conclude that any error in the trial court's finding this aggravating circumstance applicable is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "681 So.2d 1112, 1118",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court did not err in finding applicable an aggravating circumstance that had not been alleged by the State and for which the jury had received no instruction",
"sentence": "See Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 293 (Fla.1993) (affirming death sentence despite the trial court’s error in finding the aggravating circumstance of CCP applicable because “if there is no likelihood of a different sentence, the error must be deemed harmless”); cf. Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112, 1118 (Fla.1996) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding applicable an aggravating circumstance that had not been alleged by the State and for which the jury had received no instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "619 So.2d 285, 293",
"parenthetical": "affirming death sentence despite the trial court's error in finding the aggravating circumstance of CCP applicable because \"if there is no likelihood of a different sentence, the error must be deemed harmless\"",
"sentence": "See Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 293 (Fla.1993) (affirming death sentence despite the trial court’s error in finding the aggravating circumstance of CCP applicable because “if there is no likelihood of a different sentence, the error must be deemed harmless”); cf. Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112, 1118 (Fla.1996) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding applicable an aggravating circumstance that had not been alleged by the State and for which the jury had received no instruction)."
} | 11,532,441 | b |
In contrast, other courts have viewed the phrase "scheduled as contractually due" as indicating the means test provided by SS 707(b) intends to capture a "snap shot" of the debtor's financial state as of the date of the petition rather than construct a forward-looking analysis of the debtor's financial situation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "373 B.R. 645, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 2668727, *6-7",
"parenthetical": "rejecting interpretation of \"scheduled\" as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining \"the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase 'scheduled as' also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase 'scheduled as' in the same sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | 3,844,993 | a |
In contrast, other courts have viewed the phrase "scheduled as contractually due" as indicating the means test provided by SS 707(b) intends to capture a "snap shot" of the debtor's financial state as of the date of the petition rather than construct a forward-looking analysis of the debtor's financial situation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 1314125, *4",
"parenthetical": "\"nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.\"",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 2668727, *6-7",
"parenthetical": "rejecting interpretation of \"scheduled\" as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining \"the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase 'scheduled as' also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase 'scheduled as' in the same sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | 3,844,993 | a |
In contrast, other courts have viewed the phrase "scheduled as contractually due" as indicating the means test provided by SS 707(b) intends to capture a "snap shot" of the debtor's financial state as of the date of the petition rather than construct a forward-looking analysis of the debtor's financial situation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 2668727, *6-7",
"parenthetical": "rejecting interpretation of \"scheduled\" as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining \"the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase 'scheduled as' also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase 'scheduled as' in the same sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 B.R. 164, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.\"",
"sentence": "See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 656 (D.Minn.2007)(“Congress did not state that the subsection at issue applied only to payments estimated to be actually paid ... [a] natural reading of subsection (iii)(I) is that it applies to payments that the debtor is under contract to make ... ”); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2006)(“nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled payments remain contractually due.”);' In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007)(“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtors’ finances at the time of filing.”); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr.W.D.Okl. 2007) (“for the purposes of the means test calculation, the debtor may deduct the payments at issue, despite her declared intent to surrender the collateral securing the debt.”); see also In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, *6-7 (N.D.Ill.2007)(rejecting interpretation of “scheduled” as referring to bankruptcy schedules, explaining “the only other place in the Bankruptcy Code that uses the phrase ‘scheduled as’ also explicitly refers to bankruptcy schedules before using the phrase ‘scheduled as’ in the same sentence.”)."
} | 3,844,993 | b |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 573, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 765, 772-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 573, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 573, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | b |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 765, 772-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
. Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that private individuals can assert the federal government's interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive's standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit\" provisions",
"sentence": "See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that Congress cannot confer the Executive’s standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through ''citizen-suit” provisions); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that private individuals can assert the federal government’s interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the government's pecuniary claim)."
} | 4,253,194 | b |
In addition, the government's evidence established that Jones once gave advice to Deshields about cooking the powder into an oil base. This evidence is sufficient to connect Jones to the conspiracy to distribute crack, even if Jones himself never sold crack. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 862, 862",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"the Government must prove the existence of a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, but upon establishing the conspiracy, only a slight connection need be made linking a defendant to the conspiracy to support a conspiracy conviction, although this connection also must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir.1993) (“It is of course elementary that one may be a member of a conspiracy ... mthout taking part in the full range of its activities. ...” (emphasis added)); see also Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (explaining that “the Government must prove the existence of a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, but upon establishing the conspiracy, only a slight connection need be made linking a defendant to the conspiracy to support a conspiracy conviction, although this connection also must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 1044, 1054",
"parenthetical": "\"It is of course elementary that one may be a member of a conspiracy ... mthout taking part in the full range of its activities. ...\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir.1993) (“It is of course elementary that one may be a member of a conspiracy ... mthout taking part in the full range of its activities. ...” (emphasis added)); see also Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (explaining that “the Government must prove the existence of a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, but upon establishing the conspiracy, only a slight connection need be made linking a defendant to the conspiracy to support a conspiracy conviction, although this connection also must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”)."
} | 431,279 | b |
That defendant officers did not know the precise "use" to which Hobbs's confession would put at the time they solicited it is of little consequence. In May 2005, "a reasonable public official interrogating a criminal suspect would have recognized that coercing a confession by abusive language and physical contact, along with coaching the suspect as to the details of the confession, clearly violates the suspect's constitutional right against self-incrimination." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2009 WL 174994, at *8",
"parenthetical": "holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in March 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder",
"sentence": "Hill, 2009 WL 174994, at *8 (holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in March 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (“a complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "267 F.3d 648, 651",
"parenthetical": "\"a complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds\"",
"sentence": "Hill, 2009 WL 174994, at *8 (holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in March 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (“a complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds”)."
} | 4,287,508 | a |
Defendants do not rely on any caselaw demonstrating that an individual who initiated contact with police does not have a right to effectively communicate with those police when they arrive on the scene. Notably, caselaw specifically addressing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act suggests that such a right may exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275",
"parenthetical": "finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | 4,130,073 | b |
Defendants do not rely on any caselaw demonstrating that an individual who initiated contact with police does not have a right to effectively communicate with those police when they arrive on the scene. Notably, caselaw specifically addressing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act suggests that such a right may exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | 4,130,073 | b |
Defendants do not rely on any caselaw demonstrating that an individual who initiated contact with police does not have a right to effectively communicate with those police when they arrive on the scene. Notably, caselaw specifically addressing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act suggests that such a right may exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275",
"parenthetical": "finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality's 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | 4,130,073 | b |
Defendants do not rely on any caselaw demonstrating that an individual who initiated contact with police does not have a right to effectively communicate with those police when they arrive on the scene. Notably, caselaw specifically addressing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act suggests that such a right may exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality's 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911",
"sentence": "See Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F.Supp.2d 863 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (denying summary judgment regarding the effectiveness of auxiliary aids provided to a deaf 911 caller after the police arrived on the scene); Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp.2d 771, 776-77 (W.D.Tex.2006) (motion to dismiss denied where deaf individual who called 911 after finding boyfriend motionless in home given that municipality’s 911 emergency response services fell within those covered by ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the scene was secure and there was no threat to human life and there was no evidence that she was a suspect in the incident for which she had called 911); see also McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1275 (M.D.Ala.2001), affirmed in part and reversed in part without published opinion by, 67 Fed.Appx. 582 (11th Cir.2003) (finding deaf individual should have been given interpreter during on-the-scene questioning)."
} | 4,130,073 | b |
NEDC notes that at least 142 structures have been allowed since the species' listing in 1999, (BiOp 18), yet no attempt was made to determine the amount of take that has resulted from those structures. It contends no accurate understanding of potential jeopardy can be made without this information. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 F.Supp.2d 121, 127",
"parenthetical": "\"The impact of an authorized incidental take cannot be determined or analyzed in a vacuum, but must necessarily be addressed in the context of other incidental take authorized by [the agency].\"",
"sentence": "See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F.Supp.2d 121, 127 (D.D.C.2001) (“The impact of an authorized incidental take cannot be determined or analyzed in a vacuum, but must necessarily be addressed in the context of other incidental take authorized by [the agency].”); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir.2008) (“It is only logical to require that the agency know roughly at what point survival and recovery will be placed at risk before it may conclude that no harm will result from ‘significant’ impairments to habitat that is already severely degraded.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "524 F.3d 917, 936",
"parenthetical": "\"It is only logical to require that the agency know roughly at what point survival and recovery will be placed at risk before it may conclude that no harm will result from 'significant' impairments to habitat that is already severely degraded.\"",
"sentence": "See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F.Supp.2d 121, 127 (D.D.C.2001) (“The impact of an authorized incidental take cannot be determined or analyzed in a vacuum, but must necessarily be addressed in the context of other incidental take authorized by [the agency].”); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir.2008) (“It is only logical to require that the agency know roughly at what point survival and recovery will be placed at risk before it may conclude that no harm will result from ‘significant’ impairments to habitat that is already severely degraded.”)."
} | 4,191,351 | a |
Subsets and Splits